(PDF) On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation

The deterioration of Russia-US relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions in US-China relations have given rise to the perception that China-Russia relations are an actual or incipient alliance. However, the alliance elements in China-Russia relations have never been systematically defined and empirically assessed, which makes assessing alliance dynamics in these important bilateral relations difficult. This paper develops and applies a set of empirical criteria for an alliance to define how closely the post-Cold War China-Russia military relations have approached the alliance condition. It demonstrates that China and Russia have created strong institutional foundations for an alliance, and now only minor steps are necessary for a formal and functioning military alliance to materialize. However, the occurrence of such steps is not yet guaranteed.

On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation Alexander Korolev, Ph.D. Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2025, Australia. This is a pre-print version. The final publication is available from Taylor & Francis Group link at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991 To cite this article: Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary ChinaRussia Military Cooperation,” Asian Security, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991 Abstract: The deterioration of Russia-US relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions in US-China relations have given rise to the perception that ChinaRussia relations are an actual or incipient alliance. However, the alliance elements in ChinaRussia relations have never been systematically defined and empirically assessed, which makes assessing alliance dynamics in these important bilateral relations difficult. This paper develops and applies a set of empirical criteria for an alliance to define how closely the postCold War China-Russia military relations have approached the alliance condition. It demonstrates that China and Russia have created strong institutional foundations for an alliance, and now only minor steps are necessary for a formal and functioning military alliance to materialize. However, the occurrence of such steps is not yet guaranteed. Introduction China and Russia have steadily increased their military-to-military contacts and cooperation, which in the context of deteriorating Russia-US relations after the Ukraine crisis and China’s “new assertiveness” in the South and East China Seas has revived the “alliance” rhetoric in China-Russia bilateral relations. In October 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia and China were “natural partners and natural allies,” using the word “ally” that Moscow had previously eschewed with respect to China.1 Russia’s leading foreign policy experts increasingly use “de facto alliance” to characterize China-Russia relations2 or call for upgrading China-Russia collaboration to the level of a full-fledged political-military alliance. 3 In China, despite the official “non-alignment” doctrine, some news outlets have deemed that Beijing and Moscow are “allies without an alliance treaty,”4 whereas prominent international relations (IR) experts have argued that China will be unable to shift the USdominated unipolar world order “unless it forms a formal alliance with Russia.”5 A report jointly written by Chinese and Russian experts registers “elements of a military alliance” emerging between the two countries and argues that “if needed, the ties can be converted into an alliance relationship without long preparation.”6 Most remarkably, China’s first national security blue book, commissioned by the government and written by experts from the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, postulates that China should consider forming an “alliance with Russia.”7 1 The term “alliance” has also constantly often been a reference point in the scholarly discussion on the history and contemporaneity of China-Russia relations. Voskressenski argued that China and Russia “have always been exploring some form of alliance with each other.” 8 Nemets presented China-Russia relations as an “ominous anti-American alliance” that has power to considerably reconfigure the international balance of power and harm American interests.9 Wishnick argued that China-Russia relations had strategic and political foundations for an “incipient alliance” that, however, were countervailed by divergent interests over a range of issues setting limits to how close the two countries could be. 10 China-Russia relations have also been called “alliance” in the studies of arms sales from Russia to China.11 However, what has been glaringly missing in this discussion is the alliance framework itself. In other words, compliance or non-compliance of the key characteristics of China-Russia relations with the parameters of an alliance has often been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly demonstrated by rigorously applying an alliance framework drawn from the alliance literature. The result is that we continue to not know how well contemporary China-Russia relations fit into alliance criteria and in which ways, if any, these relations are a military alliance. A number of recent publications that touched upon the role of military and security cooperation in China-Russia relations have described various empirical aspects of this cooperation, but they have not provided a deductively justifiable, objective indicators-based alliance framework that would allow assessing the overall level of China-Russia military relations and locating these relations on the alliance–no alliance spectrum. 12 Similarly, analysts who focused specifically on military-to-military interactions and attempted to assess the potential for alliance-like security arrangements between China and Russia did not ground their analyses in alliance theory and, lacking a holistic, unifying framework, were rather selective in their presentations. Meick, in a very detailed assessment of China-Russia military cooperation (although more from American interests’ perspective), selects three aspects – military exercises, military-technical cooperation, and high-level military contacts – for the analysis.13 Watts, Ledberd and Engelbrekt, in turn, select only two – arms trade and military exercises – as a test of broader security and defense relationship between China and Russia.14 In both cases, the selection of the specific aspects that received consideration is rather ad hoc and does not sufficiently demonstrate how much, and how consistently, China-Russia military cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War. In summary, while the shadow of some sort of “alliance” has lingered in the discussion of post-Cold War China-Russia military cooperation, systematic attempts to explicitly define this cooperation in terms of alliance and thus demonstrate how close, if at all, it has approached the alliance condition have been absent or lacked a justifiable combination of objective indicators. As some scholars have accurately argued, “while there have been many descriptions and examinations of the empirical dimensions of Russia-PRC strategic ties (across multiple dimensions), few have focused specifically on developing an analytical framework for systematically explaining the specific […] contours of the relationship.” 15 In other words, the field has lacked a definition of China-Russia military cooperation in the categories amenable to IR theorizing. This, in turn, has hindered the generation of convincing 2 theoretical explanations; one first must answer the “what” question before the “why” question can be meaningfully addressed. The present study attempts to fill this gap. It demonstrates in a systematic and theorygrounded way how much China-Russia relations qualify as a political-military alliance. The core findings underline the institutionalization of post-Cold War China-Russia military contacts, which is understood as a process of establishing formal mechanisms and practices that facilitate peacetime security coordination and preparation for joint actions.16 The ultimate goal of the analysis is not to draw a sharp dichotomous distinction between alliance vs. no alliance and to insert China-Russia relations into either category; China-Russia relations are too complex and multilayered for that. Nor is the goal to prove that China and Russia are going to inevitably fight together against another country soon. Instead, the goal is to achieve a theory-grounded demonstration that is as accurate as possible of where China-Russia military cooperation is now in terms of approaching what the IR literature defines as an “alliance.” As such, the study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, by explicitly applying an alliance framework consisting of observable, objective indicators, it enhances the clarity of the existing discussions of the “allianceness” of China-Russia relations. Second, this study delves into the underreported routinized inner workings of China-Russia military cooperation, whereas most expert attention is traditionally focused on Russia-China arms deals or military modernization programs in the two countries.17 Hence, the third important contribution is that the empirical core of the paper consists of multiple original Chinese- and Russian-language documents, reports, and publications that, to date, have been absent from English-language publications on China-Russia military relations. Additionally, to substantiate the analysis, the author conducted a field trip to the China-Russia border area in summer 2015 and held several rounds of interviews with Chinese and Russian foreign policy experts in both China and Russia in 2015 and 2016.18 The paper is organized as follows. Section one draws on the relevant alliance literature to develop an empirically operationalizable analytical framework consisting of eight observable criteria of an alliance. Section two uses the criteria to organize the evidence and show the development trajectory and the degree of post-Cold War China-Russia military cooperation. Section three concludes. The analysis demonstrates that China-Russia military relations have been strengthening steadily since the collapse of the USSR and, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, had passed the stage of “moderate institutionalization” and begun to enter the stage of “deep institutionalization.” This situation has created a strong basis for more advanced forms of military cooperation and is best described as “on the verge of an alliance” – a condition in which technically most of the necessary alliance aspects have been established, and only minor steps are necessary for a true military alliance to materialize. The occurrence of such steps, however, remains an open question. 1. The Alliance Framework and China-Russia Relations The existing definitions and typologies of alliances vary in terms of comprehensiveness and precision. Walt broadly defines an alliance as a “formal or informal relationship of security 3 cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” 19 Weistman gives an even broader definition – “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to the signatories.” 