Science and Public Policy, 35(3), April 2008, pages 183–196
DOI: 10.3152/030234208X299053; http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/beech/spp
Delegation of authority in research funding to
networks: experiences with a multiple goal
boundary organization
Laurens Klerkx and Cees Leeuwis
The delegation of authority in research funding to multi-actor networks that include users is seen as a
way to make research more responsive to users’ needs. This paper analyzes multi-actor networks for
the planning and execution of agricultural research in The Netherlands. It shows that delegation of
authority to networks also generates several tensions, and requires substantial role adjustments and
institutional learning for the actors involved (government, researchers, intermediaries such as research
councils, and user groups) in order to effectively operate in the network. The paper indicates that the
principal–agent perspective often used for analyzing the science–policy relationship can be a useful
tool for analyzing the multilateral relationships in networks, but needs to be complemented by theories
that better capture the notion of co-production in such ‘webs of cross-cutting ties’.
I
ncreasingly, research systems are striving to become more responsive to the needs of users of
research, and aim to increase the relevance of the
research through the involvement of users in research planning and execution (Shove and Rip,
2000; Rod and Paliwoda, 2003; Caron-Flinterman et
al., 2006). Such involvement may range from a consultative role, acting as a reference, to being given
decision-making authority (Davenport et al., 2003;
van der Meulen, 2003; Gulbrandsen, 2005). Such
delegation of authority in research funding to multiactor networks entails new roles for the actors involved, such as government, researchers, users, and
intermediary bodies such as research councils
(Morris, 2003; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Slipersæter et al.,
2007).
A frequently applied theoretical perspective for
analyzing the relationship between science and policy is principal–agent theory. Delegation of authority
in research funding to networks may relieve several
Laurens Klerkx (corresponding author) and Cees Leeuwis are at
the Communication and Innovation Studies Group, Department
of Social Sciences, Wageningen University, PO Box 8130, 6700
EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands; Tel: + 31-317-484694;
Fax: +31-317-486094; Email: Laurens.Klerkx@wur.nl.
Science and Public Policy April 2008
of the classical tensions in delegation of authority in
research funding that have been identified by studies
using principal–agent theory such as goal, selection,
and monitoring problems (Braun, 2003; van der
Meulen, 2003). However, it brings with it its own
particular set of tensions that relate to the accommodation of network actors (i.e. government, researchers, research councils, and users) to new modes of
working (Gulbrandsen, 2005). Furthermore, it has
consequences for the applicability of principal–agent
theory as an analytical tool, which has traditionally
dealt with bilateral (between principals such as government and researchers as agents) or trilateral (between a principal and an agent but intermediated by
a research council) relationships, but is increasingly
used for analyzing multilateral relationships (Morris,
2003; Shove, 2003; Slipersæter et al., 2007).
This paper aims to contribute to both discussions,
offering insights on the practical implications of
delegating authority in research funding to networks
and the role of intermediaries therein, as well as on
the theoretical implications for principal–agent theory. First, the paper outlines principal–agent theory
perspectives on delegation of authority in research
funding. It then focuses on the role of intermediary
organizations in different systems of delegation of
authority in research funding. This is followed by a
0302-3427/08/030183-14 US$08.00 © Beech Tree Publishing 2008
183
Delegation in research funding
Laurens Klerkx is an assistant professor at the Communication and Innovation Studies Group at Wageningen University. He holds a M.Sc. in Tropical Agriculture, and a Ph.D. in
Communication and Innovation Studies. His research takes
place in the realm of agriculture and the life sciences and
focuses on: demand articulation and multi-stakeholder negotiations for demand-driven research and innovation; newly
emerging intermediary structures for matching demand and
supply for knowledge to support innovation; how intermediary structures affect the dynamics in innovation networks
and how they are perceived by ‘traditional’ knowledge intensive service providers (such as research institutes and consultants) and end-users of innovations.
Cees Leeuwis is professor of Communication and Innovation Studies at Wageningen University. He holds a M.Sc. in
Rural Sociology and a Ph.D. in Communication and Innovation Studies. His research focuses on: the role of new
interactive and cross-disciplinary approaches in bringing
about coherent innovations; the analysis of social learning
and conflict management in networks; and the way in which
the privatization of research and extension institutions
affects public sphere innovation processes.
case study of a system in agricultural research, in
which the intermediary organization has adopted the
role of a multiple goal boundary organization that,
apart from forming a bridge between government
and scientists, also intermediates at several other
interfaces. The analysis is organized according to the
different arenas in research governance (i.e. the policy arena, the selection arena, and the control arena
(see Braun, 1998)) and the related problems as identified by principal–agent theory, in order to identify
the tensions in each arena. The paper concludes with
practical implications for delegating authority in research funding to networks, as well as implications
for principal–agent theory as an analytical tool in
science policy.
Principal–agent theory perspectives on
delegation of authority in research funding
Analogous to developments in other economic sectors (see Braun, 2003), the wave of ‘new public
management’ has given rise to the emergence of
contractual arrangements in agricultural research,
such as systems of output-financing and competitive
grant systems (Levidow et al., 2002). A large body
of literature has analyzed the relationship between
government and research establishments, which is
often intermediated by coordinating bodies such as
research councils (e.g. van der Meulen and Rip,
1998; Braun, 1998; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Dalrymple,
2006; Slipersæter et al., 2007), from the perspective
of a principal–agent relationship (Guston, 1996;
Huffman and Just, 2000; Braun and Guston, 2003;
Fernández-Carro, 2007). Principal–agent theory refers to economic transactions in which delegation
takes place (Guston, 1996), in which “The principal
is the actor who disposes of a number of resources
but ‘not those of the appropriate kind to realize the
184
interests (for example, has money but not the appropriate skills).’ He or she then needs the agent, who
accepts these appropriate resources and is willing to
further the interests of the principal” (Braun and
Guston, 2003: 303).
Utilizing principal–agent theory, Braun (2003)
observes a number of fundamental problems for policy makers in research governance: (1) getting scientists to do what politics wants (problem of
responsiveness); (2) being sure that they choose the
best scientists (problem of adverse selection); (3)
being sure that scientists do their best to solve the
problems and tasks delegated to them and that they
avoid ‘shirking’ behavior (moral hazard); and (4)
knowing what to do (decision-making and prioritysetting problem). Gulbrandsen (2005) has related
these fundamental problems to the three research
governance arenas identified by Braun (1998), i.e.
the policy arena, the selection arena, and the control
arena, as a way to systematize concrete tensions. On
the fundamental level and long-term time horizon
(policy arena) the problem of responsiveness is
particularly relevant (i.e. goal conflicts), in the precontract phase (the selection arena) the adverse
selection problem is particularly relevant,1 and in
the post-contract (the control arena) the moral hazard problem is particularly relevant. As Braun
(1998), among others (Stewart, 1995; Lacy, 1996;
Davenport et al., 2003), has noted, these arenas are
the scene of negotiation between different configurations of actors. Funding and governance policies of
research and the corresponding delegation models
and actor configurations have implications for the
type of negotiations that take place, and the way in
which, and the degree to which, these problems relating to the principal–agent relationship manifest
themselves (see Braun, 2003: 318 for an overview;
see also Huffmann and Just, 2000; van der Meulen,
2003).
