The Ukrainian security crisis: From the false premise of Western societies to Russia’s effective hybrid strategy

See my chapter (9) in this volume published in 2016: "The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to Long-Term Crisis Management"

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Russian-Western relations are at their lowest level since the end of the Cold War following Russia’s confrontation with the West over the Ukraine crisis. The ongoing conflict between Russia and the West has engendered a wide debate over the origins of the renewed tensions. Much of the debate is dominated by Realism, which holds that the current deterioration in Russian-Western relations is caused by the West’s interference into Russia’s sphere of influence. This paper refutes the Realist argument by showing that the West did not provoke the ongoing confrontation with Moscow. Rather, the root cause of the renewed tensions between Russia and the West is Russian expansionism. Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine has not been a defensive reaction to a threat posed by the West but, rather, has been motivated by an offensive logic.

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The Ukraine crisis and Russia's contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new 'Cold War' in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine's popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seems to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been frozen and been directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU-Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterised their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasises divisions between member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia's security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.

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Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives, 2015

Ukraine was all over the international headlines from the end of 2013 through summer 2014. The fast changing, complex story was usually narrated through rather simple frames and the greatest attention was devoted to issues with international significance. As the war in eastern Ukraine became protracted and Russia showed no signs of reversing its annexation of Crimea, the story began slipping from the international news.

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Visegrad Group countries create the eastern flank of NATO. Therefore, despite the differences of interests in the security sphere, these countries have much in common. From the beginning, V4 has developed and strengthened regional cooperation in the military and defence. It was focused on joint development capabilities, interoperability of the V4 Armed Forces (education, training and exercises), defence industry and supporting each other in joining NATO and the EU. However, the matter of increasing the security of the Visegrad Group was not unequivocal when it came to V4’s foreign policy on Ukraine.

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“Europe, make no mistake, is hard work”. Few looking at the EU today would disagree with this. The EU is facing a number of problems: the continuing financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and terrorism. A more persistent problem than these, however, has been the question of what type of relationship to forge with Russia. Ukraine’s conflict has undoubtedly complicated the EU- Russia relationship, yet an unfortunate truth of that conflict is that it is in large part an outcome of the EU and Russia’s prior failure to reach an understanding about each other. This chapter considers two interrelated questions: should the EU have a common approach towards Russia? Or should the member states develop bilateral relations with Moscow?

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