The Logic of Palamism
Paweł Rojek
Institute of Philosophy, The Jagiellonian University,
ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
e-mail: pawel.rojek@uj.edu.pl
The teaching of St. Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) is usually considered
as a paradigmatic case of Eastern Christian mystical theology. It is held
that it goes beyond rational thinking and is based on antinomic premises.
Contrary to this widespread view, I try to give a consistent account of
two crucial ideas of Palamism: the distinction between essence and
energies, and the concept of deification. In doing this, I discuss and
develop some formal analyses by Pavel Florensky (1882–1937). It
proves that Palamas’ teaching is no less rational than any other
metaphysical theory. This result casts a new light on the alleged
irrational character of Eastern Christian theology, which aspect is
sometimes thought to be an obstacle in the dialog between the West and
the East.
1. Introduction
The teaching of St. Gregory Palamas (1296–1359) is widely
considered both as the peak of traditional patristic and Byzantine
theology and also as the main source of contemporary Orthodox
theology. The status of Palamas in the Christian East may be comparable
only with the position of St. Thomas Aquinas in the West. The teaching
of these two masters is often contrasted. Palamas is usually presented as
a perfect example of the dominant eastern trend of mystical theology
based on experience, whereas Aquinas is thought to be a paradigmatic
case of a typical western rational and conceptual theology. If one takes
into account that Palamas was involved into a long-lasting struggle with
Barlaam of Calabria, who was supposed to be a Thomist, the contrast
39
between these two great figures reflects difficult relationships between
the Eastern and Western Christendom.
One of the most popular opinions on Eastern Christian theology is
that it goes beyond rational thinking: at least much further than the
Western one. Indeed, many commentators suggest that the teaching of
St. Gregory Palamas cannot be squeezed into a tight schema of western
rationality. Particularly, his crucial distinction between the essence and
energies of God is often seen as antinomical, both by his critics and his
followers. Orthodox archbishop Basil Krivoshein, one of the main
advocates of Palamism in the 20th century, remarked: ‘Here we are faced
with a theological antinomy which, in view of the whole tendency of
Gregory’s teaching, must be taken to have ontological […], objective
character’ (Krivoshein 1938, p. 140). The same opinion was formulated
by Vladimir Lossky, a theologian who considerably popularized
Palamas in the West: ‘We are taken in the presence of an antinomic
theology which proceeds by oppositions of contrary but equally true
propositions’ (Lossky 1974, p. 51). Finally, archbishop Yannis Spiteris, a
contemporary Catholic scholar, warns his western readers that ‘Palamas
uses concepts, which are contradictory, though consistent in God’ and
therefore,
approaching the problem of Palamism using intellectual categories—the
attitude, which is sometimes present in discussing famous Palamitic
distinction between essence and energy—is not the best method (Spiteris
1996, p. 96).
I would like to challenge this popular view. Generally, I believe that
theology of the Eastern Church is no less rational than western thinking.
Particularly, I shall discuss here the notorious Palamistic
essence/energies distinction and the concept of deification in order to
extract deep logic underlying Palamas’ theology. It will be shown that
there is nothing especially inconsistent in Palamism. This paper
continues my attempts to provide a logical analysis of some crucial ideas
of the Orthodox theology (Roek 2010; Rojek 2010a).
I am not a pioneer in a logical analysis of Palamism. It was father
Pavel Florensky (1882–1937) who, exactly a century ago, in 1913, first
40
attempted to analyze in a formal way the Palamas’ distinction between
essence and energy (Florenskij 2000, pp. 268–274), and discuss the
logical definition of identity in the context of Orthodox teaching on
deification (Florensky 2004, pp. 53–79, 365–374). As far as I know,
after Florensky’s death in a Soviet Labor Camp in 1937, nobody
continued his project.20 Therefore, I shall take his analysis as my starting
point.
First, (§2) I will briefly present the historical background of the
discussion, dogmatization, falling into oblivion, and finally
rediscovering Palamas’ teaching. Then, I will outline the
essence/energies distinction and the concept of deification of man (§3).
The two elements of Palamism derive directly from the religious
experience in which God reveals himself and unites with man. Next, I
will undertake to analyze these two topics, starting with Florensky’s
formal remarks (§4–5). I will propose a plain formalization of
essence/energies distinction, and discuss some issues concerning identity
and indiscerniblity that are crucial for the analysis of deification. In
Conclusion, (§6) I shall highlight the specific character of Palamas’
philosophy, which falls into the category of ‘theological philosophy’
(Rojek 2009), that is a philosophy which draws its basic concepts and
axioms from theology21.
2. Historical Remarks
20
Aleksej Losev, a student and a friend of Florensky, tried to express the principles
of onomatodoxy in the terms of set theory (Losev 1997; Troickij 1997). However, I
will not discuss his views, since they need an interpretation themselves and cannot
be considered as a true logical analysis.
21
The quotations of Triads are taken from the (incomplete) English translation
(1983). The passages from Triads which have not been included in the English
edition are in my own translation based on the Russian complete edition (2003).
Due to the lack of the English edition, all the quotations of Treatises are in my own
translation based on the Russian (2007) and Polish editions (Zogas-Osadnik 2012,
pp. 257–344). I adopt the following abbreviations: Treatise I for On union and
division, Treatise II for On the divine energies and Treatise III for On deifying
participation.
41
The theory of essence and energies, however philosophically or
even physically it may sound, originally is of no philosophical nature.
The essence/energies distinction was formulated in the 14thcentury to
solve some strictly theological problems connected with religious
practice and experience of the pious Byzantine monks called hesychasts.
Strikingly enough, the teaching of Palamas was rediscovered in the 19th
century when dealing with another controversy, namely the practice of
the Orthodox monks called onomathodoxists.
2.1. Hesychasm
Hesychasts developed a technique of prayer, consisting of
concentrating mind and body in silence. Monks practising hesychasm
maintained that during long praying some of them experienced a vision
of ‘divine light’ (Krivoshein 1938; Meyendorff 1998; Mantzaridis 1984;
Spiteris 1996). This practice raises controversies in two points: first,
concerning the role of body in the spiritual life, and second, the
possibility of experiencing God. Palamas’ anthropology and metaphysics
provided a theoretical explanation of the possibility of hesychastic
religious experience.
Palamas formulated his doctrine during fierce and long-lasting
polemics with his three opponents: Barlaam of Calabria, Gregory
Akindynos and Nicefor Gregoras. The discussion started with Barlaam’s
severe criticism of hesychasts’ practice. He objected to the involvement
of body in praying, and argued that since God remains essentially
unknowable and inexperienceable, the reported light could not be divine.
Palamas, a seasoned monk from Mount Athos, retorted in his most
famous work The Triads (1983, 2003), where he argued for the integral
character of a human being on one hand, and for the distinction between
unknowable essence and knowable energies in God on the other. The
other two opponents argued not against hesychasm in general, but rather
against Palamas’ own theory, thus giving him a stimulus to clarify his
doctrine in Treatises (2007) and the final systematic work One Hundred
and Fifty Chapters (1988). As usual in Byzantium, this theological
dispute, was instantly linked with political, national, dynastic,
42
ecclesiastical and class struggles, and consequently, Palamas, as well as
his followers, got embroiled in a civil war.
Eventually, Gregory Palamas celebrated a great triumph as in 1341,
1347 and 1351, local councils in Constantinople officially confirmed his
teaching and, in turn, condemned Barlaam’s, Akindynos’ and Nicefor
Gregoras’. In 1352, the decree on Palamism was included in Synodikon,
a concise summary of Orthodox faith read out in all churches on the
second Sunday of Lent called ‘The Triumph of Orthodoxy’. As a result,
‘hesychasm and its Palamite interpretation became the official theology
of the Orthodox world’ (Bradshaw 2004, p. 235). Palamas died as the
archbishop of Thessalonica, and swiftly was canonized. The Orthodox
Church venerates him on a very prestigious day in the liturgical
calendar, namely on the third Sunday of Lent.
There are many interpretations of the controversy over hesychasm.
The Orthodox tradition likes to perceive it as a struggle between the
West and the East, Philosophy and Theology, Rationalism and
Mysticism, Paganism and Christianity. A great Russian Orthodox
philosopher, Aleksej Losev, wrote in the 1920s:
In the persons of Barlaam and Akindynos Orthodox Church has
condemned the whole Renaissance, which has just begun, and in which
all western nations engaged, perhaps to the end of their existence, since
the western man without Renaissance would not be western anymore.
Barlaamic dualism along with the grow of rationalism becomes
Cartesianism and Occasionalism; with the grow of subjectivism […] it
becomes Kantianism, and with the fall of the sense of the transcendent
becomes Positivism, etc. (Losev 1993a, pp. 872–873).
