Priests and State in the Roman World Edited by James H. Richardson and Federico Santangelo POTSDAMER ALTERTUMSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEITRÄGE (PAwB) Herausgegeben von Pedro Barceló (Potsdam), Peter Riemer (Saarbrücken), Jörg Rüpke (Erfurt) und John Scheid (Paris) –––– Band 33 Priests and State in the Roman World Edited by James H. Richardson and Federico Santangelo Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2011 Bibliograische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliograie; detaillierte bibliograische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-515-09817-5 Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Übersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie für die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. © 2011 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart Druck: AZ Druck und Datentechnik GmbH, Kempten Printed in Germany DOMINATING THE AUSPICES: AUGUSTUS, AUGURY AND THE PROCONSULS Alberto Dalla Rosa It is well known that augury played a very important part in the construction of Augustus’ own image as founder of a new era for the city of Rome. Augustus was himself an augur and made frequent use of augural symbols on coins and on monuments. Through the performance of the ancient rite of the augurium salutis in the year 29 BC, Octavian was celebrated as the bringer of peace to the State, and the ceremony was repeated several times before Augustus’ death in AD 14.1 Moreover, the name Augustus itself had a clear and acknowledged connection with augurium.2 This title had an obvious religious meaning, but it had some political implications as well. Octavian and the leading intellectuals of his era (such as Varro, Livy and Ovid), were well aware of the significant role of augury in the city’s foundation and beyond. The augural law concerned a number of aspects of Roman private, religious and political life.3 The validity of numerous acts carried out by magistrates depended on the goodness of their auspicationes and this again depended on their conformity with the augural rules.4 This is why Cicero considered the augurate the most important priesthood for the correct and virtuous life of the State, and the auspices one of the two pillars of the Republic, together with the Senate.5 The written nature of the libri augurales meant that any change to them had to be approved by the college of the augurs, although in our evidence there is only one case in which this procedure is attested, and that was when Caesar was created dictator by a praetor and not by a consul as was customary. Since the augural law did not allow the dictio by anyone other than a consul, an official decretum augurum was needed to change the rule and to give the dictatorship to Caesar in the consuls’ absence from Rome.6 1 2 3 4 5 6 Suet. Aug. 31.4; Cass. Dio 51.20.4. On the rite cf. Linderski 1986, 2255-2256; on the political significance for Octavian cf. Linderski 1986, 2226 and 2291; more recently Kearsley 2009, who exaggerates the role played by the augurium salutis in the process that eventually gave sole rule to Augustus. Ov. Fast. 1.593-616. An interesting discussion of the intellectual debate about augury in Augustus’ time is found in Green 2009. This fact led Giovannini 1998, 106 to compare the augural college with a modern constitutional court. Cic. Rep. 2.17: duo firmamenta rei publicae. The most notable statement about the role of the augurs in the State can be found in Cic. Leg. 2.20-21 and particularly in 2.31-33. Other Ciceronian passages concerning this priesthood are usefully collected by Tucker 1976. Cic. Att. 9.9.3. 244 Alberto Dalla Rosa If the augural books were so important for the correct creation and functioning of Rome’s institutions, why are they so often neglected by our sources even when it comes to the implementation of radical changes to the tradition? We have no evidence for any decree of the augurs when the first prorogation was conceded to a magistrate in 324 BC, nor when a private person was given imperium consulare for the first time in 210 BC. Nonetheless, on many occasions the auspices were at the middle of fierce political battles and remained a central issue up to the first decades of the Principate.7 On all these occasions every decision was taken by the civic institutions of the Republic, whose authority was superior to that of the priests, and in the end the duty of the augurs was and remained simply ensuring the correctness of the procedure. This paper will try to overcome the condition of our sources and show that, despite the fact that it is never mentioned, the augural discipline must have played a considerable part in the imperial monopolisation of victory. It is my intention to show what the interpretations of the augural doctrine concerning war and triumphs at the end of the Republic were, and to try to understand from these interpretations how the solution that eventually gave Augustus a supremacy over the other proconsuls evolved. The starting point will be the strange episode of the triumph that was shared between Octavian and C. Carrinas. Despite the uncertainties associated with it, this case provides the opportunity to investigate the early stages of a new interpretation of the augural rules about victory. Connected with Carrinas’ case is the African inscription which mentions the proconsul of AD 7-8, Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, who won a bellum Gaetulicum fighting under Augustus’ auspices. The central point of this paper will be the explanation and interpretation of Cicero’s view about the nature of the magistracies and the validity of the auspices of the proconsuls. It is worth pointing out that Cicero’s ideas were not in accordance with the actual behaviour of magistrates and promagistrates in his day. Nevertheless Cicero’s opinion could be adopted, and thus used in support of the idea that Augustus’ auspices were superior to those of the proconsuls. Finally there will be some remarks on the final affirmation of Augustus’ monopolisation of victory and the stabilisation of the new hierarchy of the auspices between 19 BC and AD 6. The reconstruction proposed here may be considered overly hypothetical in some parts, but nonetheless, even if certainty cannot be established, the argument will provide a good illustration of the complex interaction between political circumstance and theoretical interpretation for the adaptation of the auspical tradition to the new reality of the Principate. 7 Many examples can be found in Linderski 1990 (= Linderski 1995, 560-574). Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 245 1. THE CARRINAS EPISODE AND ITS INTERPRETATION After the expiration of the triumvirate, Octavian had to reinvent his position in the Republic.8 He could count on being designated consul for 31, and on the support of the vast army that he was readying for the war against Cleopatra and Antony. Nonetheless, Octavian needed something more to demonstrate that he was not fighting in his own interests, but on behalf of the Republic. He wanted to identify himself with the entire State, binding every citizen, Roman or peregrine, of the western part of the empire to himself through a solemn oath. Augustus himself recalls that circumstance in his Res gestae (§ 25) saying that more than 700 senators fought under his standards (sub signis meis). The best men, the boni, the ones who were to receive the highest honores of the Republic, were all with Octavian, who was joined by a considerable number of equites too. The oath did not give Octavian any real new power, but instead provided him with an auctoritas greater than that of any other aristocrat.9 He conducted the campaign against Antony and Cleopatra on the basis of his consular imperium. The new role that Octavian gave to the consulship was in itself relevant and was clearly used in opposition to Antony, who continued to style himself as triumvir. Obviously the new position sought by Caesar’s heir inevitably entailed consequences for the holders of imperium, whether they were magistrates or promagistrates. In this context, it is important to recall the events of C. Carrinas’ triumph, which was held either on the 12th of June or on the 14th of July 28 BC, and which was shared with Octavian for reasons that have not yet been fully clarified. C. Carrinas, whose father was a victim of the Sullan proscriptions, was one of the leading Caesarian generals. He campaigned against Sextus Pompeius in Spain in 45, was suffect consul in 43, stood in for Octavian and fought for him against Sextus Pompeius again in Sicily in 36. Finally, as proconsul of Gallia Comata, he was victorious against the Morini and other German peoples who had crossed the Rhine and invaded Roman territory. For these achievements he was granted a triumph, which he held on the Ides of June or July in 28. It is generally agreed that his proconsulship should be placed in 30-29, because such a date would fit well with the date of his triumph. This is however not the only possible solution. The 8 9 A reconstruction of the last years of the triumvirate from a constitutional perspective is given by Girardet 1990a. His view on the date of the expiration of the triumvirate and on Octavian’s position until 27 BC has been challenged by Roddaz 2003, 405-406, and by Vervaet 2008, 40-44. The problem is far from being resolved, but it is undeniable that Octavian continued to hold some triumviral prerogatives after dropping the title. A connection between this oath and the consensus uniuersorum of RG 34 is proposed by Kunkel 1969, 320. Some scholars conjectured that an actual plebiscite gave Octavian extraordinary command (Kienast 1999, 59 n. 240); another interpretation sees the oath as a legitimisation of Octavian’s usurped triumviral authority (Kromayer 1888, 17-19; Herrmann 1968, 78-80; Petzold 1969, 343-351; Fadinger 1969, 145 n.1; De Martino 1972-75, 107-109; Bleicken 1998, 93; Reinhold 2002, 97-98). But, as Girardet 1990a, 345-346 suggested, Octavian’s position in 32 could have been that of a prorogued triumuir with a designation for the consulship for the next year (cf. von Premerstein 1937, 42-43). 