CONSUMPTION DEMAND
IN MARX AND IN THE
CURRENT CRISIS
Radhika Desai
ABSTRACT
This chapter challenges the denial of ‘‘underconsumption’’ – the role of
consumption demand in capitalist reproduction and its paucity in crises –
in contemporary Marxism. At stake are better understandings not only of
crisis theory but also, inter alia, of imperialism, ‘‘reformism,’’ and Marx’s
intellectual legacy. The chapter shows how the centrality of consumption
demand is underlined in the three volumes of Capital and the Grundrisse,
and goes on to discuss the origins, weaknesses, and persistence of this
denial. The chapter also shows that Marx did not regard underconsumption as a moralistic argument about unfulfilled need. The denial
originates not in Marx but in productionism, the idea that capitalism is a
system of ‘‘production for production’s sake.’’
Originating in the overkill of Tugan Baranowski’s refutation of the
Russian populists’ view that capitalist development was impossible in
Russia due to lack of a home market, productionism is based on his
attempt to force Marxism into the marginalist and the general
equilibrium framework. Despite its antipathy with Marxism, most
contemporary Marxist economics are based on it. Inevitably its adherence
to Say’s Law – the denial of the possibility of gluts in the market – infects
The National Question and the Question of Crisis
Research in Political Economy, Volume 26, 101–143
Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
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ISSN: 0161-7230/doi:10.1108/S0161-7230(2010)0000026005
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the tendency to assume that capitalism’s contradictions do not lie in
circulation. Productionism’s denial of the importance of consumption
demand also rests on nonsequiturs, nondialectical thinking, and an
underestimation of the contradictions in capitalism Marx identified, other
than the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The chapter ends by showing
the centrality of demand in the recent historical evolution of capitalism as
reconstructed by Robert Brenner, followed by a discussion of whether
underconsumption is ‘‘reformist.’’
The value of the old industry is preserved by the creation of a fund for a new [capitalist]
one in which the relation of capital and labour posits itself in a new form. Hence
exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things; universal
exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands; new (artificial) preparation of
natural objects, by which they are given new use values; the exploration of the earth in all
directions, to discover new things of use as well as new useful qualities of the old; such as
new qualities of them as raw materials etc; the development, hence of the natural sciences
to their highest point; likewise the discovery, creation, and satisfaction of new needs
arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being as
the most total and universal possible social product, for, in order to take gratification in a
many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures [genussfähig], hence cultured to a
high degree – is likewise a condition of production founded on capital.
Marx, Grundrisse (p. 409, emphases added)
This chapter seeks to challenge the deep-seated and powerful tendency in
contemporary Marxist economic thinking to deny the role of consumption
demand in capitalist reproduction, and its paucity in crises.1 Ideas about
inadequate consumption demand, the bulk of which is workers’ demand, in
capitalism were practically contemporaneous with the rise of industrial
capitalism (Bleaney, 1976, pp. 22–101). By the late 19th century they
constituted a clearly identifiable strand of ‘‘underconsumption’’ theories and
Marx had criticized their characteristic remedy, increasing wages, in
Capital I. But a specifically Marxist debate on the role consumption
demand in capitalism seems not to have arisen until Russian populists,
Narodniks, took the view that capitalism could not develop in Russia. Not
only was the home market limited, they reasoned, so was the possibility of
acquiring other markets through imperialism because, as a latecomer,
Russia faced a world already divided up among major powers. It was in
contesting the populist argument that Russian Legal Marxists denied
consumption demand a role in capitalist reproduction. Rosa Luxemburg
strenuously contested this denial as excessive, surplus to the requirements
of refuting the Narodnik case. However, her views were inexplicably, and
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
103
certainly inexcusably, sidelined in the further development of Marxist
thinking on capitalist reproduction and crisis (Zarembka, 2002). While Paul
Sweezy read Marx in a Keynesian (rather than Keynes’ – see below) spirit in
which paucity of demand figured centrally (Sweezy, 1962); this account was
distinctively Sweezy’s own. In any case, the decline of Keynesianism was
accompanied by vigorous revival of those earlier refutations among
Marxists (Weeks, 1977). Today few argue overtly about the role of consumption demand. The case is closed. But the verdict is wrong and supports
a cluster of widely and deeply held convictions that prevent cognizance of
consumption’s role in capitalist reproduction. It also permanently consigns
the wrongfully convicted parties – preeminently Luxemburg – to an entirely
undeserved intellectual disdain, while consumption’s importance in the ideas
of others – Marx, Keynes, or Kalecki – is denied or underemphasized.
Accounts that give consumption demand a role in capitalist reproduction and crises are dismissed as ‘‘underconsumptionist’’ – empirically and
logically inadequate if well-meaning moral condemnations of capitalism
that, ‘‘as we all know,’’ Marx rejected. Worse, they are held to lead to the
dead-end of reformism, as with the 19th century underconsumptionists
Marx criticized, and, according to some, with Keynes. Such accounts are
also faulty for focusing on the sphere of circulation when the ‘‘real’’
contradictions of capitalism lie in the sphere of production which, moreover,
increases in importance as capitalism develops. This ‘‘productionism’’
originated in the denial of the role of consumption by Russian Legal
Marxist, Michael von Tugan Baranowski.
Technical progress is manifested in the increasing importance that the instruments of
labor, and machines even more, acquire in relation to living labor, to the worker himself.
The means of production play an ever-growing role in the process of production and on
the commodity market. Facing the machine, the worker steps to a second place and,
accordingly, the demand based on workers’ consumption is relegated to a minor position
in comparison to that originated from productive consumption. The whole activity of
the capitalist economy assumes the character of a mechanism existing by itself, so to
speak, in which human consumption appears to be a simple factor in the process of
capital reproduction and circulation. (Tugan Baranowski, 2000a, p. 73)
Since famously paraphrased as the ‘‘factories that produce factories
that produce factories,’’ productionism not only sees capitalism as
unconstrained by consumption demand, it has gone along with a tendency
to identify a single, ‘‘fundamental’’ cause of capitalist crisis located in the
sphere of production alone. For Tugan Baranowski, the favored cause was
disproportion between sectors of capitalist production while contemporary
Marxists favor the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall (TRPF), in so far
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as they subscribe to any Marxist account of crises at all (more on this
below). If members of this productionist tendency admit the possibility
of crises also arising outside production, in circulation, they refer to the
paucity of investment demand being a factor in crises. However, that would,
in any case, be part of the sphere of production, strictly speaking.
This chapter does not seek to deny the relevance of either disproportion
or TRPF. Indeed, it agrees, in opposition to many Marxist economists who
hold that Marx was mistaken on this count, that the latter, in particular, was
one of Marx’s most important discoveries about capitalist accumulation and
its contradictions. This chapter also goes a step further than some defenders
of Marx on the TRPF by pointing out that in Marx’s account of capitalist
accumulation production and consumption or circulation are inseparable
moments of a single process. It does, however, seek to reinstate the role of
consumption demand as a major factor in capitalist reproduction.
In what follows, I begin with a discussion of the stakes in contesting
productionism’s sway in Marxist economic thinking: including, most
importantly, an escape from the monomania that surrounds thinking about
capitalist production and crises to comprehend the sheer variety of sources,
forms, and mechanisms of crises in capitalism, of which the paucity of
consumption demand is one. I go on to show that in the Grundrisse and the
three volumes of Capital Marx takes the view that consumption demand has
a critical role in capitalist reproduction and its paucity is a major cause of
crisis. I then present my critique, discussing the main misconceptions that
lie at the root of the rejection of the role of consumption demand and the
two main ways in which it has been rejected – by Tugan Baranowski and
by contemporary Marxists as evinced in a key and widely cited article by
Anwar Shaikh (1978). As the work of a widely respected and sophisticated
Marxist economist, it as good a representative of this view as one can get.
Following this, we will be in a position to appreciate the full extent of the
folly of denying consumption demand a role in capitalist reproduction as
I show how central a role it has played in postwar capitalism using Robert
Brenner’s influential, and in my view largely correct, historical account of
the pattern of world capitalist development of the last many decades and
of the current crisis (1998, 2002, 2006, 2009).
While I hope these arguments will be independently persuasive, insofar
as much of the animus behind the productionist case comes from the idea
that affirming the role of demand might lead to ‘‘reformist’’ conclusions, the
chapter ends with a plea not to see reforms and revolution as mutually
exclusive. In a properly historical view, they emerge as having a ‘‘dialectical
relationship’’ (Patnaik, 2009b). While the underconsumptionism that
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
105
Marx criticized did indeed assume, incorrectly, that increasing wages would
overcome capitalism’s problems, there is no absolute necessity for an
insistence on the role of consumption demand to lead to such ‘‘reformism,’’
that is, an assumption that capitalism’s problems can be solved through
measures falling far short of a fundamental change in the social order,
of revolution. Such an insistence did not lead to ‘‘reformism’’ in Marx’s
case, or in Luxemburg’s or Kalecki’s. (Also Keynes, the only other writer
to affirm the importance of the paucity of consumption demand on a radical
understanding of capitalism’s fundamental problems, was lead to propose
changes to the capitalist order that amounted to such a radical transformation that it became moot whether, if Keynes’ prescription were applied,
capitalism could be said to exist. He may have continued to call it capitalism
but, the meaning he invested in the term concerned individual freedom not
private ownership of the means of production. While it is true that he was
loath to align himself openly and consistently with Marxism, socialism, or
the working class, and while there is no need to excuse his statements to this
effect, his intellectual and even political affinities were considerably more
complex than most Marxists and Keynesians have been willing to allow. On
this see Desai, 2009; Desai & Freeman, 2009; Dostaler, 2007; Sardoni, 1997.)
1. BEYOND MONOMANIA: THE STAKES
AND THE GAINS
Denying the role of consumption demand in capitalist reproduction and
crisis seems incredible when we consider that the most fundamental
contradiction of capitalism according to Marx is that between social labour
and private appropriation. This was also caught in wider understandings
such as Janos Kornai’s. He distinguished ‘‘pure’’ socialist and capitalist
systems as ‘‘supply constrained’’ and ‘‘demand constrained’’ respectively.
In capitalism
the effective constraint on production increase is the buyer’s demand. Demand
constraints are narrower than physical resource constraints. The available quantity of
resources would allow a further increase of production. Yet producer firms do not avail
themselves of this possibility, since they do not see the excess as saleable. Capitalism is,
in its ‘‘classical’’ form, a demand-constrained system. This is the economy Marx treats
in ‘‘Das Kapital’’ when he writes about the contradiction between the tendency of
unlimited expansion of production and the limited purchasing potential of the market.’
(Kornai, 1979, p. 804)
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Reinstating the role of consumption demand can be expected to open
a wide breach in the fortifications that protect contemporary Marxism’s
monomania about the causes of capitalist crises. It is an important reason
why Marxists find themselves on the intellectual back foot in the midst of
the greatest crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression, one that may yet
turn out to be its greatest ever.
The broad range of crisis mechanisms are routinely seen at work in
capitalism and were anticipated in Marx’s analysis, some more fully than
others because, tragically, that work remained uncompleted. Many Marxist
scholars have pointed to the plurality of mechanisms of crises. Mandel
believed that overproduction (or underconsumption: the two are, as we see
below, hard to separate entirely), disproportionality, and the TRPF
accounts of crises were all valid at different times and could be seen at
play in different phases of the development of a particular crisis. Paul
Sweezy (1970, pp. 145–146), for his part, classified Marxist accounts of crisis
into two: those associated with falling rates of profit and those associated
with realization. However, an even wider and more systematic view is
possible. While both these views recognized that crises are possible in
production as well as circulation, there are at least two other indispensable
spheres of capitalist accumulation and reproduction – finance and the
nation-state. Crises would then also be seen to arise from the financial
structures without which capitalism cannot function and from the
necessarily international geopolitical order that emerged from the imperial
as capitalism developed, creating a world of national capitalisms rather than
a single, unified, world capitalism (Desai, 2009).
