British, French and Italians, wary allies

ACTA 2019 UNSETTLED PROBLEMS AFTER THE 1919 PEACE CONFERENCE Military Conflicts and Diplomatic Negotiations 45th International Congress of Military History 18-23 August 2019 Sofia, Bulgaria INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY BULGARIAN COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY ACTA 2019 UNSETTLED PROBLEMS AFTER THE 1919 PEACE CONFERENCE Military Conflicts and Diplomatic Negotiations 45th International Congress of Military History 18-23 August 2019 Sofia, Bulgaria 2020 1 Editors: Jordan Baev Dimitar Minchev © Bulgarian Commission of Military History, 2020 © Jordan Baev, Dimitar Minchev, editors, 2020 © VELES PUBLISHING Ltd, 2020 ISBN 978-954-302-088-1 2 International Commission of Military History President Prof. Dr. Massimo de Leonardis (ITA) Vice-presidents Dr. Hans Pawlisch (USA) Dr. Efpraxia Paschalidou (GRC) Treasurer Prof. Dr. Jan Hoffenaar (NLD) Secretary General LtCol (GS) Dr. Kris Quanten (BEL) Members Kapitän zu See Dr. Jörg Hillmann (DEU) Prof. Dr. Jean D. Avenel (FRA) Senior Colonel Ke Chunqiao (CHN) Captain (Navy) (Ret) José Maria Blanco Núñez (ESP) Univ.-Doz. Dr. Erwin Schmidl (AUT) Dr. Carmen Sorina Rijnoveanu (ROU) Prof. Chiharu Inaba (JPN) Col (Ret) Willard B. Snyder (BGR) Honorary presidents Prof. Emer. Dr. A. Corvisier (†) (FRA) Dr. C.M. Schulten (NLD) Prof. Emer. Dr. Luc De Vos (BEL) Dr. Piet Kamphuis (NLD) Bibliographical Committee President Dr. Marco Wyss (UK) Military Archives Committee President Michael Steidel (DEU) Educational Committee President Dr. Phil. Michael Olsansky (CHE) 3 Organisational Committee of the XLV Congress of the ICMH: President Ivo Antonov, Director “Social Policy and Policy on Military Patriotic Education” MoD Directorate Vice-President Prof. Dimitar Minchev, Colonel (r) – President BNCMH 4 Members: Colonel (r), Dr. Dobromir Totev, Vice-President BNCMH Prof. Dr. Jordan Baev – Director Academic Programs BNCMH Colonel (r) Willard B. Snyder – Member Bureau ICMH Dr. Veselin Iliev – Finances and Law BNCMH Rumiana Miteva – Director Cultural Programs BNCMH Colonel Antoni Zaprianov – Secretary General BNCMH Secretariat Radoslav Simeonov – historian Christina Alexova – historian Table of contents Редакционна бележка/Editorial Note .................................................................... 9 Address of the President of Republic of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev ......................... 11 Address of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Krasimir Karakachanov ....................................................................................... 13 Inaugural Speech by the ICMH President, Prof. Dr. Massimo de Leonardis ............................................................................ 15 Monday, 19 August Col. (Ret.) Manuel García Cabezas (Spain): L´Espagne et la Première Guerre Mondiale: participation et conséquences .......... 23 Prof. Dr. Jean D. Avenel (France): Interventions alliées durant la guerre d’indépendance en Lettonie ........................ 33 Prof. Dr. Mikkel Kirkebaek (Denmark): Radicalization among Danish war veterans of the Baltic independence wars in 1919 ................................................................. 38 Col. Jose Romero (Spain): War Theory in Europe at the end of the Great War ................................................. 43 Prof. Dr. Erwin Schmidl (Austria): The Presence of Entente Forces in Austria, 1918–1920 .......................................... 55 Col. (Ret.) Willard Snyder (USA): Trying to Make Sense of The German Freikorps and It’s Influence on German History after WWI................................................................................. 63 Prof. Dr. Lasse Laaksonen (Finland): War and peace – the Åland Islands dispute 1917–1922........................................... 67 Lt. Col. Flavio Carbone (Italy): Carabinieri Mobile Battalions in the aftermath of the First World War................... 71 Prof. Dr. Nikolay Nikiforov (Russia): The 1919 Paris Peace Conference and New Problems of European Security ................................................................ 78 Dr. Efpraxia Paschalidou (Greece): Allied mandate to land the Hellenic Army in Smyrna (May 1919): an imminent war ...................................................................................................... 80 Dr. Carmen Rijnoveanu (Romania): Romania between the Treaty of Bucharest and Paris Peace Conference: the uneasy path of a small power in the great power game ..................................... 