246 Alberto Dalla Rosa only narrative of Carrinas’ triumph is provided by Cassius Dio:10 For Gaius Carrinas had subdued the Morini and others who had revolted with them, and had repulsed the Suebi, who had crossed the Rhine to wage war. Not only did Carrinas, therefore, celebrate the triumph – and that notwithstanding that his father had been put to death by Sulla and that he himself along with the others in like condition had once been debarred from holding office – but Caesar also celebrated it, since the credit of the victory properly belonged to his position as supreme commander (transl. E. Cary). This passage comes just after Dio’s account of the first day of the triple triumph of Octavian and the narrative gives the clear impression that it was on this first day that the future princeps claimed for himself the achievements of the proconsul of Gaul.11 The explanation given by Dio is simple: Carrinas did not possess the autokrator arche. This, and similar expressions like strategos autokrator, are often used by Dio to identify a generic supreme commander or, more precisely in relation to Roman warfare, an independent imperium-holder, namely a magistrate or promagistrate fighting under his own auspicia.12 Such status was the basic prerequisite for a triumph, and therefore Dio’s discussion might suggest that Carrinas was not an independent commander, but one subordinate to Octavian. However, we know from the fasti triumphales Capitolini,13 that, at the time of his achievements, Carrinas was proconsul and therefore should have been fighting under his own auspicia, for it had always been the rule to give this title only to consuls who had had their imperium prorogued or to private men who had been provided with consular imperium and who were campaigning independently. The problem posed by Carrinas’ case has prompted modern scholars to reconsider the relationship between the proconsuls and the triumvirs, and that between the proconsul and Octavian/Augustus.14 Our sources always take for granted a superiority of Octavian, and this fact has been interpreted in many ways. One solution is to take a stance similar to that of Cassius Dio who imagined that there was some continuity between the triumviral period and the years 32-28, and who therefore justified the subordination of the proconsuls by the fact that the triumvirs and later Octavian had the right to appoint them. For this reason the proconsuls could not be regarded as supreme commanders, and consequently every tri10 Cass. Dio 51.21.6. Cf. Freyburger-Roddaz 1991, 158 n. 204-205. 11 There is no mention of the Gallic and German tribes defeated by Carrinas in the accounts of the first day of the triumph given by Suet. Aug. 22 and Livy Per. 133. 12 The relevant passages are Cass. Dio 51.21.6 (about C. Carrinas); 51.24.4 (about M. Licinius Crassus and the spolia opima); 18.57.81 (consul’s superiority over a praetor in a dispute over the right to triumph); 36.23.4 (Pompey as supreme commander in the war against the pirates); 36.36.2-3 (Roman independent commanders, opposed to lieutenants); 39.14.2 (chief of an embassy); 40.18.3 (Roman expedition commander); 40.28.2 (Crassus commander-in-chief at Carrhae); 42.57.5 (Metellus Scipio commander of the Pompeian army at Thapsus); 43.30.2 (Scapula commander of the Pompeian army in Spain); 48.41.5 (Ventidius, Antony’s legate, not awarded with any honour because he did not fight independently). 13 InscrIt 13.1.86-87, 344-345, 570; for Carrinas’ career cf. PIR2 C 447. 14 Rich 1996, 97 denies that the episode is reliable; contra Östenberg 1999, 160. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 247 umph they celebrated was a kind concession granted by the rulers, rather than a legitimate right.15 Another solution is based upon two passages from Cicero’s De diuinatione and De natura deorum that seem to affirm that promagistrates, and therefore priuati cum imperio too, did not possess auspicia at all. If this were the case, it would have been easy for Octavian to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the auspices of every proconsul and it could have been on this basis that he shared Carrinas’ triumph, gradually assuming for himself and his family a control of the military auspicia and of the religiously correct conduct of warfare.16 Evidence for this permanent constitutional shift may be provided by an inscription from Tripolitania, dated to AD 7-8, in which the proconsul Cossus Cornelius Lentulus is praised for his victory over the Gaetulians in a war conducted under the auspices of Augustus.17 The circumstances surrounding the Carrinas episode are far from clear, but any explanation for Octavian’s supremacy that is based upon the idea of a permanent constitutional reform risks falling short of providing a reason for the numerous triumphs accorded to the proconsuls in the period from 31 to 19 BC. Had the auspical prerogatives of Octavian been so strong, or those of the proconsuls so weak, cases such as that of Carrinas would have been the rule, but because there are so many cases in which the bestowing of military honours worked as usual, I believe it is easier to assume that the case of Carrinas was the result of an ad hoc 15 Cass. Dio 48.41.4 wondered how Cn. Domitius Calvinus could have been saluted as imperator for his victories in Spain, for, he says, the region had been assigned to Octavian, who had to be the legitimate imperator. Even if not stated openly, Dio probably continued to think in this way for the subsequent period between Actium and 27 BC. Mommsen 1887, 1.130132 assumed the total superiority of the triumvirs, justifying the granting of a triumph with the concession of a fictive imperium to the provincial governors; Schumacher 1985, 191-209 considers the existence of a maior potestas, that would prevent the proconsuls from getting a triumph if they fought in the same region as one of the triumvirs. A clearer perspective on the subject is given by Roddaz 1996, 82-87. 16 This position is set out in the excellent series of articles dedicated to imperium and the magistracies of the late Republic by K. M. Girardet, particularly in Girardet 1990a, 118-126 and Girardet 1992, 218-220. His ideas have been followed by Hurlet 2001 and then further developed in Hurlet 2006b, 164-173, with some important differences: Girardet dates to 19 BC the reform that introduced the five year interval between the tenure of the praetorship or the consulship and the provincial government, thus preventing the proconsuls from taking regular auspicia. This settlement had then paved the way for another act, this time giving to Augustus the monopoly of the auspices. Hurlet, in his most recent contribution on the problem, does not think that the proconsuls’ auspicia were considered void, but instead gives them an inferior status (auspicia minora) in relation to those of the princeps (auspicia maiora), in the same way as the auspices of the consuls and the praetors were superior to those of the lesser magistrates. A more general assumption of a concentration of the military auspices in the hands of Augustus is expressed, with some differences, by Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101; Gagé 1930a, Gagé 1930b, Gagé 1933; Grant 1950, 59-72 and 167-169; Rüpke 1990, 241; Cecconi 1991, 16-17; Pani 1997, 243-244; Scheid 1998, 100-101; Itgenshorst 2004, 452. The theory of a de facto monopolisation is defended by Kneissl 1969; Eck 1984, 139; Eck 2006, 59; Beard 2007, 295-305. 17 IRT 301. 248 Alberto Dalla Rosa solution, and therefore constituted an exception. In order to verify this, the first point that has to be considered is whether or not the proconsuls possessed auspicia, and subsequently, whether or not these auspicia could be considered vitiated. The history of the auspices is a long one. According to tradition, it predates the birth of Rome, as Romulus founded the city auspicato.18 Auspicationes were taken before a great number of activities, both private and public, such as the crossing of a river, the convening of an assembly of the Senate or the people, or the commencing of battle. Magistrates, after their nomination, had to take an auspication prior to entering office in order to validate their authority over the citizens.19 They had to take the auspices before crossing the pomerium at the head of the Roman army. In a solemn ceremony on the Capitol, the magistrate asked the gods to let him lead the army of the Roman people against the enemy under his own command and his own auspices. After this act, he had his imperium granted outside the pomerium, in the military sphere (imperium militiae), until he returned to the city, crossing the pomerium again and thus relinquishing his military power.20 This particular aspect of the duration of military powers allowed Q. Publilius Philo to conclude the siege of Naples in 326 BC having set aside his urban magistracy, but still holding a regular imperium militiae until he victoriously returned to Rome. This was the first case of ‘prorogation’, not of the magistracy, but of the imperium based on the auspication taken during the magistracy and prior to departure for war. War had always been considered to be an activity that was concentrated in the period between March and October21 and therefore no magistrate was ever meant to stay outside the city at the end of his office. But if the urban magistracy and the connected imperium auspiciumque strictly ended after one year, this was not the case with the military power. Therefore, in 326 BC the Ro18 Cic. Nat. D. 3.5, Diu. 2.33.70, Vat. 6.14. 19 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.5-6: diamanteusasthai peri tes arches; cf. Suet. Aug. 95, App. B Ciu. 3.94. Other sources and discussion in Magdelain 1968, 36-40 and Linderski 1986, 21682172. 