Further, the wider and more systematic approach to crises might also take
into account the fact that crises arising in each of these spheres of capitalism
can take one of two forms – an intraclass, that is, intra-capitalist class, form
arising from the mechanisms of competition and an interclass form, pitting
capitalists and workers against each other, arising from the mechanisms of
class struggle. Provisionally these four sources of crises and the two forms that
crises originating in each of these sources may take give us at least eight
different mechanisms of crises. Whether any of these are more fundamental
than the others is not immediately clear and, as we shall see, accumulation and
realization, at least, are intimately connected. Nor can ‘‘value’’ exist without
money or capital without finance, and therefore credit is inevitably involved.
Finally, geopolitical competition, which under capitalism necessarily involves
a plurality of nation-states – whether a small number of these in imperial
competition as in the late 19th and early 20th century or in the increasingly
‘‘geoeconomic’’ competition of today – is also endemic to capitalism.
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Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
So we may have the following eight mechanisms of crises: The first two –
those of accumulation – would involve increasing organic composition of
capital reducing the profit rate and rising wages reducing the rate of
exploitation and having the same effect, the TRPF and profit-squeeze
respectively. Considering that so many today consider the TRPF to be the
quintessentially Marxist crisis it is noteworthy that until Henryk Grossman’s work in the 1930s, no major Marxist linked the TRPF to crises and
Marxists tended to neglect Capital III where this analysis was developed
(Howard, 1989, p. 316). While the phenomenon was generally accepted, it
was not considered important in explaining crises.
Intercapitalist crises of realization would be the crises of ‘‘disproportionality’’ between sectors or departments of production which Tugan Baranowski
identified and which most Marxists refer to when they accept the possibility of
shortfalls in investment demand. Crises of realization of the interclass sort
would result from a paucity of consumption demand. Intracapitalist
mechanisms of financial crises would be manifest as credit crunches – with
banks unwilling to lend to each other or to businesses – of the sort that
currently plagues so many advanced capitalist economies. The chief interclass
financial mechanism of crisis would be the ‘‘mortgage crisis’’ – with high
default rates in forms of credit extended for consumption, of which the recent
‘‘subprime crisis’’ in the United States was such an important instance.
Geopolitical crises, finally, of the intracapitalist sort could arise out of imperial
competition between organized national or imperial bourgeoisies of the sort
that culminated in the First World War and which the first Marxist theorists of
imperialism such as Bukharin, Hilferding, Lenin, and Luxemburg attempted to
comprehend. Geopolitical crises could also emerge from Luxemburgian
processes involving the role of the periphery in contributing to the stability
of core capitalism – such as oil price increases of the 1970s or contemporary
surges in commodity prices (on this see also Patnaik, 1997, 2009a).
Crises in Capitalism: By Source and Form.
Form
Source
Accumulation
Realization
Credit
Geopolitical
Intraclass TRPF
Disproportionality
Credit
Imperial or International
Crunch
Geopolitical Competition
Interclass ProfitSqueeze
Overproduction/
Mortgage Centre-Periphery
Underconsumption Crises
Exploitation and
Resistance.
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One can safely say that all these mechanisms involve fundamental
processes of capitalist reproduction and malfunction of each has the
capacity to culminate in crises. Every major crisis is a complex amalgam of
more than one of these and they can also be seen successively in the
development of any given crisis. If the argument of this chapter is accepted,
it will have not only reinstated the role of consumption demand as a factor
in capitalist reproduction and crises, it will also release Marxists from the
productionism that screens the full complexity and difficulty of capitalist
reproduction and the variety of its mechanisms of crises.
This wider vista will not be the only gain from reinstating the role of
consumption demand. Where one stands on that question also has
implications for two other important questions. First, it has never made
any sense to lift Marx out of the context of the intellectual tradition in which
he is so centrally located – breaking his relationship with the predecessors
whose contradictions he resolved with such élan and the successors – not just
Marxists – who dealt with his powerful legacy, with more or less grace and
more or less fairness. To be sure, this isolating operation was and remains
a bourgeois and Cold War one. However, there is no reason why Marxists
should cooperate in it. Rather we should question it, overturn it, and restore
to Marx his rightful place at the core of our intellectual traditions. He stands
at the culmination of the social and economic thought that preceded him
and is the fount of most of the important developments that followed,
whether they supported or opposed him. While Marx’s relation to his
predecessors is better-studied, the links between him and later developments
in understanding capitalism, particularly Keynes’s, are rarely explored.
Secondly, I am critical of the view, closely associated with the dismissal
of the consumption demand problem as the hobby horse of ‘‘reformist
underconsumption’’ and the critique of Luxemburg that goes with it, that
capitalism can be viewed either as a ‘‘pure’’ system or a self-contained one.
Thinking of capitalism as a ‘‘pure’’ system forgets that Marx’s representation of ‘‘pure’’ capitalism in Capital was a heuristic device, not to be equated
with Actually Existing Capitalism (AEC) anywhere. Not only did the
capitalism of Capital never refer to any real system, ‘‘pure’’ capitalism
existed nowhere, as Engels pointed out, confidently predicting also that it
would not be allowed to since revolutionaries would not ‘‘let it come to
that’’ (Mandel, 1978, p. 68). Notwithstanding Marx’s strictures to German
comrades – de te fabula narratur and all that – it especially did not exist in
England (Perry Anderson, 1987).
Capitalism is everywhere born amidst noncapitalist productive relations
which it only slowly, and, until today at least, never completely, transforms.
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
109
AEC is everywhere ‘‘contaminated’’ not only with legacies of the
precapitalist past – say patriarchy, slavery, or caste – which capitalism
everywhere puts to good use, but also by modern systems which modify its
workings – chiefly regulatory and welfare states which, Polanyi (1975)
insisted, were unavoidable. If the spread of market relations prompted
a countervailing effort of social protection, it needs to be taken into
account. Kornai clarified his account of capitalism as a demand-constrained
system: ‘‘Modern capitalism – mainly owing to the effect of active state
interventions often undertaken in the name of Keynes – can no longer be
qualified a ‘pure’ demand-constrained system.’’ (Kornai, 1979, p. 804,
emphasis added). The limitations of such ‘‘Keynesian reformism’’ –
effectively expanding the home market by raising workers’ purchasing
power – are clear but it is all too often forgotten that it was based not on
any ‘‘reformist’’ essence of Keynes’ but, as Joan Robinson so well put it,
on ‘‘bastard Keynesianism.’’ While hardly revolutionizing capitalism, it was
sufficiently effective, as we see in Section 4 below, to play a key role in both
the Long Boom of the 1950s and 1960s and the Long Downturn that beset
world capitalism in the 1970s, as Brenner terms these eras.
Analyses of ‘‘pure’’ capitalist dynamics decontextualized from the social,
political, and cultural integuments in which they everywhere operate also
tends to go with a never-fully-stated view that the only capitalisms that
deserve the name, that are worth examining in order to understand capitalist
dynamics, are those of the advanced industrial world. They are also, for
all practical purposes, treated as the same. In reality, not only do both first
and third world capitalisms feature inherited noncapitalist social forms
interacting with the mechanisms which Marx identified in Capital, first world
countries feature modern modifying welfare and regulatory forms that are
considerably more powerful than their counterparts from the third world.
The AECs of the advanced industrial world are, moreover, each distinct
historical formations with distinct historical inheritances and modern
regulatory and welfare structures as the literature on ‘‘varieties of capitalism’’
and ‘‘worlds of welfare’’ (Coates, 2002; Esping-Anderson, 1990) testifies.
Thinking of capitalism as a ‘‘self-contained’’ system usually involves
focusing on the centres of advanced capitalism alone, leaving the rest of the
world out of account. It takes us back to the question of the relationship between imperialism and capitalism. Is it inevitable as, from their
different perspectives, Hobson (1965) and Luxemburg (1913/2003) saw it
when they identified the search for markets to compensate for low
demand within a capitalist country as the imperialism’s chief motor? Or is
it merely contingent, if also reprehensible, as so many Marxists aver today?
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Is capitalism in the advanced world subject to no contradictions that spill
over, on the one hand onto the noncommodified or decommodified realms
of the developed world itself, say the family and the welfare states, and
on the other on the developing world? As Prabhat Patnaik put it, capitalism
is ‘‘a mode of production that never exists in isolation, that is necessarily
linked with the surrounding precapitalist modes [and, one might add,
noncapitalist contexts], and that continuously keeps itself viable by
encroaching on [them]’’ (Patnaik, 2009a, p. 5). What is certainly clear in
this chapter is that Luxemburg’s arguments on this score were unfairly
rejected while Hobson’s vision of social reform as an alternative to
imperialism, though rejected by Marxists as ‘‘reformism,’’ was ironically
vindicated in the deepening of national markets of the capitalist core’s
welfare capitalisms in the postwar period of decolonization. As our
discussion of Brenner shows, neither the ‘‘Long Boom’’ nor the ‘‘Long
Downturn’’ can be understood without taking this deepening into account.
2. MARX ON CONSUMPTION DEMAND
The importance of consumption demand in capitalist reproduction and its
paucity as a factor in capitalist crisis can be traced throughout Capital
and in it the preparatory thinking for it as revealed in the Grundrisse even
though the attention of the completed and published parts of these works
was focused away from this issue. What we have of Capital concentrates on
the productive and bourgeois aspects of capitalism. Capital I, the only one
finished by Marx and published in his lifetime, famously concentrates
on the process of production where surplus value originates and workers
appear in this volume primarily as producers, not consumers. When, in the
posthumously published Capital II, the focus does shift to circulation, the
emphasis is on attempting to show that capitalist reproduction on an
expanded scale is possible, not on emphasizing its potential for crises. When
we finally turn, in Capital III, to the totality of capitalist production, and its
potential for crises, we find that precisely the elements of circulation, of
‘‘the world market, competition, the industrial cycle and the state’’ (Mandel,
1981, p. 10) remained to be written.
2.1. Grundrisse
In the Grundrisse, the clearest statement of the importance of workers’
consumption is relegated to a footnote in which the matter is flagged for
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
111
detailed treatment later. Marx notes clearly how, although capitalism
imposed ‘‘a relative restriction on the sphere of workers’ consumption
(which is only quantitative not qualitative, or rather, only qualitative as
posited through the quantitative),’’ workers have ‘‘as consumers (in the
further development of capital the relation between consumption and
production must, in general, be more closely examined) an entirely different
importance as agents of production from that which they possessed, e.g.,
in antiquity or in the Middle Ages, or now possess in Asia’’ (Marx, 1973,
p. 283). For Marx, then, a key aspect in which capitalism was distinct
from precapitalist societies was in the economic importance of workers’
consumption. This phenomenon, historically specific to capitalism, was the
chief anchor of the idea that capitalism laid the basis for the transition to
socialism in part by increasing productive powers so as to enable humanity
to transcend the realm of necessity, of scarcity, and enter that of freedom
and plenty. This was also the meaning of the epigraph of this chapter:
capitalism would prepare the groundwork, albeit in a contradictory manner,
for the many-sided person to emerge.
