InclusIon and ExclusIon of Young adult MIgrants In Europe

© Copyrighted Material as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m InclusIon and ExclusIon of Young adult MIgrants In EuropE © Copyrighted Material © Copyrighted Material research in Migration and Ethnic relations series ate .co m Series Editor: Maykel Verkuyten, ErcoMEr utrecht university .co m as hg ate .co m as hg the research in Migration and Ethnic relations series has been at the forefront of research in the ield for ten years. The series has built an international reputation for cutting edge theoretical work, for comparative research especially on Europe and for nationally-based studies with broader relevance to international issues. published in association with the European research centre on Migration and Ethnic relations (ErcoMEr), utrecht university, it draws contributions from the best international scholars in the ield, offering an interdisciplinary perspective on some of the key issues of the contemporary world. hg ate forthcoming as hg ate .co m as Muslim diaspora in the West negotiating gender, Home and Belonging Edited by Haideh Moghissi and Halleh Ghorashi IsBn 978 1 4094 0287 9 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Full series list at back of book © Copyrighted Material © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young adult Migrants in Europe as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Barriers and Bridges m Edited by as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co KatrInE fangEn KIrstEn fossan fErdInand andrEas MoHn University of Oslo, Norway © Copyrighted Material © Copyrighted Material © Katrine fangen, Kirsten fossan and ferdinand andreas Mohn 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. ate .co m as ashgate publishing company suite 420 101 cherry street Burlington Vt 05401-4405 usa hg published by ashgate publishing limited Wey court East union road farnham surrey, gu9 7pt England ate .co m Katrine fangen, Kirsten fossan and ferdinand andreas Mohn have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identiied as the editors of this work. m .co as hg ate .co m as hg ate British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Inclusion and exclusion of young adult migrants in Europe : barriers and bridges. -- (Research in migration and ethnic relations series) 1. Teenage immigrants--Europe--Social conditions. 2. Immigrants--Cultural assimilation--Europe. 3. Teenage immigrants--Europe--social conditions--cross-cultural studies. 4. Immigrants--Cultural assimilation--Europe-Cross-cultural studies. I. Series II. Fangen, Katrine. III. Fossan, Kirsten. IV. Mohn, Ferdinand Andreas. 305.9'06912'0835-dc22 as hg www.ashgate.com hg ate .co m as hg a te. co m Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fangen, Katrine. Inclusion and exclusion of young adult migrants in Europe : barriers and bridges / by Katrine Fangen, Kirsten Fossan, Ferdinand Andreas Mohn. p. cm. -- (Research in migration and ethnic relations series) Includes bibliographical references and index. IsBn 978-1-4094-0420-0 (hbk) -- IsBn 978-1-4094-0421-7 (ebook) 1. Immigrants--Cultural assimilation--Europe. 2. Immigrants--Europe--Social conditions. 3. Young adults--Europe--Social conditions. 4. Marginality, Social--Europe. 5. Europe--Ethnic relations. I. Fossan, Kirsten. II. Mohn, Ferdinand Andreas. III. Title. as JV6342.F36 2010 305.242094--dc22 .co m 2010003963 as hg ate IsBn 9781409404200 (hbk) IsBn 9781409404217 (ebk) © Copyrighted Material © Copyrighted Material chapter 4 Estonia: a post-soviet predicament ate .co m Kristina Kallas and Kristjan Kaldur as hg Introduction as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m this chapter aims to provide contextual information for the analysis of social exclusion and inclusion of young adult immigrants in Estonia. We analyse political, economic and social developments and changes after the re-establishment of the Estonian republic, and the position of different ethnic groups living in Estonia in general, and in its capital Tallinn in particular, within those changes. The chapter also includes an overview of the available data and previous research carried out on this topic. The topic of ethnic relations and integration has been a focus of Estonian social science research for the last 15 years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union. the most important sources are listed in the references section at the end of the chapter. The Estonian Integration Fund has commissioned integration monitoring surveys every two or three years (2000, 2002, 2005, 2008). In addition, registry data are extensively available in the areas of employment (Estonian labour force survey, quarterly since 2001) and the naturalization process (annual citizenship and Migration Board statistics). During the last population and housing census in 2000 in Estonia, several characteristics such as ethnicity, mother tongue, place of birth and religion were registered, which provides a socio-economic snapshot of Estonian society. Sections on the political and legal context as well as issues of discrimination, culture and identity largely rely on integration monitoring surveys and other surveys carried out by Estonian social scientists. With respect to the socio-economic and labour market situation, the data of 2007 and 2008 come from two main research projects. The irst of them is the feasibility and needs assessment study for the Estonian national Integration Programme 2008–2013, conducted in 2007 by a team of sociologists from the university of tartu (Kasearu and trumm 2008a) and policy analysis institute Praxis (Anspal 2008). The second study is the Integration Monitoring carried out in 2008 by the same group of sociologists, analysing the integration progress in the socio-economic spheres (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b). Both of the studies focus mainly on integration, which has gained more importance vis-à-vis immigration during the last decade. In this chapter, the Estonian population is clustered into two main groups: ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians. The former refers to residents of Estonia who speak Estonian as their mother tongue and identify themselves ethnically as Estonians (in Estonian: eestlased). All other residents who identify themselves © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 82 hg ate .co m as representatives of another ethnicity and use the russian language in everyday communication are referred to as non-Estonians, although they may not identify themselves as ‘non-Estonians’. Among them, many ethnicities are represented. However, the major ethnic groups are Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. since the majority of people from other ethnic groups use russian as their mother tongue (and a substantial number of them do not speak or understand Estonian), in social science literature (and occasionally in this chapter) the term ‘russianspeaking population’ is used. as Historical Context as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m In Estonia, the history of immigration and the biggest problems and challenges associated with it date back to the post-Second World War era. Before and during the war, Estonia was mainly a country of emigration. In the second half of the nineteenth century peasants emigrated to the free lands in the eastern parts of the Russian Empire. During the war and occupation, the educated elite of the interwar republic emigrated primarily to the Western European countries, and later to the US.1 In 1945 there were approximately 830,000 people living in Estonia. Five years earlier, the Estonian population had totalled 1,133,917. Thus, Estonia lost almost 25 per cent of its population during the Second World War (Parming 1978: 34, Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 358).2 given these dramatic losses in the Estonian population, the labour force vacuum created by accelerated industrialization could not be replaced without immigration. As a result, after the war, Estonia turned into an immigration country. Since 1946, labour recruitment for rebuilding and developing the (manufacturing) industry became a major reason for immigration. One of the characteristic features of post-war migration was its high turnover (sakkeus 2007: 176), exceeding twice the total Estonian population. The irst immigrants originated from the European parts of russia, in particular from the neighbouring regions. Over time, the migrant population became ethnically more heterogeneous. Since the 1960s, the geographical hinterland of migration has expanded and included other non-russian soviet republics, mainly ukraine and Belorussia, and increasingly the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics (Kulu 2001: 2,384). Soviet immigration changed the ethnic composition of the country. Pre-war ethnic groups such as germans and swedes emigrated before and during the war, and as hg ate .co m 1 Emigrants were mostly Estonians escaping soviet occupation, but also germans leaving the country on the eve of german aggression towards the ussr and swedes emigrating from the Estonian islands to Sweden. In total, Parming estimates the number of people who emigrated as 107,500, constituting around 9 per cent of the total pre-war population (Parming 1978: 38). 2 Soviet Estonian historian U. Sõgel has estimated the wartime losses as approximately 200,000 people –80,000 less than calculated by Estonian émigré scientists (Sõgel 1988: 9). © Copyrighted Material 83 Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material Estonia’s ethnic diversity 1897–2008 (%)1 ate .co m 2008 68.7 25.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.1 1.2 0.1 1.0 1,340,935 as hg ate .co m as Ethnic group 1897a 1934 1970 1989 2000 Estonian 90.6 88.0 68.0 61.5 67.9 russian 4.0 8.2 24.7 30.3 25.6 german 3.0 1.5 0.2 0.1 swedish 0.6 0.7 Jewish 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 polish 0.2 0.2 finnish n/a n/a 1.4 1.0 0.9 2.0 3.0 2.1 ukrainian Belarusian 1.4 1.8 1.3 latvian 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 other n/a 0.3 0.9 0.7 Total (number) 985,351 1,126,413 1,356,079 1,565,662 1,370,052 Source: Parming (1978: 37), Hallik (1998: 15), Statistics Estonia (2008). hg Table 4.1 ate .co m Note: aBased on the only complete population census conducted in Imperial russia (1897), however, the ethnicity/nationality question was derived from language. as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg were replaced by mostly Slavic immigrants from other parts of the Soviet Empire. Immigration stopped in 1991, and by that time Estonia had representatives of more than 100 different nationalities. Still, a national awareness was characteristic only of the Estonians and Russians. of all the changes that took place in Estonia since the country’s incorporation into the soviet union, the drastic alteration of the ethnic composition of the population has been the most important. Between 1945 and 1991, net immigration stood at 337,000 people, and the share of non-Estonians increased from 12 per cent in 1934 to 38.5 per cent in the 1989 census (Sakkeus 2007: 176, Hallik 1998: 14). Having the smallest population among the Soviet Union republics, Estonia could hardly integrate such a great number of immigrants in such a short period. Integration was further complicated by the high concentration of immigrants in the urban centres of north Estonia. In the towns of north-eastern Estonia, immigrants constituted four-ifths of the urban population; in the north-west, around half (Kulu 2001: 2,388). In the occupational structure, immigrants reached a majority among the country’s fast-expanding industrial workforce, leaving Estonians employed in agriculture. In everyday life, it meant the segregation of the Estonian population into northern Estonia with urban-industrial russian-dominated communities, surrounded by the agricultural Estonian countryside, and the southern and western parts of the country remained dominated by Estonians. Residential segregation also took place in the urban centres. This situation led to tensions between the two groups, one Estonian and the other Russian speaking, and despite oficial ignorance of the issue, it remained one of the leading domestic problems of soviet Estonia. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Estonian © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 84 .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m parliament passed a resolution stating that all soviet-era immigrants and their descendants (around 35 per cent of the population in 1991) would not be accorded automatic citizenship in the restored Republic of Estonia. This policy was part of the broader Estonian political doctrine of legal restoration, which viewed Estonia’s independence in 1991 as a direct restoration of its pre-1940 statehood, and which consequently resulted in the situation where all the soviet-era settlers were considered as one of the by-products of soviet rule, and thus were expected to re-migrate to their countries of origin. In reality, they had three choices (Pettai 2005): (1) to become naturalized Estonian citizens after passing language and civic tests; (2) to become citizens of the newly independent russian federation or the country of their origin, or (3) to remain citizens of the extinct USSR with passports expiring in the near future. Members of the latter group later re-registered themselves as stateless people with permanent residence permits in Estonia (persons with ‘grey passports’). Yet, unlike the immigrants in some Western European countries, these soviet-era settlers did not see themselves as immigrants or as minorities, but rather as people moving around within a single country (the Soviet Union). Coupled with the Estonian political mainstream of legal restoration and the overall historical context, the nationality policies of the soviet union and post-independent Estonian governments have created a situation of segregation of two communities, living not together but rather apart from each other, effectively excluding one group (the mainly russian-speaking minority) from everyday cultural, political and socio-economic life. Now this identiication of themselves as national minorities (a realization which, after all, developed slowly and gradually), but not as immigrants, also prevails today. Immigration to Estonia from other parts of the soviet union slowed down in the 1980s and stopped in 1990. At the beginning of the 1990s Estonia established rather strict immigration laws setting the upper limit of yearly immigration at 0.5 per cent of the resident population. After the re-establishment of the Estonian republic, a reverse process began: due to uncertainty about their future in the new state, some recent immigrants decided to leave Estonia. It is estimated that during the period 1990–1996, a net total of 80,000 people left Estonia,3 the overwhelming majority to Russia. In parallel, emigration to Western Europe and northern america began, and became especially strong after Estonia joined the European Union in 2004. Although no deinite data are available about emigration over the last 15 years, the Estonian Statistical Ofice estimates that about 10,000–15,000 Estonian people live and work abroad, the majority of them in neighbouring Finland, Sweden and Norway, as well as in the UK and Ireland.4 It as hg ate 3 These igures are estimates drawn from various yearbooks of the Statistical Ofice of Estonia. However, in recent years the ofice has declined to give deinitive igures, citing the unreliability of data from this period. 4 this data is from personal communication with Maarja Kuldjärv, Ministry of social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 2007. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 85 as hg ate .co m is also estimated that a large proportion of those emigrants come from the russianspeaking community. the inclusion of Estonia in the European union did not result in greater immigration. A relatively small number of citizens of other EU member states live and work in Estonia. Estonia’s immigration law still remains rather strict, although some discussion has been going on in recent years over whether to raise the annual immigration quota from 0.5 to 1 per cent of the resident population. The labour shortage created on the one hand by rapid economic growth and on the other hand by the emigration of the young labour force to other Eu member states has been the main impetus behind the new debate about changing immigration policy. ate .co m Semantic Context as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg the question of national minorities and immigrants is very much tied to the historical background and current political context of Estonia. A heated debate about the origins of different ethnic groups began once Estonia regained its independence in 1991. More speciically, the question arose whether post-war, mostly russian, immigration was an instrument of Moscow’s colonizing effort of a troublesome republic, as is often stated in domestic political rhetoric, or whether immigration was the natural outcome of the industrialization of the USSR. The nature of the immigration process had a direct connection to the rights of russians in the newly established Estonian Republic. Such categorizations as ‘occupiers’ or ‘colonialists’ are based on certain assumptions derived from an historical interpretation of the post-war situation in Estonia. Estonia re-established (as opposed to newly established) its statehood in 1991 by declaring the 50 years of Soviet rule an illegal occupation. This legal restoration principle resulted in the situation where all those who had arrived in the territory of Estonia during soviet rule (even if they were born in Estonia) and their descendants were identiied as immigrants and denied the automatic right to become citizens of the new republic. the history of their immigration (post-second World War labour immigrants) is comparable to that of immigrants in other Western European countries, such as Turkish immigrants in Germany. That is how these people are often seen by the majority of Estonians and classiied in oficial government policies. However, the signiicant difference is that most of these Russians do not see themselves as immigrants since the relocation to Estonia took place at a time when there were no borders between the Soviet republics. This ‘disagreement’ over the deinition of immigration creates some tension in the policy process and public discussion. In oficial policy, Estonia considers only Estonian citizens with a cultural, linguistic or ethnic background that is distinct from majority Estonians to belong to the national minority. The non-Estonians (persons not belonging to the Estonian ethnic group) who do not possess Estonian citizenship are treated as immigrants in policy terms. However, in public discourse as well as in scientiic research, when speaking of minority groups, the most common usage terms are ‘non© Copyrighted Material 86 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Estonians’, ‘russians’, ‘other’5 or ‘russian speaking minorities’, whereas the term ‘immigrants’ is generally applied only to those who have arrived after 1991. The problems associated with this conceptual scheme are threefold: irstly, the ethnic background of the ‘russian-speaking minority’ is much more diverse than is usually grasped, since there are at least 121 different ethnic groups living in the country; secondly, the term ‘non-Estonians’ contains the notion of negation, which in recent years has attracted much criticism, and thirdly, the newly adopted term ‘Estonian-russians’ tends to undervalue all the other ethnic groups that are not ethnic Russians (for example, Ukrainians and Belarussians). Although one can speak of third-generation immigrants, there is no division of immigrants into different generations in either public policy or public discussion. Young people with immigrant backgrounds are often referred to as ‘young russian-speakers’ (venekeelsed noored), thus referring to their ethnic difference from the majority population rather than their immigrant background. In the Estonian media, the portrayal of minorities can be divided into several categories. First, there is a stereotypical discourse of minorities, where it is not uncommon for terms such as ‘occupants’, ‘colonists’ or the ‘ifth column’ to be used when referring to post-war immigrants. This trend – seeing minorities as ‘Russia’s henchmen’ and as a threat to state security – has intensiied after the riots in Tallinn in 2007 as well as the war in Georgia in 2008. But most importantly, it has been inluenced by recently released statistics which state that in 2008, among minorities, the number of people who have acquired Estonian citizenship has been less than half the number of people who have acquired russian federation citizenship. In addition the issue of insuficient command of the Estonian language among russian-speaking minorities is often cited as a reason for the hostile attitude towards them from Estonians. The stereotypical image of a Russian person who is not able to understand Estonian despite many years of residence (sometimes even birth in the country) and who exhibits pro-russian federation and anti-Estonian attitudes appears from time to time in the media. The second category of media representation is criminal activity among Russian-speaking people. Although the ethnicity of someone subject to criminal charges cannot be revealed, often the names of offenders are mentioned, and in the Estonian context this can reveal their ethnic backgrounds. In the last decade, a positive image of Russian-speaking people has developed that is mostly constructed through involving successful and well-integrated minority representatives in media discussions. They represent an image of the minority that the majority of Estonians would like – well versed in the Estonian language, with successful careers and supportive of the ethnopolitical regime of Estonia. Young adults of immigrant backgrounds fall into all these categories. During the Bronze soldier crises and riots in tallinn in 2007, the majority of participants were young Russian-speaking people. The image that ran through the whole 5 In the Estonian language the term muulased refers to group of people who are not ethnic Estonian and thus are ‘something different’. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 87 Estonian media – young rioters shouting in Russian ‘Russia! Russia!’ – remains strongly imprinted in the minds of Estonian television viewers, and conirms the stereotype of young Russian-speakers as ‘Russia’s henchmen’. ate .co m Political and Juridical Context Citizenship Policy and Naturalization Process m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg the distribution of the Estonian population by political-legal status is as follows: Estonian citizens (84 per cent), citizens of russia (7 per cent), citizens of third countries (1 per cent) and people with undetermined citizenship – stateless people (8 per cent) (Kodakondsus ja Migratsiooniamet 2009). The categorization of ethnic groups in Estonia conceals an interesting dichotomy – that there is an ethnic Estonian majority and a russian-speaking minority (as it is predominantly seen in the media and among the population).6 Since 1993, when the Law on Aliens was adopted and, as a result, a large number of soviet-era immigrants became stateless, the naturalization process has slowly but steadily decreased the number of stateless people.7 Currently, about 16 per cent of the people in Estonia are either stateless or citizens of third countries, and thus do not enjoy political rights such as voting for the national parliament, forming or being members of political parties and holding certain public ofices. Exclusion from political rights of citizenship (statelessness) is an important aspect in understanding the social exclusion of immigrant minorities. All individuals applying for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship by naturalization have to comply with one of two major preconditions: (1) whether he or she has settled in Estonia before 1 July 1990 and holds a residence permit at the time of submitting his or her application,8 or (2) whether he or she holds, at the time of submitting his or her application, a residence permit of a long-term resident (usually at least eight years, of which the last ive must have been permanent) or has a permanent right of residence.9 If one of those preconditions is fulilled, the individual applying for citizenship has to pass an exam on knowledge of the constitution and on the as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co 6 This discourse is partly derived from the legal restoration, not creation, of the Republic of Estonia. However, oficial census categorization distinguishes clearly between various ethnic groups (see Table 4.1). 7 In oficial policy, Estonia uses the term ‘people with undetermined citizenship’, which refers to the lack of decision on behalf of those former ussr citizens to take up the citizenship of any state, including Estonia. 8 After 1 July 1990 the immigration quota of approximately 600 people per annum was enforced by law. 9 Permanent right of residence may be granted after ive years of continuous registered residence in Estonia on the basis of a temporary right of residence (temporary right of residence: validity period up to ive years), additionally having a permanent legal income, and as of 1 June 2007, complying with the integration requirement (for example, © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 88 .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m citizenship act of the republic of Estonia, and also an exam on knowledge of the Estonian language.10 financial incentives are offered by the state to those who want to become Estonian citizens. When the examinations on the Estonian language test and knowledge of the citizenship act have been passed, compensation of up to 100 per cent of the cost of the language training is paid. The current law stipulates that minors under 15 years of age can be naturalized by their parents by submitting the corresponding application in the event that his or her parents have been residing in Estonia legally (on the basis of a residence permit) for at least ive years and if the child was born in Estonia after 26 February 1992 and is not, nor has ever been, a citizen of any other country. However, in spite of the simpliied procedure applied to minors under 15 years of age, one of the problems is the signiicant number of children who were born in post-Soviet Estonia but who do not have citizenship of any country – who, in other words, are stateless. In 2008 there were approximately 4,500 such children, comprising 4 per cent of all stateless people in Estonia. Even though most of these minors are eligible for Estonian citizenship by naturalization in a simpliied procedure (by the submission of the application by their parents), the number has nevertheless remained more or less stable in recent years. In addition, of all stateless people, 22 per cent are young people aged 15–29. How statelessness affects quality of life and welfare will be discussed in the following chapters. It is one of the factors causing unemployment, and consequently, low income levels. While Estonia’s membership of the Eu in 2004 brought an increase in citizenship applications, the latest trends also suggest that the number of people acquiring Estonian citizenship is decreasing, whereas the number of people who are living in Estonia and applying for russian federation citizenship is growing somewhat. stateless persons and permanent residents can take part in the political process through the right to participate in local elections (although without the right to run for ofice in them). Previous incentives and motivations for acquiring an Estonian passport – easier visa-free travel in the EU and Schengen countries – lost its appeal in 2006 when it was granted to all third-country citizens, including stateless people, living permanently in Estonia. Another potential cause for the slowing down of the naturalization process is the newly passed bill by the russian federation which stipulates that all stateless people have the right to visit the russian federation without a visa. In recent years, the Estonian government has gradually increased inancing to support the naturalization process, and has likewise developed new measures designed speciically to speed up the naturalization process, such as the incorporation of a citizenship ceremony for newly naturalized citizens – a measure as hg ate providing a certiicate of proiciency in the Estonian language). The Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board grants the various resident permits. 10 the following persons are exempted from passing the examination: (a) adults with restricted legal capacity, and (b) persons who, due to their state of health, are not able to partly or fully pass the examination. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 89 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m which should signal their importance to society. However, it is unclear how much effect these ceremonies have on the process of integration. None the less, the latest research suggests that the main problem with the low naturalization process is due to the lack of information, and moreover, the perceived injustices in the 1990s by refusing to grant automatic citizenship to these people. This perception of injustice towards them inhibits many stateless adults from taking up the language learning classes or even looking for information about naturalization requirements (Kallas 2008a). The question of newly arrived immigrants – people arriving in Estonia after 1991 or asylum seekers – is not very relevant in current political debates, since the numbers have been rather low: during the period 1997–2009, the total number of asylum applications was 156, whereas asylum was granted to 11 persons and subsidiary protection to 12 more. Asylum seekers by citizenship are mainly people from Iraq, russia, turkey, Belarus, georgia, pakistan and afghanistan (Kodakondsus ja Migratsiooniamet 2009). Similarly, however, the research on the social exclusion of these groups is somewhat modest. ate .co m Integration Policy hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg resulting from the historical context, the main policy issue in Estonia is not immigration (the number of newly arriving immigrants is quite low), but rather integration policy. Social inclusion and exclusion problems of the large non-Estonian population were largely ignored in the 1990s. It was the hope of the Estonian political elite that a large contingent of Soviet-era settlers would leave Estonia. All major policies such as those on citizenship, language and election law were highly unfavourable to Soviet-era immigrants. And although many did leave, the majority decided to stay. The beginning of the process of EU accession negotiations in 1997 brought a change in Estonia’s policies towards its Russian-speaking population. as a result of pressure from the Eu, the position of Minister without portfolio responsible for inter-ethnic relations and integration was created.11 the main task of the minister became the development of an all-inclusive integration policy. As an implementing agency, the non-Estonians Integration foundation (now renamed simply the Integration Foundation) was established in 1998. Stemming from the speciic political situation of the time, the irst national integration programme concentrated mostly on Estonian language training. The positive effects of this policy can be seen in improved levels of knowledge of Estonian among the Russian-speaking population, especially young people born in Estonia. However, at the same time, the neglect of other aspects of social inclusion such as labour market integration, political participation and discrimination led to half-measure results. The unemployment rate for young Russian-speakers remained higher as 11 The Ofice of the Minister for population and Ethnic affairs was abolished in the irst half of 2009, its areas of responsibility being divided between the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Culture. © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 90 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m than for Estonians. There were no serious policy measures to reduce statelessness among the Russian-speaking population. Although some changes were made to the citizenship law to allow parents to apply for citizenship for their children born in the Estonian republic without the need to go through the naturalization process (the language test and residency requirements), the effect of this new provision in decreasing statelessness, especially among the young, has remained weak. The russian-speaking community voiced its criticism of the programme by declaring it rather assimilative, since the focus was solely on teaching the Estonian language. The new national integration programme for 2008–2013 is more comprehensive, focusing on labour market integration, political integration and discrimination, and social cohesion, as well as directing more attention to the problem of the segregated school system. Improved incorporation of the interests of non-Estonians in the programme has been emphasized. Participation of non-Estonians in the integration policy development and implementation process has traditionally been quite low, although in recent years there have been some positive tendencies in this area.12 ate .co m Socioeconomic Context as hg Labour Market and Social Integration as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m levels of welfare and the economic well-being of the population can be measured by statistics such as income levels per household, employment and unemployment rates, and so on. In addition, opinion survey data are used to illustrate feelings of satisfaction or deprivation regarding a person’s well-being and material situation. Exclusion from the labour market is problematic, and can affect the possibility of inclusion into other areas of society in the long run. Several studies (for example, aasland and flotten 2001) carried out in the last ten years have argued that ethnicity has little impact on the risk of falling into poverty, and that there are no great differences in the material living conditions between different ethnic groups (Aasland and Flotten 2001). The Norwegian Fafo research team has concluded that despite the lack of citizenship and the struggle to integrate into several areas of society, ‘there are no signiicant differences between ethnic groups when it comes to social isolation’ (Grønningsæter 2003: 31). another assertion is that the latest positive trends in the labour market (the general growth of the employment rate and the decline of unemployment) do as hg ate .co m 12 Estonian integration policy has often been criticized by non-Estonians as being developed and implemented by ethnic Estonians with little attention to the needs and wishes of non-Estonians, who are the main target group of the policy. Nevertheless, one of the biggest hurdles to integration is citizenship. Although Estonian citizenship policy is very liberal and the process relatively easy to accomplish, it presupposes some degree of personal initiative and activity, which may be somewhat dificult for those used to the paternalistic system of the former Soviet Union. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material Table 4.2 91 Unemployment rate among ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians (% annual average) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 14.2 13.1 10.8 10.7 10.2 8.3 6.2 4.9 19.6 30.8 21.8 22.9 15.0 22.7 17.6 26.0 17.0 30.9 9.5 29.4 9.6 18.5 8.5 13.7 21 19.7 13.5 14 Ethnic Estonians 29.3 18.6 15.9 22.5 non-Estonians Women 15–24 Ethnic Estonians 17.5 25 17.1 23.1 non-Estonians 32.5 28.6 32.7 30.5 Source: Statistics Estonia Labour Market Database 2008. 16.6 29.2 9.8 30 8.7 13 17.5 34 9.2 28.4 10.7 28.3 10.4 15.4 6.2 n/a as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m 2000 total population (age 16 until retirement) Ethnic Estonians non-Estonians Men 15–24 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m not affect all ethnic groups equally (Kasearu and Trumm 2008a). People without citizenship have been the least affected by the positive trends in the labour market. the largest need-driven groups among the unemployed are young people aged 15–24: in 2007, the unemployment rate among young ethnic Estonians was approximately 4 per cent higher than the general unemployment rate; however, among young non-Estonians the unemployment rate was 9 per cent higher than the general level. Young non-Estonian women register the highest level of unemployment, being 4.5 times higher than that of the total population in 2006 (see Table 4.2). Moreover 64 per cent of the long-term unemployed (those unemployed for more than 12 months) are non-Estonians. For women, the corresponding igure for non-Estonians is 72 per cent. there is currently very little information available about the impact of the economic crisis in 2009 on the different ethnic groups in Estonia. Nevertheless, the latest surveys show that the russian-speaking population in tallinn is spending less money on food compared to the Estonian-speaking population, and that dismissals or job terminations have affected 38.9 per cent of the Russian-speaking households compared to 17.4 per cent of Estonian-speaking households (Toots 2009). there are no major differences in the labour market participation rate among different ethnic groups in Estonia. Participation rates are almost identical for women from different ethnic groups, while non-Estonian men show higher participation rates than ethnic Estonian men (Anspal 2008). the ethnic segregation in the labour market is clearly visible when the data on economic sectors as well as the occupational positions are taken into account. the spheres of economic activity of ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians have traditionally been different. Non-Estonians have mainly worked in industry and production, whereas ethnic Estonians have worked in agriculture and the service © Copyrighted Material 92 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material Table 4.3 Average income per family member among ethnic groups 1994–2006 (EEK per family member per month) 2003 (ESA/ EUSILC)* 4,230 4,524 3,606 2004 (ESA/ EUSILC) 4,733 5,017 4,091 2005 (ESA/ EUSILC) 5,678 5,942 5,094 2006 (ESA/ EUSILC) 6,913 7,346 5,926 87.6% 85.3% 79.7% 81.5% 85.7% 80.7% hg ate .co m 1999 (Norbalt II)* 1,935 2,039 1,739 m as total Estonian respondents russian-speaking respondents share of russianspeaking respondents among the income of Estonian respondents 1994 (Norbalt I)* 872 908 795 ate .co Source: Kasearu and Trumm 2008b. m as hg Notes: *norbalt I and II: fafo project on living conditions in the Baltic countries; EusIlc: European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co sector. Economic transition reforms of the 1990s did not affect all economic sectors equally. The importance of the primary (agriculture) and secondary (such as industry and production) sectors decreased signiicantly, resulting in high unemployment rates among people previously employed in these sectors. Although ethnic Estonians were affected by the outcomes of reforms in the agricultural sector, the proportion of these people was signiicantly smaller compared to that of non-Estonians who were affected by the restructuring in industry and production. Furthermore, the gradual rise of service sector jobs within the last 15 years has mainly created opportunities for ethnic Estonians, while non-Estonians’ opportunities in this area remain limited, mostly due to the language requirements established in 1992. Thus, it can be argued that the non-Estonians have been most severely affected by the economic transition reforms (Pavelson 2002, Fløtten 2006). In addition, ethnic Estonians rank higher among the upper-level professions such as managers or specialists, whereas non-Estonians tend to be over-represented among unskilled labourers or attendants.13 In recent years this tendency has decreased, and young non-Estonians are more often employed in the high-paid service sectors, for example in investment and banking (Pavelson 2005). Ethnic Estonian men are more often employed in senior management positions than men from other ethnic groups or women of all ethnicities, while women from minority ethnic groups are proportionally higher represented in service sector jobs such as shop and market attendants. Anspal (2008) argues that the lack of Estonian as 13 For example, the proportion of young ethnic Estonians with a university degree (higher education) working in the service sector is approximately 10 per cent, whereas among young Russians the proprtion is 25.7 per cent (Anspal 2008). © Copyrighted Material 93 Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m citizenship obstructs ethnic minority groups from taking white-collar positions. command of the Estonian and English language is also given prominence, and the use of Estonian at home is especially signiicant when explaining differences in professional level between ethnic groups (Anspal 2008). This labour market segregation is also illustrated by income levels. In 2006 the average income level per household member among young ethnic Estonians (aged 15–30) was approximately 6,250 EEK (400 euros) per month; among young Russians (aged 15–30) the average income was 4,300 EEK (275 euros) per month (Kasearu 2008: 51). Moreover, ethnic Estonians with university degrees tend to earn remarkably more than non-Estonians with the same educational level (Kasearu 2008: 51). Kasearu and trumm (2008b) have found that citizenship is one of the factors affecting income levels among the non-Estonian sector of the population. People with undetermined citizenship make up a proportionately higher share of the group of people with the lowest income in society.14 there were no major differences among ethnic groups in income levels among different age groups. Education was one of the main factors inluencing income levels among all ethnic groups. However, among ethnic Estonians education level affected income levels more than among the non-Estonian population. Income levels for ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians with primary or secondary education were similar, while ethnic Estonians with higher education were proportionally more represented in the highest-income groups compared to non-Estonians with higher education. Ethnic Estonians with higher education are 1.8 times more likely to earn more than 6,000 EEK (383 euros) per family member than non-Estonians with the same level of education (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b: 3), referring to the dimension of incomebased segregation. survey statistics revealed further that there is a large gap between the levels of satisfaction with their material well-being among ethnic Estonians and nonEstonians: 85 per cent of ethnic Estonian respondents said they were satisied with their material well-being, while only 31 per cent of Russian-speaking respondents said they were satisied (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b: 7). A somewhat smaller, though still signiicant, gap appeared in regard to the satisfaction with their work and security situation between ethnic Estonian and russian-speaking respondents (80 per cent of ethnic Estonians versus 54 per cent of russian-speakers were satisied with their job position; 87 per cent of ethnic Estonians versus 63 per cent of Russian-speakers were feeling secure in society). These differences are especially prominent among russian-speakers with undetermined citizenship, while the gap almost disappears when comparing ethnic Estonians with non-Estonians who have Estonian citizenship (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b: 8). Again, the possession or as 14 In their research, Kasearu and trumm divided the population into three income groups: (1) up 3,000 EEK (192 euros) per family member per month; (2) 3,001–5,000 EEK (up to 320 euros) per family member per month, and (3) more than 5,000 EEK (320 euros) per family member per month (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b). © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 94 as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m lack of Estonian citizenship has a signiicant impact on the feeling of material and social well-being of people in Estonia. social exclusion can be measured by objective characteristics; however, subjective indicators such as feelings of deprivation and exclusion are also important in understanding the process of social exclusion. In the case of Estonia, survey data show that people with undetermined citizenship and russian citizens often feel socially excluded compared to Estonians. While there are clear differences in the feelings of social exclusion between ethnic Estonians and the group of russianspeakers, the smallest differences conveyed are those between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship. However, Russian citizens tend to be the most excluded. Based on these data, a social exclusion index was created, and researchers concluded that subjectively felt social exclusion characterizes 15 per cent of the Estonian-speaking population and 30 per cent of the Russian-speaking population (it is even higher among people with undetermined citizenship – 40 per cent) (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b). In sum, non-Estonians have tended to beneit less from the economic growth in Estonia over the last ten years. The role and importance of non-Estonians in the labour market is signiicantly lower than that of ethnic Estonians; whereas one group – non-Estonians with undetermined citizenship – is most marginalized in socio-economic terms. People with undetermined citizenship represent the largest share in the low-income section of the population: they are more likely to be unemployed than people with Estonian citizenship, and they are least satisied with their material well-being (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b). However, the major factor inluencing material well-being and success in the labour market is neither ethnicity nor citizenship, but level of education (Kasearu and Trumm 2008b). The Estonian welfare system of social rights and beneits is less benevolent compared to the Nordic countries. For instance, the inancial assistance received by unemployed people (monthly unemployment compensation, approximately 65 euros in 2008) is insuficient, and social policies lack the extensiveness of those found in the Nordic countries. Other social services mainly include assistance from the Estonian labour Market Board, which provides vocational guidance and job mediation not only to citizens, but also to long-term residents and people with undetermined citizenship. Refugees are entitled to state beneits on the same level as those received by permanent residents. Newly arrived immigrants (within a maximum of three years after the arrival) are additionally entitled to the integration programmes implemented by the Estonian Migration Foundation.15 these programmes offer services which are necessary for initial settlement in Estonia, including basic language and job preparation training, support for receiving healthcare and welfare beneits, and assistance in inding essential information about education, residence and banking services. 15 Estonian Migration Foundation, <http://www.migfond.ee/>. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 95 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m on the other hand, the Estonian maternal leave system is generous compared to other European Union countries. Maternity leave allows mothers to take a paid period of absence of up to 575 days (approximately 18 months), and the sum of the parental beneit is similar to the person’s average salary over the 12 months preceding the oficial maternity leave. Permanent residents of Estonia and persons with undetermined citizenship residing in Estonia on the basis of a temporary residence permit are also eligible for the beneit. the Estonian socio-political model hence presupposes more individual responsibility in terms of coping with labour market shifts or changes. The wages are low compared to Western European countries, which has led to a growing outlow of specialized workers to other countries (however, this trend changed in 2008, when salaries increased at a very fast pace in Estonia). The labour market itself is quite lexible with regard to termination of one’s employment, whereas the system of re-training or providing further education for employees needs improvement. .co m Education System as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate the Estonian education system is characterized by a public bilingual school system. Both Estonian-language schools and Russian-language schools receive public funding at all levels of the educational system – preschool, primary and secondary – as well as in vocational schools and in higher education bodies. About 20 per cent of all Estonian schoolchildren attend russian-language primary and secondary schools. In addition, about 3 per cent of all schoolchildren in primary school and 1 per cent in the secondary school system attend language immersion classes, where the volume of Estonian-language studies exceeds 50 per cent of the total (Ministry of Education and Research 2008). Despite the bilingual school system, education in both types of school is uniied, based on the National Curriculum on Primary and Secondary Education (approved in September 1996). approximately 10 per cent of higher education students study in russian, whereas during the irst academic year, students with a mother tongue other than Estonian and insuficient knowledge of the Estonian language have the right to receive Estonian language training. The beneits and disadvantages of this kind of system are apparent: on the one hand, russian-speaking youths can have their primary education in their mother tongue. On the other hand, this kind of educational system has contributed to ethnic segregation, since the majority of Estonian and minority russian youths go through separate school systems and rarely communicate with each other. This problem is further ampliied by the fact that not only do Russian-speaking pupils study in russian, but they also tend to speak russian at home and in the surrounding environment, thus lowering the prospects of integration with and between other ethnic groups and increasing their exclusion from the Estonian society. Deriving partly from that, the gradual transition to Estonian-medium studies in Russian-medium secondary schools is currently under way – in 2007 © Copyrighted Material 96 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m the government approved a regulation whereby at least 60 per cent of studies at the upper secondary school level in all municipal and state schools in Estonia must be conducted in Estonian by 2011 (Ministry of Education and Research 2008).16 another interesting development is noticeable within russian-speaking families, who increasingly choose to send their children to Estonian-medium-only schools, one pragmatic reason behind this being the hope that they will be more successful in the labour market.17 although the school curriculum and textbooks in the Estonian-language and russian-language schools are largely identical, current research among history and citizenship studies teachers in russian-speaking schools points to possible problems related to the interpretation of some sensitive topics (for instance, the question of the soviet occupation) and the lack of necessary skills among teachers to cope with those issues (Kirss and Vihalemm 2008). Moreover, a PISA (programme for International student assessment) study conducted in 2007 showed that while the pupils in Estonian russian-language schools were doing better than pupils of the same age in russian federation schools, their results were still signiicantly lower than pupils who were studying in Estonian-language schools. The biggest difference between Estonian and Russian-language schools was found in mathematics (and sciences in general) and in functional reading (Kitsing 2008). This in turn indicates that teacher training may be of insuficient quality, the results of which are consequently transmitted to the pupils. The latest research also points out that the russian schools are slightly more authoritarian compared to the more liberal classroom climate in Estonian schools and maintain stricter internal rules and regulations than Estonian-language schools (toots 2008). Education levels among major ethnic groups do not vary much. Slightly more people among immigrant groups have vocational and professional secondary education, while ethnic Estonians are more likely to have masters’ degrees or science degrees. This is explained by the immigrant background of these minority groups – mainly people with professional vocational education who migrated to Estonia in the 1950s and 1960s to ill jobs in the growing industrial sector (see the section on ‘Historical Background’). Intercultural contacts between russian- and Estonian-language schools are not common. Not only is this expressed in minimal contact between schoolchildren from different language schools, but contact is also quite rare among school personnel or teachers (Kirss and Vihalemm 2008). First, this creates a situation where the prospects for co-operation are reduced; second, infrequent intercultural contact tends to increase hostility among pupils towards other ethnicities. However, schools which have initiated co-operation see the potential of this kind as hg 16 The mandatory subjects taught in Estonian will be: Estonian literature, civic studies, geography, music and Estonian history. 17 However, it should also be mentioned that the teaching of the Estonian language is compulsory in the Russian-language schools, and not vice versa. © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 97 ate .co m of joint action – most positive effects are mainly expressed around activities which focus on common interests (Kirss and Vihalemm 2008), whereas activities which include only lecturing and little collective engagement have modest effects. therefore, increasing mutual understanding via inter-school activities is one of the most important activities in helping to overcome the barriers of social exclusion and stereotypical behaviour. Language Issues as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg the language issue became a highly politicized topic in Estonia after the restoration of independence in 1990. It is one of the policy areas that remains high on the agenda of the political parties and affects the everyday life opportunities of the ethnic minorities. During Soviet rule, two languages – Estonian and Russian – were used oficially on Estonian territory, and according to statements of Soviet leaders, all Estonians were to become bilingual. In reality, as a result of a Soviet-language policy which gave preference to russian, only ethnic Estonians became bilingual, while the large russian-speaking part of the population remained without a proper knowledge of the Estonian language. Soviet language policy was one of the most inluential aspects of nationalities policy on everyday inter-ethnic relations in Soviet Union republics. Although the constitution of the Estonian SSR did not declare a state language, the importance of Russian increased with every year. In several domains Estonian was replaced by russian due to Estonia’s direct subordination to Moscow, for example in banking, statistics, the militia (soviet police), railway, naval and air transport, mining, energy and production (rannut 2004). After Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, the study of Russian became mandatory in schools. While in the 1940s and 1950s there was pressure on russian immigrants to learn the local language, the later period saw growing pressure on ethnic Estonians to learn Russian. Russian migrants were the only ethnic group that enjoyed cultural and linguistic privileges in the Estonian SSR. Whenever they located in an area, russian schools were opened and russianlanguage newspapers and other facilities were established (Kolstoe 1995). Neither Ukrainians, Byelorussians nor any other nationality enjoyed this privilege. As a result, people from ethnic groups other than ethnic Estonians or russians were assimilated into russian rather than Estonian (hence the term ‘russian-speaking minority’). After the 1958 school reform, the study of Estonian in Russian schools was not mandatory. It was still taught, but never as intensively as the instruction of Russian. The consequence was that ethnic Estonians were more luent in Russian than Russians were in Estonian. In the 1979 census, only 13 per cent of Russianspeakers declared some knowledge of Estonian as a second language. Paul Kolstoe (1995) argues that insuficient knowledge of Estonian among Russians cut them off from a deeper understanding of the dominant culture of the society in which they lived. Since the position of the Estonian language was preserved at almost © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 98 as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m the same level, over the long term this policy resulted in a lowering of linguistic integration of the immigrant population. In 1989, when Estonia was still part of the soviet union, the Estonian supreme soviet (or parliament) adopted a language law declaring Estonian the oficial language. At the time, Russian was still widely used in all areas of state administration and local governments, and the law foresaw a transition period to the sole use of Estonian. However, in 1995 a new language law was adopted. previous transition periods for the acquisition of Estonian among public sector employees were cancelled, and replaced with speciic language requirements for each employment category. In a situation where only 15 per cent of Russianspeaking people reported that they had some knowledge of Estonian, this policy led to a situation where many russian-speaking employees in the public sector lost their jobs because they could not meet the language requirements. A special language inspection was established with the task of controlling the language levels of all public employees who acquired their education in a language other than Estonian. thus, since the 1990s, the language policy of Estonia has not been favourable for russian-speakers who want to smoothly integrate into the labour market and society. In addition to the functional quality of language proiciency, better knowledge of Estonian increases the self-conidence of non-Estonians. While russian-medium schools that were established during soviet times are preserved, the labour market, and especially public political life, operates in Estonian only. The Estonian government has implemented several multi-annual policy programmes on language teaching to the russian-speaking population (many of them supported by the EU). Teaching Estonian in Russian-medium schools has also improved signiicantly. As a result, the level of proiciency in Estonian among the Russian-speaking population has increased steadily since 1990. russian-speaking youths have progressed the most in terms of Estonian language acquisition: in a survey, only 8 per cent of young people aged 15–29 claimed that they did not understand Estonian.18 Non-Estonians in the 20–29 age group had the best language proiciency (Proos 2005). This is the age group that is entering the labour market and is actively seeking opportunities for achieving job-related success. Lack of Estonian language knowledge remains a serious obstacle for full integration into Estonian society for elderly Russian-speaking people. The living environment signiicantly inluences the language proiciency of non-Estonians. For example, according to a study in 2005, the language proiciency of non-Estonian residents in Tallinn and Narva, two major cities with a large proportion of Russian-speakers, was different. Whereas in Tallinn only 16 per cent of russian-speaking survey respondents claimed they did not understand Estonian, 62 per cent of respondents in Narva claimed the same (Proos 2005). The same language gap between two cities exists among young people: 3 per 18 the survey was carried out in 2005 by sociologists from tallinn pedagogical University (Proos 2005). © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 99 ate .co m as hg ate .co m cent of young people in Tallinn were monolingual, compared to 38 per cent in Narva. Thus, the dominantly bilingual environment of Tallinn compared to the monolingual (russian) environment in narva fosters the Estonian language acquisition of Russian-speaking youth. It may also be caused by better resource allocation to russian-medium schools for teaching Estonian in tallinn compared to narva (lack of Estonian language teachers in narva has been a well-known problem for a long time). Still, despite signiicant improvements in language proiciency among the russian-speaking population, and especially youths, many studies conclude that the language issue remains one of the most important factors inluencing social inclusion and exclusion in Estonia (Kasearu and trumm 2008a, Kasearu and Trumm 2008b, Anspal 2008). as hg Living Conditions and Health .