Nataliya Gorodnia, Doc. Sc. in World History Professor, Faculty of History Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv 063-344-55-64 ngor@ukr.net MAJOR FEATURES OF THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FROM UKRAINE’S PERSPECTIVE // Modern Geopolitics as a Challenge for International Security, Oleksandra Kordonska, Rostyslav Romaniuk (eds.), Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Lviv-Olsztyn 2018, 192 p. – .13-21 The paper studies major shifts in the present international system, comparing with the late 20th century, and focuses on the processes that have influenced Ukraine the most. The existing international system is characterized by a diffusion of power among different state and non-state actors, a shift in a balance of regional and global powers, a relative weakening of established Western nations and emerging of new centers of power, increasing importance of regional integration, and rОturn oП РrОat poаОrs’ РОopolitical competition. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine demonstrates that multipolar international system is more unstable and dangerous than bipolar and unipolar, and a potential of conflicts and threats to security in it has essentially increased. Key words: international system, 21st century, multipolarity, Ukraine, Russia, China, the United States, the European Union ., В ь є ь « ь ь , У . , , », ь , Ключові слова: ША, Є ь , ь . А , , . У . . , ХХІ ХХ , є ь є ь є , ь , , , є ь, У , , К , The 21st century is characterized by rapid changes in strategic environment and international relations. Existing international system noticeably differs from the late 1990s, when it experienced a revolutionary shift, caused by the collapse of the socialist camp and the Soviet Union. Since the early 21 st century, fundamental transformations of the international system have occurred. Some of them have severely affected Ukraine and caused the international “Ukrainian” crisis. The goal of the research is to describe major features of the existing international system, comparing with the late 20th century, and also the shifts that have influenced Ukraine the most. The major features of the existing international system include: its transformation to multipolar; diffusion a power among state and non-state actors, including multinational companies, transnational crime organizations, terrorist groups, hackers-individuals; increasing importance of regional integration; a changing global balance of power; a relative weakening of established Western nations and emerging of new centers of power; more independent developing nations’ position in international affairs; significant increase oП CСina’s impact on rОРional and Рlobal Оconomв and politics; and a rОturn oП РrОat poаОrs’ РОopolitical competition. The role of financial and economic components of power in the post-Cold War strategic environment has sufficiently increased, as well as non-traditional threats to security. Most of the developments were caused by acceleration of globalization as a process of growing interconnections, interactions and interdependence among nations and individuals across the globe. The end of the Cold War and revolution in the sphere of communications contributed to the developments the most. They promoted more intensive move of goods, capitals, people and ideas across borders that brought nations of the world closer. The processes were the most visible on a regional level. Acceleration of regional integration was a prominent development of the post-Cold war period. Unlike previous periods in history, integration processes have been manaРОd bв dОlibОratО national РovОrnmОnts’ policiОs and implОmОntation of regional projects. As a result, the existing international system is more regional-based. In the 21st century, the United States has lost its global predominance. More actors exert power and influence. Several major events and processes contributed to the shifts the most: terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001; a noticeable economic progress of some emerging economies, especially China, in the first decade of the new century; and 2008 global finance crisis and the subsequent economic slowdown, which strongly aППОctОd dОvОlopОd nations and ПavorОd РroаinР CСina’s impact in the international system. As a result of a prolonged global war on terror after 09/11, including wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. essentially drained its resources and lost international leadership. Simultaneously, several nations with rich resources (territorial, human and natural) demonstrated high rates of the GDP growth in the first decade of the 21st century, before the global financial and economic crisis. Their rise was coined by the term BRICs (Brasilia, Russia, India, and China) for tСО most pОrspОctivО “ОmОrРinР poаОrs” by Jim O’NОill, analytic of American multinational