SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
• RUNAWAY URBANISATION IN TUNIS: RETHINKING
THE TERRITORIAL BOX OF THE METROPOLIS
Max Ajl
• MEDITERRANEAN CITIES AND VERTICAL FARMING:
FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE LOCAL FOOD PRODUCTION
AND BUILDING NEIGHBOURHOOD ESPRIT DE CORPS
Joel L. Cuello
• INFORMAL SETTLEMENT DWELLERS IN ALGERIA:
HOW LOCAL INITIATIVES AND PRACTICES
CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVING THEIR LIVING
CONDITIONS
Farida Naceur and Fatiha Belmessous
• ALEXANDRIA: DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
OF A COASTAL SECOND CITY
Azza Sirry
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RUNAWAY URBANISATION IN TUNIS: RETHINKING THE
TERRITORIAL BOX OF THE METROPOLIS
Max Ajl
Cornell University
1. Introduction
By now, the notion of a “Planet of Slums”, in urbanist Mike Davis’s
alluring apothegm, has become a way for many to see the urban
question in the Global South (Davis, 2007). This pathology has not
spared Tunis, Tunisia’s capital and biggest metropolis. Its symptoms are
visible in the city’s physiology: congestion, pollution, metastatic sprawl.
These problems overlap and make each other worse in a whirl of socioecological duress. As sprawl seeps into agricultural land, people need
to travel further and further to get to work. Since mass transit has been
difficult to erect in immiserated, capital-strapped, and socially hollowedout Tunisia, everyone drives or uses jerry-rigged collective taxi services,
previously the province of the countryside, where they were called Taxi
Rifi – rural taxis. Whether higher-density collective taxis or individual taxis
for the middle class, more cars means more and more traffic. Of course,
if the poorer portions of the population had private cars, the problem
would be even worse. In turn, Tunis emits more and more carbon dioxide
and non-greenhouse-gas pollutants, damaging air quality and slowly
pushing the country up the ladder of greenhouse gas emitters. These
workaday problems of non-functional cities have been paired with
endemic and unsolvable unemployment, sectoral and general strikes
and mass protests that paralyse roadways, mines and cities, and which
occasionally produce an unrest so combustible as to set off immolations
– such as the one which led to the tragic death of Mohamed Bouazizi in
the interior city of Sidi Bouzid, the spark of the Arab Spring.
Much contemporary planning literature, including that on slums,
considers cities boxes within which governance takes place. More
heterodox formulations cast the city as a unit of a multi-scalar polity –
both subject and object of multi-scalar governance processes. Nearly
all scholarly works posit urban development as a question of trade-offs:
development damages the “natural” exterior but reduced development
damages the increasingly naturalised “social” urban interior. A subset of
this accepts, in the dubious words of geographer David Harvey (2012),
“the traditional peasantry was disappearing and that the rural was
being urbanized,” with the result that “the mass of humanity is thus
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It is no longer the
countryside which
young people consider
unliveable amidst
the allure of the city.
It is Tunis itself they
considerable unliveable
amidst the allure of
the Global North
metropolis.
increasingly being absorbed within the ferments and cross-currents of
urbanized life”. In turn, for Harvey, the political subject of social change
and the site of struggle is the “right to the city,” with the rest of the
world a kind of antediluvian remnant. I question the degree to which
such an ad hoc social mapping, structural diagramming for planning, or
positing of political subjectivity speaks to the social struggles of today
and the planning regimes of tomorrow. This is not to say that cities
are not sites that merit both planning-level and political engagement.
Rather, I suggest that we examine the city as the outcome of the history
of development (Ajl, 2014). Thus, we ought to regard Tunis as it is not
as teleology, but as the outcome of choice and struggle – the outcome
of history, not the object of timeless social-scientific modelling. By
understanding choices made and unmade, we might better understand
the choices before Tunisian policymakers today, understand which
choices are not on the agenda, why they are not there, and in turn push
some alternative, affordable, feasible, and real Utopias for arresting the
cascade of crisis that is Tunis today.
2. History
Tunis has grown rapidly in at least two stages. The first ran from
1936–1956, as the effects of French agricultural colonial-capitalism
dramatically transformed the rural world (El Annabi, 1975). On the
coast, usury and debt, price manipulation and warehousing were
the socio-financial alchemy which converted olive growers into the
victims of debt peonage, leading to rural social crisis and, subsequently,
massive migration to the cities – in fact, to slums, and the birth of the
bidonvilles, the term used in Tunis for the temporary knots of housing
in urban semi-peripheries. The northern cereal belt, which confronted
intense mechanisation and drastically reduced labour needs on the
colonial wheat plantations, haemorrhaged population (Kassab, 1979).
