An Archaeology of Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion:
Conflict Landscapes of Western Sahara
In Two Volumes:
Volume One
Salvatore Garfi
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
University of East Anglia
School of Art History and World Art Studies
August 2014
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone
who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with
the author and that use of any information derived there from must be
in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any
quotation or extract must include full attribution.
Abstract
When Spain gave up its colony of Spanish (now Western) Sahara in 1975, it was
annexed by Morocco and Mauritania. A sixteen-year war ensued, leaving the country
divided between Morocco and the Polisario Front. This unresolved conflict left
indelible scars on the landscape, mainly battlescapes, made up of numerous field
fortifications littered with the detritus of war, and ‘the berm’ (or ‘berms’) a succession
of fortified earth and stone walls constructed by Morocco between 1980 and 1987,
partitioning a formerly pastoral landscape, and excluding pro-independence Saharawis
from the western four-fifths of their country.
This dissertation will explore how this desert landscape has been transformed by
colonialism and war, and how in some ways, the Saharawi people are actively reappropriating their land. This will be done by looking at the landscape at three levels
of resolution. The broadest, or national level, will chart the growth and spread of the
berms, illustrating the material extent of Moroccan colonial control, and the exclusion
of Saharawis within and outside the territory. The middle, or regional level, will
explore the militarisation of one settlement – Tifariti – which was fought over during
the war, and which hosted a unique art festival between 2007 and 2010. The third,
finer level, will look at the land art that was created as a result of the art festival, and
which is now a new stratum of contemporary archaeology, overlying the extensive
prehistoric archaeology evident in the region.
A great number of national barriers are at this moment being raised around the globe,
with countries adopting siege mentalities with their neighbours. This dissertation will
explore how archaeology can apply a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing upon a
variety of resources, to help us understand the contemporary phenomena of conflict
and exclusion, through the unique example of Western Sahara.
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Table of Contents
Volume One
Title Page
1
Abstract
2
Table of Contents
3
List of Figures
6
Acknowledgements
14
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
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Archaeology and Modern Conflict
20
Issues and Questions Driving this Research
33
Structure of Dissertation
37
Summary
39
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES
42
Introduction
42
‘The right tools for the job’
44
Visual and Geographic Sources
46
Oral History: oral testimony and interviews, blogs and videos
64
Archaeological Field Survey
70
Summary
70
CHAPTER 3: SHAPING A COLONIAL SPACE
73
Part 1: The Land, its People, Colonialism and Conflict
73
Geography
73
Children of the Clouds
74
Factories, Forts and Barbed Wire
80
Tracing out a Pacified Region
90
The Making of a Spanish Sahara
94
From Spanish Sahara to Moroccan Sahara
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3
Part 2: ‘Wall upon wall are between us’
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World War Walls
103
‘Little War’ Walls
105
Summary
110
CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE BERMS
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Part 1: Studying the Moroccan Berms
112
Charting and Describing the Berms
113
A ‘Virtual’ Survey of the Berms
119
Chronology and Outline Descriptions of the Territorial Berms
123
Part 2: Towards an Anatomy of the Berms
137
The Architecture of the Moroccan Barriers
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Ramparts to Berms
139
On Forts and Fortlets
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Mural Forts and Fortlets
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Small Mural Installations and Mural Compounds
158
Fire Support Bases
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Other Installations: installations in the rear
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Summary
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CHAPTER 5: CONFRONTING THE BERMS
171
Mobile Guerrilla Tactics
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Polisario Confronting the Berms
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Moroccan Soldiers and the Berms
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Crossing the Berms
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Summary
185
CHAPTER 6: THE LANDSCAPES OF TIFARITI
187
Pre-Islamic Archaeology in the Tifariti Area
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Archaeology From the Arrival of Islam to the Spanish Colonial Era
189
Archaeology of the Spanish Colonial Period at Tifariti
191
The Archaeology of War at Tifariti
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The Defensive ‘Box’ at Tifariti
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The Archaeology of the Tifariti Box: the salient features
206
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Descriptions of Defensive Features at Tifariti
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The Archaeology of the Tifariti Box: a landscape of defence
212
Applying KOCOA to the Tifariti Box
213
The Archaeology of the Tifariti box: Tifariti besieged
218
The Archaeology of Post War Tifariti
225
Recent Pastoral Settlement at Tifariti
228
Sites of Political Re-Appropriation
231
A Multiplicity of Layers – a Multiplicity of Meanings
233
CHAPTER 7: ARTifariti
234
Art on the Land
237
A Landscape of Solidarity, Commemoration and Protest
257
District Six, South Africa
258
Peace Camp, Nevada
261
Summary
262
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
264
Introduction
264
Recapitulating Content
265
Archaeological Consequences
269
Future Directions
275
Glossary
278
Bibliography
280
Volume Two
APPENDICES AND FIGURES
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Appendix 1: The Tifariti History Plaque
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Appendix 2: Summary gazetteer of berm installations
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Appendix 3: Gazetteer of ARTifariti artworks record in 2011
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Figures
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List of Figures
Volume Two
Fig. 3.1: General map of Western Sahara
Fig. 3.2: Extent of traditional tribal ranges in Western (Spanish) Sahara
Fig. 3.3: The position of Villa Cisneros on the Dakhla peninsular along
Fig. 3.4: An early view of the fort at Villa Cisneros
Fig. 3.5: A post card dated 1910 illustrating the fort at Villa Cisneros
Fig. 3.6: Ruins of the probable French fort at Zug
Fig. 3.7: 1926 aerial view of the expanded fort at Villa Cisneros
Fig. 3.8: By 1934 Western Sahara was enclosed by French and Spanish forts
Fig. 3.9: Spanish expansion in the 1930s and 1940s
Fig. 3.10: A very early view of the fort at Tichla
Fig. 3.11: The fort at Tifariti garrisoned by the Spanish Foreign Legion
Fig. 3.12: The new desert forts built by the Spanish in the 1960s
Fig. 3.13: Outline of ‘Greater Morocco’
Fig. 3.14: The partition of Western Sahara
Fig. 3.15: Map of the Moroccan ‘berms’ built between 1980-1987
Fig. 4.1: Google Earth image of Western Sahara showing the extent of (Digital
Globe and Geo-Eye) high resolution imagery
Fig. 4.2: Google Earth imagery showing the digitised traces of the Moroccan
berms across Western Sahara
Fig. 4.3: Spanish military map of 1960 showing the digitised traces of the
Moroccan berms
Fig. 4.4: Table of descriptive terminology applied to berm embankments
Fig. 4.5: Table of the basic descriptive types of military installations recorded
along the berms
Fig. 4.6: Map of Western Sahara showing selected rectangles for ‘snapshots’
of the berms
Fig. 4.7: Map of Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.8: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Part 1 of Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.9: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Part 2 of Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.10: Comparative table showing the differences and similarities between
parts 1 and 2 of Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.11: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 1) and
Berm No. 2, within and adjacent to rectangles 124 and 157
Fig. 4.12: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 2) in
Rectangle 215
Fig. 4.13: Map of Berm No. 2
Fig. 4.14: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Berm No. 2
Fig. 4.15: Map of Berm No. 3
Fig. 4.16: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Berm No. 3
Fig. 4.17: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 3, in rectangles
92 and 126
Fig. 4.18: Map of Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.19: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
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installations, making up Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.20: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle
100
Fig. 4.21: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle
952
Fig. 4.22: Map of Berm No. 5
Fig. 4.23: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Berm No. 5
Fig. 4.24: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle
359
Fig. 4.25: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle
583
Fig. 4.26: Map of Berm No. 6
Fig. 4.27: Table listing the different types of barriers, their lengths, and the
installations, making up Berm No. 6
Fig. 4.28: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 6, in rectangle
853
Fig. 4.29: Google Earth image along Berm No.1 in rectangle 124, the
embankment is triangular in section
Fig. 4.30: A Google Earth image showing a section of Berm No.1 in rectangle
215, the top of the embankment appears to be flat or slightly indented
Fig. 4.31: Part of Berm No.1 shown on Google Earth in rectangle 124, with
clear evidence of being bulldozed from both sides
Fig. 4.32: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.5 in rectangle 583,
with short sections of secondary banks
Fig. 4.33: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.1 between
rectangles 124 and 157, with a secondary barrier
Fig. 4.34: A low resolution Google Earth image showing parallel banks along
Berm No.2 at the Smara salient
Fig. 4.35: Google Earth image of Berm No.5 showing a frontal defensive bank
with subsidiary, intermediate banks, just west of rectangle 491
Fig. 4.36: A Google Earth image from rectangle 359, showing a multiple
embanked section of Berm No.5
Fig. 4.37: A Google Earth image of a triple embanked section of Berm No. 4
in rectangle 100
Fig. 4.38: A low level aerial photo showing a Paris-Dakar rally car passing
through the Moroccan Berm
Fig. 4.39: A low resolution image from Google Earth showing a stretch of
Berm No. 2 in Mauritania and indicating the crossing point though the
Moroccan Berm shown in Fig. 4.38
Fig. 4.40: View of Berm No. 4 taken near the border with Algeria
Figure 4.41: A view of the Moroccan barrier at ground level, photographed
near Tifariti
Fig. 4.42: One of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets from Google
Earth: redundant fortlet (flt 10) on Berm No.1
Fig. 4.43: Second of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets from Google
Earth: redundant fort (ft 163) on Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.44: Third of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets: a concentric,
fort (ft 685) with rounded corners on Berm No.3
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Fig. 4.45: Fourth of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets: fort (ft
1335) on a redundant part of Berm No.5
Fig. 4.46: Google Earth image of a semi-circular fortlet (flt 1252) on Berm
No.4
Fig. 4.47: Google Earth image of a semi-circular fort (ft 1250) on Berm No.4
Fig. 4.48: Google Earth image showing a sub-circular fort (ft 1597) on Berm
No. 5
Fig. 4.49: Google Earth image of a kidney shaped fort (ft 1387) on Berm No.5
Fig. 4.50: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 1391) on Berm
No.5
Fig. 4.51: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 681) on Berm
No.3
Fig. 4.52: Low level aerial view of fort ft 681
Fig. 4.53: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 687) at the
junction of Berms No. 3 and No. 4
Fig. 4.54: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 1269) on Berm
No. 4
Fig. 4.55: Google Earth image of a partly complex, fort (ft 1648) on Berm No.
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Fig. 4.56: Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 145) on Berm No.1
Fig. 4.57: Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 1274) on Berm No.4
Fig. 4.58: A Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 290) on Berm No.1
Fig. 4.59: A very good example of a concentrically embanked fort on one of
the Moroccan berms
Fig. 4.60: View of a mural fort along one of the Moroccan berms
Fig. 4.61: An Israeli fort or strong point (Maozim) from the Bar Lev Line
Fig. 4.62: Still image from a YouTube showing Moroccan soldiers manning a
recoilless rifle in a bunker on the berm
Fig. 4.63: Berm No. 1. Google Earth image of two mural compounds and a
mural fort, with vehicular (‘tank’) slots
Fig. 4.64: Google Earth image of pcomp 132 on Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.65: Examples of small occupation positions on Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.66: Google Earth image of ftfb 133 on Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.67: Google Earth image of ftfba 16 on Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.68: Google Earth image of fsb 1470 behind Berm No. 5
Fig. 4.69: Google Earth image of fsb 1255 behind Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.70: Google Earth image of fsb 1327 behind Berm No. 5
Fig. 4.71: Google Earth image of fsb 1257 behind Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.72: Google Earth image of fsb 237 behind Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.73: Google Earth image of fsb 703 behind Berm No. 3
Fig. 4.74: Google Earth image of fsb 682 behind Berm No. 3
Fig. 4.75: Sketch of United States Army Fire Support Base Kramer in Vietnam
Fig. 4.76: Low level aerial photo of Fire Support Base Roy in Vietnam
Fig. 4.77: Unattributed photograph of a Moroccan fire support base behind one
of the berms
Fig. 4.78: Google Earth image of two compounds behind Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.79: Google Earth image of a fort in the rear (rft 1674), behind Berm No.
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Fig. 4.80: Google Earth image of a highly developed rear support fort (rft 282)
behind Berm No. 1
Fig. 4.81: Google Earth image of a rear support fort (rft 236) behind Berm No.
1
Fig. 4.82: Google Earth image of a rear support fort (rft 706) behind Berm No.
3
Fig. 4.83: Google Earth image showing rft 1588, strung out on a ridge behind
Berm No. 5
Fig. 4.84: Unattributed photograph of a Moroccan installation, presumably
behind one of the berms and situated on a hill top ridge
Fig. 4.85: Google Earth image of garrison gar 1112 behind Berm No. 4
Fig. 4.86: Unattributed photograph of an unfortified army garrison behind one
the berms: part of gar 1112 in Fig. 4.85
Fig. 6.1: Map showing the location of the TF1 study area of the WSP, north of
the larger Tifariti Study Area (2011)
Fig. 6.2: Distribution map of funerary archaeology from the WSP TF1 Study
Area to Tifariti
Fig. 6.3: Photograph showing the vegetation in the Wadi Tifariti
Fig. 6.4: Distribution of prehistoric remains in the Tifariti Study Area
Fig. 6.5: The TF1 study area – the disposition of late, probably Islamic period
burials, amidst earlier prehistoric funerary monuments
Fig. 6.6: View of the impressive standing stones site, WS001 in the TF1 study
area, with Islamic period burials
Fig. 6.7: Map of caravan routes from 1700 to 1900 in the western Sahara
Fig. 6.8: Map showing the route taken by Lt. Col. Mouret in his raid on Smara
in 1913
Fig. 6.9: Plan of Spanish colonial Tifariti, 1964 to 1975
Fig. 6.10: Low level aerial image of colonial Tifariti, looking south
Fig. 6.11: Photograph of the fort at Tifariti taken in 2007
Fig. 6.12: Plan of the Spanish fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.13: Composite image of the east facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.14: Photograph of the Spanish fort at Hausa, taken in January-February
1969
Fig. 6.15: Composite image of the west facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.16: The fort at Echdeiria
Fig. 6.17: View of the rear, north facing wall of the fort at Tifariti taken in
2007
Fig. 6.18: November 1974 view of the rear wall of the fort at Echdeiria
Fig. 6.19: South facing elevation along the north side of the central courtyard
of the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.20: West facing elevation along the east side of the central courtyard of
the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.21: East facing elevation along the west side of the central courtyard of
the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.22: The interior of the fort at Tifariti while it was garrisoned by Spanish
troops
Fig. 6.23: View of the gateway into the 1940s fort at Tichla
Fig. 6.24: A 1970 photograph showing the central courtyard of the fort at
Hausa
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Fig. 6.25: Photograph showing the courtyard of the fort at Bir Enzaren filled
with trees
Fig. 6.26: Low level aerial view of the Spanish post and fort at Bir Enzaren
Fig. 6.27: ‘View of the school, medical clinic and Territorial Police
Headquarters in the northern town of Hausa’
Fig. 6.28: View of the remains of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti,
looking southwest
Fig. 6.29: View of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti, looking northwest
Fig. 6.30: View of Spanish post commander’s accommodation/office at Tifariti
Fig. 6.31: View of the bake house behind the fort at Tifariti
Fig. 6.32: View showing the concrete posts that supported the gravity fed pipe
that provided water to the Tifariti Fort
Fig. 6.33: View of the posts that carried a water pipe to the subsidiary cistern
at the Commander’s quarters
Fig. 6.34: Looking west over a part of the Spanish garrison’s rubbish dump
Fig. 6.35: Possibly the site of the earliest well in Tifariti
Fig. 6.36: Google Earth view of the remains of the colonia at Tifariti
Fig. 6.37: View of low cost housing in El Ayoun in the 1960s
Fig. 6.38: View of Moroccan soldier’s graves in the Tifariti cemetery
Fig. 6.39: A view of local Saharawi graves in the Tifariti cemetery
Fig. 6.40: A panorama of Mahbes
Fig. 6.41: View of a shallow ‘skirmisher trench’ or ‘scrape’
Fig. 6.42: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of single man foxhole, or slit
trench
Fig. 6.43: Moroccan defences at Tifariti.View of a large, or two-man foxhole,
or slit trench
Fig. 6.44: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Possible machine gun or heavy
portable gun position fronted with boulder parapet
Fig. 6.45: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A stone parapetted, presumed, special
purpose dug out
Fig. 6.46: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A probable mortar pit
Fig. 6.47: A recent image of a mortar pit
Fig. 6.48: Google Earth image of Moroccan defensive positions along the
western perimeter of the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.49: Google Earth image of dug out Moroccan fighting positions linked
by trenches
Fig. 6.50: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a group of dug out fighting
positions linked by a trench
Fig. 6.51: View of Moroccan field housing at Tifariti
Fig. 6.52: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti
Fig. 6.53: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti, with a tin can for a window
Fig. 6.54: Moroccan Army field structure in the Wadi Tifariti at the TF1 study
area
Fig. 6.55: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular, or ‘tank’, slot in
the Tifariti redoubt
Fig. 6.56: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular slot in the Tifariti
redoubt
Fig. 6.57: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A Google Earth view of gun pits in a
wadi
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Fig. 6.58: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Another Google Earth view of gun
pits in a wadi
Fig. 6.59: Google Earth image showing the Spanish airstrip
Fig. 6.60: Distribution of defensive features around Tifariti
Fig. 6.61: Distribution of defensive features located over key terrain
Fig. 6.62: Disposition of the inner defensive box around Tifariti
Fig. 6.63: Viewshed around the inner, Tifariti defensive box
Fig. 6.64: Viewshed from the outer, Tifariti defensive box
Fig. 6.65: The combined inner and outer viewsheds in and around the entirety
of the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.66: Distribution of entrenched defences within and around the Tifariti
box
Fig. 6.67: Distribution of built up structures in and around the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.68: Distribution of artillery gun pits in and around the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.69: Distribution of vehicular slots in and around the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.70: An illustrative density plot of all the defensive features making up
the Tifariti box
Fig. 6.71: Map indicating avenues of approach into Tifariti
Fig. 6.72: A disused Polisario/SPLA shelter in the Akhchach area northeast of
Tifariti
Fig. 6.73: The location of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’
Fig. 6.74: The approximate centre of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’
Fig. 6.75: A captured, American made, Moroccan jeep with a 105mm
recoilless rifle
Fig. 6.76: A vehicular slot on high ground in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’
Fig. 6.77: View of a vehicular slot situated in a low-lying position
Fig. 6.78: Composite panorama of buidings in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’
Fig. 6.79: A large prehistoric tumulus with the remains of Moroccan soldiers’
shelters built into its flank
Fig. 6.80: Google Earth image of a Moroccan proclamation proclaiming: ‘God,
The Nation, The King’
Fig. 6.81: Google Earth image of central Tifariti today
Fig. 6.82: Bedouin pastoral ranges before and after the war with Morocco
Fig. 6.83: Distribution of imprints of tent encampments in the Tifariti Study
Area visible on Google Earth, dated 21 February 2006
Fig. 6.84: Distribution of tent sites in the Tifariti Study Area occupied and
visible on Google Earth, dated 21 February 2006
Fig. 6.85: The imprints of tent sites visible on Google Earth set up after 21
February 2006 but deserted by 14 May 2008
Fig. 6.86: Tent sites, occupied and visible on Google Earth as of 14 may 2008
Fig. 6.87: Examples of traditional and modern Saharawi tents
Fig. 6.88: Google Earth view, in the Tifariti area, of the impressions left from
modern tents after a tent site has been abandoned
Fig. 6.89: Distribution of tent sites as of 14 May 2008 overlying tent sites of
21 February 2006
Fig. 6.90: Google Earth image of impressions of tents set up for Polisario
National Congresses at Tifariti
Fig. 6.91: View of Tifariti with tents from one of the Polisario Congresses
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Fig. 6.92: Plot of tent locations for Polisario National Congresses held at
Tifariti in 2003 and 2007
Fig. 6.93: The old Spanish airstrip. Now the parade ground for Polisario
National Congresses held in Tifariti
Fig. 6.94: Map of Western Sahara by the stands at the Tifariti parade ground
Fig. 7.95: Stone representation of the Saharawi flag on a hillside just west of
central Tifariti
Fig. 7.1: Distribution of all visible out-of-door ARTifariti artworks, recorded
in 2011
Fig. 7.2: Distribution of artworks from ARTifariti 2007 recorded in 2011
Fig. 7.3: Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22) by Fernando Pinteño (ARTifariti 2007)
Fig. 7.4: Google Earth image of Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22)
Fig. 7.5: Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return (AR21), also known as
Camino del Aaiún or The Way to El-Ayoun (ARTifariti 2007-08)
Fig. 7.6: View to the northwest along The Way to El-Ayoun (AR21).
Fig. 7.7: Proyecto de Eliminacón 1 or Removal Project 1 by Carlos de Gredos
Fig. 7.8: Proyecto de Eliminacón 2 or Removal Project 2 (AR24) by Carlos de
Gredos (ARTifariti 2007)
Fig. 7.9: Distribution of ARTifariti 2008 artworks recorded in 2011
Fig. 7.10: Caballo de Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13)
by Rolando de la Rosa (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.11: The head of the sculpture, the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13)
Fig. 7.12: El Muro de la Vergüenza, or The Wall of Shame (AR10) by
Federico Guzman (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.13: Victimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims (AR8) by Karim Sergoua
(ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.14: Gritos bajo los escombros de Tifariti or Cries under the ruins of
Tifariti (AR23) by Abd el Kader Belhorissat (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.15: El renacimiento de un pueblo or The Rebirth of a Nation (AR23a)
by Djeddal Adlane (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.16: Un orden estblecido or An established order (AR23b) by Barris
Syphax (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.17: Wall painting simply entitled S/T (AR23c) by Azzouz Seïf El Islem
(ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.18: No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards (AR3) by
Bessaï Zineddine (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.19: Silhouette portraits of the Algerian delegation of artists at ARTifariti
2008, El Grupo or The Group (AR3a)
Fig. 7.20: Graffiti like paintwork on the north range of the Spanish fort
(AR23d), ARTifariti 2008
Fig. 7.21: Viajando al Paraíso or Travelling Paradise (AR11) by Maria
Ortega Estepa (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.22: La sombra del gnomon or The shadow of the gnomon (AR25) by
Guillermo Roiz (ARTifariti 2008)
Fig. 7.23: Distribution of ARTifariti 2009 artworks recorded in 2011
Fig. 7.24: Muro de la Vergüenza ‘F Word’ Tour 2010 or Wall of Shame ‘F
Word’ Tour (ARTifariti 2009) by Francis Gomila
Fig. 7.25: Fósforo: Piss for peace or PHOSPHOR: Piss for peace (ARTifariti
2009) by Francis Gomila and Bettina Semmer
12
203
204
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
210
211
211
212
213
214
214
215
216
217
218
219
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
Volume Two
Fig. 7.26: Ficción o realidad or Fiction or Reality (AR8a) by Kenza Mebarak
(ARTifariti 2009)
Fig. 7.27: Distribution of ARTifariti 2010 artworks recorded in 2011
Fig. 7.28: Portrait of Nayem El Garhi (AR4) by Federico Guzman (ARTifariti
2010)
Fig. 7.29: U’m Dreiga, or Oum Dreiga (AR18) by Mohamed Moulud Yeslam
(ARTifariti 2010)
Fig. 7.30: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures outside traditional
tents carrying out ‘daily chores’
Fig. 7.31: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures in agony from a
napalm attack
Fig. 7.32: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) with the artist
Fig. 7.33: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing a crow or raven clasping
a Saharawi baby
Fig. 7.34: ‘The Massacre of Gdaeim Izik’ – with crows or ravens eating
Saharawi children
13
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
Acknowledgements
The University of East Anglia funded this PhD by awarding me a Faculty of Arts and
Humanities Dean’s Postgraduate Research Studentship. Both the School of Art
History and World Art Studies, and the Humanities Faculty funded my fieldwork and
assisted with conference costs.
I wish to thank the Office of the Ministry of Culture of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) for allowing me to visit the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf,
Algeria, and for carrying out fieldwork in the SADR administered zone of Western
Sahara in 2011. Thanks are also extended to the SADR representatives in London who
expedited my request to carry out fieldwork. A very special thank you is extended to
Malainin Larkhal (of the Sahawari Journalists and Writers Union) who, acting as
facilitator and interpreter in the field, made all of the necessary arrangements for my
accommodation in the Saharawi camps in Algeria, and arranged my transport,
accommodation, and victualing, while accompanying me in Western Sahara. Thanks
also go to Hamdi Touballi and his wife’s family, who looked after me while I was in
the refugee camps in Tindouf.
I am grateful to the organisers and artists of the ARTifariti 2011 Arts Festival for
allowing me to intrude on them during the time that I was in Tindouf. I am also very
thankful to the founder of the festival, Fernando Peraita, who was welcoming, and
gladly gave me his time for an interview. In particular, I am grateful to Federico
‘Fico’ Guzman, who was enthusiastic and hospitable, giving me an afternoon of his
time and talking about his involvement with, and commitment to, ARTifariti, and the
Saharawi people.
I am extremely grateful to all of the Saharawis who allowed me to interview them, and
to those who were able to tell me their personal ‘stories’. I am also grateful to
Malainin Larkhal and Hamdi Touballi, as well as Vivian Solana Moreno (from the
University of Toronto) for acting as interpreters, without whom this fieldwork could
14
not have been undertaken. Additionally, I am very glad that I was able to frequently
email Malainin Larkhal, upon my return to the U.K., who gladly answered any further
questions that I had.