20 Had this auspication not been held, then the magistrate would have had no imperium outside the city and would have been regarded as a priuatus, as is shown by the episode of the consul C. Flaminius in 217 BC. He did not take the ritual auspication before departing for the war and therefore the Senate refused to consider him more than a simple private man according to Livy 22.1.5-7. Another case involves the consul C. Claudius Pulcher in 177 BC, whose imperium was not regarded as valid by his own soldiers because he did not take the customary uota on the Capitol, but preferred to head quickly for his designed province. Pulcher had to return to Rome to perform the ceremony (Livy 41.10.2-13; cf. Linderski 1993, 69 n. 31 = Linderski 1995, 624 n. 31). Rüpke 1990, 45-46 has cast some doubts on the real existence of the auspices of departure as a specific category of auspices, whose validity could extend over the customary single day period and cover the entire military campaign. His arguments are probably right, but since this auspication was the basis of the military power of the magistrate, it is natural that it was linked with the campaign until its conclusion, namely until the return to the city. Similarly, the auspices of investiture referred only to the magistrate’s entrance into office, but an unfavourable sign was regarded as a bad omen for the whole year and therefore the magistrate was expected to abdicate (Linderski 1996, 180 = Linderski 2005, 169). 21 Cf. Rüpke 1990, 22-28. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 249 mans decided that the end of the urban auspices did not affect the validity of the military ones, because of their different duration: fixed for the former ones, but connected with the crossing of the pomerium for the latter. We do not know if the augurs were involved in this decision and how much it was debated,22 but in any case Philo was regarded as fighting under his own auspicia and so was eligible to celebrate a triumph on his return. The same situation applied to the numerous other prorogued consuls and praetors in subsequent centuries. A relevant innovation was introduced during the Second Punic War, when P. Cornelius Scipio, then a private citizen, was given imperium consulare militiae.23 Scipio could not take the auspication inside the city, because only magistrates were entitled to do that. Nevertheless he had to validate the power entrusted to him by means of an auspication, because the Republican tradition could not conceive of any public authority that was not sustained by favourable auspices. We do not know where and when Scipio took this auspication, but we know from Livy that he conducted the campaign in Spain under his own auspices and therefore his position was considered perfectly legitimate.24 A similar case is presented by a much later source, the lex arae Augustae Narbonensis, which gives us important information about the granting of imperium pro praetore to another private citizen: Octavian. Propraetorian imperium was given to him by the Senate on January 2nd, but it was auspicatum five days later, when Caesar’s heir was in Spoletium.25 This episode is very important for two aspects: firstly, the need for an auspication to validate a grant of imperium militiae to a private individual; secondly, the attestation that such an auspication had to be taken outside the pomerium. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that both priuati cum imperio and magistrates validated their military power and the inherent extra-pomerial authority by means of an auspication, with the important difference that a private man could do that only outside the pomerium, while a magistrate usually did it in the city.26 22 23 24 25 For the political context cf. Dalla Rosa 2003, 193-194. Livy 26.2.5-6. Further discussion ibid., 207-212. Livy 26.41.18, 28.16.14. CIL 12.4333 (p. 845) = ILS 112 = AE 1964, 187 = 1980, 609 ll. 21-23: VII quoq(ue) / Idus Ianuar(ias) qua die primum imperium / orbis terrarum auspicatus est. Speaking of imperium orbis terrarum, the text uses a hyperbole and refers to that first grant of power that eventually gave Octavian supreme power. On the powers granted to Octavian cf. RG 1; Livy Per. 118; Cic. Phil. 6.3, 11.20; App. B. Ciu. 3.51; Cass. Dio 46.29, 46.41. The information about the location of the ceremony (Spoletium) is given by Plin. HN 11.190. On this inscription see Magdelain 1968, 53. 26 Rüpke 1990, 46 denies that the auspices of departure were auspicia urbana and allows them to be taken in the ager Romanus, that is even outside the pomerium (cf. Rüpke 1990, 30-35). The issue is complex and the same definition of auspicium urbanum as limited by the pomerium-line is given only by the antiquarians Varr. Ling. 5.143 and Gell. NA 13.14.1. But Livy’s evidence cited above (n. 20, particularly Flaminius’ case) directly links the nuncupatio uotorum on the Capitol and the possession of a iustum imperium auspiciumque. From the same passages it is clear that there was no other place to celebrate this ceremony except the Capitol, which was inside the pomerium. Pulcher himself makes his repetitio auspiciorum on the 250 Alberto Dalla Rosa Scipio was denied a triumph because no private man had ever had this honour before, and this attitude remained unchanged until Pompey triumphed ex Africa between 81 and 79 BC, after a campaign that was entrusted to him when he had no magistracy. He obtained the honour again after receiving, as a priuatus, an extraordinary grant of imperium in order to defeat Sertorius in 77-71, and to fight the pirates and Mithridates in 67-61.27 These precedents were of great importance in 52 BC, when the lex Pompeia introduced the deployment of priuati cum imperio in the regular provincial administration, and again some 25 years later, when the law was reintroduced by Augustus in 27.28 By 28, the year in which Carrinas triumphed, several other proconsuls had triumphed, although they had been appointed while still priuati.29 Therefore, in the late first century BC, there was something of a tradition regarding priuati cum imperio and their right to hold a triumph. This last point was strictly connected with the auspication that validated their authority and gave them the right to fight independently under their own auspices. It could not be otherwise, because there was no imperium without auspicium.30 However, this position is apparently challenged by none other than Cicero himself, in two famous passages: Nat. D. 2.9: But nowadays the indifference of the nobility has led to the science of the augury being abandoned; we adhere to the mere forms of the auspices, and despise the truth that they teach. The result is that the most important activities of the State, including the wars that en- 27 28 29 30 Capitol (Livy 41.10.11). The augural division of space usually makes no difference within the ager Romanus, between the inside and the outside of the pomerium, but this sacred line was fundamental for the distinction between the imperium domi and militiae, as testified by the different display of the fasces, with or without the axes, carried by the lictors. The auspication taken before departure for war had to consider the meaning of the pomerium and was, at least de facto, a strictly urban matter; furthermore, it was considered a solemn public act to be performed in daylight, and was probably well attended by the people. About the first triumph Cic. Leg. Man. 61; Livy Per. 89; Gran. Lic. 39B.; Plin. HN 7.96. On the imperia received by Pompey, see Girardet 2001. The lex Pompeia was enforced for just two years and was then replaced by a lex Iulia de prouinciis in 49. Discussion in Girardet 1987, 293-96; Ferrary 2001, 106-107; Dalla Rosa 2003, 216-220; Hurlet 2006a, 476-483; cf. Campanile 2001, 244-245. Among these were P. Vatinius (cos. 47, procos. in Illyricum 45-43 likely not ex consulatu, triumphed in 42), L. Marcius Censorinus (praet. 43, procos. 42-40 most probably not ex praetura, triumphed in 39), C. Sosius (quaest. 39?, procos. in Judaea 38-34, triumphed in 34, cos. 32), C. Norbanus Flaccus (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 36-34 perhaps not ex consulatu, triumphed in 34), L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 34-33, triumphed in 33), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 33-32/31, triumphed in 31 or before). A later confirmation is provided by Tac. Ann. 3.19.3 where Drusus the Younger is said to have left the city and retaken the auspices (repetendis auspiciis) in order to celebrate the triumph assigned to him for his deeds in Illyricum in the years AD 17-19 (cf. CIL 14.4534). This repetitio had been made necessary because Tiberius’ son had entered the city to be present at Germanicus’ funeral, and so had lost the imperium militiae received probably as proconsul two years previously (cf. Hurlet 1997, 215-216). To be able to celebrate the triumph, he had to reactivate his imperium but he could do so only with an auspication outside the pomerium, because his military power was strictly extra-urban. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 251 sure its safety, are conducted without taking the auspices. We no longer take them when crossing rivers, or witnessing flashing spear-points, or when men are summoned for call-up, and that is why soldiers no longer make their wills when geared for battle; our commanders begin their military operations only after dispensing with the auspices (cum auspicia posuerunt) (transl. P. G. Walsh).31 Diu. 2.76-77: Our ancestors would not undertake any military enterprise without consulting the auspices; but now, for many years, our wars have been conducted by pro-consuls and propraetors, who do not have the right to take auspices (qui auspicia non habent). (77) Therefore they have no tripudium and they cross rivers without first taking the auspices. What, then, has become of divining by means of birds? It is not used by those who conduct our wars, for they have not the right of auspices. Since it has been withdrawn from use in the field I suppose it is reserved for city use only! As to divination ex acuminibus, which is altogether military, it was wholly ignored by that famous man, Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times and, besides, was a commander-in-chief, as well as a very fine augur (transl. W. A. Falconer).32 Modern scholars have interpreted these texts very differently. The context of both passages is related to the religious negligence of the Roman ruling class of Cicero’s time, something that has resulted in the neglecting of the auspices, both in the public and the private sphere. The passages seem to convey the view that the Republic had tolerated the idea that military campaigns could be conducted by people who not only did not consult the auspices but, worse still, did not even have the right to do