20 Snyder significantly narrows the definition by arguing that “alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”21 Russet’s typology of military alliances, which is dated but still relevant, contains characteristics covering the background of alliance formation and intra-alliance contacts and integration. 22 The works by Leeds and colleagues on alliance performance contain useful indicators of alliance internal institutionalization. 23 Particularly useful in terms of outlining the alliance criteria are quantitative datasets such as the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP), which categorizes the content of all existing military alliance agreements,24 and the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, which records all formal alliance treaties, including defense pacts, nonaggression treaties, and ententes.25 The present study synthesizes these works to generate a framework that responds to three interrelated methodological considerations. First, since it is an in-depth analysis of one specific case of China-Russia military cooperation, different criteria are synthesized to highlight the most important and most underreported aspects. Second, since this study is more concerned with the actual workings of inter-military cooperation (something that came to fruition) rather than the promises of written agreements, it prioritizes indicators that reflect ongoing bilateral military activity. Third, this analysis excludes characteristics that cannot be observed, such as projections of possible behavior in hypothetical wars that may or may not occur or indicators requiring classified information. Bearing these considerations in mind, the relevant alliance characteristics are grouped into two clusters, viewed as stages of alliance formation and consolidation (see Table 1). Both clusters address institutional arrangements and reflect the operational mechanics and the degree of institutionalization of an inter-military relation. 26 The first cluster represents a moderate institutionalization of inter-military contacts, whereas cluster two represents deep institutionalization, which is a more advanced stage of alliance development and implies higher demands in terms of the interoperability of military forces and defense policy compatibility. It is reasonable to assume that a functioning alliance reaches a moderate degree of institutionalization before it moves into deep institutionalization, for which powerful incentives and political will are necessary. Since institutionalization takes time, an intermilitary relation is unlikely to become deeply institutionalized without meeting all or some criteria of moderate institutionalization, though states may rush into a tight alliance treaty in response to an external threat. Table 1: The Stages and Criteria of Military Alliance Formation Stages of alliance formation 1. Moderate institutionalization Corresponding criteria 1) Alliance treaty or agreement; 2) Mechanism of regular consultations; 3) Military-technical cooperation and military personnel exchange; 4) Regular military drills; 5) Confidence building measures; 4 2. Deep institutionalization 6) Integrated military command; 7) Joint troops placement and/or military bases exchange; 8) Common defense policy. Moderate institutionalization is measured by five indicators that together show how formal, coordinated, and regular an inter-military relation is during peacetime. The first criterion is the official alliance treaty or other formal agreement of military coordination in the event of a crisis or when either party is facing an external attack or another type of direct threat. The existence of a treaty is considered important and is often the first mark to look for when assessing an alliance relation.27 However, since alliance treaties vary considerably in terms of the precision of commitments, and moreover, at times, states can act as alliance members even without binding treaties, this criterion is not sufficient. Therefore, the next indicator is the mechanism of inter-military consultations. According to Snyder, the consultation mechanism among allies, together with the formal treaty or promise, is an indispensable aspect of an alliance.28 Such mechanism enhances mutual understanding and increases the predictability of intra-alliance dynamics, which can be important assets when joint actions are required. The third indicator is military-technical cooperation (MTC), accompanied by regular exchanges of military personnel. At the early stages, military-technical exchanges can be more of a structure for the parties to purchase military equipment or technological expertise from each other. As MTC moves into more advanced stages, however, it becomes more intertwined and is increasingly characterized by long-term projects for the joint design and production of arms and their components. This increases mutual dependence and the compatibility of military hardware and is also important for allies in times of war when shared supplies of equipment and logistical and technological support can determine the alliance’s performance. The exposure of technological expertise requires a considerable amount of trust. Moreover, the proper organization of MTC requires a high level of coordination between multiple institutions (research centers, manufacturers, and various government agencies), shared procedures, and the standardization of training. Simultaneously, the active exchange of military personnel and the opening up military educational institutions and curricula to a foreign state raise the level of compatibility in terms of military thinking and approaches to warfare. The fourth important indicator is regular joint military exercises. Such exercises are important for the closeness of a military partnership and military unity in that they help achieve a certain degree of military force compatibility and interoperability, increase coordination, and practice joint techniques. They also often send important signals, admonitions, or assurances to certain countries or groups of countries. The fifth criterion is inter-military confidence building measures (CBM). These may not be necessary in a traditional discussion of alliance institutionalization, and moreover, all the abovementioned indicators are directly or indirectly related to trust building. However, many assessments highlight the lack of trust as a major weakness of China-Russia relations. Some emphasize that “Sino-Russian relations lack trust and are characterized by competition, especially in the two countries’ shared regions.”29 Others argue that “in spite of a series of 5 common interests on the global scene, there is a fundamental lack of strategic trust between China and Russia.”30 Still, others suggest that “Russia neither trusts anyone, nor is it trusted by anyone, in Asia.”31 Therefore, the application of an alliance framework to China-Russia relations invites a check of whether China and Russia invest efforts into the longevity of their cooperation by undertaking specific trust building measures such as the demilitarization and desecuritization of the common border, establishing a mechanism for resolving complex issues, and information sharing, among others. The remaining three criteria for advanced institutionalization – an integrated military command, joint troop placement or an exchange of military bases, and a common defense policy – require extensive and costly investments in joint action and indicate a much deeper military institutionalization. They also reflect the highest level of joint preparation for war. Decisions to enter this level of cooperation require strong incentives and strong resolve on the part of policy makers. For potential allies, it should be difficult to smoothly enter this stage without a strong basis in the form of moderate institutionalization. 2. Assessing Contemporary China-Russia Military Relations In the following, the analysis “ticks the boxes,” that is, reports the presence or absence of supporting evidence to meet the above-outlined criteria. Simultaneously, to address the issue of selective presentation of facts, the paper seeks counterevidence, if any, or provides a comparative perspective. 2.1. Moderate Institutionalization: Criteria 1 through 5 Of the more than 200 bilateral inter-governmental treaties that China and Russia have generated since the end of the Cold War, the most important one is the bilateral Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (also called “the Big Treaty”), signed by Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin on July, 16, 2001, in Moscow. 32 Unlike the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1950, the Big Treaty does not explicitly define external threats or include a clear casus foederis clause (mutual defense in the event of an attack on the alliance member nation) and therefore fails to qualify as a defense pact. However, based on Articles 2, 7, 8, 9, and 16, the Big Treaty is a clear nonaggression and consultation pact with very strong non-aggression commitments, containing hints of an implicit defense pact. According to Article 2 of the Big Treaty, the two parties in their mutual relations commit not to: use force or the threat of force; adopt economic or other means of pressure; be the first to use nuclear weapons; or aim strategic nuclear missiles at each other. Article 8 contains additional provisions for the event of war, namely, that neither party will: participate in any alliance or bloc that damages the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other party; or permit a third country to use its territory to damage or establish an organization or group that damages the national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other party. In fact, both countries commit to prohibiting such activities. More controversial is Article 9, which states, “when a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting 6 parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.”33 Given that “the threat of aggression” and the means of “eliminating such threats” are open to different interpretations depending on the situation, Article 9 can be viewed as carrying certain features of an implicit defense pact, meaning that if one of the two parties is attacked or becomes involved in a war, the other country must help. The absence of an explicit military assistance clause can also be compensated for by Article 7, which includes coordination of military efforts and policies in the military field “so as to consolidate each other’s security and strengthen regional and international stability.” Article 16, in turn, points to increasing military cooperation, including the sharing of “military know-how.” As such, the China-Russia Big Treaty is a typical alliance treaty subtype that, although falling short of being a straightforward defense pact, squarely qualifies as a non-aggression pact and a consultation pact. Having articles 9, 7, and 16, it slightly exceeds these categories and is at the borderline between a non-aggression/consultation pact and a defense pact. The most comprehensive and developed aspect of contemporary China-Russia security relations is the mechanism of regular consultations (criterion 2). It has played a crucial role in the overall formation of the China-Russia partnership and over the last two decades has grown into a multi-level institutionalized infrastructure of contacts that guarantees regular information exchanges among almost all major government agencies and organizations – from top decision makers (today, Putin and Xi) 34 and their administrative apparatuses to Defense Ministries and their subdivisions to regional military districts and border garrisons to military educational institutions. There is only one state in addition to Russia with which China has military interactions of comparable depth and comprehension, Pakistan.35 Even during Russia’s periodic turns to the West, when the frequency of top-level meetings with China used to drop, the mechanism of inter-military consultations consistently progressed and continued to expand. The most important mechanisms of today’s China-Russia inter-military consultations are presented in Table 2. Here, it suffices to note that the mechanisms began to take shape after the then-Chinese Minister of Defense, Qin Jiwei, visited Moscow and established official relations between the two countries’ militaries. On October 11, 1993, this time during the visit of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to Beijing, the two countries signed the Military Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Defense of China and Russia, which laid the formal foundations for bilateral inter-military cooperation.36 Since then, China and Russia have been launching a new consultation mechanism or enhancing the existing mechanisms every 3 to 4 years. Some of them were established through signing a formal treaty or agreement, whereas others emerged as the routinization and institutionalization of regular practices. Simultaneously, the frequency of contacts within some existing mechanisms has been increasing, as was the case, for example, with the mechanism of ChinaRussia Consultation on the National Security Issues, when on December 8, 2009, at the fourth annual consultation within this format, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev and the Chinese State Council member Dai Bingguo announced that this bilateral security dialogue must occur not less than four times a year. 37 Today, all the existing mechanisms combined generate a frequency of 20 to 30 high-level security-related 7 consultations per year; this number excludes the entire body of regional cooperation formats occurring between provinces and cities, educational exchanges, military exercises, and other regular contacts. All of them have been operating consistently since the date of establishment, and none of them has ceased to function. Thus, a federal-level inter-military contact between China and Russia occurs almost every two weeks. Additionally, as a rule, the two countries hold bilateral military consultations “on the sidelines” of multilateral forums such as the regular meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – similar to the already routinized special “Putin-Xi forums” that regularly occur during multilateral meetings to show the special relationship between the two leaders.38 Most of the contacts end with a joint statement or declaration that reflects the two countries’ shared view of the issues included on the agenda of the consultation. The spillover effect of the high-level consultations is the development of various regional military consultations between different types of troops and army units, which address the issues of border protection; topogeodesic, metrological, and combat support; combat training; and others. Examples include the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Border Garrisons Consultations and Meetings mechanism and the consultations between Russia’s Central Military District and the Beijing Military District, comprising commanders of battalions and companies from the Volga Region, the Ural Region, and Siberia.39 It is worth noting that the breadth and depth of China-Russia bilateral security consultations continue to grow, responding to the contingencies of the international environment in Asia Pacific, such as the aggravation of tensions in China-US relations, the South China Sea territorial dispute, and the North Korean nuclear problem, among others. The case in point is the China-Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue – a new platform for regional security consultations, launched in April 2015 and aimed at “creating effective security mechanisms in Northeast Asia.” 40 This is the most tightly scheduled format, with the frequency of meetings varying depending on the urgency of regional issues and, at times, reaching a bimonthly schedule, as occurred immediately after the US decision to launch the THADD missile shield in South Korea. There are also formats that China has only with Russia. For example, the abovementioned Consultation on the National Security Issues is “the first precedent in which China creates an interstate mechanism of consultations on its national security issues with a foreign state,” 41 which indicates the “convergence of Russian and Chinese positions on major global and regional security issues” and “the transition of the bilateral security cooperation into a new quality.”42 Importantly, the analysis of the meeting protocols of China-Russia security consultations reveals growing concerns over the “US factor” in international politics and the need for joint reaction to it. It is possible to argue that criticizing US policies in Asia and other regions for becoming “increasingly threatening” and the designation of the international environment as “increasingly complicated and unfriendly” as well as the proclamation of the intentions of China and Russia to join efforts in resisting the growing American threat have become an embedded norm of the China-Russia security dialogue. The alleged intentions of the US to contain China and Russia through various means, including the NMD program, the THADD in South Korea, the “pivot to Asia,” economic sanctions, or NATO eastward 8 expansion; the danger of the “West-ignited color revolutions” in Central Asia and the US’s broader onslaught against “legitimate political power” (and the potential threat to the political regimes in Moscow and Beijing); the emphasis on a mutual consensus and understanding of each other’s views on geopolitical security environment; and the outlining (though still vague at this stage) of China-Russia future collective security arrangement in Asia – all have become routinized content that travels from the top to the bottom of multiple China-Russia security consultations (see column 4 of Table 2 for the quotes from the respective recent joint statements). This is also where China-Russia relations sharply contrast with China-US contacts: in its interactions with the United States (or with any other country including Ukraine or Georgia), China never calls Russia a “common threat.” The same applies to Russia’s formal contacts with other countries. Table 2: Mechanisms of Regular Inter-Military Consultations Mechanism and launching year 1993- Regular Meetings Between Defense Ministers of Russia and China Level and format Agenda Summary of a recent joint statement Defense Ministers; yearly in Moscow and Beijing on a rotating basis 1997- Annual Strategic Consultations among Chiefs of the General Staff Chiefs of Stuff or Deputy Chiefs of Stuff; yearly in Moscow and Beijing on a rotating basis General strategic issues and orientations; the military strategies of the two countries; the current and future roles of both militaries in the world. Issues of military technical cooperation; planning, organization, and coordination of regular joint military drills; the practical realization of military agreements reached at higher levels. 2001-Consultations within the structures of SCO: 1) SCO’s Annual Summits; 2) Regional AntiTerrorism Structure (RATS); 3) Meetings of Heads of Ministries and Departments Defense Ministers and various military officials and experts; yearly for each mechanism on a rotating basis in the SCO’s member states Issues of regional security and stability in Central Asia; antiterrorist activities; intelligence sharing; the planning of joint military exercises; the merging of the SCO with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 2004- RussiaChina Consultation on the National Security Issues Heads of the Security Council (Russia) and the State Council (China); yearly on a rotating basis in Moscow and China’s and Russia’s immediate national interests, with a special emphasis on maintaining a friendly environment and good neighborliness along April 27, 2016: Both countries face an increasingly complex international environment requiring cohesion and joint effort; “together we are going to carry out more sea and land joint military exercises than in the previous years.”43 May 24, 2016: China is willing to be strategically “on the same page” with Russia; Russia appreciates the depth of the bilateral military links; both are concerned with American attempts to increase its influence in Asia Pacific; both emphasize the existing ChinaRussia consensus and understanding on a wide range of issues of global and regional geopolitics, as well as the directions of the ongoing military reforms in the two countries.44 July 9, 2015: The SCO members firmly believe that certain states’ unilateral development of an anti-missile defense system undermines international security; economic sanctions without authorization by the UN Security Council are unacceptable; SCO member states call for the unconditional fulfillment of the February 12, 2015, Minsk Agreements on the Ukraine Crisis; SCO member states will enhance cooperation in information exchange and law enforcement.45 September 13, 2016: Both countries intend to fully use this communication channel to jointly react to new challenges to protect each other’s national security interests; cooperation on the issues of international information security; joint policies of 9 2014- ChinaRussia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue Beijing; since 2009 – four times a year. Deputy Foreign Ministers and diplomats and military experts of different ranks; every 3 or 2 months in Moscow and Beijing the entire span of the China-Russia border. The creation of effective security mechanisms in Northeast Asia; North Korean nuclear tests; the US THAAD missile shield in South Korea. resisting “color revolutions” and unilateral economic sanctions.46 July 28, 2016: The American THADD in South Korea will undermine security in Northeast Asia; THADD is the continuation of Washington’s unilateral deployment strategy worldwide and an attempt to tilt the regional balance of power in its favor; China and Russia must consolidate mutual coordination to better respond to the new threats. 