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m living conditions and health among Estonian- and russian-speaking people differ in some important aspects. The average life expectancy at birth in Estonia in 2005 shows slightly higher numbers among Estonian men and women compared with Russian-speaking people (Sakkeus 2007). Moreover, the age-standardized mortality rate indicates signiicant discrepancies when comparing the years 1987– 1990 and 1999–2000. Russian men in particular have much greater mortality rates than Estonian men, and we see that after the break-up of the soviet union, the mortality rate for Russian men even increased. another important difference between ethnic Estonians and the russianspeaking population is related to drugs and drug-related deaths. The majority of deaths from drug use take place in tallinn and north-east Estonia, whereas ethnic origin is an important background indicator: among total drug-related deaths, the mortality rate is highest among ethnic russians (81 per cent) and people with undetermined citizenship (Abel-Ollo et al. 2007). Most recent surveys also conirm this trend, which implies that the proportion of newly registered HIVpositive people is highest in the north-east of Estonia (47 per cent) and tallinn (41 per cent) (Rüütel and Lõhmus 2007). All these aspects create an additional basis for increased social exclusion, not only because of their direct effect on minorities’ living conditions, but quite often also because these kinds of statistics are (mis)used in the media and reinforce the creation of stereotypes of russianspeaking people. hg ate Social Networks and Participation as relations between different ethnic groups in Estonia are characterized by rather infrequent encounters: 24 per cent of Estonian-speakers and 11 per cent of russianspeakers have no contacts with other nationalities in their everyday lives (Korts © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 100 as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m and Vihalemm 2008). However, willingness to share personal and social space is much higher among the russian-speaking minority than among Estonian-speakers (Korts and Vihalemm 2008). Interaction within the education system shows similar trends: intercultural contacts between schoolchildren from different language schools are minimal (Kirss and Vihalemm 2008). In general, the social networks between Estonian-speakers and Russian-speakers are weak. However, compared to ethnic Estonians or European immigrant groups in general, Estonian ethnic minority groups are characterized by signiicantly lower social capital: in terms of the extent of relationship networks, participation in the civil society organizations or in regard to trust towards political institutions (Masso 2009: 85). Due to the segregated education system, youth organizations also tend to be divided linguistically. Although state-sponsored programmes support co-operation between Estonian- and russianspeaking youth organizations, the day-to-day activities of these organizations tend to go on in separation from each other. Estonian electoral law stipulates that non-citizens of the country cannot be members of any political party, cannot run for elections and cannot participate in domestic parliamentary or European Union elections. However, non-citizens with a permanent residence permit can participate directly in the political process through their right to vote in local elections. Voter turnout is the same for ethnic Estonian and Russian-speaking voters. The 1992 elections for the Riigikogu (the Estonian parliament), and especially the elections for local governments where non-citizens can also vote, have shown that the participation of non-Estonians is similar to the national average – often even higher. Thus, the overall voter turnout in Estonia in the 1992 Riigikogu elections was 67 per cent, similar to that of predominantly Russian-speaking towns – 66.8 per cent in Narva, 66.4 per cent in Kohtla-Järve and as high as 83.4 per cent in Sillamäe. In the 1996 local government elections, the voter turnout for non-citizens reached 85 per cent in all of Estonia, according to the Electoral committee, while total voter turnout was just 49.7 per cent. However, in two of the most recent elections (the Riigikogu elections of 2003 and 2007) it was the predominantly Russian-speaking Ida-Viru county (in north-eastern Estonia) that had the lowest voter turnout (52 per cent on both occasions, compared to average turnouts of 58 per cent in 2003 and 61 per cent in 2007) (Kallas and Lauristin 2008). another similarity appears in the level of interest of ethnic Estonians and nonEstonians in politics and their participation in political groups. The ‘Me, the World and Media’ poll showed that 74 per cent of both ethnic Estonian and russianspeaking respondents stated that they were not members of any political group or party and that they were not interested in politics (MeeMa 2005). A survey conducted in the same year indicated that there were no major differences in this regard between citizens and non-citizens, except for the fact that respondents with undetermined citizenship more frequently claimed that they were uninterested in politics (Kallas and Lauristin 2008). although in parliamentary politics there are a few political parties which claim to represent the russian-speaking community, none of them have recently succeeded © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 101 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m in gaining strong political support from this community – the two biggest Russian parties that ran during the last parliamentary elections in 2007 gained 1 and 0.2 per cent of the votes respectively (the threshold to enter parliament is 5 per cent). As a result, no single Russian-speaking political party is represented in the parliament. However, the russian-speaking electorate gives its support predominantly to the Estonian centre party, which has many young politicians of non-Estonian decent among its members of parliament. representation of the non-Estonian population in the legislature has been relatively low. The number of Russian-speaking members of the Riigikogu has varied from ive to six in each of the years 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007 (Kallas 2008b). This makes up 5–6 per cent of all members of the Riigikogu, compared to the 30 per cent of non-Estonians in the population and the 20 per cent among the citizenry. There has been only one non-Estonian minister in the 17 years of independent Estonian government. On the other hand, in cities with a majority of non-Estonians (such as narva, sillamäe, Kohtla-Järve and tallinn), positions on local councils are mostly illed with politicians from the Russian-speaking minority. For example, in Tallinn 24 of the 63 members elected to the city council in 2005 were non-Estonian, while 63 per cent of the 32 members of the Centre Party faction were non-Estonian (Kallas and Lauristin 2008). m Culture, Religion and Identity as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co Identity issues in post-Soviet territories have been rather complex. Although the majority of soviet-era immigrants came from the territory of the russian federation and spoke Russian as their mother tongue, they rarely identiied themselves ethnically as Russians. Unlike Estonians, who considered themselves representatives of the Estonian ethnicity, Russian-speaking immigrants possessed a Soviet identity. These immigrants identiied themselves with the Soviet state. As this was the group which owed the most to the soviet regime for their social mobility and economic wellbeing, the russian-speakers in the various soviet union republics were mostly soviet people, linking their national identity to a multinational union. As Neil Melvin explains, the core of the migrant population was drawn from those sections of the Soviet population most closely tied to the successes of the regime – industrial workers and members of the military and security apparatus. They were largely rootless in an ethno-cultural sense (Daatland 2001). With the collapse of the soviet union, the source of their identity not only disappeared but was turned into something negative, something one would be ashamed to be associated with. This new situation created a serious ‘identity vacuum’ for the majority of Russian-speakers. Some of them, mostly the elder population, acquired russian citizenship and became increasingly more connected to Russia than to Estonia (through television, newspapers and so on). Other people, especially those living in Russian-dominated cities such as Narva, Sillamäe, Jõhvi, Loksa and Paldiski, found pride in identiication with their respective towns. And a © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 102 te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m minority went through the naturalization process and acquired Estonian citizenship that served as the basis of their identiication with the new Estonian state. In the light of these historic processes it is important to analyse the identity creation of Russian-speaking youths in Estonia. A large majority of these youths were born in Estonia, a signiicant number of them in post-Soviet Estonia. The overwhelming majority of young people aged 15–24 consider Estonia to be their homeland, and only 3 per cent consider Russia to be their homeland.19 Media consumption is an important source of identity for people in modern society. In Estonia, ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians consume different media channels. While the former mostly watch Estonian television channels and read Estonian newspapers, russian-speakers mostly consume the media of the russian Federation, and to a lesser degree Estonian Russian-language media. This creates a situation where two social groups are living in different information spheres – one Estonaian-language-based and oriented towards events in Estonia, the Eu and north america, the other russian-language-based and oriented towards events in Russia and neighbouring states. Survey data from 2005 show that young non-Estonians aged 15–29 regularly watch Russian television channels (93 per cent said they did it regularly), while Estonian television channels were of less importance (only 37 per cent said they watched them regularly, while 35 per cent never watched Estonian channels) (Hallik 2005). The Russian information environment will inevitably remain a factor in shaping the mentality and identity of Russian-speaking people in the future as well. the russian-speaking minority mostly attend the russian orthodox church, whereas ethnic Estonians tend to be more present in the lutheran (protestant) Church. However, it is assumed that religious issues or afiliations do not have any signiicant impact on the differentiation of ethnic groups or their exclusion from or inclusion in society. as h ga Discrimination and Attitudes hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m anti-discrimination policies form a part of the national social integration policies of the immigrant population in most European countries. In Estonia, however, the ight against discrimination has been largely neglected by policy-makers and the public alike. In a benchmark study on migrant policies carried out by the Migration policy group in 2007, Estonia ranked last among 28 countries studied in the area of anti-discrimination policies. It concluded that ‘newcomers and descendants [are] only … protected by the least favourable anti-discrimination regime for promoting integration in the 28 [countries studied]’ (MIPEX 2007). the report also argued that the state does not inform the public about their rights as as 19 These are the results from the integration monitoring survey of 2005. The sample consisted of 1,000 Russian-speakers all over Estonia aged 15–74. An additional sample of 200 Russians from Estonia aged 15–29 were interviewed separately (see Hallik 2005). © Copyrighted Material 103 Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m victims or lead dialogue on anti-discrimination. Neither does it ensure that public bodies respect non-discrimination’ (MIPEX 2007). Estonia has been also slow in implementing the EU anti-discrimination directive. the majority of politicians interviewed by the authors of this report in 2007 believed that there was no discrimination based on ethnicity or mother tongue in Estonia. However, they admitted that stereotyping was rather common even among high-ranking oficials and politicians (Kallas 2008a). There is very limited information about instances of discrimination or relevant court cases. Between 1999 and mid-2004, the national labour Inspection (a public monitoring institution) did not uncover any violations of the principle of non-discrimination in the workplace on the grounds of sex, ethnic origin, colour, race, native language, social origin, religion or political or other opinion. at the same time, the results of different studies display a gap between ethnic Estonians’ and non-Estonians’ perception of discrimination. A quantitative study in the summer of 2007 conducted by saarpoll and the university of tartu showed that 52 per cent of non-Estonian respondents stated that discrimination was common and widespread in Estonia and that they had experienced it personally. A majority of the ethnic Estonian respondents (61 per cent) had never experienced discrimination. The Russian-speaking minority considered both the absence of formal equality, especially in political rights and education, and inequality of opportunities for different ethnic groups in public life and in access to public services problematic. The most frequently mentioned example of the latter was ethnic Estonians’ better access to information, given the lack or downright absence of oficial information in Russian (Kallas 2008a). the same study found that the perception of discrimination varied by age group. Younger participants did not consider discrimination a problem. Only a few considered the absence of information in russian discriminatory or giving advantages to ethnic Estonians (Kallas 2008a). This is connected to the fact that there are fewer people with undetermined citizenship or russian federation citizenship among the Russian-speaking youth – a situation that would otherwise exclude many of them from several spheres of public life. In addition, as mentioned above, the linguistic skills of russian-speaking youths have improved signiicantly in the last 15 years, and this in turn has contributed to diminishing the barriers to social integration. Thus, it can be argued that while the majority of russian-speakers feel that discrimination exists in Estonian society, russianspeaking youths have less experience of it due to the fact that a higher percentage of them are holders of Estonian citizenship and have better linguistic capabilities compared to their parents. as hg Immigrants and Crime In 2008, among the total number of prisoners in Estonian social control institutions, approximately 50 per cent of the sentenced prisoners were ethnic russians, 42 per © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 104 .co m as hg ate .co m cent Estonians and 8 per cent people of other nationalities. Also, the overall crime rate among the russian-speaking population has been constantly increasing since Estonian independence in 1991, dominating in both major crime categories: violent crime and property crime (Saar 2002, Justiitsministeerium 2002). Moreover, young russian women experience twice as much pressure to engage in prostitution as is found among Estonian women aged 15–29 (Sotsiaalministeerium 2006: 9). crime issues, resulting from the economic and social inequality and disparity in society, coupled with the higher drug use among the russian-speaking population, have created a situation where ethnic Estonians tend to view young russianspeaking people as a potential criminal threat, especially in tallinn and in the north-east of Estonia. hg ate Conclusion as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as this chapter has highlighted some important issues and points of departure which are relevant to the understanding of the social exclusion and inclusion among young people, especially among the Russian-speaking population, in Estonia. Minorities in Estonia, particularly russian-speakers (russians, Byelorussians and ukrainians), tend not to be proportionally represented in the political system: in the government, parliament, local municipalities, or in the public sector employment in general. On the one hand, the feeling of exclusion is hindering their full participation in comparison to the level of ethnic Estonians; on the other hand, there may exist an implicit reluctance from the ethnic Estonian side with regard to tolerance or acceptance. In addition, the problems with language skills and political rights also play an important role. furthermore, even when they have similar educational or vocational qualiications to ethnic Estonians, Russian-speakers tend to be under-represented or are not as well integrated in the labour market as ethnic Estonians. Also, the segregated bilingual school system and seclusion of both communities has created a state of affairs where everyday contacts between Estonians and ‘non-Estonians’ are often rather minimal, although the potential for bringing together pupils from different language schools has recently shown very positive effects among young people in terms of social cohesion and mutual understanding. Nevertheless, these kinds of circumstances, coupled with a tendency towards higher crime rates and drug use among young russians, have created a strong basis for the effective social exclusion of young Russians from mainstream Estonian society – a situation which is frequently ampliied to an excessive degree in and by the media. Although recent years have not yet seen a signiicant increase in two-way integration or a decline in social exclusion, at least one third of the russianspeaking population view themselves as a wholly integrated part of society, and the second third of the Russian-speaking population is more integrated than not. discrimination is experienced by the majority of Estonian-russians, but for those with better linguistic capabilities among young people, this is also gradually © Copyrighted Material Estonia: A Post-Soviet Predicament © Copyrighted Material 105 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m decreasing. However, the largest need-driven groups in terms of social exclusion can be identiied as young people with undetermined citizenship, people with health issues (for example, HIV-positive) in the north-east of Estonia, and others marginalized in terms of unemployment – groups who tend to be the most excluded from society. compared to countries whose history of immigration has been more dynamic in terms of classical migration lows and continuity, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia do not see themselves as representing a group of immigrants per se. rather, as historical circumstances have changed in spite of the expectations of this group, the russian-speaking population displays both far less trust and higher rates of criticism towards the state, which in turn also inluences their cognition of being socially or politically excluded. However, some summary generalizations can be made: in Estonia, minorities are stigmatized in the media discourse, are lowerpaid even when they have the same educational level as ethnic Estonians, and are likely to ill lower-status jobs. Minorities tend to concentrate on a geographical basis, thus creating an important precondition for ethnic segregation as well. In addition, in Estonia individual behaviour is likely to be generalized to the whole community, where individuals are often seen as an indistinguishable part of their own social system. Furthermore, people from the Russian-speaking population are relatively often seen as being among the most nationalistic, or even as a threat to the country’s internal security, especially after the Bronze soldier riots in 2007. In terms of political rights or the welfare state system, the Estonian situation – compared, for example, to Scandinavian countries – is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, in Estonia, most minorities (those with Estonian citizenship) enjoy the same social and political rights as ethnic Estonians, though the extension of rights and beneits is not as generous as can be found, for example, in Norway or Sweden. On the other hand, the issue of newly arrived immigrants or asylum seekers does not have very much relevance in Estonia; when compared to other Western European countries, their number is very small. social exclusion in Estonia is very substantial in terms of citizenship or with regard to long-term residents with Russian Federation passports. People with undetermined citizenship tend to be more passive and feel excluded and inferior, whereas russian citizens tend to see their position with respect to their ability to inluence society very adversely. However, ‘Estonian-Russians’ – ethnic Russians with Estonian citizenship – constitute a rather peculiar or distinct intermediate layer between these most marginalized groups and ethnic Estonians, not only regarding objective characteristics (employment rate, participation in everyday life and politics, and so on), but also in respect to subjective well-being and selfassessments. Young Russian-speaking persons more frequently tend to perceive discrimination and feel themselves excluded, their social networks and interest in politics is weaker, and their trust towards institutions is lower than found among their counterparts among ethnic Estonians. As pointed out by Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009: 101), this in turn has created a situation where general discontent may strongly support the potentiality of growing tensions and conlicts between © Copyrighted Material 106 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material different ethnic groups, whereas the change of generations is not indicating any substantial improvement with regard to this situation. References as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Aasland, A. and Fløtten, T. 2001. ‘Ethnicity and social exclusion in Estonia and latvia’, Europe-Asia Studies 53(7): 1,023–49. Abel-Ollo, Katri et al. 2007. Report on the Drug Situation in Estonia 2007. Tallinn: National Institute for Health Development. Anspal, S. 2008. ‘Integratsioon tööturul’, in M. Lauristin and T. Vihalemm (eds), RIP 2008–2013: Vajadus ja teostatavusuuringu lõpparuanne. Tallinn: Integratsiooni Sihtasutus. 