Other commentators were usually less radical, though, in general,
they saw Barlaam and Palamas as two distinct figures representing the
West and the East, as well as Reason and Faith. The debate between
them was interpreted, for example, as a clash between western thomistic
and eastern patristic theologies (Lossky 1957, pp. 76–77, 220), western
kataphatic and eastern apophatic traditions (Krivoshein 1938), western
rational and eastern experimental theology (Meyendorff 1983, p. 13;
1983, p. 139), and so on.
43
In view of new historical research, some of these opinions must be
revised. There can be no doubt that Barlaam was not an ‘eastern
thomist’; he knew scholasticism only poorly, and if he had been
influenced by some western thinkers, it would rather have been St.
Augustine than St. Thomas (Bradshaw 2004, p. 230). Some western
authors even hold that Thomism virtually agrees with Palamism
(Mascall 1971; Siemianowski 1993). At any rate, western influences on
Barlaam should not be exaggerated. The polemic between Barlaam and
Palamas, as even Lossky (1964, p. 126) finally admitted, was an internal
discussion between the two eastern traditions, not simply between the
West and the East.22
Nevertheless, scholars usually agree that the most important issue in
the debate is the role of rational thinking in theology, and most of them
would agree with Vladimir Lossky:
It was a conflict between mystical theology and a religious philosophy,
or, rather, a theology of concepts which refused to admit what seemed to
it to be an absurdity, foolishness. The God of revelation and of religious
experience was confronted with the God of the philosophers, on the
battlefield of mysticism, and, once again, the foolishness of God put to
naught the wisdom of man (Lossky 1957, p. 221).
In my opinion also this popular view should be revised. First of all,
contrary to the opinion of his opponents, Palamas was a very well
educated and capable philosopher. Before he became a monk, he studied
in Constantinople and was famous for his deep understanding of
philosophy. His biographer noted that once, on the occasion of a public
discussion on Aristotle’s logic, Palamas’ teacher exclaimed in the
presence of the emperor: ‘If Aristotle himself had been here in flesh and
blood, he would have praised him’ (Meyendorff 1998, p. 29). Even when
Palamas argued against ‘secular wisdom’, he did it with a sound
knowledge of it. The controversy with Barlaam and others was,
therefore, a struggle between two different philosophies, and not simply
between theology and philosophy. Moreover, it was Barlaam who really
22
It is interesting that Lossky removed phrases on ‘eastern Thomists’ in English
translation of his 1944 book. Cf. Lossky 1944 and Lossky 1957, pp. 76–77, 220.
44
denied human cognitive power, not Palamas, since Barlaam respected
secular sciences while holding that hat they could not give true
knowledge of God. On the contrary, Palamas did not valued human
wisdom, but was much more optimistic as regards the capacities of
human cognition. After all, a close examination of Palamas teaching
shows that there is nothing especially irrational in it, and in the
following parts of the study, I will try to prove it.
2.2. Onomathodoxy
The works of Gregory Palamas were practically forgotten for
hundreds of years. He was known solely for his popular ascetical
writings; systematical treatises were rarely read and copied. Only at the
beginning of 20th century, Orthodox philosophers and theologians
rediscovered them. Palamism quickly became an intellectual foundation
of the modern Orthodox theology, and provided it with the feeling of
distinction from the western tradition. Palamas was first rediscovered in
Russia in 1910s. The main reason was a theological controversy
concerning the status of the names of God, which broke out in some
Russian monasteries at Mount Athos (see Leskin 2004; Alfeev 2007).
Religious practice of pious monks of Athos again became a trigger
for a theological debate. Onomathodoxists (imâslavcy) claimed that
since the names of Gods were divine energies, therefore they were God
himself. This belief, which was only a newer version of Palamism, was
discussed and condemned by some Orthodox authorities. Father Pavel
Florensky wrote a foreword to a book by a monk Anthony, one of the
onomathodoxists’ leaders, in which he noticed a similarity between
onomathodoxy and the teaching of Gregory Palamas (Florenskij 2000, p.
287–294). This issue was discussed by some Moscow philosophers, who
subsequently prepared extensive works on this topic (Florenskij 2000, p.
104–363; Losev 1993a, pp. 865–900; 1993b, pp. 613–880; Bulgakov
1999; cf. Leskin 2008; Obolevitch 2011). This philosophical activity
initiated the ‘vogue for Palamism’ among Russian lay intellectuals. Fr.
Basil Lourié, an Othodox theologian and a severe critic of Florensky,
admitted: ‘With no doubt traces of that vogue lead to Florensky as a
source’ (Lur’e 1997, p. 340).
45
This philosophical interest in Palamism evoked a reaction of
professional theologians. Basil Krivosheine, a Russian learned monk of
Mount Athos, published in 1930s an influential essay on the thought of
Palamas (Krivoshein 1938). Vladimir Lossky, during World War II,
gave the famous lectures on mystical theology, in which he praised
Palamas’ teaching23. However, the real turning point was a great work of
John Meyendorff, who prepared the first modern edition of The Triads
and an extensive introduction to the doctrine of Palamas (Meyendorff
1998). From this moment on, St. Gregory Palamas acquired in the
Orthodox theology a position comparable to that of St. Thomas Aquinas
in Catholicism. This parallel is not so surprising if one takes into account
that Lossky and Meyendorff were students of Etienne Gilson, one of the
leaders of the 20th century Neothomism.
3. The Teaching of Palamas
The aim of Gregory Palamas was an explanation of the following
two related facts: revelation and deification. Both have religious
character and are specific to Christianity. Palamas was not interested in
general natural theology but rather tried to construct special metaphysics
for Christian experience and hope. His question was: ‘What should the
world be like since revelation and deification are possible?’ Since the
concept of personal God, in general, and the concepts of revelation and
deification, in particular, do not fit in a classical philosophical
conceptual scheme, Palamas decided to introduce some metaphysical
innovations, such as the essence/energies distinction.
3.1. Two Religious Facts
Christian understanding of personal God assumes that although God
is essentially unknowable for human beings, he may decide to reveal
himself in the world. Therefore, Christianity goes beyond negative
23
Agnieszka witkiewicz (1997, p. 156) noticed a ‘great convergence, and at some
points even identity’ between texts by Krivoshein and Lossky. Indeed, Lossky
relied on Krivoshein’s interpretation and often simply repeated passages from his
work.
46
theology, and asserts that God may decide to manifest Himself. This
specific concept of revelation is expressed, for instance, by St. John:
‘No one has ever seen God; the only Son […] he has made him known’
(John 1:18).
Similar statements might be found elsewhere in the Scriptures. Even
in the Old Testament, though God says that ‘man shall not see me and
live’ (Ex 33:20), God ‘used to speak to Moses face to face’ (Ex 33:11).
Ultimately, the destination of man is a full revelation of God. ‘We know
that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is’
(1 John 3:2).
This last statement leads to the question of deification. Personal God
may not only be manifest, but also may unite himself with human
beings. Christian salvation is thought exactly as a kind of union with
God. St. Peter used once quite a philosophical expression:
he [Jesus our Lord] has granted to us his precious and very great
promises, that […] you may […] become partakes of the divine nature (2
Pet 1:4).
This union of man and God was described in Scripture in many
ways, for instance as being ‘the temple of God’ (2 Cor 6:16), ‘children
of God’ (John 1:12; Gal 4:7), ‘heirs of God’ (Rom 8:17; Gal 4:7), and
finally simply ‘gods’ (John 10: 34). The patristic tradition introduced a
special word for this union: deification (theosis) (Mantzaridis 1984).
God, though remains essentially inaccessible, may share himself with
the creatures.
Christian revelation and deification were not only theoretical
premises for Palamas, they were realities experienced by monks of
Mount Athos. Hesychasts believed that during their prayers God truly
revealed Himself and really deified them. The teaching and experience
of the Church was, therefore, the starting point of Palamas’ theology.
In order to explain the possibility of revelation and deification,
Palamas introduced the distinction between essence and energies. God
not only consists of one essence and three hypostases, but also of one
47
essence and many energies, perhaps infinite number of them. Energies
are distinct, yet not separable from essence. Being such, they are really
God himself, though are not God’s essence. God therefore has the
unknowable and inaccessible essence, and knowable and accessible
energies.
Hence, energies play a double role in Palamas’ ontology. On one
hand, revelation consists of energies’ manifestation, and on the other,
deification means sharing the energies. Now, I would like to analyze
these two aspects in details.