47 In terms of MTC and military personnel exchanges (criterion 3), China and Russia have progressed considerably since the collapse of the USSR. Back in the early 1990s, when Russia was experiencing severe economic hardships, China-Russia MTC contained some barely legal practices and was largely a framework for China to purchase military equipment and obtain technological expertise from Russia. For China, which was (and still is) under arms embargo imposed by the United States and European states in response to the Chinese government’s brutal suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Russia became the only source of advanced military technologies, direly needed for the modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to some sources, multiple Russian scientists and defense experts went to China as tourist groups, but in fact, they were selling military technologies for generous payments, relative to their salaries at home institutions.48 These exchanges helped China significantly neutralize the impact of the Western arms embargo and played an important role in the PLA’s military-technical modernization. In 1992, China and Russia signed the Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement and established the Russia-China Mixed Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (MICMTC), which became a formal platform for the normalization and regulation of the bilateral MTC.49 This Commission also became an important platform for formalized discussions of arms sales from Russia to China. As a result of the work of MICMTC, in 1996, the two sides agreed on the Su-27 project – hitherto, the largest agreement for defense technology transfer between China and Russia, according to which China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) procured a license to assemble 200 Russian supermaneuverable Su-27 jet fighters. This project provided an important channel for China to obtain technological expertise from Russia. As noted by some observers, the first Chinamade aircrafts had to be shipped back to Russia for reassembly due to substandard work. Subsequently, to provide training, management, and quality control and to facilitate the successful absorption of the technology and production techniques by the Chinese side, more than a hundred Russian engineers were assigned to the Su-27 project and travelled to China.50 The acquired technology has subsequently been exploited in the development of the Chinese Shenyang J-11 B fighter. In 1997, China also purchased a license to produce Krasnopol-M explosive projectiles. Vladimir Putin’s accession to power marked the reorganization of Russia’s arms export agencies and supervisory bodies and the establishment of the Russian Federation 10 Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States, empowered with control and supervisory functions. 51 These measures increased the volume of arms exports and improved quality controls, which were welcomed by arms-thirsty China. By the mid-2000s, joint ventures and technology transfers reached 30% of the total transfer of military equipment from Russia to China.52 Russia has consistently emphasized China’s status as a “special partner.” On multiple occasions, the former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov emphasized that in the sphere of MTC, China is Russia’s “privileged partner” and that MTC constitutes the backbone of the China-Russia strategic partnership, which can elevate the entire spectrum of the bilateral relations.53 However, the mid-2000s were marked by temporary stagnation in China-Russia MTC. The regular annual meetings of the MICMTC, which had been consistently taking place since 1992, were suspended in 2006 and 2007 due to, as some observers put it, “lack of topics for discussion.”54 There were three actual causes of the slowdown. First, Russia’s uneasiness about China’s unlicensed reverse-engineering of Russian weapons and, consequently, potential competition with the China-made weapons on the markets of Latin America and North Africa increased considerably. Second, by that time, Russia’s economy had relatively recovered, which reinvigorated Russia’s domestic arms market and made massive purchases by the Defense Ministry possible. This reduced Russia’s dependence on the Chinese and other foreign markets. Third, China became more capable of producing its own arms, and Beijing’s demand for large-scale arms imports began to decrease.55 China-Russia MTC was reactivated in 2008. The regular meetings of the MICMTC was resumed, and on December 11, 2008, China and Russia signed the Agreement of Intellectual Property in Military-Technical Cooperation, which significantly alleviated Russia’s concerns over the replications of its weapon systems by the Chinese and facilitated the export of more advanced arms and technologies to China.56 In the subsequent years, the pattern of China-Russia MTC began to change by moving away from providing a structure for arms and technology transfers to a more interdependent relationship, based on long-term joint projects including the joint design and production of arms and their components. The formation of the new pattern has been accelerated considerably by Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted in his speech about the development of Russia’s comprehensive partnership with China on November 22, 2014: “Important bilateral decisions have been taken, paving the way to an energy alliance between Russia and China. However, there is more to it. We can now even talk about the emerging technological alliance between the two countries. Russia’s tandem with Beijing is a crucial factor for ensuring international stability and at least some balance in international affairs, as well as ensuring the rule of international law.”57 There are multiple long-term MTC projects between China and Russia. According to Rosoboronexport (Russia’s sole state intermediary agency for military exports and imports), currently, the largest China-Russia MTC programs are related to aircraft engines and antiaircraft weapons, which in 2012 constituted 90% of Russia’s arms-related exports to China. The Chernyshev Machine-Building Enterprise in Moscow and the Chinese National Aero11 Technology Import and Export Corporation are carrying out a joint program of modernizing the Russian Klimov RD-33 jet engine that has become the primary engine for the new Chinese CAC/PAC JF-17 “Thunder” multirole combat aircraft. In 2011, the Russian Military Industrial Company began to assemble GAZ “Tigr” (Tiger) all-terrain, multipurpose infantry mobility vehicles in China. 58 In August 2015, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin mentioned three major existing projects in China-Russia MTC. 59 The first one addresses the space program and includes the building of a joint base on the moon, the production of Russian rocket engines in China, and joint projects in satellite navigation, remote earth sensing, the production of electronic components and space equipment, human spaceflights, and others. 60 The second project is the joint construction of a large military helicopter, the agreement for which was signed by Xi Jinping and Putin in May 2015 when Xi was attending the May 9 Victory Parade. According to the Chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, Lin Zuoming, who, in November 2015, visited the “Russian Helicopters” company to meet with its General Director, Alexander Miheev, the two parties agreed to accelerate the process and specified the tasks.61 The third project is the export to China and the maintenance of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft weapon system. Recalling Ivanov’s reference to China as a “privileged partner,” China became the first foreign purchaser of the previous generation of such systems – S-300. This is also the case with the S-400 deal. Beyond that, according to the Rosoboronexport officials, the Chinese J-31 fifthgeneration aircraft, which is an export program intended to compete with the US on the international market, will be powered by the Russian RD-93 engines.62 It is worth emphasizing Russia’s changing attitude toward comprehensive militarytechnical cooperation with China. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s caution about reliance on China in MTC has been disappearing. The Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoygu, during his meeting with the Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang, stated that in the context of the changing environment in Asia Pacific and North Africa, “China-Russia MTC is gaining a special character and a special meaning. The level of our relationship shows that we do not have insurmountable problems, and our work will focus on the realization of our bilateral MTC projects.” 63 Sergei Kornev from Rosoboronexport, in turn, stated that the forefront of China-Russia MTC is increasingly represented by the joint production of weapons on Chinese territory. 64 According to Vasili Kashin (Russia’s leading expert on China-Russia military cooperation), “if Moscow previously was concerned about political factors in its MTC with Beijing, now those factors have dissipated. We are now too interconnected with the Chinese.” Additionally, China now has much to offer Russia, for example, electronic components, including those for the space program, composite materials, drone technologies, and engines for warships. Russia’s tendency to consider China not only a market but also an indispensable MTC partner strengthened after the Ukraine crisis and the termination of Russian-Western cooperation. China-Russia MTC has increasingly become a reciprocal “two-way street.” Given the current dynamics, even if Russia-West political relations return to normal at some point in future, Russia has already passed its “point of no return” in MTC with China.65 12 At the same time, according to the Russian officials, the Kremlin trusts China and will work consistently to enhance the bilateral MTC.66 While the level of trust between China and Russia is still a debatable issue, Moscow, at the very least, seems to be certain that any forms of “China’s threat” theory should be disregarded mostly because the US-led West is seen by Moscow as a bigger and more immediate threat. As some leading Russian China experts put it: “At present any unprejudiced person is much better aware than before that today and tomorrow Russia faces a much bigger, more dangerous and more real threat from the West than a hypothetical threat from a rising China in the day after tomorrow.”67 According to General Leonid Reshetnikov, who used to head the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank under the Russian president, “China’s main rival is the United States, not Russia… For the next 30-40 years Russia is unlikely to face any threat from China. Beijing is doing its best to avoid whatever might cause Russia’s irritation and negative reaction… The Western countries are keen to set Russia and China against each other. They keep forcing on us this China threat notion. However, we will never buy that.”68 President Putin himself accused Western media and experts in reconstructing the so-called “China threat” bogeyman by stating that “Foreign experts keep telling us about the threat from China. We are not worried at all… There is no threat on the side of China… We know each other very well, and we have got used to respecting each other… China does not want to worsen relations with us.” 69 This shift of attitudes in the top echelons of the Russian government may not by itself indicate high level of bilateral trust but does generates a more favorable environment for further enhancements in China-Russia MTC. Regarding the exchange of military personnel, Russia was the first foreign destination for PLA officers’ long- and short-term military education. The official statistics on the number of personnel involved in military education exchanges are kept classified, mostly at China’s request.70 The existing open sources, however, suggest that such exchanges have been growing considerably. Additionally, our interviews show that China does not have a similar type of exchanges with any other major power. Although short-term exchanges and visits by PLA officers to different countries are very common, the long-term educational programs, in which officers are