Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regional elections

This art icle was downloaded by: [ Universit y of Sussex Library] On: 17 February 2013, At : 07: 40 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Modern Italian Studies Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions for aut hors and subscript ion informat ion: ht t p:/ / www.t andfonline.com/ loi/ rmis20 Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regional elections Arianna Farinelli a a & Emanuele Masset t i b Baruch College (CUNY) b Universit y of Edinburgh Version of record first published: 17 Nov 2011. To cite this article: Arianna Farinelli & Emanuele Masset t i (2011): Eppur non si muove? Prospect s for const it ut ional reforms in It aly aft er t he 2009 European and 2010 regional elect ions, Journal of Modern It alian St udies, 16:5, 685-704 To link to this article: ht t p:/ / dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/ 1354571X.2011.622474 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Full t erm s and condit ions of use: ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions This art icle m ay be used for research, t eaching, and privat e st udy purposes. Any subst ant ial or syst em at ic reproduct ion, redist ribut ion, reselling, loan, sublicensing, syst em at ic supply, or dist ribut ion in any form t o anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warrant y express or im plied or m ake any represent at ion t hat t he cont ent s will be com plet e or accurat e or up t o dat e. The accuracy of any inst ruct ions, form ulae, and drug doses should be independent ly verified wit h prim ary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, act ions, claim s, proceedings, dem and, or cost s or dam ages Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 what soever or howsoever caused arising direct ly or indirect ly in connect ion wit h or arising out of t he use of t his m at erial. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 16(5) 2011: 685–704 Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regional elections Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli Baruch College (CUNY) Emanuele Massetti University of Edinburgh Abstract The results of the 2008 Italian general election aroused expectations for the undertaking of a much awaited reform of the political system. This article discusses the prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 and 2010 ‘mid-term’ elections in order to provide informed speculation of the foreseeable outcomes. It analyses the interplay between the preferences of parties and the change of power relations amongst and within them in the context of the extant institutional veto points. The article concludes that: (1) a consensual ‘grand reform’ negotiated between government and opposition is the least likely outcome; (2) a partisan reform carried out by the governmental forces is also unlikely because of deep divisions within the governmental majority; (3) the most likely outcome is no, or very limited, reform. From a normative (liberal-democratic) perspective, given the populist constitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor (Silvio Berlusconi), it also concludes that ‘no reform’ is not the worst outcome. Keywords Constitutional reforms, Veto players, Italian transition, Berlusconi. Introduction The results of the 2008 general election were welcomed by analysts and commentators as a watershed in the Italian transition, as they seemed to represent a crucial step towards the consolidation of a non-fragmented party system and the prelude for a much awaited reform of the political system. The following events, however, have hardly provided elements for the substantiation of these predictions. In the following two years, no constitutional reform was seriously debated, with the exception of the financial autonomy of the regions (the so-called ‘fiscal federalism’).1 Even on this area, the parliament approved only a vague framework law and a legislative decree on devolution of state property to the regions, leaving the actual substance of the matter in waiting for other legislative decrees. Yet, the reform of the political system has remained very much on the agenda, with analysts presenting the period 2010–2013 as a real window of Journal of Modern Italian Studies ISSN 1354-571X print/ISSN 1469-9583 online ª 2011 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandfonline.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2011.622474 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti opportunity, given the absence of major electoral appointments after two years of almost uninterrupted election campaign. But, in what conditions have the 2009 European and the 2010 regional elections left the still fluid Italian party system? What are the implications for the prospects for constitutional reforms? Have the moderate forces within both government and opposition strengthened themselves, thus making a consensual reform more likely? Have the government forces remained united enough to be able to push through a partisan reform? Has any transversal alliance that cuts across the government/ opposition divide become more likely? This article aims at investigating these questions by bringing together the discussion of Italian political parties’ positions on constitutional reforms with the analysis of changes in power relations (both amongst and within parties) as a result of the outcomes of the two ‘mid-term’ elections. Considering the relationship between veto points and veto players (Tsebelis 2002), we argue that, while the 2008 general election reduced (at least formally) the fragmentation of the party system and consequently the number of veto players in parliament, the two ‘mid-term’ elections contributed significantly to reincreasing the number of veto players by exacerbating divisions within the main political parties and leading, in the case of the People of Freedom, to a crucial split. Combined with strong divergences amongst political forces on important constitutional areas, this increase in veto players is likely to close the door not only to consensual but also to partisan (i.e. governmental) reforms. From a normative (liberal-democratic) point of view, we also argue that, given the populist constitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the perspective of no reforms in this parliamentary term should not be taken as a negative outcome. The article is organized as followed. The first part provides a justification for conceptualizing Italy as a political system in transition and in waiting for a reform of the political system. The second part explains very briefly the main institutional veto points for constitutional reforms. In part three, we analyse the party system that emerged after the 2008 general elections to point out the number of veto players in Parliament. The fourth part provides an analysis of parties’ (and factions’) positioning on the most relevant constitutional issues, so as to point out their relative distances and the state of the art of the debate after the 2008 general election. The fifth and sixth parts analyse respectively the results of the two elections and