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MIPEX. 2007. Migrant Integration Policy Index. Available at: <http://www. integrationindex.eu> (accessed 1 February 2010). Misiunas, R. and Taagepera, R. 1993. The Baltic States. Years of Dependence 1940–1990. London: Hurst. Parming, T. 1978. Population Changes and Processes. A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 108 as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Pavelson, M. 2002. ‘Töö, sissetulek ja toimetulek: integratsiooni sotsiaalmajanduslik tagapõhi’, in Integratsioon Eesti ühiskonnas. Monitooring 2002. Tallinn: TPÜ Rahvusvaheliste ja Sotsiaaluuringute Instituut. Pavelson, M. 2005. ‘The social-economic condition of Estonians and Estonian Russians: expectations and changes’, in R. Vetik (ed.), Integration of Estonian Society: Monitoring 2005. Tallinn: MEIS. 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Toots, A. 2009. ‘Uuring: Toasooja hinnatõus ja töötuse kasv räsib inimeste toimetulekut’, Pealinn, 12 January: 4–5. © Copyrighted Material © Copyrighted Material chapter 5 Italy: unreceptive climate and forced adulthood as hg ate .co m roberto alzetta, francesca lagomarsino and andrea ravecca .co m Introduction .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate Young adult immigrants’ experiences of inclusion, exclusion, success and marginalization within Italian society occur in a very fragmented socio-political, cultural and economic panorama. On the one hand, the looseness of the Italian political, juridical and social system offers immigrants good chances to make a living even without legal resident status. On the other hand, the lack of an adequate welfare system makes Italy a dificult place to seek a secure future. In fact, unlike other Eu countries, it seems quite easy to enter Italy, while it appears more dificult to have an easy life in the receiving local contexts of Italian society. Many causes contribute to this particular situation. Italy has a geographic position that is highly exposed to many different migration lows and trajectories. At the same time, Italy has never had a consistent colonization history. This fact, along with poor organization of immigration policies, has generated a condition of status quo, in which individual and collective abilities, strategies and forms of sociocultural and economic entrepreneurship become relevant in making the migration process succeed or fail. Being a migrant complicates a balanced transition to adulthood for youths and young adults. It is not only a matter of moving into a recognized social and juridical status within a receiving society, but more importantly, establishing oneself as a positive, proactive and integrated social actor according to criteria, values and principles that often do not pertain to the immigrants’ cultures and heritages. Exclusion and inclusion of immigrants in transition to adulthood are the terms of reference for the present analysis. Given this, the aim is not to offer a comprehensive presentation, but rather to provide the main elements characterizing Italy as a context of young adult immigrants’ lives. hg ate Historical Context: From Country of Emigration to Country of Immigration as Italy became a country of immigration at the end of the 1960s, and the rates of migration have been growing since the mid-1970s (CENSIS 1979, Collinson 1994). Historically, Italy did not have a stable and durable form of colonialism, and it did © Copyrighted Material 110 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material Table 5.1 Young adult immigrant origin population development in the period 2003–2005 breakdown by gender and age 1 January 2003 1 January 2005 Total M. F. %F. Total M. F. %F. 18 3,873 2,206 1,667 43.0 4,355 2,517 1,838 42.2 19 3,981 2,153 1,828 45.9 5,020 2,854 2,166 20 4,215 2,133 2,082 49.4 5,406 2,913 2,493 21 4,524 2,095 2,429 53.7 6,153 3,245 2,908 22 4,980 2,222 2,758 55.4 6,992 3,490 3,502 50.1 23 6,224 2,706 3,518 56.5 7,923 3,913 4,010 24 6,866 2,952 3,914 57.0 9,499 4,555 25 7,990 3,562 4,428 55.4 10,714 Total 4,2653 20,029 22,624 53.04 56,062 ate .co m Age 43.1 47.3 50.6 4,944 52.0 5,111 5,603 52.3 28,598 27,464 49.0 m as hg ate .co m as hg 46.1 as hg ate .co Source: Secondary data analysis of ISTAT (2007) and Home Affairs Ministry database. as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m not experience consistent immigration lows and exchanges from and to colonies. Because of this, Italy did not face a potential multicultural social conirmation, and never produced valuable strategies and policies to cope with immigrants as found in other European countries. This resulted in an ungoverned and open context that has generated a polycentric representation of migration over the last three decades (Macioti and Pugliese 1996, Macioti and Pugliese 2003, Reyneri 1991). If we look at the national origin of the current immigrant population, about 180 different nationalities are represented; however, historical patterns of migration have led to increased immigration from some areas or countries more than others. Some small migrant groups from the 1980s (chinese, albanians, romanians) have become numerically relevant and consistent communities in later years. Most statistical data are grouped by wide age clusters and it is dificult to extract a young adult category (age 19–25), as proposed in the international literature. A further problem is also presented by the dificulty of cross-comparing data extracted from different sets of tables. Regarding the registered resident population aged 18– 25, the following aggregated igure emerges: The 18–25 age group represents 11.7 per cent of the whole immigrant population registered in Italy. Gender distribution is not far from the general trend of all immigrant population, and all these data together open up a new perspective that counters the common perception of emigration as a typically male strategy. In the last eight years the female immigrant population has grown signiicantly, due to large-scale family reuniication processes and new forms of female-based migration strategies (Campani 1989, Tognetti Bordogna 2004, Balsamo 2003). At the present © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material Total 146,299 64,061 49,746 29,081 125 29 M 69,416 34,508 26,056 11,429 53 15 F 76,833 29,533 23,690 17,589 72 14 % F. 52.5 46.1 47.6 60.4 57.6 48.3 Total 289,278 141,477 147,801 51.1 .co m as Europe africa asia america oceania apolidi ate .co m Young adult (18–25) immigrant population distribution by geographical areas hg Table 5.2 111 as hg ate Total foreigners 2,414,972 1,198,452 1,216,520 50.4 Source: Lagomarsino’s secondary data analysis over Home Affairs Ministry database. as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m stage, there are no updated data available on gender distribution by national origin. at the national level, we can compare the young adult population development in the period 2003–2005 broken down by gender and age. local and regional contextual economic and socio-political differences in Italy have generated not only delays, but also different patterns of immigration and secondgeneration formation. The north-south axis has made a difference in determining the typology and characterization of immigration following the different demands of the workforce in the labour market (Ambrosini 1999). This has also inluenced the formation of youth and young adult generations as a result of typical immigration processes generally linked to long-term planned and stable migration projects by irst-generation migrants. It is quite dificult to deine clearly the historical conditions in which the young adult immigrant population was established. In fact, the aforementioned fragmented general and speciic condition – with which Italy still struggles – does not allow a general exhaustive approach. Nor does it allow scholars, stake-holders and policy-makers to provide potentially useful and valuable insights into young immigrants’ transition to adulthood. It is not easy at this stage either to deine the category with precision or to establish deinite criteria by employing both a strong historical reading as well as a pure statistical and objective-oriented approach. In this respect, it should be noted that age and place of birth play an important role in a historically oriented perspective. Most recent igures and trends (caritas-Migrantes 2005) show that more than half of the young population of immigrant origin (aged 0–18) is Italian-born (55.6 per cent). These data easily explain how, despite acceptably consolidated and relatively dated immigration, Italy still lacks a consistent second-generation immigrant population. Further, the young adult population of immigrant origin is rapidly changing under the pressure of stable immigration lows. At the present stage, when considering residence © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 112 permits awarded in Italy up to 1 January 2007, the igures show a signiicant trend. Statistical data are presented in Table 5.2 for the 18–25 age range. This cluster differs (by one year) from the general statistical index as the data are produced by the Home Affairs Ministry. ate .co m Semantic Context hg Scientiic Discourses and Deinitions as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as The scientiic literature concerning young and young adult immigrants in Italy is quite recent, and it focuses mainly upon young immigrant students. From the irst seminal book published in 1996 concerning young immigrants in the Italian school system (Giovannini 1996) up to today, many researchers have focused on young immigrants in an institutional perspective. Only more recently have some of these researchers targeted adolescents and young adult immigrants still enrolled in post-compulsory and vocational education. This lack of information can be attributed to two main factors: irst of all, Italy has become a destination of largescale immigration lows only very recently, and more importantly, this process was not met by any well-managed and coherent action from any government in the last 15 years (Ambrosini 2005). This situation has largely prevented Italian society and institutions from undertaking a concrete and proactive policy towards immigrant acceptance, insertion and integration in Italian society at all levels (national, regional and local). Secondly, a socio-cultural obstacle has prevented large-scale studies and investigation of young adults as a social category. As made clear in the IARD report (2002) on Italian youth and their transition to adulthood, the main point is how to deine and limit young adultness according to the current situation in Italian society. there is evidence that the transition process to adulthood is very much postponed in comparison to other European societies. The most recent data (IARD 2002) show that the average age at which Italian young adults become economically, logistically and socio-relationally self-suficient is far higher than any other European country (reaching in some cases and areas an average age of more than 32). Further, Italian society is not homogeneous and – like other aspects – the transition to adulthood and access to self-suficiency differs from region to region and from area to area, given the pressure of cultural factors. These last aspects are linked to the strong cultural family ties and symbolic obligations with which young Italian children and teenagers grow up. In this respect, recent research on youth of immigrant origin reveals a discrepancy between biological age and social practices among immigrant youngsters versus native ones. Young adult immigrants show more maturity centred on economic and housing self-suficiency, and premature affective relations based on maternity and paternity. However, a problem is created by the immigrant population’s heterogeneity in Italy. This becomes relevant if young adults of immigrant origin are explored from an inclusion/exclusion processes © Copyrighted Material 113 Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m perspective. The range of possibilities varies according to a variety of factors, such as families’ socio-economic situation, legal status, and educational and working experiences. On the one hand, there are young adult immigrants who resemble their Italian counterparts in terms of lifestyle (postponing full compliance with adulthood requirements). On the other hand, strong anticipation processes make other youth of immigrant origin completely self-suficient while seeking wealth, money and detachment from conlict situations within their original families. In between these poles, a plethora of highly variable situations offer interesting ground for social scientiic investigation. Images and descriptions of young immigrants have been largely negative and mainly focused upon the idea that this social category will be always problematic. Young immigrants are often described as ‘delayed-blast social bombs’ (Barbagli 2002), disregarding differences and speciicities that might emerge from case to case and place to place. There is always the image that young adult immigrants will create a continuous threat to Italian society, despite the positive attitudes of a large number of individuals and groups. Ambrosini (2005) makes clear how in Italian society young immigrants are trebly disadvantaged as they belong at the same time to three disadvantaged categories: they are immigrants, they are young, and they largely belong to the lower class. All these three factors contribute – in a vicious circle – to a negative stereotyping process. Queirolo Palmas (2006) displays the dichotomous picture in the current Italian scientiic and public debate: the young immigrant is either a student with problems of integration (cognitive, linguistic or social) or a social trouble-maker outside the protective schooling framework. Such a vision prevents any further and deeper investigation into socializing processes, aggregation, multiple and mobile identity formation processes among young immigrants in public arenas and spheres. The immigrant dimension is often considered an immutable and deining trait of young immigrants’ condition, preventing us from grasping the multifaceted experiences of choices, practices, vocations and ‘habitués’ among different subjects from different and similar origins. This approach produces ‘a distinction between youngsters of immigrant origin and young individuals as a whole, ixing them in different and incommensurable social spaces’ (Queirolo Palmas 2006: 181). However, not all researchers have such a negative perspective, as not all young immigrants have faced such strong stigmatization. While exploring young immigrants from different origins in Milan, Bosisio et al. (2005) claim that in many circumstances, young subjects of immigrant origin have more resources in comparison to their Italian counterparts. They are often able to cope with diversity better than Italians; they are able to move in and through social and cultural spaces that differ from their origins. This situation changes dramatically as soon as access to the labour market is considered. Growing up and endorsing cultural values and norms of Italian society, young adult immigrants often experience a shift in terms of opportunities and chances to obtain what they deserve in comparison to their Italian counterparts. © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 114 Discourses on Young Migrants in the Media as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m In the 1970s, the term ‘immigrant’ emerged to distinguish poor third World migrants – called immigrants – from those coming from other European or wealthy countries such as USA, Japan, Australia and Canada – called foreigners. At that time, early stories about irregular migration to Italy appeared in the media, and the idea of violating norms and laws to cross a boundary or a frontier became the dominant theme about people who were immigrating to Italy. At the end of the 1980s, when the irst state laws on migration were approved, the terms used to describe migrants referred to legal terminology linked to residence permits (illegal, regular, irregular migrants). Similarly, at the beginning of the 1990s, with the irst waves of Albanian migrants landing illegally on Italy’s coasts, migration terminology mainly turned to terms such as ‘illegal/clandestine migrants’. Finally, in the second half of the 1990s, migrants have been connected with crime and illegality, and their country of origin has been used to deine them. In the same way, new terms appear and disappear from the media scenery. ‘Extracomuntario’ (‘extra-Eu migrant’) and apparently racist notions such as vu cumprà1 spread in public debates for a few years in the middle of the 1980s. During this period, several terms emerged to describe migrants and the constitution of migration as a phenomenon in Italian society. Firstly, direct and indirect nouns and concepts such as ‘migrant’, ‘nationality of origin’ (Moroccan, Ecuadorian and more), ‘illegal/clandestine migrant’, ‘regular/irregular migrant’ and ‘foreigner’ (now especially used to refer to other Eu countries’ natives) are largely used. Secondly, adjectives and connotative terms (especially religious and working qualiication terms) are very often employed to focus on speciic traits of the immigrant condition (such as ‘desperate’, ‘phantom’, ‘Muslim’, ‘cleaner’ or ‘street-vendor’). At the same time, articles and news stories shifted from period to period and covered very different topics, mostly related to ideas of deviance (violence, crime, police actions, urban decline), arrivals/entrances/landing and disembarkation/illegal/clandestine migrant trafic. The main focus was on the legal and juridical dimension of migration, while often neglecting socio-cultural, economic and policy aspects. as a general account, three main topics have surfaced in the Italian media over the past 20 years: deviance, arrivals and migration policies (CENSIS 2002). Some aspects have not changed over the years. Firstly, very rarely is migration approached through wider investigation, such as leading articles, seminars or speciic book reviews, or television reports, debates and programmes on the topic. Secondly, migrants’ direct voices are infrequently presented by the media. their opinions and experiences are very seldom heard, through declarations or interviews, and even less through experts. Sources quoted in the articles are always the same: politicians (government or party), judicial or police sources are 1 In English, this translates as ‘Would you like to buy?’ this sentence is used by illegal street-vendors in their hesitant Italian. © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 115 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m the most frequently referred to, and very rarely are experts from the non-proit and academic sectors involved. Direct sources – migrants and their organizations – are practically absent. Media information focuses on all aspects that can stir up an emotional impact (which are normally the worst aspects), and link them to emergency situations like crime, illegal