Whereas delegation problems are often viewed
from the principal’s perspective, the current context
of contracting also presents problems for the agent,
i.e. researchers, such as: discontinuity of resources,
incompatibility of skills or personal goals with the
principal’s requirements, and inappropriate or frustrating operating conditions and/or performance
measures (Morris, 2003). In addition to recognizing
this two-way perspective in the principal–agent
relationship, principal–agent theory has also been
expanded to include configurations that go beyond
bilateral or trilateral principal–agent relationships
and concern multilateral relationships. Pleas for a
more context-sensitive science (Funtowicz and
Ravetz, 1993; Gibbons et al., 1994; Etzkowitz
and Leydesdorff, 2000) have given rise to a shift
from delegation by contract based on ‘new public
management’ to ‘delegation to networks’, which
besides government and researchers also involve
third parties such as users2 (van der Meulen, 2003;
Davenport et al., 2003; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Morris
and Rip, 2006). Braun argues in this respect (2003:
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
305): “Delegation to networks is the recognition that
government has no serious means or instruments to
guide the unpredictable process of discovery and
innovation. The delegation of the ‘right to decide
and act’ in funding policy to ‘inter-systemic networks’ is the consequence of this thinking.”3 Several
authors have advocated the involvement of, and
control by, users in the governance, priority setting,
execution, and financial support of research as an
instrument to improve the effectiveness and relevance of research by creating democracy and ownership (Middendorf and Busch, 1997; Sperling and
Ashby, 2001; Rod and Paliwoda, 2003; CaronFlinterman et al., 2006).
As regards the delegation of authority in research
funding to networks, from the viewpoint of principal–agent theory, outcomes from conceptual and
early empirical analysis appear to be positive. Braun
(2003: 320) concluded that it is “at least in theory,
the most adequate way of dealing with the paradox
in science/research policies:4 reducing the direct influence of the state in funding policies, respect for
the independence of scientific institutions, fostering
of ‘vigorous’ scientific institutions, and a strong
commitment of scientists to user interests.”. With
respect to the role of intermediaries such as research
councils, van der Meulen (2003: 326) found support
for the hypothesis that, in such a system, the intermediary (i.e. the research council) may become
more than just a proxy for government because “an
intermediary can improve its strategic position by
focusing on third party interests as a proxy or alternative for the interests and objectives of both principal and agent. If the intermediary is able to manage
the relationship with the third party successfully,
then it might even use the control over critical resources to develop its own role.”.
However, the delegation of authority in research
funding to networks entails tensions for principal–
agent theory itself, as it does not fully address the
aspect of co-production in research planning and
execution (Morris, 2003). Shove argues in this regard that (2003: 372) “concepts of co-production
make better sense of the mutually interdependent
relationship between researchers and those who fund
them. The details of co-production are in turn shaped
by the relative power of the different principals involved and the relative ‘hunger’ of the various
agents with whom they interact — features that are
critical for the day-to-day operation of principal–
agent relations but that are not accommodated within
the theory itself.”. Principal–agent theory is too
much abstracted from the context and situation in
which science policy relationships are shaped, and
the focus is too much on a ‘clear-cut divide’ between
principal and agents instead of on a process of mutual framing (Shove, 2003). Seeing research planning and execution as a process of ‘mutual framing’
and ‘co-production’ has also consequences for how
the intermediary layer between principal and agent is
conceptualized.
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Changing roles for research councils in
systems of delegation of authority in research funging to networks: the emergence
of multiple goal boundary organizations
As van der Meulen (2003: 324) argues, the research
council can be seen as “a link in a chain of principal–agent relationships, with the government as
principal to the research council, and the research
council as principal to the scientists. A research
council would be both agent (in relation to the government) and principal (in relation to the scientists)
at once.”5 In its nature as an intermediary body, the
research council “differs from the government as a
principal and the research performing sector as
agent, because its interest is defined in terms of the
interests of the other two actors” (van der Meulen,
2003: 324). The specific form of the configuration
depends on the interests that the principal and the
agent have in the relationship as such, as well as on
their interest in having an intermediate body to mediate it, which in turn would depend on the possibilities of the principals finding other agents, and of
agents working for other principals, and on the possibilities for direct interactions between principals
and agents and the existence of alternative, competing mediation structures (van der Meulen, 2003).
Principal–agent theory looks at the relationships
in configurations for delegation of authority in research funding from an economic theoretical point
of view (i.e. considering the execution of research as
a transaction, hindered by market failures and transaction costs such as adverse selection, information
asymmetry, and moral hazard), with the role of the
intermediary organization as a ‘stabilizing structure’
(van der Meulen, 1998; Braun and Guston, 2003;
Caswill, 2003). As Braun and Guston (2003) have
argued, from the viewpoint of constructivism, such
stabilizing structures also exist in the form of
boundary organizations. Cash et al. (2003: 8090)
have stated that boundary organizations are “organizations mandated to act as intermediaries between
the arenas of science and policy”, with three features: (i) they involve specialized roles within the
organization for managing the boundary, (ii) they
Principal–agent theory looks at the
relationships in configurations for
delegation of authority in research
funding from an economic theoretical
point of view (i.e. considering the
execution of research as a transaction,
hindered by market failures and
transaction costs)
185
Delegation in research funding
have clear lines of responsibility and accountability
to distinct social arenas on opposite sides of the
boundary, and (iii) they provide a forum in which
information can be co-produced by actors from different sides of the boundary through the use of
‘boundary objects’, and hence fulfill a bridge between different ‘worlds’ (Cash et al., 2003; Braun
and Guston, 2003). Whereas from the viewpoint of
principal–agent theory this stabilizing function appears to deal mainly with ‘co-ordination’ and relates
to the ‘economic dimension’ of the relationship between demand and supply with regard to the development of scientific knowledge, the concept of
boundary organizations deals with the ‘substantive
dimension’ of the relationship between demand and
supply,6 with their focus on the co-production of
knowledge.7
Similar to the principal–agent perspective, the
concept of boundary organization has focused principally on the science–policy boundary (Guston,
1999; Raman, 2005). However, as Waterton (2005)
has argued, such a focus on a single boundary may
be too narrow: the highly diverse nature of the
boundaries that contemporary scientists appear to be
establishing in partnership with funding and policy
bodies would call for a ‘wider picture’. With an increasing focus on the involvement of users of research in the research planning and execution
process, such a wider picture is becoming particularly relevant. As a result of the delegation of authority in research funding to networks, intermediary
organizations such as research councils see their role
changing from being a ‘lieutenant’ of government (a
mere funding allocation body standing between government and science with varying configurations for
delegation of authority, funds, and monitoring rights,
(see van der Meulen, 2003)), to becoming broader
multiple goal boundary organizations, i.e. research
councils with an ‘innovation agency function’
(Gulbrandsen, 2005). These combine both the economic and substantive dimension of the relationship
between policy bodies, researchers and user groups,
acting at several boundaries and fulfilling several
bridging functions within a multi-stakeholder setting
(Hellström and Jacob, 2003; Raman, 2005; Jacob,
2005; Dalrymple, 2006; Durant, 2006).