their impact on the number of veto players. In the concluding section, we discuss the changes in order to formulate informed speculation on the fate of constitutional reforms being carried out within this parliamentary term. Italy: a political system still in transition? The dramatic changes that occurred in the Italian political system – particularly in the party system – between 1992 and 1994 are often referred to as the end of 686 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy the Italian ‘First Republic’. Since then, there has been an overwhelming consensus that Italy has remained in a state of transition. First, since 1994 the Italian party system has gone through a long and, arguably, unfinished phase of restructuring based on three pillars: the highly divisive figure of Berlusconi, the consolidation – but not definite solidification – of electoral/political coalitions, and the establishment – but not unanimous acceptance (Donovan 2008) – of bipolar competition (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004; Diamanti 2007; Di Virgilio 2006; Massetti 2009; Pasquino 2001). Second, the transition phase was generated and accompanied by strong and enduring expectations for the emergence of a ‘normal democracy’, after decades of partitocrazia and ‘blocked democracy’, which would be achieved primarily thorough a ‘modernization’ of the political system. In such a political context, the idea of a ‘grand constitutional reform’, which was first put on the agenda in the 1980s, has regained momentum (Bull and Pasquino 2007). The establishment of a new Republic has, therefore, been envisaged as the necessary end point of the transition. Although these aspirations have not been fulfilled, attempts to carry out such a ‘grand reform’ have, indeed, been undertaken: a bicameral commission headed by centre-left politician Massimo D’Alema managed to reach compromise amongst most parties on several constitutional areas in 1997, but in early 1998 it had to acknowledge its failure because of Berlusconi’s U-turn; while the extensive constitutional revisions passed unilaterally by the centre-right majority in the period 2003– 2005 were all rejected by the Italian electorate in a referendum in June 2006 (Bull and Newell 2009). While we acknowledge that the absence of a commonly agreed destination makes the completion of transition more difficult, the fact remains that a comprehensive reform of the Constitution is still very much on the agenda and this, per se, already determines a diffuse perception of the current system as a transitory one. Influential politicians, opinion makers, important stakeholders (such as the business organization Confindustria) and even the President of the Republic keep emphasizing the need for a more efficient and streamlined political system. Even those academics who have rightly pointed to the problems related to the application of the concept ‘transition’ seem to end up rehabilitating it: the need for constitutional overhaul is now an unquestioned and taken-forgranted matter of consensus right across the political spectrum at the elite level – and ultimately it may be this – the fact that politicians themselves see things that way – that makes it meaningful to apply to the Italian case the term ‘transition’. (Newell 2009a: 7, emphasis in original) We argue that this conceptualization of the Italian political system as a ‘work in progress’, justifies our questioning about an event, comprehensive constitutional reform, which has not happened yet and, indeed, may not happen in the foreseeable future (Morlino 2009). 687 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Institutional veto points for constitutional reforms Revisions to the Italian Constitution are regulated by article 138 of the Constitution itself, which envisages a long and complicated process, with several veto points. The aim is clearly that of favouring well-meditated and consensual reforms: meditated because two votes in each House with at least three months of interval are required, which give doubts and controversies more chances to emerge and be (re-)considered; and consensual because the final approval must be achieved either by an absolute majority and a popular (confirmative) referendum or by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Since the opposition is always able to call for a popular referendum, if parties are unable to reach a wide compromise in Parliament, the voters will have the final word.2 This was the case of the reform passed by the centre-left government (led by Giuliano Amato) in 2001. That reform enhanced the powers of the regions visà-vis the state, including the possibility of financial autonomy. It was strongly opposed by the then centre-right minority and especially by the Northern League. On that occasion the referendum was called for by both government (to have their reform legitimated by voters) and opposition. However, the opposition parties (which at the time of holding the referendum in October 2001 had already gone back to power) did not campaign to block the reform, proving that their position against it was more instrumental than substantial. As a result, the centre-left reform was confirmed by the referendum without much recrimination by the centre-right. By contrast, the partisan reform pushed through by the centre-right majority led by Berlusconi (2001–2006) faced a much stronger and convinced opposition. As a result, the following referendum campaign (which gain took place after the centre-left opposition had gone back to power) was a real political struggle and ended up with the scrapping of the reform in June 2006. Institutional veto points decrease significantly when it comes to reforming constitutionally relevant areas without the necessity to change the Constitutional text. This is particularly the case of implementing constitutional norms through ordinary legislation or changing the electoral system, which was never included in the Constitution. These kinds of reforms are, therefore, within the government’s reach, at least in principle. For instance, the third Berlusconi government (2005–2006), which was sufficiently cohesive and united, succeeded in passing unilaterally a new electoral law in 2005. By contrast, the subsequent centre-left government (2006–2008), which included about fifteen veto players, was unable to pass a counter-reform of the voting system in spite of an explicit and public commitment of the then Prime Minister, Romano Prodi (Zuccolini 2006). As this example points out, institutional veto points constrain political actors, but it is the interaction between the number of relevant actors (veto players) and their constitutional preferences that, ultimately, determines the outcome. These will be analysed in the following sections. 