trained to later join the commanding staff of the PLA, exist only in China’s relations with Russia. It is very unlikely for military cadres with extensive exposure to Western education to move smoothly to top-ranked commanding positions. The reason is that China does not trust the United States and its Western allies when it comes to military relations.71 In 1996, the Central Military Commission of China ratified a series of documents specifically targeted at facilitating military educational programs with Russia. These included the Notice on Sending Military Students to Russia and Other Countries (Guanyu Xiang Eluosi Deng Guo Paiqian Junshi Liuxuesheng de Tongzhi), the Methods of Management of China’s Overseas Students in Russia (Fu Eluosi Junshi Liuxuesheng Guanli Gongzuo Zanxing Banfa), and the Practical Suggestions Regarding Military Overseas Students Returning from High Level Command Training in Russia (Guanyu Fu Eluosi Gaoji Zhihui Peixunban Junshi Liuxuesheng Huiguo Hou de Shiyong Yijian). In September of the same year, China negotiated with Russia an agreement on sending Chinese students to Russian 13 military educational institutions for comprehensive education and training and sent the first batch of 42 high- and medium-ranking commanding officers and engineers.72 Beyond general education and training for military commanders, an important aspect of such exchanges consisted of training Chinese officers to use new advanced weapons systems purchased from Russia, such as S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems, Su-family aircraft, and Kilo-class submarines. In July 2000, the two sides signed a Basic Bilateral Agreement on Military and Defense Cooperation for the Period from 2000 to 2015, which further expanded the intermilitary exchanges.73 According to the agreement, China sent 450 air force, rocket force, and navy officers to Russia for advanced education. Russia, in turn, sent advisors to assist PLA officers in learning how to properly exploit Russian military hardware.74 There are a few military educational institutions that are the main destinations for Chinese PLA officers. Top-ranking officers typically go to the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which offers general programs in strategic and tactical aspects of warfare and, according to some estimates, accepts up to 20 high-ranking PLA officers every year.75 Other important institutions are the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces, the Gagarin Air Force Academy, and the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation. They offer 2- to 3-year programs, and each accepts 40-60 PLA officers every semester (mostly mid-career-level commanding officers and General Staff officers between 35 and 45 years of age).76 Although the Chinese officers typically attend classes separately from their Russian peers, the actual content of the offered curriculum is similar to that taught to the Russian officers. Although the tangible impact of China-Russia military educational exchanges is difficult to measure, the fact that large numbers of PLA officers study in Russian military institutions and are trained to use Russian-designed military hardware should not be underestimated. Together with narrowly specialized technical knowledge, the PLA’s officers absorb the knowledge of Russian military traditions, strategies and tactics, which is likely to exert a significant impact on China’s military build-up and army organization and make the two countries’ overall thinking about modern threats and warfare more compatible. Also, education in Russia has often helped many PLA officers make significant career leaps. To name a few, Lu Chuangang, a Senior Colonel, who studied at the Russian General Staff Academy, became the Head of the PLA’s Command Group for the 2008 “Peaceful Mission” China-Russia joint military exercises. Xu Linping, who in 2007 was promoted to Major General of the PLA and during 2011-2014 was a Commander of the PLA’s Beijing Military Area’s 38th Army Group, also studied in Russia. In January 2014, he became the ViceCommander of the PLA’s Lanzhou Military Region. Another success story is Chen Zhaohai, who became the Director of the PLA General Staff Headquarters’ Military Training and Arms Department. Most remarkably, Cao Gangchuan, who was China’s Defense Minister from 2003 to 2008, also studied in Russia for six years and later became the main facilitator of China’s purchases of Russian arms. The fourth criterion in the framework is joint military exercises. The intention to begin conducting such exercises was first officially expressed in 2003 by Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Yury Baluevsky, who made it clear to Chinese military leadership that 14 consolidation of a strategic partnership with China is one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities and that regular military drills would push the partnership to a new level and become an effective mechanism for mutual learning. The Chinese reciprocated, and on December 13, 2004, the two countries announced the milestone decision to conduct the first large-scale joint military exercises – “Peace Mission-2005.” The exercises occurred August 19-25, 2005, in China’s Shandong Peninsula and Russia’s Vladivostok, and they engaged 10,000 soldiers and officers (8000 Chinese and 2000 Russians). The official reason for the new exercises was counter-terrorism. However, some believe that the large scale and the use of heavy firepower, including long-range bombers; the practicing of air and naval blockades; amphibious assaults; and the occupation of a region show that the actual goals were likely to intimidate Taiwan or to prepare for a post-Kim Jong-il regime collapse scenario. For Russia, the drill also became a showcase for its military hardware. Immediately after the exercises, on September 6, 2005, China signed an agreement with Russia on the purchase of transport military aircrafts worth US$ 1.5 billion, after which China became Russia’s largest purchaser of weapons and Russia became the monopolist on the Chinese arms market. “Peace Mission”-type large-scale joint military exercises became a regular practice, occurring every one or two years. Some were held within the SCO format, and most included strategies and tactics for resisting the danger of “color revolutions” and curbing political turmoil in Central Asia. As a rule, Western observers and journalists were denied. After the “Peace Mission-2009,” which took place in China, the first Chinese suggestions to abandon the “non-alignment strategy” could be noticed. It was argued that “non-alignment” was a “strategic illusion” that “deprived the PLA of the valuable experience of aligned warfare.”77 “Peace Mission-2010,” in turn, was the longest exercise and lasted 17 days from September 9 to September 25, 2010, involving approximately 5000 servicemen, over 300 military vehicles and more than 50 aircraft and helicopters.78 During the subsequent “Peace Mission-2012” and “Peace Mission-2014,” the militaries of the two countries further practiced cooperation and interoperability, solidifying the mechanism of joint military exercises. The second type of regular large-scale China-Russia military exercises – “Joint Sea” – was launched in 2012. Unlike the “Peace Mission,” which is a predominantly ground and air exercise, the “Joint Sea” exercise aims to achieve better coordination between the two countries’ navies. The first “Joint Sea” occurred April 22-27, 2012, in the Yellow Sea and included the practicing of convoying, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft warfare, rescue and anti-piracy activities, as well as naval logistics. This type of joint naval exercise occurs every year in different locations. “Joint Sea-2015” was a geopolitical game changer; it became the hitherto largest joint naval exercise of the PLA Navy with a foreign navy. Occurring in the post-Ukraine context, its second stage occurred in the Mediterranean, considered the area of NATO. Before departing with Russian ships to the Mediterranean, Chinese warships entered the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This visit was the first in the history of ChinaRussia relations and was symbolically linked to Xi Jinping’s attendance of the Victory Parade in Moscow on May 9, 2015. During the drills, the two navies demonstrated a high level of coordination in foreign waters.79 In turn, “Joint Sea-2016,” which occurred September 12-19, 2016, involved surface ships, submarines, fixed-winged aircraft, helicopters, and amphibious 15 vehicles and became the first major exercise of its kind involving China and a second country in the disputed South China Sea after the Hague-based tribunal overruled China’s claims on the waters under its nine-dash line claim. 80 Although both China and Russia rushed to announce that the drills did not target any third party, given the international context, “Joint Sea-2016” has sent a strong signal to the rest of the world. Combined, the “Peace Mission” and “Joint Sea” military exercises ensure that every year China and Russia have one or two large-scale joint military exercises involving thousands of servicemen and hundreds of military vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and naval ships. Some observers in Russia note that the vast geographic range of the China-Russia military drills, which spans from on and off the coast of eastern China to Central Russia and Central Asia, and the leap in geography toward the Mediterranean Sea show that the two countries are sending a message to the world about their close military partnership and demonstrating strategic unity in one of Eurasia’s strategically most important and volatile regions.81 Most recently, the two countries have launched new types of smaller-scale military exercises, such as ballistic missile defense simulation exercises and regular exercises for internal security troops involving Russia’s National Guards and China’s police units.82 The inclusion of these activities raises the number of Chinese-Russian joint military drills to 4-5 per year. The last indicator of moderate institutionalization in our framework is the trust and confidence building measures (criterion 5). In the context of China-Russia relations, bilateral trust building is related to issues of the common border and policies in Central Asia, which Russia considers an area of its priority strategic interests. Undefended borders create vulnerabilities between states. Trusting states such as Canada and the United States do not actively patrol their common borders and do not worry about the ensuing vulnerability because bilateral hostilities are highly unlikely. In contrast, active surveillance, of the type employed by the United States and the Soviet Union, suggests that the two superpowers are concerned that, without this oversight, cheating would occur.83 Despite the complex history of the China-Russia border and the border conflicts of the 1960s, which are still remembered in both countries, it was the multiple bilateral border negotiations from which the subsequent trust-building measures, including border demilitarization and desecuritization as well as various inter-military information exchanges, gradually developed. On December 18, 1992, Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Guiding Principle for the Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces and the Strengthening of Trust in the Border Region, according to which the two countries intended to create a “common border of trust.”84 Two years later, in July 1994, the two countries signed another document, the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, the main goal of which was to further desecuritize the border by establishing regular consultations and information exchanges regarding the movements and activities of the two countries’ near-border army units. 