Flight is Not an Implied Admission of Guilt

Flight is Not an Implied Admission of Guilt By EBY Traders Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community ( People v. Mores, G.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013 citing People v. Asilan, G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 405, 419). Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt (Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007; People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862 (1999); People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325) Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985) that flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one. A person may flee or hide for some other motive and may do so even though innocent.   Whether the evidence of flight or concealment in this case should be looked at as tending to prove guilt, depends upon the facts and circumstances of this case and especially upon motives which may have prompted the flight or concealment.   You may not find [appellant] guilty solely on the basis of evidence of flight or concealment (Commonwealth v. Bruce, August 26, 1998, Superior Court of Pennsylvania). [I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion." Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury, --not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves (Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511, 16 S.Ct. 864, 868, 40 L.Ed. 1051, 1056 (1896). Earlier that term in Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 16 S.Ct. 327, 40 L.Ed. 474, (1896), the Court also found error in the giving of a flight instruction, finding that it was misleading because it presented the inculpatory inferences but "omitted or obscured the converse aspect." Flight does indicate consciousness of guilt, and a trial court may consider this as evidence, “along with other proof, from which guilt may be inferred.” (Commonwealth v. Hargrave, January 10, 2000, Superior Court of Pennsylvania citing Commonwealth v. Bruce, 717 A.2d 1033, 1037-38 (Pa.Super.1998), quoted in Commonwealth v. Miller, 721 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Pa.Super.1998).   Nonetheless, this only holds true in cases in which the other evidence of guilt consists of more than mere presence at the scene.   “Mere presence on the scene both immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of a crime and flight therefrom is not sufficient evidence to prove involvement in the crime.” (Commonwealth v. Goodman, 465 Pa. 367, 370-71, 350 A.2d 810, 811-12 [1976]).  “The additional element of flight, which is as consistent with fear as with guilt, does not convert presence into proof of guilt.”   We do not believe this one fact alone [flight] is sufficient, especially as in this case where the appellant is not the actual thief. To hold this to be sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction requires us to make too many assumptions not based on facts in the record. It requires us to assume that Bailey knew that a crime had been committed and the individual in the back seat had committed the crime and that the goods were in the car. Although the fact that Bailey drove the automobile away without responding to Pettolina's request to permit a search of the trunk might give rise to an inference that the stolen goods were secreted therein with Bailey's knowledge, it is just as reasonable to assume therefrom that Bailey knew nothing of the crime, and when accused of being involved in a crime of which he knew nothing about, he took flight out of fear. Convictions in criminal cases may not and will not be allowed to stand on guesswork or conjecture (Commonwealth v. Bailey, 48 Pa. at 229-30, 67 292 A.2d at 347). Accordingly, there was no direct evidence to establish Roscioli knew the window pane was removed from the restaurant, or even that there was a burglary in progress, nor that he was running from the police. But assuming these are reasonable inferences from the proof, they are not sufficient in our view to establish Roscioli was involved in the burglary. Because such conclusions depend too much on conjecture, a criminal conviction based wholly on inference, suspicion and conjecture may not stand ( Commonwealth v. Roscioli, 454 Pa. 59 [1973]). PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT 2