migration and terrorism, or to incidental facts. Television intensiies the above-mentioned trends to their extreme conclusions: the news depicts migrants in terms of deviance, legislation and arrivals, or ‘disembarkation’ of illegal migrants, without any further and deeper analysis, and with no attention to any other matters. a cEnsIs survey (2002) outlines clearly the image of young immigrants portrayed by Italian television. First of all, the media representation is exaggerated in comparison to the real presence and distribution of immigrants. In particular, concerning adolescents and young adults, they appear on television at a rate near to 50 per cent, while the total permits awarded to the same young population in Italy do not exceed 5.3 per cent of the entire immigrant population. The explanation for this is that the media tends to use young migrants for communication and audience purposes. Concerning the distribution and presence of young immigrants in different television programmes, the evidence is that they mostly appear in the news (96.6 per cent) with particular reference to criminality and crimes topics (50.8 per cent) welfare and solidarity (36.6 per cent) and health (12 per cent). the Queirolo palmas and torre (2005) study of journalistic reports about young latin american teenagers residing in genoa offers an insight into the role of the press. From the appearance of short stories about criminal activities by young latinos, a journalistic genre based on gangs emerges, with rapid increase in gangrelated information’s value in the media, and poor analysis and reading of such social phenomena. In such a context, the condition of being young teenagers of Ecuadorian origin becomes a predictive factor of deviance and delinquency, and the variety of forms of socialization among these groups are approached with a criminalizing and stigmatizing attitude. Even though television and the press are not explicitly racist, the terms employed are very often used collectively: every individual and his/her actions are framed into a general collective responsibility based on belonging and ethnicity. As a consequence, migration processes in general are often analysed according to the personal responsibility of every individual migrant, while social phenomena and events related to migrants in the receiving contexts are always analysed according to a rigid and overwhelming system of large categories based on national, ethnic and regional origin. Andall (2003) notes that the terms ‘black’ and ‘Italian’ are still mutually exclusive in Italians’ perceptions, and often young black individuals – despite their Italian citizenship, luency in the Italian language and success at university level – are still viewed with suspicion and perceived as foreign subjects. At the same time, the emergence of the G2 network and association in the public Italian panorama is providing a new contribution to the public debate. the g2 network was founded by young adults of immigrant origin with the aim of © Copyrighted Material 116 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material promoting a different approach to immigration laws in Italy, a better distribution of social rights, and of organizing socio-cultural activities to improve knowledge and awareness of diversity and multiculturalism in Italian society. Political and Juridical Context as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Italy was politically unstable after the decline of the christian democratic party’s hegemony (in the 1970s), and only with voting reform (to a majority system) has the country partially gained a more stable political situation. The new logic, based on two great and opposite coalitions, has only slightly modiied the contingent political agenda about immigration. Both coalitions (the central-right wing and central-left wing) have both been dramatically inluenced by the media and public opinion in dealing with migration-related matters. The result has been a general common political attitude of riding public opinion discourses without taking into account serious and homogeneous social, cultural and economic policy planning that would cater for immigrants’ needs and rights while residing in Italy. The current legislative confusion is the mirror of such differentiated socio-cultural and political perspectives. The centre-right governments have normally acted under the pressure of extreme xenophobic parties and produced laws and norms that have been mainly directed to limiting and controlling immigration lows, treating migrants in a subordinate integration perspective and maintaining the socio-cultural and economic predominance of Italian society over all immigrant socio-cultural components. On the other hand, the centre-left coalitions have accepted migration as an inevitable social process, and all efforts have been made to drive migration lows and to support immigrants in the direction of bidirectional integration within Italian society. Both approaches have been inluenced by the social security and crime emergency discourses linked to immigration and its illegal implications. In conclusion, the question of the different political attitudes in Italian politics can be clearly synthesized using the al azar ‘water metaphor’ and the possibility of either blocking the water (the centre-right vision) or channelling it to bring about positive outcomes (the centre-left approach). In 1996, the centre-right government, under pressure from Lega Nord’s extreme and xenophobic position, tried to give police the power to pursue, check, detain and eventually expel illegal and irregular migrants. This action led to massive protests against the threat of increased police powers, and the process ended with a revision of the law (which saw the restrictive aspects dropped) and a general amnesty (sanatoria) for irregular resident immigrants. In 1998, with a centreleft coalition, the turco/napolitano law (40/1998) took an organic approach to the problem of systematizing migration policies in all its domains. It was the irst law to strive for a balance between juridical recognition of migrants’ parity and acceptance of cultural diversity as a value for Italian society (anticipating European Community Directive 200/43/CE). This perspective aimed to produce some important outcomes for immigrants’ livelihood in Italian society (especially © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 117 ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m in education, health, welfare and employment), but it largely failed to achieve this goal due to poor executive interventions and lack of inancial resources. at the turn of the century, with the reappraisal of Berlusconi government, the Bossi/fini law (189/2002) again moved the main normative boundaries by cancelling sponsorship and introducing more restrictive entry and residence regulations. In some respects, it resembled the idea of guest workers while strictly linking the condition of full employment to the right of residence. The political message became even clearer: there was no more room in Italy for irregular and clandestine immigrants. In the following years, the connection between working conditions and legal status generated processes of ‘return illegalization’, where legal resident immigrants were rendered illegal after having been out of a job for more than six months. Both trade unions and employers’ organizations have criticized aspects of the new legislation, arguing that they could ultimately harm the national economy. despite such a confusing landscape, some general constant elements can be revealed as characterizing the Italian socio-political debate on migration in the last two decades. First, Italy never had a migrant labour recruiting policy, and does not have eficient measures in place to plan immigrant entry and migration lows. In this latter respect, some speciic steps have been taken only recently (Bossi/fini law 189/2002) under pressure from the general European debate on ighting illegal immigration and the rise of bilateral agreements with south Mediterranean emigration/transiting countries. Second, no long-terms policies have been enforced; rather, forms of una tantum amnesties have characterized the Italian legislative framework over the last 20 years. It should be noted that from 1990 to 2005 there has been an average of one regularization every third year. The last one – complementary to the Bossi/Fini law in 2003 – provided regular documentation for approximately 700,000 people. Third, lacking a proper welfare system and adequate integration policies, the degree of actual political and social intervention towards immigrants is largely a product of local political actors and non-proit, non-governmental and charity agents. Fourth, the Italian population suffers generally from negative attitudes towards immigrant reception. The main reason is poor understanding of immigrants’ economic function in Italian society, but also a clear perception of insecurity generated by inadequate political intervention and the large-scale presence of illegal and clandestine immigrants. as hg Access to Citizenship as hg ate .co m the present law on citizenship (91/92) favours the principle of jus sanguinis: ‘a person’s nationality at birth is the same as that of his natural parents’. Such a principle is integrated with jus soli (birthright citizenship) in only one case: ‘the foreigner born in Italy who has been a legal permanent resident up to the age of 18 becomes a citizen if he/she declares to be willing to acquire Italian nationality within a year from his/her 18th birthday’. As a matter of fact, this norm hinders access to citizenship for many foreigners’ children born in Italy, because it is very © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 118 as hg ate .co m dificult to demonstrate that they have resided in Italy from birth to adulthood without interruption. the law states that citizenship can be acquired by marrying an Italian citizen and residing legally in Italy for six months (or for three years for marriages celebrated abroad), and through naturalization after ten years’ uninterrupted stay in Italy (ive years if you are a stateless or a refugee). In 2006, the Council of Ministers passed a draft bill to reform citizenship law, which would have changed and facilitated – if parliament had passed it – access to Italian citizenship.2 Since its approval in August 2006, the draft bill failed parliamentary examination and was withdrawn by the following elected government in 2008. .co m Entrance and Stay: Legislative Framework as hg ate The law currently in force is Legislative Decree 268/98, as modiied by Law 189/2002, also known as the ‘Bossi-Fini law’. as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Work permit Every year, the government passes a ‘Migration flows decree’ which establishes how many foreign workers are allowed to come to Italy to work. there are quotas for each area, according to what each region reports in terms of ‘sustainable lows in relation to the absorbing capacity of the social and productive fabric’. Concrete experience shows that annual quotas have systematically underestimated demand for labour, with such quotas being used for regularization of foreign workers already living in Italy. The duration of work permits depends on the duration of the employment contract the foreign citizen has with the employer. In any case, the maximum duration for a work permit is two years for a permanent job, and one year for a ixed-term work contract. the current law does not consider the possibility of coming to Italy to look for a job, while the previous ‘turco-napolitano law’ expressed this concept through the currently abolished ‘sponsorships’. With such sponsorships, foreigners could come to Italy to look for a job by presenting a guarantee (a deed of guarantee and indemnity) and having as guarantor an Italian citizen. Despite criticisms from anti-racism organizations, which considered sponsorship a form of ‘monetization’ of the right of entry, sponsorships are the only experimental measure ever taken to favour legal entrance of migrants who want to look for a job. The failure to address such a possibility is one of the main causes of such a high rate of irregular immigrants in Italy. According to some studies, more than three-ifths of foreign citizens with a residence permit have regularized their condition ex post (after staying in Italy irregularly) thanks to the regularization measures over the years (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002). 2 The Draft Bill – Changes to 5th February 1992 n.91 Law with new norms on citizenship. © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 119 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Family reunion and unaccompanied foreign minors the right to family reunion is guaranteed only to the spouse or civil partner, children under 18, and parents over 65, in case there is no other child who can take care of them in the country of origin. Children over 18 can rejoin their families only if they are seriously disabled. There are speciic norms for foreign children coming to Italy alone: the child has the right to an ‘under-age’ residence permit and to participate in ‘social and civil integration projects organized by public or private bodies’. After turning 18, the child can apply for conversion of his/her permit into a work, study or health permit by meeting some requirements: the foreign child needs to have resided in Italy for at least three years and participated in an ‘integration project’ for at least two years, based on a education programme within a post-compulsory and vocational education scheme. This means that foreign minors who have come to Italy after turning 15 cannot obtain a residence permit, and are therefore supposed to leave Italy at age 18. as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Residence card foreign citizens who have been living in Italy for at least six years and who have a non-term employment contract, a permit for independent work or a family or religion permit3 can apply for a residence card. Migrants with such requirements also need to demonstrate that they earn enough to provide for themselves and their families and have decent accommodation. The residence card has no expiry date, but can be invalidated if the foreign citizen is found guilty of the crimes listed in Art. 380 and 381 of the Italian criminal law. As a matter of fact, the number of foreign citizens with a residence card is very low: it is very dificult for foreigners to demonstrate that they have a suficient income and suitable accommodation. m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Expulsions foreign citizens can be issued with three types of expulsion orders: administrative expulsion – for illegal entry or stay, or for alleged social danger; security expulsion – as a consequence of a criminal court sentence, and substitute expulsion – as an alternative sanction to imprisonment. The Bossi-Fini law has exacerbated the use of expulsions, increasing the number of cases for which a police escort to the border is needed. If it is impossible to carry out the expulsion immediately, migrants are detained in so-called ‘temporary detention centres’ (Italian: CPT), which are controlled by the police. Migrants can be detained there for 60 days, after which they are released if the police have not been able to identify them. Minors and pregnant women cannot be expelled. hg ate .co Asylum rights Italy has no systematic law on asylum: this issue is disciplined only partially through some norms which are to be found in two laws on immigration: as 3 These are speciic types of residence permits awarded to either relatives who are non-nuclear family members, or to religious institutional igures who immigrate to serve their own communities (such as pastors, rabbis and imams). © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 120 ate .co m Law 39 of 28 February 1990 (also known as the ‘Martelli law’) and Law 189/2002 (also known as the ‘Bossi-Fini law’). Until 21 April 2005, the National Committee for the recognition of refugee status has been the competent body to assess asylum cases. Law 189/2002 has enforced a speciic regulation on that, which speciies the decentralization of such tasks to seven newly established local committees. To date, asylum rights are not properly protected: on the contrary, the latest changes to the law further limit access to this right, introducing ‘simpliied’ procedures which risk prejudicing the right to an in-depth analysis of applications. as hg ate .co m as hg Right to study the turco-napolitano law (40/98) introduced the right to education (Art. 38–9) for foreign minors, even if they are illegal immigrants. It also set some rules for access to universities and post-graduate schools. This law protects language and cultural diversity through programmes of intercultural education and Italian courses, together with the teaching of language and culture of the country of origin. m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Protection against discrimination Law 654/75 (also known as the ‘Reale law’), Law 205/93 (also known as the ‘Mancino law’) and Art. 43–4 of Legislative Decree 268/98 would be a good basis for protecting people against discrimination in Italy, if only they were actually implemented. It is important to stress the fact that the Italian law envisages discrimination factors to include national origin, an aspect not included in EU Directive 43/2000. Italian law also requires regions to establish monitoring observatories and to deal with prevention and legal protection against racism and discrimination. Unfortunately, Italian law collides with EU Directive 43/2000 by casting the burden of proof on the victim, and not on the perpetrator of the discriminatory act. ga te. co Socioeconomic Context as h The Role of Immigrants in the Formal and Informal Economy as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as outlined in the historical section, Italy has very recently become the target of large-scale immigration lows from non-European countries. If this sudden process has created problems at the juridical, social and political level, minor problems have been created by migrants in economic terms. Italy and its economic structuring have provided opportunities for immigrants to participate in sectors of the labour market that Italians do not want to take on any more (low-wage jobs) and take part in the large-scale informal economy and black labour market. the pull factor of available work has made Italy a privileged country of destination for international immigration (Bonifazi 1998, Bonifazi and Chiri 2001). Italy is not a homogeneous country, and regional differences have inluenced migration patterns (Zanfrini 1998, Ambrosini 1999). There are areas in Italy where unemployment is at the highest rate in Eu, while in other areas unemployment © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 121 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m is very low. This situation has produced a very fragmented picture in terms of immigrant distribution in the labour market, and relects a very speciic structuring of the Italian economy. As with internal migration in the 1950s and 1960s, it reveals old contradictions and new transformations in Italian society (alberoni and Baglioni 1965, Collinson 1994). It is a mirror of its geographic economy, its institutional organization, its territorial differentiation. In short, the main elements that shape the current Italian economy in relation to the socio-economic presence of immigrants can be synthesized as follows: an industry formed around midand small-scale enterprises, a large-scale informal economy, and a diffused black labour market, an insuficient welfare system, often subsided by private and nonproit charity organizations, a changed family organization in which women have a dual domestic and extra-domestic role, young individuals who struggle to ind a decent permanent job, and high rates of unemployment concentrated mainly in some areas and regions. As Ambrosini (2005) puts it, the immigrant labour force not only fulils demands from the Italian economy, but also seems to be well ‘embedded’ in Italian society as a whole. There are four main domains of the Italian economy that are relevant in this perspective. Firstly, there is an industrial structure based mainly on mid- and small-scale industries. This sector demands a lexible and low-wage labour force. Immigrants it in very well in this respect. Secondly, a well-developed tourist, agricultural and building sector offers good employment opportunities. All three are highly affected by the immigrant presence, given the