Some went to tenuous hillside farming, but more went to Tunis, as
it kept shooting out pseudopods of growth from the old urban core
centred around the Medina. Such extensions and even the core city
itself – alongside slightly wealthier Lafayette – soon brimmed with
deracinated peasants. Those people were less drawn by the allure of the
city and more fled a countryside without a place for them. In the former,
there was no question of them taking up posts in productive circuits:
they were, instead, relegated to the tertiary circuit.
Post-colonial planning accelerated rather than arrested this process. This
occurred in two phases, but with the same mindset animating both:
that agriculture could soak up some quantity of the unemployed, but
labour-light, machine- and capital-intense modes of production ought to
prevail in the cities, in the burgeoning network of factories which urbanbased planners identified as inseparable from if not equivalent to that
eternal eidolon in the eyes of city-based social managers, modernity.
In the first stage, from 1961–1969, capital- and machinery-intensive coops
burst across the north, gathering together peasants on their small scraps
of land and around state-owned nodes (Amrani, 1979; Makhlouf, 1968).
Because the state opted for capital-intensive and technicist modernisation
and US aid programmes pushed tractors on the population beyond any
plausible need, there was a temporary crowding of the population into
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coops which bled money. Meanwhile more of the population fled the
countryside to Tunis, a flow magnified after the state put an end to the
cooperatives in 1969. Tunis grew alongside the urban factory base for
import-substitution industrialisation and rural tractor fleets.
The second phase was equally based on capital-intensive agriculture and
urban industrialisation – this time through the “off-shore” regime (Gouia,
1988; Romdhane, 1981). Agricultural modernisation rested on a Green
Revolution. The logic of technicism, deus ex machina solutions to social
problems through chemical, genetic and mechanical modernisation of the
rural cereal-growing world reached its consummation. USAID planners
and Green Revolution acolytes in Tunisian ministries converged on a plan
with the ambition of increasing cereal yields for Tunisia’s swiftly growing
population, further replacing labour with machines, but skipping entirely
the reorganisation of the social organisation of labour as occurred through
the cooperative mirage. Instead, private farm-owners would organise this
process. The state dumped subsidies into improved seed, fertilisers and
tractors. As chemicals and metal replaced men and women, people fled
the country to the city. But not just to the city of Tunis. By the late 1960s
national planners were predicting that industrialisation would be unable
to produce enough jobs to deal with the populations continually displaced
from production in the countryside (Centre de Recherches et d’Etudes
Administratives, 1967). Tunis’s urbanisation-industrialisation project was
neither resilient nor capacious enough to provide for the exiles from the
countryside. In turn, many of them became adjuncts to the European and
Libyan industrialisation projects. People went at first in equal measure to
Saudi Arabia, Libya and France. Later, as the former two saw oil boom
turn to bust, France became a preferred destination for labour emigration
– or more accurately, labour export. Tunisia’s rural problems were never
solved. Its people were just transposed to cities where the country could
not afford to incorporate them, leading to ever-mounting problems.
From the 1960s,
well before Tunisian
cities had any laborabsorption capacity
whatsoever, planning
literature, educational
curricula, and cultural
programming was
replete with contempt
towards “tradition”.
Amidst intense urbanisation, the transport sector now absorbs 45% of
total fossil fuel consumption and is the second largest user of energy
after industry. Fully half of that is private cars. Bank loans accelerate and
exacerbate this process, since car ownership is a status symbol and credit
for car purchase is released easily and frequently. The car fleet increases
6% per annum while the bus fleet is more like 0.6% per annum, with
the latter often too crowded to even enter while proceeding slower than
walking speed. Increased density in the urban core and increased car
use combine in a synergistic mélange, increasing car travel time, energy
consumption and, finally, emissions. Infrastructural investments – a site
of chronic under-investment on the part of the public authorities – orient
more towards road infrastructure and less towards investments in public
transport. Indeed, the two are in a spatial zero-sum game in downtown
Tunis where they literally share road space (Mraihi et al., 2015).