85 Two months later, Jiang Zemin visited Russia, and complementing the successful settlement of the western part of the ChinaRussia border, the two countries signed an Agreement on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons against Each Other and Not Targeting Strategic Nuclear Weapons at Each Other, 86 after 16 which the bilateral relations were upgraded from “good neighborliness” to “constructive cooperation.” On November 10, 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang signed a new border agreement, settling the demarcation of the disputed 4300-km eastern sector of the China-Russia border, with the status of three islands lying in border rivers being subject to future negotiations. The agreement was followed by new CBMs, which included the China-Russia Protocol on Border Defense Information Exchange, signed in August 1998. 87 In December 1999, two other important border agreements – on the western and eastern parts of the China-Russia border – were signed. They legally settled almost the entire China-Russia common border and were accompanied by the removal of Chinese and Russian operational army units to a distance of 100 km from the border, creating a vast demilitarized area.88 The final resolution of all border issues occurred on October 14, 2004, through the signing of the Agreement on the Eastern Segment of the China-Russia Border, which resolved the issue of long-disputed islands – Bolshoi Ussuriisky Island and Bolshoi Island – and closed the book on territorial disputes in China-Russia relations. A new important confidence building measure was taken in 2009 by signing the Agreement on Mutual Notification about Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles, which established a new level of information sharing.89 The above-listed CBM are not meant to prove that the level of trust in China-Russia relations regarding the common border is the highest possible or that it is similar to the level of trust existing between the abovementioned US and Canada. After all, the presence of all these measures itself indicates that there is room for improvement, and more trust needs to be built. They show, however, that the two countries have openly recognized the issue and consistently worked on it, significantly improving the situation over the last ten years. Today, the China-Russia border is peaceful and desecuritized. The Russian city of Blagoveshchensk, located across the Amur River from the Chinese city of Heihe, impresses with its orderliness and, simultaneously, the absence of any visible security measures. Since 2017, annual ChinaRussia ice hockey “matches of friendship” occur every January on the icy surface of the Amur river exactly on the line of China-Russia border between Heihe and Blagoveshchensk (the Amur river in the area freezes every year between November and April with the thickness of ice during the coldest months reaching 1.2 meters, which can hold weight of up to 70 tons).90 Visa-free cross-border movements of Chinese and Russians in both directions occur daily, and the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, free from mutual fears or worries about malignant intentions or threats, prevails. The situation is the same in Khabarovsk – another city on the Russian side of the China-Russia border.91 The way the border is managed indicates that the issue of “lack of trust” in China-Russia relations has been resolved or at least controlled. There is a certain geopolitical sense of a big neighbor in both Russia and China. Both sides understand that border conflicts are extremely costly for both and that, therefore, it is better to coexist peacefully. Simultaneously, the way Russians view the Chinese has improved dramatically. More than 60% of ordinary Russians consider RussiaChina relations to be friendly. 92 Various public opinion research centers register positive perceptional dynamics in Russia-China relations since at least 2006.93 In turn, comparable public opinion polls in China demonstrate that more than 70% of Chinese individuals consider contemporary China-Russia relations to be “very good” or “good.”94 This finding 17 reconfirms the disappearance of the “China threat” complex from Russian society or negativity toward Russians from Chinese society. It is reasonable to expect that this situation will considerably facilitate Russia-China cooperation. 2.2. Deep Institutionalization: Criteria 6, 7, and 8 The problem with assessing deep institutionalization is the lack of data and information classification. One means of addressing this situation is to take a more careful look at the details of joint military activities. Although there is currently no evidence showing an exchange of military bases (criteria 7), and the emergence of a common defense policy (criteria 8) can only be assessed during wartime, the growing comprehensiveness and regularity of China-Russia military interactions reveal certain elements of episodic military force interoperability and an integrated military command (criteria 6). According to some assessments, there is a modest degree of compatibility and interoperability between Chinese and Russian forces.95 In this regard, some cases warrant specific mentioning. During the abovementioned “Peace Mission-2005,” a new system of command codes allowing the transmission of orders and communication between Russian and Chinese pilots was introduced. The system facilitates the execution of joint military tasks. “Peace Mission-2009” was also characterized by the improved coordination of military forces with elements of joint defense simulation. More elements of interoperability and integrated command could be registered during the “Peace Mission-2010,” when three Chinese H-6 and two Russian Mig-29s jet bombers were merged into a single squadron and completed joint tasks with the goal of practicing joint command codes and interoperability. 96 All China-Russia joint tasks during the drills are commanded in the Russian language. Chinese PLA soldiers and officers learn the Russian command system to facilitate interoperability.97 During “Joint Sea-2014,” the exercises included the joint defense of warships in anchorage, convoying and the rescuing of captured ships, episodes of anti-aircraft warfare, and various rescue operations. Importantly, all operations were coordinated from a joint command center. In turn, “Joint Sea-2015” marked a step forward, as it included the joint commanding of warships in the foreign waters of the Mediterranean Sea. For that, a joint command center was established in the Divnomorskoye Coordination Center of the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.98 According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the aim of the exercise was “to deepen China-Russia friendly and practical cooperation and increase our navies’ ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats.” 99 During the post-Hague tribunal “Joint Sea-2016,” which occurred in the South China Sea, the two countries’ navies carried out a range of activities, including search and rescue exercises, anti-submarine warfare, and, importantly, “joint island-seizing missions” – a new addition to the “Joint Sea”type drills. These observations make it possible to say that China-Russia military relations have begun moving into the initial stages of deep institutionalization, as it is conceived in the present framework. The current state of military interoperability and episodic joint command may not guarantee the consolidation of deep institutionalization or the emergence of joint 18 defense policies. However, it shows that the bilateral military interactions are highly functional and that there is a strong basis for a further enhancement that can be utilized in a time of need. Figure 1 summarizes the above analysis and provides a dynamic overview of the development of the four criteria of moderate institutionalization of China-Russia military cooperation since the collapse of the USSR. Each line represents a criterion examined above, whereas each elevation of a line shows the emergence of a new mechanism of cooperation. One can observe that, since 1991, China and Russia have built a comprehensive mechanism of inter-military cooperation that has steadily been expanding and that continues to expand as new mechanisms are added to the mix. Some argue that the current scale of China-Russia cooperation goes far beyond what some existing bilateral alliances, such as the alliance between the United States and Thailand, represent.100 Figure 1: Development of China-Russia Military Cooperation 3. Conclusion As indicated in the title of this paper, China-Russia military cooperation is “on the verge of an alliance.” Although one can still argue about how close it is to a true alliance or what a “true alliance” means in contemporary international politics, it is clear that the China-Russia military partnership is solid and comprehensive. It is also highly institutionalized and shows an upward incremental trend. The two countries view themselves as great powers and share hostility toward American hegemony in world politics. Hence, China-Russia military relations are not ad hoc but rather strategic. Not announcing an “alliance” by China and Russia does not mean that an “alliance” is not possible or not ready. Rather, delaying the official announcement, or not making such an announcement, may be beneficial for both China and Russia at the current time. 19 At the same time, “on the verge of an alliance,” as a characteristic of China-Russia military cooperation, should not be viewed as deterministically irreversible. While showing a high level of cooperation, it also highlights that the Rubicon has not been and may not be crossed. Indeed, as emphasized by Snyder, some alignments may, due to various exogenous and endogenous factors, begin to run counter to the prior patter of tacit alignment and thereby transform the pattern.101 It is not impossible for China-Russia military cooperation to start moving in opposite directions. While the American global dominance, which to a considerable extent drives this cooperation, is likely to last for a long time, there are multiple other factors that may affect the possibilities of further upgrading of China-Russia relations to the level of a fully-fledged military alliance. For example, China’s rather ambivalent stance towards Russia’s behavior in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 reveals that Beijing’s position on the issue of state sovereignty or vision of its own regional interests may not fully coincide with Moscow’s. The same ambivalence characterizes Russia’s reaction to the issue of crucial importance for Beijing – the SCS dispute.102 As areas of actual or potential political discord, one can also mention certain differences between Beijing’s and Moscow’s perspectives on NATO enlargement and the American missile defense system or the Xi Jinping leadership’s view on China’s new global role within the new form of great power politics with the United States. All these and other issues may or may not undermine ChinaRussia relations, depending on the system leader’s (the United States) behavior. Moreover, it is up to the states to decide on future steps, and the political will may not be there yet.103 How these factors will play out and what impact they will have on China-Russia relations is beyond the scope of this paper. The goal here was to show how closely China and Russia are aligned currently. This is believed to be a prerequisite for any further discussion of either the various likelihoods of a formal alliance or of China-Russia potential joint actions against the United States. It has been shown that China-Russia military alignment, if not yet an alliance, is currently in place and should be taken seriously. Notes “Putin Confirms Plans to Meet Chinese President during APEC Summit in Beijing,” Sputnik International, October 14, 2014, http://sputniknews.com/politics/20141014/194060827.html 2 See, for example, Sergei Karaganov, “Izbezhat’ Afganistana-2 [To Avoid Afghanistan-2].” Vedomosti, July 28, 2014, www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/29501801/izbezhat-afganistana-2 3 Yuri Tavrovsky, “Moskva-Pekin: Novaya Strategicheskaya Os’? [Moscow-Beijing: A New Strategic Axis?]” Russia in Global Affairs, October 23, 2013. 