688 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Veto players: the new Italian party system after the 2008 general election The Parliament that emerged from the 2008 general election boasted the lowest number of (relevant) parties in the ‘Second Republic’. On the left-ofcentre camp, the Democratic Party (PD) dominates the scene, at least numerically. The new party, which had been formed in 2007 from the merge of the Left Democrats (DS) and Margherita (Ma, Catholics and social liberals) under the leadership of former left-democrat Walter Veltroni, appeared, however, from the very beginning as a rather divided and, therefore, potentially fragile political creature. There were influential politicians both within the DS and Ma, such as D’Alema and Franco Marini, who were not fully convinced of the necessity to create a united party and, especially in the view of the 2005 electoral reform, preferred a strategic ‘centre-left’ alliance, which would allow both parties to keep ‘fishing in their respective electorates’.3 This division also implied a different orientation towards coalition politics and, in turn, towards the preferred electoral system. In the run-up to the 2008 election, Veltroni entered an electoral alliance only with ‘Italy of Values’ (IdV), the party formed by former public prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, and the Radicals, the latter being directly hosted within the PD’s list. The idea was to incorporate the IdV within the PD after the election, but Di Pietro eventually decided to remain autonomous. The parties of the radical left – Communist Re-foundation (RC), Italian Communists (PdCI) and the Greens – formed a coalition on their own but did not succeed in being represented in parliament. On the right-of-centre camp, Forza Italia (‘Forward Italy’; FI) and the National Alliance (AN) decided to present a common list under the label ‘People of Freedom’ (PdL), with the explicit commitment to merge into a united party after the election. They formed a coalition with the Northern League (LN) and a sort of Sicily-centred southern league called Movement for Autonomy (MpA). This coalition, in which only the first three parties (FI, AN and LN) are relevant, won the 2008 general election and formed the cabinet. The Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC) was given a preelection ultimatum: either to merge with the PdL or to remain out of the coalition. It decided to form a ‘centre coalition’, Union of Centre (UdC), which managed to get elected in both Houses of Parliament. As a result the party finds itself in a sort of limbo: part of the centre-right in terms of ideology and social constituency but out of the government and, therefore, formally part of the opposition. The format of the party system that emerged from the 2008 general election boasted, therefore, only six relevant parties: FI and LN representing the populist right (throughout Italy and in the North respectively), AN and UdC representing a moderate centre-right (secular and Catholic respectively), the PD representing a moderate centre-left and the IdV representing a form of 689 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 left-leaning populism that focuses primarily on issues of justice and repression of white-collar crimes. The eventual merge of FI and AN into the PdL in March 2009, represented a further move towards the concentration of the party system, leaving the number of relevant parties at just five. However, it also represented a somehow confused aggregation, as it brought under the same roof a right-wing populist and charismatic/personal party, territorially balanced throughout Italy (FI), with a moderate centre-right party (at least as far as its leader, Gianfranco Fini, is concerned) with a marked southern tradition (AN).4 In so doing the resulting party, PdL, internalized potential tensions concerning (among other issues) constitutional reforms. Positions of political forces on constitutional reforms In the last two decades of debate about constitutional reforms all political parties have had a chance to advance, discuss and/or vote proposals. This allows us to chart, in spite of some incoherent positioning over time, the overall stances of each party or relevant faction within parties. As a preliminary consideration, it is important to underline the existence of a wide consensus on few and very general ideas. Virtually all parties, at present, support the idea of streamlining the legislative process by reducing the number of MPs and diversifying the competences of the two Houses of Parliament. In addition, although more disagreement remains on these issues, there seems to be an emerging consensus on the general idea of turning Italy into a federal system (or, at least, a state of autonomies) and in providing the Head of Government with more powers within the cabinet (e.g. by directly hiring and firing ministers). The presence of a general consensus on these few areas is confirmed by the bipartisan approval of a proposal (the so-called ‘Violante draft’) in the Parliamentary Commission for Institutional Affairs in 2007.5 Yet, it is important to stress that the failure of the ‘Violante draft’ was due not only to the premature end of the parliamentary term but also to persisting divergence on the details of the abovementioned reforms. In addition, strong disagreement persists on virtually all other areas, and in particular on the voting system, on the role and organization of the judiciary, on national solidarity, and even on the overall system of ‘checks and balance’ (i.e. the relationship between the executive and the other organs). As far as the electoral rules are concerned, in the aftermath of the 2008 general election a referendum on the voting system was pending. It proposed, amongst other things, to assign the majority bonus to the plurality list rather than to the plurality coalition of party lists (Sartori 2009). The positions of parties are, therefore, analysed in respect to the current system, to the amended system envisaged by the referendum, and in respect to alternative systems that have been discussed. The PdL, and in particular the majority faithful to Berlusconi, is the strongest supporter of the current system, as it allows voters to de facto elect a 690 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy Prime Minister with his parliamentary majority and manifesto, rather than to elect a Parliament in which the formation of a government is subsequently negotiated (Sartori 2010). The blocked-list system also shifts the attention of voters from individual candidates to the party and, in turn, from the party to the leader. Yet, initially, Berlusconi and, more consistently Fini, saw favourably the victory of the ‘yes vote’ in the referendum as this promised to benefit major parties, such as the PdL. Not surprisingly, the LN opposed the referendum and made clear that a victory of the ‘yes vote’ would put at risk the survival of the government. Until he remained within the PdL, Fini was open to consider the adoption of other electoral systems that could favour big parties and maintain bipolar competition, such as a two-round single-member constituency system (like in France) or a Proportional Representation (PR) system with a low district magnitude (like in Spain). However, as the convergence amongst Berlusconi and the LN on the current system is crucial for the stability of the government, the willingness to avoid governmental crisis has kept the two allies anchored to supporting the current election rule (Diamanti 2010). On the opposition camp, the UdC was the most resolute