One might discount these ideas, particularly the last, as well-meaning but
mistaken philosophies flourish, especially at a time when the many-sided
consumption of the few rests, often fairly directly, on the all-sided deprivation of most. And they would be, were it not for the fact that, in critical
ways, the reliance of capitalism on popular consumption, on (at least some)
workers’ consumption, is underlined in Marx’s critique of political
economy, from the Grundrisse onwards. Levels of workers’ consumption
higher than hitherto known in the history of class society are, as we have
seen, the other side of the coin of increasing accumulation, increases in the
means of production and productive capacity, creating the ‘‘more massive
and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations
together’’ such that no ‘‘earlier century had even a presentiment that such
productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour’’ (Marx & Engels,
p. 1848). It is precisely because of workers’ consumption demand, the bulk
of consumption demand in capitalist society, looms large that it can act,
when it is insufficient, as a limit and constraint in capitalist production in a
way that was inconceivable in precapitalist class societies.
2.2. Capital I
Although Capital I clearly shows that the sphere of circulation cannot
create value, and thus surplus-value, that these can only arise in production,
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RADHIKA DESAI
the importance of realization and consumption is underscored in the very
foundation for the analysis of Capital that is laid in its opening pages – the
contradictory unity of use value and value which is the commodity. This
contradictory unity is the basis of Marx’s critique of Say’s Law – the idea
that ‘‘every seller brings his own buyer to market with him and that,
therefore, there can never be gluts’’ – that is, crises arising out of paucity of
demand in relation to production.
Nothing could be more foolish than the dogma that because every sale is a purchase, and
every purchase a sale, the circulation of commodities necessarily implies an equilibrium
between sales and purchases. y its real intention is to show that every seller brings his
own buyer to market with him y No one can sell unless someone else purchases. But no
one directly needs to purchase just because he has just sold. Circulation bursts through all
the temporal, spatial and personal barriers imposed by the direct exchange of products,
and it does this by splitting up the direct identity present in this case between the
exchange of one’s own product and the acquisition of someone else’s into two antithetical
segments of sale and purchase. y The two processes lack internal independence because
they complement each other. Hence, if the assertion of their external independence
[äusserliche Verselbständigung] proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently
makes itself felt by producing – a crisis. There is an antithesis, immanent in the
commodity, between use-value and value, between private labour which must
simultaneously manifest itself as directly social labour, and a particular concrete kind
of labour which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labour, between the
conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into things; the
antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the commodity are the developed forms of
motion of this immanent contradiction. These forms therefore imply the possibility of
crises. y (Marx, 1867/1977, pp. 208–209, Emphasis added.)
Not only was Say’s Law a dogma, which assumed ‘‘that overproduction
is not possible or at least that no general glut of the market is possible’’
(Marx, 1867/1977, p. 210n), the market was a critical factor in the core
process of capitalism – in the creation of value. Value could be determined
only when commodities were sold, that is, socially validated. Only then did
the labour embodied in them become abstract and thus the basis of value.
The multitude of private and concrete labors could only be validated as
social and abstract value through the mediation of the market, by
commodities finding buyers who wanted them for their use value. And
value is what competition, including competitive cost-cutting, determines is
the ‘‘socially necessary’’ amount of labour needed to produce any given
product. It was the market, therefore, that determined whether, and to
what extent, the various concrete labors successfully realized themselves as
abstract labour. It translated the private into the social, the concrete into
the abstract. It was only because use value and exchange value, concrete
labour and abstract labour were not immediately identical that they
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
113
required the mediation of the market which, in turn, ‘‘implied the
possibility of crises.’’ Capital or surplus value did not arise in circulation,
nevertheless ‘‘it is equally impossible for it to arise apart from circulation.
It must have its origin both in circulation and not in circulation’’ (Marx,
1867/1977, p. 268).
In distinguishing use value and value in the first pages of Capital, Marx
had meant neither to discount the first, nor to imply that the latter could be
self-sustaining as in accounts which one-sidedly view capitalism as merely
‘‘production for production’s sake’’: ‘‘nothing can be a value without being
an object of utility’’ (Marx, 1867/1977, p. 131). His point was rather more
complex: Value was condemned to seek fulfillment as the satisfaction of
individual and concrete human needs, to become a use-value, however real
or fan/phan-tastical, in order to realize itself as abstract and social. As for
the heroes of yore faced with similar ‘‘missions,’’ for the ever-growing mass
of commodities let loose on the market by the grotesque-Promethean
productive powers of capital, there might be numerous detours in the
fulfillment of their mission of realization as a use value, including becoming
producers’ goods, but the ultimate test of human utility could never be
foregone. In order to be sold, commodities had to have use value – whether
directly as an object of consumption or indirectly as objects that were used
to produce objects of consumption. If in the process of valorization capital
appears to be ‘‘value which can perform its own valorization process,
an animated monster which begins to ‘work,’ ‘as if its body were by love
possessed,’ ’’ the animus that drives it is the search for realization as use
value (Marx, 1867/1977, p. 302).
2.3. Capital II
In Volume II, Marx specifically treats the circulation of capital and
its realization. Although his main focus is on demonstrating realization’s
possibility, rather than its difficulty, he nevertheless registers the latter.
The maximum limit of the capitalist’s demand is C ¼ cþv, but his supply is
cþvþs; y the greater the percentage of s produced (the rate of profit), the smaller his
demand in relation to his supply. Although, as production advances, the capitalist’s
demand for labour power, and hence indirectly for necessary means of subsistence,
becomes progressively smaller than his demand for means of production, it should not
be forgotten that his demand for mp is always smaller than his capital, considering this
day by day. (Marx, 1884/1978, pp. 197–198)
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Marx goes on to add, ‘‘That many capitalists are involved here, and not
just one, in no way affects the matter’’ (Marx, 1884/1978, p. 198), clearly
dismissing arguments that capitalists buying producers’ goods from each
other was the solution. Nor does he dismiss the role of foreign trade in
alleviating overproduction in both Department I and Department II,
remarking that it ‘‘only shifts the contradictions to a broader sphere, and
gives them a wider orbit’’ (Marx, 1884/1978, p. 544). However, the problems
created by the limits on workers’ demand are noted only in a footnote, and
postponed, once again, for proper discussion to a later volume:
The workers are important for the market as buyers of commodities. But, as sellers of
their commodity – labour-power – capitalist society has the tendency to restrict them to
their minimum price. y the periods in which capitalist production exerts all its forces
regularly show themselves to be periods of over-production; because the limit to the
application of the productive powers is not simply the production of value, but also its
realization. However, the sale of commodities, the realization of commodity capital, and
thus of surplus-value as well, is restricted not by the consumer needs of society in
general, but by the consumer needs of a society in which the great majority are always
poor and must always remain poor. (Marx, 1978, p. 391n)
2.4. Capital III
In Volume III, while Marx notes that ‘‘Capitalist production y is not y
production whose immediate purpose is consumption, or the production of
means of enjoyment for the capitalist’’ (Marx, 1894/1981, p. 352), he goes on
to clarify that the ‘‘production of surplus-value is only the first act in the
capitalist production process, and its completion only brings to an end the
immediate production process itself. y [In] y the second act y The total
mass of commodities, the total product, must be sold, both that portion
which replaces constant and variable capital and that which represents
surplus-value.’’
The conditions for immediate exploitation and for the realization of that exploitation are
not identical. Not only are they separate in time and space, they are also separate in
theory. The former is restricted only by the society’s productive forces, the latter by the
proportionality between the different branches of production and by society’s power of
consumption. And this is determined y by the power of consumption within a given
framework of antagonistic conditions of distribution, which reduce the consumption of
the vast majority of society to a minimum level, only capable of varying within more
or less narrow limits y The more productivity develops, the more it comes into conflict
with the narrow basis on which the relations of consumption must rest. (Marx, 1981,
pp. 352–353, emphasis added)
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This is how ‘‘excess capital coexists with a growing surplus population’’
(Marx, 1981, p. 353). Marx concludes that section by saying:
The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its selfvalorisation appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and purpose of
production; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse, i.e. the means
of production are not simply means for a steadily expanding pattern of life for the society
of producers. The barriers within which the maintenance and valorisation of the capitalvalue has necessarily to move – and this in turn depends on the dispossession and
impoverishment of the great mass of the producers – therefore come constantly into
contradiction with the methods of production that capital must apply to its purpose and
which set its course towards an unlimited expansion of production, to production as an
end in itself, to an unrestricted development of the social productive power of labour.
(Marx, 1981, p. 358)
He repeats later on, ‘‘The ultimate reason for all real crises remains the
poverty and restricted consumption of the masses’’ (Marx, 1981, p. 615),
frontally challenging any idea that the ‘‘fundamental’’ cause of capitalist
crises lay in some separate sphere of production. That Marx’s views directly
contradict productionist views is hardly surprising, given the constitutive
nature of Marx’s distinction between the use value and value sans phrase
which lies at the root of the commodity, the primary unit of capital.
Production and circulation are equally necessary – ‘‘The circulation of
commodities is the starting point of capital’’ – to the reproduction of capital
and therefore equally problematic in its reproduction and productive of crises.
3. HOW TO DENY THE OBVIOUS:
LET US COUNT THE WAYS
Underconsumption, as Anwar Shaikh’s influential 1978 ‘‘Introduction
to the History of Crisis Theories’’ put it, is the view that ‘‘if left to itself,
capitalism is incapable of generating sufficient effective [consumption]
demand to support accumulation’’ (Shaikh, 1978, p. 222). Two distinct
arguments are made in rejecting this view (a rejection that is all the more
relished because the view is so intuitive for so many). One is that it is a sort
of moralistic argument about human needs left unfulfilled by capitalism
which takes no cognizance of Marx’s clear recognition that ‘‘effective
demand,’’ backed by the ability to pay, is the only sort of demand that
matters in capitalist society. We deal with this in Section 3.1. The second
argument is productionist. It takes the view that capitalism is a system of
‘‘production for production’s sake,’’ that for Marx only investment demand
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matters in capitalism, not consumption demand. Productionism comes in
two variants according to the particular mechanism of crisis each deems as
the fundamental one. In Tugan Baranowski’s original version the favored
mechanism of crisis was disproportional production between sectors
while in productionism’s more modern versions it is the TRPF that is the
fundamental crisis mechanism. While the first dismisses consumption
problems on the basis of an outright adherence to Say’s Law, the second
argues that only investment demand matters in capitalist reproduction and
crisis or that consumption demand is merely a part of investment demand in
that it is the variable capital set in motion in any period (Shaikh, p. 227).
Both variations on this view too are, as we shall see, remarkably like ‘‘every
seller bringing his own buyers to market,’’ like Say’s Law. Section 3.2 deals
with four general problems of productionism before Sections 3.3 and 3.4
deal with each of its chief forms.
3.1. What’s Really Wrong with Underconsumptionism?
The dismissal of underconsumption as a problem claims to derive from Marx’s
own discussion of underconsumptionism in which he famously said that
It is a pure tautology to say that crises are provoked by a lack of effective demand or
effective consumption. The capitalist system does not recognise any forms of consumer
other than those who can pay, if we exclude the consumption of paupers and swindlers. The
fact that commodities are unsalable means no more than that that no effective buyers can
be found for them, i.e. no consumers (no matter whether the commodities are ultimately
sold to meet the needs of productive or individual consumption). (Marx, 1978, 486–487)
However, those who take this to be Marx’s refutation of underconsumptionism miss an important point. What is wrong with tautologies
is merely that they go no further than themselves, that they have no further
implication. Statements only become tautologies when there is an attempt to
draw implications which cannot be drawn. But they are not, thereby, wrong.