89 BG Dr. Grudi Angelov (Bulgaria): The Treaty of Neuilly and its Impact on the National Power of Bulgaria ..............104 5 Tuesday, 20 August Dr. Paolo Formiconi (Italy): A Ghost wonders around Versailles. The Allies and the Red Russia in 1919 ........117 Dr. Oleg Alpeev (Russia): The building of the Red army as a response to the challenges of the Versailles world order ..................................................................................124 Sr. Col. Zhang Mingcang: (China) The Paris Peace Conference Unsettled Problems and the Communist Party of China ........................................................................129 Amb. Dr. Dumitru Preda (Romania): Romania and the Bolshevik offensive in Europe. The International Dimension of the Romanian Army Campaign in 1919-1920 ...............................135 Prof. Dr. Pasi Tuunainen (Finland): Fighting in subarctic forests: Military expeditions by irredentist Finnish volunteers into Russian Eastern Karelia, 1918–1922 ..............................144 Dr. Francine Saint-Ramond (France): Le rôle de la France à Constantinople – 1919-1920 – d’après les mémoires du général Nayral de Bourgon et les archives de l’Armée française .....................152 Prof. Dr. Mohamed Issa Babana El Alaoui (Morocco): L’impact de la conference de paix de 1919 sur les nationalismes africains par l’absence de la question coloniale: le cas du Maroc .............................................159 Prof. Daniel Abwa (Cameroon): La crise des Régions du Nord-ouest et du Sud-ouest au Cameroun: 2016 à nos jours. Résurgence du partage du Cameroun au Traité de Versailles 178 BG Marco Ciampini (Italy): Weimar- an unsettled problem: the new economic military framework deriving from the peace treaty ............................................................. 190 Prof. Dr. Oreste Foppiani (Switzerland): Italy’s aspirations in the Adriatic Sea in the aftermath of WWI: Impromptu Intelligence and Naval Diplomacy......................................................196 Peter Mulready: (Ireland) Ireland and the Treaty of Versailles .......................................................................214 Prof. Andrew Orr (USA): The Cilician War (1919-1921): The Franco-Turkish War after the Great War .....221 Dr. Giacomo Innocenti (Italy): British, French and Italian, wary allies ..................................................................233 Dr. Gilman Barndollar (USA): “Arabs, Aeroplanes, and Armoured Cars: ” Imperial Policing and Britain’s Interwar Crisis of Empire .................................240 6 Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan (Turkey): Turkey in the Years Following the First World War: from Occupations to Independence, from Moúdhros to Lausanne .........................................................245 Drs. Anselm van der Peet (The Netherlands): HORNET’S NEST SMYRNA 1922-1923. The strange case of Dutch gunboat diplomacy in Turkish waters in the end phase of the Greek-Turkish War/Turkish War of Independence .............................................................................................264 Radoslav Simeonov, Kristina Alexova (Bulgaria): The “Petrich incident” in 1925 and the League of Nations ..................................271 Asist. Prof. PhD Candidate Boyan Zhekov (Bulgaria): Bulgaria and the “secret” military buildup in the Interwar Period .......................278 PhD Candidate Gloria Stoeva (Bulgaria): The Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) and Bulgaria .......................................289 Thursday, 22 August Thomas Hauser (USA): Shattering Siegfried‘s Sword: Imposing Disarmament on Germany from 1918 to 1926..................................................................................................299 Dr. Richard Mayne (Canada): Unresolved issues of Imperial airpower after the First World War: Canada, the United Kingdom and the diplomatic challenges of creating a national air force, 1919 – 1924 ............................................................................................306 Prof. Dr. Bernard Cook, Dr. David W. Moore (USA): The United States and the Creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes: The Role of the Coolidge Mission ........................................................313 Dr. Jorge Manuel Lima da Silva Rocha (Portugal): From the 1919 Peace Conference to the 1926 military dictatorship Portugal and the consequences of the First World War .........................................320 Prof. Allon Klebanoff (Israel): The aircraft – between development and neglect .................................................331 Prof. Dr. Gianluca Pastori (Italy): World War One and its impact in Middle Asia: the Third Afghan war .................336 MG Shen Zhihua (China): The Awakening and Resistance in Turmoil: The Sequelae of Paris Peace Conference and the Rise and Development of China’s Anti-Japanese War ...............................................................................345 Jung Joon Choi (Republic of Korea): Paris Peace Conference and Korea‘s Independence Movement against Japan during the 1920s .............................................................................349 7 Capt. (Guardia Civil) Joaquin Mariano Pellicer Balsalobre (Spain): England´s return to Palestine after the First World War. Reasons, motives and consequences .....................................................................................355 Col. (Res.) Benny Michelsohn (Israel): Military conflicts