3.2. The Essence/Energies Distinction
The distinction between essence and energy was not really invented
by Palamas. The concept of energy had been more or less explicitly used
by the Greek Church Fathers before, not to mention Aristotle (Bradshaw
2004). Palamas himself willingly admitted his debt to Saint Dionysius,
St. Basil and St. Maximus the Confessor. Moreover, local
Constantinopolitan synod, in 1351, officially linked the essence/energies
distinction with the teaching of the Sixth Council on two energies in
Christ (Losev 1993a, p. 895). ‘It would be no exaggeration to say that
patristic tradition had already formulated such a teaching in a general
form, and that Palamas merely took it to its furthest conclusions’
(Mantzaridis 1984, p. 105). Nevertheless, during the heated discussions
with opponents, Palamas developed such a detailed account of
essence/energy distinction as no one has ever before.
The distinction between essence and energies seems, in fact, quite
intuitive. Things manifest themselves. It is plausible to suppose that
manifestations (energies) of a thing are not exhaustive. There probably is
always something hidden in a thing (essence), the rest which has not
been actually manifested. One thing can have many different
manifestations depending on specific circumstances in which they are
produced. As Pavel Florensky formulated it:
Being has its inner side, in which it turns to itself without involving
anything else, and an outer side, in which it turns to other beings. These
are two sides, but they are not joined to each other since they are primary
48
unity; they are one and the same being, though turned to different
directions. […] In patristic terminology these two sides of being are
called essence or substance, ousia, and act or energy, energeia
(Florenskij 2000, p. 255).
Energies ‘manifest’ (Triads III, 2, 7), ‘present’ (II, 12), ‘express’ (II,
14) the essence. They ‘characterize or present [the essence], though do
not present what it is, that is what it is as regard to essence’ (II, 23).
Essence, though is ‘present’ in each of the energies (Triads III, 2, 7;
Treatises III, 3), nevertheless ‘transcendents’ (Triads III, 2, 7) and
‘surpassess’ (Treatises II, 19) all its energies.
What are energies after all? Palamas understood them very broadly,
apparently uniting a few traditional ontological categories under one
label. David Bradshaw (2004, p. 273) indicated that it encompassed at
least three categories: ‘realities’, ‘attributes’ and ‘operations’. For
instance, in the case of God, energies include realities such as uncreated
light or the gifts of the Spirit, attributes such as infinity, immortality,
life, and, finally, some operations like the act of creating, providence and
foreknowledge. Realities seem to be separate things, while attributes are
plainly inseparable and dependent, whereas operations presumably
presuppose causality. Is there a common mark of all these categories?
One way to look at Palamas is as inviting us to reconceive what have
traditionally been regarded as distinct categories […] as species within a
broader genus, that of acts of self-manifestation (Bradshaw 2004, p.
273).
Indeed, Palamas introduces quite a new general category, and as yet
there is no reason to object to it.
It is worth comparing Palamitic notion of energy with the traditional
concept of accident. Palamas himself did it in a few passages, pointing
out both similarities and dissimilarities. As John Meyendorff remarked,
Nothing shows Palamas’s main preoccupation better than these
hesitations; that preoccupation was to free theology from Aristotle’s
philosophic categories which were clearly inadequate worthily to express
the Mystery (Meyendorff 1998, p. 225).
49
This also shows best, in my opinion, his strenuous attempts to
formulate a new, more adequate category.
There are three crucial features of accidents (symbebekos):
dependency, contingency and non-coextensivity (Brunschwig 1991).
Contrary to substances (ousia), accidents are dependent constituents of a
thing; contrary to properties (idion), they need not to belong to the
substance and are not specific for just one species. What about energies?
John Meyendorff (1998, p. 225) referred to the following passages from
Palamas:
[energy] is neither essence, nor accident, and if some theologians have
used the word “accident” that was only to show that everything in God is
not essence (Capita, 127);
accident does not always exist; energy is similar to accident in this
respect since it does not always act, as well as does not always not act.
Therefore energies resemble accidents in that respect, that might create
or not create, but differ from accidents in this, that they cannot not exist
(Against Akindynos VI, 21);
God […] is able to grant the Wisdom and actually grants it […] and He
possesses it not as a property, but only as energy (Against Gregoras II).
It seems that these statements correspond, in turn, with the three
abovementioned features of accidents. First, exactly like accidents,
energies exist in a thing. Second, they differ from accidents in respect of
contingency. In some sense, energies are contingent, in the other, they
are necessary. Palamas distinguished an energeia from the
corresponding dynamis. Energeia is the use of dynamis (Bradshaw 2004,
p. 239). Palamas wrote: ‘there is a beginning and end, if not of the
creative power itself, then at least of its action’ (Triads III, 2, 8). Both
energeia in this narrower sense and dynamis are energies in a general
sense. Energies may begin and end only as a temporal realization of
necessarily existing dynamis. In short, energeia resembles in this aspect
accident, while dynamis is more like property. Third, it seems that
energies are not specific for one species only, and can characterize other
beings. Divine wisdom, for instance, may be transferred to human
50
beings, so it is not a property in a strict Aristotelian sense. The
similarities and differences might be summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.Energies and Aristotle’s categories.
Dependent
Accident
(symbebekos)
+
Property
(idion)
+
Contingent
+
—
Coextensive
—
+
Energy
(energeia)
+
—
(as dynamis)
+
(as energeia)
—
This brief comparison reveals, I believe, that Palamas wanted to
adjust traditional philosophical concepts to his purposes. Energies, in
some sense, are more dynamic than properties and more static than
accidents. One of the most important advantages of the category of
energy is that it embraces natural as well as voluntary manifestations,
and therefore fits in the concept of personal God.
The attributes-energies, to St. Gregory Palamas, by no means are abstract
concepts applicable to the divine essence, but living and personal forces,
[…] manifestations of personal God (Lossky 1974, p. 57).
Apparently, though Palamas went beyond the inherited
philosophical tradition, he tried to adapt it to a new content, and not
simply to abandon it.
I have presented the essence/energies distinction as a perfectly
general ontological account. I think that there is strong evidence for this
interpretation. Palamas taught: ‘The natural energy is the power which
manifests every essence, and only nonbeing is deprived of this power’
(Triads III, 2, 7); ‘no nature can exist […], unless it possesses an
essential energy’ (Triads III, 3, 6; see also e.g. Treatises II, 14, 24).
According to Palamas, all beings have its essence and energies; God is
51
only one of the applications of this general distinction. We nevertheless
owe theology the proper formulation of this distinction.
Some commentators suggested, however, that either the
essence/energies distinction is applicable to God only or this distinction,
in the case of God, somehow differs from the other case. On one hand,
Basil Krivoshein insisted:
The distinction between substance [i.e. essence] and energy is quite
different from ordinary, logically definable and classifiable distinctions
which exist between created objects. More than ever, here, we must
remember the antinomism of our conception of God, which does not fit
into the ordinary framework of logic (Krivoshein 1938, p. 143).
On the other, Yannis Spiteris held:
We should not apply concepts of essence and energy to God in a general
meaning delivered by human reason. We might apply these concepts to
God only in a metaphorical way (Spiteris 1996, p. 55).
Both these limitations seem to me unnecessary. Palamas adopted a
downward methodology. He formulated the concept of energy for the
particular case of God, and then used it for other cases. Therefore, we
should not hesitate to apply it to creatures as well as God. This point was
clearly formulated by Pavel Florensky:
all intellectual efforts of Palamas and his followers were historically
focused on a restricted domain, but in fact the principles stated by
Palamists concern an immensely broader field than it might seem at first
glance; indeed, it is difficult to determine where they have no application
(Florenskij 2000, p. 272).
Palamas frequently repeated that energies are ‘not identical’ with
essence, (Triads I, 3, 23) nor ‘distinct’ (Treatises II, 12), though
‘inseparable’ (Triads III, 2, 13; II, 3, 15; III, 1, 34; III, 2, 20; II, 3, 37;
III, 1, 24; Treatises II, 28, 32) from it. ‘It is impossible to separate from
acting nature […] its corresponding powers and energies, even though
they differ from it in other ways’ (Treatises I, 10).
52
Being distinct, and yet inseparable, is a mark of non-substantial
entities. In fact, energies are not, as Palamas often said, ‘hypostatic’ but
‘enhypostatic’, that is they need to be connected with a hypostasis
(Triads II, 3, 6; III, 1, 9; III, 1, 18; III, 2, 23; Treatises II, 10). In other
words, energies are ontologically dependent on their essence. That is
why they are so tightly connected with essence; dependency is the best
known ‘ontological glue’ (Mertz 1996). Dependent entities are exactly
distinct, yet not separable entities.
Palamas, in many passages, pointed at the ontological dependency
of the energies.
Energy descends from essence, not essence from energy. The former is a
cause, the latter is an effect; the former exists on its own, the latter does
not exists on its own (Treatises II, 10).
