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A Deadlock Difficult to Break
Giuseppe Franco Ferrari
The outcome of the constitutional referendum held on 4 December 2016
has given rise to feasibility assessments of any future reforms of the
Constitution. It is generally agreed, both in the media and in academic
contexts, that save for any unforeseen changes to current political institutions,
any new proposals to amend the Constitution are totally unlikely, at least in
the medium term. Beyond strictly legal considerations, it seems clear that any
political force seeking to promote any amendment to the constitutional text
faces very high risks, especially if the proposed amendment is extensive and
profound.
This is not the appropriate forum in which to elaborate upon the concept
of populism and its manifestations in terms of parties and movements, as this
analysis has already been conducted both by Italian scholars and foreign
political scientists. Nonetheless, it seems clear that leading a wide-ranging
project of constitutional reform requires a lot of work and must be conducted
by those political entities able to publicly demonstrate leadership capable of
maintaining power authoritatively for at least the time needed to complete the
amendment process. Under current circumstances, however, it is almost
certain that such political entities, regardless of their leaders and of the
average length of the leadership they exercise, would be quickly transformed
into a political class to be opposed. In the opinion of a lay person, the outcome
of the revision procedure would be inevitably doomed.
The constitutional comparatist can only point out how in the main
European legal systems the constitutional revisions carried out since the
1980s have been approved by very vast majorities, far greater than the
government majorities. One needs only recall the Basic Law amendments
subsequent to the incorporation of the Länder of the former German
Democratic Republic, made necessary by the changes to the structure of
German federalism, and also the changes in the Spanish, Portuguese and
French Constitutions to meet the requirements established by the intergovernmental or inter-institutional initiatives aimed at strengthening the
European Union (EU). In addition, the Swiss revisions of 1999, or finally, the
Full Professor of Constitutional Law, Bocconi University, Milan.
I SSN 2421-2156
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clusters of articles in the Dutch Constitution that were modernized and
rewritten in 1988 and the following years. The impression gleaned from even
a superficial comparative analysis is unambiguous: turning points in
European history over the last fifty years, have always been marked by, or at
least accompanied by, constitutional revisions approved by broad majorities
(larger than the current governmental majorities of the moment) focused on
rewriting wide-ranging rules. The revision of Title V of Part II of the Italian
Constitution approved in 2001 was an important exception.
This is not meant to imply that all revisions approved by government
majorities necessarily lack constitutional legitimacy or are politically
inappropriate. Yet critical points in European constitutional history – if one
can consider the making of the Amsterdam, Maastricht, Nice, Lisbon treaties
as such – should have been evaluated fully, not ignored, with their fallout in
the domestic dimension remaining unexamined. In Italy such events have
been incorporated into the legal structure with the blessing of a broad consent
of the political representatives almost without notice by the public opinion.
The reality is that, historically Italy has not followed the method of
problematizing, highlighting, and proceduralizing the different constitutional
steps, unlike other, more important EU countries. One could argue that, in the
absence of progressive adjustments, or at least in the absence of the
adjustments suggested and perhaps imposed by the development of EU law,
in retrospect, pushing ahead with those reforms in some way forced and
guided by majorities cannot be avoided as they are more conscious of delays
and more eager for remedy, by extending reform to other fields, such as the
form of government or the structure of the regional State. However, the
Italian electorate has already shown little appreciation for this approach, not
so much because it is ‘Jacobin’ in itself, but perhaps because of the inability of
the reformist leadership to gather consensus within a sufficiently large
segment of the electorate.
This seems to lead to the conclusion that the system of constitutional
amendment has ended up in a vicious cycle, which is now extremely difficult
to break. The adaptation of the Constitution to European law, supranational
law and strictly international law (in its contemporary version), has not
succeeded in the natural way, ie that of constitutional amendment, but has
had to be assimilated into the system through the evolution of constitutional
jurisprudence, while formal constitutional mechanisms remain unused. In the
meantime, it has become apparent that parts of the constitutional text have
become obsolete, primarily regarding the form of government, and to a lesser
but not less important extent, especially in light of their relationship with nondomestic law, the catalogue of rights. At this point, a valuable constitutional
tool increasingly strained by the complexities of globalization has to deal with
increasingly large adjustment needs. And this is happening just as the crisis of
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party system is reaching its peak. At the roots of it are external factors, linked
to globalization on the one hand and to the pressure of the European
institutions and bureaucracy on the other hand, as well as domestic factors,
some of which are brought about by an institutional framework which is
outdated or otherwise inadequate to respond to contemporary needs.