in Palestine: 1920-1921 and San Remo conference .................374 Dr. Randy Papadopoulos (USA): From Nothing to Something New? Using Institutional Memory in the German Navies, 1918-1945 .................................................................................................379 Thean Potgieter (South Africa): Versailles, imperial interest and national defence in South Africa .......................388 Friday, 23 August Col. Dr. Dalibor Denda (Serbia): Reestablishing of German –Yugoslav relations after World War I .......................401 Dr Andreas Karyos (Cyprus): The Events in Colonial Cyprus in October 1931: the Suppression of a Revolt in the Interwar Years ................................................406 Prof. Dr. Victor Gavrilov (Russia): „The Balkan Tangle“ in the Triangle of Interests in the 1930s ........................... 413 Dr. Enrico Magnani (Italy): The military dimension of League of Nations, the missed opportunity................419 Capt. PhD candidate Nikolai Leontiev (Russia): Munich Agreement and European Security Issues ...............................................432 PhD Candidate Kevin Smythe (Australia): Unsettled Problems after the Peace Conference of 1919: Britain, Japan and The Breaking of The Japanese Air Blockade of Australia 1942-45 ......436 Prof. Dr. Kyengho Son (Republic of Korea): Rethinking the UN Forces during the Korean War: New Discoveries and Different Perspectives ........................................................445 8 Редакционна бележка След като в периода 2012-2016 в България се проведоха успешно три годишни конгреса на Международната комисия по военна история, през август 2019 г. Българската национална комисия по военна история отново бе организатор на поредния световен конгрес на военните историци. В работата на 45-ия конгрес по военна история взеха участие 102 делегати и гости от 30 държави от Европа, Северна Америка, Азия, Близкия изток, Африка и Австралия. Академичната програма бе организирана в 18 паралелни научни сесии и седем заседания на ръководните органи и подкомитети на Международната комисия по военна история. Подобно на предходните международни конгреси по военна история беше организиран и един докторантски семинар с трима участници. Допълнително за чуждестранните гости бе предвидена богата културна програма, която ги запозна с хилядолетното историческо и духовно наследство по българските земи. В заключителния ден на конгреса се проведе и церемонията по награждаване на млади военни историци. Годишната награда на името на първия президент на МКВИ проф. Андре Корвизие бе връчена на Адам Сторинг от Великобритания. В настоящия том с конгресни материали са включени получените в установения срок окончателни варианти на 51 доклада на делегати от 25 държави. В него намират място различни гледни точки и интерпретации за междувоенния период след края на Първата световна война, последователно представени чрез многообразието от проблематични и географски обособени тематични кръгове. 9 Editorial note After three successful Congresses of the International Commission of Military (ICMH) in the period 2012–2016, held in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Commission of Military History (BCMH) organized again in August 2019 the XLV world Congress of the military historians. 102 delegates and guests from 30 countries in Europe, North America, Asia, Middle East, Аfrica and Australia attended the Congress in Sofia. The academic program was organized into 18 parallel academic panels, together with seven sessions of the leading bodies – committees and subcommittees of the ICMH. Similar to the previous international congresses of military history, a doctoral seminar was organized with three participants. For the foreign participants there was organized a rich cultural program, which made them familiar with the historical and spiritual heritage in the Bulgarian lands. At the final day a ceremony for the Corvisier Prize Award for young military historians was organized, received this year by Adam Storting from Great Britain. The current volume of Congress proceedings contains presented the final versions of 51 papers of the delegates from 25 countries, which were received according to the regulations. Different viewpoints and interpretations, presented consequently through the diversity of problematic and geographic thematic circles, covered the interwar period after the end of the First World War. 10 BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIANS, WARY ALLIES Dr. Giacomo Innocenti (Italy) The First World War started in 1914 and the conflict saw the coalition of Great Britain, France, Russia and Serbia – the so-called Entente – fighting against AustriaHungary and Germany, the so-called Central Powers. In the following years more States joined the conflict: the Ottoman Empire chose the Central Powers (1915), so did Bulgaria (1915). On the other side, Japan (1914) and later Romania (1916) joined the Entente (and a number of other minor Powers). Italy was one of the Powers that chose the