As we have already seen, Marx emphasized repeatedly the difficulties of
realization thanks to the restriction of workers’ consumption.
The real problem was, as Marx pointed out, that the classic underconsumptionist remedy – increasing wages – would not avoid crises.
[W]e need only note that crises are always prepared by a period in which wages generally
rise, and the working class actually does receive a greater share in the part of the annual
product destined for consumption. From the standpoint of these advocates of sound and
‘‘simple’’ (!) common sense, such periods should rather avert the crisis. (Marx, 1978,
pp. 486–487)
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117
Two things cry out for notice. First, while underconsumptionists were
certainly wrong in thinking that crises could be avoided through increases in
workers’ incomes, this did not mean that rising wages would make no
material difference to patterns of accumulation and reproduction. Section 4
elaborates on how they did during the ‘‘Long Boom’’ and how the stagnant
wages played out in the ‘‘Long Downturn.’’ Secondly, on the one hand
increasing wages could contribute to stabilizing capitalism by increasing
demand, not to mention improving the lives of workers and their families,
but that could be at the cost of a squeeze on profits and another kind of
crisis, as Marx pointed out in the passage quoted above and Kalecki (1943)
also recognized. On the other, on their own, rising wages would not solve
the fundamental problem that the workers receive only a portion of their
product under capitalism, only postponing the problem at the price of
making it greater in the future. While increasing wages can, under certain
circumstances, squeeze profits, leading to crises of profitability, rising wages
do not have this effect when productivity is rising faster than wages are and
wage increases constitute a less than proportional share of the rising
product. In this scenario, however, they can, despite creating greater
consumption demand than before the productivity-led wage increases, lead
to a still-greater disproportion between consumption and production thanks
to the increases in productivity and therefore, eventually, to an even greater
paucity of demand.
One may note in concluding this part of our argument that Bleaney’s wellknown Marxist study of underconsumption theories, widely cited though it
is by those wishing to dismiss the role of consumption demand, does nothing
of the sort. He only dismisses as underconsumptionist theories which, unlike
Marx and Keynes, consider only the role of consumption demand, leaving
out investment demand. However, he does not dismiss the role of consumption demand and nor does he argue that Marx and Keynes do.
Moreover, Bleaney is sufficiently careful to note that while most underconsumption theories hitherto were deeply flawed, they did not have to be:
Underconsumption theories can be constructed free of elementary mistakes, and
therefore the whole tradition of thought cannot be rejected on these grounds alone.
In skeletal form they can be presented as follows: the consumption of the working class
always falls substantially short of the total productive capacity of the community, while
capitalists will always only absorb a limited portion of the surplus value in personal
consumption. On average, there is a tendency for capitalists not to plan to invest
sufficiently to fill this gap between production and consumption, so that the economy
is being pressed down towards stagnation because of inadequate effective demand.
(Bleaney, 1976, p. 237)
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This is no more than a summary of Marx’s views, and, one might add,
Luxemburg’s, Keynes’ and Kalecki’s.
3.2. Productionism and its Problems
There are four distinct general problems with productionism which need
to be understood before we can go on to discuss the two specific arguments
against consumption demand.
3.2.1. Nonsequitur
First, productionists infer a nonsequitur. Engels had counted the discovery
of surplus value to be one of Marx’s two key discoveries, the other being the
historical materialist interpretation of history (Engels, 1998). It is true that
the most critical departure on the way to this discovery was going from the
sphere of circulation, where labour power is merely bought and sold,
into the hitherto-neglected sphere of production, where it is (productively)
consumed, going, as Marx picturesquely put it, from ‘‘the noisy sphere
[of the market], where everything takes place on the surface and in full view
of everyone y into the hidden abode of production on whose threshold
there hangs the notice ‘No admittance except on business.’ Here we y see,
not only how capital produces, but how capital is itself produced.’’ (Marx,
1977/1867, pp. 279–280).
It is also true that in doing this Marx corrected the ‘‘astounding’’ error in
political economy hitherto – including Smith’s and Ricardo’s – of presenting
‘‘accumulation as nothing more than the consumption of the surplus
product by productive workers’’ (1977/1867, p. 736), nothing more than the
wages of productive workers alone (a doctrine that ‘‘political economy has
not failed to exploit in the interests of the capitalist class’’ Marx, 1977/1867,
p. 738). Accumulation may be resolved into wages alone in some infinite
regression, Marx argued. Indeed this must be so if labour power was the
source of value. But that did not help us understand the instabilities that
drove capitalism. The real issue was to understand the accumulation process
within a reasonable time-frame, say a year (perhaps this was Marx’s version
of ‘‘In the long run we are all dead!’’). Within such a time-frame, without the
infinite regression that permitted Smith and Ricardo to dissolve all capital
outlay into workers’ wages, any outlay of capital consisted, in addition to
variable capital that purchased living labour, of constant capital that
purchased dead labour. This was, in turn, composed of circulating and fixed
capitals.
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119
It is further true that this is where Marx’s analysis finally got on the
path to demonstrating the TRPF. With only part of constant capital’s
value being transferred to the product in any given year, a necessary
gap emerged between the outlay of capital and the portion of it which
was transferred to the value of the product of any given year. On this gap
rested the critical distinction between the rate of surplus value and that
of profit: the former was the ratio between the surplus and variable capital
(wages) while the latter was that between the surplus and constant capital
(with significant increases being possible in the outlay on fixed constant
capital) as well as variable capital. If the value of fixed capital rose
sufficiently relative to other components, rates of profit could decline
even as rates of surplus value rose. It was the tendency of constant
capital, particularly of its fixed portion, to go up which accounted for the
TRPF, a phenomenon widely lamented but unexplained until Marx’s
Capital.
All of this is true but the nonsequitur lies in assuming that any of it
implies that circulation does not matter, that demand, particularly
consumption demand, particularly still workers’ consumption demand,
is not a factor in capitalist reproduction and its paucity, a cause of crisis.
None of the above means that capitalism, as generalized commodity
production, was, in Marx’s view, anything other than the contradictory
unity of its production and circulation processes. Both words are
important. On the one hand, the contradiction that was the TRPF could
not operate, could not manifest itself, without the intervention of
circulation. Profits could only be had upon realization, upon sale, and
only through sales of any product could the level of the ‘‘socially necessary
labour’’ required to produce it be determined. This was necessary before
the higher-cost, lower-profit firms could be separated from the lower-cost,
higher-profit firms. This constituted the benchmark that more dynamic
firms attempted to undershoot in order to gain cost advantages, thereby
setting off the processes that typically brought down the rate of profit
across any sector. On the other hand, a critical determinant of this process
is the level of demand: without demand constraints limiting the market,
the whole process would be quite unnecessary. This is clearly reflected in
Brenner’s account, as we shall see, where the level of demand is among
the parameters that determine the behavior of the rate of profit. Brenner’s
own rejection of the TRPF (whose problems are discussed in the third
section) notwithstanding, there is no reason to believe that this is
incompatible with Marx’s understanding of the operation of the capitalist
economy.
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3.2.2. Leaving Out Dialectics
If the first problem is in one sense an unwarranted inference, the second
is undialectical reading. Marx may have insisted that accumulation was
capital’s one and only commandment – ‘‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is
Moses and the Prophets! y Accumulation for the sake of accumulation,
production for the sake of production’’ (Marx, 1867/1977, p. 742).
However, he regarded this as a contradiction – both imperative and (near)
impossible – indeed the fundamental one within which capitalism lived out
its tortured existence, not an accomplished and self-perpetuating fact as it
appeared in the flatly one-sided understandings of all-too-many, including
its probable originator, Tugan Baranowski:
Not consumption, but production is the determining factor in capitalism. The capitalist
entrepreneur seeks to realize the largest feasible profit, but not to create the largest
possible amount of means of consumption. In fact, the laws of capitalist competition
enforce the capitalization of an important part of profit, its transformation, to a greater
or lesser extent, into means of production, not apt for human consumption at all. Hence,
one could say that the aim of capitalist production is not consumption but the growth of
capital itself. (Tugan Baranowski, 1901/2000a, p. 72)
Such separation of production and consumption is simply alien to Marx’s
reasoning in Capital, as we have already seen. What is particularly ironic
about this flat reading is that the enforcement of the ‘‘capitalization of an
important part of profit, its transformation, to a greater or lesser extent into
means of production’’ was precisely what Marx held responsible, as is clear
from the passage from the Grundrisse which forms the epigraph for this
chapter, for the historical peculiarity of capitalism as a class society – that,
unlike all others, and without intending it, it was capable of, and rested on,
advancing (at least some) ordinary workers’ consumption to previously
unimaginable levels.
3.2.3. How Many Key Discoveries?
A third remarkable aspect of the rejection of the role of consumption
demand is a partial understanding of how Marx advanced our understanding of capitalism. While Engels may have deemed the discovery of the
source of surplus value the key discovery of Marx’s economic analysis of
capitalism, it is far from clear that there were not other equally weighty
aspects to his understanding of capitalism. If the TRPF was based on
Marx’s understanding of the role of fixed capital in accumulation which was
built, in turn, on the foundation of his discovery of the origin of surplus
value in production, Marx’s understanding of the paucity of consumption
demand as a source of crisis also equally rested on his discovery of the
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121
source of surplus value. It was the difference between the value of labour
power and the value of what it was capable of producing which accounted
for the gap between the goods produced and the goods demanded, a gap
which could not always be filled by capitalist consumption demand,
however gluttonous, or investment demand, however prodigious. Along
with his clear understanding that in a monetary economy such as capitalism,
money could also be hoarded, the paucity of consumption demand was
also the basis of his unprecedented critique of Say’s law (Marx, 1867/1977,
p. 210).
This insight links Marx, who died in March 1883 to Keynes, who was
born three months later. Exploration of this nexus has been blocked by the
majority of Marxists who are only interested in rejecting Keynes as a ‘‘mere
reformist’’ and the majority of Keynesians who never read Marx. Contrary
of the image of mutual repulsion between a rigidly productionist Marx and
an anti-Marxist, antisocialist, antiworking class Keynes, Keynes’ oft-quoted
expressions of disdain for Marx, socialism, and the working class were part
of a more complex set of attitudes which included the rarely noted strong,
and acknowledged, intellectual affinities with Marx (Desai, 2009; Desai &
Freeman, 2009; Dostaler, 2007; Sardoni, 1997). In particular, Keynes’
distinction between the neoclassical ‘‘real exchange economy’’ and his own
conception of a ‘‘monetary economy’’ on which he built his whole approach
in the General Theory is derived from Marx’s foundational distinction
between the circuit of commodities – C–M–C – and the circuit of capital –
M–C–M’ which opens Capital.
The distinction between a co-operative economy and an entrepreneur economy bears
some relation to a pregnant observation made by Karl Marx, though the subsequent
use to which he put was highly illogical. He pointed out that the nature of production
in the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a case of C–M–C’ i.e.,
of exchanging commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private
consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is the case of M–C–M’, i.e., of
parting with money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money. (Keynes,
1979, p. 81)
These foundational similarities are hardly surprising: both needed to
reject Say’s Law before they could proceed with their respective critiques of
capitalism and the classical tradition of legitimizing it that each inherited.