He [God] gives them [energies] existence, but He does not receive its
existence from them (Triads III, 2, 25).
Finally, essence and energies are analogous to Sun and sunbeams.
‘There is not even a trace left after sunlight when the Sun is set’
(Treatises I, 30).
The relation between essence and its energies should not be
conflated with causality. Cause and effect need not coexist, whereas
energies actually depend on essence. Palamas on many occasions wrote
that essence ‘produces’ (Triads III, 1, 23), ‘creates’ (Treatises II, 44)
energies, or that energies ‘follow’ (Treatises II, 26) from essence.
However, sometimes he also maintained that essence ‘causes’ energies
(Triads III, 2, 7; Treatises II, 19). Commentators rightly pointed out that
he did not understand this kind of causality in a usual way.
The energies are not effects of the divine cause, as creatures are; they are
not created, formed ex nihilo, but flow eternally from the one essence of
the Trinity (Lossky 1957, p. 73; see also Krivoshein 1938, p. 143).
Palamas has also stressed the difference between the creation of
things and producing energies. He devoted to this topic the whole
treatise On the divine energies. ‘Created beings are not processions [i.e.
53
energies], […] but effects of God’s processions’ (Treatises I, 7); ‘a
creature is an effect of divine energies not the energies themselves’
(Treatises III, 19).
Palamas insisted that since essence and energies are not separable,
they do not, strictly speaking, make a whole. Things are not
mereologically compounded of essence and energies. ‘That what
appears, or can be thought of, or can be given [i.e. energies] is not a part
of God’ (Treatises III, 6). Nor ‘elements’ are of God’s nature (Treatises
II, 23), since ‘no being is composed of its own acts’ (Treatises III, 25).
He asked rhetorically: ‘What kind of whole can be built by a mover and
moving, that is by acting principle and its energy?’ (Treatises I, 22).
It is interesting to notice that Palamas’ distinction strikingly
resembles the classical scholastic notion of formal distinction (Tweedale
1991). According to some medieval western philosophers, beings may
be conceptually different, yet really inseparable. Conceptual difference
means that things have different definitions, belong to diverse
categories. Exactly the same definition may be found in Palamas: ‘We
do not treat the unity of essence and energies as if they had the same
meaning, but as something inseparable’ (Treatises II, 8). This
coincidence calls into question the thesis on specificity of the
essence/energy distinction. However it does not deny originality neither
to Palamas, nor Scotus. There could hardly be any intellectual exchange
between the learned monks in the East and the West.
Some Orthodox commentators tried to moderate somehow this
coincidence. Basil Krivosheine (1938, p. 152), for instance, eventually
admitted that essence/energy distinction corresponds to scholastic
distinctio realia minor, but ‘very relatively’ and ‘very inexactly’. At the
same time, he understood Palamitic distinction as a pragmatike diakrisis,
that is a real (not mental—kat’epinoein) distinction (not separation—
diairesis). This is precisely meant by scholastic formal distinction. It
seems there really is no gap between the eastern and the western
distinction.
The distinction between essence and energies was introduced by
Gregory Palamas to explain the possibility of experiencing God in
hesychastic praying. Indeed, hesychasts could contemplate God himself,
though not in His inaccessible, divine essence, but in knowable,
54
uncreated energies. It is so because divine energies are no less divine
than divine essence. Energies ‘are not out of God’ (Treatises I, 32), they
are ‘God Himself, though not in the respect of the essence’ (Treatises I,
15, 32). ‘God is entirely present in each of the divine energies’ (Triads
III, 2, 7). Therefore, both the essence and the energies might be ‘named
with the same words’ (Treatises II, 4).
The energies or divine acts belong to the existence of God himself; they
represent his existence for us. It is therefore not only justified but
necessary to apply thereto the attributes proper to the divine Being; they
are God (theos) and Deity (theotes) (Meyendorff 1998, p. 217–218).
3.3. The Metaphysics of Deification
The essence/energies distinction was formulated not only for the
explanation of the possibility of revelation; the most fundamental truth
for Palamas, as well as to the whole the Eastern Christian tradition in
general, was the reality of deification (Meyendorff 1983, p. 2). The
whole Palamas’ theory was, in fact, an attempt to provide ontological
explanation of the mystical union with God.
By his doctrine on […] divine energies Gregory Palamas gives an
indestructible theological foundation to the traditional mystical teaching
of the Orthodox Church, since only on the basis of this doctrine is it
possible to consistently assert the reality of the communion between God
and man […] without falling into the pantheistic confusion of creature
with Creator (Krivoshein 1938, p. 207).
According to Palamas, the union with God is at the same time the
highest cognition of God (Mantzaridis 1984, p. 114–115). Strictly
speaking, this way of knowing has no intellectual character. Palamas
understood deification as a real transformation of human being in which
man ontologically unites with God. Becoming an object of knowing is,
however, definitely the best way to know.
What is the ontological mechanism of deification? It appears that
Palamas formulated a considerably innovating and illuminating solution.
He noticed once:
55
dwelling of the light of grace in a soul is not a simple connection […] but
amazing internal communion, in some sense inexpressible and
unparalleled (First Letter to Barlaam 43, Spiteris 1996, p. 84).
Before Palamas, patristic theology developed two distinct concepts
of union—namely essential union of divine Persons in the Trinity and
the hypostatic union of two essences in Christ. Palamas proposed a third
solution. God and man unite neither by essence, nor by hypostasis, but
by energies.
God in His completeness deifies those who are worthy of this, by uniting
Himself with them, not hypostatically—that belonged to Christ alone—
nor essentially, but through […] energies (Against Akindynos V, 26,
Meyendorff 1983, p. 164; cf. Lossky 1957, p. 87).
It is worth noticing that such analysis of eternal life seems to differ
significantly from the theory of mere beatific vision developed in the
western theology (Bradshaw 2004).
According to Dionysius the Areopagite (CH I, 3; cf. Treatises III,
7), deification (theosis) consists of both assimilation (aphomoiosis) and
unification (enosis). Palamas carefully distinguished these two concepts.
He perceived assimilation as a result of man’s own effort to imitate God.
It consists of ascetics and virtuous life. All Christian moral teaching
concerns the way in which man can imitate their divine example.
Nevertheless, Palamas insisted, that assimilation is only a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition of deification (Treatises III, 7; see also
Krivoshein 1938, p. 72; Mantzaridis 1984, p. 88). The main reason for
this was the fact that imitation is a human action, whereas deification is a
gift of divine grace. As St Paul said, ‘[God] saved us […] not in virtue of
works but in virtue of his own purpose and the grace’ (2 Tim 1:9).
Hence, Palamas taught:
Every virtue and imitation of God on our part, indeed, prepares those
who practise them for divine union, but the mysterious union itself is
effected by grace (Triads III, 1, 27; italics mine).
56
The crucial component of deification is unification. Palamas
understood the union of man and God as sharing by man divine energies.
God, while remaining entirely in Himself, dwells entirely in us by His
superessential power; and communicates to us not His nature, but His
proper glory and splendor (Triads I, 3, 23).
‘Power’, ‘glory’ and ‘splendor’ are obviously names of divine
energies. Deified man is endowed with divine energies, which become
his own energies. Human being retains their created human essence and
obtains uncreated divine energies.
The divine life […] belongs to the divine nature even when man benefit
from it (by grace, not by nature); hence it constitutes the means of a
communion both personal and real with God, a communion which does
not involve the impossible confusion of the natures (Meyendorff 1998, p.
217).
Thus, in some specific sense, man partially becomes a God. As
Palamas put it:
He who achieves deification is fittingly defined by both: he is on the one
hand unoriginate, eternal and heavenly […] on account of the uncreated
grace that eternally derives from eternal God; he is on the other a new
creation and a new man […] on account of himself and his own nature
(Reply to Akindynos III, 6, 15, Mantzaridis 1984, p. 112).
Palamas quoted with approval St. Maximus’ phrase:
The one, who is considered worthy of it, by grace would be everything
that God is by nature, save only the identity of nature (Treatises II, 34;
cf. Lossky 1957, p. 87).
Therefore, it may be said that ‘them, who participate in energies and
act in accordance with them, through God’s grace are made gods with no
beginning and no end’ (Third Letter against Akindynos, Spiteris 1996, p.
78).
57
The possibility of human deification is given through Christ in the
Church (Mantzaridis 1984, pp. 41–60; Meyendorff 1983, pp. 163–164).
The human nature assumed by Christ was deified first due to the
hypostatic union. Now, thanks to Sacraments, people are able to
participate in that nature and to be endowed by divine energies.