so. Much of the interpretation depends on what meaning we give to Cicero’s phrases auspicia habere and auspicia ponere. Recently, M. Tarpin has proposed that both phrases refer to the customary auspications that had to be taken day by day in the course of the military operations.33 In this case auspicia habere would mean ‘consult the auspices’, much like senatum habere or contionem habere, i.e. to gather the Senate or the people for consultation. This interpretation could well apply to Diu. 2.77-78, but could not explain the expression auspicia ponere of Nat. D. 2.9. Many other scholars, A. Giovannini and F. Hurlet among them, have seen in Cicero’s words evidence for a more rigorous interpretation of the augural law,34 31 sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa ueritas auspiciorum spreta est, species tantum retenta; itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in iis bella quibus rei publicae salus continetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia seruantur, nulla ex acuminibus, nulli uiri uocantur, ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt; tum enim bella gerere nostri duces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt. 32 bellicam rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt, cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent. itaque nec amnis transeunt auspicato, nec tripudio auspicantur. ubi ergo auium diuinatio? quae, quoniam ab iis qui auspicia nulla habent bella administrantur, ab urbanis retenta uidetur, a bellicis esse sublata. nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est, iam M. Marcellus ille quinquiens consul totum omisit, idem imperatori idem augur optumus. 33 Tarpin 2003, 287-289. 34 Giovannini 1983, 60; Hurlet 2006b, 161-164; cf. Magdelain 1968, 55. It is unlikely that Cicero could refer here to the lex Pompeia of 52, for its provisions had been in place for too short a time; the passage instead seems to allude to a more general and ancient custom, that 252 Alberto Dalla Rosa an interpretation similar to that of another important augur, M. Valerius Messalla. A statement made by Messalla is reported by Varro, according to which no one but a magistrate could take the auspices. This would mean that, in Messalla’s view, priuati cum imperio and presumably all consuls and praetors whose imperium had been prorogued could not take the auspices.35 But, if a prorogued magistrate had no right to auspicate, then his power had to be considered void. A similar position was defended by the consuls of 187 BC, M. Aemilius Lepidus and C. Flaminius. Livy reports that they complained in the Senate over the prorogation of their predecessors in Macedonia and Asia, saying that, if Rome wanted to maintain an army in those regions, it had to be led by the consuls and not by private men.36 Prorogued magistrates could not act inside the city, because their magistracy had expired and therefore they had ‘deposed’ their auspicia urbana. For a strict traditionalist, a magistracy was marked by a series of actions that were to be carried out inside the pomerium, or at least in the ager Romanus. Cicero himself did not want to go to a province during his consulship, giving a central significance to the political and urban role of the supreme magistracy. However there was, as we have seen, a vigorous series of interpretations and precedents that allowed prorogued magistrates to exist and to fight under their own auspicia, and this was the case for the priuati cum imperio as well. The opinions of Cicero and Messalla were and remained largely academic, and it is very unlikely that they could be adopted tout court by Octavian to justify his supremacy over the proconsuls.37 In fact, saying simply that proconsuls like Carrinas had no auspices, was like saying that they had no power at all, because there was no imperium without the right to take the auspices. Imperium that had not been validated by auspication did not exist, as a lex rogata against the auspices did not need to be abrogated, simply because it never existed.38 35 36 37 38 of the magistrates remaining most of the year in the city and leaving for their province only in the last weeks of office. Varr. Ant. Hum. fr. 84 (ap. Non. 92.8): de coelo auspicari ius nemini sit praeter magistratum. Livy 38.42.9-10, with the final sentence: si exercitus in his terris esse placeat, consules iis potius quam priuatos praeesse oportere. For the political context of the passage see Briscoe 2008, 150-153. Cicero did not regret asking for a triumph for his achievements in Cilicia (Fam. 11.1.1) and for this reason remained outside the city until he was sent to recruit news forces to face the invasion of Caesar in 49 (Fam. 16.11.3, 12.5; Att. 7.11.15, 14.2, 15.2, 8.3.4, 11B.1 and 3, 11D.5.9, 11A.2). There were many ways in which a law could be declared to have been passed against the auspices. In general, the claim had to do with the validity of the auspications taken before the convening of the popular assembly, and involved the interpretation of sudden signs from the sky, like thunder. These signs were considered an expression of disapprobation intentionally given by the gods and were therefore called auspicia oblatiua. Cic. Phil. 5.7-8, 16 uses this argument to claim that a law by Antony was passed against the auspices. Apparently, the augur in charge of reporting such auspices was intimidated and did not report what had to be considered a clear sign given by Jupiter through a thunder clap (7: silet augur uerecundus Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 253 Our evidence suggests that during the first decades of the Principate things went on according to the normal Republican praxis, and therefore the cases in which the auspical superiority of Octavian/Augustus seems to be in place were most probably the result of ad hoc measures. These could not be based on a supposed nullity or imperfection of the auspices of the proconsuls, but could only take advantage of Octavian’s constitutional and moral position. For this reason, it is fundamental to try to find some analogous cases, in which we can see two generals with the same imperium fighting one under the auspices of the other. This will be the subject of the next section. 2. THE CONSULS AND THE PROCONSULS: CASES OF SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSPICES F. Hurlet has recently proposed that we should see subordination to the auspices of Augustus only when proconsuls were nominated directly by the emperor and without recourse to the lot, i.e. extra sortem. This happened unquestionably in the case of Cossus Cornelius Lentulus in AD 6-8, who had been nominated by the emperor after a special decree of the Senate had authorised the emperor to choose every provincial governor and to appoint them for two years to face the calamitous series of insurrections that were taking place throughout the Empire.39 According to Hurlet, Augustus was given this prerogative in 19 BC, as a corollary of a reform that set his auspicia as greater (maiora) than those of the proconsuls, considered somewhat invalid for the reasons expressed by Cicero.40 This solution has many merits, but poses two difficulties: the use of the Ciceronian passages quoted above, and its inapplicability to the case of Carrinas for chronological reasons. Nevertheless the connection between the auspical prominence of the emperor and the nomination of the proconsuls in AD 6-8 finds a significant parallel in the status of Octavian in 31 BC. As we saw at the beginning, Caesar’s heir had an unprecedented position in the Republic, as he himself recognises in his Res gestae, and yet it is not his constitutional position that takes centre stage, but his moral one. As Octavian wrote, his intention was not to gain a greater potestas over his colleagues in the magistracies, but to define his prominence by exploiting his extraordinary auctoritas.41 This grew enormously after the coniuratio of Italy and the western provinces, but probably much more when almost the whole Senate (except those who deserted to join Antony) and a good number of equites fought with him in the campaign. In other words, the whole of the Republic was fighting under his guidance, that is under his own auspicia. A hint to sine collegis de auspiciis. quamquam illa auspicia non egent interpretatione; Ioue enim tonante cum populo agi non esse fas quis ignorat?). 39 Cass. Dio 55.28.2; IRT 301. 40 Hurlet 2006b, 166-173. It remains unclear how the passages of Cicero (Nat. D. 2.9; Diu. 2.77) could be used to justify an inferior status of these auspices, because, as we have seen, they seem to say that proconsuls did not have auspicia at all. 41 RG 34. 254 Alberto Dalla Rosa this effect may be found in the text of the Res gestae itself, when Augustus speaks of the number of senators and equites that fought under his standards (sub signis meis tum militauerint).42 To serve under the standards of a general, and in particular of a consul, meant clearly to be under his auspices, as shown by several passages of Livy.43 A further detail given by the Res gestae is that such a position of prominence was intended to be limited to the war that was won at Actium, and therefore could not be extended beyond this point in time.44 Given these elements, Octavian had many arguments to affirm that, from the beginning of his third consulship to September 2nd, the date of the victory of Actium, every military action conducted by generals of the Republic had to be placed under his auspices, and therefore any achievement by them had to be referred only to his person. Such a claim would have been unprecedented, but later evidence tells us that in AD 6-8 something similar happened. The year 31 could thus be seen in hindsight, and could furnish a reasonable explanation for Carrinas’ case. In fact, nothing prevents us from placing the achievements of the proconsul of Gaul in the year 31. The provincial fasti are fragmentary for that period, but a two-year tenure of the proconsulship does not seem unreasonable and surely Octavian needed to entrust the Western provinces to his most loyal collaborators before departing for the East.45 The most important question is related to the legal arguments that Octavian could employ to give some strength to his claim. We have already seen the coniuratio Italiae and the fact that the best men of the Republic served under his standards. But further claims could be based on the magistracy that he held at that time, the consulship. Regarding this point, there were some precedents for the subordination of proconsuls to consuls and Octavian probably knew them. According to the regular practice of provincial administration under the Republic, when a magistrate was sent to replace another magistrate of the same rank, the latter had to hand over command and return to Rome.46 A proconsul had the same imperium consulare of the consul that would succeed him, but it was principally a matter of auctoritas that gave strength to the position of the consul.47 Furthermore, it would not have been a good move for a proconsul to go against the 42 RG 25. 