INSS Insight No. 1470, May 25, 2021
The Cognitive Campaign in Operation Guardian of the Walls: The
Battle over the Narrative
Yoram Schweitzer, David Siman Tov, and Kobi Michael
As in every kinetic military campaign against Hamas and its allies in the Gaza Strip,
the cognitive aspect was embedded from the very beginning of Operation Guardian
of the Walls, and its importance increased as the campaign progressed. The
integration of the cognitive campaign with the kinetic is essential for the realization
of military achievements in order to then reap political gains. For Israel, the first
cognitive achievement required is a deep engraving in the minds of Hamas
commanders and their associates, as well as in the minds of the Gaza Strip
population, of the growing and intolerable cost of the recent military venture and
any rounds to come.
Operation Guardian of the Walls saw Hamas's most intense use of military power since
Operation Protective Edge. Heavy rocket barrages toward the Israeli civilian home front
focused on massive “routine” rocket fire at the Gaza envelope communities and at cities
in the south and center of the country, all introduced by the rocket fire toward Jerusalem
on the opening day. In the most recent campaign, the severe damage to Hamas’s military
infrastructure and rocket production industry, in addition to the damage to significant
parts of the underground infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, was accompanied by targeted
and widespread damage to the commanders' offices and houses and the commanders
themselves. It included the demolition of high-rise buildings used by Hamas in addition
to the military infrastructure, to convey a deterrent message of exacting a personal and
economic price from the organization's leadership.
Hamas's Goals in the Cognitive Campaign
It is important to understand Hamas’s goals in this campaign in the internal Palestinian
context – which, in Hamas's view, is related to the political and propaganda contexts visà-vis Israel and other target audiences and arenas relevant to the organization.
In the tensions that developed in Jerusalem during Ramadan, Hamas identified an
opportunity to create a significant cognitive effect and to ignite several fronts
simultaneously in order to position itself as the leader of the Palestinian national struggle
and restore it to the regional and international agenda. Exacerbating the cracks between
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Jews and Arabs in Israel, both at the social level and at the political level, is seen as a
very important achievement – an achievement that was then leveraged to magnify the
organization's influence capability and extend it to the regional level. These achievements
are intended to shape cognition regarding inter-Arab unity and puncture Israel's
strengthening regional status.
Hamas tried to position itself in a confrontation as the one that widened the deterrence
equation with Israel by connecting Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, as the one that dared to
issue an ultimatum to Israel and make good on its threats, as the one that managed to
crack the fabric of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel and set off a wave of violence that
significantly undermined the sense of security of the citizens of Israel, as the one that did
not succumb to Israeli military power and rained rockets on population centers in Israel,
which Israel was unable to prevent, and as the one that managed to stir up and agitate
parts of the Arab world.
Had the campaign ceased in the first days, it is possible that Hamas's cognitive
achievements would have carried weight. However, as the operation continued, and as
the severe Israeli losses to the organization's military infrastructure and commanders
increased and much infrastructure in the Gaza Strip was heavily damaged, the validity of
Hamas's claim to military achievement was undermined. Diminishing Hamas's
achievements of recent years in reconstruction and improved civilian life in Gaza may
erode its domestic legitimacy and the international legitimacy it sought to establish as a
responsible sovereign, and instead, strengthen its image (at least to several audiences,
mainly in the West) as an unbridled terrorist organization that holds civilians hostage to
its wild policies.
Israel's Goals in the Cognitive Campaign
In order to undermine the rationale behind Hamas's belligerent rounds of escalation that
have characterized relations between Israel, Hamas, and the Gaza Strip over the past
decade, Israel sought to exact a physical toll from Hamas and its supporters that would
also be deeply etched in their minds and weaken their readiness to pay such a heavy price
in the future. In addition, Israel sought to send a message to Hamas that despite the
barrages of rockets launched at Israeli cities, its military campaign did not achieve its
purpose, and furthermore, its strategy of an underground secured safe heaven was badly
crippled. Another message is the futility of developing resource-intensive projects that
are destroyed in every round of fighting that Hamas launches in the face of Israel’s clear
military and technological superiority, which readily exacts a heavy toll in the face of
indiscriminate attacks on its civilians.
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Beyond that, the massive destruction throughout the Gaza Strip during the conflict with
Israel underscored to Gazans that Hamas has caused the area to regress significantly. To
the Palestinians in the West Bank living under the Palestinian Authority, it should be
clear that Hamas has sustained a severe blow to its military capabilities and thus to its
political stance, and that the challenge it poses to the PA's dominance in the territories
and Jerusalem has been weakened in the wake of the recent campaign.