Despite the apparent benefits of delegating authority to networks outlined earlier, applying principal–
agent theory, Gulbrandsen (2005) found a number of
tensions for research councils in such new ways of
working (i.e. as multiple goal boundary organizations). These tensions relate to the selection of users
with the right competencies for acting successfully
in configurations of delegation to networks, and
managing different kinds of monitoring systems
attached to the different expectations of groups
involved in the network that may act as principals
versus researchers. Furthermore, as Shove and Rip
(2000) and Davenport et al. (2003) have pointed out,
the user is not homogeneous but is a heterogeneous
entity, and this entails difficulties in relation to
186
effective representation of users’ interests (as regards the broader constituency).
Exploring tensions in delegation of authority
in research funding to networks:
the case of Bioconnect
Goal and case selection
The goal of this paper is to describe experience with,
and reveal tensions in, such a system of delegating
authority in research funding to networks, mediated
by a multiple goal boundary organization-type research council. This paper documents experiences
with such a network in The Netherlands, called Bioconnect, through which government (i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality) has
operationalized the delegation of authority in agricultural research funding to networks from the organic agricultural sector. In the light of the theory of
the principal–agent relationship and boundary organizations, the case is interesting from a number of
points of view:
• Users are given the task of acting as principals
versus researchers, both in the economic sense
by initiating and monitoring the contract with researchers, and in the substantive sense by articulating demands and seeing that these are
adequately elaborated in research proposals as
well as by participating in collaborative research.
Often, users cannot enforce specific behavior and
act merely as a reference (van der Meulen,
2003), but here they can do so. Morris (2003:
369) has stated that, when users become more
involved in scientific decision making, “it will
be interesting to map the terms of engagement of
the agents with this new element in the science–
policy relationship”. In this regard, Braun (2003)
has indicated that functional differentiation is a
primary source of tensions. We hope to contribute to the refinement of principal–agent theory,
which often deals with bilateral or trilateral relationships (see Braun, 1993), with empirical insights into the “web of cross-cutting ties between
multiple principals and multiple agents” (Shove,
2003: 381).
• The intermediary shifts from being a funding
allocating body between government and researchers towards being a boundary organization
that mediates at several boundaries, i.e. between
varying constellations of users, researchers, and
government, hence addressing both the economic
dimension (i.e. accountabilities) and the substantive dimension (i.e. bridging the different worlds
of those involved in the network and their constituencies and creating mutual understanding and
co-production). With regard of this shift of the research council towards a multiple goal boundary
organization, the most important question regarding
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
boundary organizations is whether they work, and
this calls for more evaluative research
(Waterton, 2005; McNie, 2007). As Slipersæter
et al. (2007: 414) have argued regarding the
principal–agent approach, this “captures essential
features of how councils work, but might be in
danger of not capturing adequately the councils’
complex embeddedness in the scientific and
political system, or the factors affecting the responsiveness of councils.”
Research methods
This paper draws on qualitative methods of data collection. To gather insights about the relationship of
the different actors directly involved at the different
Funding body – Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature, and Food
Quality:
Three directorates involved
(agriculture, trade and industry,
knowledge)
Knowledge committee
forwards advice on
proposal quality and
consistency with program
and budget
Knowledge committee
Consists:
farmer representatives
industry representatives
research representatives
ministry representatives
Ministry determines broad themes for
each PWG and budget for each theme
(ex-ante)
Ministry ultimately approves prioritized
proposals (ex-post)
The different PWGs are managed by a
general knowledge manager and a cluster
manager (for the theme-coordinators)
PWG forwards prioritized
proposals
PWG
Ministry
representatives#
Farmer
constituency
Farmers’
representatives*
Industry
constituency
Research
theme
coordinators#
Knowledge
managers
Supply, processing
and trade
industries
representatives*
Other policy
makers
Consultants#
Researchers
Other
consultants
(within or
outside firm)
Advocacy organizations*
Constituencies
are consulted
for research
queries and
receive results
of ongoing
projects
Civil society
PWG assesses
proposals and
monitors research
progress
Bio-knowledge
portal/
information
broker
Research results and other useful information
Farmers and industry constitute research guidance committees
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Bioconnect network. * with decision-making authority; # without decision-making
authority (i.e. advisory role)
Science and Public Policy April 2008
187
Delegation in research funding
decision-making levels of Bioconnect, 23 actors involved in different networks (so-called product
workgroups (PWGs) see Figure 1) were interviewed
using semi-structured interviews. These 23 actors
consisted of four farmers, four theme coordinators,
three consultants, four industry representatives, two
advocacy organizations’ representatives, two ministry representatives, and four staff from the Bioconnect organization (three knowledge managers and a
general manager). Three PWGs (out of eight) were
studied. The interviews were fully tape-recorded and
fully transcribed to permit detailed coding (Strauss
and Corbin, 1998; Emans, 2002). To gather insights
about the course of affairs at the intermediary level
of the Knowledge Committee (KC) and the level of
the financier (the Organic Agriculture Cluster Management Board at the Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature, and Food Quality), observation took place
during their meetings. Observations also took place
at two PWG meetings, as well as at a meeting of the
Bioconnect facilitators (i.e. knowledge managers in
Bioconnect terminology) and the representatives/cluster managers of the researchers (theme coordinators in Bioconnect terminology). In addition,
several documents, such as meeting minutes, policy
documents, and internal evaluations were analyzed.
Thus, triangulation of the data ensured its validity
(Yin, 2003). A detailed presentation of the results
can be found in Klerkx and Leeuwis (2007).
Results
Bioconnect structure
The PWG consists of representatives of users of
research (farmers and supply and processing companies in the agri-food chain, as well as civic advocacy
organizations representing consumer interests), who
are brought together with representatives of researchers, consultants and policy makers into the
policy arenas in which research planning negotiation
takes places. These arenas are organized according
to the different agricultural sub-sectors (dairy production, glasshouse horticulture etc.). The PWG also
monitors research progress. Prior to the establishment of Bioconnect, PWGs were often informally
involved in informing researchers about their needs,
articulating demand for research, and consulting researchers during research, but this has now become
institutionalized through Bioconnect.
Within themes established by government, each
earmarked with a certain budget, the PWGs can decide
which particular topics they want researched. The KC
as an intermediary between the PWG and government
checks compliance with these budgets and the broader
goals of government. As Figure 1 shows, because of
the involvement of large actor groups (among users
and researchers), there are several levels of delegation.
The user groups’ representatives are expected to propose topics based on a broadly shared demand from
188
their constituencies. Actors from these constituencies also play a role on research guidance committees. The task of the PWG theme coordinators is to
feed the researchers within their institutes with information from the PWG to guide proposal development and ensure that proposals correspond with
guidelines set by the financier, i.e. government.