To Palamas, the communion of the sacraments signifies the union with
the human nature of Logos of God, which, united hypostatically with the
second person of the Trinity, was deified and became the source of
deification to man (Mantzaridis 1984, p. 54).
In the result of a sacramental life, ‘Christ’s uncreated life and
energy become the property of the man who is united with Him, and in
whose person Christ himself lives and operates’ (Mantzaridis 1984, p.
128).
4. Ontological Dependency, Relational Order and Energies
In this part, I would like to present some formal analyses of
Palamas’ teaching. As I noticed in §1, Father Pavel Florensky attempted
this a century ago. It should be highlighted that his analyses were in fact
one of the first applications of contemporary logic to the traditional
metaphysics. Now, I would like to discuss and develop some of his
ideas. The first one concerns the formal analysis of essence/energy
distinction as a kind of ontological dependency.
4.1. Florensky’s Analysis
In 1913, archbishop Nikon published a critical assessment of
onomathodoxy. Pavel Florensky prepared an extensive commentary on
Nikon’s paper, aimed at defending the monks of Athos. In one place of
this commentary, Florensky sketched in a margin note a logical analysis
of onomathodoxy (Florenskij 2000, p. 316). Though the commentary has
not been published yet, the logical analysis sketch was developed further
in §10 of the fundamental paper ‘Onomathodoxy as a Philosophical
Principle’ in 1922 (ibidem, pp. 272–274). Florensky tried to give a
58
concise formalization of the basic idea of Palamism. In order to do it, he
formulated all possible positions in the debate on essence and energies.
‘There are four abstract possible analyses of essence and energy relation,
which may be formalized by four double logical inclusions’ (ibidem,
273). Let ‘A’ represent the energy, ‘B’ represent the essence. Florensky
formalized possible types of interconnections between them in the
following way (I intentionally leave Florensky’s old-fashioned notation
without any changes):
(F1)
(F2)
(F3)
(F4)
A ⊃ B : B ⊃ A,
A ⊃ −B : B ⊃ A,
A ⊃ −B : B ⊃ −A,
A ⊃ B : B ⊃ −A.
Florensky characterized (F1) as ‘immanentism,’ (F2) as ‘extreme
positivism,’ (F3) as ‘Kantianism,’ and, finally, (F4) as ‘Platonism.’
Immanentism conflates energy and essence, extreme positivism denies
the possibility of revelation of essence, and Kantianism entirely breaks
the connection between these two realities. Platonism, which is,
according to Florensky, identical in this respect with Palamism, holds
that energy ‘presents the reality itself,’ ‘really exposes the essence,’
though ‘does not exhaust completely the reality, which appears,’ since
essence is ‘not reducible to phenomena’ due to its being ‘an independent
reality’ (Florenskij 2000, p. 274). Florensky believed that (F4) is the
proper formulation of these intuitions.
The logical core of theological disputes in the 14th and 19th centuries
boils down to only this epistemological formula. […] This is the general
sense of onomathodoxy as a philosophical principle (ibidem, p. 274).
Unfortunately, the formula (F4) raises at least three serious doubts.
First, it is not clear what the letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ really stand for. Do they
represent propositions, concepts or rather objects? Florensky wrote
ambiguously that the ‘terms of thinking’ may be equally propositions
and concepts (Florenskij 2000, p. 272; cf. Florensky 2004, pp. 425–426).
Second, how should the symbol ‘⊃‘ be understood? Florensky
59
characterized the relation between A and B both as ‘implication’ and
‘inclusion’ (Florenskij 2000, p. 273), but perhaps he really meant some
other relation? Finally, it is unclear whether the sign of negation stands
in the right place.
I shall start with the last problem. It seems obvious that, regardless
the particular interpretation of the symbols, the negation should stand in
de dicto, not in de re position. For now, the formula proposed by
Florensky is simply defective. The modern version of (F4) would be
(P1)
(A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ ¬A).
It seems that this formula plainly fails to capture the meaning of
Palamism in Florensky’s informal interpretation. It means that if A, then
B, and if B, then not-A. Therefore, it denies the very existence of energy.
This result may be obtained in a formal way. By the law of transitivity of
implication it follows from (P1) that
(1)
A ⊃ ¬A.
The formula (1) may be true if and only if A is false. Hence,
Palamism would be true if and only if there were no energies at all. It
evidently contradicts Florensky’s intention. Formulas (F2) and (F3) face
the same problem. The formal interpretation proposed by Florensky is
somehow too strong since it implies that there is no energy or essence at
all. Therefore, I propose to change the position of negation to de dicto.
Formula (P1) should be formulated in the following way:
(P2)
(A ⊃ B) ∧ ¬(B ⊃ A).
If A, then B, and it is not the case that if B then A. Florensky had a
well known passion for the use of logical and mathematical formulas.
Unfortunately, they are quite often inaccurate or simply mistaken. In the
Polish edition of his works, it was necessary to make numerous
corrections of obvious mistakes in the text (Florenski 2009, pp. 35, 37,
38, 181, 183, 184). It is hard to say whether these mistakes were made
60
by Florensky or by his editors. At any rate, I think that (F2)–(F4) is a
case which should be corrected in this way.
My proposal of this correction (Rojek 2010b, p. 54) evoked a
criticism of Bogdan Strachowski (Strachowski 2010, p. 194; cf. Rojek
2010c). He pointed out that changing the place of negation in the case of
(F3) leads to contradiction. The modified de dicto Kantianism runs as
follows:
(2)
¬(A ⊃ B) ∧ ¬(B ⊃ A)
This formula is inconsistent since the thesis of logic is that (A ⊃ B)
∨ (B ⊃ A). Therefore, according to Strachowski, one should seek a
different way to make Florenski consistent. Indeed, a mere change of the
negation’s place is not sufficient for a uniform and consistent
interpretation of Florensky’s formalizations. I think that what is really
needed here is a modal logic which would secure the consistency of de
dicto interpretation of (F3). I shall come back to this problem in §4.2.
I would like to roughly sketch two different interpretations of
Florensky’s analysis. The first one takes ‘A’ and ‘B’ as names of
propositions and ‘⊃‘ as an implication. The second interprets ‘A’ and ‘B’
as names of objects and ‘⊃‘ as a specific relation between energy and
essence. Both interpretations assume that the negation should stand in de
dicto position.
4.2. Dependency Interpretation
Florensky suggested that the formula ‘A⊃B’ means ‘if there is
energy, there is essence’ (Florenskij 2000, p. 272). Thus, ‘A’ and ‘B’
should be read as existential propositions: ‘there is energy’ and ‘there is
essence’. On the ground of this interpretation, (P2) would be an assertion
of one-sided ontological dependency between energy and essence. The
existence of energy presupposes the existence of essence, whereas the
existence of energy does not presuppose the existence of energy.
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The formula (P2) may be further improved to go along Florensky’s
intention more precisely. It seems plausible to insert modal concepts into
the formula:
(P3)
□(A ⊃ B) ∧ ¬□(B ⊃ A).
Necessarily, if there is energy, then there is also essence, and not
necessarily, if there is essence, there is energy. This formula expresses
exactly the ontological dependency in proper modal terms. Florensky
could not use the modal concept as modal formal logic was not invented
at that time yet.
The advantage of the modal reformulation of Florensky’s
formalization is that it gives a uniform and consistent interpretation of
Kantianism (Rojek 2010b, p. 211). Now, the corrected and modalized
version of (F3) is the following:
(3)
¬□(A ⊃ B) ∧¬□(B ⊃ A),
that is, after some obvious transformations,
(4)
◊(A ∧ ¬B) ∧ ◊(B ∧ ¬A).
These formulas do not lead to contradiction since, though ◊(A ∧ B)
⊃ ◊A ∧ ◊B is a thesis of standard modal logic, the reversed implication
◊A ∧ ◊B ⊃ ◊(A ∧ B) is not. Kantianism holds that energies and essences
might exist independently. Energies do not necessarily reveal, and
essences do not necessarily manifest themselves. There may be energies
without corresponding essences and essences without energies. I think
that this modal description closely fits in Florensky’s intuitions.
The sense of Palamism may be even more accurately captured in
modal quantifier calculus. The principle of Palamism can be
reformulated as follows:
(P4)
x<y),
□(∃x En(x) ⊃ ∃y Es(y) ∧ x<y) ∧¬□(∃x Es(x) ⊃ ∃y En(y) ∧
62
where ‘En(x)’ stands for ‘x is energy’, ‘Es(x)’—‘x is essence’, and
‘x<y’—’x is energy of y’. Perhaps, instead of essence, one should speak
about hypostases, which are ultimate substrates of both energies, and
essence, but I will not develop this topic here (see Triads III, 2, 12;
Meyendorff 1998, pp. 213, 214–215).