Here in the U.K. I am grateful to Matthew Richards, lecturer in Spanish at
Aberystwyth University, who arranged for two of his students, Stephanie Morgan and
Joe Scott, to transcribe and translate Spanish language videos from the Internet,
referenced in this research. Additionally, I am grateful to Alexander Wasse for freely
giving his time to translate texts from Arabic to English for me: in particular, the
‘Tifariti History Plaque’. I must also thank Action on Armed Violence (formerly Land
Mine Action) who provided me with GIS plots of minefields and unexploded
ordnance around Tifariti and elsewhere in Western Sahara.
This research would not have been embarked upon if I had not been invited to join the
Western Sahara Project (WSP) of the University of East Anglia, in 2007. By carrying
out archaeological fieldwork in the Western Sahara badiya, near Tifariti, I became
acutely aware of the impact of colonialism and war on the land, so I am indebted to
Drs. Joanne Clarke and Nick Brooks, co-directors of the WSP. I am also indebted to
my colleagues on the project in 2007 and 2008, and to Mark Milburn who did research
on the fort at Zug after taking part in fieldwork with Nick Brooks, in Western Sahara,
in 2005. The Saharawi facilitator of the WSP, Bachir Achmed Bhaua, must not go
unmentioned. Besides being an inestimable expedition organiser and comrade in the
field, he was also a font of local knowledge.
At UEA, I must thank Joanne Clarke (my primary supervisor) for her enthusiasm and
support, and for initially encouraging me with my application to the School of Art
History and World Art Studies. I must also thank the then Head of School, Prof. John
Mack (my secondary supervisor), for his equal enthusiasm and support. I am very
grateful to Dr. Rob Liddiard (a fellow conflict archaeologist) of the School of History,
for reading over some of my work and giving me positive feedback; and I have to
thank all of the other conflict archaeologists, postgraduates or otherwise, who I met at
the numerous conferences that I have attended over the last four years, who also
encouraged me with my research.
15
Above all, I have to thank my wife, Barbara, who tolerated our lost weekends, and my
long hours, week in and week out since Autumn 2010. Without her love, patience, and
support, I could never have completed this dissertation.
16
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The 20th century, and by extension, the 21st century, is an age in which conflict has
forever been present. Indeed, the historian Niall Ferguson has epitomised the many
conflicts of this era as one ‘War of the World’.1 This period has seen an
unprecedented industrialisation of war, the breaking up of great empires, both old and
newly born in the 20th century, and the creation of new nation states. It has also seen
the partitioning of countries and territories, and the increasing defence of frontiers
with extensive physical barriers explicitly designed to prevent human movement
across space. Colonialism was supposed to have ended in the 1960s, but by the middle
of the 1970s, extraterritoriality has prospered in its vacuum creating neo-colonial
relationships based on newly defined geo-political entities, global economics and
cultural hegemonies. In Africa, however, there is still one territory that is often
described as the last colony on the continent, and that is Western Sahara, formerly the
colony of Spanish Sahara and now known to Morocco – which presently occupies
around eighty percent of the territory – as its ‘Southern Provinces’. For a location, and
general map of Western Sahara, see Fig. 3.1.
As maintained by Mohamed Cherkaoui, Morocco claims that its own Arab-Berber,
‘Moorish civilization’, has its roots in the Almoravid expansion across much of the
Maghreb (see Chapter 3), which started in the far west of the Sahara amongst the
Berber Sanhaja tribes in the 11th century, in what is now Mauritania and Western
Sahara. In consequence, all of Morocco’s subsequent dynasties ‘… took over this
heritage and strengthened it. Without the Sahara, Morocco’s history would be
incomprehensible, and without Morocco, [Western] Sahara would be no more than a
desert’.2
Such a view, however, is anachronistic today, as it was when Spain gave up its
Saharan colony of 90 some odd years in the winter of 1975-1976. But even with the
1
2
Ferguson 2006.
Cherkaoui 2007: 3.
17
Western Saharan people – the Saharawis – agitating for their own sovereignty from
the early 1970s and before, and their desire for self-determination supported by the
International Court of Justice in 1975,3 Morocco (with Mauritania) persisted in
occupying the colony, literally on the heels of the departing Spanish. The violent
occupation that occurred, caused the exodus of an estimated maximum of around
100,000 Saharawis out of the country and into refugee camps in Algeria,4 where their
numbers have increased to possibly more than 150,000 in the present day, and with an
estimated 90,000 Saharawis presently living in the Moroccan occupied zone.5 This
precipitated 16 years of war which ended with a United Nations brokered ceasefire in
1991, between the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), founded by the
Polisario Front (an acronym for the ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia elHamra and Río de Oro’),6 and The Kingdom of Morocco. The hostilities ended with
the Western Saharan landscape being scarred in a way that would not have been
imagined at the start of the conflict. Not only are there battlescapes littered with the
detritus of war, but the country has been partitioned between a ‘free’ or ‘liberated’
zone controlled by the SADR/Polisario, and an ‘occupied’ zone that has,
administratively, been incorporated into Morocco.
The nationalist Saharawis (Polisario) opposing the occupation of their country by
Morocco and Mauritania, proved to be an extremely effective fighting force. They
forced Mauritania out of the territory in 1979, and pushed the Moroccans, more or
less, into an enclave in the far northwest of the country. However, in 1980 the
Moroccans went on the offensive and started to push the SADR/Polisario eastwards
3
Pazzanita 2006: 215-221.
Numbers for refugees in 1975-1976 are only approximations. It has been estimated that the number of
refugees fleeing Western Sahara might have risen from 9000 in late 1975 to more than 100,000 by the
end of 1976 (San Martin 2010: 109). In comparison, the number of refugees in the camps outside
Tindouf, Algeria, were put at around 100,000, only by early 1979 (Mercer 1979: 19).
5
The figure of more than 150,000 Saharawi refugees was estimated by UNICEF in 2010 and published
on their website at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/algeria_54061.html accessed 21 October 2013.
In contrast, the UNHCR estimated the number of Saharawi refugees at 116,446 as of 2012. See their
population statistics website at http://popstats.unhcr.org/ accessed 21 October 2013. A report produced
for Forced Migration Online, and available at
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5146 (accessed 27 November 2013)
has estimated the number of Saharawi refugees at 165,000, with a population of 90,000 Saharawis
living in the territory as of 2004. See Smith 2004.
6
The full name for the Polisario Front in Spanish, or the Frente Polisario, is: Frente Popular para la
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro. This recognises the two regions that made up Western
Sahara as a Spanish colony – the Saguia el-Hamra in the north (the northern panhandle extending to the
coast) and the Rio de Oro in the south.
4
18
and southwards from the confines of their pale. To do so, they started to build a great
wall of sand and rocks, referred to as ‘the berm’, punctuated by forts, and with
extensive minefields. As the Polisario were pushed further east and south, successive
walls were constructed, one after another, excluding Polisario combatants from an
ever enlargening territory regained by Morocco.
A total of six walls (or berms) were raised from 1980 to 1987 consisting of around
4000 kilometres of earthen banks and ditches, and naturally defensive features, with
forts and fortlets, and minefields, excluding a very large percentage of the Sahrawi
people from much of their own country. Occasionally, Polisario forces broke through
the walls, but they were more or less kept in check. This barrier system has parcelled
up the territory, cutting swathes through a formerly pastoral landscape, leaving an
indelible inscription on the land that will remain for centuries, maybe even millennia
in some places. The barriers are clearly visible on satellite imagery and clear for all to
see, for instance, on Google Earth. This has marked out the very land of Western
Sahara in a distinctly singular way, made even more salient by the fact that the berms
are still fortified, manned, and mined.
This dissertation is an interdisciplinary, though archaeologically grounded exploration
of this contested landscape. By its very nature, this study is geographically multiscaled, and historically and culturally multi-layered and multi-vocal. Taking an
anthropologically informed archaeological approach, this project is a most needed,
and appropriate avenue for examining the materiality of this conflict. From the
Moroccan barriers to individual battlescapes, and to the settlements that have been
abandoned (and in some instances now being re-settled), the physical reality of this
conflict is little known, nor understood, and this unique, material perspective on it has
been overlooked by analysts and commentators alike. Their interests have obviously
lain elsewhere, since benchmark works on Western Sahara covering the train of events
from 1975-1976 to the present day7 all deal with the geo-politics and history of the
conflict, along with the humanitarian issues of the Saharawi people’s refugee status in
camps in Algeria.8 This research does not dismiss these important studies in any way,
7
Thompson and Ardloff 1980, Damis 1983, Hodges 1983, Lawless and Monahan 1987, Shelley 2004,
Zunes and Mindy 2010, Jensen 2011, and the most recent addition, Boukhars and Jacques 2014.
8
San Martin 2010.
19
but instead, it aims to bring to the fore, to manifest9 and make sense of some of those
elements of the Western Sahara conflict that have been taken for granted – elements
that are rooted in a materiality that has affected the landscape and people of Western
Sahara to this day, and tells a story that is uniquely different from those narratives
which are pre-occupied with the political machinations on the international stage over
the people and country of Western Sahara.
Archaeology and Modern Conflict
The narrative of this research rotates around certain key concepts, themes and
approaches to the archaeological understanding of modern conflict, and consequently,
the war in Western Sahara. They fall under the rubrics of:
•
the archaeology of modern conflict as an archaeology of the present,
•
archaeologies of colonialism and imperialism (including an archaeology of
occupation), and
•
art at an interface with archaeology.
These encapsulate the conceptual drivers that inform this dissertation, and within them
(as explained further below) they articulate the relationship between battlefield and
conflict archaeology; they emphasise the relationship of forensics to archaeological
enquiry; they recognise that archaeology dealing with the modern era is an
archaeology in and of the present, and that the present day is essentially extra, or
‘super’ modern (and this is undeniably reflected in modern war); that archaeology can,
as in this dissertation, deal with issues of imperialism, colonialism and foreign
occupation, and finally; that archaeology shares with artistic endeavours the aim to
investigate and make sense of what it is to be human (though in the specific instance
of this research) in the context of a contested landscape.
This chapter will summarily examine and explain these concepts and themes, but it
will not attempt an overview of the archaeology of conflict, as a whole, since that is
9
González-Ruibal 2008, and Shanks 2004: 148.
20
better served by John Carman’s recent, Archaeologies of Conflict.10 The chapter will
then move onto the issues and core questions that have driven this research, and it will
end with an overview of the structure and presentation of this dissertation, along with
a summation.
The Archaeology of Modern Conflict as an Archaeology of the Present
All human activity takes place in substantive geographic space. There is a concrete
relationship between human actions and the places in which they occur, and those
places can be landscapes, seascapes, townscapes, buildings, and mindscapes (and even
airscapes). They can be unique to an individual or shared by a group, and all are made
up of material structure, meaning and human practice.11 They are the meat of human
existence and all too often abstract versions of history and geo-politics, as in the case
of Western Sahara, leave them out. Even though the Moroccan berms, as material
entities, are described by a number of commentators, all of their renditions are overly
generalised, incomplete and inconsistent. To paraphrase Miller (though writing about
material culture in general), the berms, to many writers and commentators, have faded
out of focus and become peripheral to their vision, yet still serving as a singular
determinant in their studies and analyses of the Western Sahara conflict.12 As a result,
a barrier so large as that partitioning Western Sahara cannot be fully comprehended by
most readers of the standard works on the conflict. It has, in effect, become obscured,
and its tangible and material presence has only been dealt with marginally. The same
applies to battlescapes, and this inadequacy can also be found in many published
accounts of almost all types of wars. However, John Keegan’s The Face of Battle13
aimed to remedy this by deliberately homing in on the human, phenomenological
experiences of war, and by so doing, has contributed to changing the complexion of
contemporary military history. While the archaeological study of battlefields came to
the fore, internationally, with Scott et al investigating the site of the Battle of the Little
Bighorn in the United States,14 and as a result, becoming an exemplar for battlefield
archaeology since the latter 1980s.15
10
Carman 2013.
Cresswell 2009.
12
Miller 2005: 5-6.
13
Keegan 1978. For other examples, see also Leed 1979 and Holmes 1985.
14
Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989.
15
Carman and Carman 2006: 5.
11
21
Work on the Little Bighorn battle site clearly showed the potency of combining the
inherently forensic qualities of archaeology with historical enquiry.
If it can be said that history turns pages, then archaeology turns the ground. Historical
archaeology, as the name implies, does both. Records and documents are essential
ingredients in historical archaeology but no more so than the knowledge gleaned from
artefacts left behind by historical personages. Thus historical archaeologists weave the
strands of history with clues painstakingly sifted from the earth to form a fabric unlike
that attainable through history or archaeology alone.16
In fact, Scott et al go on to characterise the unique histories that can be written by
historical archaeology, and in their case battlefield archaeology, by drawing upon the
often-used analogy of crime resolution. ‘In solving a crime, police rely upon two
disparate classes of evidence. Witness testimony is important but so are clues
provided by the physical evidence of a crime’. For historical archaeologists, therefore,
historical documents, ‘especially firsthand accounts.., are tantamount to eyewitness
testimony’, while ‘the archaeological record contains historical clues in the form of
physical remains, including artefacts, and their contextual relationships’.17 Crime
investigators will use numerous methodologies to make sense of clues and testimony,
as do archaeologists investigating the ‘historical’ past. On the face of it this multimethodological approach is a hallmark of the archaeology of modern conflict, but this
latter archaeological sub-discipline is palpably different from battlefield archaeology
as it is usually practiced. Battlefield archaeology usually deals with a single event in
history at a specific location. It has a strong emphasis on field methodology, be it
terrain analysis or patterns of projectile residues, making its theoretical leanings
highly processual.18 In contrast, the archaeology of conflict is not site or event
specific. Its remit is broad, looking at societies in conflict – not just combatants on a
battlefield – and examining the materiality of conflict on a broader anthropological
canvas.
In contrast to battles and wars prior to the 20th century, Carman and Carman have
characterised modern warfare as
16
Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989: 5.
Scott, Fox, Connor, and Harmon 1989: 5.
18
Carman 2013: 45-46.
17
22
disconcertingly extended from the surface of our globe into other realms: into the air;
under the sea; into the most inhospitable regions of the world… and even into outer
space. It has also gone beyond the physical into more conceptual regions: into the
relations of government to people; into the realm of science and technology; and,
…into the so-called ‘infosphere’ and… cyberspace. The battles of our age can be said
to have no limits or boundaries: they frequently cannot be seen or measured, nor
physically controlled. Unlike the warfare of previous ages, they do not occupy a
particular location but are at once nowhere and everywhere.19
Modern conflict, as Schofield points out, can be military or civilian. It can include
small-scale ethnic disputes or larger civil conflagrations. Conflict can be ‘hot’ or cold’
and spread across the globe. Its complexity and size can include individual
battlefields, the landscapes in which battles are situated and the ‘landscape of
experience’, including not just the land, but also the sea and air, and into space.20 This
sense of scale and multidimensionality, to Saunders for instance, means that the
archaeology of modern conflict is, by its very nature,
an anthropologically-informed multidisciplinary endeavour, concerned with the
social, cultural, psychological, and technological as well as military complexities of
recent conflicts, and their powerful and unpredictable legacies… This multitude of
issues makes modern conflict sites, in effect, highly sensitised multilayered
landscapes that require a robust, interdisciplinary approach, far beyond the ability of
traditional, single event-oriented, battlefield archaeology to deliver.21
And he goes even further to pointedly differentiate battlefield archaeology from
modern conflict archaeology.
It is that the names ‘Modern Conflict Archaeology’ and ‘Battlefield Archaeology’ are
neither coterminous nor interchangeable. They embody quite different approaches and
agendas, both to the empirical data, and to the presence or absence of an
19
Carman and Carman 2006: 31.
Schofield 2005: 19-20.
21
Saunders 2012: x.
20
23
acknowledged theoretical sophistication concerning the nature and meaning of objects
and landscapes, and their relationships to people in the past and the present.22
Modern, industrialised conflict is a ‘force which has shaped, and continues to shape
the modern world’,23 and the study of its materiality through archaeology is firmly
embedded in what has come to be known as the ‘archaeology of the contemporary
past’. This oxymoron is generally taken to mean that the very way in which
archaeologists undertake and structure their studies, even when applied to the
contemporary world, makes familiar quotidian objects – that are so much at the core
of almost all archaeological enquiries – unfamiliar and even alien, and thereby like
objects from a more distant past. This idea of alienation and distancing ourselves from
the materiality of the present through its archaeological study is at the core of Buchli
and Lucas’ definition of the archaeology of the contemporary past. Though they also
raise the notion that such an archaeology ‘constitutes the unconstituted’ in that the
common and everyday, the taken-for-granted, is brought to the fore and given a
presence – a voice.24 In line with this is the concept of ‘rendering the familiar
unfamiliar’,25 but this might actually be a poor turn of phrase. Archaeologists, in fact,
become more familiar (in the broadest of senses) with the objects of their study. They
familiarize themselves with artefacts, buildings and landscapes in a way that is utterly
sensual as well as intellectual. By direct physical study, they get to know every crack,
chip or indent in an artefact. They become intimate with its form and make-up.
Archaeologists crawl around buildings to examine the way in which they have been
constructed, leaving almost no interstices unchecked. In terms of landscapes, they will
walk over ground again and again to understand its features and lie of the land. By
doing so, and to quote from Ingold, they take on a ‘dwelling perspective’.26 This
means that they come to understand their object of study by ‘immediate experience’
and ‘the understandings that people derive from their lived, everyday involvement in
the world’. In fact, by ‘dwelling’ with the object of study, it ‘becomes a part of us, just
as we are [or become] a part of it’,27 and this undoubtedly takes place in the here and
now of the archaeologist. This chimes with Harrison’s call for ‘a shift away from the
22
Saunders 2012: xiii.
Saunders 2012: xiv.
24
Buchli and Lucas, 2001.
25
Graves-Brown 2000: 6.
26
Ingold 2010.
27
Ingold 2010.
23
24
idea of an “archaeology of the contemporary past”, towards an “archaeology of the
present”… suggest[ing] that we think about the present as a surface – a physical strata
that contains not only the present, but all its physical and imagined pasts combined’.
By doing so, and by using the metaphor of the landscape that is all around us, and
continually changing through human and natural actions, then the ‘past, present and
future are combined and still in the process of becoming’.28 Harrison goes on to
propose that archaeologists
abandon the idea of the ‘contemporary past’ to focus instead on an archaeology of and
in the present; to shift archaeology away from the study of the ruin, the derelict and
the abandoned to become a discipline which is concerned with both the ‘living’ and
the ‘dead’. Indeed, our failure to do this hitherto has led to an obsession with the
novelty of the application of archaeology to the present itself, producing a field of
research which has appeared at times both superficial and piecemeal in nature. …what
we need more than anything else is a series of detailed, long term, longitudinal studies
which demonstrate the actual contribution archaeology can make to understanding the
present, rather than a series of justifications for it.29
The archaeology of modern conflict can perhaps answer Harrison’s call with, for
example, Saunders’ account of First World War archaeology, Killing Time (written for
both the layman and specialist), being a case in point. As Saunders presents it, the
archaeology of the Great War is, in effect, the excavating of memories: memories of
an entire century that started in 1914 and continues to this day. He takes a profoundly
holistic approach to studying the Great War, conjoining archaeology and anthropology
through landscape and material culture study, and through embracing issues of
memory, commemoration, national and trans-national heritage, tourism, private
artefact collection (with its potential for looting), and the still volatile nature of former
battlescapes due to unexploded ordnance.30 This is very much an archaeology in and
of the present, and equally, an archaeology that will continue to imprint itself on the
future. As a pivotal event in human history, and especially remembered by the nations
that took part, it is an archaeology in the process of becoming – and always on the
cusp of becoming something new for the future as long as memory does not fail it.
28
Harrison 2011: 153-154.
Harrison 2011: 160.
30
Saunders 2010. See also, Saunders 2002.
29
25
Working in the far west of Ethiopia, Gonzáles-Ruibal has shown how archaeology can
reflect on the failure of modern ‘reason’, which has gone ‘berserk’. In Ethiopia,
modernity has scarred the land and littered it with the refuse of intensive, modern war,
and through the impressing of a Soviet inspired ‘utopia’ on top of a traditional African
nation with agricultural collectivisation and forced re-location of communities. Here
there is an archaeology of recent contestation manifested through wasted war material
and abandoned industrial ruins – disposed amidst an ancient landscape and made more
poignant by the memories of people who experienced the conflict, and changes, that
occurred during the country’s 17 years of civil war that ended in 1991.31 This too is an
archaeology in and of the present, and it, like the archaeology of all modern conflicts,
is also an archaeology of the ‘super modern’. Here, modernity is seen as something in
excess.32 It is extra modern, exaggerated and exacerbated, baroque even.33 And since
1914, as Gonzáles-Ruibal points out, it has been ‘characterised by increasing means of
devastation, both of humans and things, and as a result of this, by a proliferation of
[new] archaeological sites (battlefields, industrial ruins, concentration camps)’. In
fact, an archaeology of supermodernity can be unconcealing – disclosing and making
bare ‘the traumatic nature of the recent past’ and even our own, possible implication
in events that can still be raw. It should manifest ‘what cannot be said’, 34 and the very
nature of archaeology is undeniably suited to such a task.
Another way in which archaeology can make sense of the past within the present can
be found in the application of forensic archaeology to modern conflict; in particular, in
the examination of mass graves from recent wars and scenes of crimes against
humanity. The work of Layla Renshaw, on Spanish Civil War mass grave
exhumations, is an exemplar of forensic archaeology carried out in a social context.
Through the examination of mass graves, Renshaw linked a traumatic past with the
present through the materialisation of the dead and their associated objects by
exhumation. Working closely with local communities she and her colleagues, were
able to facilitate and explore the transformations that those communities underwent,
through their encounters with their own dead from the Spanish Civil War, creating
31
Gonzáles-Ruibal 2006.
Augé 1995.
33
Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008.
34
Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008.
32
26
‘new individual and collective identities in the present’.35 Such an approach and
outcome is very much in keeping with Harrison’s view of contemporary archaeology
being in and of the present.
However, there is a further use of forensics relevant to the present, and it is one that
has been employed by the architect Eyal Weizman in the context of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and which he articulates as ‘Forensic Architecture’. As advocated by
Weizman and his colleagues, forensic architecture is mobilised to study sites of
violence and human rights violations both in the field and remotely. By its very nature
it is archaeological, even though his work has been described as a kind of ‘spatial
cryptography’ and only ‘quasi-archaeological’.36 Nevertheless, Weisman’s specific
use of the word ‘forensics’ truly resonates with the practice of archaeology of both the
distant and recent pasts, and of the present. Weizman goes back to basics. He reminds
us that ‘forensics’ is derived from the Latin forensis, and therefore has its root in the
‘forum’. In particular, it deals with the rhetorical skill of presenting an argument to a
legal, professional, or political assembly, or the like, and as such it is concerned with
speech: not only human speech, but also that of things that require a ‘translator’ or
‘interpreter’. He cites the rhetoricion’s role as that which ‘the Greeks and Romans
called prosopopoeia – a mode of speaking on behalf of inanimate objects’. Adding
from the orator Quintilian, that prosopopoeia gives ‘”a voice to things to which nature
has not given a voice”’, it can also ‘”evoke the dead”’ and give ‘”voices to cities and
states”’. To Weizman, therefore, what he calls ‘the thick surfaces of Forensic
Architecture’ is made up of three related parts: the thing or things at issue, an
‘interpreter’, and a forum – the place of argument and presentation.37
Though talking and writing as an architect, and being concerned with the concrete
issues of Palestine and Israel today, what Weizman says is virtually a reflection of an
35
Renshaw 2011: 20.
‘Forensic architecture typically refers to the practice of building-surveyors who assess building
damage and structural integrity in legal contexts, often providing expert testimony in court. However,
extracted from the specialized context of property and insurance disputes, the term could designate a
general strategy for architectural research and enquiry, expanding the scope of what architecture can
achieve in the world today… The “architecture” in forensic architecture would thus designate, not the
product of building design, but rather an expanded field of spatial investigation, imaging and
representation, while the word “forensic” should be understood as the very condition that enables
architectural research to perform politically, that is, to enter a complex political or juridical calculus’
(Forensic Architecture Project 2011-2015).
37
Weizman 2012: 8-9, citing Quintilain’s Institutes of Oratory, bk. 9, ch. 2.
36
27
archaeology of the present, and because of the context of his work, of contemporary
conflict. Even he, after all, has referred to his work as ‘a kind of “archaeology” of
present conditions as they could be read, or misread’, and as ‘a kind of archaeology of
spaces’, especially with reference to the use of imagery, mapping and remote
sensing38 – well used tools of modern archaeology. His application of ‘forensics’, like
an archaeology of the present, and of modern conflict, does not give precedence to any
specific type of knowledge,39 but instead, recognises that there is an entangled
richness of data, experience and phenomena to draw upon, so as to make sense of the
complexity of modern contestation.
Archaeologies of Occupation, Colonialism and Imperialism
One of Weizman’s pivotal concerns with the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is
the way in which Israel has colonised Palestinian territory through the use of
architecture, that is, through the creation of an Israeli built environment parcelling up
the Palestinian West Bank and alienating, and disenfranchising, its Palestinian
inhabitants. This is expressed in his book, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of
Occupation.40 This work is an exploration of the materiality of the Israeli occupation
of Palestinian lands. Though not described as such, it is an archaeology of modern
conflict in and of the present, and additionally, it falls under the rubric of what Gilly
Carr has coined as the ‘Archaeology of Occupation’.
To Carr, based on her ongoing work in the Channel Islands (occupied by Nazi
Germany from 1940 to 1945) occupation archaeology should be a distinct subdiscipline within archaeology since it deals with human experience in a specific
context – that of occupation in times of war, and by extension, even after hostilities
may have ended. It examines the material culture of the occupiers and the occupied at
all levels of resolution, from individual objects to whole landscapes. It examines, with
an archaeological sensibility, the manifestations of the unequal power relationship that
exists when a territory is occupied, and how the people of an occupied country react as
either opponents, collaborators, or as bystanders – be they active, neutral or with a
sense of impotence. Trauma from an occupation along with its memory can extend
38
Schapira and Hung 2012.