Bioconnect does not have a competitive grant system. Funds are assigned to two research institutes
active in organic agricultural research, Wageningen
University and Research Centre (WUR) and the
Louis Bolk Institute (LBI), but research is contracted
on the basis of selected proposals. This implies that,
in terms of principal–agent theory, the problem of
adverse selection is principally about decisionmaking and priority-setting problems rather than
about the problem of selecting the best scientists.
Proposals are not selected through pure scientific
assessment by peer review, but rather by user and
funding body (i.e. government) review.
As a multiple goal boundary organization, Bioconnect mediates at several interfaces. In its research
council function, Bioconnect is involved as a facilitator in research planning, funding, and monitoring
(i.e. a research council function) but also has a role
as a broader boundary organization, guiding applied
collaborative research to support farmer innovation
and acting as an information portal or information
broker between research contractors and users to
stimulate wider dissemination and uptake of research results (through its Bio-knowledge unit) (see
Figure 1). This paper focuses principally on the research council function. The ‘face’ of Bioconnect
within the PWG is the so-called knowledge manager
who fulfills the role of facilitator, streamlines the
flows of information coming from the different system components and mediates between the different
actor groups who are involved. These knowledge
managers embody the Bioconnect organization,
which manages the Bioconnect network.
Tensions in the different arenas
of research governance
We now consider the tensions that emerged at the
different levels within Bioconnect in the light of
principal–agent relationships. As Bioconnect governs the whole research planning and execution
process, the tensions observed will be related to the
policy arena (goal conflicts), the selection arena (adverse selection/information asymmetry tensions),
and the control arena (moral hazard/monitoring tensions), and reported from the perspective of the different actor groups involved. Often principal–agent
relationships are simplified for analytical purposes,
whereas in reality there are many layers or webs of
principals and agents, and an individual may sometimes act as a principal and at other times as an
agent. Because Bioconnect was designed to have a
network structure, there are multiple principal–agent
relationships (see Figure 2).
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
Whereas the former chain is principally about setting
macro (government) goals and priorities and checking
compliance with these as well as assuring accountability for public expenditure (i.e. the economic
dimension of research planning and monitoring), the
other chain is mostly about setting the micro (user)
goals and priorities and checking that the research
yields results that suit users’ needs (i.e. the substantive dimension of research planning and monitoring). This implies that there is a nested system of
intermediaries: the KC is an intermediary between
the government ministry and the different PWGs,
user representatives are intermediaries between their
constituencies and their PWG, and the theme coordinator is an intermediary between the PWG and the
researchers. In the PWG, the knowledge manager is
the intermediary between the different actors, not
only between those who have been given decisionmaking authority (users) and the executors of research (theme coordinator), but also between those
that have an advisory role (ministry representatives,
consultants).
As Bioconnect governs the whole
research planning and execution
process, the tensions observed will be
related to the policy arena (goal
conflicts), the selection arena (adverse
selection/information asymmetry
tensions), and the control arena (moral
hazard/monitoring tensions)
As Figure 2 shows, in a formal sense there appear
to be two ‘chains of delegation’ (Shove, 2003), with
different rationales: one chain runs from government
down to the PWG and ultimately to the researchers,
and the other runs from the user group constituencies to their representatives to the researchers.
Ministry
P
A
Delegation chain with a
focus on the economic
dimension (i.e.
accountability and
compliance with policy
goals)
Knowledge
committee
P
A
PWG
Farmers’
representatives
Farmer
constituency
P
A
P
A
P
Industry
constituency
Supply, processing
and trade industries
representatives
Knowledge
managers
Research
theme
coordinators
Researchers
P
A
A
P
Advocacy
organizations
Civil society
P
A
P
A
P
Delegation chain
with a focus on the
substantive
dimension (i.e.
demand
articulation and
collaborative
research)
Figure 2. Principal–agent relationships in the Bioconnect network. Only actors who have enforcement rights as principals are
shown in this figure, P = principal, A = agent
Science and Public Policy April 2008
189
Delegation in research funding
What is not shown in Figure 2, but is essential
to the Bioconnect network, is that there is a lot of
horizontal information exchange at the level of the
PWG between all the actors mentioned in Figure 1
(and also between other components in the Bioconnect network), which cannot easily be captured in
terms of principal–agent relationships (cf. Shove,
2003) as there is no formal delegatory relationship.
Examples of this are the consultant and ministry representatives, who participate in discussions in the
PWG and contribute with their insights, but have no
decision-making authority. Ministry representatives
act as informal informants on relevant policy issues,
and consultants have a traditional role as ‘boundary
spanners’ between farmers and research (see Cash,
2001) and can give insights from practice. They
cannot, however, submit proposals directly. When
an advisory component needs to be integrated within
a research project, consultants have to be subcontracted by a research contractor.
Tensions in the policy arena
Typical tensions in the policy arena relate to goal
conflicts (Gulbrandsen, 2005). Because the delegation of authority in research funding to networks
leads to several nested principal–agent relationships,
in addition to goal conflicts between principals and
agents in the classical sense, i.e. between those that
want to have research executed (in this case government and users) and researchers, goal conflicts
also emerge between the ‘master principal’ (i.e. government as the ultimate financier) and the ‘delegated
principal’ (i.e. the users in the PWG, in that they are
responsible for articulating substantive demands
towards researchers, but the PWG as a whole is an
agent vis-à-vis government). A conflict that manifested itself between the master principal (government) and the delegated principal (users) was that
whereas farmers, as the most dominant user group,
prefer research on technical issues that will yield
solutions to farm-level problems in the short term,
government wants research aimed at the long term
which focuses on issues that affect the broader
performance of the organic agri-food chain. Farmers
Farmers, as the most dominant user
group, prefer research on technical
issues that will yield solutions to farmlevel problems in the short term,
government wants research aimed at
the long term which focuses on issues
that affect the broader performance of
the organic agri-food chain
190
sometimes even see this focus on the broader
agri-food chain as a threat, because industry queries
‘compete’ with farmer queries. Another more
general tension that could be observed and that transcends the different arenas is that government in its
role of master principal is not necessarily a monolithic entity that acts unequivocally as a unified principal. In the case of Bioconnect, the different
directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature,
and Food Quality were involved in an ongoing negotiation about who should contribute to which budget,
and this caused confusion in the Bioconnect network
right down to the PWG level. Furthermore, some
people working at the ministry were not very convinced about the desirability of the new way of
setting the research agenda, which grants more
power to the user.
There are also goal conflicts amongst the different
delegated principals in the PWG. As noted earlier,
farmers’ preferences, with a focus on farm-level issues, are dominant. The prevalence of such a focus
on farm-level issues is also due to a lack of countervailing power on the part of the industry actors involved, whose participation has been included partly
to achieve a broader scope. However, industry actors
have indicated that they are not very interested in
participating in the PWG, because they feel their
topics are not addressed sufficiently. Furthermore,
they generally have the resources to tackle issues
themselves. As a result, they are often absent from
PWG meetings. The same holds true for some advocacy organizations, especially general consumer representatives, whereas more specialized advocacy
organizations (such as animal welfare organizations)
do try to influence the matters under consideration.