One obvious solution is increased investment in public transport using
clean-burning energy. But I wish to make a less obvious suggestion
and put forth the idea that the problem of the city in Tunisia, and the
problem of the city of Tunis, must also be considered as a question of
demography. Of course, a caveat is necessary: demography is not a
natural fact but becomes a problem only because of the structuring of
the institutions which exist to absorb and manage population growth and
allocate resources. Put differently, demography is not primarily a problem
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of fertility but in fact is the demographers’ translation of systemic social
malaise. I wish to first raise the socioeconomic point that Tunisia – and
Tunis – do not provide enough jobs for the denizens of the city, despite
ongoing growth and its function as a population magnet. People come
to the cities, flock to their mushrooming private universities, but then
find themselves unable to find jobs. Tunis’s structural maldevelopment
then becomes one of the country’s exports, and the problem of other
countries, since most young people see no future for themselves in the
country. This is in effect a loss of value – the country feeds and educates
them when they cannot add to social wealth, and then loses them to
Europe when they can. Furthermore, there are those in the capital who
live in a complex relationship with the countryside: they spend much of
the week in the city, working in the tertiary or secondary sector, while
their wives may work on a farm in a primary sector. Urban life is a means
to increase incomes, while it ends up contributing to urban dysfunction.
Such an outcome is neither inevitable nor positive.
But such an attitude is the fruit of many people’s reading of the
socioeconomic landscape. I suggest that we turn the question on its
side, and ask: If people move within Tunisia to its capital, and abroad,
in search of meaningful and remunerative labour, what then is the
cheapest way to make jobs?
3. Policy mechanisms
We are accustomed to considering prices the outcomes of a fey and
indecipherable market logic which produces outcomes in accordance
with the arcana of supply and demand. Meanwhile, ownership titles are
frequently considered as natural facts with an appropriateness if not a
permanence akin to the tides or the mountains. Both price and landtenure policies in Tunisia – as I indicated above – led to population shifts
from countryside to city. But, as I also indicated above, those were the
outcomes of history, and history is made and unmade by men.
As partial policy remedies, I here propose four ways to lighten the
rural-urban population flows which aggravate contemporary Tunis’s
mounting urban issues. The first is to consider the question of shifts
in ownership titles, or to consider what agrarian reform could do for
Tunis. In the first place, in Tunisia as elsewhere, labour intensity per
hectare is in an inverse relationship with plot size, and productivity
measured in dollars per hectare generally has an inverse relationship
with plot size. Although in the Tunisian case this ratio is perhaps
slightly more complex due to the tendency towards irrigation as a
means of intensification, it then also becomes a function of access
to credit or capital to finance such means of (usually unsustainable)
intensification. A redistribution of land is tantamount to a redistribution
of income. Economic modelling and planning schemas are based on
the “pull” factor of the city, based on the relative outcomes of living in
cities. Because such planning has been premised on existing agrarian
inequality that inequality has endured, converting the countryside,
particularly Tunisia’s western belt, into Tunisia’s repository of poverty.
A redistributive agrarian reform would, in the first place, rein in ruralurban migration by making the countryside a more remunerative place
for people to live their lives.
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Consider also the historical process through which Tunisia moved to lowvalue-added export-oriented industrialisation alongside wage containment
in the urban centres where industry concentrates. This history occurred in
part because of the narrow size of the internal market, thereby making
selling products from urban factories relatively less attractive for private
capital. Because of a constrained internal market – and keeping in mind that
the magnitude of the internal market is no natural fact but the outcome
of a variety of choices and struggles – there was insufficient internal
articulation of the productive system. Thus, Tunisia moved to a system of
production based on using industry for export. As studies have shown, such
efforts, for example in the textile sector, are only successful, or can only be
evaluated as successes, when the metric is monopoly profitability (Baghdadi
et al., 2017). Workers’ livelihood outcomes are less successful, giving them
less income, leading in aggregate to less demand.
A larger and more articulated internal market, which would emerge if
Tunisia adopted an agrarian reform and more justly redistributed internal
incomes, would create more opportunities for a wider-ranging programme
of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). This is the second policy –
industries, especially those based on processing primary-sector production,
could produce for a wider internal market and subsist if not prosper based
on economies of scale rather than wage containment. Accordingly, wages
could increase in the cities, thereby allowing for both higher income and
demand. Because there would be a wider internal market, there would be
a greater need for all kinds of wage-goods, both agricultural and industrial.
To create those goods, more jobs would be needed, and more jobs would
thus be available to absorb urban unemployment. Such goods need not be
typical ISI, or non-productive manufactured goods. Even better, they could
also be implements like solar energy grids, or tools for alleviating labour
intensity without resort to inappropriately heavy farming implements. Solar
energy could free up capital spent on imported fuel, allowing the state
more resources for price engineering or, for that matter, jobs in sectors not
oriented towards profit – such as hospitals. Such a combination could set in
motion virtuous circles of economic growth based on relatively less entropic
modes of production. In this way, changing what factories make in Tunisia
could easily make the countryside a better place to live.