43 Livy 28.27.12 (auspicia sub quibus militatis); 36.17.3 (qui in hac eadem prouincia T. Quincti ductu auspicioque militaueritis); in 22.30.5 (sub imperium auspiciumque tuum redeo et signa haec legionesque restituo) Minucius Rufus handed over his standards to the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus as a sign of submission to his auspices, thus providing us with a good example of the equivalence of having one’s own standards and fighting under one’s own auspices. 44 RG 25 refers only to the war that was won in Actium (Italia … belli quo uici ad Actium ducem depoposcit). 45 In the same years we find C. Calvisius Sabinus in Spain (who could have been there from 31 to 28 as postulated by Broughton 1986, 2.421, cf. PIR2 C 352), L. Autronius Paetus in Africa and M. Valerius Messalla as Carrinas’ successor in Gaul. 46 For example Livy 36.37.6, 39.54.3. 47 For this point cf. Staveley 1963, 475-477. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 255 Senate’s decision to replace him with a regular magistrate. This lack of a clear hierarchy between magistrates and promagistrates is probably the principal reason why the instances of consuls and proconsuls operating simultaneously on the same battlefield are very rare. It is not surprising that the examples are predominantly found only in periods of intense military action, such as the Second Punic War. To my knowledge, the first circumstance was the ominous campaign that led to the defeat of Cannae. At the beginning of 216 BC Cn. Servilius Geminus and M. Atilius Regulus, the consuls of the previous year, were left in Apulia to control Hannibal’s movements, while the new consuls recruited new men for the army. Both arrived in Cannae probably at the beginning of the summer, joining the two proconsuls. At this point Livy notes that Geminus and Regulus had already had their imperium prorogued, while Polybius states that they were made antistrategoi by the consul L. Aemilius Paullus.48 The word used by the Greek historian is not immediately understandable, but in any case cannot be taken as a formal degradation of the two former consuls, first of all for procedural reasons. A degradation of imperium could have hardly been possible without the participation of the people, and the delegation of praetorian imperium would seem very strange, if not absurd, to a person that already held consular power.49 Furthermore, Livy refers to Servilius simply as prioris anni consul, giving the impression of a normal prorogation.50 Nevertheless, both Livy and Polybius make it clear that Servilius was a subordinate of the two consuls that led the operations. The battle ended up being the worst defeat in Roman history and Servilius himself, commanding the centre of the army, fell during the course of it. A second case occurred in 204 and again in relation to Hannibal’s dangerous presence in Italy. The consul P. Licinius Crassus Dives was sent against Hannibal in Bruttium in 205. At the beginning of the next year, the Senate decided to leave him in place to control the enemy until it seemed appropriate to his successor, the consul P. Sempronius.51 After he arrived in the ager Crotoniensis, Sempronius did not seek the proconsul’s help and clashed alone with Hannibal’s forces. Being defeated, he contacted Crassus and ordered him to join his forces for the next battle. With two armies, Sempronius did not hesitate and attacked again, leading the 48 Livy 22.34.1; Polyb. 3.106.2. 49 Contra Brennan 2000, 640-41. Concerning the role of the people, we have the example of an increase of imperium in 217, when the authority of the magister equitum Minucius Rufus was made equal to that of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus (Livy 22.25.10), and perhaps in 215, when the people may have given an imperium pro consule to the praetor M. Claudius Marcellus (cf. Brennan 2000, 192; Dalla Rosa 2003, 207); other interventions concerned the complete abrogation of the powers of a certain magistrate (cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.629). As all these cases present exceptional circumstances, we cannot speak of strict rules, but it seems clear that the modification of someone’s imperium could not be simply arranged by another magistrate. 50 The same opinion is expressed by Jashemski 1950, 102 n. 102 and Walbank 1957, 1.435. 51 Livy 29.13.3: quoad eum in prouincia cum imperio morari consuli e re publica uisum esset. 256 Alberto Dalla Rosa assault, while Crassus remained behind, ready to bring help if necessary.52 In this way, the consul alone could be said to have reported the victory, and probably he was well aware that an active participation of the proconsul could have resulted in an unwanted claim to share the honour deriving from the success. In fact, such a dispute would not have been unpredictable, given the precedent of 242, when the praetor Q. Valerius Falto won a naval battle against the Carthaginians while the consul C. Lutatius Catulus remained inactive. Falto argued that he deserved the triumph, but after much debate the Senate decide that it was the consul that had to be credited with the victory because of his superior imperium and auspicium.53 On the basis of this precedent and given that the assignment of a triumph was often a matter of dispute, Sempronius did not rely much on the superiority given to him by the Senate and, considering the consular status of his collaborator, preferred to avoid every risk and so acted alone.54 The third and final case is another Roman defeat, this time at Arausio in 105 BC. Q. Servilius Caepio had received Gaul as his consular province the year before, but refused to hand over his command to the new consul Cn. Manlius Maximus. The Senate had sent him with the intention of replacing the proconsul (as is clearly indicated by the use of metepempsato by Cassius Dio) and therefore no collaboration had been planned. However Manlius had no formal power to dismiss Servilius, for the two generals had the same imperium consulare. Servilius clearly did not consider the prominence of the magistrate to be enough to concede the supreme command to him. Therefore the two Roman armies were prepared to fight separately against the Cimbri, and Servilius tried in every way to take a position between the consul and the enemy, because, as Cassius Dio reports, he had ‘the evident intention of being the first to join battle and so of winning all the glory of the war’.55 These examples seem to offer little help in solving the problem of Octavian’s auspical prominence in the Republic at the time of Actium. Anyway, if we have to think about Roman religion and warfare, precedents can be very important and these examples can give us some precious evidence. The first thing that has to be noted is that it was the consul, the regular magistrate, that was always meant to be the commander-in-chief (strategos autokrator) in case of any collaboration with a proconsul. This seems quite logical in a period when the consuls still had a central role in the fabric of the State and especially in the conduct of military campaigns. But, apart from the case of Cannae in which it seems that the Senate was in favour of maintaining the former consuls in the field, any joint action resulted from the decision of one of the generals: the consul in the 52 Livy 29.36.6-9. 53 Val. Max. 2.8.2. The fasti attribute the triumph to both magistrates (InscrIt 13.1.76-77; Stewart 1998, 120-122). This is a clear sign that, despite the differences in levels of imperium, consuls and praetors were independent generals by their nature, as was pointed out by Last 1947, 159; Staveley 1963, 471. 54 Cf. recently Beard 2007, 206-214. 55 Cass. Dio 27.91.1-3. More concise accounts of the event are provided by Livy Per. 67; Flor. 1.38.4; Gran. Lic. 17B; Eutr. 5.1.1; Oros. 5.16.17. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 257 case of the year 204, the proconsul in the case of 105. The case of Arausio is particularly interesting, because it shows all the problems of the archaic system of the Roman magistracies when it had to face the administration of a large empire, which needed to be carried out by many officials. Servilius Caepio could argue that his imperium was equal to that of Manlius, but his deliberate aim was to obtain the glory of a triumph. Had his troops fought under the consul’s standard, then he would have definitively lost the right to fight under his own auspicia. Given the absence of strict regulations for the awarding of triumphs, his only chance to keep his hopes alive was to attack first and to keep Manlius away from the enemy, in order to prevent him from having any claim to the possible victory. Nevertheless, the main question remained the determination of whether he was fighting under his own auspices or not. A hierarchy was actually put in place at the battle of Cannae. The consuls had the leadership and the proconsul Servilius was clearly subordinate to them. The subordination meant in the first place that Servilius had to fight under the auspices of the consuls (actually under those of the consul that had his turn in the daily rotation of the auspices).56 That, and not any change of the level of imperium, was the only formal way to set the leadership among the three generals pari imperio. Unfortunately the tremendous defeat meant that no triumph could be celebrated and so we cannot see which general would have been credited with victory had there been one, but