While Keynes misunderstood Marx in many ways, partly because he
seemed to take his Marx second-hand from unreliable accounts, he
understood enough to see that he stood with Marx and against the classical
tradition on some fundamental issues (Keynes, 1979, pp. 81-2n). As Claudio
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Sardoni has shown, an early draft of the General Theory was formulated in
terms close to, and derived from, Marx’s. Keynes only
abandoned his 1933 approach and, in The General Theory, y formulated the critique of
orthodox economics in a different way from Marx y [because] y the economic theory
criticised by Keynes was significantly different from the Ricardian theory to which Marx
referred. In particular, a satisfactory criticism of the marginalist version of Say’s Law
and its implications required the development of some theoretical issues that Marx was
not compelled to take into consideration. (Sardoni, 1997, p. 261)
Marx had criticized Say’s Law in its classical Ricardian version but it
remained for Keynes to take it on in the form it took in the wake of Marx.
The legitimation of capitalism now required that its central category –
value – be shifted from the objective basis it had in classical political
economy onto an entirely subjective basis. This move broke, and was
meant to break, the contradictory unity of value and use value on whose
foundation Marx exposed the limitations of classical political economy
and its understanding of value. Marx’s critique of Say’s Law and his
understanding of the workings of a monetary economy may not have
received the fuller treatment that the source of surplus value or the TRPF
did in the incomplete work that was Capital. Whether this makes them less
important discoveries is, in my view at least, moot.
3.2.4. Productionism’s Neoclassical, Marginalist, and Anti-Marxist Origins
This brings us to the final general feature of the rejection of consumption
demand as a factor in capitalist reproduction and crisis. It not only
antedates Marx, lying in the Russian Legal Marxists’, particularly
Tugan Baranowski’s, overzealous rejection of the populists’ arguments, the
theoretical foundation of these arguments are noteworthy. While Shaikh
rightly traces the rejection of the role of consumption demand to Tugan
Baranowski and points out that the target of Tugan Baranowski’s critique
was the Narodnik idea that capitalism could not develop in Russia, there are
four critical things he does not mention.
First, the paucity of consumption as a source of reproduction problems
and crisis was not merely the product of Narodnik misunderstanding of
Marx’s theories, but was a widely held understanding among Europe’s
social democratic leaders. Kautsky, for instance, had been a target of Tugan
Baranowski’s original critique and, in turn, the former pointed out in a 1902
review of Tugan Baranowski’s work that while markets would indeed
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grow with the development of capitalism, thanks to the commodification it
relentlessly wreaked, they could only grow
less rapidly than the accumulation of capital and the rise in the productivity of labor.
Capitalist industry must, therefore, seek an additional market outside of its domain in
non-capitalist nations and strata of the population. Such a market it finds and expands
more and more, but not fast enough’. (Kautsky cited in Zarembka, 2000, p. 217)
Secondly, Shaikh elides important differences between Lenin and Tugan
Baranowski and simply assimilates the two positions as antipopulist.
However, Lenin concentrated on processes of commodification in the rural
economy while Tugan Baranowski focused on the industrial economy
(Howard, 1989/I, pp. 168–176). While Lenin’s The Development of
Capitalism in Russia (1899/1967) had refuted the Narodnik argument by
showing how the commodification that came with capitalism would expand
markets and that, in that sense, the development of capitalism in Russia was
not impossible, he nowhere assumed that the market would be sufficient, or
that consumption demand did not matter and that capitalism would
not suffer from problems and contradictions on this front. Indeed, when
later confronted by Tugan Baranowski’s argument to this effect, Lenin gave
it an interpretation which ‘‘subsumed consumption conditions under
proportionalities’’ (Zarembka, 2003, p. 290), that is, considered the paucity
of consumption demand to be an instance of disproportionality. Tugan
Baranowski, however seems to have at least partially accepted this subsumption (Zarembka, 2003, p. 291) raising questions about the seriousness of his
commitment to the view that capitalist contradictions were to be located in
the sphere of production alone and that realization problems could be
solved by the infinite production of producers’ goods.
Thirdly, Shaikh does not inform us that, as a marginalist, Tugan
Baranowski operated with a conceptual apparatus considerably at variance
from Marxism. Most seriously, it differed on the central idea of value,
rejecting classical political economy’s objective value in favor of a subjective
idea of value, based on utility and individual preferences (Clarke, 1991). The
resulting chasm between the two ways of thinking can be illustrated with
a brief passage in which Tugan reflects on profit, price, and value.
the problem of profit has nothing in common with the problem of value. It is clear that,
from the point of view of the individual firm, profit is a phenomenon of trade and can
only be clarified through the laws of the formation of price and, consequently, of value.
In a society in which the division of labor prevails, a good produced by a particular
entrepreneur, considered as a thing, as a use-value, has nothing in common with the
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goods which make up its production costs. For example, a piece of cloth as a thing, as a
use-value, is something completely different from the machines, the factory buildings,
the workers’ means of consumption, the raw material, the fuel and the other things
which were needed to produce it. Only in its characteristic as exchange value is the
produced good – the piece of cloth – greater than the goods that were necessary for its
production. y [S]ocial wealth is independent of prices. This wealth can only be
expressed in terms of use-values. (Tugan Baranowski, 1901/2000b, pp. 98–99)
Not only is profit no longer a function of the extraction of surplus value,
but a ‘‘phenomenon of trade,’’ not only does price exhaust the meaning of
value, not only is social wealth thought of only in terms of use-value, Tugan
Baranowski has no use for the complex social alchemy of objective value
through which alone concrete labour becomes abstract and socially necessary
labour the basis of value. Tugan Baranowski’s Marxism, if it so be called
at all, is drained of all Marx’s critical and analytical power. It is hardly
surprising then that, in line with most marginalists, Tugan Baranowski also
considered himself an adherent of Say’s law whose rejection lay at the heart
of Marx’s understanding of capitalism as a contradictory system.
Tugan considers himself a supporter of the doctrine he ascribes to Say, James Mill, John
Stuart Mill, and Ricardo that ‘‘given a proportional distribution of social production,
supply and demand must coincide.’’ y For Tugan, therefore, ‘‘when Marx opposes the
lack of proportionality to the efficiency of social consumption as two independent causes
of stagnation, he acknowledges being a follower of Sismondi’s underconsumptionist
theory.’’ (Zarembka, 2003, p. 291)
Tugan Baranowski’s ‘‘disproportionality’’ theory of crises arises precisely
from this rejection of Marx’s value analysis and his fundamental assumption
of Say’s Law. Since there can be no general ‘‘excess of social product’’
(Tugan Baranowski, 2000a, p. 78), and since value is only price – a matter of
supply and demand – there can only be disproportions arising from the
unplanned nature of capitalist production. These can give rise to crises, for
in Tugan Baranowski’s view, they can have no other origin.
We have seen that capitalist production itself creates its own market – consumption
being only one of the elements of capitalist production. If social production were
planned, if the directors of production had a perfect knowledge of demand, and the
power for transferring labor and capital from one branch of production into another,
then, commodity supply could not exceed demand, however low social consumption
might be. Yet, given the complete lack of planning of social production and the anarchy
that reigns over the market, the accumulation of capital leads inexorably to crises.
(Tugan Baranowski, 1901/2000a, p. 77)
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3.3. Productionism Against Populism
In insisting that capitalism was not a system of production for need or
consumption, productionists forget that this was only one side of a
contradiction whose other side was value’s existential imperative to realize
itself as a use value. While becoming a use-value in the production of further
value was a detour, and indeed an increasingly frequent one as capitalism
developed, the ultimate prize for all values produced was to be realized in
the consumption as final use values. However, productionist arguments,
which Mandel labels ‘‘neo-harmonicist,’’ locate the problems of capitalism
in the sphere of production alone, and assume, like J. B. Say, that ‘‘there is
no specific problem of value realization, only one of surplus-value
production.’’ (Mandel, 1981, p. 40). Both versions of productionism assume
an expansion of the production of producers’ goods to an extent and in a
way that would obviate any potential for paucity of workers consumption to
cause crisis. While it is certainly true that the production of producers’
goods can be expected to become a growing portion of any capitalist
economy as it develops, these two arguments envisage a phantasmagorically
one-sided ‘‘production for production’s sake’’ that was neither envisaged by
Marx nor experienced in any capitalist society.
As we have seen Tugan Baranowski, productionism’s originator, saw crises
as originating in the anarchy of capitalist production. More specifically,
disproportions arise between the production of Department I, producing
investment goods and Department II, producing consumption goods. These
could be averted by organizing investment through cartels or the state. In
Tugan Baranowski’s view, which he illustrated mathematically, ‘‘department
I could develop completely independently from department II, to the point
where the output of consumer goods would tend to fall towards zero, without
such a development causing any crisis whatsoever’’ (Mandel, 1981, pp.
43–44). Thus discounted, consumption played no independent role: shortfalls
in consumption demand could be made up by increases in investment
demand, provided ‘‘disproportionality’’ between sectors could be avoided.
Tugan Baranowski’s resulting conception of capitalism as an endless
production of producers’ goods is easily contradicted. As Mandel rightly
points out, ‘‘unlimited growth of department I leads to an ever faster growth
of the productive capacity of department II (although not necessarily in
the same proportion); in other words, that under capitalist commodity
relations production can never fully emancipate itself from sales to the final
consumer’’ (Mandel, 1978, p. 72). What needs accounting, however, is the
enduring attraction of this view.
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As mentioned earlier, Tugan Baranowski and other Russian Legal
Marxists developed this view in the course of their debates with the Russian
Populists. As Rosa Luxemburg pointed out in her critique of their views, the
result was overkill.
There can be no doubt that the ‘‘legalist’’ Russian Marxists achieved a victory over their
opponents, the ‘‘populists,’’ but that victory was rather too thorough. In the heat of
battle, all three – Struve, Bulgakov and Tugan Baranowski – overstated their case.
The question was whether capitalism in general, and Russian capitalism in particular, is
capable of development; these Marxists, however, proved this capacity to the extent
of even offering theoretical proof that capitalism can go on without limits, one
has obviously proved the unlimited capacity of capitalism to survive! (Luxemburg,
1913/2003, p. 304)
Tugan Baranowski developed this view of capitalism on the basis of
his reading of Marx’s reproduction schemas at the end of Volume II of
Capital, schemas whose relation to the rest of Capital was problematic, going,
as Rosa Luxemburg showed, directly against its grain. They particularly
contradicted ‘‘the conception of the capitalist total social process and its
course as laid down by Marx in Capital, volume III y based on the inherent
contradiction between the unlimited expansive capacity of the productive
forces and the limited expansive capacity of social consumption under
conditions of capitalist distribution’’ (Luxemburg, 1913/2003, p. 323).
As we have also noted, the insufficiency of consumption demand,
and its centrality to capitalist reproduction, is a theme that runs through all
the volumes of capital, including volume II. It is only the incompleteness
of Capital that prevents this theme from being developed more fully in
its own right. Against this, in the reproduction schemas at the end of
volume II, Marx sought to show merely the possibility of capitalist
reproduction, simple or expanded, abstracting from capital’s contradictions,
and the possibilities for crises, whether they arose from accumulation or
from realization. Indeed, as Rosa Luxemburg showed, in these schemas
Marx also abstracted from technical progress and increasing labour
productivity and the account of crisis most associated with this, the
TRPF, is not developed until volume III. Moreover, the abstraction of
the schemas was reinforced, in Tugan Baranowski’s case at least, by his
marginalism and adherence to Say’s Law. What is interesting is that this
adherence was not unconnected with his rejection of the TRPF in terms
similar to those which would be invoked by Okishio many decades later.