It is therefore very difficult to make any diagnosis in the political context,
even if only tactical, that could result in any kind of prescription involving
future constitutional revisions. One cannot escape the impression that there
are very few ways to short-circuit the current situation, and that only an
eventful change of circumstances, caused by external events, could put an end
to the deadlock. The ideal way to amend the Constitution seems to be the
shared way, with a broad parliamentary participation, capable of conveying to
the public an image of a large consensus in order to mitigate the risk of a
populist reaction, though still not completely eliminable. However, at the
moment and in the short term, this condition does not seem possible, let
alone likely. The tactical manoeuvring of the party system, exacerbated by the
uncertainties about the electoral formulas to be used, prevents the
consolidation of sufficiently broad coalitions of parties, lest some subsequent
penalization take place on election day. From a strictly academic viewpoint,
one would be tempted to imagine a scenario in which a force of populist
inspiration, after gaining the majority in both Houses, might confront the
opportunity to promote a constitutional revision and then have to deal with a
referendum: a reversed framework in comparison with the Boschi-Renzi
reform ahead of the popular vote. However, laying aside this temptation, one
cannot escape the thought that such a scenario is by far the closest to the
breaking of the Constitution.
Therefore, a largely shared revision to the Constitution requires a stable
and dynamic party system, while at present it is extremely unstable and
withered. In addition, uncertainties regarding the electoral formulas hinder
alliances and understandings. On the contrary, a revision approved by strictly
governmental majorities or slightly larger ones seems doomed not only to
failure, but to create conflicts that tear apart both the party system and the
material constitution.
Furthermore, in terms of content, the scope and the extent of the
amendments are widely questionable. However, recent referendum controversies
aside, the perceived need for change is widespread, even among the most
tenacious defenders of the status quo.
There seems to be no doubt regarding the adjustments to be made to Title
V of Part II of the Constitution, concerning territorial autonomies. For example,
the failure to repeal the reference to the Province in Art 114 has reopened the
debate on the constitutional necessity of such local authority but also on the
direct or indirect nature of the political representation by the Province, despite
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and beyond judgments expressed on the issue in well-known decisions of the
Constitutional Court. Unlike previous occasions, namely the enactment of the
Bassanini laws and legge costituzionale 18 October 2001 no 3, this time the
joining together of reforms on local authorities and the definition of their
constitutional role has not been finalised. The gutting of representative offices
and resources, without adequate supporting measures, has opened a wound
that must be somehow dressed, even if starting from the top is not the best
solution.
The issue of the division of powers between the State and Regions
undoubtedly requires more than just a band-aid solution. In this regard,
however, the 2001 experience shows that any revision should be well thought
out and shared. Solutions too different from those already established, like the
much criticized ‘general and common provisions’ in the Boschi-Renzi bill,
should be avoided, as they would lead to an open season on constitutional
litigation, like after 2001. So-called fiscal federalism, abandoned after 2011 on
the basis that it burdened public finance with unsustainable dynamics, at least
had the merit of recovering the standard costs of local functions under Art 119,
and of eradicating, or at least the prospect of eradicating, the plague of the
historical costs. The political forces should negotiate common guidelines,
involving either the maintenance or the adjustment of the constitutional
provision. This is not a zero-sum game that can be left to negotiations between
the State-Regions Conference, ANCI (the National Association of Italian
Municipalities) and the Government, or even to the unified Conference, but at
the minimum, a reorganization of the common house, in order to get
administrative and financial co-existence with the European institutions in
decent working order and to provide citizens with a real and fair enjoyment of
social and other rights.