A redistributive
agrarian reform would,
in the first place,
rein in rural-urban
migration by making
the countryside a more
remunerative place
for people to live their
lives.
A third policy mechanism would be getting prices wrong. Of course,
the notion of “wrong” prices is always a bit of a provocation, since
“right” prices do not exist. In any event, this mechanism is not new
to Tunisia. In fact, price engineering has been central to Tunisia’s postcolonial experiment in economic management. Throughout the 1960s,
wages were nearly frozen, to take one “price” – the price of labour.
There is no reason that the terms of trade need to be weighed against
the goods produced by labour-intensive agriculture, such as durum
wheat and barley, except that this has been understood as the way
things work. I would suggest that anti-agricultural goods terms of trade
are also a mechanism for siphoning off rural value. And like all such
suction devices, it takes the people along with it. The movement of
people from countryside to city is not a natural phenomenon such as the
movement of light, the movement of the moon across the sky, or gravity
pulling planets together. It is the result of sociopolitical arrangements,
which are a kind of human-designed gravitational field pulling people
hither and yon. Because they were made socially, they can be unmade
and remade differently. A government could use selective price policy
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Tunisia’s rural problems
were never solved.
Its people were just
transposed to cities
where the country
could not afford to
incorporate them,
leading to evermounting problems.
alongside an agrarian reform to strategically rework the terms of trade,
favour agricultural goods that are labour-intensive and concentrated
in poorer areas of the countryside, and thus induce a relatively more
favourable standard of living in the countryside. Because such policies
would divert more capital to small farmers, they would also allow for
increased investment, creating more wealth in the countryside and more
demand from farmers for goods which enhance rural production, such
as appropriate-scale mechanisation.
A fourth policy mechanism is preferential interest rates for small farmers
and opening the spigot of loans and capital for small farms. In Tunisia,
there is an absolute capital shortage and a fundamental incapacity of
the state to supply enough credit at competitive rates to the smallest
farmers, whether seasonal credit or medium- or long-term credit.
Creating a credit system that benefits large plot owners is another
way of making the countryside less attractive to rural people, since
large farms substitute capital for labour. Put differently, in a creditlimited system – freezing other variables for the moment – opening
wider the flow of credit is akin to choosing which plant one wishes to
grow in a world in which only so many plants can grow. The choice
to over-allocate credit to industry, and furthermore to over-allocate
credit to city-based private real-estate development, is in form and
content precisely a decision to not allocate enough credit to small
farmers. Increasing credit to small farmers in the context of expansionary
macroeconomic policy in fact increases overall small-farmer wealth, with
effects analogous to agrarian reform, thereby increasing the country’s
overall wealth.
4. Non-livelihood cultural investments
At least two other policy reversals would need to accompany such a
programme. The first: a revision of the educational curriculum and the
language of state planning. From the 1960s, well before Tunisian cities
had any labour-absorption capacity whatsoever, planning literature,
educational curricula and cultural programming were replete with
contempt towards “tradition” (Akkari, 1993). Tradition meant that
which was affiliated with the rural world, above all the world of the
centre and south. Population flows correspondingly moved along
channels lubricated by an ideological value system which told young
people that the good life was in the city and the bad life was in the
countryside (Amami, 1982). Such a programme is not inevitable. It
is a choice, the result of policies oriented towards replacing men
and women with machines in the countryside and concentrating the
population in the urban core, above all Tunis. In 2018, this experiment
has failed. It is no longer the countryside which young people consider
unliveable amidst the allure of the city. It is Tunis itself they considerable
unliveable amidst the allure of the Global North metropolis. That
is a choice, the result of people-made development, infrastructure,
investment and planning policies. Furthermore, there is a question of
the “objective” allures of city and country life – culture, museums,
culinary diversity. I would simply suggest that a policy suite based on
decentralising populations and not allowing any further growth of a city
like Tunis ought also to be partnered with cultural investments in local
urban centres, as well as means for people to access those centres.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter has historicised the concentration of Tunisia’s population in
the coastal belt and above all Tunis. It has located the origins of those
demographic shifts in a set of policies which, when clumped together
and put in simple words, made it so that country people could not
make a life for themselves in the countryside and thus went to try to
make a life for themselves in the cities. What I propose is that planners
concerned with constantly swelling cities make problems easier for
themselves – and for the people on whose behalf they plan – by looking
at why cities keep growing faster than population rates in countries
like Tunisia and try to grasp the problem not by its thorny and difficult
exterior, but rather with a little more digging, at the origin of all things –
its root.
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