Saunders 2012: x.
40
Weizman 2007.
39
28
into the present, and arguably into the future through many generations, and those yet
to be born, and this has a bearing on commemorations and heritage awareness.41 This
resonates with the situation in Western Sahara where the greatest manifestation of the
country’s occupation is the Moroccan partition with its earthen berms, and where
specific loci are sites of memory due, for instance, to Moroccan attacks on fleeing
refugees, or as battlescapes. The occupation of most of Western Sahara has forged the
Saharawi identity and this is reinforced by national commemorative events, even
including an art festival, in the Polisario controlled, liberated zone.
Carr goes on to point out that an archaeology of occupation is relevant to any period
and place on the globe where expansive empires have conquered and occupied
territories. She cites Roman Britain as a case in point, along with the contemporary
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Such a perspective would, undoubtedly, enable
us to study the archaeological record [of occupation] from a different perspective, or
to watch it in its very act of creation’.42 Her latter point applies to this research since
the Western Sahara conflict is still unresolved, and only kept in check by a United
Nations ceasefire. Equally, Carman has pointed out that any ‘archaeology of modern
conflict has inevitably also to engage with the ongoing nature of conflict’,43 and this is
undeniably the case in Western Sahara.
Inextricably linked to Carr’s conception of an archaeology of occupation is the
archaeological study of imperialism and colonialism. In particular, from the period
that Hobsbawm called the ‘Age of Empire’ (1875 to 1914),44 through to the
withdrawal from empire by the European nations in the 1960s, and the new post
World War II ‘empires’ made up of the United States and Soviet Russian spheres of
influence, and now, the re-shuffling of post Cold War hegemonies. Surprisingly, in the
post world war era, a newly ‘liberated’ Morocco, freed from France’s African Empire
in 1956, embarked on its own imperial venture. With a vision of a ‘Greater Morocco’,
it claimed sovereignty over much of western Algeria and Mali, and the whole of
Mauritania and the then Spanish Sahara. But with Mauritania and Mali gaining
independence in 1960, and with Algeria following on in 1962, Morocco could only
41
Carr 2009 and Carr 2010.
Carr 2010: 172.
43
Carman 2013: 78.
44
Hobsbaum 2010: 56.
42
29
covet the remaining Spanish Sahara. Then in 1976, the Kingdom came to realise its
‘imperial’ destiny, when in agreement with Spain and Mauritania, it colonised the
northern two thirds of Western Sahara, and subsequently absorbed the southern third
when Mauritania withdrew from the war with SADR/Polisario. With the whole of
Western Sahara technically incorporated into the Kingdom of Morocco, it has turned
Western Sahara into the last colony in Africa.
Another African country that colonised a neighbouring territory in the modern era was
Egypt, which expanded into the whole of what is now Sudan, and South Sudan,
between 1820 and 1874.45 But the Egyptians also extended their influence into
Northern Uganda, and even into western Ethiopia, with the construction of defended
military stations from the 1860s onwards, only to be abandoned by the 1890s.46 The
archaeological fieldwork carried out at some of these stations in the 1960s and
resumed in the 2000s, caused Posnansky to propose, in 2006, ‘Imperial Archaeology’
as a ‘distinct sub-field’ within Historical African Archaeology. Such an archaeology
would represent ‘the contact between two or more peoples, cultures, economies,
societies and technologies’, implying ‘a power relationship, an imposed new culture, a
violent impact rather than the gradual development of relationships between
juxtaposed populations’, and characterised by a lack of equality and partnerships, and
by domination and control.47 These themes and their examination through material
culture and landscape, also characterise the ‘archaeology of the colonized’ as
described by Given.48
Given points out a number of factors that mark out the experience of those who are
colonised. With relevance to Western Sahara, these include the specific notions of
alienation and resistance. With the former, Saharawis were moved and resettled and
‘alienated from their own landscape, …their daily patterns of life and their memories
of meaningful places’,49 while with the latter – resistance – they have fought off the
Moroccans and Mauritanians and continue to occupy around one fifth of their country.
They have built up their own nation with its own functioning government, armed
45
Adams 1977: 614-625 and Lane and Johnson 2009.
Posnansky 2008 and Gonzáles-Ruibal 2011.
47
Posnansky 2006.
48
Given 2004.
49
Given 2004: 163.
46
30
forces and infrastructure, and they are re-appropriating their land in the liberated zone,
even though they are a nation in exile in Algeria.
Art at an Interface with Archaeology
It is not an aim of this dissertation to fully explore the relationship of art to
archaeology and archaeology to art. This is an expanding theme in contemporary
archaeology, which is opening up new and valuable vistas in the ways in which we
relate to, and understand the materiality of the past and the contemporary world that is
all around us. While quoting the title of Paul Gauguin’s allegorical, Polynesian
inspired painting entitled: Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we
going to? – Colin Renfrew has succinctly put it that archaeologists and artists, though
in their own distinct ways, ‘seek to investigate the “human condition” – to engage
with and comment upon what it is to be human’.50 In so doing, they both perform,
interpret, narrate and characterise the materiality of the things that are the objects of
their work; and ‘inevitably artistic intervention becomes archaeology. Once these new
places and things are created, their creation is in the past, and thus archaeological’.51 It
is this aspect of art as archaeology that is focused on in this research, and in particular,
art as archaeology within the context of an unresolved conflict.
The types of contemporary art that has become archaeology, and are a part of this
research (examined in Chapter 7), can broadly be categorized as war art (including
trench art), protest art, and solidarity art. They are mainly interventions that have been
undertaken out of doors, and as such include murals, sculptures and land art. The
examples cited have not been carried out by people who were involved in the
hostilities of 1975 to 1991, but instead, they were created by foreign artists in a sense
of solidarity with the Saharawi people, and Saharawi artists memorialising the conflict
and the plight of their nation: all during art festival activities from 2007 to 2010 in the
liberated Zone of Western Sahara, at the small settlement of Tifariti. They have been
carried out as an act of defiance – contributing to, and creating an archaeology of
opposition52 – in a belief that art matters, and that it can have a tangible impact on the
observer. This can either be in Western Sahara or in exhibitions abroad, thereby
50
Renfrew 2003: 10-11.
Schofield 2006: 5.
52
Cadw 2009: 16.
51
31
making the world aware of the plight of the Saharawi people, and fostering support for
their cause. Many of the artworks have been created with recycled materials, or
utilised buildings either still in use or in ruins due to Moroccan bombing. In a way, as
April Krause would put it, they are ‘aestheticising’ a post-conflict place. The artworks
are ‘anti-authoritarian.., site-specific, visual marks embedded within the built fabric of
a post-conflict site’53 – Tifariti.
To the artists – and as it would be put by Alfred Gell – their artworks have been
created as ‘agents’ that can mediate social change.54 They are each, intimately
connected with their creators as ‘components of their identities as human persons, just
as much [for example] as their fingerprints’.55 By being created within the context of a
humanitarian, pro-Saharawi art festival, the artists and their works are a collective, or
family, that is self-generating with its own momentum.56
They marry, so to speak, and beget offspring which bear the stamp of their
antecedents. Artworks are manifestations of ‘culture’ as a collective phenomenon,
they are, like people, enculturated beings.57
The notion that an artwork is like a person, and as such, a social agent, and also in a
genealogical relationship (able to ‘beget offspring’), relates to Gell’s concept of
‘distributed personhood’. The artists are a group of people making up something akin
to a sub-culture sharing their concerns for the Saharawi cause, and imbuing their
artwork with their sentiments, making them extensions of themselves. Each artist and
each artwork does not stand alone, but as parts of an aggregate.58 In material terms,
this ‘aggregate’, especially of artworks literally on the ground, makes up a stratum of
archaeology in and of the present, poignantly distributed amidst the ruins of colonial,
and contemporary Tifariti.
53
Krause 2011.
Gell 1998: 6-7.
55
Gell 1998: 21.
56
Though the art festival – ARTifariti – is no longer held in Tifariti, it has, since 2011, continued to be
held in the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria.
57
Gell 1998: 153.
58
Rampley 2005.
54
32
Issues and Questions Driving this Research
Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion
As the title of this dissertation indicates, there are three intertwined strands to this
research. They are the issues of Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion. It is my aim to
explore these, drawing upon the concepts and themes within the rubrics already
described, and consequently, to be presented in terms of landscape archaeology
(utilising the strategic tools described in Chapter 2). As explained above, the conflict
in Western Sahara has, to date, been mainly dealt with in terms of contemporary
history, social history, and international relations, but as with most conflicts,
especially modern ones, there are longstanding, material manifestations on the ground,
which is the meat of landscape archaeology.
Issues of colonialism in the western Sahara go back to the latter 19th century with
France expanding into what is now Mauritania, and with Spain occupying the Western
Saharan coast at Villa Cisneros from 1884 onwards. And although this European
expansion is a backdrop to this study, the main colonial issue to be dealt with is the
colonising of Western Sahara by Morocco in the last quarter of the 20th century. In
terms of landscape archaeology this will be initially approached through a
characterisation of the very medium by which the Morocans have been able to occupy
Western Sahara, and that is through a study of the Moroccan wall – the berm, or better
– the berms. How its construction in waves, from the northwest of the territory,
represents how the military fortunes of both Morocco and the SADR/Polisario
changed, and how, as Morocco’s latest and continuing manifestation of its
appropriation of the Saharawi patrimony, it has physically isolated the Saharawi
people from most of their homeland.
Alongside a characterisation of the Moroccan berms, and how they have become
imprinted on the face of the desert, this research will explore the issue of conflict
through a more detailed landscape study of the fought over terrain of a specific locus
in the liberated zone. This is the settlement and immediate region of Tifariti where
there is archaeological evidence for the Spanish administration and militarisation of
the area in the 1960s, followed by the fortification of the area by Morocco during their
33
occupation of 1977-1979 in which they were besieged by Polisario. The topography
around Tifariti is undulating and very rocky and it turned out to be ideal for the
creation of defensive sangars and dugouts, lookout posts, bivouacs and artillery gun
emplacements. The terrain was an integral part of Tifariti’s defence and it is reflected
in the way in which Polisario forces invested the settlement.
A landscape study of the berms, as noted above, is by its very nature a study in
exclusion. In fact San Martin and Allan59 have described Western Sahara as the largest
prison on the planet, confining Saharawis into zones within and outside the berms. But
in the case of the Saharawis in the Free Zone, and in the camps in Algeria, this study
will look in some way at how these people have reacted to their exclusion, with
specific reference to the Tifariti area.
Tifariti has symbolic importance to the Saharawi people. National assemblies are held
there, it is seen as a future capital for the liberated territories, and it provides amenities
to the Bedouin re-settling the surrounding area. It is the headquarters of the Tifariti
military region of the SADR, and it is a base for foreign visitors to the liberated zone.
The settlement has also been the focus of the ARTifariti arts festival, which has been
running since 2007, but was only held in Tifariti up to 2010. Since that time, the
festival has been held in the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. In terms of
archaeology, foreign and Saharawi artists have created new artefacts in the landscape
as land art, sculptures have been created out of cast off materials and the remains of
exploded ordnance, and buildings, ruinous or otherwise, have been appropriated and
painted as artworks. These artworks are new features inscribed on the land, just like
the berms and the prehistoric remains that can be found in abundance, mainly east,
west and north of Tifariti. In fact, ARTifariti has been one way of subverting the
Saharawi people’s exclusion from their land. Through the work of Saharawi artists
and the solidarity of foreign artists, they have imprinted the very land with their own
meaningful markers – ‘memorialised interventions’,60 and these efforts have, and are
seen as giving succour to the Saharawi people on what has turned out to be a slow,
and still unfulfilled road to self-determination and international recognition.
59
60
San Martin and Allan 2007.
Krause 2011.
34
Research Questions
This research came about as a direct result of my involvement in the Western Sahara
Project directed by Drs Joanne Clarke and Nick Brooks of the University of East
Anglia. I became involved in the project in 2007 and my primary role was to survey a
prehistoric funerary landscape along the Wadi Tifariti, around 14 kilometres north of
Tifariti. What struck me on a daily basis, though, especially while driving to the
survey area, was the ubiquitousness of the remains of the 1975 to 1991 war between
the SADR/Polisario and Morocco. Positioned along numerous rocky ridges were the
dug outs and sangars of Moroccan positions, while in the survey area in which we
worked, there was a group of defensive dug outs including the remains of stone and
mud brick structures in the Wadi Tifariti, and occasional instances of unexploded
ordnance (UXOs), and scatters of shrapnel. There were also the numerous remains of
Moroccan defensive positions in and around Tifariti itself, and amidst these, Action on
Armed Violence (AOAV, then known as Land Mine Action – LMA) field operatives
were surveying and clearing UXOs, working from their base in the settlement.
Coupled with the ruined remains of the Spanish colonial presence in Tifariti itself, and
with the advent of the ARTifariti art festival near the end of the same year, it became
evident that Western Sahara was a unique country in which to explore the
archaeological complexity and materiality of a late 20th century conflict, and this was
impressed upon me more so when I saw the Moroccan berms through the virtual globe
of Google Earth. This opened up the vista of an archaeological presence of conflict
both on the ground, and through satellite imagery on the Internet, which could be
explored through the multi-disciplinary approaches of the archaeology of modern
conflict, and as an archaeology in and of the present.
Google Earth was undeniably a catalyst in inspiring me to explore the conflict
landscape of Western Sahara. And with my seeing ARTifariti interventions on the
ground when I returned to Western Sahara in 2008, it was obvious to me that the
archaeological study of the conflict, as a landscape phenomenon, could only add to
our understanding of it. Thereby adding a concrete, and palpable reality to the study of
the conflict that has been missing from all the standard works on the contemporary
Western Sahara. To this end this research hovers around two very simple, yet
profound, research questions. These are:
35
How has the landscape of Western Sahara been transformed by the 1975-1991
war, as manifested by the material remains of conflict?
And, how are the Saharawi people manifesting the re-appropriation of their
land, in particular, at the settlement of Tifariti, which has a special resonance
for them?
Collage
I describe the ‘tools’ for carrying out this research in Chapter 2, where this
dissertation is elaborated on further as being multidisciplinary, multi-vocal and multidimensional, and employing and generating a multiplicity of materials. Because of
this multi-faceted nature, answers to the above two questions will be presented as
woven within the overall narrative of this research. This being the case, it would
probably be best to describe the end result of this work as something akin to a
‘collage’. In keeping with the view that an archaeology of the present, or the
contemporary past, ‘has a major role to play in foregrounding those aspects of
contemporary life at the margins that are constantly being overwritten by dominant
narratives’,61 then ‘collage’, as described by Rowe and Koetter, is an apt descriptor of
the work of this project.
Collage [is] often a method of paying attention to the left-overs of the world, of
preserving their integrity and equipping them with dignity, of compounding matter of
factness and cerebrality, as a convention and a breach of convention, [it] necessarily
operates unexpectedly.62
As an example, the anthropologist Hadas Yaron clearly embraced the notion of
‘collage’ while investigating a contemporary contested landscape in Israel. She
recognised that in the multiple materials generated by her research there were ‘gaps
and tensions’ exposed ‘between the narrated and the inanimate, the past and the
present, and between different narrators or voices which compose different accounts’,
and by placing such a diversity of voices and materials next to one another, she
created a collage. In this context, a collage is a partial and alternative reflection of the
world. It ‘emphasises the agency of the researcher and later the writer in the formation
61
62
Harrison and Schofield 2010: 11.
Rowe and Koetter 1978: 142.
36
of the text which is composed and, mirroring the researcher/author’s own choices and
inner conflicts, is autobiographical’.63 In my view, this reflects the make up of what
will be presented here as the end result of this research. Recognising it as a collage is
an honest acceptance of the limitations (and serendipitousness) of archaeological
fieldwork and data collection, and the acknowledgement of mediation on the part of
the researcher. Nevertheless, by placing together multifaceted histories (narratives),
perspectives and tools, along with archaeological field (and remote) data, an
archaeological ‘collage’ will be composed, expressly rooted in the present and the
contemporary past, and taking advantage of the distinctly forensic qualities of
archaeology to do so.
Structure of Dissertation
There are seven further chapters to this dissertation. Chapter 2 develops further some
of the themes and key concepts introduced here within the context of the strategic
methodologies employed in this research. It explains and elaborates on ‘the right tools
for the job’, which, after traditional bibliographic research, fall into three broad
categories. These are: visual and geographic sources, oral testimony/history, and
archaeological field survey. Chapter 3 moves on to describing Western Sahara: its
topography, geography and its people. It lays the groundwork for the subsequent
chapters by describing the Spanish colonial ‘project’ in the territory, and by going part
of the way to characterising its materiality in the open spaces of Western Sahara. The
chapter also outlines the events leading up to the war of 1975-1991, and the
annexation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, and the conduct of the war. It
ends with an overview of Morocco’s grand tactic of exclusion through the
construction of ‘the berms’, along with a comparative review of a number of other
barrier fortifications from the very late 19th century up to the present.
The materiality of the berms is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 presents an
archaeology of the barriers, and by its very nature, is landscape archaeology at a
national, or macro scale. The chapter depends heavily on Google Earth imagery and
other internet resources (see Chapter 2), while Chapter 5 draws upon oral testimony
63
Yaron 2006: 10.
37
(both recorded during fieldwork, and from published and internet sources) to describe
the phenomenology of the berms – but perhaps best described as ‘confrontations’ with
the barriers – and also incorporating Polisario perceptions and tactics towards
Morocco’s ‘Great Wall’. Archaeology moves from the macro scale to the meso scale
in Chapter 6. Here, the landscape archaeology of the immediate Tifariti area is
examined. Starting with an overview that begins in the mid-Holocene, through to the
coming of Islam, and on still, to the invasion of the region by punitive French colonial
forces, and the eventual transformation of Tifariti into a Spanish Foreign Legion post
and a locus with amenities for the local Bedouin. Tifariti became militarised between
1977 and 1979, encircled by rings of dugouts and sangars, constructed by the
occupying Moroccan army into a large defensive ‘box’. The garrison was in a nearly
perpetual state of siege, and the analysis of this conflict landscape is at the heart of
Chapter 6. In all, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 aim to make sense of the transformations that
modern industrialised war have wrought upon the landscape of Western Sahara.
Chapter 7 deals very much with the archaeology of ‘the now’ in Tifariti. In relative
terms, it can be described as landscape archaeology at a micro scale. It looks at issues
of landscape re-appropriation and conflict memorialisation through public artworks –
artworks created on the land in and around Tifariti during the ARTifariti festivals that
were held in the settlement from 2007 to 2010 – though it also makes international
comparisons. It deals with the founding of the festival and the experiential aspects of
the mainly foreign artists, working in the Western Sahara landscape as an expression
of solidarity towards the Saharawi struggle for self-determination. The chapter
highlights selected artworks and their artists, and contextualises them as integral to a
new stratum of contemporary archaeology at Tifariti. The chapter caps the
archaeology of Tifariti described in Chapter 6. A discussion of conclusions is
presented in Chapter 8, which aims to make sense of the collage like narrative that is
at the heart of this dissertation. It reviews the context of the research and the central
themes of colonialism, conflict and exclusion. The chapter ends by examining the
archaeological consequences of this research, and it gives directions for future work.
38
Summary
My aim in this research is to explore, and bring into focus, the materiality of the
Western Sahara War of 1975-1991 and its aftermath. This aspect of the conflict has
been barely touched upon by most commentators, analysts, and historians dealing with
Western Sahara, yet the very works of war – in particular, the Moroccan berms –
though monumental in nature and written about often, are barely understood. The
same applies to battlescapes, and the ways in which the Saharawi people are trying to
re-appropriate their national territory since the United Nations brokered ceasefire of
1991.
The conceptual springboard that drives this dissertation is based on the idea that the
archaeological study of modern conflict is multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary,
and this, in turn, is situated within the notion that the archaeological past and present
can exist, and be visible, side-by-side in the landscape. They make up a palimpsest.
That the best way to study such an archaeology, especially in the context of modern
conflict, is to draw together the practical and forensic skills of traditional archaeology,
and especially landscape fieldwork (be it on the ground or through remote sensing),
with historical accounts and oral testimony (either traditionally compiled or derived
from publications and the internet), thereby connecting the past with the here and now
– creating an archaeology in and of the present. This is crucial, in Western Sahara,
since the territory is still contested and the effects of the Moroccan occupation of the
country is continuously felt by Saharawis on a daily basis, either by living in exile in
refugee camps in Algeria, and/or living in the Polisario controlled ‘liberated’ zone, or
living in the Moroccan occupied zone. This makes the archaeology of conflict in the
territory an archaeology with a running narrative, and one that is continually evolving.
As a result, the materiality of the conflict continues to ‘become’ something new for
every generation of Saharawis.
But the practical, forensic qualities that are a hallmark of good archaeological enquiry,
consist of more than just meticulous record making. As pointed out within the concept
of forensic architecture, they have to do with the very way in which the study of
conflict is carried out. That is, that there is an issue, or object of study; it is to be
39
interpreted and given voice; and this takes place and is presented within the public
sphere. That is what good archaeology does. It gives presence and voice to the
materiality under study, with no preference to any specific type of data or knowledge.
It is the purpose of this dissertation, and this approach is very much in keeping with
the aims of the archaeology of modern conflict, and an archaeology in and of the
present.
The issues of colonialism (and imperialism) and occupation, by a foreign power – in
this case Morocco – are crucial to understanding this research. The power imbalance
that exists has been expressed materially at a national geographic scale: by the very
partitioning of Western Sahara through the construction of the Moroccan territorial
berms. Consisting of almost 4000 kilometres of barriers (most of which are still
fortified), their study as a landscape phenomenon, especially through the employment
of Google Earth, as in this research, is undoubtedly unique. As far as I am aware, no
other similar study has been undertaken anywhere else on the globe, so I believe that it
is the first of its kind. Through my description and analysis of the berms, I will show
how one nation has literally appropriated and corralled another. Nevertheless, the
resultant exclusion of the bulk of the Saharawi people from approximately eighty
percent of their national territory has created a new, post-ceasefire relationship
between the Saharawi people with the remainder of the country still under their
control. In material and geographic terms this is best shown by a landscape study of
the little known settlement of Tifariti. Here, and again, this study emphasises the
concept of palimpsest, and archaeology as being multidimensional, and in and of the
present. To this end I will present an archaeological study, and narrative, of the
landscape surrounding, and including Tifariti, that will illustrate the composition of its
palimpsest as an archaeological continuum up to the present day. This will also
include artworks created out of doors as part of the ARTifariti festivals held in the
settlement between from 2007 to 2010. Within the context of this study, these make
up the top-most stratum of archaeology in the settlement.
In the chapters that follow, I will present the archaeology of Western Sahara’s
contested landscape as an archaeology in and of the present, and as Harrison would
put it, as a real stratum that combines its physical and imagined pasts with the present,
and is concerned with both the living and the dead. I also put this research forward as
40
a study that answers Harrison’s call, that archaeology dealing with the recent past and
present should not be piecemeal but detailed, cover the long term, and be longitudinal
in scope.
41
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the strategic methodology and resources
employed in this dissertation, and to explain the reasoning behind their choice. This
research applies a multiplicity of methods reflecting the essence of modern conflict
archaeology and the subject’s multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature. Saunders
has described the archaeology of conflict, and in particular conflict landscapes as
multi-vocal and multi-dimensional.64 This view has roots that go back to W. G.
Hoskins,65 in the context of British landscape history, whose
main thesis was that the landscape was there to be ‘read’. If one examined it closely
one could ‘read’ or detect evidence for earlier landscapes that had subsequently been
replaced or adapted. This approach has been likened to a palimpsest, faint traces of
original writing visible in parchment that has been reused. Sometimes, the landscape,
like manuscript palimpsests, can reveal multiple episodes of use and reuse. Hoskins
stressed the importance of combining evidence produced by an archaeological
examination of the landscape itself with a study of historical records, such as maps,
parish registers, deeds and so forth.66
Hoskins’ emphasis on the combining of different types of evidence to get a total,
holistic picture of a landscape’s history, is a strength that is found in contemporary
historical archaeology. It is especially so with an archaeology of the present, including
the archaeology of modern conflict; though the different classes of evidence for the
recent past, undoubtedly, go far beyond anything Hoskins might have considered. An
archaeology of the recent and contemporary past can draw upon an immense and
varied range of resources unavailable to researchers of the more distant past. Besides
64
Saunders 2001: 37.
Hoskins 1977.
66
Pryor 2010: 15.
65
42
traditional resources such as artefacts, and written and visual accounts – in all of their
variety – we are also all personally linked to, and part and parcel of the recent past and
present. We move with it and it moves with us in a personal and intimate way. The
present becomes the past on a daily basis while we inexorably move into the future.