In terms of rights to freedom, there is a commonly shared fear that
amending Part I of the constitutional text might give way to worse failures
than those that would arise from its maintenance. However, the fact remains
that very different Constitutions, such as those of Switzerland, Finland, the
Netherlands, and Norway have been revised on the basis of structured
improvement to the standards of protection in the sphere of liberties, by
adding third and fourth generation rights and an adequate consideration of
the Strasbourg case law, compared with more traditional subjective positions.
The Italian Constitutional Court had to do it alone, often facing judicial
activism that corresponded to the silence of Parliament on delicate issues such
as the end of life, the system of personal ties different from those of the
traditional family, and bioethics. In these areas, one could imagine deep political
divides, so garnering wide consensus in Parliament could be problematic.
On the delicate matter of general principles, adapting Arts 10 and 11
would have been very useful in the 1980s, when enormous intellectual
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energies were consumed by the theory of counter-limits, on the relationship
with supranational jurisdictions, on the standards of protection; and in the
1990s, when the debate about peace-keeping and peace-restoring, the impact
of jus cogens, monetary and financial sovereignty, globalization and soft law,
began. Italian scholars and judges have almost become accustomed to doing
without updated constitutional principles on this delicate matter, as if the
structural problems of a system of legal sources and the equilibrium of original
dualism were already overcome, resolved through interpretation. The quality
of international law studies in our country is such that cultural support and
proper drafting should not be lacking from any serious revision attempt.
On the side of the form of government, the field is open, since opinions
are wide apart, as evidenced by the recent pre-referendum debate. To take a
stand for one of the many viable solutions here is neither possible nor
appropriate. It is clear that a solution involving strengthening the Executive
and the easing of equal bicameralism, after the recent experiences, can only be
approved by a slim majority, due to the harsh contrast between the positions
that have emerged with respect to this field. Also, the electoral systems cannot
be relegated to the background as if they are irrelevant variables, whether or
not they are constitutionalized.
Other minor changes, starting with the abolition of the CNEL (the National
Council for Economics and Labor), may not cause particular difficulties.
However, other non-minor ones, like the possible formalization, if necessary,
of the separation of judicial careers, despite having wider agreement than is
generally believed, would likely be able to garner broad consensus only in a
genuine situation of constitutional reform.
Another and different issue is that of the ‘vehicle’ for possible future
constitutional revisions: one law or multiple bills? Recent experience seems to
point to the latter solution: assuming the popular rejection of the reform has
depended on the difficulty in voters’ minds in separating the different contents
of the package submitted for their consideration, rather than more general
political factors. Somewhat extreme theories about the need to articulate
referendum questions despite a single revision law are not shared, as more
than one question is admissible only if there are several revision laws. But
even in that case, there is always the risk that an excessive articulation might
give rise to different levels of popular approval, with consequent contradictory
and mutually incompatible outcomes. For example, the modification of Title
V, inclusive of regional representation at the central level, could be approved,
while a new structure for the Senate could be rejected, or vice versa. On the
other hand, at least in Europe, referendum en bloc on constitutional texts
approved by a Constituent Assembly or processed by small committees, like in
France, historically occur only in very special circumstances, radically constituent
in nature, rather than merely reviewing.
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Finally, one need not be an old-fashioned constitutionalist or a conciliatory
one to believe that any revision, large as it might be, should only go through
the established and accepted form of Art 138. It is not advisable, for many
reasons, to repeat past attempts to follow alternative derogating paths. The
most important of those reasons is that, if the new text needs to be legitimized
in the same way as the old one, space should not be afforded to radical
criticism. Many politicians and some public law scholars have recently labelled
the amendment procedure a coup d’état, due to the fact that the revision was
approved by a Parliament elected on the basis of an electoral formula declared
unconstitutional in part. Since the level of political tension now seems to be
growing rather than diminishing, the political and constitutional system
cannot afford deadweight of any kind.
The occasion of the recent referendum and the uselessly performed
aggravated procedure must therefore legitimately stimulate timely reflections,
hopefully less passionate than those that took shape over the last few months
during the unfolding of the procedure provided for in Art 138. However, we
should still not delude ourselves. As Lucien Febvre taught, men study history,
but almost always this does not result in real experience.