Tugan Baranowski argued that Marx ignored the fact that increased
investment, increased organic composition of capital, also increased
productivity.
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
127
The error of the whole argument lies, however, in that we cannot suppose that all the rest
remains constant. Marx himself has noted that the elevation of the composition of
capital is only a capitalist expression of an increase in labor productivity. As variable
capital is a smaller proportion of total capital, the productivity of labor rises. The effect
of both factors on the rate of profit – and Marx ignored this – is balanced out, and the
profit rate cannot fall, in spite of the modification of capital composition. (Tugan
Baranowski, 1901/2000b, p. 91)
Having first shown that it could offset increases in the organic composition of capital, leading to no fall in the rate of profit, he then went on to
show that actually, increased investment would increase productivity to
such an extent that
The total mass of product undergoes a strong increase. So, the rise in the productivity of
labor is much higher than we have supposed. Hence, this implies a modification in our
conclusions: We have concluded that the replacement of manual labor by mechanical
work does not reduce the rate of profit. This would be correct under the supposition that
the introduction of machines does not imply an increase in the mass of goods. But, since
actually the mechanical work generates a greater amount of product than the manual
labor, the rate of profit must increase as a consequence of the relative rise in the constant
capital. This is, exactly the opposite of Marx’s theory. On the basis of the theory of laborvalue, we reach the conclusion that the replacement of workers by machines, in itself and for
itself, not only does not imply a tendency for the rate of profit to fall; rather, it implies a
rising tendency of this rate. (Tugan Baranowski, 1901/2000b, pp. 95–96)
We take up the matter of this ‘‘disproof ’’ of the TRPF in the next section.
What is relevant in explaining the endurance of productionism is that
though Rosa Luxemburg brilliantly exposed this position and insisted on
the reality of the problem of consumption demand in The Accumulation of
Capital, this work remains was unjustifiably dismissed. In that work, which
is regularly dismissed as flawed with the appellation ‘‘brilliant’’ attached,
one suspects, as a consolation prize, she had posed a very simple question:
for successful accumulation to take place
the desire to accumulate plus the technical prerequisites of accumulation is not enough in
a capitalist economy of commodity production. A further condition is required to ensure
that accumulation can in fact proceed and production expand: the effective demand for
commodities must also increase. Where is this continually increasing demand to come
from which in Marx’s diagram forms the basis of reproduction on an ever rising scale?
(Luxemburg, 1913/2003, p. 104)
Luxemburg comes, via a process of elimination, to the answer that in the
‘‘pure’’ capitalist economy consisting of only workers and capitalist, the
sources of demand inevitably remained inadequate and therefore capitalism
had to either reach beyond itself to non-capitalist formations or seek in
other ways to deepen and broaden the home market. This was in line with
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Marx’s emphases all along and only corrected the smoothing out of
contradictions in the schemas of reproduction.
But, as Paul Zarembka shows, Luxemburg’s work has been subject to
some of the most irresponsible critiques in the history of Marxism. Among
the most important critiques of The Accumulation of Capital
made after her 1919 murder, Nikolai Bukharin’s [was] the most well-known and most
instrumental in putting her down. These critiques carry differing political agenda – some
pro-Soviet, some anti-Soviet, some ‘‘independent,’’ some Hegelian-based, some not so –
but are not more cogent for their diversity. Typically they choose a secondary issue, raise it
to front-line status, and criticize that. The result is often either an error or a distortion. But
confronting Luxemburg’s theory in its full integrity is a rarity. (Zarembka, 2002, pp. 4–5)
Diverse as these critiques were, one point emerges, perhaps, as a very
widely shared criticism of Luxemburg: that the penetration by capitalism of
noncapitalist formations ‘‘can and does happen and it does aid capitalist
accumulation when it does happen, but it is not required by the logic of
capitalism’’ (Zarembka, 2003, p. 8). However, it is only by dismissing the
necessity of consumption demand falling short that this can be asserted.
The impact of these unjustified dismissals of Luxemburg’s arguments by
Marxists can be seen, ironically, in Mandel’s defence of Luxemburg. Mandel
is, of course, not among those who dismiss consumption demand. But even
he ends up conceding something to the dismissal of Luxemburg. Luxemburg
had indeed erred, he avers, in thinking of capital in general rather than of
capitalism as the competition of many capitals in which ‘‘capitalists can
indeed grow richer by buying one another’s surplus product’’ (Mandel,
1978, p. 64) and where ‘‘the surplus-value created at one point requires the
creation of surplus-value at another point, for which it may be exchanged’’
(Grundrisse, p. 407). Her working out of the ‘‘interrelated variables of the
reproduction schemas’’ (Mandel, 1978, p. 67) did not make her case fully,
at the level of the actual historical process of capital accumulation.
Nevertheless,
Luxemburg seems fundamentally correct. Capitalism was born essentially in a noncapitalist milieu; it has immensely enriched itself by plundering that milieu, and the
same value transferring metabolism has continued to this very day. (Mandel, 1978,
p. 68)
But does Mandel really need to put Luxemburg in the position of being
theoretically wrong but historically correct, as though she was, though
logically deficient, at least that lesser thing, a better observer? Surely not,
given his agreement with her on the relevance of consumption demand.
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129
Luxemburg is one of the few Marxists of her generation, and for that
matter, of all Marxists since Marx, to refer to the critical link between
paucity of demand and crisis on which Marx’s understanding clearly rested
even if he did not have the time to develop it. Among commentators on
Luxemburg it was left to Joan Robinson, by no means immune from the
general condescension toward, and tendentious reading of, Luxemburg,
to note this. Perhaps it had to be Robinson. For this theme also links
Marx and Luxemburg to Keynes and Robinson was one of the few scholars
to know Marx and Luxemburg as well as Keynes. Luxemburg, Robinson
says, ‘‘appears to be concerned with the inducement to invest. What motive
have the capitalists for enlarging their stock of real capital? How do they
know that there will be demand for the increased output of goods which
the new capital will produce, so that they can ‘capitalize’ their surplus in
a profitable form?’’ (Robinson, 2003, p. xxix). Robinson believed Luxemburg to be incognizant of the ‘‘savings and investment problem, for she
takes it for granted that each individual act of saving out of surplus
is accompanied by a corresponding amount of real investment, and that
every piece of investment is financed out of surplus of the same capitalist
who makes it.’’ Thus, Robinson held, Luxemburg had greater affinities to
Hobson than to Keynes. But the passages to which she refers us merely state
the assumption that Luxemburg believes Marx makes in his reproduction
schemas and are neither a statement of her belief about capitalism in general
nor, considering that Luxemburg regarded these schemas as out of joint
with the rest of the analysis of Capital, are they a statement about Marx’s
beliefs. In any case, any assumption of an identity of saving and real
investment flies in the face of Robinson’s own understanding of Luxemburg
as being concerned about the inducement to invest – what else might a lack
of inducement refer to but a difference between surplus and investment,
a hoard?
As Prabhat Patnaik notes, Marx always insisted that in any monetary
economy there was always the possibility of a ‘‘hoard’’ (Marx, 1867/1977,
p. 736), an uninvested portion of the profit which implies that Say’s
Law cannot possibly hold and which, therefore, implies the possibility of
generalized overproduction.
But neither Marx nor his followers pursued this fundamental contribution of Marx any
further; they preferred instead to follow exclusively the other major theoretical discovery
of Marx, namely, the one relating to his theory of surplus value. This is why three
quarters of a century had to elapse before the same themes surfaced again during the
Keynesian revolution through the writings inter alia of Kalecki and Keynes y .(Patnaik,
2009a, pp. 3–4)
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Part of this difficulty here is, of course, the mutual ignorance and
antagonism between the partisans of Keynes and of Marx, not to mention
the systematic distortion of the work of each by his own followers. This
link points to another implication of the role of consumption demand in
capitalist reproduction and crises. As we have seen, Rosa Luxemburg had
already noted how the paucity of consumption demand required either that
capitalism reach beyond itself to noncapitalist formations to find markets, in
short engage in imperialism, or it must seek ways to deepen and broaden the
home market. This link was also underscored by Hobson in his case against
imperialism.
In Hobson’s view, since it was the paucity of home demand that was a
major driver of imperialism, government action could overcome the problem
of overproduction and underconsumption in better, universally beneficial,
ways through social reforms and the redistribution of income. As he put it,
If the consuming public in this country raises its standard of consumption to keep pace
with every rise of productive powers, there could not no excess of goods or capital
clamorous to use Imperialism in order to find markets: foreign trade would indeed exist,
but there would be no difficulty in exchanging a small surplus of our manufactures for
the food and raw material we annually absorbed, and all the savings we made could find
employment, if we choose, in home industries. (Hobson, 1965, p. 81)
One might say here that Hobson was subject to the same criticism that
Marx made of the underconsumptionists of his time. One might also
recognise that the nonimperialist national social order envisaged by
Hobson, which was essentially no different from the one envisaged by
Keynes (1933, 1936/1967), required not reform but a change in the nature
and dynamics of capitalism, in particular in its class structure, that
amounted to a revolution. Marxist critics of imperialism of the time were
simply more conscious of the political implications of their critique.
3.4. Investment Against Consumption
The contemporary Marxist productionism views not disproportion
but the TRPF as the chief cause of crisis, that is, provided they agree that
the TRPF is a valid theory. Many Marxist economists do not. It is wellknown that Marxist economists in the postwar period believed they could
demonstrate a rise in the rate of profit (e.g., Sweezy, 1970). While assessing
this argument, though issues of data and the suitability of the statistical
measures used would take us too far away from the main concerns of this
chapter, one may safely say that this demonstration did not necessitate to a
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
131
rejection of the TRPF. The TRPF is just that, a tendency, which can be, and
often has been, counteracted by other tendencies – including that held
responsible for the postwar rise in the rate of profit – the cheapening,
reduction in value, of capital equipment. However, some Marxist
economists reject Marx’s account of the TRPF on stronger, theoretical,
grounds. They believe, first, that Marx could not solve the ‘‘transformation
problem’’ of how values were transformed into prices (Steedman, 1981) and
second that, as the famous ‘‘Okishio Theorem’’ had ‘‘proved,’’ Marx was
wrong about the TRPF and that instead of falling, the rate of profit
necessarily rose.
In the wake of these arguments Marxist economists who are interested in
these issues are broadly divided into those who seek to give, like Shaikh,
what they consider is better account of capitalist reproduction in which
they have solved the ‘‘transformation problem’’ and the rate of profit does
fall, logically and empirically, and those who reject Marxist accounts of
reproduction and crises entirely. However, scholars adhering to what they
call the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) (Kliman, 2007,
Freeman in Freeman & Carchedi, 1996) have recently shown, correctly in
my view, that the transformation problem exists only for those who attempt
to fit Marx’s economic analysis in a neoclassical equilibrium format, assume
that prices and values are determined by two independent systems, and
refuse to see that input and output prices are not determined simultaneously
but in circumstances that change with the time that elapses between the
moment of input and the moment of output.
We have already seen that Tugan Baranowski dismissed the TRPF by
simply assuming that because increased investment lead to increased
productivity, the rate of profit must rise. Part of the problem here was the
necessitarian assumption: the rate of profit in Marx’s account tends to fall,
though it can be counteracted by opposing tendencies. However, at least
some contemporary Marxists, following the famous Okishio Theorem which
‘refuted’ the TRPF, seem think that according to Marx the rate of profit
should rise because capitalists would not ‘‘adopt new techniques that
decrease their own rate of profit – and y end up reducing overall
profitability’’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 12n, citing Okishio, 1961 and Roemer,
1978). This seems to imply a relation between capitalists’ intentions and the
effects of their actions that flies in the face of Marx’s careful explication of
the operation of the TRPF.