We interact immediately with its materiality and we have access to the voices of
others, both close to us through direct contact in some instances, and further a field, or
around the globe, through a variety of ways and media, and of course, through the
matrix of the World Wide Web, all contributing to an archaeology in and of the
present. This is also the case for an archaeology of modern conflict in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries, which, by being multi-faceted, draws on the insights, resources,
techniques and knowledge of disciplines other than archaeology. They include
anthropology and culture studies, cultural geography, military history, art history,
museum and heritage studies, and tourism, plus the sub-disciplines that feed into these
fields. This diversity gives a strength to modern conflict archaeology ‘which, rather
than privileging one or other kinds of knowledge, seeks instead to draw on each as
appropriate in order to respond to the complex challenges of investigating conflict in
the modern world’.67 As Schofield points out, archaeology is not a ‘thing’, it is ‘a way
of looking at the past’.68 It is a way of looking at the little things, the mundane things,
the familiar and overly familiar, the taken for granted, and those things that are so
humble that we do not even see them,69 and in the words of Arundhati Roy, talking
about her novel The God of Small Things:
the God of Small Things is a book where you connect the very smallest things to the
very biggest: whether it's the dent that a baby spider makes on the surface of water or
the quality of the moonlight on a river or how history and politics intrude into your
life, your house, your bedroom.70
Roy’s statement is relevant to the archaeology of all periods, and her sense of
intimacy and scale in recognising the connectedness of the ‘small things’ that make up
human experience with the bigger things of natural phenomena, history and politics
resonates with an archaeology of the contemporary, and of modern conflict.
67
Saunders 2012: x.
Schofield, 2005: 28.
69
Attfield 2000, Graves-Brown 2000, and Buchli, and Lucas 2001.
70
Barsamian 2001.
68
43
Therefore, those distinct methodologies from the contemporary archaeologist’s tool
kit that are best suited to understanding the disposition of smaller things on a greater
landscape – that is both physical and conceptual (and even ‘virtual’) – are to be
employed in this research, and their application is discussed below.
‘The right tools for the job’
While describing the practice of archaeology, David Hurst Thomas has succinctly
written: ‘Archaeological objects vary. So do archaeological contexts. Deciphering
meaning from such objects in context is the business of archaeology’.71 This simple
distillation of archaeology’s goal is ever more challenging in the context of recent and
contemporary conflict, where
militarised landscapes and the metallic artefact assemblages of recent conflict… [are]
windows into a world of extraordinary complexity and contradictions. Tradition
clashes with modernity. Rival ethnicities and nationalisms collide. Memory and
remembrance are politically contested.72
As pointed out by Klausmeier et al., these complex issues take archaeologists beyond
‘simple field recording, noting presence/absence and architectural detail’. They
require ‘more reflexive, more integrated and more thoughtful approaches’.73 It is these
kinds of approaches that are examined below, and hopefully are, ‘the right tools for
the job’.
The tools and methodologies used in this research are quite varied. Besides the
expected bibliographic searches of standard research, they range from traditional
archaeological landscape survey to the analysis of satellite imagery (Google Earth),
and from the application of geographical information systems to the Internet fostered
phenomenon of ‘volunteered geographic information’. The Internet has been explored
for topic specific (general and personal) websites and further user generated content,
including historical imagery, contemporary imagery and relevant art. Oral history
71
Thomas, 1989: 15.
Current Archaeology 2009: 40.
73
Klausmeier, Purbrick and Schofield 2006: 5.
72
44
fieldwork has been carried out, and YouTube videos have been included as audiovisual documents.
The ‘materiality of conflict’ is at the heart of this research, and attempts to present and
understand it have dictated the composition of the ‘tool kit’ utilised. After traditional
bibliographic research, including published books, journals and newspapers,
dissertations, technical and specialist papers, and online publications, there are three
generalised categories of tools and resources employed in this project. They are:
Visual and geographic sources
Oral history/testimony
Archaeological field survey
The order of these three categories is not hierarchical, they all fold into each other.
They do, however, represent different distances (both real and conceptual) at which
the Western Sahara conflict has been examined. Visual and geographic sources are the
most distant, relying on satellite imagery (in particular, Google Earth), geographic
information systems, and user generated Internet imagery – photographs. In contrast,
the carrying out of oral historical research is a close contact undertaking – it requires
person-to-person interaction. ‘Oral history’ is multi-faceted, it can refer to a spoken
memoir or describe a historical research methodology. It provides a distinctive ‘source
base which can be integrated into approaches to history such as social, political,
cultural, economic, medical, legal or military history’,74 and of course, the
archaeology of the recent past. In this project, it also includes websites and blogs,
YouTube videos (and similar) and published interviews and personal accounts.
Archaeological field survey is also ‘close contact’, but the interactive human element
is minimal. It has mainly been carried out to familiarise oneself with the data derived
from satellite imagery, though it also highlights the relationship between the
archaeologist in the field and the landscape under study.
Fieldwork was carried out in Algeria and Western Sahara in 2011 between October
11th and November 5th. The aim was three fold:
74
Peniston-Bird 2009: 105.
45
To carry out an archaeological examination of the Moroccan field defences in
and around Tifariti with the aim of ground truthing them in relation to Google
Earth satellite imagery. Also, to record the Spanish Foreign Legion fort in the
centre of Tifariti, and to record the still standing artworks produced by artists
taking part in the annual ARTifariti festivals since 2007.
To interview artists taking part in the 2011 ARTifariti festival, specifically,
while they were working in Tifariti.75
And to interview individual Saharawis about the war with Morocco and their
personal experiences, and to get an intimation of their feelings about their
country.
Visual and Geographic Sources
Visual sources and tools can mediate the materiality of conflict very effectively. The
visual tools used in this research include open source geographic information systems
and Google Earth (and free third party applications) along with user generated visual
Internet content, both historical and contemporary. It has been an aim of this project to
see how productive open source and Internet resources can be in pursuing research of
this kind.
Using Google Earth
Remote sensing in archaeology, that is, the study of past materialities from a distance,
and through non-direct human intervention, has been a part of archaeology since the
earliest pioneers of aerial archaeology in the early 20th century.76 However, with the
proliferation of satellites in orbit around the earth, archaeologists have been able to
access satellite imagery that can record very great expanses of the earth’s surface in
relatively fine detail. Satellite imagery can also provide data in non-visible light
spectra, allowing features to be seen, and analysed, which are not visible to the naked
eye. But in terms of satellite imagery captured within the visible light spectrum, that
75
It turned out, that at very short notice, the organisers of ARTifariti 2011 decided not to go to Tifariti
due to limited finances. Instead, they stayed and worked in the refugee camps in Tindouf. Because of
this I was not able to talk with artists while working in, and experiencing the landscape of Tifariti. As a
result, I had to seek out other sources of information and personal recollections of artists from earlier
ARTifariti festivals. This is explained below in the section on oral history and testimony etc.
76
Parcak, S.H. 2009.
46
is, the kind of imagery that is captured in a simple photograph, and is visible to the
naked eye, archaeologists now have a free tool in the ‘virtual globe’ of Google Earth,
released onto the Internet in 2005.
Google Earth satellite imagery is all around us. It is used on a daily basis in television
news coverage, and it is used in education at all levels, at the very least, for
visualisation and presentation.77 In fact, Google Earth has probably been used its most
in visualisation and presentation, from, for example, presenting and displaying
archaeological sites in the Egyptian Delta78 to the mapping and presentation of the
Nazi Holocaust, and more recent genocides – extremely violent events in the history
of mankind.79 It has shown to be of real use in the health and other sciences,80 and it
has been recommended as a productive, though basic, mapping tool that can be
employed by NGOs in humanitarian crises and natural disasters.81
Though, accepting Google Earth as a mapping and visualisation tool, archaeologists
have not held back from voicing their concerns over the perceived drawbacks of the
application, mainly being, as Myers has summarised: issues of data ownership and
permanence, the use of file formats specific to the application, the variable coverage
of high resolution imagery, and the ethical issues of the potential use of Google Earth
by antiquities hunters. He also raises the point that people recorded on Google Earth’s
highest resolution imagery have no say in their being viewed, especially in such a
freely available application. Additionally, he raises the spectre that it is panopticonlike and that it has the potential to do ‘violence’ to those being viewed.82 However,
this potentiality surely exists with all types of remotely acquired imagery.
Nevertheless, and as Parcak clearly acknowledges, the best imagery available on
Google Earth can qualitatively match similar aerial photography, and all of the
application’s benefits outweigh its disadvantages.83
77
Myers, A. 2010b: 7.
Spencer and Spencer 2009: 42.
79
See the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum website at http://www.ushmm.org/ accessed 16
April 2012.
80
Stensgaard et al 2009.
81
Crossley 2008 and Morris 2009.
82
Myers 2010b: 10.
83
Parcak 2009: 47.
78
47
Stensgaard et al. reviewed the use of Google Earth within the scientific community
between 2005 and 2008, and they discovered a positive response to the application.
They searched peer-reviewed literature and found, in 2008 alone, seventy publications
actually using Google Earth for scientific purposes. The disciplines included, geology,
palaeontology, environmental management, conservation, and medicine. Though its
most extensive use was in the environmental sciences, with its use in the health
sciences and in public health projects increasing. The application had also been used
retrospectively for earlier research to be disseminated to new and wider audiences.84
In contrast, Myers, writing in 2010, noted that the use of Google Earth in the social
sciences – beyond visualisation, presentation and teaching – had been relatively slow
in coming, and he only described three archaeological research projects, carried out
since 2008, which used the application analytically.85 These were; Thomas and
Zipfel,86 and Thomas et al.87 in Afghanistan; Contreras and Brodie,88 examining the
looting of archaeological sites in Jordan; and Myers’ own work investigating the
development of Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.89 However, Contreras also
examined the looting of archaeological sites in Peru,90 while Yves Gauthier has been
examining and mapping prehistoric Saharan sites and monuments with Google Earth
since at least 2006. More recently, Kennedy has used Google Earth to map prehistoric
monuments in inaccessible areas of Saudi Arabia.91
Yves Gauthier has been investigating prehistoric sites in the Sahara since, at least,
1989.92 Since 2006, with the introduction of high-resolution imagery on Google Earth,
he has been systematically plotting swathes of visible prehistoric remains across the
Sahara. He has used these to augment his earlier fieldwork, to prepare and get the lie
of the land before commencing new fieldwork, to contextualise his findings, and to try
84
Stensgaard et al, 2009: 129-131.
Myers 2010b: 8-9.
86
Thomas and Zipfel 2008.
87
Thomas et al 2008.
88
Contreras and Brodie 2010.
89
Myers 2010a.
90
Contreras 2010.
91
Kennedy and Bishop 2011.
92
Gauthier and Gauthier 1991.
85
48
to understand overall site distributional trends across large portions of the Sahara. He
also uses Google Earth to illustrate and inform his findings.93
With Gauthier writing almost exclusively in French (and by not highlighting his use of
Google Earth in the titles of his published articles), Thomas et al. remarked that, as of
2008, ‘hardly any archaeological research using Google Earth has been published,
partly because most archaeologists are able to conduct fieldwork, rather than being
solely restricted to desk-based studies’.94 This latter point was made in the context of
his own ASAGE (Archaeological Sites of Afghanistan in Google Earth) project,
where Thomas decided to utilise the high resolution imagery available on Google
Earth to ‘collate new information about the archaeological remains of southern
Afghanistan, where fieldwork opportunities… [were] limited’95 due to the ongoing
conflict in the country since the United States led invasion of 2001.
As of 2008, Thomas and his colleagues were able to identify 250 (that is, nineteen per
cent) of the then known archaeological sites in Afghanistan in the seven per cent of
the country (around 46,000 square kilometres) covered by high resolution Google
Earth imagery. Of these, 217 lacked even the simplest of plans. They also focused on
45 medieval sites of which only eight had plans. This being the case, ASAGE took a
threefold approach to utilizing Google Earth as a research tool. First, descriptions and
plans of known sites were checked, and where necessary, enhanced. Second, detailed
‘sketch’ plans were generated of known, but un-mapped, sites, and third, Google
Earth’s high-resolution imagery was interrogated so as to locate and plot unknown
archaeological sites.
Their approach was very systematic, virtually carrying out the equivalent of a land
based survey, working over transects of north to south strips of high-resolution
imagery, and covering a variety of environmental zones. By visually scanning the
strips in five survey areas, Thomas was able to identify 451 potential archaeological
sites, which were cross-checked and catalogued. Further, more detailed planning of
93
The following references illustrate, very well, the way in which Gauthier has made Google Earth an
integral part of his research: Gauthier and Gauthier 2007, Gauthier and Gauthier 2008a, Gauthier and
Gauthier 2008b, Gauthier and Gauthier 2008c, Gauthier 2009a and Gauthier 2009b.
94
Thomas et al 2008: 22.
95
Thomas and Zipfel 2008.
49
sites was also carried out, and at Bust, for instance, they were able to enhance and
expand a 1978 plan with the addition of intra and extramural features including,
houses, possible caravanserais, enclosures, mausolea and further details of the
fortifications.
The dimensional accuracy of Google Earth was also checked by
measuring features with known dimensions, such as tennis courts and football pitches.
This was done on six continents, and the dimensional variation was usually within one
to two percent of the expected measurable value.96
The looting of archaeological sites is a market driven, international problem, and the
analysis of looting through commercially acquired satellite imagery can be hampered
by prohibitive costs. With this in mind, Contreras and Brodie decided to investigate
whether it was ‘possible to use exclusively free [Google Earth] or low-cost imagery to
identify and interrogate evidence of looting and site destruction’, and to enquire how
information gathered through remote sensing could be ‘combined with other types of
data to generate quantitative studies of archaeological site looting.’ They chose Jordan
as a case study, since there was a substantial history of looting in the country, and
since pedestrian survey had failed to systematically record or quantify any of it.97
Also, a significant inventory of Jordan’s archaeology exists, and the country is well
covered by sub-metre pixel imagery on Google Earth.98
By inputting the distribution of known archaeological sites, and by visually inspecting
the relevant Google Earth imagery, and taking into consideration references of known
looting from archaeological surveys and publications, Contreras and Brodie were able
to identify 25 looted sites (reduced to 22 after ground truthing). The areas of looting,
shown by extensive pitting were then compared with the known, overall areas of the
sites, and in the case of ancient cemeteries (of which there were eighteen), estimated
densities of graves or tombs was factored in. Such a methodology allowed Contreras
and Brodie to quantify the destruction through looting at the sites investigated, and in
effect, created a base line from which past and future looting could be compared. They
clearly showed that, free, publicly available satellite imagery could be employed in
96
Thomas et al 2008: 23-25 and Thomas and Zipfel 2008.
Contreras and Brodie 2010: 102.
98
Contreras and Brodie 2010: 104-105.
97
50
site analysis, and in this case, the analysis of archaeological robbing.99 However,
Contreras has also pointed out, by carrying out a similar analysis of looting in Peru,
also with Google Earth, that the extent of looting in cemeteries could provide a
minimum estimate of cemetery size (since it can be presumed that looters will not dig
where their efforts would not yield profitable results) and this could inform
archaeological fieldwork, by providing a rudimentary index of areas of ancient
occupation.100
Writing in 2009, David Kennedy was alerted by Abdullah Al-Saeed, an amateur
archaeologist, to the extensive presence of prehistoric remains visible on Google Earth
in Saudi Arabia.101 He subsequently explored some of the ‘windows’ of highresolution imagery available on the application, and realised that a virtual survey of
even a small part of the country could add, quite considerably, to all the land based
surveys that had previously been carried out in the country. With the assistance of
M.C. Bishop he decided to explore a window of high-resolution imagery east of
Jeddah with an aim to work out issues of feature and site categorization, and the
limitations and strengths of Google Earth for archaeological prospection and
interpretation.102
The evaluation area was a north to south strip of high resolution imagery measuring
17 kilometres by 72.8 kilometres, with an area of approximately, 1240 square
kilometres. With a pre-knowledge of monument types, Kennedy visually inspected the
imagery and marked site and feature locations in Google Earth. These were looked
over a second time by Bishop and confirmed, and/or expanded upon. Any additional
sites were added to the dataset, and a total of 1977 sites were recorded in all.103 This is
a very impressive number, and undoubtedly, it does not represent the full distribution,
and quantity, of monument types present in the landscape. To Kennedy, Google Earth
proved its worth in the identification of, and prospecting for, archaeological sites
when dealing with large, inaccessible landscapes.
99
Contreras and Brodie 2010: 105-110 & 112.
Contreras 2010: 552-553.
101
Kennedy and Al-Saeed 2009.
102
Kennedy and Bishop 2011.
103
Kennedy and Bishop 2011.
100
51
As Thomas et al have shown, it is more than possible to use Google Earth to survey,
record, and analyse, archaeological sites in inaccessible and contested regions – in
their case, the war zone of contemporary Afghanistan. While Adrian Myers has used
Google Earth to explore the American detention complex of Camp Delta at the United
States Naval Base of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since this too is an area of high
inaccessibility, Myers has, in effect, strayed into the realms of ‘satellite imagery
activism’104 and he has used Google Earth as a ‘reverse panopticon’ where ‘the takenfor-granted neutral power of satellite imagery, aerial photography and mapping is
deployed against the very forces that were instrumental in its original deployment’.105
From the start, and like Contreras and Brodie, Myers wanted to use Google Earth
imagery and publicly available spatial data to learn, in a systematic and
methodological way, as much as possible about Camp Delta. He collected dated
Google Earth imagery, using the ‘historical time slider’ utility in the application, along
with other imagery, including media photographs of the camp as well as documentary
sources. And like the other Google Earth based projects described above, the collected
data was loaded into a GIS for detailed analysis and mapping. His ‘Camp Delta
Project’ has been able to record the expansion of the prison between 2003 and 2004,
and between 2004 and 2008 when sub-camps were constructed. Constructional
changes have also been recorded – from temporary barrack-style buildings to multilevel concrete structures.106
The Camp Delta Project shows that ‘Google Earth has shifted the relationship between
archaeologists and remotely sensed data in exciting, significant and sometimes
troubling ways.’107 This free application can obviously turn the archaeology of the
contemporary into a critical, political and humanitarian intervention, with ‘the
potential to contradict, what is officially stated and displayed about places like Camp
Delta in other sources.’108 Such a use of Google Earth can also be situated within the
contemporary phenomenon of ‘neogeography’.109 According to Turner, neogeography
104
Baker and Williamson 2006. Myers’ work can also be placed within the realm of ‘citizen
empowerment’ through ‘counter surveillance’, see Monahan, Phillips and Wood 2010.
105
Perkins and Dodge 2009.
106
Myers 2010a: 457-461.
107
Myers 2010a: 456.
108
Myers 2010a: 463-64.
109
Kennedy and Bishop 2011.
52
is a new type of geography and cartography that is accessible to many people who are
using new techniques and tools outside of what is now considered traditional GIS. It
‘is about people using and creating their own maps, on their own terms and by
combining elements of an existing toolset. Neogeography is about sharing location
information with friends and visitors, helping shape context, and conveying
understanding through knowledge of place’, and much of this is realised using virtual
globes and mapping, and geographically referencing (‘geo-tagging’) photography and
text.110 Goodchild sees this growing trend as something akin to ‘traditional citizen
science’, reviving the ‘role of the amateur in geographic observation’. And this
‘volunteered geographic information (VGI)’ is, undoubtedly, part of a growing
internet phenomenon of ‘user generated content’.111
The projects just described all indicate that Google Earth is a viable tool for remote
imagery interpretation. Google Earth does not include the additional data that is
included in commercially available satellite imagery. But where the imagery has high,
sub-metre pixel resolution, it can equal in quality some traditional, vertical aerial
photography. Besides Google Earth’s easy to use interface, there are some additional
programmes that can be used in conjunction with the platform, and the following
examples have had utility in this research. One is ‘Another Earth’.112 This application
allows the user to view Google Earth in two adjacent windows, and within both, the
historical time slider facility can be used so that imagery of different dates can be seen
side by side. This is very useful when comparing landscape changes. The tilting, three
dimensional facility in Google Earth can also be used in one window, while in the
other, the vertical view can be kept, or a three dimensional view can be looked at from
a different angle, allowing comparisons from different viewpoints to be made. There
is another application, ‘Hey What’s That’,113 which incorporates SRTM114 digital
elevation data with Google Maps to produce landscape panoramas and profiles, and
highly relevant to this research, viewsheds, called ‘visibility cloaks’ in the application.
110
Turner 2006: 2-3.
Goodchild 2007: 211-221.
112
Available at http://anotherearth.org/, accessed 25 April 2012.
113
Available at http://www.heywhatsthat.com/, accessed 25 April 2012.
114
SRTM stands for Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, being digital topographic data collected by
NASA, by the Space Shuttle Endeavour in February 2000. Further information is available at
http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/ accessed 25 April 2014.
111
53
These can be displayed and saved in Google Earth, and/or as image files.
Subsequently, they can be imported in one form or another into a GIS, and used in
further analyses.
By using these add-ons to Google Earth (and Google Maps), and by doing so in
tandem with an open source GIS, a formidable suite of geographic analysis tools can
be created at no cost. And as already emphasised, incorporating free geospatial
software is one of the aims of this research. In fact, this project could not have been
conceived without Google Earth, since the cost of commercial satellite imagery of
comparable resolution would have been economically prohibitive.
Online Visual Archives
As Myers has shown with his analysis of the American detention centre at
Guantanamo Bay, publicly available geospatial information can be harnessed to make
meaningful enquiries about highly contested spaces. This application can be academic
or anti-hegemonic as a form of citizen empowerment. The tools are easy to use, and
when virtual globes are combined with other sources of online and user generated
content, such as virtual photo archives, then very interesting enquiries can be carried
out. The arts magazine, Cabinet, recently ran an article with the title, ‘D.I.Y. Eye in
the Sky’, and the title says it all. Here, the author, Andrew Toland, wanted to take
photographs from publicly available internet archives and see ‘just how far beyond the
images’ he could go (also with the use of Google Earth and Google Maps).115
First, Toland accessed Flickr, the online photo and video hosting website and searched
for ‘Beirut skyline’. After finding one distinctive image of Beirut in Lebanon, he was
able to access the producer’s Flickr photostream to find other similar images of the
city. They, also, all provided him with their exposure dates and cameras used. He
compared photos taken from different angles, and in his example, he marked out
distinctive buildings common to two photos. He tried finding images of the same
Beirut locations in Google Earth by searching the application’s embedded user
generated imagery, but there were too many images to cross check. Instead, he went
back to the original photos and found the hint of an address on a very tall building,
115
Toland 2012.
54
and by querying Google Maps, he was able to find its location in the city. This then
allowed him to discern the alignments of the two photographs he was working with
and to record their fields of view in plan, and in Google Earth, he was able to acquire
the viewpoint from where the photos were taken. Also, by marking the position of the
sun in one photograph, he was able to estimate its azimuth and by using the longitude
and latitude coordinates of the viewpoint, the date the photos were taken, and by
taking account of Beirut local time, he was able to figure out the time of day that the
photos were taken. By comparing Google Maps with Google Earth, and by using the
search facilities in the former, and the Google search engine, and by additionally
searching Wikimapia when inconsistencies occurred, he was able to acquire the
address of the building from which the photos were taken. The location was a hotel,
which Toland was able to confirm by a simple email request.
By interrogating other photographs uploaded by the same photographer, Toland was
able to cross reference them and discern who his employer was, and by so doing he
was able to do further internet searches which gave him more personal information.
Toland was also able to double check the date and time that the photos were taken
since they could be downloaded with their metadata attached. This revealed a time
stamp that matched the time of exposure already calculated by Toland. But the
recorded time was two hours earlier, the time in London, not Beirut. The photographer
was British, on a business trip in the city, and he obviously did not adjust the time
settings in his camera.
This example, which could be described as a form of cyber, or digital excavation,116
along with the archaeological examples already cited, illustrates all too clearly the
potentialities of free Internet resources. Toland’s example clearly shows that there are
substantial ethical issues to be addressed, but the principle still stands that the Internet
is a viable source of geospatial and visual information that can be systematically
interrogated.
116
Harrison 2009.
55
Using Visual Imagery
The Western Sahara conflict has a definite Internet presence, and since the conflict has
continued into the twenty-first century, parties with an interest in it have been adding
materials to the World Wide Web. Amongst these are photographic images –
historical and contemporary – from official sources, journalist photographers, artists
and other types of Internet users. They have been an invaluable visual resource in this
research, and their online origins and the way in which they have been incorporated
into this work is described herein. For example, a sizable portion of Chapter 3 is
devoted to a narrative of the Spanish presence in Western Sahara, and in particular, to
the creation of a Spanish colonial space and military presence. That ‘space’ had, as
would be expected, a real material expression in the form of military outposts and
forts – along with French colonial posts in the neighbouring French colonies –
encircling and enclosing Western Sahara. To appreciate the materiality of these desert
posts, and to express their concretedness, it has been appropriate to employ historical
imagery, and because of ease and accessibility, imagery specifically sourced from the
Internet. This approach has also been applied to the decades following the end of
Spanish rule in the territory, where imagery is also available.
It is not the intention here to give a thorough review of the use of imagery in historical
research. Suffice it to say, historical photographic imagery appears to be rarely used in
archaeology, even in an archaeology of the contemporary and recent past, though a
recent exception to this is the University of Manchester archaeological project at
Whitworth Park in Manchester. In this project, 19th and early 20th century postcards
are seen as ‘agents’ that can provide insights into the materiality of the park in the
past, as well as provide or hint at social meanings and identities associated with it.117
Also, Matthew Leonard, a postgraduate student from Bristol, has studied imagery in
the form of sketches produced by a family relative who served in France, and the
Levant, during the First World War. These made up a secret, visual diary (soldiers
were forbidden to keep diaries): ‘a piece of visual material culture in the form of a
personal history of the war’, and reflecting the ‘varied physical settings in which the
conflict occurred, and… the structure of… everyday life’ for the soldiers at the front.
117
Jones 2012.