financial company Goldman Sachs1. The term symbolized a shift in the global economic power from developed nation (the U.S., the EU and Japan) to the leading emerging economies. Foundation of a Group of Twenty (G-20) of the nations with the largest GDP, not only developed but also developing, in November 2008 as a new international forum on financial and economic affairs demonstrated a new role of the emerging economies in the global politics TСО most rОmarkablО pСОnomОnon аas CСina’s dвnamic Оconomic РroаtС and its incrОasinР impact in the international system, caused primarily by economic factors. Global 2008 finance crisis did not hit China, unlike leading WОstОrn nations. TСouРС CСina’s Оconomic РroаtС sloаОd doаn, it remained rather high (approximately 7 percent). As a result, China became a major driving force of a global economy, and significantly increased its finance and economic power, regionally and globally. China’s investments in the U.S. national debt during the global finance crisis tied American and Chinese economies more closely. After tСО crisis, CСina’s dirОct invОstmОnts have been welcomed not only in developing but also developed nations, and essentially increased. China participated in foundation of some financial rescued mechanisms (in a greater East Asia, and in BRICS framework), initiated renunciation of dollar as an international reserve currency in 2009, promoted renminbi in the international trade, and called for a reform of International Monetary Fund and World Bank to increase its role in the institutions, dominated by the U.S. and other developed nations. When negotiations on the reform did not succeed, in 2015, China founded multinational financial institution – Asian infrastructure investment bank – on its own terms to address infrastructure needs across Asia. The bank has been joined by 58 nations and is open to new members. China also proposОd a Рrand “OnО BОlt, OnО Road” initiativО Пor larРО-scale infrastructure projects from East Asia to Europe, which the Bank intended to finance. According to the Brookings Institute analysis, in 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization, despite its dynamic economic development, its global influence was limited. Transformations tСat occurrОd in 15 вОars did not СavО anв analoРiОs in Сistorв. CСina’s GDP incrОasОd 8-fold, and it became the major driving force of the global economic development. It jumped from the sixth to second place among the most developed world economies (after the U.S.), occupied the first position in the global trade and the second one in the global investments (after Japan)2. As BritisС “HuППinРton Post” nОatlв remarks, financing in infrastructure projects, which are keys for many nations economic development, is a powerful tool of geopolitics, the same as military alliances 3. CСina’s invОstmОnts, crОdits, and Рrants to dОvОlopinР nations СavО Сad a rОmarkablО political effect. ImplОmОntation oП “OnО BОlt, OnО Road” initiativО аill continuО tСО trОnd, and is ОбpОctinР to incrОasО siРniПicantlв CСina’s rОРional and Рlobal inПluОncО. Other BRICs nations, except China and partly India, were strongly hit by the global financial and economic crisis, and the assessments of their economic growth essentially decreased. However, the period of J.O’NОill. Building Better Global Economic BRICs, “Global Economics Paper” 2001, 30th November, No: 66, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf [10.09.2017]. 2 Philippe Le Corre and Jonathan Pollack. China’s Global Rise. Can the EU and U.S. Pursue a Coordinated Strategy? Geoeconomic and Global Issues 2016, Paper 1, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-globalrise-can-the-eu-and-u-s-pursue-a-coordinated-strategy/ [15.09.2015]. 3 Parag Khanna. New BRICS Bank: a Building Block of Alternative World Order, 2014, Sep 17, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/parag-khanna/new-brics-bank_b_5600027.html [10.09.2017]. 1 their noticeable growth during the years preceding the crisis gave them a feeling of their strength and a new role in the international system. In 2009, as a result of Russia initiative, the first summit of Brasilia, Russia, India and CСina’s lОadОrs took placО to become annual. The summit established BRIC forum of the four nations as a platform for their cooperation in financial sphere and more close political relations. Admission of South Africa to the forum in 2010 changed it title into BRICS and raised its international status. Participation in BRICS Пorum strОnРtСОnОd Russia’s position and ОnablОd it to ОscapО intОrnational isolation after annexation of the Crimea. No one BRICS nation supported Western sanctions against Russia. Moreover, they used the situation to conclude profitable deals with Russia. In 2014-2015, they established BRICS multinational finance institutions, such as the BRICS Development Bank (the New Development Bank) and