opponent to the referendum, as the party prefers either a return to a pure PR system or the adoption of a mixed-member proportional system (similar to Germany’s), which allows parties more room for negotiating alliances after, rather than before, elections. By contrast, the PD, despite its dislike of the current system, appeared deeply divided on alternatives. Veltroni, the first PD leader, preferred the ‘French system’ but the party has also flirted with the idea of adopting the ‘Spanish system’, as well as going back to the pre-2005 Italian system. However, a substantive minority within the party (especially those who were sceptical of the creation of the PD in first instance, such as D’Alema and Marini) seems to have developed a position very close to the UdC’s (Il Sole 24 Ore 2010). Finally, the position of the IdV is rather ambiguous too. Although the party maintains to be in favour of bipolar competition and a reduction of the number of parties, it is also too small to support voting systems that would advantage the bigger parties in the two poles. Indeed, it campaigned for ‘No’ in the referendum. The two most controversial issues on the reform of the judiciary concern the belonging of judges and public prosecutors to the same career track (which allegedly poses the defence side systematically at a disadvantage), and the relationship between the judiciary (especially public prosecutors) and politicians. Since the time of the tangentopoli scandals, they have contributed to create a sort of ‘justice versus politics’ cleavage in the Italian party system. The supporters of ‘justice’ argue that politics should be ‘cleaned up’ from corruption and, therefore, politicians must undergo judicial checks and trials like any other citizen. The supporters of ‘politics’ argue that, with the abolition of MPs’ immunity in the early 1990s, the equilibrium was disturbed, with ‘justice’ gaining the upper hand and keeping ‘politics’ consistently under blackmail. 691 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti Not surprisingly, the great majority of political forces leans towards the ‘politics’ side. Berlusconi and the majority of the PdL represent the most radical element in this respect. They have consistently advocated the separation of the judges’ from the public prosecutors’ career track and the subjection of, at least, the latter category under governmental control. They have also tried to reintroduce immunity for politicians, though limited to those taking up important institutional positions (with the obvious intent of including Berlusconi amongst those covered by immunity).6 In this position they are followed by the LN. Although this party has often indulged in anticorruption discourses, it has always advocated the primacy of ‘politics’ over ‘justice’. In its constant engagement with ‘simulative politics’ (Cento Bull 2009), it has even proposed a reform for direct election of judges. A number of political actors seem to occupy a much more moderate position, though still within the ‘politics’ side. A minority of the PdL (led by Fini), the UdC, the MpA and a minority of the PD accept the argument that ‘justice’ has invaded the space of ‘politics’, with prosecutors taking decisions to investigate politicians too light-heartedly, given the deleterious consequences of judicial implications on the politician’s career, even in the case of eventual acquittal. Many within these political forces also agree that Berlusconi has been, at least to some extent, the victim of a persecution by biased (if not ‘partisan’) public prosecutors who aimed to end his political career. For these reasons, they would be in favour of some kind of rebalancing of the relationship between ‘justice’ and ‘politics’. Most of these forces would be prepared to discuss the reintroduction of some kind of immunity for MPs, though this remains a hugely unpopular provision. They would also take into consideration the separation of career track between judges and public prosecutors. However, posing the judiciary under the control of the executive would entail an important departure from the basic principles of the 1948 Constitution which meets a lot of resistance within most of these political forces. On the other side, the IdV and its leader, former prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, represent the champions of ‘justice’. For them, the main problem is that some individuals use ‘politics’ as a shield against the due judicial consequences of their own private crimes. Berlusconi is, in their view, the paradigmatic example. They reject any form of immunity for politicians and any proposal for separating the career of judges from that of public prosecutors, let alone the idea of posing the judiciary under the control of the executive. Although more moderated in tone and more nuanced in the substance, the orientation of the majority of the PD appears to follow the IdV’s. Concerning the issue of national solidarity, de facto linked to the issue of unity and indivisibility of the country, the main division is between the Northern League, on one side, and the MpA, UdC, IdV, the PD and a minority of the PdL on the other side. Berlusconi and the majority of the PdL occupy, in this area, an intermediate position. However, sharing governmental 692 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy responsibilities with the LN seems to make Berlusconi prone, most of the time, to give way to its ally. As mentioned above, in the last two decades, a consensus on the general, though rather superficial, idea of creating a federal state has emerged. The problem is, however, how to proceed on that path without jeopardizing the unity, both formal and substantial, of the country. The Northern League, which is still formally a secessionist party, aims to use this reform to retain more financial resources in the rich Northern regions.7 This approach is strongly opposed by parties that explicitly protect the interests of the south, like the MpA, and by parties that claim to be concerned with the unity of the country (UdC, IdV, PD and the minority of PdL). Part of the latter forces, however, could turn in favour of fiscal federalism if it was financially sustainable for the South and encouraged virtuous management of public resources at regional and local level throughout Italy (Fini 2010). Last, but definitely not least, the political forces are divided on the overall ‘checks and balance’ system. Here the main division is between Berlusconi and all the other political forces, including Fini. Some of the latter are determined to maintain a purely parliamentary system, while others (like Fini) are prepared to discuss proposals for the establishment of a semi-presidential system (after the French model) if accompanied by a reform of the electoral law (similar to France’s) and by the checks and balance that such a system entails, including the possibility of ‘cohabitation’ (Panebianco 2009b). By contrast, Berlusconi and its majority in the PdL appear to push for the establishment of a new regime built around the de facto unrestrained power of the ‘charismatic leader’. Berlusconi’s ideas of the new institutional order were clearly outlined in the