luctuating and unstable demand in terms of work (seasonal, and related to inancial investment in good times). Moreover, these are the sectors in which black labour is lourishing. Immigrants are appreciated for their lexibility and their subordinate attitude. thirdly, a tertiary urban sector provides a labour market in which dangerous, hard and low-wage jobs are not accepted by Italians any more, and immigrants ill these vacancies. Finally, a continuously rising care sector offers low-paid and often contractually irregular working solutions. This sector of the Italian economy has become crucial due to developments in socio-cultural and demographic conditions in Italian society. A poor welfare system, a rising elder population, and a need for both parents to have a full-time job are major variables that determine such availability. comparing and synthesizing emerging evidence from Italy’s economic structure and its variability with immigrant presence and contribution, the following three territorial models are revealed. The irst is a model of extended industry (especially in the middle and northeast of Italy). With the exception of two provinces, all 15 main provinces in the economic development ranking fall within this area, and all these are also in different positions in the top 15 concerning degree of non-Italian employment. this means that the top 15 provinces in Italy in terms of economic development and growth are also the ones that mostly employ immigrant workers. second, there is a metropolitan model, in which Milan and rome are at the top, followed by other cities from all regions. This model largely involves jobs in © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 122 as Education hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m the tertiary sector and construction, and it is characterized by an unstable dynamic related to uncertainties and luctuation in the labour market itself. It should be noted that in metropolitan areas, a signiicant phenomenon of autonomous activities and entrepreneurship has emerged in the last decade as a response to these uncertainties. finally, there is an unstable territorial model, largely developed in small cities and the countryside (especially in the southern regions) that is characterized not only by jobs in agriculture, but also in other activities such as tourism, building and social care. The very poor rates of settlement degree indicators in southern Italy provide an image of unstable immigration processes characterized by low rates of regular jobs in comparison to irregular ones (often managed by local interest groups and maias), and very often organized on a seasonal basis. departing from castells and portes’s (1989) idea that the informal economy should be deined in process terms, it might be assumed that this could be any activity that could generate an income and is not regulated by society’s institutions in legal, bureaucratic and social terms. The main reasons for immigrant workers’ involvement in the informal Italian economy are, in decreasing order: irregular contractual status, working conditions, and extensive tax fraud. A inal important annotation is that such processes have not appeared with the arrival of an immigrant labour force, but are endemic in Italian society and its economy since the postSecond World War reconstruction and restructuring. access to the labour market by immigrants (with no distinction, whether regular or irregular) is based on the balance between the need for labour by the Italian system and the availability of immigrants willing to work. The process of recruitment is basically shaped around three main mechanisms and processes that together offer different opportunities. First, there is the system of normative regulations, oficial public and private recruiting institutions. Second, there are private, charity and irregular channels of recruitment. Finally, there are the self-managed and chained informal networks related to migrant communities. The set and juxtaposition of these three elements governs and regulates access for immigrants to all areas and domains of the formal and informal Italian economy. It should be stressed that the last element seems to be quite relevant in many economic sectors, while creating a large-scale process of ethnicization of some speciic kinds of work (a strict relation between migration networks and specialized ethnic jobs). as hg ate .co m the Italian educational system has seen a recent increase in pupils of immigrant origin. In 2007 (ISTAT 2007) there were 664,196 such students, spread through all levels (22.6 per cent out of the whole school population), compared to 284,224 in 2005 (ISTAT 2005). The school system is imagined to promote competence, information and soft skills, as well as opportunities for socio-cultural interchange between very different coexisting cultures, and was last reformed in 2003 (Law 53/2003). The new law sets the limit for compulsory education at 12 years, © Copyrighted Material 123 Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m organized into three levels: primary, lower secondary and upper secondary. Having completed the upper secondary cycle, any student can opt for either the lyceum or a technical/professional study career. The former option is designed to prepare students for university education, while the latter is imagined as a more direct gateway to the labour market. Immigrants and minorities residing on Italian soil are obliged by law to join an education programme (law 20/99) and to reach educational goals according to national standards (Law 144/99). In this respect, Italian institutions recognize the universal right to education for any person residing in Italy regardless of legal and juridical status. Above and beyond this important legal decision of rights and obligations, a new policy of incorporation for students of immigrant origin has been enforced (MIUR 2009, Ravecca 2009). at the same time, immigrants are investing in education as a tool for emancipation from subordinate status (giovannini and Queirolo palmas 2002, Queirolo Palmas 2006, Ravecca 2009). Migrants’ segregation in niches and sectors is also reproduced in the educational system. Research (MIUR 2004, Ravecca 2009) has demonstrated how students of immigrant origin are over-represented on technical and vocational courses, and that their drop-out levels are high. The distribution of immigrants shows that the major differential increase during the last two years occurred in non-compulsory education. This can be explained by decreasing drop-out rates, probably connected with the perception of education as a crucial element for emancipation and integration among the population of immigrant origin (Ravecca 2009). as with other trends in the immigrant population in Italy, local and regional variation is signiicant – illustrating different contextual conditions in different regions. In wealthy and economically active regions (in the north and north-east), the average proportion of students of immigrant origin stands at 10 per cent at all levels. In the underdeveloped (especially southern) regions, the situation is the opposite, with a minimal presence of 1.6 per cent. The connection between economic development and immigrant students’ presence becomes even more striking at the local-provincial level. Among the ten most relevant provinces, not one is from the central and southern regions. In the last ive years, the fragmented national distribution along with the heterogeneous composition of the immigrant population by origin, language, culture and citizenship have produced very different local realities. Both the native and immigrant populations are now much more aware of the importance of credentials (Brint 1999), and consider education and higher qualiications as the gateway to the labour market and proitable employment. At present, approximately two per cent of the Italian university student population consists of non-Italian citizens – a percentage far lower than that of other European countries (UK, Germany and France). There is a predominance of females in the general student population, but more males among the immigrant student population. Female students of non-Italian origin are less likely to drop out, and non-Italian males are more likely to drop out at upper secondary level, with easier © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 124 as hg ate .co m transition to the labour market and more unsuccessful study careers at university than their female counterparts. As a inal consideration, the Italian academic system has recently faced a strong internationalization process. Italy has never been a destination for massive lows of international students. This trend has changed in the last decade due to the rising presence of immigrant networks capable of supporting prospective international students. In a future perspective, the multicultural turn of Italian compulsory education is expected to contribute positively to guaranteeing better opportunities for students of immigrant origin residing with their families in Italy. .co m Living Conditions and Health as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate Housing market dynamics are a relevant factor in immigrants’ settlement strategies. Housing is now considered a central value and right in EU countries (Ec Bolkestein directive); however, it is not considered as such by the Italian Constitution. Following the large increase of immigrant population in Italy in the last decade (from 800,000 to nearly 3,000,000) and its transition from a temporary to a residential qualiication (via a large-scale family reunion process), housing demand has risen dramatically. At the present stage, the housing market for immigrants is highly fragmented on a geographical basis. Along with a historically permanent informal market of low-wage housing solutions, new forms of ethnicized housing strategies have appeared. Many immigrant families have managed to afford to buy a house or invest money in the housing market. Some middle-class households of immigrant origin have invested money in commercial properties with the aim of gaining a stable extra income (ambrosini 1999, caritas and CCR 2003). given this, the immigrant population still largely lacks appropriate and decent housing. Within this framework, young immigrant population clusters are more exposed than others. This not only depends on immigrants’ inancial constraints, but also on the reluctance of Italian landlords to rent out lats to young single immigrants. In geographic terms, the metropolitan areas and growing industrial areas are most exposed to the emergence of a parallel housing market made up by poor-quality accommodation. In these areas in particular, housing solutions are characterized by insuficient standards and poor environmental, infrastructural and social contexts. The latter aspect is also crucial in determining the large-scale process of social stigmatization and partial ghettoization (ISMU 2007). Good examples of these housing models are the suburban and peripherals areas of the main industrial cities, such as Milan, turin or the old city centres in genoa and Palermo (Novak 2006). In addition to a parallel immigrant housing market, public housing has become a potential solution for immigrant families. Public buildings and neighbourhoods are now largely inhabited by immigrant families (often in competition with Italian low-waged families). This situation has generated strong © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 125 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m social tensions and contrasts between the native and immigrant population in some poor areas. In Italy, health rights are guaranteed by Art. 32 of the Constitution, and following the WHO’s health deinition from 1978, it is not only a matter of treating any kind of illness, but also providing for complete bio- social and psychosocial well-being. As a result, all kinds of treatment and therapies should be made available to all sections of the resident population (including immigrants). following this, in remodelling its national health system, Italy has shifted from centralist to locally managed healthcare, in the hope of responding to population needs more eficiently. However, such a change has produced differences at the regional level. The principles underpinning the Italian health system have always been social protection, solidarity and equity (Pasini and Picozzi 2005). All three of these requirements involve the immigrant population. Social protection is the crucial principle through which health is guaranteed to all sectors of the population. Whether regular or irregular, immigrants have a right to access to all kinds of therapies provided by the national health system. This guarantees that the Italian population is protected directly and indirectly from all forms of diseases and illness. The solidarity principle offers integral health protection to all sectors of the Italian population, with no distinction based on gender, origin, age and profession. Members of poor and endangered social categories are expected to have access to the same opportunities and treatments as those belonging to wealthy ones. Immigrants are no exception to this. Finally, equity means that not only is access to treatment guaranteed to all, but that all have the right to receive the best possible treatment available. Altogether, these principles function both as a great epidemiological deterrent as well as a tremendous social protection for the low-wage and poor sectors of society (Ortensi 2004). In order to fulil such criteria, the 1998 law on immigration norms has provided a comprehensive solution for immigrants’ healthcare. All legal immigrants should be registered with the national health system, and all illegal residents can access public health services and treatment under the STP (‘Temporary Present Foreigners’) scheme. such a distinction allows everybody to have free access to public hospitals, ambulatories and medical institutions. However, statistics show how the irregular population tends not to use the services available. At present, a proposed law about immigration (under parliamentary review since January 2009) plans to modify current norms and allow doctors to report to the police all illegal immigrants who show up at a public healthcare centre. This proposition has recently dramatically reduced stp scheme applications in public hospitals and emergency units (to 25 per cent). This means that immigrants without residence permits would avoid the risk of being reported by doctors to the police when asking for assistance. above and beyond the doctors’ personal choice to proceed with a report, there is a more general risk. Given such a fear, there is an increased chance for the entire population facing new forms of health risk related to transmittable diseases. © Copyrighted Material 126 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material Social Networks and Participation as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m social networks are at basis for migration strategies and immigrants’ settlement and participation in Italy. Departing from Massey (1988) and Fernandez Kelly’s (1995) deinitions of social and migration networks, it is interesting to reveal how they shift into ethnic networks. The traditional Anglo-Saxon overlap between ethnic and social/migration networks can be easily applied to the Italian context, where groups join together to occupy certain formal and informal labour market niches. However, this process cannot be understood only as the result of certain migration strategies sustained by migrants’ networks and chains. There is also a contribution from perceptions and social construction by receiving societies concerning certain stereotypes. In Italy, speciic jobs are the exclusive domain of certain ethno-national groups, not only due to pressure from certain appropriative dynamics operated by the migrants’ network, but also as a result of recurrent ideas among receiving societies that some jobs should only be done by speciic ethnic groups. Such stereotypes have the power to sustain (at least in early stages) appropriation patterns by certain immigrant groups in certain job categories (la Rosa and Zanfrini 2003, OIM and Melchionda 2003). as Korac (2001) shows for ex-Yugoslavian immigrants in rome, networks among immigrants of the same origin seem to be the most relevant and effective support agencies. This fact points to a series of speciicities that characterize Italian society. First of all, the welfare state is lacking in support of both residents and immigrants’ insertion in the labour market, maintaining acceptable living standards when deinitively or temporarily out of the labour market, or reinsertion into the labour market. To overcome this, immigrants have generated a series of informal relations within their ethnic network, characterized by closeness (Wallman 1986) and exclusive relations (abbatecola 2002): immigrants are more likely to overlap and tie together all their personal relational spheres (social, leisure, friends, work, family time), rather than distributing them over and beyond their familiar network of ties. It is important to note how such strong bonds have both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, solidarity helps to maintain strong ties with the ethnic community and to reproduce within the same work circuit. On the other hand, it prevents immigrants from accessing social capital based on open relations with those outside their own ethnic community. The latter is crucial in seeking better social mobility, while the former at least guarantees reciprocal support between all members. In sum, some distinctive characteristics can be outlined when accounting for the socio-political participation of young adult immigrants in Italian society. First, Italy lacks speciic policies useful in promoting the socio-political participation of immigrants, and young immigrants in particular. Such holes are often illed by organized social groups and associations, often managed by immigrant groups. Second, the religious dimension often determines opportunities for some speciic immigrant groups and individuals to take an active role in Italian social and political life. Catholics in particular seem to enjoy a form of privilege in accessing © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 127 as hg ate .co m political resources in Italian society. Given the great impact that Catholic charities, social organizations and supportive institutions have in the ield of Italian welfare, their practice is made easier not only by sharing common ethical and moral values with the majority of Italian society, but also by having more opportunities made available to them in an extended network based on religious rather than ethnic afiliation. Third, cultural difference can be an important factor. Cultural proximity along with religious belonging could serve as valuable supports for the integration process. Lastly, the general level of education plays a role in shaping and determining opportunities for social and political participation in Italian society. .co m Culture, Religion and Identity as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate Transition to adulthood is a quite underestimated and poorly investigated topic. The same applies to young individuals of immigrant origin. The Italian legal system provides a particular legal framework for non-Italian youths residing and growing up in Italy, forcing them to become socio-economically self-suficient. In fact, by law, all individuals who are not Italian citizens must detach themselves from their parents’ residence permit and apply for an individual one, fulilling all the criteria necessary at the age of 18. It is clear that such a legal and juridical constraint may have a tremendous impact on young immigrants’ livelihood and transition to adulthood. This situation – in conjunction with the poor economic conditions in which immigrant families often ind themselves – creates an implicit obligation for young individuals to seek a job rather than entering further education. Italy has been a culturally heterogeneous country since its reuniication in the nineteenth century. The historical and cultural distinction between northern and southern Italy has been always crucial in the Italian debate over the economic, sociocultural and political differences between two distinctive forms of ‘interpreting Italianness’. The issue has dominated the Italian cultural debate over the past century, and it still inluences political and socio-cultural debates in the media and public opinion. The cultural diversiication has become even more relevant