Now, are these refined Florensky’s formulas appropriate? Do they
express the Palamitic distinction between essence and energies well? I
shall focus, in turn, on the two terms of Florensky’s formula, namely on
the one asserting the dependency of energy on essence, and the second
asserting the independency of essence on energy.
First, with no doubt, as I indicated above in § 3.2, Palamas held that
energies ontologically depend on essence. The existence of energy
presupposes the existence of correspondent essence. Nevertheless, it
seems that standard ontological dependency captured in Florensky’s
formalization is not sufficient for a proper analysis of Palamas’
distinction. On the ground of this interpretation, there would be no
difference between energies and effects of essence. For example, the
divine grace, as well as the world, equally would not exist without the
existence of God’s essence; the difference is that energies, contrary to
effects, are inseparable from essence. Thus, the proper formalization of
essence/energies distinction should adopt a more sophisticated concept
of ontological dependency.
It seems that such a concept was formulated by a Polish
phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden (1964), who distinguished ‘non-selfsufficiency’ (‘Unselbständigkeit’) on one hand, and ‘dependence’
(‘Abhängigkeit’) on the other.24 Non-self-sufficient beings need some
other beings for their existence; dependent beings are not-self-sufficient
but, moreover, must also belong to the other being. Effects may be
thought as simply non-self-sufficient, whereas energies seem to be
dependent in the Ingardenian sense.
Second, as I argued above, essence is not entirely independent of
energy, otherwise energies would simply be accidents. Energy as
dynamis is essential for essence. The essence cannot exist without
24
I modify the English translation of Ingarden’s terminology (Ingarden 1964),
which is very misleading.
63
having its natural dynamis, though dynamis is not essence. On the
contrary, energy as a realization of potency is accidental in relation to
essence. Therefore, Florensky’s analysis holds only for acts, not for the
potencies.
4.3. Relational Interpretation
I would like to show that at least one more interpretation of
Florensky’s formalization is possible. Bogdan Strachowski (2010, p.
197) suggested to treat ‘A’ and ‘B’ as names of objects, not propositions,
and ‘⊃‘ as a sign of a specific ontological, not just logical implication.
Now, I would like to follow his suggestion and sketch a relational
interpretation of Palamism.
The natural basis of this interpretation is the primitive relation ‘is
energy of’. The plausible reformulation of the principle of Palamism
would be as follows:
(P5)
∀x∀y (x<y) ⊃ ¬(y<x).
This formula states that if x is energy of y, then y is not energy of x.
It is a clear indication that the relation of being energy is not
symmetrical. What are the other formal properties of this relation? From
(P5) it follows that it is also irreflexive:
(5)
∀x¬(x<x).
It seems clear also that < is transitive:
(6)
∀x∀y (x<y) ∧ (y<z) ⊃ (x<z).
Therefore, < would be a relation of sharp order. Essences and
energies may be defined as simple and co-simple elements of an ordered
set 〈U, <〉:
(7)
Ess(x) ≡ ¬∃y(x<y),
64
(8)
En(x) ≡ ¬∃y(y<x).
The existence of the root of the 〈U, <〉 would mean that everything
is energy of one object, presumably God. Palamas insisted, however,
that there is a difference between being energy and effect, and that the
creations are not divine energies. Therefore, in Palamitic universes there
would be no root of the relation <.
Perhaps the other set of formal properties would be more adequate
for Palamism. The basic relation can be understood more broadly as
‘being energy or being identical.’ That would be a relation of unsharp
order ≤. The modified principle of Palamism would assert that:
(P6)
∀x∀y (x≤y) ⊃ ¬(y≤x) ∨ x=y,
therefore, ≤ would be of anti-symmetrical character:
(9)
∀x∀y (x≤y) ∧ (x≤y) ⊃ x=x.
The relation ≤ would also be reflexive and transitive:
(10)
(11)
∀x(x≤x),
∀x∀y (x≤y) ∧ (y≤z) ⊃ (x≤z).
The definitions of essence and energies would be as follows:
(12)
(13)
Ess(x) ≡ ¬∃y (y≠x ∧ x≤y),
En(x) ≡ ¬∃y (y≠x ∧ y≤x).
The analysis of the essence/energies distinction in terms of unsharp
order makes it possible to express this distinction within the well known
logical calculus. The same formal properties have, for instance, ‘ε‘ in
Stanisław Le niewski’s ‘ontology’ (Słupecki 1955), ‘ontological
connection’ in Jerzy Perzanowski’s (1996) ‘ontologics’, or ‘Moda’ in
Vyacheslav Moiseev’s ‘projectively modal ontology’ (Moiseev 2002;
2010, pp. 243–308).
65
5. Identity, Indiscernibility and Deification
As I indicated, the essence/energies distinction was introduced by
Palamas mainly for the explanation of the nature of deification.
Florensky suggested that deification might be understood as identity of
properties; this leads him to the rejection of the Principle of Identity of
Indiscernibles. I shall follow his idea and point out two problems of the
deification theory.
5.1. Florensky on Identity
According to Basil Lourié (Lur’e 1997, p. 339), Pavel Florensky
discovered the teaching of Gregory Palamas only after the Athos
dispute. The search for arguments in support of the revolted monks lead
him to Palamas’ writings. There is almost no evidence of Florensky’s
acquaintance with Palamas’s writings in the earlier works. In The Pillar
and Ground of the Truth (2004), the most important of Florensky’s
books, Palamas is mentioned only in a few footnotes. Nevertheless, in
that work Florensky outlined an interpretation of the patristic notion of
deification. True, Florensky did not relate his analysis directly to
Palamas and neglected the essence/energy distinction, but his
interpretation seems to be very close to the core of Palamas’ teaching.
In Chapter V of The Pillar and Ground of the Truth (2004, p. 53–
59), Florensky analyzed the concept of love. To him, love—primarily
love between God and man—is not a mere psychological attitude, but an
genuine ontological process. Love is a real unification of lovers.
Florensky insisted that through love two distinct persons may become a
really one being. He even used as the book’s motto the Latin sententia
Finis amoris ut duo unum fiant—‘Love is completed when two become
one’. He analyzed Biblical and patristic evidences of the reality of
unification between man and God. He was, therefore, concerned with the
very same problem as Palamas.
When developing the ontology of love, Florensky made some
surprising remarks on the logical concept of identity. The two
supplements, added to the main text, were devoted directly to the
analysis of the concept of identity in classical philosophy and in
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contemporary formal logic (Florensky 2004, p. 365–374). First, he
criticized the modern western philosophers for neglecting identity in
favor of resemblance. Florensky said: ‘when there is talk of identity,
what one means—more or less decisively—is fullness of similarity, not
more’ (Florensky 2004, p. 60). Christian metaphysics, in contrast, allows
properties to be numerically identical, not mere similar.25 With no doubt,
the issue here was the problem of universals, which concerns precisely
the possibility of existence of numerically identical properties in many
distinct things (see e.g. Armstrong 1978). Florensky made an appeal to
the classical trinitarian terminology and called the modern nominalistic
philosophy homoiousian, in contrast to Christian homoousian realism
(Florensky 2004, p. 59; cf. Slesinski 1984, pp. 136–138). Second,
Florensky protested against the bundle theory of thing. Namely, he
accused positivistic logicians of a desire to ‘destroy the autonomous
nature of the individual and reduce it to a sum of traits’ (Florensky 2004,
p. 371). A thing is not merely a combination of traits since it contains an
irreducible ‘carrier of traits’ (ibidem, p. 368). Finally, he rejected the
following logical Principle of Identity (I use its contemporary
formulation):
(14)
x=y ≡ ∀P (P(x) ≡ P(y)).
According to Florensky, this classical definition ‘replaces the
question of real numerical identity with the question of the formal
similarity of traits’ (2004, p. 372), whereas these two questions differ
fundamentally. Florensky held that it is possible for distinct things to
have numerically one nature. The three consubstantial divine Persons are
the most eminent example, which also serves as a paradigm of the unity
of lovers. Hence, the Principle of Identity excludes the possibility of the
25
Florensky often spoke about the numerical identity of things but he evidently had
in mind the numerical identity of properties (natures or energies) of numerically
distinct things. His standard examples of ‘numerically identical things’ were the
Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity; they are plainly numerically distinct, though
have numerically one nature. The question is, however, not so clear, since in some
places Florensky claimed that the terms ‘hypostasis’ and ‘nature’ are synonymous,
and therefore the Holy Trinity is antinomic (Florensky 2004, p. 39–52).
67
Trinity and deification (though deification, as Florensky should have
added but did not, does not mean sharing the nature, but energies).