56
Without text, the diary is ‘an embodiment of the notion that a picture is worth a
thousand words’.118
A very well received overview of critical visual methodologies is presented in what
has become a standard text on the subject, by Gillian Rose,119 and in it she guides the
reader over a series of interpretive methods applicable to imagery, including
compositional interpretation, content analysis, semiology, psychoanalysis, discourse
analysis, audience studies, and the social life of visual objects. However, none marries
directly with what can be deemed as an archaeological approach, meaning an
interpretive method that provides insights into, and primary data on, the materiality of
human existence – our relationship with material objects of all types, visible in any
given photographic image. This can be implicit in the methods described by Rose,
with much of the interpretive guidance directed at understanding imagery per se and
our relationships with images and imagery, as opposed to eliciting information on
material culture and our relationship with materiality (though this can be a by-product
of the methods described).
In sum, the researcher must approach the photograph as a social artefact, to
understand the process of interaction between the producer of the image, the subject
of the image, and the viewer. [In] …a reflexive, critical, study of photographs that
contextualizes [the] images...120
The most analytical use of imagery within archaeology is with satellite and aerial
photography, and the employment of the latter in modern conflict archaeology is
admirably elaborated upon in Images of Conflict, edited by Stichelbaut et al.121 When
an archaeologist interprets an aerial photograph (or a satellite image), he/she is not
immediately concerned with the producer of the image, nor the initial and subsequent
viewers of the image and their interactions with it, nor the image as artefact with its
own history (or biography). The archaeologist is interested in primary data that can
shed light on the palimpsest that is the land and/or townscape viewed from above.
Stratigraphy is not so important too, instead, the past and present are both visible and
118
Leonard 2012: 54, 55 & 69.
Rose 2001.
120
Scherer 1992: 32.
121
Stichelbaut et al 2009.
119
57
on the same surface, and this is the object of data acquisition and subsequent
analysis.122 The same basic approach can be applied to terrestrial photographs, and at
least one anthropologist has done so, examining historical photographs with a critical
eye for the ‘material’.
In 1981, the anthropologist Margaret Blackman published Window on the Past: the
Photographic Ethnohistory of the Northern and Kaigani Haida,123 wherein she
examined the changes in the material culture of the Haida Native Americans of the
Pacific coast of Canada and southern Alaska from the last quarter of the 19th century
into the early 20th century. By interrogating collections of historical photographs she
was able to chart changes in settlement layouts, and architectural styles, including the
effects of missionary activity (through acculturation) and the impact of that on
traditional settlement patterning. She also examined the relationships of material
culture items within and around buildings and the village-scapes that she was
studying. This was informed by fieldwork and interviews, archival research, and
published ethnographic and historical accounts, but central to her thesis was that
photographs could be the medium through which an ethnohistory could be written.124
Quoting Sontag, that a ‘photograph is a thin slice of space as well as time’,125
Blackman went on to compare the ethnohistorical study of photographs to
archaeological sampling:
The photographs... can be regarded as sharing much in common with archaeological
specimens. This similarity can be seen first of all in the fact that the photographs of
the Haida are only a sample from the past of a population of photographs, much as
archaeological specimens are only a sample from a past population of artefacts. The
photographs constitute a sample because they represent neither all of the historic
photos taken of Northern and Kaigani Haida people and villages, nor do they present
in their entirety a total picture of Haida culture during the time period under study.
The shortcoming of the photographic sample, its incompleteness, is the same
shortcoming inherent in the archaeological record of a culture. Archaeologist and
122
For a standard text book on aerial archaeology and the interpretation of aerial photos see Wilson
[1982] 2000.
123
Blackman 1981. See also Blackman 1992.
124
Blackman 1981: 2.
125
Sontag 1973: 22 cited in Blackman 1981: 48.
58
photo ethnohistorian share some of the same methodological problems. Both are
attempting to reconstruct the dynamics of past cultures, but these cultures must be
deduced from study of only some of the parts.126
She then highlights how her ‘archaeological’ type of ethnohistory has, as its kernel,
material culture studies:
contained within the photographs are images of artefacts, material culture which can
be described both temporally and spatially. As with the organization of archaeological
data along space-time co-ordinates, one can examine and order the photographic
material to see how Haida villages and their components differ from area to area and
how village features change through time. The content of the photographs of Haida
culture… is primarily artifactual as opposed to behavioural. The photographs
comprise almost exclusively images of houses and totem poles, panoramas of
villages, and a few shots of house interiors. Because of the artifactual orientation of
the photographs, as in the reconstruction of archaeological cultures, the behavioural
sphere of the culture must be derived largely from analysis of the material culture.127
Blackman’s use of historical photographs resonates with the approach to imagery
applied in this research, though of course, the scale of photo enquiry is not the same.
Visual imagery, and in particular, user generated internet imagery, is only a small part
of this project, but as a part of the narrative presented, it adds to an understanding of
the material reality of the Western Sahara conflict.
Online Imagery and Archives – the Spanish occupation of Western Sahara
User generated Internet content has its pitfalls. It is not checked or reviewed (except in
limited circumstances) and in the case of geographically referenced imagery, it might
even describe the wrong place. It is a lottery as to whether or not the material is
useful, or of good quality. Some of the individual items recorded and posted on the
Internet might be insignificant, and sometimes only partially of value, but the overall
sum of such data is probably greater than the individual parts. By reflexively
interrogating this partial data, such user generated content can only add to an
examination of the contested and militarised landscape of Western Sahara.
126
127
Blackman 1981: 48.
Blackman 1981: 49.
59
Some websites exist to memorialise people’s experiences. These can be individuals or
groups, and they can include texts and/or group or personal blogs, group forums and
virtual archives. There are three such websites that have been a good source of
historical imagery relevant to this research, and they have been set up by veterans of
the Spanish military who served in Western Sahara up to the winter of 1975-76. The
first site is La Mili en el Sáhara,128 a website created in 2003 with the stated aim of
wanting to stimulate and reawaken the experiences of those people who lived, worked,
and served in (and were conscripted into) the Spanish military in Western Sahara
during the colonial period, and to rediscover the places they lived in and the people
they met, in that ‘wonderful land’. The website is very much a celebration of veterans’
times in Western Sahara, and by invoking a passage on its home page from the
prologue in Wilfred Thesiger’s Arabian Sands, which also quotes T.E. Lawrence, it
expresses the romantic idea that once a person experiences the desert, that person will
always long to return to it.
Lawrence wrote in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, ‘Bedouin ways were hard, even for those
brought up in them and for strangers terrible: a death in life.’ No man can live this life
and emerge unchanged. He will carry, however faint, the imprint of the desert, the
brand which marks the nomad: and he will have within him the yearning to return,
weak or insistent according to his nature.129
This website includes articles, book lists, audio and video recordings, a forum for
members, and photo albums. The albums130 allow individuals to post their own
photographs of their times in Western Sahara up to 1976, and of their more recent
trips, exploring the sites at which they served while in the Spanish military. It is
common, also, for veterans to post scanned images of their military documentation
and citations. Most of the photographs are snapshots, usually showing individuals in
specific locations, and/or with friends, including Sahawari military comrades and
civilians. The photographs are often posed, and their aim seems to have been to record
young men having a ‘good time’ in the company of other, like-minded young men.
128
La Mili en el Sáhara (2003-2013).
Thesiger [1959] 1994: 17.
130
The majority of the photographs have attributions to their producers (or submitters), but there are
also early photographs with no attributions.
129
60
However, there are also photographs of soldiers carrying out daily chores, in training,
and on manoeuvres. There are photographs of troops on parade, troops with military
equipment, and images of the main Spanish settlements, including townscapes and
historic buildings, street scenes and aerial shots. Some of the soldiers photographed
scenic vistas, while others just recorded their places of work and the posts they were
stationed at. The site is very active, and it is being continually updated with new
material.
Another website memorialising the experiences of Spanish veterans in Western Sahara
is Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara.131 This site is
specifically for veterans of Spain’s camel corps: the Tropas Nómadas. Although its
overall aims appear to be the same as those of La Mili en el Sáhara, there is something
which could be described as more officious about the website. It seems to be very
much a veteran’s association in that, for instance, its members appear to be associated
with the mainstream veterans culture in Spain, and members of the ‘fraternity’ take
part in public military parades on national holidays in Spain. Such activities can be
found on the website’s home page. The site includes articles about member’s
experiences in Western Sahara, the history of the Tropas Nómadas (including the
Regulares132), and Spain’s military presence in the colony. There is a member’s
forum, a downloadable magazine, and photo albums.133 The albums are different from
those in La Mili en el Sáhara, since they do not include many images of common
soldiers living their daily lives in the colony. The emphasis is on more historical and
topographic imagery. However, there are also photo collections dealing with the flags
of units, unit formations, individual forts and posts, some military hardware, maps,
flora and fauna, local people, colonial stamps, and even sites of water wells. In all,
there are fewer photographs than are available at La Mili en el Sáhara, and they have
not been updated since 2010.
131
Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara (2011).
The Regulares were an elite unit of the Spanish Army in northern Morocco, made up of indigenous
Moroccan soldiers commanded by Spanish officers (Alvarez 2001: 219-220).
133
Although there is meta data attached to each photograph, the creators or posters are not usually
noted.
132
61
The third website with historical imagery relevant to this research is Tercio ‘D. Juan
de Austria’ 3° de La Legion.134 This site is primarily aimed at memorialising the 3rd
Regiment of the Spanish Foreign Legion. The site is very martial indeed, and on its
home page, there is a cameo of the founder of the Legion, Milan Astray: an ultra
conservative and controversial character within his own lifetime. The site definitely
aims at commemorating the Legion, and besides including items on the history and
campaigns of the unit (including its deployments today), it posts the ‘Creed of the
Legion’, and its martial songs, including the official hymn of the Tercio (the Legion),
and the song, ‘The Betrothed of Death’.135 Nonetheless, the website photo galleries
are very pertinent to this research.136 They emphasise the history of the Legion from
its foundation during the Riff War and into the Spanish Civil War, then up to the
present day, including its disposition in Western Sahara. As with photo albums on the
Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara website, most of the images
show units and men in action, posts and bases, and scenes of men in battle. There are
very few snapshots of individual soldiers with their comrades. There is a forum on the
site, but it is little used, though there is much activity with articles about the
contemporary Spanish military scene.
Online Imagery – from the Spanish occupation to the present day
Besides websites set up by veterans of Spain’s military presence in Western Sahara,
there are other types of websites that aim to document the story of Western Sahara.
One in particular is www.lasonet.com/sahara/, a website entitled on its home page as
(when translated from Spanish) ‘Let’s help the Saharawi People!’. The site includes
very basic facts about Western Sahara; a video about the Western Sahara conflict;
photographs of stamps, both Spanish colonial and of the Saharawi Republic; Spanish
military and non military badges, stickers, and posters; some Saharawi poetry; a link
to Western Sahara in Google Maps; a listing of the countries that recognise the
Saharawi Republic; and even photographs of some Spanish period car number plates.
Most importantly, however, the site includes 300 web pages of historical and
134
Available at http://www.amigosdeltercertercio.com/ accessed 12 September 2012.
For the texts and lyrics of these see Álvarez 2001: 237-244.
136
Many of the photographs have captions, but the names of the image originators are apparently never
noted.
135
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contemporary photographs137 including images of the Spanish colonial period (some
of which are duplicated on the websites already noted), the areas occupied by
Morocco and Mauritania, the Polisario controlled ‘free zone’, and the refugee camps
in Tindouf (including the Saharawi diaspora). The site also includes some low level
aerial photography of the Moroccan berms and its forts.
The mix of historical image types on www.lasonet.com/sahara/ is very much the same
as on La Mili en el Sáhara, and there is a celebratory air about the photography. But
the site also includes scenes of Saharawi protests at the time of the handover of the
colony to Morocco and Mauritania, and images of anti-Moroccan protests today. Also
photographs of Saharawis physically abused and tortured when in detention by
Morocco, which can be disturbing.
Another source of imagery that bridges the Spanish colonial period in Western Sahara
with the contemporary is Panoramio, linked with Google Earth. As the Panoramio
website says, it
is a community-powered site for exploring places through photography… Panoramio
is different from other photo sharing sites because the photos illustrate places. As you
browse Panoramio, notice that there aren't many photos of friends and family posing
in front of places, or photos of interesting surfaces – Panoramio's all about seeing the
world.138
As a website with user generated visual content, people can upload their own
photographs, both recent and old, and they can also upload historical photographs. In
Western Sahara, for instance, the Google Earth Panoramio layer includes historical
photographs of the main towns, and photos taken by people visiting the country now
and in the recent past. However, most of the historical imagery appears to have been
culled from other websites, such as the ones already described. Nevertheless,
Panoramio provides the added dimension of contemporary photography, and in the
deeper desert of Western Sahara it even provides relatively recent terrestrial imagery
137
Available at http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/fotos.htm accessed 2 October 2013. Many of the
photographs have their producers and/or submitters noted, and there are captions in many instances.
138
See http://www.panoramio.com/help accessed 2 April 2014.
63
of the Moroccan berms. This can only contribute to an understanding of the
physicality of place within colonial and contemporary Western Sahara.
There are other online sources of imagery that are drawn upon in this research, mainly
reflecting the contemporary materiality of Western Sahara, and as expressions of
different people’s experiences with the country. There are also sites with virtual
archives dealing with other conflicts, in particular, the Vietnam War, which are drawn
upon for relevant comparative material. But all of these will be noted as and when
they are referred to in the text.
Oral History: oral testimony and interviews, blogs and videos
Oral history, or personal testimony, has much to contribute in this research. Oral
history is a ‘people’s history’ giving voice to those individuals, actors or participants,
whose lives have been intimate with, or have been affected by historical events (from
the mundane to the momentous), and whose life stories are usually not to be found in
traditional historical documentation.
Where oral histories are introduced in this
research they tend to the autobiographical, allowing the interviewees to put their own
experiences and interpretations of the Western Sahara conflict onto the historical
record. But the concept of a people’s history in this project, in effect a social history
from the perspective of non-hegemonic individuals or small groups also includes web
logs (blogs), personal websites and internet user generated videos. Blogs and user
generated videos can be as intimate as diaries, published or otherwise, (or as verbal
accounts given in an interview) and they are the voices of people who would remain
hidden if accounts of Western Sahara only depended on published sources. When
married with visual records and archaeological enquiry, a rich, multi-dimensional
narrative can be created.
Oral history is also ‘”recovery history”, recovering the voices of those who have been
hidden, such as the working classes or women’.139 It can ‘constitute the unconsituted’:
an aim of contemporary archaeology,140 and as such, it can illuminate the ‘lifeworld –
139
140
Peniston-Bird 2009: 106.
Buchli and Lucas 2001.
64
the taken-for-granted pattern and context of everyday living through which the person
conducts his or her day-to-day life’.141 Such histories are undoubtedly subjective, but
the unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the
historian and which no other sources possess in equal measure is the
speaker’s subjectivity. If the approach to research is broad and articulated
enough, a cross section of the subjectivity of a group or class may emerge.
Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do,
what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.142
This resonates with the anthropological approach of contemporary conflict
archaeology where there are multi-vocal, parallel narratives. The military historian
Richard Holmes had this impressed upon him when he was with the Princess of
Wales’s Royal Regiment in Iraq in 2004. About the book that he eventually published,
he had this to say when writing about his experiences in the field with the regiment:
This book taught me more than I thought I needed to know about the writing of
military history. Most participants saw action through blinkers, often with little idea
of what was happening even a short distance away, and when they recalled events
they sometimes reassembled them in the wrong order, like an editor haphazardly
reassembling film from the cutting-room floor… Even though I could telephone or
email to check or question accounts, it was occasionally difficult to reconcile four
versions of what happened at the same place and at the same time. If it was hard for
an hour-long battle at the road junction known as Yellow 3 in Al Amarah, then it must
have been correspondingly more difficult for the retreat from Moscow or the Battle of
the Somme. 143
Holmes was totally dependent on what people wanted to tell him since (as he noted)
the Battalion’s war diary would not be accessible for thirty years. He relied on
accounts from all ranks, gathering his information from conversations and written
accounts composed for him at the time, all of variable quality. In contrast, not all
historians have embraced the breadth of scope possible through oral histories (and by
extension today, audiovisual material and sources available on the internet). For
141
Seamon 1984: 130.
Portelli 1998: 67.
143
Holmes 2007: xxv-xxvi
142
65
instance, the military historian Barbara Tuchman, wrote in the 1970s (and republished
in the 1980s) that the audio recording of oral histories was encouraging ‘an artificial
survival of trivia of appalling proportions’ and that historians were ‘drowning’
themselves in ‘unneeded information’.144 In terms of material culture, however, the
trivial is very much the stuff of archaeology, without which the subject would not
even exist.145 And in contrast to Tuchman’s view, the historian Richard Baxell – and
with a real pertinence to key aspects of this research – has written:
It is undoubtedly true that oral testimonies often fall short of providing pinpoint
locations, reliable chronologies, or dispassionate and objective analysis, but this is not
their strength. To really gain an understanding of a soldier’s day-to-day experiences in
war requires looking at the world through his (or her) eyes. As Helen Graham, one of
the foremost British Historians of modern Spain, has argued: ‘Telling big stories
through individual human lives is a powerful way of doing history’.146
Collecting Oral Testimony
It is not the intention to treat oral history as something separate from the other
resources employed in this research, but to weave it into the overall narrative, mixed
with all the other resources and methods employed. The multi-disciplinary character
of modern conflict archaeology lends itself to a multiple method approach. Oral
historical and personal accounts (in whatever medium) are as valid as any other data
source: they are all pieces of the puzzle. They are in effect part of a triangulation net
that lends focus to the research.147
Thirteen people were formally interviewed in Algeria and Western Sahara, or asked to
give statements, between 13 October and 2 November 2011. These were all audio
recorded, but additional conversations were had with some of the interviewees, and
notes on these informal discussions, where appropriate, were recorded in a fieldwork
day-book. Five of the 13 interviews were conducted in English, one was conducted in
Spanish with an interpreter, while seven were conducted in Arabic, also through an
interpreter.
144
Tuchman 1984: 76, cited in Sharpless 2008: 20.
Because of this, Olsen et al 2012 gives archaeology the moniker of ‘the discipline of things’.
146
Baxell 2012: 10, and citing Helen Graham quoted in Faber and Fernández 2010.
147
On the use and juxtaposition of multiple research methods, see Brewer and Hunter 2006.
145
66
Two of the interviewees essentially gave statements reflecting the ‘official’ Polisario
narrative of the war. These were by senior SADR Army officers. One dealt with the
course of the war in general, and tactics,148 while the second was specifically about the
hostilities around Tifariti.149 Three interviews were of personal experiences of the
conflict, and the present situation in Western Sahara, but expressed with a historical
dimension. One of these was with a poet and activist who was a Polisario soldier in
Tifariti in the 1980s,150 the second was with the Mayor of Tifariti,151 while the third
was with a very high profile Saharawi journalist and activist.152 Six further interviews
were undertaken with Saharawi individuals, two of which were journalists and
activists,153 another well-known Saharawi poet,154 an elderly veteran from the early
days of the conflict,155 and two Bedouin women presently living in the Tifariti area.156
All of these people, save for the SADR Army officers were essentially asked to
recount their ‘personal stories’ about their lives in Western Sahara since the start of
the conflict (with very little cross questioning). Additionally, two artists from
ARTifariti were interviewed in the Tindouf refugee camps. One was the founder of
the art festival who explained his motivations and aspirations for it,157 while the
second was a long-standing participant in the yearly gathering, who elaborated upon
his participation in ARTifariti and his personal feelings for the Saharawi people and
their land.158
Web Logs: Blogs
It was my intention to collect oral testimony from ARTifariti artists while they were in
Tifariti, interacting with the landscape and creating artworks out of doors.
Unfortunately, and at short notice, the 2011 festival confined itself to the refugee
camps in Tindouf due to financial restrictions. It was, therefore, incumbent on me to
148
Breica, Interviews 13 October and 2 November.
Fadel, Interview.
150
Awah, Interview.
151
Deya, Interview.
152
Larkhal, Interview.
153
Touballi, Interview and Bachir, Interview.
154
Salama J’Dud, Interview.
155
Billali, Interview. In the end, however, this interview has not been referenced.
156
Najem, Interview and Salma, Interview.
157
Peraita, Interview.
158
Guzman, Interview. This interview, however, has not been referenced, and instead, Guzmán n.d. has
been referred to.
149
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find other sources of information, and personal recollections, by and about the artists
who took part in previous ARTifariti festivals. Besides accounts from the ARTifariti
website and blog, and included in the festival’s annual catalogues, some artists had
personal websites about their interests and work, some were featured on websites
dealing with the arts, while some had their own internet blogs. Some videos were also
produced about ARTifariti by the festival organisers, and some of the participating
artists produced their own videos about their involvement, and their artworks
produced in Tifariti prior to 2011.
All of these Internet resources have been employed in this research, where
appropriate, and blogs, personal websites, and artist produced videos are viewed as
personal testimony. According to www.blogger.com a site for creating web logs, a
blog is ‘a personal diary. A daily pulpit. A collaborative space. A political soapbox. A
breaking-news outlet. A collection of links. Your own private thoughts. Memos to the
world’.159
The initial blog for acquiring insights into the artists taking part in ARTifariti – and
the event itself – is the ARTifariti blogspot.160 There is also an ARTifariti website (relaunched in 2012).161 The blog has up-to-date information about all of the ARTifariti
events around the globe, as well as in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps.
There are links to other online media and websites, and the annual ARTifariti
catalogues describing each year’s festivals can be easily accessed. There are also links
to Flickr162 for a full collection of photographs chronicling the ARTifariti festivals and
other events, and there are links to YouTube videos: mainly produced by ARTifariti.
Federico Guzman is an important blogger for the ARTifariti phenomenon. He is an
artist who has been involved with the festival since 2008 and he has two blogs, one in
English and one in Spanish.163 They chronicle his thoughts on, and experiences of,
Western Sahara, and his and other ARTifariti artist’s artwork is displayed. The
Saharawi artist Mohamed Moulud Yeslam has a blog called Arte Por La Paz (Art for
159
See www.blogger.com/tour_start.g accessed 18 December 2012.
ARTifariti n.d.
161
ARTifariti 2014.
162
See http://www.flickr.com accessed 2 April 2014.
163
Guzmán n.d. The Spanish language version is available at http://salammalekum.blogspot.co.uk
accessed 18 December 2012.
160
68
Peace).164 It chronicles his activities as an artist and it includes the artwork he created
for ARTifariti 2010. This website was only started in October 2012, but it is
distinctive in that it provides a Saharawi artistic voice alongside the blogs and videos
presented by artists from outside Western Sahara. Another Spanish artist with a blog
which, includes his write up on his contribution to ARTifariti in 2008, is Guillermo
Roiz de la Parra.165 Additionally, there are the web presences of other artists who have
taken part in ARTifariti, but these will be referred to as and when it is appropriate.
Videos: YouTube
YouTube is a free Internet video facility that allows anyone to upload videos onto the
Internet. These are mainly user generated and they can cover almost all aspects of
people’s lives. They can be personal diaries, video-logs, political comments (and
polemics), educational and instructional materials, artistic creations, commercial
videos, and people just presenting themselves as highly serious or downright silly.
YouTube can also be a record of, and witness to, current events, with individuals (as
well as established news producers) uploading live action events from their computers
and mobile devices.
‘Worldwide YouTube is becoming a major platform for viewing news. In 2011 and
early 2012, the most searched term of the month on YouTube was a news related
event five out of 15 months, according to the company’s internal data’.166 Over the
same time period the most viewed videos on YouTube were natural disasters and
political upheavals, with more than a third of all news items being citizen generated.
In the United States, for instance, just under a third of all adults visit YouTube on a
daily basis.167 This being the case, it is not unusual for ARTifariti to produce and
upload videos onto YouTube, or Vimeo (a similar facility), and for videos to be
produced by, and about, some of the festival’s artists. Also, videos describing aspects
of the Western Sahara conflict have been uploaded onto the Internet, apparently by
activists representing Saharawi interests, while there are also videos that are
undeniably pro-Moroccan. All of these types of videos are considered legitimate
sources of information about the Western Sahara conflict. Of course, the caveats that
164
Yeslem 2012.
Roiz de la Parra 2008.
166
Pew Research Center 2012: 3.
167
Pew Research Center 2012: 6.
165
69
have already been noted about user generated Internet content applies to them, but in
particular, those that represent the testimony of individual people are viewed as oral
history, and they are treated as such in this research.
Archaeological Field Survey
Essential archaeological field recording was carried out in 2011 over a three and a half
week period – as an adjunct to satellite (Google Earth) imagery analysis – within and
around the settlement of Tifariti. The aim of this type of survey was to ground truth
Google Earth’s satellite photography, so that features visible on the imagery could be
more confidently identified. Generalised descriptions and dimensions for some types
of features were compiled, and a number of different types of features were
photographed. Four days were specifically spent investigating military features on the
ground, while a further four days were similarly spent recording the still standing
artworks created during the ARTifariti festivals from 2007 to 2010. Of the latter, 19
artworks were recorded, and besides a selection described in Chapter 7, they are listed
in Appendix 3. Additionally, a hand measured, and photographic, survey of the old
Spanish Legion fort was carried out, see Chapter 6.