unquestionably it could not have been Servilius. In 204 the Senate did not envisage any collaboration between the consul Sempronius Tuditanus and the proconsul Licinius Crassus, but left it to the magistrate’s discretion. The consul did not dismiss Crassus, but nevertheless preferred to exclude him from the actual fighting against Hannibal. On this occasion as well the two generals had joined their armies and there should not have been any doubt that the battle had to be fought under Sempronius’ auspices. Anyway the consul avoided any kind of participation in the victory and made all contact between Crassus and the enemy impossible, just to make sure that the proconsul could not be a contender for any honour deriving from the victory. A second aspect that has to be pointed out is that the consuls seem not to have had a theoretical auspical superiority. It was always a concrete situation of danger that made the Senate decide for a joint action of two or more generals, thus creating the conditions for a hierarchy of the auspicia. Furthermore, the auspical superiority was strictly connected to the province assigned: according to the cases discussed above, it seems that it was only when a consul was given the same prouincia as a proconsul that the auspices of the former were intended to be maiora than those of the latter. The importance of these precedents for Octavian’s likely claim to be strategos autokrator of the whole of the Republic in 31 is related to the central role that they give to the consulship as the only magistracy capable of having greater aus56 According to Polyb. 3.110.4, 113.1; Livy 22.45.5; Plut. Fab. Max. 15, Varro was the commander in chief on that day; App. Hann. 19 agrees with this view, but reports that Varro eventually left the command to Aemilius Paullus. 258 Alberto Dalla Rosa pices than those of other generals pari imperio. It is well known that between 31 and 23 BC Octavian/Augustus made use of the consulship as the principal instrument to administer the Republic.57 In 27 he received an extraordinary number of provinces, which he governed by virtue of his consular imperium, like his father Caesar in 59. As consul he could summon the Senate and he passed many acts of legislation by virtue of his ius agendi cum populo and cum patribus, something that he later did on the basis of his tribunicia potestas.58 The consular powers were just one aspect of the plan that Octavian put in place to redefine his position in the Republic after the expiration of the triumvirate. Despite the unprecedented set of powers that he had, Octavian still wanted to appear more as the princeps or rector rei publicae outlined in Cicero’s works.59 This figure, according to Cicero, should exercise his good influence on the State principally by virtue of his moral qualities and of his auctoritas. His political action should follow regular Republican practice and therefore the Senate and the civic magistracies were to remain valuable instruments. In particular, the consulship played a key role in the description of the ideal constitution, as is outlined in the third book of the De legibus. The consuls possess a regium imperium (limited only by the tribunician intercession), the militiae summum ius, and their supreme goal is the safety of the people.60 In another passage Cicero restates that the consuls have supreme power and all other magistrates must obey them, with the exception of the plebeian tribunes.61 The special position of the consuls, this time in relation to the assigning of the provinces, occurs again in a letter to Atticus62 and in the Philippics,63 where Cicero clearly states that every province should be at the consuls’ disposal. The words he uses in the two passages are different: in the former he speaks of the consul’s right to be assigned to whatever province he desires; in the latter he seems to imply that the consuls could dispose of, and have power over, every province, even if not assigned to them. This last passage could be seen 57 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.2. 58 Further evidence is provided by the case of the denial of the spolia opima to M. Licinius Crassus. A solution to the controversy about the legitimacy of Crassus’ claim is far from being reached, and I do not intend to risk any new interpretation here. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Livy (4.20.6) reported that Augustus had said that the last person to have dedicated the spolia opima was a consul and not a military tribune. That implied that only a supreme magistrate could receive this honour, because the only two precedents were Romulus, the first king, and M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 222 BC (this is the position held by Syme 1959, 44 [= Syme 1979a, 418], cf. Kienast 1999, 220; for sources cf. Rich 1996, 81 n. 81). This interpretation conveniently excluded any proconsul like Licinius Crassus. 59 See the famous passage of RG 34: post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt (‘After that time, I exceeded all in influence, but I had no greater power than the others who were colleagues with me in each magistracy’). On the importance of Cicero’s political thought for Augustus’ consular principate see Grenade 1951 and De Francisci 1968. 60 Cic. Leg. 3.8. 61 Cic. Leg. 3.16. 62 Cic. Att. 8.15.3. 63 Cic. Phil. 4.4.9. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 259 as evidence for a formal superiority of the imperium of the consuls over that of the provincial governors, but the context of the passage is largely polemical and, despite the general tone of the sentence, there is clear reference to the province of Gaul, to which Antony wanted to be assigned in place of the proconsul D. Brutus. Cicero’s assessments did not reflect actual practice but were the result of his own thinking about magistracies. In fact we know that the provisions of the lex Sempronia did not give the consuls the chance to get any province but only those already defined as consular by the Senate before the election. The reforms of 52 by Pompey and of 49 by Caesar do not seem to have introduced any kind of freedom of choice for the consuls.64 Cicero’s view seems then to be heavily influenced by his own political reflections on the consulship.65 Another aspect has to be stressed and it concerns the role given to the promagistrates by Cicero. To put it simply, there is no place at all for prorogued magistrates in Cicero’s ideal Roman State. This may be better understood if we look again at the two passages from the De natura deorum and from the De diuinatione cited above. Cicero expressed there his doubts about the validity of the auspices of the promagistrates. Following the augural tradition very strictly, he thought that there were no auspices other than those of the civic magistrates and therefore measures like prorogation or the bestowing of imperium on private men were seen as aberrations and simply could not exist. It has to be said that this extreme conservatism was limited to political theory, because in practice Cicero was keen to accept and promote compromises. He certainly knew very well that the empire could not be effectively governed without the continuous prorogation of the imperium of consuls and praetors and with the occasional creation of extraordinary commands, such as those of Pompey. Nevertheless he dreamed of a Republic in which the consuls guided the city with the Senate in every aspect: military, political and moral. The emphasis that he put on his own consulship of 63 confirms this view of the magistracy. In that fateful moment for the State, Cicero took responsibility for breaking one of the principles of the Republic, the prohibition of capital punishment without the people’s permission, because he was convinced that his duty as consul was to preserve at any cost the safety of the Roman people. The safety of the people was the supreme law (suprema lex) for a consul, and only this fact could justify an extraordinary measure.66 It is time to try to sum up the results of these first two sections. According to Octavian’s propaganda, in 31 BC Caesar’s heir was not only leading a Roman 64 After the lex Pompeia the provinces continued to be designated by the Senate, as confirmed by Caes. B Gall. 1.6.5. On the lex Iulia see Girardet 1987. 65 On this argument see Dyck 2004, 456-457. As shown by the excellent analysis of Powell 2001, 32-37, in the exposition of the laws of the ideal State Cicero gradually assumed a universal perspective, using more general language in the definition of the magistracies. Referring to virtually any State with a mixed constitution, the role of the supreme magistrates (sometimes called consuls, sometimes praetors or iudices) was that of representing monarchy, with all that that entailed in terms of the extent of their powers. 66 The connection of this passage with the practice of the senatusconsultum ultimum is discussed in Dyck 2004, 458-459. 