BRICS Contingent Reserve Fund. Except BRICS, other forums and organizations were established, mostly on a regional level, without dОvОlopОd nations’ participation, for example, “ASEAN Plus Three” or the Shanghai International Organization. “GroаtС oП otСОrs” and ОmОrРinР nОа balancО oП poаОr аas Пamouslв dОscribОd in tСО book “PostAmОrican World” bв AmОrican analвst FarООd Zakaria in 20084. The global finance and economic crisis, and the consequent economic slowdown, significantly strengthened the trend. The U.S. president Barack Obama (2009-2017), admitted existence of a multipolar world order, and recognized a changing U.S.’ rolО in it. His administrations rejected a balance of power concept and great poаОrs’ РОopolitical compОtition, and developed a new concept of multipartner (instead of multipolar) international system to address mutual threats together. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2010 emphasized transnational non-traditional threats, including terrorism, global criminal networks, weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, attacks on cyberspace capabilities, global warming, financial crises and economic slowdown. The U.S. leadership was mostly regarded as forging collective actions of all interested nations and international coalitions to address the threats5. Simultaneously, B. Obama administrations promoted all nations’ compliancО аitС international norms and rules, and their increasing responsibility in the international system, according to the growing power. The National Security Strategy of 2010 defined an important task for the United States and like-minded nations to modernize international institutions, strengthen international norms, and enforce international law. The 2015 Strategy rОcoРniгОd tСat “a sСiПtinР poаОr dвnamics crОatОs botС opportunitiОs and risks Пor cooperation, as some states have been more willing than others to assume responsibilities commensurate аitС tСОir РrОatОr Оconomic capacitв”6. Indeed, Оconomic proРrОss and a rОlativО аОakОninР oП tСО U.S. and tСО E.U.’ position in the international arena encouraged some nations to more assertive foreign policy to meet their national interests at the expense of weaker neighboring statОs. Russia’s actions in the post-Soviet area and its aggression against Ukraine demonstrate the trend the best. When Russia was weak, it could change nothing in the postCold War international system, which was associated with its humiliation. However, after Russia reemerged from the crisis in the early 21st century, it gained more confidence and bОРan to claim Пor “a rОspОct” Пrom the Western powers. It was measured by their recognition of Russia’s “spОcial” intОrОsts in the post-Soviet area7. Unlike Europe and other regions, Russia-led integration within a Commonwealth of the Independent Nations in 1990s failed. In the early 2000s, when Russia reemerged, new projects of regional integration (Eurasian Economic Community and Common Economic Space) were launched. An agreement on establishing of the Common Economic Space was reached in 2003, including Ukraine. However, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 hindered the process. After the Revolution, Russia’s prОsidОnt V. Putin considered Russian-Ukrainian relations to be directly depended on UkrainО’s participation in the Russia-led integration projects. UkrainО’s cСoicО of European integration was perceived as anti-Russia’s course that contributed to a dОvОlopmОnt oП Russia’s aРРrОssivО nationalism and rОvisionism. During the following years, new idОoloРical concОpts аОrО dОvОlopОd in Russia, includinР “a sovОrОiРn dОmocracв” (2006), “Russiy mir” 4 F. Zakaria. The Post-American World, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 2008. National Security Strategy. May 2010, p. 3, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/ [03.01.2018]. 6 National Security Strategy. The White House, February 2015, p. 4, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf [03.01.2018]. 7 B. Lo. Russia and the New World Disorder, Chatham House, Brookings Institution Press, London, Washington D.C. 2015, p. 48. 5 (2007), and “rОal sovОrОiРntв” (2007), which had an essential impact on its foreign policy. In February 2007 V. Putin’s MunicС speech, he statОd Russia’s discontОnt bв its status in tСО intОrnational sвstОm. WСОn Ukraine and Georgia claimed for NATO Membership Action Plan, Russia responded with August 2008 war with Georgia. EuropОan Union’s Обpansion аas onО oП tСО most important dОvОlopmОnts tСat inПluОncОd Russia’s policy. Importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and the foundation on the European Union (1992-1993) happened nearly at the same time. In 2004, the largest expansion of the E.U. occurred, including several former post-socialist and three post-Soviet nations. Though the E.U. did not demonstrate an interest in admission other post-Soviet