4 Mu Chunshan, “Why Doesn’t Russia Support China in the South China Sea?” The Diplomat, June 21, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/why-doesnt-russia-support-china-in-the-south-china-sea/ 5 See: Xuetong Yan, “The Weakening of the Unipolar Configuration,” in China 3.0, Mark Leonard, ed., (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), pp. 112-118; Dai Xu, “Kitayu i Rossii sleduent sozdat’ Evraziyskiy Alyans [China and Russia Should Create a Eurasian Alliance]” People’s Daily (Russian edition), January 30, 2012, http://russian.people.com.cn/95181/7714612.html. For a concise summary of recent Chinese arguments in favor of an alliance with Russia, see: Rensselaer Lee and Artyom Lukin, Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific and Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), pp. 117–20. 6 Igor Ivanov, ed., “Rossiysko-Kitayskiy Dialog: Model’ 2015 [Russia-China Dialogue: The Model 2015],” Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council, 2015, p. 6. 1 20 “Terrorist Surging in China: Blue Paper,” Beijing News, May 7, 2014, http://wcm.bjd.com.cn:8080/pub/jbw/10beijingnews/focus/201405/07/t20140507_6769522.html 8 Alexei Voskressenski, Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations, London: Routledge 2003, p. 208. 9 Alexandr Nemets, “Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance,” The Journal of International Security Affairs 11 (2006): 83-88; 10 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brother Again?” Asian Survey 41.5 (2001), p. 798. 11 See: Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning,” International Studies Quarterly 47, No. 4 (2003): 709-732. 12 For the resent discussion of military cooperation as a part of a broader analysis of China-Russia relations, see: Marcin Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations in The Post-Crisis International Order (New York: Routledge, 2015); Thomas Ambrosio, “The Architecture of Alignment: The Russia–China Relationship and International Agreements,” Europe-Asia Studies 6, No.1 (2017): 110-156; Liselotte Odgaard, “Beijing’s Quest for Stability in its Neighborhood: China’s Relations with Russia in Central Asia,” Asian Security 13, No. 1 (2017): 41-58; Michael Cox, “Not Just ‘Convenient’: China and Russia’s New Strategic Partnership in the Age of Geopolitics,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1, No. 4 (2016): 317-334; Marcin Kaczmarski, “Two Ways of Influencebuilding: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road Initiative, ” Europe-Asia Studies 69, No. 7 (2017): 1027-1046. 13 Ethan Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 20, 2017. 14 John Watts, Sofia Ledberg, Kjell Engelbrekt, “Brothers in Arms, yet Again? Twenty-First Century SinoRussian Strategic Collaboration in the Realm of Defence and Security,” Defence Studies 16, No. 4 (2016): 427449. 15 Quoted in Thomas Wilkins, “Russo-Chinese Strategic Partnership: A New Form of Security Cooperation?” Contemporary Security Policy 29, No. 2 (August 2008), p.358. 16 This understanding of the institutionalization of interstate alliances is inspired by Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” International Interactions, Vol. 31, No.3 (JulySeptember 2005):183-202. 17 See, for example: Stephen Blank, “The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China,” The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 1997; Donaldson and Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in RussianChinese Relations; Irina Isakova, Russian Defense Reform: Current Trends (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2006); Ji You, China's Military Transformation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). 18 The targeted interviews occurred in Tianjin (April 2016), Shanghai (May and September 2016), Moscow (July 2016), and Vladivostok (May 2015). The fieldwork, also accompanied by interviews with academics and regional bureaucrats, occurred in Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk, which are on the Russian side of ChinaRussia border, and Vladivostok in July 2016. It is recognized that some of the interviewees may not have direct access to foreign policy making, and therefore, their views should not be incautiously attributed to either Chinese or Russian officials. However, among the interviewees, there were some who do have relatively greater access to the foreign policy executives than most other scholars, mostly by means of regular meetings, advising and consulting, as well as by simply being in the loop of certain foreign policy-related correspondence and interactions. 19 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1. 20 Patricia Weitsman, ‘Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: the Central Powers and the Triple Entente’, Security Studies, 12:3 (2003), p. 7. 21 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. 22 Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1971): 262-289. 23 For instance, see: Leeds and Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance.” 24 The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project dataset http://atop.rice.edu/ 25 Correlates of War (COW) formal alliance dataset http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances 26 The literature argues that greater institutionalization, understood as increased policy coordination and formalization during peacetime, affects alliances’ reliability and credibility in deterring challenges and, therefore, their performance in military conflicts. See: James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1994): 270–297; Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1995): 405–425; James D. Fearon, “Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997): 68–90. 27 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why write them down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3.1 (2000): 63-83. 28 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.350-362. 7 21 Jeffrey Mankoff, “U.S. Perspective,” The Asan Forum 25 July 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/usperspective-3/. 30 Valerie Niquet, “French Perspective,” The Asan Forum 25 July 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/frenchperspective/. 31 Sergey Radchenko, “Multilateralism in Northeast Asia – 3,” The Asan Forum, http://www.theasanforum.org/multilateralism-in-northeast-asia-3/ accessed April 6, 2014 32 The full English text available at http://www.voltairenet.org/article173177.html. The treaty is still active and will most likely be automatically renewed after its first expiration in 2021. 33 Ibid. 34 Since 2013 the two leaders have met more than 20 times. With this number of contacts, the words of greeting by both evolved from “dear President” to “dear friend” and later to “my old friend.” See: The Chronology of Putin-Xi meetings with description of settings and full text speeches, available at the President of Russia web portal: http://kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/351. 35 Author’s interview with an expert on China-Russia military cooperation from the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 3 October 2016. 36 The full Russian text is available at http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102026598&rdk=&backlink=1, accessed 22 June 2016. 37 E-Zhong Jiang Meinian Juxing 4 Ci Zhanlue Anquan Cuoshang [Russia and China will hold Strategic Security Consultations 4 times a year], Sputnik News, 8 December 2009, http://sputniknews.cn/russia_china_relations/20091208/42655990.html 38 “Ministru Oboronu Rossii i Kitaya Provedut Segodnya v Sankt Peterburge Peregovoru ‘Na Poyah’ Soveschaniya Voennuh Vedomstv Stran SHOS [Defense Ministers of Russia and China Hold Negotiations in Saint Petersburg ‘On the Sidelines’ of the SCO Member-States’ Defense Ministries Summit], The Russian Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=12044152@egNews, accessed 2 July 2016. 39 “Oficeri CVO vstretilis s komandovaniem Pekinskogo voennogo okryga NOAK [Central Military District Officers Met with the Commanders of PLA’s Beijing Military District],” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 30 November 2015, http://stat.function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12070552@egNews, accessed 22 June 2016. 40 “O pervom raunde rossiisko-kitaiskogo dialoga po bezopasnosti v Severo-Vostochnoi Azii [About the first round of China-Russia Northeast Asia security dialogue],” The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 April 2015, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1207275 41 “Vustypleniya Presidenta Rossii V.V. Putina i Chlena Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Kitaya Tang Jiaxuena v hode Rossiisko-Kitaiskoi Vstrechi [The Address by the Russian President Putin and the member of the Chinese State Council Tang Jiaxuan during Russia-China meeting],” Moscow, Kremlin, The Russian President Media Service, 2 February 2005, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/cn//asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/449890 42 China-Russia Joint Communique (in Russian), The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2005, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/cn/-/asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/433748 43 “Ministru Oboronu Rossii i Kitaya Obsudili Perspectivu Dvyhstoronnih Otnoshenii [Russian and Chinese Defense Ministers Discussed the Prospects of Bilateral Cooperation],” The Russian Ministry of Defense, 27 April 2016, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=12084050@egNews, accessed 2 July 2016. 44 “Zhong E Liang Jun di Shiba Lun Zhanlue Cuoshang Zai Jing Juxing [The Eighteenth China-Russia InterMilitary Strategic Negotiations Take Place in Beijing], Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, 24 May 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/diplomacy/2016-05/24/content_4663577.htm, accessed 2 July 16. 