Goal conflicts may even emerge within user groups:
mitigating power inequalities between the different
user groups or even amongst individual user representatives is sometimes difficult. This results in
those with the loudest voice having their wishes realized. Sometimes this may also mean that a representative follows his or her private interest rather
than the collective interest, i.e. those of their constituencies. Regarding representation of constituencies, there are mixed views. Interview respondents
indicated that they gather queries for research
through various formal and informal channels, but
given the heterogeneity in the sector they sometimes
find it difficult to articulate a clear collective voice.
They state that the queries they pose in the PWG
meetings are driven by both collective and private
interests.
Amongst researchers (embodied by the theme coordinator) and users, goal conflicts often had to do
with the scope of the research. As researchers are
more inclined towards long-term thinking, they often
find the scope of users too short-sighted and directed
towards satisfying private interests rather than also
considering public interests (which are deemed to be
important by the master principal, the government).
At the PWG level, theme coordinators try to balance
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
the several interests by addressing the long-term
concerns.
Having the role of mediator at different levels, the
Bioconnect organization (i.e. the knowledge managers and their superiors) also perceive some tensions
at the policy arena level. One tension at the PWG
level relates to neutrality conflicts, i.e. knowledge
managers are not seen as impartial actors, but as
spokespersons for certain principals and/or agents.
Although knowledge managers indicate that they
bring policy information into the PWG from a neutral stand, this is nevertheless perceived by some
PWG members as imposing a preferred research
strategy from the point of view of government or the
knowledge managers’ employer, Biologica, which
has a long tradition as an advocacy organization for
organic agriculture. A second tension that concerns
the overall goal of the whole structure is that Bioconnect, despite being a new organization rather
than an established research council which hence
does not have to undergo an institutional change
process itself towards developing the innovation
agency function, does have to establish certain
workable and accepted procedures. This is a process
of trial-and-error and implies inducing and guiding
institutional change among other actors. Because
Bioconnect has far reaching consequences for the
resources, power, modes of working, and operational
autonomy of the actors involved, it sometimes meets
considerable skepticism and resistance.
Tensions in the selection arena
In the selection arena, adverse selection caused by
information asymmetries is a principal tension according to the literature (e.g. Braun, 2003;
Gulbrandsen, 2005). Such information asymmetry
also manifests itself in the PWG. Despite the mediation of knowledge managers and continuous adaptation of proposal formats, user representatives
(especially farmers) have difficulty grasping the
matters under consideration. The degree of abstractness needed to keep demand articulation and proposal assessment manageable (there is no time for
in-depth discussion of farmers’ problems, although
this is what farmers appreciate most) results in farmers and also industry actors not always being able to
fully understand what is actually being discussed.
Furthermore, the mixing of the economic dimension
with the substantive dimension of research planning
entails problems. In contrast to PWGs’ previously
informal nature, their integration into Bioconnect
has caused a shift to formal written reporting, as this
is a requirement of the financier (i.e. the master
principal, the government). As a result, there is a
considerable amount of reading required, for which
most farmers and industry actors have neither the
time nor the motivation. The consequence is that the
principals in the PWG (i.e. the user group) are often
less informed than the agents (researchers represented by the theme coordinator).
Science and Public Policy April 2008
To resolve this information asymmetry, theme coordinators adopt the role of ‘pilots in the information
sea’, which, besides creating order, is also perceived
by some as steering towards satisfying the researchers’ interests. At the same time, besides having to
manage the content of proposals, theme coordinators
also have to manage the embedding of projects
within current and future research programs (i.e.
they act as ‘aggregation machines’, see Shove,
2003), a fact that is often overlooked by other PWG
members. This includes balancing the predilection of
PWG user members for short, quick yielding, and
cheap projects (as PWG members often regard the
budget as if it were their own money) with requirements for achieving scientific rigor. As regards this
coordinating role of theme coordinators, one tension
appears to be that there is function ambiguity between the knowledge manager and the theme coordinator in their role as intermediaries. While
knowledge managers are supposed to facilitate discussion in the PWG by structuring the discussion,
mitigating power inequalities and dominant behavior
of individual members, bridging the different worlds
of the actors involved, and a gatekeeping role introducing relevant external knowledge, these roles are
now often fulfilled by the theme coordinators. This
leaves knowledge managers performing a mere secretarial role, especially when they lack detailed
knowledge of the technical subject under discussion.
Hence they cannot fulfill their tasks as mediators of
the substantive dimension in research planning that
well. Observation revealed that coordinators and
managers continually discussed the scope of their
tasks and coordinated their actions, and that they
would have to continue doing so in the future.
Another tension that also has to do to some degree
with function ambiguity is the role of the KC as an
advisory committee that checks the compliance of
prioritized research proposals with long-term programs and budgetary requirements. As PWG members have to draw up and prioritize proposals within
a given thematic framework and assigned budget,
they do not understand the function of this intermediary layer, and even see it as patronizing. This tension is also felt in a more general way. Many PWG
members (both users and theme coordinators) neither know the exact position and mandate of the
PWG in the broader Bioconnect network, nor do
they understand the overall Bioconnect structure.
As regards the assignment of projects to different
research contractors, although there is no competitive grant system, the current contractual system
has over the years developed a proportional assignment of funds to both research contractors,
WUR and LBI. This entails the risk of ‘forced adverse selection’: because LBI has a more limited
budget assignment, sometimes WUR is awarded the
project although LBI may have more expertise
(WUR then sometimes subcontracts LBI, though).
Theme coordinators perceive also that there is a lot
of informal political negotiation outside the PWGs
191
Delegation in research funding
at different levels (at PWG, KC, and ministry level)
that affects decision making on project formulation
and funding.
Tensions in the control arena
As moral hazard is a typical problem in the control
arena (Gulbrandsen, 2005), monitoring systems must
be put in place. A principal tension appears to be
that the different principals involved in Bioconnect
(i.e. the master principal (government), and its delegated principal (users)) have different monitoring
requirements that are difficult to reconcile because
they serve different purposes. Users want to be
clearly informed about the practical implications of
intermediate research results (monitoring for informative purposes), whereas government needs to
have detailed information on research setup and progress in terms of compliance with time, budget, and
output requirements. Policy makers have delegated
decision-making authority and monitoring rights to
the PWG, but nevertheless have to remain accountable to parliament because public funds are involved, hence accountability purposes prevail.
Theme coordinators have even noted an intensification of monitoring efforts. They state that on the one
hand government has delegated authority to users,
but on the other hand it tries to regain control by
intensifying monitoring through detailed reporting
formats, with a resulting increase in bureaucracy and
paperwork. Similar to the assessment of proposals,
users often do not have the time, motivation, and/or
skills to properly assess research progress reports,
despite reporting formats being adapted to users’
needs.
Related to this, a tension at a more practical level
that transcends the different arenas is that, because
users are involved in a semi-professional way, they
want to be remunerated adequately for their time,
which may be considerable. These demands are particularly expressed at the PWG level, where participation offers fewer direct tangible benefits than for
those users from the broader constituency that participate in research project guidance committees. In
this regard it is an interesting paradox that farmers
and industry actors especially complain about the
formalization of the PWG and the increasing amount
of information they need to assess, but that at the
same time this increases their insights into the process of research agenda setting and execution, which
results in a call for even more information, which in
turn calls for more information processing capacities
(in terms of competencies and time).