The attack on the "metro" – the system of underground tunnels – appears to be one of the
most important cognitive moves in the operation, both in disrupting the organization's
strategic infrastructure, damaging its immunity, and creating a sense of infiltration among
its operatives, and in conveying a message to other terrorist organizations that use the
underground space that it is not immune to attack. The destruction highlights the futility
of the enormous force buildup efforts invested by the organization (at the expense of
Gaza’s civilians) and at the same time its inability to defend itself against Israel.
In the international arena, Israel conveyed that Hamas is the aggressor that planned and
launched this campaign and that it acts as a terrorist organization in every way and
blindly directs its weapons at the civilian population. Moreover, Israel emphasized that
since its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, Hamas has preferred
military armament and harm to Israel over civilian welfare and development. Israel also
clarified that rocket fire or terrorism against its citizens is unacceptable, just as it is
unacceptable in any country in the world.
Beyond the direct cognitive discourse with Hamas, the campaign in Gaza sent a deterrent
message to Hezbollah, demonstrating IDF capabilities (emphasis on intelligence and
precision fire, willingness to use destructive force that is far greater than what the
opponent possesses, including in the underground space). Another message was
conveyed to Arabs in Israel and to Palestinians in the West Bank, some of whom may
have pinned their hopes on Hamas as the leader of the Palestinian national struggle.
Hamas's failure in the military campaign may undermine the hopes of that extremist
minority that was enticed by the organization.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Hamas's cognitive achievements in the early days of the campaign were significant, but
their weight over time is in question. For example, despite Hamas's initial success in
linking rocket fire toward Jerusalem and the flare-up between Jews and Arabs in East
Jerusalem, shifting the focus of the campaign to the Gaza Strip overshadowed the linkage
it sought to create between the two arenas.
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The outbreak of violence between Jews and Arabs in Israel was influenced by the
escalation initiated by Hamas, but it is likely also the outgrowth of deep currents in Arab
society, fueled by a combination of issues of identity, frustration, crime, incitement, and
lack of leadership. In Israel, much effort has been channeled to locate those who incited
the violence, including among the extreme Jewish minority, as part of the main effort to
alleviate the tension between the two populations and to sever the connection that Hamas
sought to establish with the outbreak of the war in Gaza. The tactical achievements of
Hamas's “surprise attack” were also reversed, once it was surprised by the demonstration
of Israeli power and Israel's willingness to launch a large-scale campaign against
everything perceived by Hamas as an asset, including high-rises, luxury houses in the
Rimal neighborhood, and financial institutions, along with the razing of the organization's
military infrastructure.
Hamas's attempt to portray the campaign in Gaza as an element that engulfed the
Lebanese and Syrian arenas was neutralized by Hezbollah's careful and meticulous
behavior, which avoided direct involvement in the fighting and contented itself with
statements encouraging the “Palestinian struggle against the predatory occupier” from
Iran and the Shiite-affiliated militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, while allowing sporadic
rocket fire from Lebanon and Syria and the UAV infiltration attempt. Moreover,
Hezbollah and Iran have closely watched Israel's kinetic ability, determination, and
intensity, which relayed a clear cognitive message as to Israel's willingness to pursue an
extremely high-intensity aggressive policy in response to rocket fire into its territory.
In the long term, the following lessons should be emphasized:
a. Attack on the media building in Gaza: During the campaign, the al-Jalaa building
was demolished – a site that in part was used by international media (AP and alJazeera). The attack on the building evoked media shockwaves and sharp
international criticism. Israel's statement that the attack was essential due to
intelligence that Hamas had used the building remained vague (at least in the
media). Therefore, if possible, it is essential to reveal intelligence about Hamas's
use of the building, and in the future, to manage events that have the potential to
provoke international resentment in similar fashion.
b. Preventing the entry of foreign journalists into the Gaza Strip as a lesson from
previous operations in the Gaza Strip (Cast Lead) subjects Israel to sharp criticism
by the world media, and is interpreted as an attempt at concealment. Foreign
media should be allowed, while taking care to protect the lives of the journalists,
because the images of destruction and killing in the Gaza Strip are published
anyway and override Israel’s public diplomacy.
c. Need for a "national spokesperson": Although there has been an improvement in
the work of the Foreign Ministry and the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit vis-à-vis the
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international arena (briefings, articles, and activities on social media), as well as
coordination between the relevant parties, the lack of a "national spokesperson”
for both the Israeli target audience and the global target audience is noticeable. As
a lesson for the future, a national information and cognition apparatus must be
established.
d. Strengthening Israeli presence on social networks: The moves in the diplomatic
arena led by the Foreign Ministry afforded Israel some success. However, it
seems that the digital realm, in which Israel's rivals in the world have an apparent
advantage, requires special organization and encourages the harnessing of civil
society in Israel and around the world as a force multiplier.
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