45 Shaghai Hezuo Zuzhi Chengyuanguo Yuanshou Wufa Xuanyan [Ufa Declaration of the Heads of the SCO’s member States], 9 July 2015, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/ 46 “Segodniya v Pekine Proshli Rossiisko-Kitaiskie Konsul’tacii po Voprosam Yustitcii, Obschestvennoi Bezopasnosti i Pravoporiadka [Today Russia-China Consultations on Security Issues Took Place in Beijing],” Russian State Security Council, 13 September 2016, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/1136.html 47 O chetvertom raunde rossiisko-kitaiskogo dialoga po bezopasnosti v Severo-Vostochnoi Azii [About the fourth round of China-Russia Northeast Asia security dialogue], The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 July 2016, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/cn/-/asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/2376057 48 Pavel Felgengauer, “An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russia Defense Cooperation and Arms Trade,” in Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin, eds., Russia in the World of Arms Trade (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 97-103. 49 Ching Wei Lin, “Tantao Zhong-E Junshi Jishu Hezuo xin Dong Xiang [Exploring the Military Technology Cooperation between China and Russia],” Prospect and Exploration, Vol. 7, issue 8 (2009): 60-71. 29 22 50 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Cornell University Press 2009), p. 141. 51 For more details on Putin’s early policies in this sphere, see: Vadim Kozyulin, “Russian Arms Sales: Another Reform?” Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest, Vol.6, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp. 35-39, available at http://www.pircenter.org/en/security-index/134-yaderny-kontrol; Konstantin Makienko, “November 2000 – January 2001 Reform of Russian Defense Export System,” Moscow Defense Brief, No.1, 2001, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2001/at/rrdes/ 52 Cheung, Fortifying China, p. 141. 53 Ching-wei Lin, “Zhong-E Junshi Hezuo de Zhuanbian – Cong Zhong-E Lianhe Junyan Tantao [China-Russia Military Cooperation A Probe into China-Russia Joint Military Exercises],” Zhongguo Dalu Yanjiu [Mainland China Research], Vol. 49, Issue 4 (December 2006), pp. 49-75. 54 Vasily Kashin and Alexander Gabuev, “Vooruzhennaya Druzhba: Kak Rossiya i Kitai torguyut Orizhiem [An Armed Friendship: How Russia and China Trade Weapons],” Moscow Carnegie Center, November 2017, p. 14. 55 Kashin and Gabuev, “Vooruzhennaya Druzhba,” pp. 15-17. 56 List of acting agreements in the sphere of intellectual property protection between Russia and Foreign States http://www.ved.gov.ru/rus_export/protection/special/ 57 Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the XXII Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (Moscow: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 22 November 2014) http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/24454A08D48F695EC3257D9A004BA32E 58 “Voenno-Technicheskoe Sotrydnichestvo Rossii i Kotaya. Docie [China-Russia Military Technical Cooperation. A Dossier],” TASS Russian News Agency, 2 September 2015, http://tass.ru/info/2228966 59 “Novui Etap v Kitaisko-Rossiiskom Voenno-Technicheskom Sotrydnichestve [A New Stage in China-Russia MTC], People’s Daily (Russian edition), 15 December 2015, http://inosmi.ru/military/20151215/234815876.html 60 Roman Krecyl, “Rossiya i Kitai Usilivayut Sblizhenie v Voennoi Oblasti [China and Russia are accelerating Military Rapprochement]” Vzglizd, 19 November 2014, http://vz.ru/society/2014/11/19/716036.html 61 “Novui Etap v Kitaisko-Rossiiskom Voenno-Technicheskom Sotrydnichestve” 62 Krecyl, “Rossiya i Kitai Usilivayut Sblizhenie” 63 Krecyl, “Rossiya i Kitai Usilivayut Sblizhenie” 64 Krecyl, “Rossiya i Kitai Usilivayut Sblizhenie” 65 Krecyl, “Rossiya i Kitai Usilivayut Sblizhenie” 66 “Novui Etap v Kitaisko-Rossiiskom Voenno-Technicheskom Sotrydnichestve” 67 Vladimir Portyakov, “Vozvyshenie Kitaya: Chto Dal’she? [The Rise of China: What is Next?],” Russia in Global Affairs, July 2, 2014. 68 Lee and Lukin, Russia’s Far East, p. 106. 69 “Highlights: Russia’s Putin on 2012, China, Ukraine,” Reuters, September 7, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/09/07/russia-putin-quotes-idUKLDE6860DP20100907 70 Interview with an expert on China-Russia military cooperation, Moscow, October 2016. 71 This picture emerged during multiple interviews with both Russian and Chinese experts. 72 “Wojun Junshi Liuxue zhi Lu: Tansuo Zhong Kaituo Xin Jumia [The Overseas Military Education Path: Analysis of the New Situations], Jiefang Junbao [PLA’s Newspaper], 25 December 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-12/25/content_10556591_5.htm 73 Li Chenghong, “Zhong-E Junshi Jishu Hezuo: Xianzhuang, Wenti yu Duice [China-Russia Military Technical Cooperation: State of Affairs, Problems, and Strategies], Eluosi Yanjiu [Russian Studies], 2009, Vol.155, No.1. 74 Yu Xingwei, “Xin Shiqi Zhong-E Junshi Guanxi Fazhan Lunshu [Discussion of China-Russia Military Relations in the New Century], in Luan Jinghe, ed. Zhong-E Guanxi de Lishi yu Xianshi [History and Reality of China-Russia Relations], (Henan Daxue Chubanshe [Henan University Press], 2004), p.722. 75 Interview with an expert on China-Russia military cooperation, Moscow, October 2016. 76 Interview with an expert on China-Russia military cooperation, Singapore, October 2016. 77 “Zhong-E Lianhe Junyan: Jiefangjun Buzai Fengxing Bujement Zhengce [China-Russia Joint Military Drills: the PLA no Longer Pursues the Non-Alignment Policy],” Huangqiu Shibao [The Global Times], 14 July 2009, http://junshi.cctv.com/20090714/105454.shtml; “Zhongguo Ying Diudiao Huanxiang, Ba Shanghe Zuzhi Kuoda wei Junshi Tongmeng [China Should Abandon Illusions and Expand SCO into a Military Alliance], Tiexie Net, 21 July 2009, http://bbs.tiexue.net/post_3722517_1.html. 78 “Peace Mission 2010,” http://english.cntv.cn/english/special/peace_mission/home/index.shtml 79 Veronika Bondareva, “Rossiisko-Kitaiskie Ucheniya ‘Morskoe Vzaimodeistvie’. Dos’e [China-Russia Exercises ‘Joint Sea.’ Dossier], Russian News Agency TASS, 19 August 2015, http://tass.ru/info/1960969. For more on “Joint Sea 2015,” also see: “Korabli VMF Rossii i VMS Kitaya Otrabotali Zadachi Popolneniya Zapasov na Hody i Kovoirovaniya Sudov [Russian and Chinese Navies Practiced Supplying and Ship 23 Convoying],” Russian Ministry of Defence, 19 May 2015, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=12034576@egNews. 80 Ankit Panda, “Chinese, Russian Navies to Hold 8 Days of Naval Exercises in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, 12 September 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/chinese-russian-navies-to-hold-8-days-of-navalexercises-in-the-south-china-sea/ 81 Trenin, “From Greater Europe to Greater Asia?” 82 Participatory observations from the seminar “Russian-Chinese Military and Defense Industry Cooperation Since the Beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis” by Vasily Kashin, Visiting Fellow, Military Transformations Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 3 October 2016. 83 Hoffman, Aaron M., “A conceptualization of trust in international relations,” European Journal of International Relations 8.3 (2002): 375-401. 84 Zhong-E Guanyu Zai Bianjing Diqu Xianghu Caijian Junshi Liliang he Jiaqiang Junshi Lingyu Xinren Wenti de Liangjie Beiwanglu [The Memorandum of Understanding on the Guiding Principle for the Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces and the Strengthening of Trust in the Border Region], http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=eagn&Gid=100669717&EncodingName= 85 Zhong-E Yufang Weixian Junshi Huodong Xieding http://www.chinabaike.com/article/baike/1000/2008/200805111442468.html 86 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/3b_1.pdf?_=1316627913 87 Shannon Kile, Appendix 2. Chronology of principal defence-and security-related agreements and initiatives involving the Russian Federation and Asian countries, 1992–99, SIPRI. 88 Wu Yan, “Juxing Lianhe Junyan: Zhon-E Hui Jiecheng Junshi Tongmeng Ma? [Joint Military Exercises: Will China and Russia Form a Military Alliance?], Renmin Want [People’s Daily], 10 July 2002, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/62/20020710/772735.html 89 “Kuai Xun: ZhongE Qianshu Xinghu Tongbao Fashe Dandao Daodan he Hangtian Yunzai Huojian de Xieding [Express News: China and Russia Sign Agreement on Mutual Notification about Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles], China News, 13 October 2009, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/10-13/1908552.shtml 90 “Hokeistu is Rossii i Kitaya Sugrayut v Hokkei na Granitce na L’dy Amura [Hockey Players from Russia and China will Play Hockey on the Border on the Ice of Amur River],” Ria Novosti, 14 January 2018, https://ria.ru/society/20180114/1512566069.html. 91 During the fieldtrip, none of the interviews revealed any presence of the “Chinese threat.” Quite the opposite, the prevailing view in these cities, at least among academics and bureaucrats, is that Russia’s development of its eastern regions is not possible without active Chinese involvement. 92 Levada-Center, population survey “Vneshnepoliticheskie vragi i dryz’ya Rossii [Foreign Enemies and Friend of Russia], 26-29 September 2014, http://www.levada.ru/21-10-2014/vneshnepoliticheskie-vragi-i-partneryrossii, accessed 12 December 2014. 93 FOM survey “Otnosheniya mezhdy Rossiei i Kitaem” [Relationship between Russia and China], 5-6 April 2014, http://fom.ru/Mir/11460#, accessed 14 December 2014. 94 Pan Deli and Wu Wei, “Zhong-E Liangguo Lianghao Guanxi de Yinzheng – ‘Zhongguo Ren Yanzhong de Eluosi’ Shehui Yulun Diaocha [The Evidence of Good Relations between China and Russia – Public Survey ‘Russian in the Eyes of the Chinese],” Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu [Russian, Central Asian, and European Studies], No. 5 (2008): 79-85. 95 Trenin, “From Greater Europe to Greater Asia?” 96 “Peace Mission 2010,” http://english.cntv.cn/english/special/peace_mission/home/index.shtml 97 Author’s interview with an expert on China-Russia military relations, Singapore, 11 October 2016. 98 Tom Parffit, ‘Russia-China Clinch Tightens With Joint Navy Exercises in Mediterranean,’ The Telegraph, 11 May 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11596851/Russia-China-clinch-tightenswith-joint-navy-exercises-in-Mediterranean.html 99 “China, Russia to hold first joint Mediterranean naval drills in May,” Reuters, 30 April 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia-military-idUSKBN0NL16F20150430 100 Lee and Lukin, Russia’s Far East. 101 Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter, 1991), 125. 102 For more on China’s and Russia’s reactions to each other’s crises situations, see: Alexander Korolev and Vladimir Portyakov, “China-Russia Relations in Times of Crises: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation,” Asian Perspective, forthcoming. 103 See a very balanced article by Fu Ying, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, who sends a clear message to the American readership that by no means is the China-Russia relationship simply a “marriage of convenience” because it is complex, sturdy, and 24 deeply rooted. Simultaneously, however, it is not an “alliance.” See: Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow are Close by Not Allies,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2016): 96-105. 25

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