nations, including Ukraine, the prospects were possible. In 2004, the E.U. began implementation of the European Partnership Policy. Since 2009, it has launched Eastern European Partnership program with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan’s participation. The program was expected to lead to signing Association Agreements between the nations and the E.U., including free trade agreements. The program implementation causОd Russia’s nОРativО rОaction, and was considered anti-Russian. In Kremlin, revival oП Russia’s “РrОat poаОr” status was associated with its leadership in the postSoviet area regional integration, and a reconstruction of its sphere of influence. In 2011, then prime-minister V. Putin initiated foundation of the Eurasian Economic Union as the major goal of his third presidency to turn Russia into a leading center of a new multipolar international system. Its implementation entered into a conflict with the program of Eastern European Partnership, and caused a crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2013, and the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in November 2013 – February 2014. Kremlin considered Ukraine to be a key component of the Eurasian Economic Union, and dОmonstratОd its dОtОrmination to prОvОnt UkrainО’s rapprocСОmОnt аitС tСО European Union with sharp statements and actions, includinР Рas and tradО “аars”, and Пinallв, аitС annОбation of the Crimea and a proxy war at Donbas. The background for the actions was composed by Russia’s ОaРОrnОss to usО cСanРinР strategic environment on its behalf and revive its previous (Soviet times) status in the international system. Besides, Russia was interested in a return to a previous geopolitical situation, when its sphere of influence was integrated, and Europe was not. The perception resulted in pursuing a policy on weakening and disintegration of the E.U. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2015 admitted that Russia’s aРРrОssion aРainst UkrainО and belligerent stance toward other neighboring countries endangered international norms that had been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War8. Russia refused to follow established international rules to restore its sphere of influence. The actions were a result of the shifts in the international system since the early 21 st century, and caused its current crisis. No intОrnational institutions can addrОss Russia’s aРРrОssion, Пirstlв, bОcausО Russia is one of its leading members with a decisive voice, and, secondly, because the global balance of power has changed. The trend was demonstrated by a vote in the United Nations on the rОsolution to condОmn Russia’s annexation of Crimea on March 24, 2014. The vote revealed a distribution between proponents and opponents of the Western nations and Russia. 11 nations did not support the resolution, and 58, including all non-Western nations, sustained. The United Nations reaction on the similar actions in 1990 – annexation of Kuwait by Iraq – was quite different. According to Javier Solana analysis, perception of the reality in 20132014 was the following: American unipolar moment had ended, Europe was in decline, and the new group of nations with its unique vision of global affairs was emerging9. In 2015, in accordance with Russia’s initiativО, tСО Eurasian Union аas ПoundОd, though without Ukraine. We suppose that Russia will not stop its efforts to return Ukraine into its sphere of influence. So far, Russia fires Donbas military conflict with three major interconnected goals: first, to use Donbas as a leverage for recognition of the Crimea annexation by the United States, the European Union, Japan and other nations; second, to weaken Ukraine and return it to its sphere of influence; and third, to bargain new rules in the international system, according to its interests. A prolonged crisis of the European Union, including 2016 GrОat Britain’s dОcision to Обit, reveals a complexity and vulnerability of the E.U. integration project. It also demonstrates that regional integration processes are not linear, and risk of disintegration always exists. 8 National Security Strategy, 2015, op.cit., p.10. Javier Solana. Grave New World, Project Syndicate 2014, September 25, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/javier-solana-urges-the-world-s-traditional-and-emerging-powers-to-unite-toconfront-shared-challenges#vmgouCz8ha6S7OuT.99 [12.11.2017]. 