No capitalist voluntarily applies a new method of production, no matter how much more
productive it may be or how much it might raise the rate of surplus value, if it reduces the
rate of profit. But every new method of production of this kind makes commodities
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cheaper. At first, therefore, he can sell them above their price of production, perhaps
above their value. He pockets the difference between their costs of production and the
market price of the other commodities, which are produced at higher production costs.
This is possible because the average socially necessary labour-time required to produce
these latter commodities is greater than the labour-time required with the new method of
production. This production procedure is ahead of the social average. But competition
makes the new procedure universal and subjects it to the general law. A fall in the profit
rate then ensues – firstly perhaps in this sphere of production, and subsequently
equalised with the others – a fall that is completely independent of the capitalists’ will.
(Marx, 1981/1894, pp. 373–4)
Andrew Kliman’s account of TSSI puts the problem down to the
simultaneous valuation of inputs and outputs, equalizing them in a way that
‘‘spirits away the disinflationary or deflationary effect of technological
change’’ (Kliman, 2007, p. 117). It is not merely that these Marxist
economists are, like Tugan Baranowski, mesmerized by the increase in the
volume of output which results from productivity increasing, costdiminishing investment. Rather, they are theoretically constrained from
taking into account the price declines which also ensue in the process of
equalization because they value inputs and outputs simultaneously:
That physical output rises in relation to physical input as a result of increasing
productivity is undeniable, as is the fact that this tends to boost profitability. Yet these
same increases in productivity also tend to reduce the rate of increase in the price of the
output relative to the price of the input. (Kliman, 2007, p. 114)
Marx’s version of the TRPF can only be rejected on the basis of
erroneous neoclassical equilibrium methods, a trend of which Tugan
Baranowski was a pioneer, as we have seen, in which prices and values are
determined by separate systems and time plays no role, and by the most
tendentious readings of his careful explanations. On may note in passing
here that the question of exactly how the TRPF or, for that matter, paucity
of demand, lead to crises is a separate one (Itoh, 1978).
While Shaikh does believe there is a ‘‘transformation problem,’’ he is not
a partisan of Okishio. The detail of his reconstruction of the TRPF that
most concerns us here is that Shaikh assimilates workers’ consumption
demand, that is, the bulk of consumption demand in any society, into
investment since it consists of constant capital (fixed and circulating capital)
and variable capital, that is, wages. Having done that he merely seeks
to ‘‘prove’’ that it was possible that consumption demand would pose no
problem. As he sees it,
if capitalists did undertake the appropriate amount of investment, then they would
indeed be able to sell their produce and make the anticipated profits. If this success spurs
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
133
them to reinvest once again in anticipation of yet more profits, they would be rewarded
once again, and so on. All the while, consumption would expand due to the
growing employment of workers and the growing wealth of capitalists. (Shaikh, 1978,
p. 229)
In such a reading, paucity of demand can only be a symptom of a deeper,
more fundamental, problem – the decline in the rate of profit that reduces
the willingness of capitalists to invest. However, there are at least two
reasons why this argument is not successful in relegating consumption
demand to the margins as a cause of crisis. First, both Marx’s own analysis
and the historical experience of capitalism over recent decades show that
while investment demand, when it is robust, can and does often offset the
paucity of consumption demand by increasing employment and therefore
consumption demand (as in the classic ‘‘Keynesian’’ prescription), the
conditions of existence of capitalism ensure that it can never keep pace with
the ever-increasing scale of production. Secondly, capitalists’ desire to invest
is negatively affected by perceptible shortfalls in demand, as both Marx and
Keynes recognized.
In Shaikh’s scenario, investment demand, defined as including constant
and variable capital, could keep growing in a way such that the expansion in
each period produced adequate demand for the value, including surplus
value, produced in the previous period. Such ‘‘balanced growth.’’
implies that productive power and effective demand can grow at roughly the same rate.
Taken by itself, however, it does not necessarily imply that capitalism achieves anything
remotely like that. Nor does it tell us anything about the way the causation might run if
such growth was indeed possible on the average. Nonetheless, the fact that expanding
reproduction is possible poses a distinct threat to underconsumption theories. (Shaikh,
227, emphasis added – RD)
Shaikh spends no time on whether such ‘‘balanced growth,’’ now proved
theoretically possible, can be actually realized, or why capitalism does
not ‘‘achieve anything remotely like that.’’ Instead he moves swiftly on to
talking as though this mere possibility is enough to dismiss ‘‘underconsumption.’’ The problems with this maneuver should be obvious to
anyone. First, if the possibility of ‘‘balanced growth’’ is to serve as the
refutation of the relevance of consumption demand, Shaikh would have to
demonstrate that the conditions of expanded accumulation he stipulates
would be normally, or at least fairly regularly, exist to the extent necessary
to undo the effects of the extraction of surplus value on the income, and
therefore consumption capacity, of workers. Though by his own admission,
they do not, Shaikh is not thereby led to wonder what effect such
imbalances might have on capitalists’ inclination to hoard, rather than
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invest. Second, deriving workers’ consumption from investment as ‘‘variable
capital’’ overlooks the fact, continuously emphasized by Marx, that the laws
of competition tend, over time, to reduce the labour necessary for capitalist
production and therefore the amount of variable capital. Can constant
capital take up the slack?
Here there are two scenarios. One is where the increased production of
Department I goods is realized in sales to Department II firms. In that case,
The only thing this analysis proves is the fact that consumption y grows as long as
accumulation grows. But it does not prove that consumption grows in the same
proportion as does the productive capacity of Department II. Indeed, the combined
operation of the increasing organic composition of capital in department II and the
increase in the rate of surplus-value in the overall economy makes it rather probable
that (at least periodically) consumption, while growing, will grow less than productive
capacity in department II. In which case, a glut of consumer goods can indeed
occur before accumulation has slowed down in the economy taken as a whole. (Mandel,
1981, p. 47)
However, some raise a second Tuganesque possibility: that the increased
production of Department I is realized through sales to other Department I
firms, and not to Department II firms. This would indeed be the ultimate
phantasy of noncontradictory, self-perpetuating capitalist accumulation,
production for productions’s sake gone bonkers. However, the conditions
under which it would take place would have to be specified – what would the
relevant demand conditions have to look like? Where would demand for
more and more producer goods which did not produce consumer goods
come from? Why would it occur? Has it ever occurred? Certainly no
historical examples can be mustered for this (the Chinese economy of recent
years, where investment has accounted for nearly a third of total annual
product, and the Soviet economy of the 1930s might be the closest examples.
But given the degree of state involvement in the first and the noncapitalist
nature of the second, they do not apply since the argument in question
concerns a competitive private capitalist economy explicitly).
Contrary to the reproduction schemas of volume II, where we begin
with the production of goods in Department I, with the production of
producers’ goods, the analysis of the rest of capital clearly demonstrates
that capitalism developed originally by taking over existing precapitalist
production for need, subsuming workers only formally. It triumphed
over these precapitalist producers, manufacturers, by the efficiency of its
production which it continually increased by producing producers’ goods.
However complex and sophisticated, this production of producers’ goods
has got over the decades and centuries, it does not seem to me to have
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
135
broken its ultimate link to human need (albeit expressed through effective
demand alone). If a case is to be made that this link was indeed broken,
the point in the historical development of capitalism where it was broken
would need to be clearly specified. It is hardly surprising that no one
has done this. It cannot be done. There has been no such break.
4. THE DEMAND PROBLEM IN
THE CURRENT CRISIS
Indeed, the career of capitalism in the latter 20th century shows that the link
between capitalist production and consumption remains alive and well.
Robert Brenner’s account of the political economy of postwar capitalism, in
particular its ‘‘Long Boom’’ and ‘‘Long Downturn’’ (1998, 2002, 2006, 2009)
foresaw the present crisis and is, to my mind, the only properly historical
Marxist account of capitalism in the latter part of the 20th century. It has
elicited considerable critique. Debate revolves around his focus on
manufacturing to the exclusion of other sectors of the economy, his use of
the triad of United States, Germany, and Japan as a stand-in for the world
capitalism, as well as other issues (Historical Materialism, 1999; Arrighi,
2003). From our point of view, however, the work’s most germane aspect is
its view of capitalist crises: his theoretical dismissal of the TRPF and his
subsequent historical reconstruction of the same. The matter is complex.
On the one hand, Brenner misunderstands, or at least misrepresents, the
TRPF. In criticizing what he calls ‘‘Fundamentalist Marxist theory’’ he says
that ‘‘The rate of profit falls, from this perspective, because with the real
wage assumed constant, investment in mechanization cannot but result in an
increase in labour productivity (output–labour ratio) that is more than
cancelled out by a decrease in capital productivity (real output–capital
ratio)’’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 11n). Here Brenner, like other critics of the TRPF
forgets that the proposition in question is a tendency not an iron law as
he portrays it. He seems, further, to assume that the paradox that
‘‘capitalists adopt new techniques that decrease their own rate of profit’’
(Brenner, 1998, p. 12n) simply cannot be obtained. We have already
seen, on the contrary, that this is precisely the paradox that underlies the
TRPF. Marx would not deny that in increasing the organic composition
of capital the individual capitalist is motivated by a desire to increase his
rate of profit both absolutely and relatively to others, an increase which
would last until the new technology became generalized in the sector. Nor
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would Marx deny that when certain technologies raise productivity
particularly high, and other circumstances prevent wage increases in line
with productivity increases and price decreases in line with lower costs,
conditions for continuing high profit rates may exist even after a given
technology is generalized.
On the other hand, Brenner’s dismissal of the TRPF is, in any case,
rather gratuitous – it is not necessary for his essentially historical argument.
If that were not enough, he re-establishes the same tendency out of the facts
he encounters! His explanation of the ‘‘Long Downturn’’ turns on falling
profitability in manufacturing and it is hard to distinguish from Marx’s
account of the TRPF as outlined in this chapter. Indeed, one might say,
having rightly dismissed his own wrong understanding of Marx’s TRPF,
Brenner is more or less forced to recreate a TRPF in historical form in the
course of his explanation which is essentially the same as Marx’s original
and correct understanding. Brenner’s recreation of the TRPF vindicates the
TSSI view that only assuming away the product price declines that follow
the generalization of a technology across a sector allows the critics of the
TRPF to make their case that profit rates necessarily rise. It also reveals the
profound link between demand and the mechanisms of the falling rate of
profit. Brenner’s
account of the long downturn y finds its source of the profitability decline y in the
tendency of producers to develop the productive forces and increase economic
productiveness by means of the installation of increasingly cheap and effective methods
of production, without regard for existing investments and their requirements for
realization, with the result that aggregate profitability is squeezed by reduced prices in the
face of downwardly inflexible costs. (Brenner, 1998, pp. 23–24, emphases added)
In Brenner’s empirical account, then, not only do profit rates fall, not only
do they fall because price decreases follow increasing productivity, the rise
and fall of profit rates is inextricably tied up with the problem of realization,
of demand, including, as will become clear, consumption demand.
Brenner’s explanation of the Long Boom and Long Downturn has
two further virtues which, however, have not hitherto been pointed out.
First, it puts the political economy of our time in its historical context,
seeing capitalism not as an unchanging and self-contained system but one
which has evolved over time – whether through the critical role of national
economic management or the postwar recovery of Europe and Japan
and the entry of new industrial competitors. Second, it is an essentially
geopolitical account of capitalism, putting the economic role of states – both
domestically and in their geoeconomic competition – within a wider
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
137
perspective on capitalism’s uneven and combined development. Thus
formulated, his account features demand centrally.