As regards moral hazard, with regard to the principal–agent relationship that exists between theme
coordinators and their researchers, the theme coordinators note that not all the researchers they manage
complement Bioconnect’s focus on collaborative
research. However, they also observe that a process
of learning-by-doing has taken place with regard to
interacting and cooperating with users.
192
Conclusions
We will first discuss some practical implications of
our findings for delegating authority in research
funding to networks. Then we will discuss implications for the functioning of research councils as multiple goal boundary organizations. Finally, we will
offer some reflections on the potential and limitations of using principal–agent theory to analyze the
delegation of authority in research funding to
networks.
Delegation of authority in research funding to
networks requires capacity and awareness building
This paper has demonstrated a case in which government has become a ‘facilitator of self-organized
networks’ (cf. Braun, 2003) by delegating authority
in research funding to networks and supporting a
multiple goal boundary organization. This should
help resolve the paradox in research funding, because it would reduce the direct influence of the
state on funding policies, respect the independence
of scientific institutions, foster ‘vigorous’ scientific
institutions, and ensure scientists’ strong commitment to user interests. As the paper has shown, however, despite the delegation of authority in research
funding to networks being seen as a solution to several problems identified by principal–agent theory,
various goal, selection, and monitoring tensions
emerge in such a system, which are similar to those
reported with reference to similar user-controlled
systems (see Gulbrandsen, 2005).
A first issue is whether one can speak of ‘selforganized networks’ when they are convoked for an
externally induced goal, and within a pre-set operational framework. The case shows that, even when
third parties such as users can enforce specific behavior, as government determines the macro-priorities
within which users can maneuver, their mandate is
limited and this can be perceived by users as being
patronizing. Furthermore, the specific behavior the
delegated principal wants to enforce amongst the
agents (i.e. users vs. researchers) can conflict with the
desired behavior the master principal wants to enforce
(i.e. government vs. researchers). Overall, because
there is a “web of cross-cutting ties between multiple
principals and multiple agents” (Shove, 2003: 381),
there is more potential for goal conflicts. Multiple
principals and multiple agents need to negotiate an
agreed joint goal. Whereas within a bilateral relationship goal conflicts concern mainly government’s
desired trajectory vs researchers’ interests (cf. Braun,
2003), in a situation in which there are multiple
principal–agent relationships there can also be goal
conflicts between users (united in the PWG) and
government, between users and their constituencies,
between different user groups, between researchers
and the intermediary (Bioconnect organization), and
between researchers and their constituencies. For the
agents (i.e. researchers) it can cause confusion as to
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
which principal (i.e. government or users) is most
important and whose goals they should pursue.
A second issue related to this is that network
delegation may in one way reduce the direct influence of the state in funding policies, but when there
is no coherent institutional change in government so
that it becomes fully oriented towards new ways of
funding research, the functioning of the network can
be frustrated in other ways, e.g. by incoherent funding and control mechanisms. The findings of this
paper correspond with findings elsewhere (Morris,
2003; Gulbrandsen, 2005) that the involvement of
different principals that have different needs with
regard to monitoring output (i.e. for accounting, accountability, information purposes) increases bureaucratic requirements as it appears hard to
integrate the needs of all the principals within a single format.
A third issue is that, although the network delegation system can inculcate a strong commitment on
the part of scientists to users’ interest, the results
indicate the manifestation of several problems that
were also noted by Gulbrandsen (2005). Concretely,
the problems exist that: (1), poor user competencies
or little user involvement can result in adverse selection due to information asymmetries; (2), it is hard
to distill a single unequivocal user interest and forward a clear demand (as also noted by Shove and
Rip, 2000, and Davenport et al., 2003, there is no
such thing as ‘generic users’); (3), there is a risk that
either the user’s voice is molded too much by the
researcher, giving rise to moral hazard when researchers in their role of guides through the wealth
of information are inclined towards satisfying their
self-interest by steering the discussion in a favorable
direction; or (4), conversely, the researcher’s voice
is denied or distrusted, with the resultant risks for
scientific rigor. Furthermore, although researchers
that are active in the negotiation arenas within such a
system may be very committed to user interests, this
does not mean that their constituencies (i.e. the researchers they manage or represent) act in the same
way and effectively embed user interests in their
research. However, the results suggest that introducing delegation of authority in research funding to
networks can help induce institutional change towards context-sensitive ways of working, because
interaction of researchers with users is built into the
system and is a prerequisite for obtaining funding.
Overall, the optimization of network delegation
systems requires capacity building amongst the actors involved to be able to effectively operate in the
various arenas (e.g. to reduce the information
asymmetries). The fact that theme coordinators
rather than the knowledge managers act as intermediaries in the PWG (in the role of boundary spanners
between researchers and the user group) suggests
that facilitators, besides having the necessary process skills, should also have sufficient technical
knowledge, and that users should be sufficiently
trained and empowered to act in the various arenas
Science and Public Policy April 2008
as Jacob (2005) has also noted.8 Furthermore, it requires the synchronization of the different expectations of different actor groups involved in the
network with regard to the goals at macro-level
(government) and at micro-level (users) and related
monitoring output (i.e. pay sufficient attention to
mutually understandable boundary objects). It also
calls for awareness building amongst user groups in
the PWG about the private investments that network
participants have to make and the collective benefits
they yield. Furthermore, there should be broad recognition amongst government bodies that government may delegate authority in research funding to a
network and a corresponding boundary organization,
but that the government is not external to the network but is an essential part of it.
The balancing act of the boundary organization as a
‘spider in the web of cross-cutting ties’
As regards the formal intermediary (the Bioconnect
organization), in its capacity as a multiple goal
boundary organization, it is present in all ambits of
the research planning (i.e. goal setting, prioritization,
and fund allocation) as well as in the execution
process and the dissemination of research results.
Hence, it has a pivotal position. This corresponds
with the observation by van der Meulen (2003) that
an intermediary can become more autonomous when
third parties such as users are involved. At the same
time it constantly has to justify and defend that position since it has to balance the different interests,
and gain the trust, of the stakeholders for whom it
mediates, and on whom it depends for its resources
in terms of social capital and operating funds (see
also van der Meulen et al., 2005). Others have noted
that boundary organizations need to satisfy both scientific and political principles and draw stability
from making themselves accountable and responsive
to external authorities (Guston, 2000; Durant, 2006).
Bioconnect as a multiple goal boundary organization
has to deal simultaneously with both the economic
and the substantive dimension in research planning
and monitoring, and deals with several authorities
(government, different user groups, researchers)
with their own interests and hence has several accountabilities, thus making its work very complex.