Florensky’s reasoning, though not completely clear, is perfectly
sound. Realism in the question of universals combined with the criticism
of the bundle theory leads by necessity to the rejection of the Principle
of Identity. More precisely, it leads to the rejection of the Principle of
Identity of Indiscernibles:
(15)
∀P (P(x) ≡ P(y)) ⊃ x= y,
which is one of the components of the (14); the reverse Principle of
Indiscernibility of Identicals is usually accepted as trivial. This
reasoning, implicitly present in Florensky’s remarks, plays a crucial role
in analytic metaphysics as an argument either against the bundle theory
or against realism (Armstrong 1978, p. 81; Loux 1978, pp. 131–137,
155–156; Moreland 2001, p. 141).
At this point, it seems that, to Florensky, the real union of lovers
consisted of sharing all the relevant properties. Indiscernibility is meant
here in a realistic manner, namely as having numerically identical
properties actually, Florensky spoke about natures, but his analysis
applies perfectly to energies as well. Indeed, such a unity is real and
internal, contrary to merely external similarity.
Thus, Florensky virtually distinguished two kinds of idiscernibility:
homoousian, with universal properties on one hand, and homoiousian,
with particular, yet exactly similar properties, on the other. The Principle
of Identity of Indiscernibles is not valid in both cases. The realistic
indiscernibility, which Florensky sometimes misleadingly called
‘numerical identity of things’, may be defined as follows:
(D1)
x=oy ≡ ∀P∀Q ((P(x) ≡ Q(y)) ≡ P=Q).
The right side of the (D1) is intended to be equivalent to the right
side of (14). I inserted the indication of identity of properties ‘P=Q’ just
for a clear comparison with the nominalistic idiscernibility:
(D2)
x≈oy ≡ ∀P∀Q ((P(x) ≡ Q(y)) ≡ P≈Q).
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‘P≈Q’ means that properties P and Q resemble each other. In this case,
all properties of things can be similar, yet not identical. Since identity
follows resemblance:
(16)
P=Q ⊃ P≈Q,
the realistic indiscernibility follows the nominalistic:
(17)
x=oy ⊃ x≈oy.
The concept of homoousian indiscernibility is, therefore, stronger
that homoiousian one.
Unfortunately, the analyzed text of Florensky is rather obscure. It is
not clear, for instance, whether he distinguished merely two competitive
theories, or rather two distinct domains in which these theories hold, or
perhaps even two stages of ontological development of one thing. First,
he suggested that the theory of resemblance is characteristic of ‘the
Western, Catholic view of life’ (Florensky 2004, p. 367). In the same
spirit Robert Slesinski (1984, p. 137) argued that David Hume perfectly
fits in the description of homoiousian philosophy. Second, Florensky
contrasted the domain of things, which is governed by the theory of
resemblance, and the domain of persons, in which the theory of identity
is valid (Florensky 2004, p. 58–59). Things have similar properties,
whereas persons can share their actions.26 Third, he suggested that
beings can move from the world of mere resemblances to the world of
identity. For a human being this can be achieved in the process of ascesis
and moral life aimed at deification.
I am not going to analyze Florensky’s view further. For now, I
would just like to point out that the presented interpretation seems to
overcome the crucial problem of Florensky’s theory identified by Robert
Slesinski.
26
This means that Florensky could accept the bundle theory for things since things
are individuated by individual properties (cf. Florensky 2004, p. 368). Persons may
share universal properties, so they must have a substratum, or—as Florensky would
say—hypostasis.
69
His understanding of numerical identity, if not properly understood,
could appear to be the Achille’s heel of his whole suggested system, and,
in truth, could subject it to the charge of pantheism. Specifically, how
can Florensky reconcile the consubstantiality of the divine Hypostases
with the consubstantiality of created species in terms of numerical
identity? (Slesinski 1984, p. 136).
The answer for this question is straightforward if we complement
Florensky’s theory with the essence/energies distinction. By ‘numerical
identity’ of things Florensky meant numerical identity of their properties
in general. Numerical identity of natures yields ‘consubstantiality’,
which characterizes the Persons of Holy Trinity; numerical identity of
energies yields ‘synergy’, which characterizes (not only) Holy Trinity,
but also human beings living in God. Indeed, without the Palamitic
distinction it is uneasy to avoid the charge of pantheism.
5.2. The Problem of Synergy
What is the use of Florensky’s analysis for interpretation of
Palamism? I think that he rightly indicated the ontological dimension of
deification. Deification consists of a real change of properties. He was
mistaken, nevertheless, in suggesting that man can be consubstantial
with God. This is such a bold mistake that one might wonder whether
Florensky in Pillar used the word ‘nature’ in a strict sense. In any case,
everything that Florensky said on natures holds for energies in
Palamism.
Florensky distinguished two interpretations of union with God,
namely in terms of identity (D1) and resemblance (D2). They may be
now formulated on the ground of the essence/energy distinction:
(D3)
(D4)
x =ey ≡ ∀z∀z′ ((x<z ≡ y<z) ≡ z=z′),
x ≈ey ≡ ∀z∀z′ ((x<z ≡ y<z) ≡ z≈z′).
Things are energically indiscernible in the realistic sense if and only
if they share all their energies, and in the nominalistic sense if and only
if they have all energies exactly similar. The former case might be called
70
realistic synergy, the latter—nominalistic one. As I indicated in §3.3, to
Palamas theosis consists of both assimilation and unification. (D4) may
be considered as a formal expression of full assimilation, whereas (D3)
captures the meaning of unification. One should note that by virtue of
(16), unification implies assimilation:
(18)
x=ey ⊃ x≈ey.
Therefore, assimilation really is only a necessary but not sufficient
condition of deification.
I suggest that deification consist of strict identity of energies, and
not mere resemblance. It must be observed, however, that there is no
agreement among commentators on this crucial point. Some authors
suggest an analogy between the relation between the two energies in
Christ and the energies of man and God in deification. But this, as I
argue, unfortunately leads to the resemblance, not identity theory.
Patristic theology before Palamas used the notion of energy in two
cases: Christ and the Holy Trinity. On one hand, Christ is the only
person with two natures, and, hence, has two numerically distinct, yet
reconciled, human and divine energies. The Third Constantinopolitan
Council clearly stated that in Christ there were ‘two natural principles of
action [i.e. energies] in the same Jesus Christ our lord and true God,
which undergo no division, no change, no partition, no confusion’
(Tanner 1990). This statement was aimed against monoenergism, which
accepts only one ‘principle of action’ in Christ. One the other hand, the
Trinity consists of three divine Persons, one nature and one divine
energy shared by all the Persons (Treatises I, 21; Meyendorff 1998, p.
215; Spiteris 1996, p. 105). ‘The energy of the Three Divine Hypostases
the is one not by analogy [i.e. not mere similar] (as with us) but truly
also one in number’ (Capita 138, Krivoshein 1938, p. 141). Therefore,
we are also told that, in the case of human beings, we are dealing with
many distinct energies, which, nevertheless, may be similar to one
another and assimilated to divine energies. ‘Human acts are similar, but
not identical’—Palamas stated firmly (Treatises I, 21; cf. Meyendorff
1998, p. 215). These distinctions may be summarized in Table 2.
71
Table 2.The variety of patristic ‘identities’.
hypostases
=
=
=
=
≠
≠
numerical identity
excluded
Monoenergists Christ
Orthodox Christ
The Holy Trinity
human beings
deification according to
≠
(D3)
deification according to
≠
(D4)
essences
=
=
≠
≠
=
=
≠
≠
energies
=
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
≠
What is it like in the case of human and divine energies? Is it
analogous to the case of Christ or to the case of Holy Trinity? Most
commentators use here the term ‘synergy;’ energies of man and God are
supposed to be somehow ‘united.’ However, the specific meaning of this
term may vary. Particularly, it is often not quite clear whether synergy
presupposes numerical identity or mere resemblance.
John Meyendorff, for instance, suggested that the relation between
human and divine energies mirrors the analogous relation in Christ.
It is not through his own activity or “energy” that man can be deified—
this would be Pelagianism—but by divine “energy”, to which his human
activity is “obedient”; between the two there is a “synergy”, of which the
relation of the two energies in Christ is the ontological basis (Meyendorff
1983, p. 164; italics mine).
Therefore, divine and human energies would have the same
characteristic formulated by the Sixth Council: ‘no division, no change,
no partition, no confusion’ (see also Strachowski 2010, p. 203). In this
interpretation, however, they still are two numerically distinct, yet
exactly similar and reconciled, energies.