constitutional reform voted by the centre-right majority in 2005: a prime minister directly elected by voters, with no requirement to pass a confidence vote in parliament, with a permanent parliamentary majority, with de facto no chances to be voted down by Parliament, with the power to call new elections, to hire and fire ministers, and to determine the agenda of Parliament. In addition, the reform also envisaged the reduction of powers for all the organs of guarantee, such as the President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court. Indeed, this part of the reform was strongly criticized by many authoritative experts who warned that it would place Italy outside the family of western liberal democracies.8 Although that (failed) constitutional reform was then voted by AN and the UdC too, in the new parliamentary term the only political force that is prepared to back Berlusconi in his populist project – which now appears to take the shape of a sui generis semi-presidential system – is the LN, obviously in exchange for a federal reform. The European election of 2009 and the regional elections of 2010 The 2009 European election in Italy represented an important test for the party system and the political coalitions that emerged from the general election of 693 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti 2008. As European elections involve the whole national electorate, they are a good barometer of the relative strength of national political parties both in the competition between government and opposition, and within political coalitions. Berlusconi turned the election into a plebiscite on himself, a test on his new party, the PdL, after the official merger between FI and AN, and an opinion poll on the performance of the government in its first year. He had predicted a landslide for the PdL which his polls indicated at 40 per cent and above. The elections were also a critical test for other political parties. The PD sought a comeback after the party had suffered heavy defeats in regional (Sardinian) and local elections earlier that year, whereas the LN and the IdV aimed at consolidating and hopefully increasing their political influence vis-à-vis major parties in their respective coalitions. Finally, the (extraparliamentary) radical left, which had failed to meet the required threshold in the general election of 2008, hoped to maintain some parliamentary representation in Brussels. Yet, as shown in Table 1, while the governmental coalition managed to maintain about the same vote share as in 2008, the election results showed a redistribution of votes in favour of the LN and to the detriment of the PdL. In absolute terms, the LN gained 100,000 more votes than in 2008, while the PdL Table 1 June 2009 European Election results in Italy compared with the 2008 General and the 2004 European Election results 2009 Votes in thousands Government PDL LN MpA Opposition PD Radicals IdV UdC Extra-Parliamentary Left RC-PdCI SEL (Left Ecology and Freedom) Turnout 2009 % Diff. 2008 votes in thousands Diff. 2008 (%-%) Diff. 2004 Diff. votes in 2004 thousands (%-%) 14,207 10,779 3,124 304 13,163 7,989 740 2,441 1,993 1,987 46.4 35.3 10.2 0.9 43.5 26.6 2.4 8.0 6.5 6.5 72,856 72,850 þ100 7106 72,576 74,106(b) / þ847 757 þ863 70.4 72.1 þ1.9 70.2 þ0.3 76.6(b) / þ3.6 þ0.9 þ3.4 þ1,034 7782(a) þ1,512 / 7243 72,088 þ12 þ1,750 þ83 71,559 þ5.8 70.4 þ5.2 / þ2.1 73.5 þ0.2 þ5.8 þ0.6 72.0 1,035 952 3.4 3.1 / / / / / / / / 32,659 66.5% 72,539 76.6 75,215 714 Source: Re-elaborated by authors on the basis of data from Ministry of Interior *The 2008 data refer to the election results in Italy (except Aosta Valley) for the Lower House. (a) Difference with the sum of votes gained by FI, AN, Social Alternative, Sgarbi List and UDEUR. (b) The figures do not take into consideration that the Radicals run within the PD list in 2008. If the Radicals’ votes and vote share are counted, the difference is 73,366 thousands of votes and 74.2 per cent. 694 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy lost 2.8 million votes, mostly because of abstention (Corbetta et al. 2009). Nonetheless, Berlusconi’s party was still the first political party in Italy with 35 per cent of the vote. Across the political spectrum, the PD lost votes both towards other opposition parties (primarily the IdV and the UdC) and, to a lesser extent, parties of government (Corbetta et al. 2009). By contrast, the IdV was able to double its electoral weight by presenting itself as the toughest opponent to Berlusconi. Finally, whereas the UdC remained stable, the radical left failed to meet the parliamentary threshold, thus continuing to be excluded from parliament. Nine months after the European election, in March 2010, Italy held regional elections in thirteen regions (out of twenty). Before the elections, the centre-left controlled eleven of the thirteen regions. Although the centre-left (which at regional level often includes parties of the radical left) was able to retain the governorship of seven regions, the centre-right (PdL and LN) gained the most important regions of the north (Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto), where the alliance with the LN turned out to be once again crucial, and the regions of Lazio (where Rome is), Campania and Calabria, which were previously controlled by the centre-left. The UdC, albeit part of the opposition at national level, supported centre-right candidates in Lazio, Campania and Calabria, while its incompatibility with the LN led the party to support centre-left candidates in the northern regions. In Apulia, the centre-left re-elected as governor a popular figure of the radical-left, Nichi Vendola, after the national leadership of the PD had tried to get rid of him in order to forge an electoral alliance with the UdC. Vendola managed to reconfirm himself as the centre-left candidate and went on to win. This personal victory also served to relaunch the radical left, now under Vendola’s unquestioned leadership, in the polls at national level. As shown in Table 2, the turnout was extremely low (63 per cent) and all the main political parties, with the only remarkable exception of the LN, lost a Table 2 Results of the 2010 Regional Elections compared with the 2009 European, 2008 General and 2005 Regional Elections Votes in thousands PDL LN PD IDV UdC E-P Left Turnout 6,005 2,750 5,852 1,565 1,249 1,404 22,500 % Diff. in Diff. Diff. in Diff. Diff. in Diff. thousands 2009 thousands 2008 thousands 2005 Euro 2009 %-% Gen. 2008 %-% Reg. 2005 %-% 29.4 72,400 12.3 7195 26.1 71,100 7.0 7474 5.6 7376 6.2 7500 63.5 710,159 75.9 74,000 78.0 þ2.1 7117 þ2.0 70.5 74,500 77.1 71.0 þ272 þ2.6 70.9 7350 þ0.0 70.3 þ138 þ3.1 72.0 715,374 716.0 71,919 þ1,370 72,231 þ1,213 7199 71,212 77,250 72.5 þ6.7 76.4 þ5.6 70.2 74.3 78.1 Source: Data by the Ministry of Interior and Istituto Cattaneo re-elaborated by authors. 695 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti considerable amount of votes because of abstention. By contrast, the LN lost only 117,000 votes relative to 2008 (195,000 relative to 2009), while it gained 1 million 380 thousands votes relative to 2005. Unlike the other political parties, the LN was able to mobilize most of its electorate and increased its share of the total vote from 10 per cent in 2009 to over 12 per cent in 2010. In Veneto, the LN passed the PdL and became the first political party. Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 The impact of ‘mid-term’ elections on prospects for constitutional reforms Both the 2009 European election and the regional elections of 2010 reinforced and possibly accelerated some of the political trends initiated by the 2008 general elections. After 2008, both political coalitions experienced a progressive redistribution of votes in favour of radical parties, the LN and the IdV, and at the expenses of major parties, the PdL and PD. As a result, both the LN and the IdV have acquired more weight over the political agenda of their respective coalitions. The rising political power of the LN and the IdV has also exacerbated pre-existing tensions within the PdL and the PD, where more or less important splits have either already matured or appear to be about to mature. Within the governing coalition, the election results show a loss of consensus for the PdL (especially in the north) and confirm the increasing electoral and political power of the LN. Whereas the PdL is internally divided, lacks deep roots in the north and has to represent a broader array of interests across the country, the LN is a cohesive party with strong ties to the territory. Thus, it can convincingly present itself as the only reliable advocate of the northern economic interests (Panebianco 2009a). Although during the legislature 2001– 2006, the LN proved to be a loyal political ally, Berlusconi fears its electoral competition in the north, where the LN’s declared ambition is to become the first political party. After its striking electoral performances, the LN enhanced its capacity to shape the government’s political agenda, especially on immigration and institutional reforms. As far as the latter are concerned, in 2009, the LN managed to impose its willing on the 2009 referendum on the election rule. To be sure, the LN perceived the referendum as a serious threat to its own political survival (Franco 2009). In fact, in case of a victory of the yes-front, the plurality bonus would be attributed to the party – not the coalition – with the greatest share of the vote, thus penalizing minor parties, such as the LN. The political battle on the referendum revolved around whether to hold it on the same day of the European election (which also coincided, in many parts of Italy, with local elections). This option would have enhanced the turnout, thus allowing the referendum to reach the 50 per cent quorum. The LN conducted the game, making absolutely clear that a valid victory of the yesvote would have doomed the government. The LN’s Minister of Interior thus 696 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy proposed to hold the referendum after the European elections – i.e. in between the first and second round of the local elections. Throughout the electoral campaign, Berlusconi ensured his personal support to the referendum, although he never explicitly campaigned for it, in respect of the LN’s opposition. Yet, on the night of the European elections, the LN traded its support in the second round of the local elections with Berlusconi’s opposition to the referendum. Thus, albeit the majority of voters (77 per cent) favoured the referendum’s proposals, the voter turnout (only 23 per cent) was insufficient to meet the necessary quorum (data Ministry of the Interior). After its triumph in the 2010 regional elections, the LN was eager to take control over the government’s agenda on constitutional reforms. Bossi’s party drafted its own reform proposal and presented it to the President of the Republic without consulting with PdL members (with the exception of Berlusconi with whom the proposal was negotiated). The draft proposed the adoption of a semi-presidential system shielded against cohabitation (i.e. in which the president and the parliament are elected simultaneously). The proposal was also to maintain unchanged the current voting system as opposed to replacing it with a double-ballot system à la française (Torcino 2010). Along with proposing a change in the form of government from parliamentarism to semi-presidentialism, the LN made it clear that in case of a Berlusconi’s victory in the 2013 presidential elections, it would claim the premiership for itself. As former leader of AN and cofounder of the PdL, Fini has shown concern for the Berlusconi–Bossi axis and the growing electoral and political power of the LN. In several public occasions, he has criticized Berlusconi for being overly compliant towards Bossi’s diktats, and for degrading the PdL’s platform to a mere ‘photocopy’ of the LN’s. For Fini, the influence of the LN on the governing coalition should be somewhat proportional to its share of the vote. By contrast, although the LN has only one third of the votes of the PdL, it manages to shape the government’s agenda, and to impose both electoral alliances and political candidacies (e.g. the candidacy of a LN’s minister for the governorship of Veneto). Tensions within the PdL started to emerge during the campaign for the 2009 European election and reached a peak after the 2010 regional elections. Fini’s criticism cost him isolation from the rest of the party. PdL’s executives viewed him as a maverick able to challenge Berlusconi’s long-time uncontested leadership and destabilize the right-wing coalition.9 Even most former AN’s executives, who became members of Berlusconi’s fourth cabinet in 2008, turned their back on him showing that their allegiance is to the Prime Minister. After the regional elections, in an attempt to break the isolation in which the Berlusconi–Bossi alliance had forced him, Fini announced plans for the creation of an organized faction within the PdL. Not surprisingly, this intention exacerbated the rivalry with Berlusconi. The showdown took place at the party’s first governing assembly (direzione nazionale), where Fini publicly criticized the lack of internal democracy in the PdL and its self-defeating 697 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti dependency on the LN. Furthermore, almost breaking a taboo within the party, Fini condemned Berlusconi’s conflict of interest and the laws ad personam aimed at ensuring his judicial immunity (see Fini’s speech at the PdL governing assembly, on 22 April, reported in www.Ffwebmagazine.it). Berlusconi, from his part, accused Fini of moving too far towards the centre (especially on immigration), defended the electoral success of the governing coalition and the alliance with the LN, tried to ban the formation of organized factions within the party, and approved a document that condemned the behaviour of Fini and his fellow dissenters. The latter reacted, forming, in late July, an autonomous parliamentary group called Future and Freedom for Italy (FLI), which is now in the process of becoming an independent party (Corriere della Sera 2010a). Although the exact number of FLI’s MPs is still subject to change, the new parliamentary group includes forty-five MPs (mainly but not exclusively from AN): thirty-five