260 Alberto Dalla Rosa army, but the Roman State itself in a great battle for survival against an Eastern monarchy. The Senate and many equites were under his direct command. Italy and the Western provinces had sworn to support him in this crucial battle. He came and won, and won again in Alexandria. Upon his return he celebrated a triple triumph, something that put him on the same level as Romulus, the founder of the city. How does Carrinas’ case fit in to this chain of events? The solution proposed above assumes that the achievements of the proconsul of Gaul date to 31 and that Octavian exploited his extraordinary position to place all military action in every province under his own auspicia. Any reconstruction of how this could have happened must remain hypothetical, but it is nonetheless worth offering a possible outline of events. Octavian, after his return to Rome, took an unexpected move and celebrated Carrinas’ victory among his other achievements in the first triumph. The extraordinary political, moral and military status that he held at Actium could justify this, as could the appropriate interpretation of those precedents which suggested that the consuls had greater auspicia than any other generals. He may have found further support in Cicero’s political theory about the supremacy of the consuls over the other magistrates. With this act Octavian intended to force the Senate to accept a new kind of prominence for the consulship and, indirectly, for him. The second case, of Carrinas’ triumph of 28, which took place three years after his achievements in Gaul, could be seen as the result of a compromise. The Senate may have conceded to Octavian that he had the right to celebrate that particular victory because of his extraordinary position as leader of the entire Republic, but did not make Carrinas a subordinate, considering his auspicia still independent and thus giving him the honour he deserved. Whether this solution is likely or not, it remains unclear how and why Octavian decided to add Carrinas’ achievements to his own. Normally, it was the Senate that gave the authorisation for a triumph, and therefore it should have had the last word on the achievements that deserved to be celebrated. Rather than being defined by strict rules, the right to hold a triumph was based on a customary set of requirements, whose interpretation could always be subject to the actual political circumstances, as we have seen with the priuati cum imperio. In some cases, magistrates took the initiative themselves and celebrated a triumph without having previously been allowed to do so by the assembly.67 If the Senate acted in favour 67 This is a point well stressed in the recent monograph by Beard 2007, 187-218. Nevertheless, the author goes too far and argues that there were no real rules for the assigning of triumphs in the Republic; this statement is unnecessarily derived from the critique of later attempts to reconstruct a clear ius triumphandi. Even if customary, some of the requirements were clear enough and concerned chiefly the status of the general (independent or subordinate) and the importance of the victory itself. Both aspects could be interpreted in a more or less strict sense, but we are nonetheless able to say that the possession of independent auspices was a fundamental requisite and that generals with delegated imperium (i.e. legates) were never able to triumph; Beard 2007, 298, 390 n. 23, following Cass. Dio 48.42.4 and 49.21.2-3 wrongly thinks that Cn. Domitius Calvinus and P. Ventidius Bassus triumphed as legates of one of the triumvirs, but they were certainly proconsuls as is shown by the triumphal fasti Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 261 of Octavian already in 29 – thus acknowledging the extension of Octavian’s auspicia to the entire Republic – then a second triumph for the same victory, this time celebrated by Carrinas, would have seemed very odd. Probably then, the Senate was not consulted at all and had to face the difficult situation created by Octavian’s unexpected move. Caesar’s heir still had a great share of power, but he needed to avoid the possibility that, with the end of the emergency status for the Republic, his opponents could demand the revocation of any extraordinary power and a return to normal political practice. Nevertheless, Octavian’s attempt did not completely achieve his goal: the Senate recognised the validity of his triumph and therefore of the extension of his auspicia to the entire Republic for the period up to the battle of Actium, but did not downgrade Carrinas’ auspices to a lower level. After this episode, triumphs continued to be awarded regularly to every proconsul who deserved them, and Carrinas’ case remained isolated until a new serious military crisis occurred. 3. AUGUSTUS’ CONSULAR PREROGATIVES OF 19 BC AND THE COSSUS INSCRIPTION In AD 6-8 a tremendous series of riots rocked a very large number of provinces in the empire. The pirates renewed their activity, the Isaurians ravaged some of their neighbouring regions, disorder broke out in Africa and Germany, riots began in an indeterminate number of cities, and among the Dalmatians and the Pannonians. This dangerous series of upheavals forced Tiberius to come back from his campaign in the heart of German territory and forced the Senate to decide to hand over to Augustus the nomination of every proconsul, and to extend their service to two years instead of one.68 As we have seen above, an inscription from Lepcis Magna reveals that Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, one of the proconsuls appointed for two years by Augustus in AD 6, celebrated a victory over the Gaetulians, but fought under Augustus’ auspices.69 The text of the inscription tell us that the war had been won under the command of the proconsul (ductu … Cossi Cornelii Lentuli … procos.), but under the auspices of Augustus (auspiciis imp. Caesaris Aug.).70 (InscrIt 13.1.632-633, 636); for Calvinus cf. also RRC 532/1 and CIL 2.6186; for Bassus cf. Schumacher 1985, 194-197. On the relationship between the triumvirs and the proconsuls cf. Roddaz 1996, 82-87. 68 Cass. Dio 55.28.1-2. 69 Cossus’ campaign is briefly described by Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4. 70 IRT 301: Marti Augusto sacrum | auspiciis Imp(eratoris) Caesaris Aug(usti) | pontificis maxumi patris | patriae ductu Cossi Lentuli | co(n)s(ulis) XVuiri sacris faciundis | proco(n)s(ulis) prouincia Africa | bello Gaetulico liberata | ciuitas Lepcitana. We cannot doubt the official character of this text (cf. Hurlet 2000, 1515-1516). The inscription mentions the traditional formula ‘under the command and the auspices’ (ductu auspicioque) frequently used for Roman generals (for example Livy 28.16.14; other sources in Hurlet 2000, 1518 n. 23), but in this case the two elements are distinguished and referred to two different persons, reflecting a precise legal difference that was officially defined. The same distinction 262 Alberto Dalla Rosa Many scholars have already pointed out the importance of this text for the study of the relationship between the proconsuls and the emperor, and some interpretations also call into play the passages of Cicero quoted above.71 However, we have seen already that Cicero’s words do not reflect the real position of the proconsuls in the Republic. A comparison with Carrinas’ case could, in contrast, shed some useful light on the matter. As in 31 BC, so in AD 6-8 the State was under great military pressure that could potentially affect Italy. To face the danger, the Senate decided to give Augustus some of the powers that he had enjoyed in the triumviral period, such as the right to nominate every provincial governor, thus temporarily suspending the traditional allotment of the proconsular provinces. Furthermore, Cossus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that his campaign against the Gaetulians and probably every other military action, both in the proconsular and in the imperial provinces, were placed under Augustus’ auspices. This fact did not make the proconsuls the immediate subordinates of the emperor: their imperium remained consular and continued to derive from the people, and their auspices were always of the same status as before. Augustus would not have been in direct command of every province, but nevertheless every victory would have been credited to him and to no one else. By AD 6, Augustus’ position in the State was much more secure and clearer than thirty-five years previously. Furthermore, the last triumph assigned to a general who was not a member of the imperial family was twenty-five years in the past. By AD 6, victory was something that belonged exclusively to the emperor and his family and this fact required that the Senate find a new solution that could save the existence of the proconsular provinces while giving to Augustus the right to claim every military achievement for himself.72 At this point, Carrinas’ case could have constituted a useful precedent, because of the many similarities between the two emergency situations of 31 BC and AD 6. One important difference was the position of Augustus himself. After his abdication from the consulship in 23, the princeps had decided to found his power on a different basis from the monopoly of the supreme magistracy. Between 23 is made by Flor. 2.31 when he says that ‘[Augustus] suppressed the Musulami and Gaetulians, who dwell near the Syrtes, under the command of Cossus’ (Cosso duce). 71 Syme 1946, 156 (= Syme 1979a, 192); De Martino 1972-75, 4.185-186; Syme 1979b, 308 (= Syme 1984, 1198); Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 9 and 44-45; Raaflaub 1987, 261 n. 30; Bleicken 1990, 89-90; for the use of Cicero’s evidence, cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101; Magdelain 1968, 55-56; Hurlet 2001, 173-74; Hurlet 2006b, 167-173. I prefer not to refer to the spolia opima of Licinius Crassus in 29 BC: as said before, the case is complex and probably over-interpreted by Cassius Dio. 72 The last triumph awarded to a proconsul was in 19 BC (L. Cornelius Balbus, from Africa). There is still some controversy among those who find a political or a religious reason for the end of the concession of triumphs to generals other than Augustus and his family. For various theories on the monopolisation of the auspices by the emperor, see the bibliography cited above n. 16, and also Gagé 1930a, 1-35, Gagé 1930b, 166-167, Gagé 1933, 2-11 (who connects it with the conferring of Augustus’ name); Giovannini 1983, 43-44 and 77-79; Konrad 1994, 155-159; Rich 1996, 102-103. A purely political motivation is argued for by Eck 1984, 139 and Eck 2006, 59; see also Beard 2007, 295-305. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 263 and 19 a series of powers and prerogatives was granted to Augustus, who could still act in as many areas as he could have done before, when he was consul.73 However, he did not hold the consulship after 23, apart from on a few occasions, and therefore could not exploit any more the argument of the pre-eminence of this magistracy and all the precedents that gave to the consuls greater auspices than those of the proconsuls. Despite that, it is likely that Augustus found this particular consular privilege again among the others that were conferred on him in 19 BC, when Cassius Dio tells us that he received a generic consular authority (exousia ton hupaton).74 The interpretation of this grant is controversial and I do not intend to go into the details of every possible consequence of this crucial decision. My intention is to focus on a particular aspect, one related to some tasks that were the duties of the consuls and that nevertheless Augustus could perform after receiving the exousia. Cassius Dio reports that after this grant Augustus was permanently assigned twelve lictors, like a consul, and could take a seat in the Senate between the two consuls in office. As J.