9 A struggle for power among and within many states of the Middle East and North Africa, generated in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war and 2011 Arab uprisings, is another noticeable development that affects the international system. The region is the most vulnerable to non-statО tОrrorist Рroups’ activitiОs, as tСО Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has recently demonstrated. The trend will continue as non-state actors exploit the same resources and opportunities in the existing international system as national states. The new centers of power challenged the liberal international system, shaped after the Second World War, with Western nations’ dОcisivО rolО. As a result, it was significantly destroyed, and a contemporary “аorld ordОr” morО rОsОmblОs a “аorld disordОr”. The National Security Strategy of the United States, developed by D. Trump’s administration in 2017, recognizes a return of great power competition regionally and globally. It indicates China and Russia as two major strategic competitors of the U.S., which are “trying to change the international order in their favor”10. Among other factors, Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. TСО documОnt considОrs tСО contОst Пor poаОr “a cОntral continuitв in Сistorв” 11, and the present period does not differ. Besides China and Russia as revisionist powers, the Strategy defines two other sets of rivals who are actively competing against the United States, its allies and partners in political, economic and militarв spСОrОs “to sСiПt rОРional balancО oП poаОr in tСОir Пavor”12. They are the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and jihadist terrorist groups and other international threat organizations. According to the Strategy, “tСОsО arО ПundamОntallв political contests between those who favor rОprОssivО sвstОms and tСosО аСo Пavor ПrОО sociОtiОs”13. At the same time, the document is based on a “principlОd rОalism tСat is РuidОd bв outcomОs, not idОoloРв”14. Geopolitical competition among great powers resembles the situation before the Great War of 19141918. However, the recent international situation is much more complex because of numerous transnational tСrОats, аСicС dОmand closО nations’ coopОration to addrОss tСОm. TСО “Ukrainian” intОrnational crisis demonstrates that the United States is the last resort for the nations that do not participate in NATO or other security alliances that leaves them unprotected in the face of a larger and a stronger adversary. During the Cold War period, America repeatedly defended European nations from Soviet expansion. In our days, it has a mission to prevent Russia from imposing its will by force, and to protect and preserve a rules-based international system. To sum up, the present international system is characterized by multipolarity, dissemination of power among state and not-state actors, relative decrease of the U.S. and otСОr dОvОlopОd nations’ international impact, a risО oП CСina’s as well as non-state actors role, increasing importance of regional integration, and more competitive environment, including a return to great powers’ РОopolitical compОtition. The strategic environment is very fluid. As a result, the world we live in is more unstable and dangerous than bipolar and unipolar ones. The existing international system is in the grip of a crisis, and its outcome is not clear yet. The most importantly, aggression cannot be tolerated, middle and small nations rights must be protected, as well as basic norms and rules of liberal international order. The 20th century history proves that great powers’ trade-offs at the expense of weaker nations had only a temporary effect, and finally deepened the crisis. Bibliography Khanna, Parag. New BRICS Bank: a Building Block of Alternative World Order, 2014, Sep 17, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/parag-khanna/new-brics-bank_b_5600027.html [10.09.2017]. Le Corre, Philippe and Jonathan Pollack. China’s Global Rise. Can the EU and U.S. Pursue a Coordinated Strategy? „Geoeconomic and Global Issues” 2016, Paper 1, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-global-rise-can-the-eu-and-u-s-pursue-a-coordinated-strategy/ [15.09.2015]. Lo, Bobo. Russia and the New World Disorder, Chatham House, Brookings Institution Press, London, Washington D.C. 2015, p. 48. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/ [03.01.2018]. 10 National Security Strategy of the United States of http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/ [03.01.2018]. 11 Ibidem, p. 25. 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem. 14 Ibidem, p. 1. America, December 2017, p. 27 National Security Strategy. May 2010, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/ [03.01.2018]. National Security Strategy. February 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf [03.01.2018]. O’NОill, Jim. Building Better Global Economic BRICs, „Global Economics PapОr” 2001, 30tС November, no 66, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf [10.09.2017]. Solana, Javier. Grave New World, Project Syndicate 2014, September 25, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/javier-solana-urges-the-world-s-traditional-and-emerging-powers-to-unite-toconfront-shared-challenges#vmgouCz8ha6S7OuT.99 [12.11.2017]. Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 2008.