in the Lower House and ten Senators (data from the official sites of the two Houses of Parliament, accessed 27 October 2010). The new group/party is, therefore, strong enough to block partisan constitutional reforms in the Lower House. In addition, the creation of this political force increases the relevance of other smaller parties, such as the MpA, whose support, especially in the Senate, could become crucial too. Not only does the split in the PdL make partisan constitutional reforms less likely, but it also poses at risk the survival of the government and, perhaps, the parliamentary term itself. Indeed, since its birth, FLI seems to be in a sort of limbo between government and opposition. In late September, FLI, which still has one minister and a few deputy ministers, supported the government in a confidence vote proving to be determinant for its survival (Corriere della Sera 2010b). Yet, this vote did not solve the conflict within the governmental majority. Interestingly enough, the main source of tension concerns exactly constitutional reforms. The LN and Berlusconi’s PdL keep pushing respectively on fiscal federalism and immunity for the highest charges of the state, threatening early elections in case FLI would not support them. FLI, by contrast, has declared its availability, in case of government crisis, to form an alternative ‘technical’ executive with opposition parties, in order to avoid early election and to reform the electoral system (La Repubblica 2010b). Concerning the opposition, the bad results of the 2009 European election forced Franceschini, the PD’s leader who had unsuccessfully followed the IdV in its strong anti-Berlusconi rhetoric, to resign. The party was forced into a new leadership contest and this time Pierluigi Bersani, a former PCI-PDS-DS member (widely seen as a man of D’Alema), was elected leader.10 Since its foundation, the PD (and before the PDS-DS) has been disrupted by internal power struggles along the D’Alema–Veltroni axis. The party has changed three leaders in three years, giving the impression of being in a permanent turmoil. Although Bersani managed to survive the non-exciting results of the 2010 regional elections, the PD remained internally divided in, at least, two political factions: the party’s majority, which supports Bersani’s leadership; and the 698 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy minority, which clustered around former leader Veltroni. The main source of disagreement keeps concerning two intertwined issues: coalition politics and the reform of the electoral system. For the party’s majority, the PD should be ready to support a ‘technical’ government with all the other opposition parties and FLI in order to take care of the most urgent issues, such as the economic crisis and the reform of the voting system, before the next general election. It is not clear which electoral system would be adopted, but, given the crucial role that the UdC and other smaller parties will have in the process, it is reasonable to speculate that it would be a proportional one. The PD’s majority also envisaged – though it is not clear whether depending on (or independently of) which voting system will be in force for the next election – the creation of a broad alliance of all ‘democratic’ forces, from the revived radical left to the UdC and, possibly, with the FLI (La Repubblica 2010a). By contrast, the adoption of a proportional electoral system is seen as a disgrace by the party’s minority, which maintains that the PD should firmly pursue its ‘majoritarian vocation’ instead of undertaking improbable alliances with parties that have little in common apart from their anti-Berlusconi stance. In an attempt to contrast the ‘confuse’ strategies of the current leadership, a subgroup of the party’s minority, led by Veltroni, has recently authored a formal document, signed by seventy-five PD MPs, of open critique towards the party’s agenda (Corriere della Sera 2010c). It is, therefore, arguable that the creation of a technical executive supported by the opposition parties and FLI would stress the differences between the two wings of the PD, blocking the reform of the voting system and exacerbating intra-party conflict with unpredictable consequences. It is worth specifying that, while the PD’s minority would perhaps remain isolated on the electoral reform, the party’s majority appears rather isolated on the idea of forming a wide anti-Berlusconi electoral coalition. All other parties have, indeed, remained rather sceptical, including the closest ally, IdV (La Repubblica 2010a). On all other constitutional issues, intraparty divisions in the PD are less marked, with the exception of justice. Here, the differences are cross-cutting rather than self-reinforcing. In both factions, there are politicians who lean towards a more radical approach on justice (similar to the IdV’s uncompromising stance) and politicians who take a more moderate position and could even consider the reintroduction of immunity for all MPs. This latter issue, however, is unpopular among the electorate and would increase the IdV’s capacity to attract voters from the PD. On the reform of the constitution, the PD’s new leader, Bersani, has offered to Berlusconi his willingness to discuss reform proposals in parliament. However, the government has so far shown no interest in bringing comprehensive projects for constitutional reforms in Parliament, nor to hold previous discussions with the opposition. To be sure, until the justice issue dominates the political debate, it is unlikely that the opposition will be able to work with the government on a bipartisan reform of the constitution. The IdV, 699 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti in fact, is against any project of reform that could deliver unbridled power to Berlusconi and restrain the autonomy of the judiciary. Even only a narrow reform of the constitution (limited to the reduction of the number of the MPs, the end of the symmetric bicameralism, and the strengthening of the Prime Minister’s powers) seems out of reach. Berlusconi’s attempt to trade his immunity with the promise of a bipartisan, albeit narrow, reform of the constitution has met the firm opposition of both the IdV and the PD. Finally, on fiscal federalism, the opposition parties have taken very different stances. The UdC, given its electoral strength in the South, has voted against the original framework law. The PD, albeit in favour of decentralization, decided to abstain, having no trust in the government’s capacity to draft legilative decrees that will not penalize the south. The IdV, perhaps with the aim of obtaining some political visibility, has unexpectedly voted along with the government, on the grounds that fiscal federalism can entail a more virtuous use of public resources. However, this reform remains very controversial both within the government and the opposition. Conclusions Berlusconi remains the undisputed leader of the PdL and the most powerful actor on the scene. The electoral losses of the party in the two ‘mid-term’ elections have been compensated by the gains of the government coalition as a whole, for which Berlusconi has restlessly