-L. Ferrary pointed out in his fundamental essay on Augustus’ powers, the assumption of the symbols of consular coercitio could not be possible without the corresponding authority.75 Similarly, although it was a purely symbolic measure, the fact that he could sit between the consular pair was of great importance, as it almost made Augustus into a third consul. Still, the princeps was not a consul: he could not preside over consular elections and could summon the Senate or the people by means of his tribunicia potestas only, and not by means of the ius agendi cum patribus or cum populo that was proper to the magistrates. As many scholars have already shown, the grant of 19 BC did not give Augustus any new powers, but probably extended to the city and Italy some of the powers that he already possessed, that is the imperium consulare and the iurisdictio uoluntaria proper of the provincial governor residing outside his province.76 Moreover, one can say that the imperium consulare that Augustus continued to possess as a promagistrate was elevated to a higher dignity, namely that of the consuls. The exousia ton hupaton would be then the grant to use his powers to perform tasks that were exclusively conferred upon the consuls for reasons of dignity or because they concerned the Republic in general, such as the census.77 73 Among these powers and prerogatives were the annually renewed tribunicia potestas and an imperium greater than that of any proconsul whose province he visited: see Ferrary 2001, 130-141. 74 Cass. Dio 54.10.5. 75 Ferrary 2001, 124; the statement is based on Dig. 1.16.1 (on the possession of the proconsular insigna); 1.16.16 (on the deposition of the imperium when trespassing the pomerium); 1.16.2 pr. (on jurisdictional prerogatives outside the assigned province); see also Cass. Dio 53.13.4. 76 Cf. Jones 1951, 13-15; Cotton-Yakobson 2002, 196-203; Eck 2006, 58. The levelling of Augustus’ imperium with that of the consuls is suggested by Girardet 1990b, 120-121. 77 One of these tasks could have been the conducting of the general censuses of 8 BC and AD 14, that Augustus held consulari cum imperio (RG 8). He did hold a census in 28, during his sixth consulship. There is no doubt that, as consul, Octavian could receive censorial powers, as did the consuls of 75 when they were made responsible for the locatio of Sicily’s uectiga- 264 Alberto Dalla Rosa What is important for us is that the reform of 19 gave the consular dignity back to Augustus even without the corresponding magistracy and therefore made it possible for him to exploit once again all the precedents concerning the auspical superiority of the consuls over the proconsuls. This privilege could have had a very broad impact on many different areas and was not primarily concerned with the auspices of the emperor. But the unexpected emergency of AD 6 required a drastic measure and it was then that the prerogative that had been granted to Augustus twenty-five years earlier provided a fundamental basis for finding a solution to the crisis. From that moment on Augustus had another way of securing his prominence over the other imperium-holders without making them imperial legates, thus preserving the traditional façade of the Republic. Following this case, the subordination of a proconsul to the emperor’s auspices recurred on at least two more occasions, both involving the province of Africa, and the proconsuls M. Junius Blaesus in 21-23 and Ser. Sulpicius Galba in 44-46 respectively. Both proconsuls were appointed extra ordinem for a two-year period and were sent to face difficult military situations: Blaesus had to deal with the dangerous raids of Tacfarinas, while Galba had to bring security again to a province troubled by internal unrest and by the incursions of nomadic populations. For these cases we have good evidence from a passage of Velleius and a probable imperial acclamation for Claudius.78 There may be other cases, but I would not argue that the auspical submission was used so frequently: by 11-10 BC, if not earlier, only the proconsul of Africa was left in command of legionary troops, while the other senatorial provinces had only a few auxiliary units;79 this meant that a proconsul was rarely engaged by the enemy and therefore it was de facto very difficult for him to achieve a victory that could entitle him to a triumph. As a result, the emperor did not need to fear the competition of these governors and could leave them independent, apart from on a very few occasions, such as those lia (Cic. Verr. 2.1.130 and 2.3.18-19). Similarly, the lex portorii indicates that the consuls had the same task, this time in relation to the province of Asia, in 73 as well, and other passages of the same text show that many subsequent revisions of the locationes were made by consuls (cf. Kunkel-Wittmann 1995, 329-330; see now Cottier 2008, 4-8). That means that, in a period in which no censors were elected, some of the competencies of these magistrates were passed on to the consuls and that was what happened also in 28. For the next two censuses, Augustus was not consul, but nevertheless could perform the operations. As he himself says, he was still in possession of his consulare imperium, which was nothing other than the same power that he enjoyed as promagistrate from 24 and that was freed by the traditional limit of the pomerium in 23. He was technically a proconsul and no proconsul was ever given a task of general concern for the State like conducting a census. However, the exousia ton hupaton of 19 gave Augustus the dignity to perform such assignments. He did not need any new power, because his imperium was still valid and adequate for the task. What he needed was the permission to use that power, as if he was a consul. 78 On the military action against Tacfarinas, see Vell. Pat. 2.129.4; on Blaesus’ appointment, see Tac. Ann. 3.32-35. On the subordination see Eck 1999, 225; contra Hurlet 2006b, 94 and 169 n. 178. For Claudius’ acclamation see Kienast 1996, 91; cf. Mattingly 1968, 1.125 no. 116-121. 79 Cass. Dio 54.34.4; Syme 1934 (= Syme 1971, 40-72); Hurlet 2006b, 135-147. Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 265 involving Blaesus and Galba. The auspical subordination was then the best compromise and it was only on those few occasions that this ad hoc measure was adopted. A permanent auspical superiority would have been unnecessary and could have given rise to some resentment among the senatorial class. 4. CONCLUSIONS To sum up, the reconstruction proposed here for explaining how the auspical superiority of the princeps was put in place relies upon a certain degree of conjecture, as the paucity of ancient evidence inevitably creates great uncertainty. Cossus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that such a subordination was a fact at the end of Augustus’ reign. Some scholars have deduced from two passages in Cicero’s writings about religion that the auspices of the promagistrates were somewhat vitiated and have used these statements as a key argument to justify the imperial superiority. As I have tried to show, Cicero’s passages were largely polemical and very conservative in the interpretation of augural law and therefore cannot provide evidence for Republican practice. Had Cicero’s principles been used, the whole category of proconsuls would have disappeared, but much evidence confirms that the proconsuls continued to enjoy full auspical autonomy. The vindication of the superiority of Augustus must therefore be founded elsewhere and, as far as we can see, the only available precedents all concern cases in which, for different reasons, consuls were given auspical prominence over proconsuls, without diminishing in any way the imperium of the promagistrates. In the face of this new political interpretation of some of the religious foundations of the Republic, the augurs as a college of priests did not and could not express any kind of opposition and this is the reason why they do not appear in our sources; nevertheless such an arrangement could not have been reached without any debate about different antiquarian views of the augural discipline concerning magistracies and triumphs. The cryptic reference of Cassius Dio to a victory in Gaul celebrated by both Octavian and Carrinas could hint at the first attempt to achieve what we know became a reality in AD 6. The arguments that the future prince could have used to justify the celebration of Carrinas’ victory were his position as consul, the large number of senators and knights fighting under his standards, the precedents about the auspical superiority of the consulship and Cicero’s political thought about the prominence of the supreme magistracy. The extreme danger that threatened the Republic gave the best pretext for Octavian’s claim. The actual events cannot be reconstructed, but everything probably ended in a compromise. The definitive recognition came thirty-five years later. At the time Augustus was no longer consul, but the grant of exousia ton hupaton in 19 BC gave him the same dignity as a consul. Roman religion, always strictly bound to Roman political life, and the sacral conduction of warfare gave Augustus a powerful instrument to eliminate every possible threat to his position from the military achievements of the proconsuls. 266 Alberto Dalla Rosa One last word has to be said about the actual procedure that was followed to secure auspical superiority for the emperor. Obviously there had to be a decision of the Senate, like that of AD 6, but this could not be enough. In fact, we know from the episode of Arausio that a proconsul could refuse to join the consul’s forces and could then remain independent; a personal submission seems therefore to be required, as shown in 217 BC by the case of Minucius Rufus, the magister equitum of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus. 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