after large-scale immigration from very different geographical and cultural areas occurred. It is not only a matter of preserving an alleged Italian identity against very different cultural iniltrations, but more importantly, promoting an organic, comprehensive system of cultural and normative strategies to allow very different cultural forms to integrate into Italian society. A related topic is religion. Over and beyond the ethical and juridical dimension, great concerns are rising at the emergence of a multi-religious society next to a multicultural one. Italy has now turned from a mono-religious country into a home for many different religions, faiths and churches with the right to exist and constitutional recognition allowing them to worship. According to a 2008 Caritas Migrantes report, approximately 2.1 million immigrants are registered as christians of different faiths (orthodox, catholic, protestant and other churches), followed by Muslims (1.2 million), Hindus (100,000), Buddhists (80,000) and © Copyrighted Material Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material 128 as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m Jews (10,000) (Pittau 2000, Fiorita 2007). However, as Italian society becomes increasingly secularized, many migrants are abandoning their religious traditions and practices. In many circumstances, individual, personal and private beliefs are not transformed into active participation in religious practices and worship. recent surveys (saint Blancat 1999, trEsEgY 2008) show how the emergence of intergenerational conlicts among irst- and second-generation immigrants is more likely to be caused by religion related aspects than any other factors. The greater the cultural distance between Italian culture and that of the immigrants, the more religion plays a role in generating a gap between parents and children, as well as generating very different paths, strategies and trends among more ‘culturally’ exposed young adult immigrants (Frisina 2007, TRESEGY 2008). at present, the juridical position of the roman catholic church is a privileged one in comparison to all other faiths and religions. Given the premise that, by constitution, Italy is not a religious state, particular attention is paid by the Constitution (Art. 7) and law (Patti Lateranensi 1929, subsequently revised in 1984) to relations with the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican State. The Italian state guarantees the catholic church privileged access to the education system in a formal institutionalized way by ranking the catholic religion as a school subject in all compulsory grades. Until 1984, religion was a compulsory and marked subject for all students, while nowadays it is voluntary and not subject to any marking. none the less, even today, all religion teachers in Italian schools are appointed by local bishops without any interference from government educational institutions. All other religions and faiths are recognized and regulated by Art. 8 of the Constitution, and by speciic bilateral agreements with most relevant churches and religions (Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish and Evangelical). To date, no speciic agreement has been made with Muslim organizations. The distance in cultural terms and the existence of much-differentiated religious organizations in the Italian Islamic scene has so far made it very dificult to establish a single juridical/legislative bilateral agreement with organizations representing Muslims in Italy. m Discrimination, Racism and Attitudes as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co recent trends, surveys and research on Italians’ opinion, ideas and stereotypes about the immigrant presence are important in order to reveal the construction and typiication processes that occur in a rapidly changing society. In addition, these social constructions are highly inluential at the normative and policy-making level: receiving societies’ opinions and ideas are highly inluential in decisionmaking processes and planning at the political level. concerning the large degree of prejudice and preconception that still affects Italian society, important research has been carried out by cologna and Breveglieri (2003) on young immigrants from six different ethnic groups in Milan. According to the authors, despite a highly complex picture, one of the main emerging differences between Italians and youths of immigrant origin concerns the degree © Copyrighted Material Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material 129 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m of stress in terms of lived experiences and perceptions about their conditions. at the same time (see also trEsEgY 2008), immigrant and Italian adolescents share several daily life experiences. Above all, loneliness, a sense of being lost and poor projections for the future are the main issues referred to by both Italian and immigrant respondents. What makes a difference between the two groups is the perception of a ‘partial exclusion’ as a result of a sense of ‘semi-belonging’, and a sense of inability to communicate their conditions to those (Italians) who do not experience this (Cologna and Breveglieri 2003). The experience of partial exclusion might in some cases cause a reactive phenomenon of close ethnic socialization (Feixa et al. 2006). Recent studies on young Ecuadorian immigrants in Italy (Queirolo Palmas and Torre 2005, Lagomarsino 2006, Cannarella et al. 2007) have revealed such a risk. since the 1990s, a new interest emerged in European societies to understand the relational processes of opinion-formation, both at a national level and in an international comparative perspective (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Maddens 2000, Bauer et al. 2000, Diamanti 2001, Gang et al. 2002, Bonifazi 2003). The emerging data provide a quite interesting picture of the historical development of Italians’ perceptions of immigrants’ presence in their society. To simplify, some different phases on the temporal axis can be outlined: during the early stages of immigration processes in the 1970s there was general neutrality towards immigrants’ presence. It was a phase were the term ‘foreigner’ did not have negative connotations, but rather a sense of curiosity towards those who were visibly ‘foreign’. This situation was determined mainly by the low level of immigrants’ presence and the accordingly marginal social expectations and perceptions generated in the receiving society. A second phase that characterized the 1980s can be deined as the unconsciousness phase. While immigration was rising and in some areas immigrants were now seen as a potential threat to Italians’ rights and access to work opportunities, there was increasing awareness of immigration as a phenomenon (but not yet as a concrete problem). A third phase that characterized the early 1990s can be deined as the emergency phase. In this period, institutions and government took action to stop uncontrolled immigration lows. This was the period in which immigration was constructed as a social problem and in which immigrants were not perceived with curiosity, but rather with fear. a fourth phase during the 1990s largely exacerbated the processes that occurred in the third one. It can be deined as the labelling phase, in which Italians applied stereotypes, targeting speciic ethno-national groups. The fear of uncontrolled immigration and its social, security and economic consequences were the key elements of these discriminative processes. finally, since the turn of the century, a new phase that could be called the realistic one has emerged in the Italian scene. Although immigrants are represented as potential risks for Italian society, they are also perceived as a contributing factor to Italian society’s economic and cultural growth. In the last few years the © Copyrighted Material 130 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m proportion of people who largely consider immigration as a more negative than positive social process in Italy has decreased to approximately 31 per cent (Eurisko 2004, Valtolina 2004). the Irp (population research Institute) and Irpps (population and social policies Institute) of the cnr have conducted large-scale surveys on this topic during the last 20 years (1988, 1991, 1997, 2002, 2008). First of all, the negative perception of immigrants’ presence has dramatically changed from period to period: from 49 per cent in 1988 to 71 per cent in 1991, and down to a 60 per cent in the following periods, 1997 and 2002. These data – representing opinionformation – do not relect immigration low trends over the last two decades. Social reality and its representation in public discourses can be dramatically different, and the latter is often generated by emotive, opinion-driven and not fully rational constructions (Bonifazi and Karamas 1998). opinions of the cultural impact of immigrants’ presence in Italy have not changed much during the past two decades. Ideas and opinions are generally positive, and only a small proportion of the Italian population has very strong and negative opinions about the potential coexistence of different cultures. However, the situation appears radically different if the relationship between immigration and criminality is made a theme. Among Italians, there has always been a majority of people who believe there is a correlation between immigration and growth in crime. By cross-comparing such conceptions with social categories, some interesting indings emerge. Women are more exposed than men to a higher sense of fear towards a large-scale immigrant presence. The older population is highly intolerant towards immigrants compared to the younger one. More highly educated individuals (those with a degree) are nearly twice as positive towards immigrants as those with only primary-level certiicates. Teachers have the most positive attitudes, while workers, traders and businessmen are the most critical. In sum, most of the Italian population wants a stronger and decisive role from the central government in managing immigration lows. there is an emerging distinction between two forms of prejudices: the ethnically oriented one, and the contextually determined one. While the former is purely concentrated in determining a substantial difference between the immigrant and autochthonous populations (racism), the latter is far more focused on immigrants’ right to access to resources and opportunities in receiving societies (xenophobia). According to large-scale surveys and in-depth research (Bonifazi 2003) the question of discrimination and exclusion seems to be contextually shaped around both perceived feelings and actual conditions of competition with immigrants for available resources. as hg Immigrants and Crime as mentioned above, many Italians associate immigration and immigrants with insecurity and criminality (CENSIS 2003). In the last 15 years, crimes committed © Copyrighted Material 131 Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material Table 5.3 1) Ex-Yugoslavia 2) Morocco 3) Tunisia 4) Algeria 5) Senegal 1) Morocco 2) Ex-Yugoslavia 3)Albania 4) Romania 5) Tunisia 1) Morocco 2) Albania 3) Romania 4) Ex-Yugoslavia 5) Senegal 1) Morocco 2) Albania 3) Romania 4) Ex-Yugoslavia 5) Senegal ate .co m 1993 1998 2002 2007 The 5 national groups most often reported to the police during the period 1993–2007 as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg by immigrants have risen in absolute terms (Ministero dell’Interno 2005, Ministero dell’Interno 2006, Ministero dell’Interno 2007, ISTAT 2007), and two new elements have contributed to shaping this situation: the numerical increase in crimes committed by immigrants of Eastern European origin (mainly albanians and romanians), and an ethnicization process of criminal actions according to new patterns. The percentage of immigrants has more than doubled in the last 15 years. If we consider that in the last regularization process in 2003 about 600,000 irregular immigrants applied, it is a matter of fact that igures might not be representative of the entire population. The same applies if the percentage of people reported to the police for a crime is accounted for. Next to this increase, the national origins among those reported and/or sentenced have changed. Table 5.3 shows the trend over the last 15 years for the ive most reported national groups. this trend highlights the continuous increase of irregular immigration from Eastern European countries that, through regularization processes and Eu membership procedures, make these national groups more exposed to statistical accounts. Meanwhile, crime typologies among different national groups have not changed over time. Among the ten most reported national groups, there have been no changes in criminality. Africans (Moroccans, Senegalese and Algerians) are more likely to be accused of crimes related to drug dealing, while Eastern Europeans are more frequently reported for crimes against property and belongings. As a general consideration, it appears that most reported offences belong to the general category of socio-economic related crimes; in other words, a large proportion of the criminal act registered are related to conditions of marginality and irregularity. there are also data indicating that the jail population of those of immigrant origin in Italy is increasing. In 1994, foreign inmates accounted for 16 per cent, compared to 38 per cent in 2007. This trend has made Italy one of the countries with the highest percentage of its jail population of immigrant origin in Europe (Barbagli et al. 2004). However, comparing data between those reported, convicted and sentenced among Italians and immigrants, it emerges that immigrants who are reported for a crime are more likely to be jailed than Italians. In Italian criminal law typology, the availability of alternative solutions to jail, the risk of escape and economic self suficiency during home-jail regimes are relevant factors in determining a judge’s decision whether to opt for temporary jail or release before trial. Given this, immigrants are more exposed than Italians to these restrictions, © Copyrighted Material 132 Inclusion and Exclusion of Young Adult Migrants in Europe © Copyrighted Material .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m especially in terms of economic and risk of escape factors. Finally, due to the nature of the offences, those of immigrant origin are statistically less involved in crime prescription. Another speciic criminal area which immigrants are particularly involved in concerns human traficking and exploitation. The statistical data available show how in this speciic set of offences, two-thirds of registered crimes refer to human traficking, while only one-third refer to human exploitation (prostitution, slavery and so on). It is not clear whether this igure is signiicant, as it is dificult to determine how these crimes are registered. In fact, many researchers (Transcrime 2004, Di Nicola 2004) suggest that human traficking (illegal immigrant transportation) is more likely to be detected by police forces than human exploitation crimes such as prostitution and slavery. As a inal consideration, the overall picture of immigrants’ criminality in Italy provides a good opportunity to reveal possibilities for improvement in future. First of all, most crimes and offences are related to the poor level of socio-economic support that institutions are able to provide to immigrants. Delinquency is not completely independent from this variable, and a more eficient welfare regime might be of help in combating such phenomena. To reach this goal is not only an economic challenge, but also a social policy one. The goal for the future is to support legality and its preservation among all sections of the immigrant population, rather than to set rules and norms that drive in the opposite direction. ate Conclusion as hg ate .co m as hg ate . co m as h ga te. co m as hg our primary endeavour in this chapter has been to unlock the contextual elements contributing to young adult immigrants’ experiences of inclusion and exclusion in Italy. There is, however, a need for a systematic summary of our main arguments. What is the overall picture of the Italian socio-economic, political and cultural system in which young adult immigrants experience their lives? First, Italy has a quite particular socio-economic structure. Its main general traits are a consistent industrial structure, a well-developed tourist, agricultural and building sector, a tertiary urban sector in which dangerous, hard and low-wage jobs are not accepted by Italians, and a continuously rising caring sector linked to the care of elders and children and housekeeping – all sectors in which immigrant workers can ind a job. Second, Italy has a peculiar immigration history. The late arrival of immigrants compared to other European countries left Italy unprepared to become a country of destination. At the present stage, migration lows geography has followed different trajectories from different directions, and Italy is facing a dramatic situation with illegal migration coming from the east and south shores of the Mediterranean. The massive emergence of sudden immigration lows during the 1980s and 1990s has generated an extensive process of closure towards immigrants in Italian society. Stereotypes and stigmas are widely used in media and public discourse. Despite © Copyrighted Material 133 Italy: Unreceptive Climate and Forced Adulthood © Copyrighted Material as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m as hg ate .co m this, most recent trends indicate that the general attitude towards immigrants has more closely resembled xenophobia than racism. third, Italy lacks a coherent corpus of laws and norms to manage migrationrelated issues, despite the fact that its immigration legislation is one of the most advanced in Europe (Consolidated Act 286/98). The quota system is still ineficient in responding to labour needs, and the residence permit granting procedure remains very slow and bureaucratic. As of January 2009, a new law proposed by the Berlusconi government aimed to introduce the offence of illegal migration. this means that anyone who enters illegally in Italy could be charged with a criminal offence: such a step, along with other restrictive interventions, aims to have an immediate effect on controlling illegal immigration while failing to take into account the long-term consequences for Italian society and immigration in Italy. This will have a dual negative effect on an already dramatic situation: irstly, supericial generalizations will lead to a massive criminalization process at all levels; secondly, new norms will lead the irregular immigrant population to turn away from the social and health services provided by the Italian health and education departments due to the fear of being reported to the police. At the same time, the welfare system was not suficiently developed to support both low-class Italian and immigrant-origin families. Facing this, Italian governments since 1990 have used a massive process of regularization as the main tool to alleviate the problematic presence of large numbers of irregular immigrants. Only in recent years has a more stable political situation offered the opportunity for a new approach to immigration. This new deal, based on the 2002 Bossi/Fini law, resulted in undesirable effects on immigrants’ living conditions. More recently (2009), a new immigration regulation (under parliamentary review) aims to introduce an even tighter set of conditions which immigrants must comply with in order to retain the right to reside in Italy. Fourth, Italy has a very tight naturalization and access to citizenship policy. the system is based on a jus sanguinis principle. As an alternative, non-Italians can acquire citizenship by marriage or an application that can be submitted under very restrictive conditions asylum seekers and refugees fall into a very complicated and centralized system of evaluation. This situation makes Italy an undesirable destination for large-scale migration of such migrant categories. In comparison to working, seasonal and family reunion immigration, asylum seekers and refugees represent a minimal proportion of the non-Italian population residing in Italy. Fifth, speciic socio-cultural and economic conditions make transition to adulthood a quite complicated and delayed social process in comparison to other European countries. From this perspective, young immigrants are more likely to be exposed to deprivation due to a lack of any kind of freedom and choice (dal Lago 1999). 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