campaigned. Indeed, most of the former AN’s establishment has remained with Berlusconi rather than following Fini in his split. Berlusconi is, therefore, still in a position to lead the game. However, his leadership has been substantively weakened by the birth of FLI, the dominating role played by the LN within the governing coalition, and Berlusconi’s own judicial problems. As far as constitutional reforms are concerned, he seems unable to find a widely agreed compromise. His preferences on the judiciary and, more importantly, on the overall ‘checks and balance’ system place him well beyond the ‘red lines’ of most other political forces and, definitely, beyond those of the opposition parties. Therefore, the possibility of a ‘grand reform’ being pursued consensually in this parliamentary term can be ruled out. This conclusion is in line with previous predictions based on the analysis of both the party system and the ideological positions of political actors (Massetti 2009; Newell 2009), while other predictions based overwhelmingly on the analysis of the (reduced format of the) party system had come to more optimistic conclusions (Carbone and Newell 2008). The alternative possible scenario is a partisan ‘grand reform.’ In this case Berlusconi would only need to negotiate the support of the other government forces, ignoring the opposition. Although this represents his preferred option, important obstacles appear on the way. Leaving aside the risk of seeing the reform rejected again by popular vote in a referendum, the Prime Minister 700 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy might not even be strong enough to push it through the parliamentary vote. Indeed, the new parliamentary group FLI seems to be strong enough to block a populist reform. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that this route to a ‘grand reform’ is closed too. Other possible scenarios prefigure much narrower reforms. The first concerns issues on which some consensus has already emerged (reduction of number of MPs and end of ‘prefect bi-cameralism’) and Berlusconi’s most important goal: immunity for himself, either in the form of immunity for all MPs or just for the highest charges of the state. Given the unpopularity of the latter provision, this narrow reform must be voted consensually (at least by two-thirds of MPs in both Houses) to succeed. Otherwise, a popular referendum would almost definitely reject it. A compromise with the opposition needs, therefore, to be reached. With the IdV definitely against and the UdC most probably in favour, the crucial factor would be the choice of the PD. In this case, it is more difficult to come to a definitive conclusion. Much will depend on the content of the reform: immunity for all MPs would gather more support than immunity for only the highest charges of the state. However, given the growth of support for the IdV and the losses of the PD in the two mid-term elections, the former will be able to exercise an extraordinary pull on the latter, making this third scenario very unlikely. An equally prudent conclusion is required for those reforms that do not need to pass through constitutional review, such as the new electoral system and the implementation of regional fiscal autonomy, which can be carried out by simple majorities. However, as far as the former is concerned, Berlusconi’s and the LN’s preference for the current system makes its reform highly unlikely. Even in the case of an attempt by the current opposition plus FLI to co-operate to change the voting system, the variety and distance of positions amongst the various parties (and, crucially, within the PD) would make a compromise all but easy to reach. As far as fiscal federalism is concerned, the level of isolation of the LN depends on how far the party is prepared to compromise between its approach, that is ‘the interests of the North first’, and the other parties’ approach, that is ‘the unity of the country first’. If the LN insists on its own preference, it will find opposition also within the governmental forces, primarily from the MpA and FLI. In addition, the economic downturn does not create a favourable context for passing this reform, as in the short run additional costs would, probably, be necessary. However, if the League manages to present the reform as a way to more virtuous use of public resources or, even more, settles for a façade reform, then it could find enough supporters to carry it through. All in all, in spite of all the expectations raised after the 2008 general election, this parliamentary term seems to be set to deliver little or nothing in terms of constitutional reforms. The above analysis leads to excluding a ‘grand reform’, and casts serious doubts on the perspectives for narrower compromises, even in the case of reforms not requiring constitutional change. 701 Arianna Farinelli and Emanuele Massetti However, considering the constitutional preferences of the most powerful actor, Berlusconi, from a normative (liberal-democratic) point of view, this perspective would not necessarily represent a negative outcome. Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 07:40 17 February 2013 Acknowledgements We thank the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions and Mark Donovan for commenting on an early draft of our article. Emanuele Massetti thanks also the British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for its support (Grant reference: PTA-026-27-2119). We remain obviously solely responsible for mistakes, shortcomings and imprecision. Notes 1 In this article the term ‘constitutional’ is used in a broad sense, which includes constitutionally relevant areas, even if they do not involve changes to constitutional text. 2 One-fifth of the Lower House MPs are sufficient to call for a popular referendum in order to stop constitutional reforms (Italian Constitution, art. 138). 3 On the content and consequences of the 2005 electoral reform, see Massetti (2006) and Pasquino (2007). 4 On FI as a personal or charismatic party, see Calise (2000), Diamanti (1995), Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) and Raniolo (2006). As far as Berlusconi’s ideology is concerned, the label ‘populist’ has been mainly used by the left-leaning press, but also by academics. See, for instance, Musella (2010), Taggart (2000) and Tarchi (2008). On the ideological gap accumulated between Fini and its own party, see Ignazi (1998). 5 Only the PdCI, which at that time was still represented in Parliament, voted against. Forza Italia, as a party, abstained, but Berlusconi voted in favour (http:// www.affaritaliani.it/politica/violante-pd-riforme251109.html). 6 For a very succinct but clear account of Berlusconi’s judicial troubles, including the still unfolding trials, see D’Avanzo (2009). 7 Its full name is still ‘Northern League for the Independence of Padania’, and ‘independence’ is still its first objective as spelt out in its Party Statute (Lega Nord 2002: 1) 8 Sixty constitutional experts expressed their preoccupations, primarily because of the excessive powers attributed to the Prime Minister vis-à-vis other powers (Bassanini 2004). 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