Summary
As already stated, the main tool for the recording and interpretation of the archaeology
of the Moroccan berms has been Google Earth (see Chapters 4 and 6). However, using
remote sensing to study landscape phenomena is not simply a methodology for
recording archaeological remains, it also creates an archaeology. It, and the other
resources employed in this project, actually bring into being, an archaeology of the
recent conflict in Western Sahara. As with Blackman’s photos of the Northern and
Kaigani Haida, that which is under examination is partial – only fragments of a past
reality, and in the context of this research, that being studied is mediated by a remote
technology (digital satellite imagery capture) which transforms an earth bound,
concrete reality into a pixellated representation on a computer screen. While living
and working in the present, it is the archaeologist’s senses and fore-knowledge that
70
also mediates the material under study, and this is translated into archaeological
records and interpretations – all a creative act – recomposing and reconstituting that
which was once whole, but seen ‘through a glass darkly’, and never being able to
know the true degree of authenticity, if any at all, of the new confection. To mitigate
this, this project embraces the interdisciplinary and multidimensional essence of
modern conflict archaeology, employing the multiple methods and resources
elaborated on above. Such a research approach was written about in 1953 by the
French historian Marc Bloch, who had this to say about multidimensional research:
The variety of historical evidence is nearly infinite… Everything that man says or
writes, everything that he makes, everything he touches can and ought to teach us
about him. It would be sheer fantasy to imagine that for each historical problem there
is a unique type of document with a specific sort of use. On the contrary, the deeper
the research, the more light of the evidence must converge from sources of many
different kinds. What religious historian would be satisfied by examining a few
theological tracts or hymnals? He knows full well that the painting and sculpture of
sanctuary walls and the arrangement and furnishing of tombs have at least as much to
tell him about dead beliefs and feelings as a thousand contemporary manuscripts.168
This catholic approach to research can only be enriched by the craft of archaeology,169
especially when combined with the naturally heuristic approaches of the discipline. It
is perhaps appropriate, therefore, to end this chapter with another quote, this time from
Andrew Flemming who, while writing about the craft of landscape archaeology, has
pointed out that it relies on ‘a range of measures of confidence around truth claims,
from effective certainties to probabilities and possibilities, and then conjectures and
speculations’. He emphasises that it is the strength of argument that makes an
archaeological account plausible.
These arguments are exposed to the scepticism of colleagues who need no instruction
about the cussedness of archaeological data or the sketchiness and fragility of
representations of the past. They are also assessed against a variety of questions, such
as: ‘what other explanations or interpretations might there be?’… ‘could this apparent
168
169
Bloch 1953: 66-67. Cited in Brewer and Hunter 2006: xv.
Shanks and McGuire 1996.
71
pattern or relationship have come about by chance?’ or ‘how thin does the evidence
have to be before I abandon this proposition?’170
In consideration of this, it is hoped that the strategic approaches and resources laid out
in this chapter, and employed herein, will be shown to successfully foreground the
materiality of conflict and contestation in Western Sahara. By presenting what I
believe to be a qualitatively genuine account of historical events and archaeology, I
hope equally, that the possible scepticism of colleagues and others, would not call for
my presented narrative, and propositions, to be ‘abandoned’.
170
Fleming 2006: 272-273.
72
CHAPTER 3
SHAPING A COLONIAL SPACE
Part 1
The Land, its People, Colonialism and Conflict
Geography
While situated on the Atlantic coast, at the western limit of the Sahara, Western
Sahara’s neighbours are Morocco to the north, Algeria to the east, and Mauritania to
the south and east (see Fig. 3.1). The territory’s width, east to west, varies from
around 450 kilometres in the north, down to its narrowest width in the south, at around
325 kilometres. The length of the territory from north to south is around 700
kilometres, and it has an area of roughly 266,000 square kilometres.171 Its coast is
1062 kilometres long,172 and in many places it is characterised by steep cliffs, which
make access from the sea difficult. The country has only two natural harbours,
Dakhla, formerly Villa Cisneros at the inlet of Rio D’Oro, and La Guera at Cape
Blanc. There is only one wadi which can be described as a seasonal watercourse – the
Saguia al-Hamrah. This is a long distance, east to west wadi in the north of the
country that can pool with water at El-Ayoun, where its path to the Atlantic is blocked
by sand dunes. The wadi extends for some 650 kilometres from the uplands of the
Zemmour massif. This rocky highland is characterised by numerous wadis, which
dissect it, feeding the Saguia Al Hamra.
Most of the Zemmour massif is in the northern, Western Sahara panhandle, though
part of it extends southwestwards to Guelta Zemmour. The terrain, away from the
massif, to the south and east and into Mauritania is mainly flat, being relatively highlevel stony desert known as hamada. Along the lower ground of the coastal literal,
there are distinct areas of sand dunes broken up by areas of dissected rocky ground,
from which areas of flat stony ground rise upwards to the east, known as reg. The
171
172
Mercer 1976: 23.
Mercer 1976: 23.
73
dunes run more or less parallel with the coast and extend inland by around 15 to 30
kilometres. Further inland, Western Sahara is relatively free of large sand dune areas,
with its southern and eastern borders virtually outlining the expansive sand dune areas
of Mauritania. Only in the far southeast does Mauritania’s Azeffal sand dune belt
cross through the territory. The southern half of the country includes salient igneous
ridges, inselbergs, and large plug-like outcrops called guelbs, which stand out like
beacons in the Tiris plateau. As might be expected, there are numerous low level
saltpans, known as sabkha, though the most notable in the region is in Mauritania at
Idjil.
There are no real oases in the territory, but rainfall is relatively high inland. It is higher
than in other Saharan regions at the same latitude, and in the period 1926-1950 mean
annual rainfall was estimated at 30-40 mm in the Tifariti area and at more than 50 mm
elsewhere nearby.173 This produces good areas of pasture with savannah-like
vegetation, especially after the occasional autumn and winter rains.
Children of the Clouds
Western Sahara is rich in archaeological remains, especially prehistoric rock art sites
and extensive funerary landscapes which include a variety of built stone structures and
burial monuments. Nevertheless, archaeological fieldwork in the territory has been
sporadic, and not surprisingly, there were no field investigations during the years of
conflict from 1975 to 1991. Most of the fieldwork undertaken, to date, has been
carried out by archaeologists from Spain, with Basque and Catalan teams carrying out
a good deal of it since 1991.174 However, the University of East Anglia’s Western
Sahara Project (WSP) has been operating in the territory since 2002, though their
latest field season was in 2009. The following, very brief synopsis of the prehistoric
archaeology of Western Sahara is derived from the findings of the WSP in an area
around 14 kilometres north of Tifariti (the TF1 study area, centred on the Wadi
Tifariti) where the project carried out intensive fieldwork in 2005, 2007 and 2008.175
173
Dubief 1953: 920-921, cited in Brooks et al 2009: 920.
Fieldwork commenced in 1995, four years after the ceasefire, with the Catalan, University of
Girona, followed by the Universities of Granada, and the Basque Country. See Soler Subils 2007.
175
Brooks et al 2006, Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks in press.
174
74
The TF1 study area includes evidence for human occupation in the Early Holocene
and the early Middle Holocene, indicated by sites with chipped (knapped) stone
assemblages and pottery, and ranging in date from around 9000 years before present
(bp) to 5000 bp. The last Saharan humid phase ended around 4500 bp, and with the
shift towards the aridity that characterises the Sahara today, starting by or around 5200
bp (the Middle Holocene), occupation in the TF1 study area started to shift from
hunter gatherers to cattle pastoralists represented by the introduction of stone funerary,
and ‘ritual’ architecture. The WSP excavated two burial mounds (stone tumuli or
cairns) indicative of this phase of occupation, and surprisingly for the excavators, their
C14 dates indicated a date range spanning the 5th to 8th centuries A.D.176 Such late
dates suggest that the funerary and ritual landscape of which these features were a part
might have been occupied by pastoral people for at least 4000 years, and that the
landscape in which they were embedded, was the same as that encountered by the
early evangelists who brought Islam to the far northwest of the Sahara in the 8th
century.
The 7th century Arab invaders of the Maghreb did not penetrate the Sahara, instead,
Islam was spread by Berber converts through their efforts to sustain trade with the
Sudan.177 Hugh Kennedy has described the Maghreb, for the Arab invaders of the 7th
to 8th centuries, as a kind of ‘wild west’. The Muslim Arab expansionists did not
consolidate their Moroccan and Algerian conquests well. In no way was the
indigenous Berber population supplanted by the invaders, and apparently, their
conversion to Islam was only nominal.178
The Berbers are the pre-Arab peoples of North Africa and much of the Sahara. The
term ‘Berber’ comes from the Greek barabaroi, Latinised to barbari, and denoting
non-Greek and Latin speakers, and non-Phoenicians in Cathaginian North Africa.
Berbers call themselves ‘Imazighen’ which means ‘free men and women’.179 The
origin of the Berbers is not precisely known, and ‘today, many scholars believe that
the peopling of North Africa was infused with migrations from the east and south and
176
Brooks et al 2009: 930.
Mercer 1976: 72.
178
Kennedy 2007: 224.
179
Ilahiane 2006: xxx.
177
75
across the straits from Western Europe’.180 Starting with the Roman occupation of
North Africa, Berbers were gradually pushed into the North African hinterlands,181
though this might not have been the case in Western Sahara since Roman influence
did not penetrate far into western Morocco.182 The Berber tribal group which occupied
Western Sahara, Mauritania, and even spread into the West African Sudan and the
region of the River Niger, was the Sanhaja. This ‘great historic Berber family’183 was
highly mobile and able to penetrate well into the western Sahara, especially with the
introduction of the camel in the first to fourth centuries A.D.184
By the 8th century, the Sanhaja tribes were only partial converts to Islam. The new
religion was slow to take hold, but this was to change in the 11th century with the
ascendancy of the Almoravids. This was an Islamic puritan movement that came
about in the wastes of the far western Sahara, when a Sanhaja chief, Yahya Ibn
Ibrahim, returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca in the late 1030s, and realised that his
fellow Sanhaja Berbers were not truly adhering to the observances of Islam.185 To reevangelise his people, he ‘invited a fierce and austere preacher from the Souss (in
Morocco), Abdallah Ibn Yacin, to begin lecturing the Berbers on what they believed
to be a “pure” form of Islam’.186 Ibn Ibrahim even hoped that a revival of Islamic
adherence would counter the then falling eminence of the Sanhaja in the region. To
this end, Ibn Ibrahim and Ibn Yacin, soon called for a holy war, a jihad, to regain the
Sanhaja’s pastoral ranges across the western Sahara, and the key trading towns of
Aoudaghost and Sijilmassa, thereby giving them control of the caravan routes across
the Sahara (previously lost to the Ghana Empire and the Zenata Berbers).187
The Almoravids became masters of the western Sahara and eventually Morocco. Their
power and influence, and martial prowess, allowed them to spread into Iberia and their
‘empire’ extended from Zaragoza in Spain to the Senegal River in Africa, and
eastwards to Algiers. They could not sustain their authority, however, and in 1147
180
Ilahiane 2006: xxxi.
Ilahiane 2006: xxx-xxxii.
182
Past Worlds 1993: 170-171.
183
Ilahiane 2006: 109.
184
Pazzanita 2006: 383.
185
Hodges 1983: 5-6.
186
Pazzanita 2006: 19-20.
187
Pazzanita 2006: 19-20.
181
76
they were eclipsed by the Almohads, in Morocco, with the fall of Marrakesh which
the Almoravids founded in 1062. Muslim Spain also revolted against them and they
were permanently eclipsed by 1150.188 From the 12th century onwards, there was a
continuing influx of Arabs into the Maghreb from the east. These invaders settled as
far west as the Atlantic plains of Morocco, and in the 13th century, one group – the
Maqil (originally from Yemen) – settled south of the Moroccan Atlas.189 From within
the Maqil, a sub section known as the Beni Hassan moved on further still, and settled
well into Mauritania. This group came into conflict with the Sanhaja, but the Beni
Hassan – the ‘Hassaniya’ Arabs – gained the ascendancy. Berbers and Arabs
intermarried, their cultures mixed, and many of the former acquired the Hassaniya
Arab language. This process was virtually completed in the 17th century by which
time all the Berber tribes of the very far west of the Sahara adopted an Arab origin and
could be considered ‘Arabised’. Known to Europeans as ‘Moors’, these desert nomads
of mixed, Berber, Arab, and black African ethnicity (the latter through miscegenation
with slaves and their descendants) came to occupy a region extending from the Wadi
Draa in the north, to the Senegal in the south, and to eastern Mauritania and the bend
of the River Niger. Their adoption of Hassaniya Arabic was more or less complete by
the 19th century.190
Out of this crucible came the tribes that occupied Western Sahara at the advent of the
colonial period. Many of these nomad groups had pastoral ranges that extended well
beyond the boundaries of the territory, and these (for the main tribal groups in the
1970s) are illustrated in Fig. 3.2. It is not the intention to present a history of the tribes
here, but the following brief observations on four of the more conspicuous tribes is
pertinent nonetheless.
The Reguibat Confederation
The largest of the tribes were, and still are, the Reguibat Confederation. They called
themselves the ‘sons’, ‘children’ or ‘people of the clouds’191 since, like all the pastoral
tribes of Western Sahara, they had to follow the clouds that brought the rains since
there are no natural oases in the territory. They trace their ancestry back to their
188
Pazzanita 2006: 19-23.
For a thorough history of the Arab invasions of the western Sahara see Norris 1986.
190
Mercer 1976: 74-75, and Hodges 1983: 8-11.
191
Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 309.
189
77
common ancestor, Sidi Ahmed Reguibi, who in 1503 founded the tribe.192 It has also
been noted, contrarily, that Sidi Ahmed was a 14th century saint, who ‘reputedly
delivered his fellow Berbers from Arab domination’.193 Nevertheless, upon his death,
the tribe split in two. The western (coastal), or Sahel branch, confined its ranges
within what is now Western Sahara, and they only extended into Mauritania during
periods of drought. In contrast, the eastern (Leguacem), or Sharq branch, extended
over a much greater range of pasture – more or less covering much of the territory of
the Sahel branch and extending from Goulmim in Morocco to Atar in Mauritania, and
taking in the Tindouf region of Algeria and extending further into Mali, and in the
extreme, even into Niger.194 By virtue of numbers, the Reguibat are the most
influential tribe in Western Sahara, and as such, they are a very substantial component
of the Saharawi nationalist movement.195
The Tekna Confederation
The Tekna tribal group are Berber and Arab, dating back to the 12th and 13th centuries.
Unlike the Reguibat, they have been both sedentary and nomadic, living by agriculture
in the Wadi Draa and by pastoralism in the open Sahara, traditionally, between the
Anti-Atlas Mountains and the Saguia el-Hamra. Positioned thus, many Tekna became
traders and they could exploit their position straddling the caravan routes into southern
Morocco. In all, they interacted well with the Spanish and French, and they were on
good terms with Donald Mackenzie, founder of the British North-West African
Company at Cape Juby in 1877. Fig. 3.2 shows the southern extent of the Tekna’s
ranges, but at the end of the colonial period, most of the tribe were to be found in
Southern Morocco.196
The Oulad Delim and the Oulad Bou Sba
The Oulad Delim, like the Oulad Bou Sba – two bellicose tribes – claim Arab Maqil
origins.197 The Oulad Delim (‘Oulad’ means ‘children of’) have been described by
Mercer as having a ‘history of rapine’, due, they claim, to the poor environment in
which they ranged, causing them to take up raiding and extortion as a justified
192
Mercer 1976: 132.
Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 309.
194
Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 309.
195
Pazzanita 2006: 363-367.
196
Pazzanita 2006: 406-409.
197
Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 321.
193
78
livelihood.198 Even in the 16th century they were described as being ‘Poor Robbers…
and Strangers to Gallantry’.199 They were a hostile and arrogant tribe, which came to
dominate their neighbours, and with their ranges in the south of Western Sahara, they
had no reservations about attacking both the Spanish and the French in the region.200
However, the direction of such belligerence was to change when the Spanish
consolidated their colony, and many Oulad Delim took up soldiery with the colonial
army and police. Apparently, amongst the Polisario fighters, they (up to 1980 at least)
made up the second most important tribal element after the Reguibat.201
The Oulad Bou Sba ranged over central Tiris and into Mauritania (see Fig. 3.2),
though they must have also covered the same pastures as the Oulad Delim, since they
were encountered by the American sea captain James Riley, and his crew, who were
shipwrecked in 1815 and landed at Cape Barbas – around 175 kilometres north of
Cape Blanc. The Oulad Bou Sba had a terrible reputation with mariners at the time,
especially if they were unfortunate enough to get shipwrecked south of Rio D’Oro.202
As judged by the ill treatment they meted out to Riley and his compatriots they
obviously lived up to their hostile and bellicose nature, treating the sailors as slaves
and trading them for meagre profit. In fact, the sale of Riley and some of his crew to a
Moroccan caravaneer, who expected to be paid a ransom for the sailors in Mogador
(present day Essaouira, in Morocco), eventually secured the Americans’ release.203
But perhaps such hostility towards Christians who landed in Western Sahara by sea
should not be seen as out of place. Repercussions of the Spanish reconguista ‘sent
impulses into the desert’ in the 15th century and after,204 and trading in humans was
well established in the region well before the arrival of Europeans.205 Additionally,
Portuguese, and then Spanish slavers, raided the Atlantic Saharan coast in the 15th and
early 16th centuries, resulting in the creation of short-lived European coastal outposts,
198
Mercer 1976: 131.
Marmol y Carvajal 1573, cited in Mercer 1976: 93 & 131.
200
Pazzanita 2006: 319-322.
201
Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 317.
202
King 2004: 125-126 & 328.
203
Riley [1817] 1859. The caravaneer was one Sidi Hamet, and he and Riley developed a very close
bond. After Riley was freed, Sidi Hamet went on to look for other members of Riley’s crew in the
Atlantic Sahara, and in the process of saving one, he was killed by brigands. King 2004: 307-308.
204
Mercer 1976: 78.
205
Blanchard 2005.
199
79
and recurrent violence between the Iberians and the indigenous tribes.206 The Spanish
finally left the region in 1524 when they abandoned their trading post at Santa Cruz de
Mar Pequeña – occupied since 1476 and believed to be located around 70 kilometres
northeast of Cape Juby. Their interests in Africa waned while their ambitions in the
Americas increased, and they did not return to the Atlantic Sahara until the late 19th
century.207
Factories, Forts and Barbed Wire
The present day extent of Western Sahara was demarcated by agreement between
France and Spain in 1912, after a series of negotiations and treaties.208 Spain reentered the Atlantic Sahara during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ when, in keeping with the
spirit of the time in Europe, Spain desired an ‘area of interest in Africa’. This was
encouraged by a renewed interest in the African coast opposite the Canary Islands,
which was increasing from the 1870s onwards (initially at the instigation of the
Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid), and there was a firm belief that Britain and France
would carve up Africa between them. By sending an expedition to the Sahara coast in
1884, led by a lieutenant Emillio Bonelli, and partly funded by the Compañía
Hispano-Africana and the Compañía Transatlántica,209 Spain claimed the coastal
territory, that would eventually extend from the Wadi Draa in the north to Cape Blanc
in the south, by establishing the trading post of Villa Cisneros at the inlet known as
Rio de Oro (see Figs. 3.1 and 3.3). Although the settlement and factory was
established by negotiation with the local Bedouin, it quickly came under attack by the
Oulad Delim (whereby a number of Spaniards were fatally wounded) causing its
inhabitants to flee to the Canary Islands.210 Thus began the contest over the territory of
Western Sahara in the modern era, and the creation of a Spanish colonial space on the
far western fringe of the Sahara.
It would be an understatement to say, as Pazzanita has, that the Saharawi tribes ‘did
not take kindly to European intrusion on their land’. With the re-establishment of a
206
Mercer 1976.
Pazzanita 2006: xxiv & 385-386.
208
Rezette 1975: 64-67.
209
San Martin 2010: 20-22.
210
Hodges 1983: 43.
207
80
Spanish presence at Villa Cisneros by Bonelli, with only twenty soldiers, the factory
came under attack in 1887, 1890, 1892 and 1894, and these only came to an end in
1895 when a trading concession was agreed with Sheikh Ma el-Ainin, the then
charismatic leader of tribal opposition to colonial expansion in the western Sahara (see
below).211 It was during this period that the Spanish started a process that resulted in
the militarisation of the landscape of Western Sahara; initially, by turning the factory
of Villa Cisneros into a fort, and by reinforcing their presence through the progressive
monumentalising of the structure. At this time, the Spanish had very little interest in
the deep desert of Western Sahara. Their concerns were mainly commercial, being
pre-occupied with off shore fishing and limited trade with the tribes. The attacks
between 1887 and 1895 led Bonelli and his contemporaries to realise that the
hinterland was a potential minefield that a small Spanish garrison could never deal
with, therefore it was best to leave the Bedouin tribes in peace, not to interfere in their
internal affairs, and behave as diplomatically as possible towards them.212
Three pre 1910 images, two photographs213 and one illustration captioned as being a
view of the fort and factory as of 1893,214 clearly show the early fort as a simple, stone
built, rectilinear compound with blockhouses at diagonally opposite corners. The
corner blockhouses were two-storeys in height and of substantial proportions. The one
at the northern corner (Fig. 3.4), adjacent to the entry to the compound had gun loops
at ground level with battlements along the roof. The second storeys of both structures
had shuttered windows. The compound wall apparently reached no higher than the
floor of the second storey. The corner blockhouses were rendered, though the
compound wall was not, and there was a portion of an upper floor, or gangway, above
the arched entrance. One of the photos shows that, internally, single storey courtyard
buildings were being constructed along the compound walls, and in the mean time
were being used for storage. Mercer noted that this early ‘trading fort’ had two
entrances, one door leading eastwards to the bay, while the other, the northern entry,
211
Pazzanita 2006: 89-90.
San Martin 2010: 27.
213
Two undated photographs of the interior and exterior of the Villa Cisneros Fort are available at:
www.sahara-mili.net/images/fuerte/bens19.jpg and www.sahara-mili.net/images/fuerte/bens20.jpg both
accessed 11 April 2011
214
An undated illustration with the caption: ‘El fortin y la factoria de Rio de Oro segun un grabado del
ano 1893’ is available at:
www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/fotos/displayimage.php?album=lastup&cat=6&pos=133 accessed
25 April 2011
212
81
was referred to as the ‘Moors’ Gate’, which had an eight centimetre Krupps field gun
pointing towards it from within the compound. He also described one of the
blockhouse-type structures as a ‘trading building’, with the other noted simply as a
‘defensive tower’, with a complement of twenty-five soldiers (this latter structure was
probably the northern corner blockhouse).215
A postcard (Fig. 3.5), post-marked 1910, proclaimed that the factory was definitely
now a military fort, being captioned: ‘Rio de Oro: Exterior del Fuerte militar’. This
was presumably during the administration of Francisco Bens Argandoña (1904-1925),
a veteran of the Spanish-American War who realised upon taking on the governorship,
that much had to be done if the territory was to be more than just a flag and a
warehouse planted on hostile soil. So the postcard shows that besides Bens’ reputation
for good relations with the Saharawi tribes, and his empathy towards them,216 he
obviously embarked on a project improving the fort, making it fit for a garrison
(though when he arrived he only had 31 infantrymen), and turning it into the largest
construction in the region save for Ma el-Ainin’s city of Smara217 built between 1898
and 1902, and about 550 kilometres to the northeast.
The postcard shows definite building phases. The enceinte of the fort was enlarged
and the ground level buildings were heightened by an additional storey, thereby
raising the external walls in most places. These also had broadly spaced crenellations.
According to Lodwick, the rooftop firing parapets were up to shoulder height, and
only a ‘powerful battering ram’ could break down the main door.218 The postcard also
shows that only some of the masonry had been rendered, and where it was not,
construction details can be easily seen, such as the dressed window jambs and quoins
at the new building’s corners. There are Bedouin tents in the foreground, and these
low-lying, portable structures designed to deflect the winds of the desert, and to be
malleable in form so as to adjust to the changing needs of their inhabitants, contrast
sharply with the monolithic form of the fort. Although, at this time, the Spanish had a
very ‘hands off’ approach to administering Western Sahara, this postcard illustrates
that there is a difference between the coloniser and the colonised. There is
215
Mercer 1976: 106.
San Martin 2010: 29-30.
217
Pazzanita 2006: 392-393.
218
Lodwick. 1956: 187.
216
82
undoubtedly a ‘them and us’, an ‘other’ that is outside the ‘pale’ of the fort. Brice
describes this succinctly with reference to an illustration of Fort Laramie in the
American West in 1849, also showing Native Americans and their tipis outside the
walls of the fort:
In common with all peoples confronted with different cultures the Indian tribes find
themselves drawn towards the trading opportunities offered by the fort, even though it
also acts as a cavalry base and staging post for military and commercial operations
which will eventually destroy their way of life. Meanwhile, the pioneers, fearing the
primitive peoples outside have surrounded themselves with blank-faced walls, their
corners protected with square blockhouses.219
The existence of forts such as Laramie and Villa Cisneros, unbidden and imposed onto
the landscape by outsiders, an ‘other’ to the indigenous peoples, would undoubtedly
turn the land into a contested landscape, manifested by the transfiguring of the land
through further colonial building works, and the eventual stratagems of outright
conflict by all involved. Nevertheless, Bens pursued a ‘sugar lump’ approach towards
the Saharawis. He was obviously very positive in his feelings towards the Bedouin,
and although he wanted to consolidate Spain’s position along the littoral of the
territory, he, like Bonelli before him and the Spanish authorities, did not want to
occupy the hinterland, nor pursue an aggressive policy of colonisation as the French
were conducting in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. In fact, he made a point of
distinguishing Madrid’s policies from those of France with respect to territorial
expansion.
He managed, after a number of attempts (initially thwarted by Madrid) to occupy
Cape Juby (Tarfaya) in 1916, setting up a fort and garrison there, and establishing a
fishing base and factory at La Guera in 1920.220 But the policies of France in
consolidating its Protectorate over Morocco and in its expansion throughout
Mauritania during this period, created inevitable conflict with the Saharawi tribes
who, in real terms, occupied an area far larger than the territory of Western Sahara,
inhabiting the desert regions south of the Wadi Draa and extending south of Cape
219
220
Brice 1984: caption, fig. 2.
Hodges 1983: 49-52.