Entente, in 1915. The Italian choice was made after a long period of negotiation between the Italian Government and the Entente and the Central Powers. It is well known that Italy was part of the Triple Alliance (1882) and this theoretically implied that at the beginning of the war Italy had to fight alongside Austria-Hungary and Germany. In reality Italy had added a ministerial declaration to the Triple Alliance’s treaty (in 1882). In this declaration Italy said that all the clauses envisaged by the treaty would not have applied against Great Britain. As a matter of fact, Italy did not join the fight from the beginning for three reasons: the strategic dependence from the import by sea, mostly controlled by Great Britain, which controlled Gibraltar, Malta and Suez Canal; the difficulty of protecting the extremely long coasts from an attack led by the Royal Navy and the Royal Italian Army’s lack of preparation. During the first year of war Italian Government was in contact with the Entente and the Central Empires, checking which side could give Italy the best options. Germany and Austria-Hungary offered to Italy some borders compensations, Trento and a review of the status of the city of Trieste, but these conditions were not enough for Italian ambitions. Italy wanted the control over Trento, Trieste and the leadership on the Adriatic. After a long period of negotiations, during which the army was mobilized and equipped, Italy chose the Entente, because Great Britain and France guaranteed Italy the possession of the cities of Trento and Trieste with their regions, part of Dalmatia, Valona in Albania, eventually some territories in the Ottoman Empire and some colonial compensation if France and Great Britain gained territories from the German colonial empire. All these concessions were formalized in the London Pact (1915). 233 After the signature of the London Pact, Italy declared war against its former allies. It was the 24 May 1915. Actually, Italy in the first place declared war only against Austria-Hungary. It was only in August 1916 that Italy declared war to Germany. This fact shows that for Italy the only real enemy was Austria-Hungary, and that partially explains why there were so many frictions and differences between Italy, Great Britain and France during the war. The Italian strategic objectives were very different from those of the British and French and that determined the mutual mistrust inside the Entente, situation that badly affected the negotiations between allies at the end of the war. It is well known that war in the Alps was extremely difficult for both sides. Italians and Austro-Hungarians fought at one of the hardest fronts and from the 1915 to the 1917 there were twelve major battles: eleven Italian offensives (so called Cadorna’s “Spallate”) and one led by Austria-Hungary (the Battle of Asiago but is better known as Strafexpedition). At the end of the 1917 Austria-Hungary had almost completely exhausted its resources. The Austrian-Hungarian General Staff was aware that the Imperial Royal Army would not have been able to support another Italian offensive, so Wien asked Germany for help. Germany sent an entire Army (the 14th Army led by Otto von Below) to support a new Austro-Hungarian offensive and there was the Battle of Caporetto, the “Black Day” for the Italian Army. 24th October 1917 the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians made a joint offensive that hit hard the Italian defensive system, causing the dissolution of the entire 2nd Army and a general withdrawal of the Italian Army, which apparently was no longer in a position to resist Central Empires. This moment was extremely important for the situation that occurred after the war. Considering the possibility that the Italian Government asked a truce to Germany and Austro-Hungary, France and Great Britain took the decision to send an important number of divisions to help the Italian resistance. From that moment on, the presence of the Allies in northern Italy partially determined the Italian war and it surely was crucial in the post war contest. During the discussions between the Entente Governments, British and French made clear their intention to take over the control of the strategy over the conflict against AustriaHungary. The Italians tried to oppose this politic, but they had to recognize that their financial and material dependence on France and especially on Great Britain, leave them poor choices but let their Allies to obtain several changes on the Italian front. Even so, Italians managed to maintain their strategic independence, but anyway the presence of the Anglo-French units was a constant remainder of the Italian defeat of Caporetto and was a remainder of the allies’ influence over the Italians’ ambitions. As a matter of fact, during the battle that stopped the German Austro-Hungarian offensive, the so called first battle of the Piave, the Allies did not join the fight, and immediately after the conclusion of the defensive battle they began to recall their divisions in France. During the first battle of the Piave there were eleven Anglo French divisions, six of them French, the others British. 