How so? First, the ordinary processes of capitalist competition –
investment to increase productivity, cost-cutting, and later price-cutting to
expand market share – lead to a situation in which ‘‘the cost-cutters’ rate of
profit remains the same as before and y the higher cost firms’ rates of profit
are reduced, the outcome is an aggregate reduction in the rate of profit in the
line.’’ This constitutes ‘‘over-capacity and over-production’’ ‘‘in the sense
that – there is insufficient demand to allow the higher cost forms to maintain
their former rates of profit; they have been obliged to cease using some of
their means of production and can make use of the rest only by lowering
their price and thus their profitability.’’ (Brenner, 1998, pp. 25–26, emphasis
added). Moreover, over-capacity and over-production further exacerbate
the problem of demand: ‘‘the slowed growth of demand that is the
unavoidable expression of the reduced growth of investment and of wages
that inevitably result from falling profit rates makes it increasingly difficult
to reallocate to new lines’’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 33).
Demand is also central to the geopolitical aspect of the story. It was
important in the Long Boom, though in ways distinct from the usual
‘‘Keynesian’’ understandings. On the one hand, while the Long Boom was
not, according to Brenner, rooted in favorable demand conditions created
by Keynesian welfare states, they ‘‘must have helped endow these economies
with greater stability than in the past’’ (Brenner, 1999, p. 91). On the other,
though all major capitalist states featured Keynesian demand management,
the bulk of the Long Boom’s growth took place in the recovering economies,
while the United States stagnated relative to the other fast-growing centres
of capitalist accumulation in the 1950s and enjoyed only a brief and highly
inflationary boom in the 1960s. This pattern of growth could only be
attributed to supply-side factors. However,
Where the autonomous growth of demand did operate powerfully to augment investment
and growth, it appears to have done so, paradoxically, less within national boundaries than
across them. German and Japanese manufacturers derived much of their dynamism by
means of appropriating large segments of the fast-growing world market from the US
and the UK. This redistribution of market share y gave a powerful boost to their
investment and output, while detracting somewhat from the growth prospects of the US
and the UK. The resulting pattern of development was extremely uneven, but it made for
a boom of historic proportions. (Brenner, 1998, p. 91, emphasis added)
Moreover, demand and demand management were critical to Brenner’s
account of why, once it had set in, the downturn was so prolonged.
The ‘‘insufficient exit’’ of firms which prolonged the downturn was partly
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because of their ‘‘intangible assets’’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 147) and partly
because of ‘‘barriers against their entering new lines.’’ It was also because,
critically, ‘‘With the growth of profits – and thus of investment and wages –
suppressed, aggregate demand grew more slowly’’ (Brenner, 1998, p. 148,
emphasis added). Demand management – taking the perverse form of
tax-cuts and a credit boom in the neoliberal decades that followed – was also
critical to easing the series of recessions that nevertheless occurred. And they
prolonged the Downturn.
In 1974–75, 1979–82, and in the early 1990s, the advanced capitalist world did indeed
sustain a series of recessions more severe than any since the 1930s, after each of which
the level of unemployment was generally higher and the rate of growth of output lower
than following the previous ones. Had it not been for the unprecedented expansion of both
public and private debt in response to these recessions, the world economy could not easily
have avoided a depression. Yet, the same expansion of credit which ensured a modicum
of stability also held back recovery. For, by cutting recessions short – and more generally
making possible the survival of those high-cost, low-profit firms which perpetuated overcapacity and over-production, and prevented the average rate of profit from recovering –
the subsidy to demand through Keynesian debt creation prolonged the downturn.
Keynesianism made the downturn both milder and longer. (Brenner, 1998, pp. 150–151)
Of course though Brenner calls the stimuli to demand ‘‘Keynesian,’’ they
were so only in a perverse sense. In the anti-Keynesian neoliberal times,
demand was stimulated first by expansion of government military spending
(military Keynesianism) rather than an expansion social and working
class consumption. Later, when consumption demand did expand, thanks
to wage stagnation, it had to take the form of unsustainable forms of
consumption credit – the famous wealth effect, first of the stock market
boom and then the house price boom – and was skewed towards higher
income groups (‘‘credit Keynesianism’’) (Needless to say, the extension of
this demand creation farther down the social scale to the hapless
‘‘subprime’’ borrowers laid the basis of the now infamous ‘‘subprime’’
crisis a few years later).
Brenner’s analysis captures the central irony of neoliberalism: its attempt
to restrict working class wages and consumption forced it into perverse
forms of demand expansion which soon came up against their own
limitations, most spectacularly in the present crisis. But perversely produced
or not, expanded private and public consumption via debt, particularly in
the United States, sustained both investment and consumption demand in
the United States and in the parts of the world economy reliant on the US
market. The extent of the stimulus the United States thus provided was so
great that consumption came to account for about 70% of US GDP and,
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
139
as the United States emerged as the world’s ‘‘consumer of last resort,’’ it
produced approximately 6% less than it consumed (i.e., the US trade deficit
was about 6% of its GDP). And, one might add, some expect that the
prospect of the United States ceasing to be able to perform the ‘‘consumerof-last resort’’ function, thanks to the current economic and financial crisis,
will result in a brutal interruption of growth worldwide. Others expect a
major reorientation of growth patterns in the emerging economies, with the
reliance on export demand of recent decades giving way to one on domestic
or inter-emerging economy demand.
Marxists who discount the role of consumption demand in capitalist
reproduction and crisis would have to deny all this: the role, so clearly
brought out by Brenner, of demand in the Long Boom, the Long Downturn;
the role of fiscal and monetary measures in mitigating the potential severity
of recessions by putting a floor under demand, including consumption
demand; and neoliberalism’s own perverse ways of generating demand.
They would also have to deny that the severity of the present crisis, the most
severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s, has been mitigated, if not
resolved, by government stimulus policies. And they would be unable to
understand how the search for new sources of demand by the emerging
economies in the current crisis, and its success or failure, will shape the
outcome of the present crisis in a fundamental way.
5. REFORMS AND REVOLUTION
Part of the unpopularity of underconsumptionism arises from the taint of
‘‘reformism.’’ However, reformism – the belief that capitalism’s problems
are limited and can be resolved without questioning its fundamental basis
in private property in the means of production – is one thing, and reforms
quite another. A reform may not be attached to any wider idea of whether
capitalism needs to be transformed, or it may be attached to a quite opposite
belief – that achieving it would require the overthrow of capitalism. The
same demand – say for a radical form of income equality – would be called
a reform in one case and a revolutionary demand in another. Calling does
not make things so. What makes a given demand a reform and another a
revolutionary demand is not the labels this or that band of self-styled
revolutionaries deem to apply to them but the wider political situation that
determines the historical outcome of any struggle whether it be styled
reforming or revolutionary. The most modest demand – say for cheap
bread – might turn out to be revolutionary if the ruling order is unable or
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unwilling to fulfill it and the political energy and organization exist behind
it to inspire people to believe that if it is not going to be fulfilled it is
time for people to remove the ruling order and fulfill it for themselves.
‘‘Merely reformist’’ demands for higher wages may become revolutionary
and apparently more radical demands may become ‘‘granted’’ reforms.
Labels can also be misleading in another sense. As has been pointed out
above, there may be some writers who, like Keynes or Hobson, for whatever
reason, alight on critiques of capitalism that are pretty thoroughgoing and
whose implications for ‘‘reform,’’ modestly though they may be couched,
are such as to require a fundamental transformation of capitalism.
Moreover, if the ruling class does concede a given reform it is likely to
increase the ability of working people to advance further demands. This is
why reforms and welfare measures are opposed by capitalists, as should
surely be clear after three decades of neoliberal attacks on welfare
states. They are, for all the complexity of their history – Bismarck and all
– direct or indirect achievements working class struggle. Attacks on them
have only been possible in an era of historic working class retreat.
As Prabhat Patnaik notes, the capitalist classes oppose the welfare states
for several reasons: because ‘‘it militates against the basic ethics of the
bourgeois system y that the distribution of rewards by the spontaneous
working of the capitalist system is ‘fair’; because, therefore, ‘‘the acceptance
of welfarism amounted to ‘no confidence’ in the bourgeois system’’ and,
most importantly, because
Welfare State measures improve the bargaining strength of the proletariat and other
segments of the working people. The maintenance of near-full employment conditions
improves the bargaining strength of the trade unions; the provision of unemployment
assistance likewise stiffens the resistance of the workers. The ‘‘sack’’ which is the weapon
dangled by the ‘‘bosses’’ over the heads of the workers loses its effectiveness in an
economy which is both close to full employment and has a system of reasonable
unemployment allowances and other forms of social security. (Patnaik, 2009b)
In this sense, as Patnaik notes socialism and welfarism, revolution and
reform, are ‘‘dialectically linked.’’ ‘‘Socialists must support Welfare State
measures, not just because such measures are humane, not just because
such measures benefit the working people, but above all because such
measures stiffen the will of the people to resist, help the process of changing
them from objects to subjects, and hence contribute to the process of
sharpening of class struggle’’ (Patnaik, 2009b). Kalecki had identified
much the same logic in his analysis of the political implication of full
employment – it was because full employment as a reform would have this
Consumption Demand in Marx and in the Current Crisis
141
effect that he recognized that it would be politically difficult for the
bourgeoisie to accept.
How reforms and revolution can be linked dialectically was illustrated in
the case of Sweden where a long history of working class gains led, at its
culmination, in ‘‘reforms’’ which entailed the gradual transfer of the
ownership of the means of production to workers (Korpi, 1983). If this
failed it had more to do with the political conditions – of ruling class capacity
to fight back and of fissures within working class solidarity – and less to do
with any ‘‘inherently’’ reformist or revolutionary character of the demand.
This complex relationship between reform and revolution is especially
important to understand because no one, not even the citizens of the
most advanced capitalist country, lives in a ‘‘pure’’ capitalism. Actually
existing capitalism everywhere necessarily (and not least because they
are not abstract capitalisms but national ones) rely on a number of political,
social, and cultural structures and practices – both traditional and
modern – to intensify oppression and exploitation. But other structures of
the same sort also furnish the second aspect of Karl Polanyi’s ‘‘double
movement’’ – the movement of social protection. These measures constitute,
especially in the advanced capitalist world, a dense network of structures
and practices – from city zoning restrictions to national regulatory and
welfare structures – that modify the dynamics of capitalism quite thoroughly
(Elson, 2000). The further extension of such modifications in ways that favor
working people and strengthen their organizations would be reforms worthy
of achievement in their own right. If undertaken with sufficient organization, seriousness of purpose and political will to take on the inevitable
opposition to them, there is no telling at what point in the struggle for their
extension capitalism might be modified beyond recognition. The problems
will certainly not be the reforms themselves but how ambitious we are in
conceiving them and how seriously we mean to achieve them.
NOTE
1. I have learned much from Makoto Itoh, Andrew Kliman, and John Weeks’
comments on earlier drafts, not least about the virtues of intellectual generosity
towards work which attempts a critique of one’s long-held positions. My debt to
Paul Zarembka’s careful argumentation on related matters is evidenced in the
references and his editorial suggestions have greatly improved this chapter. Alan
Freeman’s careful comments on two drafts sharpened the argument and many parts
of it are simply strands of our on-going conversations. Unresolved problems remain
my responsibility.
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