As van der Meulen (2003) has indicated, relationships of intermediaries with the principals (i.e.
government as financier), agents (i.e. researchers),
and third parties (i.e. users as delegated principals)
are not independent but interacting. Following
Shove (2003), who talks about programs as ‘aggregation machines,’ the PWG can also be seen as such
an aggregation machine, in which the knowledge
managers have a dual role of principal towards researchers and agent towards users and hence need to
be ‘schizophrenic’. On another level, knowledge
managers as agents for the whole PWG need to represent the PWG’s interest towards the KC. Thus,
tautologically speaking, knowledge managers have
193
Delegation in research funding
to be ‘multiple schizophrenics’. Furthermore, as the
analysis has shown and analogous to the earlier
observations by Shove (2003) in the context of
research programs, the ‘macro-intermediary’, Bioconnect, is in fact a collection of several formal and
informal ‘micro-intermediaries’. The broader
boundary organization hence has to deal with different foci of formal micro-intermediaries within the
broader organization (such as the different knowledge managers and the KC), and has to position itself vis-à-vis other actors in the network who
‘informally’ fulfill roles as intermediaries. For example, the knowledge managers have to compete
with theme coordinators in fulfilling an intermediary
role between users and researchers, and besides
formal interaction in the PWG, ‘horizontal manoeuvrings’ (in the words of Shove, 2003) take place
amongst several actors and these co-shape research
proposals.
Given the foregoing, the structural position and
stability of such a multiple goal boundary organization that acts at several interfaces seem to depend on
the degree to which it succeeds in promoting institutional learning, in providing clarity with regard to
the roles and positions of the several actors involved,
and in coming to sufficient goal convergence.
Implications for principal–agent theory as an
analytical tool
As the results demonstrate, when delegation of
authority in research funding to networks takes place
and users are given enforcement rights, principal–
agent configurations become indeed a “web of crosscutting ties between multiple principals and multiple
agents” (cf. Shove, 2003: 381), as well as between
multiple intermediaries (being both agents and principals at the same time). Because principal–agent
theory focuses mainly on bilateral relationships (or
trilateral relationship when an intermediary is
involved between principal and agent), and has a
tendency to extract science policy relationships from
its context, it is less suitable for analyzing the complex multilateral relationships between principals
and agents, as Shove (2003) and Morris (2003) have
argued. Nonetheless, principal–agent theory does
offer analytical tools to dissect such multilateral relationships and gain insight into the dynamics in the
different arenas (policy, selection, and control) looking at the principal problems identified by principal–
agent theory in each arena (i.e. problems of responsiveness, adverse selection, moral hazard, and decision-making and priority-setting problems).
However, the analysis confirms the earlier findings of Shove (2003): similar to research programs,
multi-stakeholder networks to which decisionmaking authority in research funding has been
attributed are aggregation machines, with a mutual
framing of priorities and no clear-cut division
between principal and agent. The economic focus of
principal–agent theory on transactions, with its
194
tendency to abstract problems from context to classify them as transaction costs and market failures,
and to think in term of aggregated agents and principals who have a formal delegatory relationship,
appears to be inadequate to fully capture the process
of articulation of substantive demands and the process of co-production. Following the arguments of
Shove (2003), this is because the dynamic interplay
between the several actors in a network may give
rise to new combinations and configurations, such as
the emergence of many actors with the ‘schizophrenic’ properties of intermediaries, and the mixing
of formally attributed roles and personal preferences.
In a network approach with several horizontal
relationships and informal contacts, several of the
complicating factors for using principal–agent theory as identified by Morris (2003), such as the coexistence of other kinds of relationships (such as
trust), multiple principals, the mitigating role of
several intermediary bodies, and the gap between
principals’ formal requirements and workable procedures in practice, appear to be present.
These complications in using principal–agent theory as an analytical tool to capture both the economic and substantive dimensions in delegation of
authority in research funding to networks reinforce
the plea of several authors to look more broadly at
institutional factors that influence research planning
and monitoring (cf. Hall et al., 2001; Morris, 2003),
to complement the principal–agent approach with
organization or systems theory (cf. Slipersæter et al.,
2007), and to seek further integration with the more
substantively oriented focus on co-production of
knowledge embodied in theories on boundary work
and boundary organizations (Jacob, 2005; Durant,
2006; McNie, 2007). Furthermore, following observations by Shove (2003), supplementing the predominantly macro-structural analysis of principal–
agent theory with a more micro-level process-based
analysis9 could provide important insights into how
network-based research planning structures affect
longer-term developments in research agendas.
Notes
1. Although not explicitly mentioned by Gulbrandsen (2005), the
decision-making and priority-setting problem would in our view
fit in the selection arena.
2. Whereas van der Meulen (2003) refers to users as ‘third parties’, Braun and Guston (2003) refer to users as ‘fourth parties’. Given that in the bilateral view on delegation government
as principal, researchers as agents, and the research council
as intermediary can be considered as first, second, and third
parties, the latter designation appears to be more appropriate
in this context.
3. The idea of delegation to networks has been inspired by systems of innovation literature (e.g. Lundvall, 1992; Nelson,
1993), and there is a growing literature on research governance that analyzes it from an ‘innovation systems’ perspective
(Jacob, 2005; Hall et al., 2006). This literature emphasizes the
roles multiple actors play in innovation and the importance of
the institutional context for the cooperation between several
actors (Hall et al., 2001; Ekboir, 2003); this implies that “research is now seen as one of the many ‘stakeholders’ within a
‘chain-link’ or ‘network’ innovation system” (Sumberg, 2005: 4).
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Delegation in research funding
4. Braun (2003: 309) formulates this as follows: “A basic paradox
in funding policy is that policymakers want to guarantee maximum welfare benefits without violating the independence of
scientists and their organisations.”.
5. Hence the metaphor ‘schizophrenic’ is often applied to
intermediaries (van der Meulen and Rip, 1998; Shove, 2003).
6. As Sarewitz and Pielke (2007: 7) have argued, a strict delineation in demand and supply categories cannot be understood
as “conceptually discrete or fully coherent” but, as these authors continue, “while notions of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ may
embody considerable complexity, they also represent something real and recognizable: on the one hand, people conducting research that has been justified in terms of particular
societal outcomes, and on the other, people making decisions
aimed at contributing to those outcomes”.
7. However, as work from Braun (1993) and Durant (2006) has
indicated, in practice, these economic and substantive dimensions in delegation are heavily linked.
8. Jacob (2005) comments on a course for public sector managers. Likewise, at the end of the fieldwork period for this paper,
the Bioconnect organization launched a course targeted at
PWG members.
9. See Ekboir (2003), Caron-Flinterman et al. (2006), and Klerkx
and Leeuwis (2008) for such system- and process-oriented
analyses.
References
Braun, D 1993. Who governs intermediary agencies? Principal–
agent relations in research policy-making. Journal of Public
Policy, 13(2), 135–162.
Braun, D 1998. The role of funding agencies in the cognitive
development of science. Research Policy, 27(8), 807–821.
Braun, D 2003. Lasting tensions in research policy-making – a delegation problem. Science and Public Policy, 30(5), 309–321.
Braun, D and D H Guston 2003. Principal–agent theory and research policy: an introduction. Science and Public Policy,
30(5), 302–308.
Caron-Flinterman, J F, J E W Broerse, J Teerling, M L Y van Alst,
S Klaasen, L E Swart and J F G Bunders 2006. Stakeholder
participation in health research agenda setting: the case of
asthma and COPD research in the Netherlands. Science and
Public Policy, 33(4), 291–304.