234 Immediately after the battle the major part of these divisions went back to France leaving only five Allies divisions, three of those were British, the remaining two French. These divisions fought in different battles on the Italian sector. In particular they fought in the second battle of the Piave (the so-called Battle of Solstizio) and in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto. Their participation in this last battle was extremely important, not just on a military point of view, but more important for the aftermath of the war on the Italian front. In fact, before the battle were established two new armies, one was the Twelfth French Army and the other was the Tenth British Army. Has to be said: these Armies were not British and French, even if they were called British and French, actually they were mixed units. In the French Army there was a French division with three Italian divisions, in the British Army there were two British divisions with two Italian divisions. Anyway, these Armies were quite important during the battle of Vittorio Veneto. The British in particular had a relevant role in crossing the river Piave, and they were the leading units of part of the general offensive. When the armistice between Italy and Austria-Hungary was signed, the British divisions had overtaken the city of Sacile, and they were the most advanced Entente units in the Venetian-Friulan Plain. All these facts are quite important in order to comprehend the allies’ behaviour immediately after the end of the war. When the battle was over, immediately the British and French began to speak about an Entente victory over the Habsburg or an Anglo-French victory. Not in all cases, but on many occasions the Anglo-French newspapers tried to underline the Entente effort on the Italian sector, trying to hide the prominent role played by Italians. This attitude worried the Italian Government, which had clear in mind what would have happened if this idea had become established. Italian embassies in the main European capitals send reports about the diffusion of articles that tried to diminish the Italian military effort. The aim of this policy was clear: to ensure that the Italian military role was perceived as irrelevant. In this way Paris and London would be able to reject or at least reduce Italian requests. The actual British and French presence in Italy create a particular situation: when the Italian Army began to occupy Austro-Hungarian territories, the AngloBritish divisions cooperated in these operations. With an order: make clear that the occupation was not just an Italian occupation, but an Entente occupation. That was really clear in Dalmatia. During all the First World War, in the Adriatic Sea there was a constant contrast between the Italians and the Allies, in particular with the French. This friction was caused by the French desire to control all the operations in the sector. This request was presented by France because of the previous pact made with Great Britain: in case of war, the operation in the North Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean would be led by the Royal Navy, in the Mediterranean Sea would be the French Fleet in charge of the operations. So that was the tool used by the French to try to control the operation in the Adriatic, where on the other side the Italian Fleet pretend to lead all the operation against the Austro-Hungarian Fleet. 235 This contrast happened because the French did not want that Italy gained the control over the Balkan region, even though they were signatories to the London Pact, which guaranteed to Italy the possession of Dalmatia. This French aim became clear in the last period of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: while Italian Government supported the national independence movements, hoping that they could make the Empire’s collapse by the inside, France supported the Serbs, who were of course enemy of Austria-Hungary, but at the same time they were adversary of the Italian ambition over the Balkan area. In all the period after the war France supported the Serbs instead of the Italians. One of the most important reasons of contrast between Italians and French was the fate of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. As it was said, when the war was over the French immediately supported the new State of the Slovenes, Croatians and Serbs. Before the end of the war the last Habsburg emperor Charles, gave the Austro-Hungarian fleet to the new Balkan state. The Italians hoped to add the Austrian fleet to their units, but the act of the Emperor created a new and unexpected situation. The Italians protested for that action, but the French and the British did not help Italy in this case, and they let that the Austro-Hungarian fleet became Yugoslav. Before and after this episode, Italian navy officers complained about an overly friendly attitude of the French