It seems that Pavel Florensky held another view. He also spoke
about ‘synergy’ (Florenskij 2000, p. 256), but evidently, he understood
72
that term in a stronger sense. He maintained that energies may ‘join’
(ibidem, p. 358), ‘knit’ (ibidem, pp. 257, 263, 359) and ‘fuse’(ibidem, p.
257) one another.
Beings, staying neither mixed in their essences, not reduced to one
another, nor dissolved in one another, can at the same time really unite
through energies. This union must be understood neither as adding one
act to another, nor as mechanical pushing one being by another, but as
mutual braiding of the energies, co-operation, synergeia, in which there
is neither one, nor the other taken separately, but something new emerges
(Florenskij 2000, p. 256).
I think that what Florensky had in mind was simply the identity of
energies. One and the same energy is both divine and human, and at the
same time is something new in the sense that it is no more solely human
or solely divine. Some authors are even more radical. Basil Lourié
suggested that ‘there is no more synergy in the deification; in this sense
it should be said that deified man has no human energies, only divine’
(Lur’e 2006, p. 390).
It appears that Palamas held the identity view. As I pointed out in
§3.3, he insisted on the real union of man and God. Resemblance, even
exact one, does not suffice for this purpose. On the ground of the two
energies approach, deification would be merely external imitation of
God. This approach was directly criticized by Palamas. It would be only
a homoiousian imitation, not homoousian union.
Palamas did not endorse the thesis that deification is analogous to
hypostatic union. It is, as Palamas admitted, an ‘unparalleled’ connection
which differs both from relations in Christ and in the Holy Trinity. The
reason for different models for Christ and deification is that, in the case
of Christ, divine and human energies do not need to be united in a strong
way since the two natures of Christ were already united by one
hypostasis. In the case of deification, there is no such common
hypostasis, and the Christological model leads to unduly weakening of
the relation between divine and human energies.
There is one analogy which may serve as an additional support for
the identity interpretation. Palamas repeated that God unites with a man
as soul with body: ‘He is conjoined to them as a soul is to its body’
73
(Triads III, 1, 27; III, 1, 29; I, 3, 23). How did Palamas understand the
soul-body relation? The most important point, for now, is that he
believed there are energies common to both soul and body (Mantzaridis
1984, p. 84). ‘There are, indeed, […] common activities of body and
soul, which […] serve to draw the flesh to dignity close to that of the
spirit’ (Triads II, 2, 12). The grace of the Spirit, transmitted to body
through the soul, ‘grants to the body also the experience of things divine,
and allows it the same blessed experiences which the soul undergoes’
(ibidem). Therefore, by virtue of analogy, divine energy would be
common to God and man, not just similar.
5.3. One-sided and Two-sided Deification
At the end, I would like to address one more question. The proposed
formal interpretation of deification (D3) involves equivalence: all
energies of God are energies of deified man, and all energies of man are
energies of God. This interpretation has, prima facie, strong evidence in
the texts. Palamas wrote for example:
The entire Divinity comes to dwell in fullness in those deemed worthy,
and all the saints in their entire being dwell in God, receiving God in His
wholeness (Triads III, 1, 27; italics mine);
He [God] unites Himself to them to the extent of dwelling completely in
them, so that they too dwell entirely in Him (III, 1, 29; italics mine; cf.
Krivoshein 1938, p. 203).
It seems that every divine energy becomes human and reverse; all
human energies become God’s own energies.
But at the same time, some passages suggest a different
interpretation. In Against Akindynos (V, 26) Palamas said: ‘God in its
fullness deifies them who deserve it […] through a small part of the
uncreated energies and the uncreated divinity’ (Meyendorff 1983, p. 164;
italics mine). It might be thought as if all human energies were divine,
but not all divine energies were human. This may be formalized in the
following way:
74
(D5)
x =e*y ≡∀z∀z′ ((x<z ⊃ y<z) ≡ z=z′),
The equivalence present in (D3) is replaced here by implication. In
this case, deification is, as if, one-sided. Man entirely partakes in divine
energies but not in all of them.
Which interpretation is correct? For sure, from the existential point
of view, it seems that one-sided deification is perfectly enough to fulfill
human aspirations. It appears that, contrary to the first impression, the
evidence in favor of the first interpretation may be reconciled with the
second. The point is that to Palamas ‘God is entirely present in each of
divine energies’ (Triads III, 2, 7). It is thus because energies are ‘not
parts of God’, and therefore ‘the whole’ God appears in them (Treatises
III, 6). So ‘a small part of uncreated energies’ is enough to have ‘entire
Divinity’; not all divine energies are required to it. Moreover, the
analogy to soul and body seems to support the second reading. Though
all bodily acts might be at the same time acts of the soul, there are,
nevertheless, some acts of soul which are not bodily. Thus, even though
all human energies may be identical with divine, God can have some
energies which are not shared by man.
6. Conclusion
The distinction between essence and energies is usually considered
as antinomic and, therefore, mysterious, and perhaps mystical. For
instance, according to Vladimir Lossky (1974, p. 53), it is ‘a theological
antinomy’, which points at ‘mysterious distinction in God’s very being’.
Similar opinion might be found in many others commentators (see e.g.
Losev 1993a, p. 866; Spiteris 1996, p. 97; Leskin 2008, p. 118). Since the
essence/energies distinction constitutes the core of Palamas’ teaching,
which is considered the peak and source of the Orthodox theology, the
opinion on its antinomic character spread into the whole Eastern
tradition.
I tried to show that Palamas’ teaching on energies and deification is
no less rational than any other ontological positions. No true antinomy
was found. Moreover, his teaching may be analyzed with the help of
some logical tools. Even the most mystical elements of Palamism, such
75
as the divinization of human nature, can be expressed in a formal way
consistently. Furthermore, the use of formal logic may help in noticing
some problems usually neglected by commentators.
I believe that the opinion on the allegedly antinomic character of
Palamism arose from its specific methodological character. Usually,
theology accepts some concepts and axioms from philosophy. Palamas
clearly saw the inadequacy of existing philosophical notions in
explaining revelation and deification. However, he did not forsake the
project of philosophical explanation of religious truth, but adapted the
reversed methodology. To him, philosophy should accept concepts and
axioms from theology. Elsewhere I labeled such theories a ‘theological
philosophy’ (Rojek 2009). Palamas, therefore,
neither sacrificed revelation to philosophy nor contented himself with a
dry repetition of patristic opinions, but tried to base his teaching about
God on the Church’s faith and experience. Thus, man has knowledge of
God’s existence through His energies which are sent into the world
(Mantzaridis 1984, p. 106).
The consequence of this methodology was modification of the
existing ontological conceptual scheme. For instance, he modified the
Greek philosophical categories of accident and property to reach the
appropriate ontological concept of energy (see above §3.2). That is why
some of his theses may seem ‘antynomic’ and ‘mysterious’ from the
previous point of view. The question ‘what is mysterious?’ is,
nevertheless, reversible in philosophy. If one accepts essence/energies
distinction as an axiom, this distinction would be no more explanandum
but rather explanans.
As I tried to show, Palamas’ teaching was not restricted to
philosophy of God merely. The essence/energy distinction, though
formulated in the context of God, applies to all beings. Therefore,
Palamism has a downward structure: creatures are governed by
principles holding for Creator. Palamas’ ontology might be called a
‘theology of being’. Since Palamas’ philosophy was designed to explain
some specific Christian facts, it has a specific Christian character.
76
The answer for the question about the character of Palamism has
grave consequences for the ecumenical dialog. Some authors accepting
the antinomic nature of essence/energies distinction hold that this nature
even facilitates the agreement between the East and the West. If
Palamism was not a rational philosophy but rather some mystical poetry,
there would be no moot point for a dispute with supposedly more
rational western thinking. From this point of view, any rational
interpretation of Palamism would even be an obstacle for the ecumenical
efforts.
We believe that the ecumenical dialog requires, among other things, the
reinterpretation of Palamism through depriving it of all conceptual
content, through its purification from philosophical jargon and […]
through its clarification as a type of mystical theology (Spiteris 1996, pp.
120–121).
I adopt here the opposite view. The logical reconstruction of
Palamas’ teaching reveals its deep foundations, which are not so alien to
western philosophy. Therefore, philosophical, and even logical,
interpretation of Palamism may become a foundation of such an
ecumenical dialog which would avoid rough stereotypes of ‘the
intellectual West’ and ‘the mystical East’.
Acknowledgments
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant
from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this
publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the John Templeton Foundation. I also thank Professor Ryszard
Legutko, Professor Krzysztof Le niewski, s. Teresa Obolevitch, father
Włodzimierz Misijuk, Artur Mrówczyński-Van Allen, Walter N. Sisto,
Alexandr Schevchenko and Katarzyna Popowicz for helping me in
preparing this paper.
77
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