Cash, D W 2001. ‘In order to aid in diffusing useful and practical
information’: agricultural extension and boundary organizations. Science, Technology and Human Values, 26(4), 431–453.
Cash, D W, W C Clark, F Alcock, N M Dickson, N Eckley, D H
Guston et al., 2003. Science and technology for sustainable
development special feature: knowledge systems for sustainable development. PNAS, 100(14), 8086–8091.
Caswill, C 2003. Principals, agents and contracts. Science and
Public Policy, 30(5), 337–346.
Dalrymple, D G 2006. Setting the agenda for science and
technology in the public sector: the case of international agricultural research. Science and Public Policy, 33(4), 277–290.
Davenport, S, S Leitch and A Rip 2003. The user in research
funding negotiation processes. Science and Public Policy,
30(4), 239–250.
Durant, D 2006. Managing expertise: performers, principals, and
problems in Canadian nuclear waste management. Science
and Public Policy, 33(3), 191–204.
Ekboir, J M 2003. Research and technology policies in innovation
systems: zero tillage in Brazil. Research Policy, 32(4),
573–586.
Emans, B 2002. Interviewen: theorie, techniek en training.
Groningen, The Netherlands: Stenfert Kroese.
Etzkowitz, H and L Leydesdorff 2000. The dynamics of innovation: from national systems and ‘mode 2’ to a triple helix of
university–industry–government relations. Research Policy,
29(2), 109–123.
Fernández-Carro, R 2007. A principal–agent model of public research with a retrospective payoff rule. Science and Public
Policy¸ 34(5), 317–328.
Funtowicz, S O and J R Ravetz 1993. Science for the post-normal
age. Futures, 25(7), 735–755.
Gibbons, M, C Limoges and H Nowotny 1994. New Production of
Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London, UK: Sage.
Science and Public Policy April 2008
Gulbrandsen, M 2005. Tensions in the science council–research
community relationship. Science and Public Policy, 32(3),
199–209.
Guston, D H 1996. Principal–agent theory and the structure of
science policy. Science and Public Policy, 23(4), 229–240.
Guston, D H 1999. Stabilizing the boundary between US politics and
science: the role of the office of technology transfer as a boundary organization. Social Studies of Science, 29(1), 87–111.
Guston, D 2000. Between Politics and Science: Assuring the
Integrity and Productivity of Research. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, A, G Bockett, S Taylor, M V K Sivamohan and N Clark 2001.
Why research partnerships really matter: innovation theory, institutional arrangements and implications for developing new
technology for the poor. World Development, 29(5), 783–797.
Hall, A, W Janssen, E Pehu and R Rajalahti 2006. Enhancing
Agricultural Innovation: How to Go Beyond the Strengthening
of Research Systems. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hellström, T and M Jacob 2003. Boundary organisations in
science: from discourse to construction. Science and Public
Policy, 30(4), 235–238.
Holt, D 1998. Integrating public and private R&D. In Privatization
of Information and Agricultural Industrialization, S A Wolf ed.,
pp. 51–71. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Huffman, W E and R E Just 2000. Setting efficient incentives for
agricultural research: lessons from principal-agent theory.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(4), 828–841.
Jacob, M 2005. Boundary work in contemporary science policy: a
review. Prometheus, 23(2), 195–207.
Klerkx, L and C Leeuwis 2007. Professionalisering van participatie in kennisontwikkeling en -verspreiding. Ervaringen met het
kennisnetwerk Biologische Landbouw (Bioconnect). Wageningen: Wageningen University, Communication and Innovation
Studies.
Klerkx, L and C Leeuwis 2008. Institutionalizing end-user demand
steering in agricultural R&D: farmer levy funding of R&D in The
Netherlands. Research Policy, 37(3), 460–472.
Lacy, W B 1996. Research, extension, and user partnerships:
models for collaboration and strategies for change. Agriculture
and Human Values, 13, 33–41.
Levidow, L, V Sogaard and S Carr 2002. Agricultural public-sector
research establishments in Western Europe: research priorities in conflict. Science and Public Policy, 29(4), 287–295.
Lundvall, B A 1992. National Systems of Innovation. Towards a
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London, UK:
Pinter.
McNie, E C 2007. Reconciling the supply of scientific information
with user demands: an analysis of the problem and review of
the literature. Environmental Science and Policy, 10(1), 17–38.
Middendorf, G and L Busch 1997. Inquiry for the public good:
democratic participation in agricultural research. Agriculture
and Human Values, 14, 45–57.
Morris, N 2003. Academic researchers as agents of science
policy. Science and Public Policy, 30(5), 359–370.
Morris, N and A Rip 2006. Scientists’ coping strategies in an
evolving research system: the case of life scientists in the UK.
Science and Public Policy 33(4), 253–263.
Nelson, R R 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative
Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
Raman, S 2005. Institutional perspectives on science–policy
boundaries. Science and Public Policy, 32(6), 418–422.
Rod, M R M and S J Paliwoda 2003. Multi-sector collaboration: a
stakeholder perspective on a government, industry and university collaborative venture. Science and Public Policy, 30(4),
273–284.
Sarewitz, D and J R A Pielke 2007. The neglected heart of science policy: reconciling supply of and demand for science.
Environmental Science and Policy, 10(1), 5–16.
Shove, E 2003. Principals, agents and research programmes.
Science and Public Policy 30(5), 371–381.
Shove, E and A Rip 2000. Users and unicorns: a discussion of
mythical beasts in interactive science. Science and Public Policy, 27(3), 175–182.
Slipersæter, S, B Lepori and M Dinges 2007. Between policy and
science: research councils' responsiveness in Austria, Norway
and Switzerland. Science and Public Policy 34(6), 401–415.
Sperling, L and J Ashby 2001. Participation in agricultural
research planning. In Planning Agricultural Research:
A Sourcebook, G Gijsbers, W Janssen, H Hambly Odame
and G Meijerink eds., pp. 171–182. Wallingford, UK: CABI
Publishing.
195
Delegation in research funding
Stewart, J 1995. Models of priority-setting for public sector
research. Research Policy, 24(1), 115–126.
Strauss, A and C Corbin 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research.
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sumberg, J 2005. Systems of innovation theory and the changing
architecture of agricultural research in Africa. Food Policy,
30(1), 21–41.
van der Meulen, B 1998. Science policies as principal-agent
games. Institutionalization and path dependency in the relation
between government and science. Research Policy, 27(4),
397–414.
196
van der Meulen, B 2003. New roles and strategies of a science
council: intermediation of the principal–agent relationship. Science and Public Policy, 30(5), 323–336.
van der Meulen, B, M Nedeva and D Braun 2005. Intermediaries
organisation and processes: theory and research issues. Position paper for the PRIME Workshop, 6–7 October 2005,
Enschede, The Netherlands.
Waterton, C 2005. Scientists’ conceptions of the boundaries between their own research and policy. Science and Public Policy,
32(6), 435–444.
Yin, R K 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Science and Public Policy April 2008