83
Blanc and deep into Mauritania. As nomads dependent on their herds, always seeking
out the best pasture, and with no permanent settlements and mainly seasonal water
sources, the idea of a territory controlled either by France, Spain, or even the Sultan of
Morocco was anathema.221
With the Spanish on the coast, and with the French expanding northwards into
Mauritania, Ma el-Ainin, an almost Mahdi-like individual, who managed to
consolidate some of the western Saharan tribes in opposition to the French, founded
the town and religious centre of Smara in 1898, near the Saguia el-Hamra.222
Construction of the main part of the city was completed by 1902, and it is so very
striking that while Europeans were encroaching around the perimeter of what is now
Western Sahara, a regional marabout had the vision and wherewithal, albeit with the
support of the Moroccan Sultan, to impress upon the desert a brand new, indigenous
city, in effect, running counter to the advances of France and Spain, and contributing
to the contest for Western Sahara. But from Smara’s location, it is obvious that Ma elAinin was also planning something that was to represent more than a direct
confrontation with the Europeans. Smara is around 180 kilometres from the sea, and it
straddles the longstanding caravan corridors from Goulmim in southern Morocco to
the Senegal basin.223 Such a location, with the presence of water in the Sagia elHamra, suitable for limited agriculture, would have made Smara a magnet and an
entrepot for the Saharawi tribes.
After a military defeat at the hands of the French in 1909, Ma el-Ainin left Smara (he
died in 1910), and the city was eventually seized and partially destroyed by a French
occupying force in 1913, even though it was virtually uninhabited at the time.224 This
did not end hostilities, however, and the territory was not considered ‘pacified’ until
1934.
From a European’s perspective, as has already been noted, the Saharawi tribes had a
longstanding antagonism towards foreigners. The early nineteenth century accounts of
221
Pazzanita 2006: 56-57.
Pazzanita 2006: 251-254 & 392-393.
223
For an excellent study of the Goulmim to Senegal caravan trade see Lydon 2009.
224
Berthome 1996: 140-149, and Pazzanita 2006: 393.
222
84
Adams,225 Cochelet,226 Paddock,227 Riley228 and Robbins229 give vivid descriptions of
the plight of shipwrecked sailors on the Atlantic Sahara coast, though obviously
belonging to the genre of ‘white slave’ literature with all of its inbuilt biases and preconceptions. Nevertheless, Riley’s account has been described as the first
ethnographic description of the Saharawi people,230 while Mackenzie’s account of his
travels in 1883231 gives a description of the tribes around Cape Juby as being
approachable, unantagonistic and eager to trade.
With the Spanish confined to the coast, leaving the hinterland unoccupied, the
Saharawis, quite justifiably saw the French, with their aggressive policies in the
region, as interlopers and a threat to their way of life, and through the impetus of Ma
el-Ainin and his sons, Western Sahara soon became a base for Saharawi raids against
them. The raid, or ghazi, was for all intents and purposes the basic offensive tool of
the Bedouin tribes in the Sahara, and the Middle East. T.E. Lawrence harnessed it in
the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918, and immortalised it in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom.232
Pazzanita makes the point that raiding ‘militarised’ traditional Saharawi society.233
Although the roots of the ghazi had more to do with pastoral ecology and economy,
the acquisition of livestock along with booty, and in the expression of dominance
within regional groups or tribes of Bedouin,234 the degree of planning required to
undertake such raids, and the martial skills acquired and developed in their execution
prepared the Saharawi tribes to confidently oppose the advancing French, and to a
lesser extent Spanish, in the western Sahara. In fact, Briggs has pointed out that the
very presence of colonial camel corps troops caused some Saharawi tribes-people, at
the time of his writing (in the 1950s), to view them as ‘raiders’ and respond
accordingly.235
225
Adams [1816] 1817.
Cochelet 1822.
227
Paddock 1818.
228
Riley [1817] 1859.
229
Robbins 1817.
230
Mercer 1976: 102.
231
Mackenzie 1911.
232
Lawrence [1926] 1974.
233
Pazzanita 2006: 165.
234
Sweet 1965.
235
Briggs 1960.
226
85
Raids against European outposts and forces could take place over great distances. In
1927 an audacious raid was launched from Cape Juby to attack the French at Port
Etienne (Nouadhibou), more than 1000 kilometres to the south (though Port Etienne
was also attacked earlier in 1924236). The raiders reached their destination but the
camel corps based in Atar intercepted them ‘and slaughtered them to a man’.237 This
took place more or less when Antoine de Saint-Exupery took up his tenure as chief of
the Aero Postale station at Cape Juby, but he too described another instance when a
ghazi was being planned for an attack into Mauritania. Saint-Exupery recounts how
camels were being ‘led to the wells [around Cape Juby] for three days’, how there
were ‘powwows’, and he continued that there was a ‘fever running through the camp:
it was as if men had been rigging an invisible ship… the air was filled with the wind
that would take her out of port’. All of this preparation was for an attack (that would
take two months) on a French camel corps column out of Atar, led by one, Captain
Bonnafous, described as an almost ‘legendary figure’ amongst the tribes, who could
outflank them by raiding within the Spanish territory, and driving off their camels.238
Camel corps (Mehariste) officers such as Bonnafous adapted the ghazi to French
military ends, and archaeological evidence supporting this might exist in Zug in
southern Western Sahara close to the border with Mauritania. Here, in a great expanse
of open desert, mainly punctuated by inselbergs and guelbs, a small fort (Fig. 3.6) was
constructed on a low-lying rocky outcrop – literally daubed onto the landscape. It was
summarily recorded in 2005 by Mark Milburn and Nick Brooks, while carrying out
surveys for the WSP in the area. The local Saharawis knew of the structure as a
‘French fort’, and Milburn made subsequent enquiries of the Musée des Troupes de la
Marine (in Fréjus, France), and indeed, in around 1911, accounts of French incursions
into Spanish territory did suggest some kind of military presence in the Zug area.
Also, by 2007, at least two of the 2005 team members went back to the fortlet and
found a French army button.239 The remains of the fort consist of an irregular polygon
covering an estimated area of around 22 metres by 30 metres. The denuded walls are
236
Naval Intelligence Division 1944: 333.
Cate 1970: 133.
238
Saint-Exupery [1939] 1966: 86-87.
239
Milburn 2008.
237
86
of drystone rubble construction, and they include the remains of internal buildings
along with three bastion-like structures.240
With the situation intensifying between the French and Saharawi tribes in the first
quarter of the twentieth century there was an undoubted knock on effect at the Spanish
garrisons along the coast, and this altered the way in which the landscape was
inscribed. Looking back at the 1910 postcard described above, it is clear that there is
no physical barrier between the fort and the tents in the foreground, but that was to
change with the employment of barbed wire.
Barbed wire was invented in the 1870s in the United States. It was a cheap, low
technology success story, allowing the American West to be parcelled up so that the
land could be appropriated by cattle ranchers and farmers. The very act of enclosing
the land with a simple wire deterrant that could hurt the flesh of any living creature
that tried to force its way through it – by its numerous barbs – made the wire a prime
tool for not just controlling animals, but people. Entire landscapes could now be
enclosed with an offensive wire inscribing authority over previously accessible and
open spaces.241 Its use in war and in the controlling of populations was initialy made
most evident in the Cuban insurgencies just prior to the Spanish-American War of
1898. As a precursor to the 20th century use of barbed wire, the Spanish military
divided Cuba into zones attempting to exclude Cuban freedom fighters from specific
parts of the island. These barriers consisted of barbed wire fencing, ditches and banks,
and forts and blockhouses, and they stretched across the island from coast to coast.
They also, along some of them, incorporated a railway.242 This was the advent of 20th
century ‘total war’, even with the inclusion of concentration camps. Here, as
elsewhere, swathes of landscapes were inscribed with linear implements of hostile
control, eventually culminating in the 20th century with the Iron Curtain, the IsraeliPalestinian barrier wall, and the Moroccan berms in Western Sahara.
The British in South Africa, during the Boer War (1899-1902), took the combination
of barbed wire, blockhouses, railways, and concentration camps to a new offensive
240
Photographs of the fort were taken by Nick Brookes during the WSP survey of 2005.
Netz 2004.
242
New York Times 1896.
241
87
level. In order to combat the Boer commandos, they criss-crossed the veldt with a
system of blockhouses and barbed wire fencing that rivalled any enclosing of the
prairie by American farmers and ranchers. And in the same way that an American
rancher would ‘drive’ his cattle, the British military, under Kitchener, drove the Boer
insurgents from one enclosed part of the veldt, into another, and another, until they
were either killed, surrendered, or had nowhere else to go and were captured.243 So
with this in mind, and with the belligerance of both the French and Saharawis, it is not
surprising that at some time within the first quarter of the 20th century, the Spanish
employed barbed wire in their coastal enclaves.
An undated photograph shows a Spanish blockhouse at Rio de Oro surrounded by
barbed wire entanglements.244 This was one of four such blockhouses constructed by
Francisco Bens in 1914 in a line across the narrowest part of the Dakhla peninsula
immediately north of Villa Cisneros (see Fig. 3.3). High resolution Google earth
imagery shows that three of these blockhouses are still standing and they were
recently recorded by the Spanish archaeologist, Luis Blanco Vázquez.245 Save for the
barbed wire, the blockhouse in the photograph is relatively picturesque. It is obviously
square and there are turrets at its diagonal corners. The building is two-storeys high,
and with decorated crenelations along its rooftop parapet. It is rendered and pale in
colour, but with a dark dado at ground level. The upper floor has ordinary windows,
but the ground floor has firing embrasures and the turrets have horizontal firing slits.
The photograph cannot tell us if barbed wire entanglements stretched from blockhouse
to blockhouse, since Francisco Bens hoped to construct an extensive barrier across the
peninsular. However, in whatever form he envisaged it, it was never realised.246
243
Grant 1910: 568-576.
Available at:
www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/fotos/displayimage.php?album=lastup&cat=6&pos=395 accessed
25 April 2011.
245
Blanco Vázquez 2012. In the middle 1950s, John Lodwick mistakenly wrote that there were six
blockhouses equidistantly spaced at around 300 yards from each other across the peninsular (Lodwick
1956: 197). However, in the 1960s, the British Hydrographic Department noted only four, white
blockhouses equidistantly spaced across the peninsula (Hydrographic Department 1967: 248). This
latter observation conforms with the satellite evidence of Google Earth and Blanco Vázquez’s findings.
246
Lodwick 1956: 197.
244
88
Two photographs, one terrestrial,247 and one aerial (Fig. 3.7), show the Villa Cisneros
fort surrounded by barbed wire. The photographs also include bi-planes and hangars,
thereby dating them to sometime after World War One. This was when France’s Aero
Postale service was inaugurated, flying over Western Sahara to Dakar, and the
Spanish air force initiated its Escuadrilla Sahariana.248 The photographs also show
the fort much as it looked up to its demolition in 2004.249 The additions that were
constructed by 1910 were now all rendered, and an additional blockhouse-like tower
was added to the front façade at the eastern corner of the fort. Interestingly, this new
tower had decorative corner turrets. Along the rear wall, a small bunker-like extension
was added at the building’s western corner, and this had a horizontal firing slit.
In contrast to the earlier pre 1910 postcard image, these photographs show no Bedouin
tents or people, the local Saharawi were now kept a greater distance away from the
fort, girdled in its protective barbed wire entanglements. There is now an even greater
distance between the coloniser and the colonised, and it is clearly inscribed on the
ground. The situation was similar at Cape Juby, where a perimeter of barbed wire, two
kilometres in length surrounded the fort, and the garrison was described in a
contemporary account as being dejected and godforsaken, and since there was also a
gaol at Cape Juby, the soldiers were considered as being hardly indistinguishable from
the inmates.250
The technology of enclosure as represented in barbed wire is the first step in literally
marking out the land of Western Sahara and creating oppositional, and militarised
spaces. Luckily for the Saharawi tribes, the Spanish were never overly aggressive in
appropriating their land, and at this time they clung to the coast. It would take further
machinations by France into the 1930s, and a conflict in the late 1950s, to really cause
the Spanish to impress upon the land their colonial project.
247
Undated photograph captioned: ‘Villa Cisneros – Fuerte’, available at: www.saharamili.net/images/fuerte/anon1930.jpg accessed 11 April 2011.
248
Cate 1970: 133.
249
ICOMOS n.d.
250
Cate, 1970: 134.
89
Tracing out a Pacified Region
By the time that France and Spain felt that the region was ‘pacified’, in 1934, a brutal
war had been fought in the Rif region of northern Morocco, subduing the uprising of
Abd el Krim,251 and the bilad es siba (or the ‘dissident territory’) south of the Atlas
Mountains, and north of the Wadi Draa, had been brought under French control.252
The Spanish had secured its three coastal positions at Cape Juby, Villa Cisneros and
La Guera, while along the desert frontier between Western Sahara and Mauritania the
French had a garrison in Tindouf, Algeria, and forts at Ain Ben Tilli, Agmar, Bir
Moghrein (Fort Trinquet),253 Idjil (Fort Gouraud),254 Attar and Port Etienne, all
hugging the border outline (see Fig. 3.8). Most of these forts were linked by the Piste
Imperiale No 1, which extended all the way to Dakar in Senegal.255 Designated as
such, this route unequivocally exemplified the colonial spirit of France, writ large on
the desert sands.
Berthome256 has published a plan of the French fort at Attar as it appeared in the
period 1907-13, and it illustrates clearly how the French envisaged space in their
military outposts in the Sahara at this time. The fort was roughly diamond shaped in
plan, and aligned longitudinally more or less north to south. It was probably a mud
brick structure257 with bastions at its northern and southern ends, and with an entrance
on its northeast facing side. The curtain walls had rooms up against their internal
sides, which included company detail rooms, officer’s quarters, storerooms, an
infirmary, a gaol, and a powder store. A zariba, of thorn or brushwood, five metres
thick surrounded the fort, following a trace not that different from that of the fort, save
for a rectangular extension to the southeast where a camp for colonial troops was
located. This illustrates, in the very layout of the fort, the difference between the
colonial troops and the French, in that the latter, soldiers and officers, were quartered
within the walls, while the African troops, separated from the Europeans, were
camped outside and only protected by the zariba. Also, outside the fort, but within the
251
For a very good study of the 1920-1927 war in the Rif region of Morocco, see Balfour 2002.
Thompson and Adloff 1980: 186 & 219.
253
Trout 1969: 348.
254
Windrow 2011: 604.
255
Beslay 1993: 30.
256
Berthome 1996: 96.
257
Judging from a poorly reproduced photograph in Berthome 1996: 97.
252
90
zeriba, there were kitchen facilities, a well and latrines. To the southwest, just outside
the zeriba, were depot areas for camels and goats.
Forts such as this, along with the Spanish positions on the coast, served as a
containing mechanism surrounding much of the heartlands of the ‘refractory tribes’,258
creating a geography of enclosure, and delineating a militarised landscape. But this
was not an extensive enclosure of barbed wire, blockhouses and fortified ditches as in
Cuba and South Africa. Instead it was a ring of strong points impressed onto the land
and dependent on the ability of locally recruited mobile troops to patrol the hinterland,
as the Spanish started to do in 1926 with the creation of their own camel corps, the
Tropas Nomadas.259 Meanwhile, the French, based in their Mauritanian forts could
interdict ghazis, and invade Spanish territory, either with their Mehariste troops
(Groupes Nomades) or with tribal factions in league with them.260 In fact, the eventual
‘pacification’ of the region was seen by many Saharawi Bedouin, the very people who
were ‘pacified’, as a way of being protected from the French. San Martin261 illustrates
this with an account given by an old Saharawi of an encounter with a Spanish column
in 1935:
I was in Hagunia in the year 1935 when Captain Capaz faced for the first time a group
of 40 Saharawi… Before, I had heard about the Spanish, but I had never seen one.
Capaz told us: ‘ask what you want’. We… established four conditions: The Islamic
Shaaria to be the law in the territory, not to force anyone to abandon arms and to give
a licence to keep those arms we have now, that the slaves will continue under the
command of their owners and that the owners could decide what to do with them in
their own way… and not to give to Spain any recently pregnant camel nor any
castrated camel for transport. We demanded these conditions…to be sure that they
would not do the same as the French… The Spanish fulfilled their promise. 262
In a way, an equilibrium was reached in the western Sahara in the 1930s, with the
Spanish and French both acknowledging their territorial limits and responsibilities.
258
The terms ‘refractory’ and ‘dissident’ tribes have been used by early 20th century writers to describe
the tribes of the western Sahara that opposed the colonial expansion of France, and to a lesser degree,
Spain. Examples include: Saint-Exupery [1939] 1966, and Vieuchange [1932] 1987.
259
Pazzanita 2006: 417.
260
Bonte 1993: 73.
261
San Martin 2010: 32-33.
262
Garcia 2001: 83, cited in San Martin 2010: 33.
91
After decades of fighting, the tribes had to accept the dominance of the better armed,
and organised Europeans, and in the end, they found themselves welcoming what
became a durable peace.263 The Spanish finally occupied Smara in 1934, where they
created their first desert post. They secured the coastal routes, and by 1938 they
founded El-Ayoun, the future capital of the territory.264 They also occupied Guelta
Zemmour, Bir Gandus, Tichla and Zug by 1946 (see Fig. 3.9).265 San Martin has
described Western Sahara at this time as mainly one large military garrison, and as a
‘playground’ for Spain’s African army that was ‘forged’ in the Rif War. Though this
became even more salient after Morocco became independent in 1956.266 In fact, an
informant told Lodwick in 1955 that to the Spanish military, Western Sahara was very
much ‘their territory’. The army felt that they built up, and held on to the colony with
little assistance from Madrid, even ‘against every kind of foreign intervention and
intrigue’.267
Photographs, mostly dated from 1971, exist of the small desert fort that the Spanish
established at Tichla (located about 200 kilometres from the sea, and around 30
kilometres north of the border with Mauritania) in their efforts to extend their colonial
space into the interior in the decade or so after 1934. They give us a glimpse into what
a Spanish, deep desert outpost was like. From the collection available on the La Mili
en el Sáhara website268 we can clearly see a simple, yet martial, colonial edifice
implanted onto the desert landscape, something akin to a Beau Geste fort, and the
images clearly illustrate the built, military environment which the Spanish constructed
for themselves in the deeper desert. An aerial image, which is one of the few photos
not dated in the set, shows the small square fort, quite forlorn, and like the earlier fort
at Zug, literally daubed onto the great expanse of the desert. It is probably the earliest
view of the fort since it does not include any of the external structures shown in the
other photos, almost all of which are dated to 1971. It (Fig. 3.10) also shows the fort
cocooned in a broad ring of barbed wire, clearly marking it out as an implant in
263
Caro Baroja 1966: 69, cited in San Martin 2010: 33.
San Martin 2010: 32-33.
265
Hodges 1983: 69.
266
San Martin 2010: 41.
267
Lodwick 1956: 136.
268
See the photographs available at http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed
9 April 2011.
264
92
territory perceived as hostile (and perhaps indicating that the date of this image is
closer to the 1940s than to 1971).
One close-up elevation of the entrance to the fort suggests that its construction was of
stone rubble, with a coarsely applied mud render.269 A plan of the fort, with no scale,
and given a date of 1971,270 along with other photos of the exterior of the fort, confirm
that it was virtually square with its entrance on its northern side and with towers at its
northeast and southwest corners. The towers had balconies around them and
decorative arabesque-style double windows.271 Most of the photos also make clear that
there were broadly spaced crenels along the upper parapet. This resonates with similar
detailing along the parapeted roofline added to the Villa Cisneros fort that can be seen
in the postcard dated 1910, and in the subsequent, later photographs. The interior of
the fort at Tichla (according to the 1971 plan, but also recorded in a composite
panorama272) included separate quarters for troops and non-commissioned officers,
accommodation for the commandant, an office, weather station, radio room, kitchen
and canteen, a dispensary and store rooms, while externally, there were generator
buildings and a sizable encampment of local Bedouin. And notably, by 1971, there
was no longer any barbed wire surrounding the fort, separating the colonised from the
colonisers.
Judging from these images, outposts like Tichla were no longer lone forts in the desert
well before the 1970s, but instead, the hub of a colonial presence servicing a locale or
region. That is, servicing the military as well as the local Saharawis. This happened in
a presumably larger way at Villa Cisneros, where a low level aerial photograph, dated
to 1930,273 showing details of the fort’s interior, also shows that the barbed wire
around the fort had been removed, and apparently, local people can be seen to roam
269
See Chapter 6, Fig. 6.23.
Plan of fort at Tichla, entitled ‘Plano de la Base’, Juan Piqueras, dated 1971 and available at
http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/mapas/planotc.jpg, accessed on 9 April 2011.
271
Photographs, each entitled ‘Base de Tichla’, Juan Piqueras, dated 1971 and available at
http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/jptc/jptc022.jpg, http://www.saharamili.net/images/jptc/jptc023.jpg, http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/jptc/jptc001.jpg, and an undated
colour photograph available at http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/mani/mitc001.jpg. All accessed 9
April 2011
272
Photograph entitled ‘Base deTichla – Panoramica interior’, Juan Piqueras, dated 1971 and available
at http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/jptc/jptc028.jpg, accessed 9 April 2011.
273
Aerial photograph of the fort at Villa Cisneros, dated to 1930, available at
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-74.htm, accessed 12 April 2011.
270
93
freely were the entanglements once were. By removing their barbed wire, and
allowing the civil population access to the heart of the settlement, in this case the fort,
the Spanish must have felt secure in their appropriation of the territory. It may very
well have looked as if the creation of a Spanish colonial space was succeeding. But
this was to change.
The Making of a Spanish Sahara
The Maghreb was a tumultuous region in the middle and late 1950s. There was a
brutal war for independence in Algeria (1954-1962) while both Tunisia and Morocco
gained their independence in 1956. From 1953, various guerrilla groups existed in
Morocco, mainly from the Rif and Middle Atlas regions. These coalesced into the
‘Army of Liberation’ in 1955, and at that time, southern Moroccans and Saharawis
started to join the group. Also, many Moroccans who were auxiliaries in the French
army joined the group in 1956 when Morocco gained its independence. With their
officers gone, they brought with them arms raided from their former French
armouries. As a result, the new, independent government of Morocco did not have full
control over large areas in both the north and south of the country. These were
controlled by insurgents bent on removing France and Spain from the whole of the
western Sahara. To gain control of these regions the King of Morocco tried to lure
many of the insurgents into his new Moroccan army, the Forces Armees Royal (FAR).
But even though, about 10,000 members of the Army of Liberation agreed to lay
down their arms, thousands more remained virtually in control of the south of the
country, south of Agadir. The King distrusted the Army of Liberation, but his new
army did not have the capabilities to confront it. So undeterred, the Army of
Liberation went into action, attacking French Algeria in June of 1956, and then setting
their sites on Sidi-Ifni.274
274
Pazzanita 2006: 32-33.
94
War in the Western Sahara
The Army of Liberation attacked the Spanish Enclave of Sidi Ifni in 1957,275
beginning the Ifni-Sahara War, known to Spanish Historians as the ‘Forgotten
War’.276 The war soon spread deeply throughout Spanish Sahara, and parts of
neighbouring Mauritania and Algeria. By re-instituting the tactics of the ghazi, the
Army of Liberation, now known by the Spanish as the Saharawi Liberation Army,
virtually roamed unchallenged across the territory. They successfully pushed the
Spanish back to El-Ayoun and their pre 1934 positions.277 To counter this, the French
and Spanish joined forces and launched ‘Operation Ouragon’.278 By deploying 5,000
French and 9,000 Spanish troops and 70 French and 60 Spanish military aircraft,279
the insurgents were defeated in 1958, a year that became known as the ‘year of the
peace of the graveyards’.280 Western Sahara was now securely back under Spanish
control.
Morocco played a double game during the conflict. At first it distrusted the Army of
Liberation, then its newly formed FAR gave the rebels logistical support during the
early months of the conflict. In opposition to this, Morocco then allowed Agadir to be
used as the airbase from which French and Spanish aircraft could fly sorties,
successfully attacking the rebels. In consequence, the Tarfaya strip was ceded to
Morocco, by Spain, ‘as a reward for its collaboration in the last phases of the war’.281
Spain’s Saharan colony was now given the geographic delineation it has today, as
Western Sahara, and ‘…from the decade of the 1960s onwards… it make[s] sense to
name this region Spanish Sahara, and only then… the colonial frontiers start[ed] to be
real, for the Saharawis as well as the Spanish’.282 In fact, this second pacification of
the territory created a new colonial impetus previously unmatched, and in the deeper
desert areas it created a new militarised space imprinted on the land.
275
Sidi Ifni (Ifni) was a Spanish enclave approximately 200 kilometres due north of Western Sahara,
and about 2,500 sq kilometres in area. This coastal territory was occupied by Spain in 1934 and ceded
back to Morocco in 1969. Mercer 1979: 121 and Zunes and Mundy 2010: 100-101.
276
San Martin 2010: 69.
277
San Martin 2010: 69-70.
278
Pazzanita 2006: xxviii & 31.
279
Pazzanita 2006: 35-36.
280
San Martin 2010: 70.
281
San Martin 2010: 71.
282
Gimeno 2005: 36, cited in San Martin 2010: 73.