towards the Yugoslavs, clearly showing that they would support the interest of the new state, not the Italians’ war aim. The French objective was to be sure that the Italian fleet was not the strongest actor in the Adriatic Sea, and therefore the power which could control the Balkan area. Considering all these situations it is not a surprise that the Italian occupation of Dalmatia was not supported by the French. As a matter of fact, there were different cases in which the French directly helped the Yugoslavs. Meanwhile, what was the attitude of the British towards Italy? During the war the attitude of the British towards the Italians was surely less conflictual than the French. This was clear when the participation of the Allies in Italy after the Battle of Caporetto occurred. During the period between the First battle of the Piave and the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, the British, although they did not really appreciate Italians, maintained a good relationship with the Italian Army. In light of this good relationship between the two parties the Italians believed that the British would support their claims over Dalmatia and the other territories claimed by Italy. The reality was quite different. As has been described, the Allies pretended show that the new occupations were Entente actions, not just Italian. So, the first act that the British did after the armistice with Austria-Hungary was sending troops in the Trentino region, with one clear task, “to emphasise the Allied character of the occupation”, as much as happened in Albania, where were deployed British and French units. Another problem occurred: when the French started to help Yugoslavs, Italy hoped to be supported by Great Britain, why? Because the British did not have a direct interest over the Balkan area. What the Italian Government did not understand 236 was that the British surely were not interested in the area, but if they had to choose between a good relationship with the Italians or the French, they would have chosen the latter. And there was another important actor in that dispute: the President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson. The United States entered the war only in 1917, but they were decisive for the outcome of the conflict. Using this superiority, Wilson proposed his famous 14 points for the peace. The fourteenth point spoke explicitly of Italy, saying: “A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality”. And so did the tenth point: “The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development”. As a matter of fact, Italy had no ally willing to favour its Adriatic ambitions, and British and French used Wilson’s points to contain Italian ambitions. As a matter of fact, every time there were contrasts British decided to support France’s positions, in the way to maintain a good relationship with the stronger ally. So, at the Paris peace conference the territories, that previously were assigned to Italy, were given to the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The case that better explain this contrast was the case of the city of Fiume. That was a really particular occasion: Fiume was not part of the London Pact. The Italians thought that the city could remain to the Habsburg Empire, because they thought that at the end of the war the Empire would still exist. Having all Dalmatia and controlling Albania was enough to rule over the Adriatic Sea. But the birth of a new Yugoslav state and the high density of Italian speakers in Fiume made the Italian Government and people want that city. The reaction of both the Allies was negative and in particular the French opposed sending troops. The Italian military governor of the city, general Francesco Saverio Grazioli, was formally the commander of all the Entente troops in the area, but actually the allies, especially the French acted independently, supporting or at least not stopping the Yugoslavs’ antiItalian manifestations, with the consequence of clashes between Italians and Slavs. Not only but also, they usually helped the Yugoslav component of the city, and at the very end they tried to stop the Italian administration, frustrating Grazioli who did not receive precise orders from Rome, where the Italian Government was afraid of a reaction from the British and the French. During the Peace conference the city was occupied by D’Annunzio and other Italian nationalists. The consequences were fights between Italians and Yugoslavs. The resolution was the creation of an independent state of the city of Fiume, which was created after the city’s liberation made by the Italian Army. The creation of this new state was not the end of the contrasts inside the city. These ended partially after the Rome treaty 1924, that divided the territory of Fiume between Italy and Yugoslavia. To sum up, Italy believed that joining the Entente enabled them to control of the Adriatic Sea, but the London Pact was not sufficient to guarantee this situation. 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