95
With Spain giving up northern Morocco in 1956, its African Army, with its mainstay,
the Spanish Foreign Legion, was posted to Ifni and Western Sahara. It has even been
implied that Franco was keen to hold on to these territories, ‘partly out of a desire to
find a new mission for the Foreign Legion in Africa’.283 There were already large
military establishments attached to the main towns of El-Ayoun, Villa Cisneros, and
Smara, but by 1961, with the potential for further conflict with a resurgent Army of
Liberation, the Spanish military had established a presence throughout the territory.284
Amongst these was a new type of small desert outpost, such as the fort at Tifariti,
which was indicative of the type. There were at least seven of these forts throughout
the territory, and apparently, they were all identical. Many were positioned in the
north, presumably, in case of further conflict with Morocco (the Spanish still occupied
Sidi Ifni which Morocco disputed), and there were tensions between Algeria and
Morocco which could have spread into Western Sahara, and resulted in the ‘War of
the Sands’ in 1963.285
The outpost, or fort, at Tifariti (Fig. 3.11) was constructed by the Spanish Foreign
Legion in 1964.286 It would probably be fair to say that Tifariti was more of a place
than a settlement in the 1960s. It was shown on Spanish and French maps, and judging
from these, it was on obvious routeways, and it had a water source (see Chapter 6). It
may even have served as a stopover point for one of the innumerable routes that must
have passed through the area serving the Goulmim-Senegal caravan trade (the Wadi
Tifariti heads northwards, towards the Saguia el-Hamra). The location of Tifariti is at
the junction of flat stony desert to the south, and low level, igneous hills to the north,
and that is more or less where the fort was constructed. Tifariti is approximately 17
kilometres from the southern border of Western Sahara’s northern panhandle. It is
around 130 kilometres southeast of Smara, 150 kilometres northeast of the French
Fort at Bir Morgrein in Mauritania, and 100 kilometres west of the French fort at Ain
Ben Tilli. The closest Spanish outpost was Hausa, around 115 kilometres to the northnorthwest (see Fig. 3.12).
283
Pazzanita 2006: 401.
Mercer 1976: 226.
285
Farsoun and Paul 1976: 13-16.
286
Personal communication from Bachir Achmed Bhaua (facilitator for the Western Sahara Project)
who witnessed the fort under construction.
284
96
The fort at Tifariti is only partly preserved. It was hit by a Moroccan air strike in mid
August 1991 (see Chapter 6), just before the proclamation of the present UN brokered
ceasefire. The attack destroyed approximately one third of the structure. It was
apparently built to a standard plan, and it is identical to the Spanish forts at Echdeiria,
Hausa and Mahbes in the north of Western Sahara, and Aargub, Guelta Zemmour and
Bir Enzaren in the centre of the territory (see Fig. 3.12). It is presumed that all of these
posts were established sometime soon after the end of the ‘Forgotten War’. A good
selection of photographs exist, illustrating the structure and layout of these small
desert forts.287 They were all rectangular in plan with rectangular blockhouses at their
corners and a central courtyard and a defendable right-angled entrance. The cast
concrete walls were slightly battered with narrow embrasure-like windows, while
internally there were obvious attempts at domesticating what was essentially a
military space.
As has already been noted in the case of the earlier fort at Tichla – and judging from
the photographic coverage of these desert posts – these newer forts were all an integral
part of locally emplaced hubs of colonial presence distributed in the more remote parts
of Western Sahara. Surrounding them were ancillary buildings and other compounds,
and encampments of local Bedouin, as shown in a photograph of the fort at Mahbes
taken in 1974.288 What is striking about all of these outposts, and it is made clear in
the photograph of Mahbes, is the fact that these forts are constructed in such a way
that they look solid and embedded. With their corner towers and slit windows, they
are iconic redoubts in the centre of isolated military and tribal settlements. Though,
for a full description of the fort at Tifariti, in its setting, see Chapter 6.
From Spanish Sahara to Moroccan Sahara
So far, the Spanish colonial space of Western Sahara has been seen to have been
created by the dual actions of France and Spain. Initially, by the creation of Spanish
forts and factories – militarised places along the coast – at Villa Cisneros, Cape Juby
and La Guera. While the French, in their turn, encircled the territory with forts and
287
These are available at http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm and
http://www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/fotos/thumbnails.php?album=16 accesed 9 April 2011.
288
See Chapter 6, Fig. 6.40.
97
garrisons along the Piste Imperiale through Mauritania, which served a similar
function to the limes of the Roman Empire. With the acknowledged pacification of the
region in 1934, the Spanish began to occupy the interior by securing the future
colonial capital at El-Ayoun, and by occupying the iconic capital of colonial
resistance in the region, Smara, the city of Sheikh Ma el Ainin. Nevertheless, the
Spanish were restrained in their punctuation of the territory with military posts,
especially since the tribes accepted the peace imposed upon them mainly by the
tenacity of French arms. But after the ‘Forgotten War’ of 1957-58, the situation
changed, and Western Sahara was turned into an extensive garrison for Spain’s
African Army.
The historical events that altered the situation of Western Sahara during and after the
1960s – culminating in the rise of the Polisario Front – and which paved the way for
the annexation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, and the 1975-1991 war,289
are best described by the mainly geo-political works referred to in Chapter 1. It is not
my intention to cover the same ground here, but instead, to summarise the events that
led up to the partitioning of Western Sahara, which started in 1980, and created a
territory-wide militarised landscape that is dealt with, in terms of its materiality, in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
In June 1956, the leader of the nationalist Istiqlal Party in Morocco declared that a
Morocco independent of France, would only be complete if it included the whole of
Mauritania with Spanish Sahara, and much of Western Algeria and Mali (this ‘Greater
Morocco’ is shown in Fig. 3.13). As noted in Chapter 1, Morocco has seen its natural
territorial limits as including the lands taken by the Almoravids in the 11th and 12th
centuries, and denied to them by the partitioning of the western quarter of the Sahara
by France and Spain. By the end of 1957, this irredentist vision became firmly rooted
in the political establishment of Morocco.290 But with the independence of Algeria in
1962, and the independence of Mauritania and Mali two years earlier, Morocco could
only channel its claims, for a ‘Greater Morocco’, in the direction of Western (Spanish)
Sahara.
289
290
Pazzanita 2006: 248-251.
Hodges 1983: 85-86.
98
In 1965, the Government of Francisco Franco in Madrid, was being pressured by the
United Nations to de-colonise Sidi Ifni and Western Sahara. Spain accepted the
United Nation’s call but wanted the process to be delayed because of the
underdeveloped nature of the territory. Nevertheless, the United Nations called for a
referendum on Saharawi independence at the end of 1966.291 The presence of
phosphate deposits at Bou-Craa was announced in 1962,292 and perhaps because of
this, Spain stalled on the issue of independence for the territory. Nevertheless, in
1967, Spain set up the Asamblea General del Sahara (or Djemaa) of Western Sahara.
This was an assembly of Saharawi notables, which it was aimed would lay the
foundations for eventual autonomy for the territory under a pro-Spanish Saharawi
leadership.293 At the same time, Harakat Tahrir Saquia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab
(the Movement for the Liberation of Saquia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab) was
founded, agitating for independence from Spain. Its activities were peaceful, but in
1970, at a protest in the Zemla neighbourhood of El-Ayoun, Spanish Foreign
Legionnaires fired on the protestors, killing some and arresting many others. The
founder of the organisation, Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, was immediately
arrested, and soon after ‘disappeared’. As a result of this ‘Massacre of Zemla’,
Harakat Tarhrir was duly extinguished.294
At Tan-Tan, in southern Morocco, anti-Spanish demonstrations took place in 1972
and the United Nations adopted, for the first time, a resolution upholding the right of
independence for the Saharawi people. In the following year, 1973, phosphate exports
began from Bou-Craa, and the Polisario Front was founded, led by El-Ouali Mustapha
Sayed.295 Polisario also formed the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) at the
same time,296 and on May 20th, only ten days after its founding, Polisario/SPLA
committed its first military action against Spanish colonial troops at El-Khanga. In
1974, internal autonomy plans were announced by Spain for Western Sahara.
Morocco tried to dissuade Spain from following this route and the King, Hassan,
announced in August that he could not accept a referendum in the territory if the vote
included the possibility of independence. Nevertheless, Spain immediately announced
291
Pazzanita 2006: xxviii-xxix.
Mercer 1976: 185.
293
Pazzanita 2006: 96-97.
294
Pazzanita 2006: 186-187.
295
Pazzanita 2006: xxix.
296
Pazzanita 2006: 379-382.
292
99
that it would hold a referendum within the first half of 1975, but by January 1975 they
postponed it. The following May, a United Nations Visiting Mission found that the
majority of people in Western Sahara wanted independence, and by September, Spain
and Polisario came to a tentative agreement on independence for the territory, if
economic concessions were granted to Madrid. In October, the Saharawi sheikhs
declared their backing of the Polisario Front, and four days later, on October 16th, the
International Court of Justice at the Hague, ruled that territorial claims on Western
Sahara by both Morocco and Mauritania were unfounded, and that the Western Sahara
people had a primal right to self-determination. Ignoring this, King Hassan already
had plans in place for annexing Western Sahara in cooperation with Mauritania. He
announced his so-called ‘Green March’ on October 17th and it commenced on
November 6th. This was a supposedly civilian demonstration, which marched into the
far northwest of the territory, but it was preceded by a Moroccan military invasion
into the north-most limits of the territory. By November 14th, the Madrid Agreement
was signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, partitioning and handing over
the colony to Morocco and Mauritania by the end of February 1976 (see Fig. 3.14).
Generalissimo Franco, who had been seriously ill for some time, died on November
20th, and a provisional tripartite administration was set up on November 25th by the
signatories of the Madrid Agreement. Two days later Moroccan troops entered Smara,
and on the following day, more than 50 percent of the Djemaa, in Guelta Zemmour,
proclaimed their support for Polisario, and created a Provisional Saharawi National
Council.297
From November 1975 onwards, there was a steady exodus of Saharawi refugees
leaving the centres of population for the interior of the territory. Moroccan troops
entered El-Ayoun in December, and Dakhla in January 1976.298 The soldiers did not
arrive in a spirit of fraternity, instead they viewed most Saharawi as collaborators of
the ‘terrorists’ – Polisario.299 Many Saharawi men flocked to join Polisario to
militarily oppose the invasion of the country. In fact, Polisario was bulwarked by
former Saharawi colonial troops who became the backbone of their forces. But the
refugees mainly consisted of women, children and older men, and they continued to
297
Pazzanita 2006: xxix-xxxi & 220-221.
Pazzanita 2006: xxxi.
299
García 2001: 159, cited in San Martin 2010: 108.
298
100
move into the badiya, into centres such as Guelta Zemmour, Amgala, Oum-Dreiga,
Bir Lahlu, Mahbes300 and Tifariti,301 all organised by Polisario. The refugees found
themselves under aerial attack (which included napalm) by Moroccan forces and their
safety became a priority for Polisario. With the goodwill of neighbouring Algeria,
Polisario was able to set up refugee camps outside Tindouf, Algeria (around 53
kilometres east of the Western Sahara frontier), and there, the Saharawi people
became a nation in exile.
Part 2
‘Wall upon wall are between us’ 302
Spain’s African Army finally left Western Sahara in January 1976,303 while Morocco
occupied the northern two thirds of the territory, and Mauritania occupied the southern
third. This was not a deterrent to Polisario who proclaimed the existence of the
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1976304 and vigorously took
up arms against the occupying armies. By reviving the tactics of the ghazi, they forced
Mauritania out of the conflict in 1979, and they pushed the Moroccan forces up into
the northwest corner of the territory, into what was called, the ‘useful triangle’ (see
Fig. 3.14). To counter this, and to regain their almost lost colony, Morocco embarked
on the creation of a series of great earthen fortifications, which would literally sculpt
the desert in a hitherto unseen way. Between 1980 and 1987, the brute force of simple
earthmoving machines305 carved out a new, Moroccan colonial space in Western
Sahara.
These earthen fortifications, called ‘berms’ in contemporary military jargon, have put
a new slant on the concept of mankind inscribing itself on the surface of the earth.
Here, the power of a territorial authority, in this case Morocco – a colonizing power,
300
Laschi 2009: 136, and San Martin 2010: 108.
Awah, Interview, Deya, Interview, and Fadel, Interview.
302
From the poem ‘A Wall’ by Robert Browning.
303
Hodges 1983: 230.
304
Pazzanita 2006: xxxi & 374-378.
305
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 21.
301
101
with the assistance of modern technology, bulldozers and the like, was able to
appropriate a land and corral it. The Spanish built forts and outposts to punctuate their
authority across their colony. These were at unconnected points distributed across the
territory, all potentially vulnerable by their isolation from each other. But in the 1980s,
Morocco re-shaped the very earth to lay claim to Western Sahara. Much as in the great
trench systems of World War I, ‘digging’, in the guise of bulldozing, made a
comeback, and Morocco embarked on building, that is excavating and earth moving, a
series of six earth and stone defensive walls which extended in waves from the
northwest corner of the territory, partitioning Western Sahara with the aim of denying
the fighters of the Polisario access to around four fifths of the country (see Fig. 3.15).
The use of continuous, fortified barriers to deny territory to an enemy was not a new
idea. The greatest example from antiquity is the Great Wall of China, and in Britain,
there are the Roman examples of Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall, the latter, an
earthen barrier not that different from the Moroccan berms. As already noted, 19th
century industrial technology allowed barrier defences to be devised quickly and with
ease, as shown by the use of barbed wire in anti-insurgency measures in Cuba, and in
South Africa. But the First World War took the use of barbed wire and excavated
defences to a new level of complexity and land coverage.
When writing about pre 19th century field fortifications and siege works, and in
particular, Renaissance period sieges against artillery fortresses, Paul Hirst has noted:
The besiegers… had to behave as if they were besieged and to erect fortifications that
were often as elaborate, if temporary, as those they confronted. Sieges thus involved
an immense amount of digging. They created ephemeral structures that are fascinating
in their own right but that have been ignored by architectural historians.306
Hirst goes on to describe them as ‘disposable architecture’, and as ‘inventive’ as some
1960s ‘radical’ architecture. These ‘spider’s web[s] of earthworks’, though temporary,
were as elaborate and ‘costly in human effort’ as the very fortresses that were under
306
Hirst 2005: 199.
102
attack.307 These offensive, though also defensive, siege works evolved into the trench
systems of World War I, which
were simply versions of the saps and parallels of the old siegeworks. Over time they
became more and more elaborate, and concrete bunkers began to appear as the core of
the strongpoints. Essentially, a sixteenth-century technology was adapted to the
demands of industrialised warfare.308
When coupled with barbed wire, the continuous trenches of the Western Front became
a ‘river of steel’, and as such, they came to be viewed as a ‘permanent feature of the
landscape’ of the war. The 475 mile long wire and excavated obstacles, extending
from Switzerland to the English Channel, became the perfect solution to the problem
of ‘preventing human motion’ across space,309 and culminated with the idea that a
place to be defended was no longer a specific locus, like a town, a fortress or a city,
but a ‘national territory’.310 This attitude of mind set in motion a great spurt of military
engineering across the European continent in the post war period, and resulted in the
construction of massive, defensive networks and barriers. All aimed, in what turned
out to be a futile effort, to prevent another continent wide European war.
World War Walls
The most impressive of these new national defences was the Maginot Line – devised
by France to prevent a potential German attack. It consisted of underground concrete
fortresses, and extensive support facilities, all linked by tunnels. There were also
numerous bunkers, anti-tank barriers, and barbed wire with landmines. But the
Maginot Line proper was only 125 miles long, mainly covering the border with
Germany, though there was also the ‘Little Maginot Line’, facing Italy.311 Because
France fell to Germany early on in World War II, the Line is often evoked as a symbol
of that defeat. But in actuality, it was a success, and where the Germans attacked it, it
did not succumb. Linear defences could work. France fell because of the openness of
307
Hirst 2005: 199.
Hirst 2005: 205.
309
Netz 2004: 109.
310
Hirst 2005: 205-206.
311
Sterling 2009: 206-7. For a good description of the Maginot Line, see Kaufmann and Jurga, 1999.
308
103
its border with Belgium and the inability of its army to counter the unanticipated route
of the German offensive.312
Germany also constructed extensive, linear defences along its eastern and western
frontiers between the World Wars. There was the West Wall (or Siegfried Line), and
the East Wall. These consisted of anti-tank barriers, bunkers and heavily reinforced
underground fortifications. In all, the West Wall was relatively lighter than the East
Wall, but it had a great depth of formidable obstacles, such as anti-tank ‘dragons
teeth’, and these eventually came into their own by obstructing the Allies’ advance
into Germany in 1944.313
Sensing a threat from Germany in the 1930s, the Czechoslovak government
constructed its own ‘Maginot Line’. There were underground forts and bunkers
inspired by French examples, but the degree of fortification was variable.
Nevertheless, they were made almost continuous by anti-infantry barriers (barbed
wire), and anti-tank obstacles. Though incomplete, they extended along the German,
Austrian and Hungarian borders, but they never fired a shot in anger, and
Czechoslavakia was occupied by Germany in early 1939.314
In the 1920s and 30s, Finland constructed a system of linear fortifications along the
Karelian Isthmus in an attempt to thwart Soviet aggression. Known as the
Mannerheim line, it ran roughly east to west and was approximately 130 kilometres in
length. It mainly consisted of bunkers – of stone, wood or concrete – and trenches
were a key element. There were also anti-tank obstacles. The system was not
continuous, and its defensiveness depended on the abilities of the soldiers manning it.
At the end of the Winter War with the Soviet Union in 1940, the Finns commenced
construction on the Salpa Line, this time along their eastern border with the Soviets
from the Gulf of Finland to the Barents Sea. The line consisted of entrenchments, and
bunkers of various types, some armed with tank turrets. There were also anti-tank
obstacles and mine fields. The Salpa Line was stronger than the Mannerheim Line but
312
Sterling 2009: 242.
Kaufmann and Jurga 1999: 59-98.
314
Kaufmann and Jurga 1999: 239-261.
313
104
it was never completed. Both lines also relied on natural obstacles such as forests,
lakes and rocky terrain.315
These linear defensive systems were all based on the premise that they would have to
deter a modern industrial aggressor. The presumption was that the offensive
technology developed during, and after, the First World War, would be hurled at them
in terms of unlimited and total war – with mass troop movements, long range heavy
artillery, tanks, and aerial bombardment. All in a potential war, not that dissimilar to
the world conflict described by H.G. Wells in his alternative, futuristic history, The
Shape of Things to Come.316 In effect, these defences were designed for ‘big wars’.
This appellation is not made to trivialise the awesome destruction of modern industrial
warfare, but the term is used here to highlight the difference between our
understanding of unlimited war and small, or ‘little wars’.
‘Little War’ Walls
The term petite guerre, or ‘little war’, came into use in the eighteenth century. It was
coined to describe the irregular ways of fighting encountered by traditional European
armies in North America and Central and Eastern Europe. The tactics of North
American colonials and Native Americans in the late 17th century confounded
traditional militarists, as did the behaviour of Eastern European irregulars from the
Hungarian-Turkish marches and the Polish plains. Such ‘partisans’ were perceived
more as ‘spectres than soldiers’, especially in their abilities to cover great distances, to
strike and run, and to terrorize populations.317 The Arab ghazi fits very well with this.
Today, for example, we call the fighters of little wars ‘guerrillas’ (from the Spanish
for ‘little war’), ‘partisans’ and even ‘terrorists’, and little wars have become
‘insurgencies’, ‘irregular warfare’ and ‘special operations’. In turn, little wars in the
20th century in colonial North Africa and Indochina, and even the Arabian peninsular,
not to mention the Arab-Israeli conflict, have spawned further developments in the
application of linear barrier defences, and some of these are briefly described below.
315
Kaufmann and Jurga 1999: 329-348.
Wells 1933.
317
Grenier 2005: 93.
316
105
Libya
Before World War Two, Italy finally crushed all resistance to its occupation of Libya
in the Italian-Sanusi War of 1923-31. Besides undertaking a war of attrition that
exhausted all tribal opposition, especially in Cyrenaica, the Italians, in 1930, built a
barbed wire barrier nine metres wide by 1.5 meters high and extending for 320
kilometres along the border with Egypt, from the Mediterranean to the Great Sand Sea
that straddles the Libyan-Egyptian border. Its aim, and it was successful in doing so,
was to cut the rebels off from sanctuaries and sources of supplies in Egypt.318 Such an
anti-insurgency barrier would not have been out of place in Spanish Cuba, nor in
South Africa, just a few decades earlier. While ten years later, in World War Two,
Alan Moorhead described the barrier as ‘Mussolini’s famous fence’ and saw it
impotently silted up with sand at its southern end, allowing vehicles to drive over it,319
or in other places, nosed through by British tanks.320
Indochina and Algeria
A bitter war for independence erupted in Algeria in 1954, and lasted until 1962 when
Algeria finally won its independence from France. With both Morocco and Tunisia
already attaining their own independence in 1956, both countries were obvious safe
havens for insurgents of the Algerian National Liberation Front, and its National
Liberation Army. After France’s defeat in Indochina in 1954, its military were
‘baffled by how poorly armed insurgents could defeat a modern army’, and believed
‘that all insurgencies were part of a global Communist strategy to subvert the West’.
They concluded, that to stop the flow of fighters and arms, mainly from Tunisia, from
bolstering the Algerian insurgency, they had to secure the country’s borders by
devising frontier barriers.
Although the earlier French experience in the ill-fated Indochina war of 1946-54 was
nationally demoralising, they managed to successfully construct a string of
fortifications to secure the Tonkin Delta region in northern Vietnam from the
communist Viet Minh. This was the de Lattre Line,321 a string of 2,200 bunkers and
318
Berry 1987.
Moorhead 1943: 51.
320
Moorhead 1965: 8-9. The barrier still exists, and most of it can be easily seen on Google Earth.
321
Porch 2010: 85-86.
319
106
other fortifications. Some could be linked by trenches to become forts, and all were
surrounded by minefields, barbed wire, and even moats in some instances.322
This barrier concept was applied to Algeria’s borders, though, most famously, along
the border with Tunisia. Here, the Morice Line was constructed (1957-1958) from the
Mediterranean to the Sahara. It was essentially an electrified fence of 5,000 volts,
eight feet high, incorporating a barbed wire apron, and with minefields on both sides.
Electronic sensors and radar could detect breaks in, and people approaching, the
barrier, and such surveillance could then direct the fire of howitzer batteries while
rapid reaction forces would be put into the field. The barrier proved highly successful,
killing thousands of insurgents within seven months after its completion.323
Vietnam
The success of the Morice Line was highly attractive to the American military in the
Vietnam War, and a similar barrier was commenced in 1967 to the south of the
Demilitarised Zone, between North and South Vietnam. Christened the McNamara
Line and modelled on the Morice Line, this ‘high tech’, anti-personnel barrier was
planned to incorporate minefields with cleared ground and barbed wire obstacles,
sensors, and observation towers, and all supported by manned strong points and fire
support bases in the rear. But the barrier was never completed, especially when its
electronic sensors were re-deployed in the extensive defence of Khe Sanh, and the
Vietcong’s strength south of the barrier had already become too great. Nevertheless,
the sensor technology proved extremely successful at Khe Sanh, and it showed how
adaptable it could be, working well in 360 degree applications as well as in linear,
barrier deployments, as along the Morice Line.324
Oman – Dhofar
Oman had been ruled as a feudal state from 1932 until 1970, when Qaboos bin Said,
engineered a near bloodless coup against his father, the Sultan. In the forty or so years
prior to 1970, animosities developed in the country and these evolved into a Marxist
rebellion against the Oman government and so-called ‘Western imperialism’ in Oman
322
Fall [1961] 1972: 175-176.
Bairstow 2006: 28-30.
324
Brush 1994.
323
107
and the Arabian Gulf.325 The insurgents had supply bases in neighbouring South
Yemen, and as in Algeria, it was incumbent to prevent rebel traffic across the border.
To this end, the British military supporting Sultan Qaboos, built a series of fortified
barriers from the coast up into the mountainous Dhofari hinterland east of the border
with South Yemen. In the end, four barriers were constructed, made up of barbed wire
entanglements, booby traps, minefields, fixed patrol bases and artillery positions.
They were so successful that clean-up operations between the barriers and the South
Yemen border were easily executed, and the campaign was declared as successfully
ended by December 1975.326
Suez – Sinai: Return of the Big War Wall
The lightning Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbours radically
altered the geo-politics of the Levant by turning Israel into an unrivalled military
power in the region. Israel also expanded into the ‘West Bank’ of Jordan, the Golan
Heights (Syria), and the whole of Sinai (Egypt). The war was fought conventionally,
more in keeping with the concept of a ‘big’ war. The opponents were highly
mechanized and they all had artillery and modern air forces.
After the war, the newly occupied territories gave Israel a geographic spread of three
times its pre-war area, and provided it with ‘new boundaries… thought to form the
strategic enclosure that would buttress the defence of the state’. In line with this, there
were ‘frenzied and varied attempts at studying and domesticating these territories
from within and efforts to fortify their edges against counter-attack from the
outside’.327 Israel was intent on fortifying its new, enlarged borders – it was only a
question of how.
Through its own tactical inertia in the Six day War, the Israeli army fought its way to,
and occupied the east bank of the Suez Canal, a formidable barrier in itself to any
further military advances from Egypt. Although the decision was not unanimous, the
Israeli premier wanted to keep the canal and even close it to shipping, with the aim of
forcing the Egyptians to sign a peace treaty favourable to Israel. It was also proposed
325
Beckett 2010: 176-178.
Beckett 2010: 188-190.
327
Weizman 2007: 57.
326
108
that the east bank of the canal be fortified with a series of strongholds that could
withstand continual artillery fire. These evolved, during the War of Attrition with
Egypt (1968-71), into an immense barrier system328 – the Bar Lev Line – which
became operational in 1969.
At the base of the barrier was the entirety of the Suez Canal, stretching approximately
200 kilometres from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez, and described as ‘one of
the best anti-tank ditches in the world’.329 Above it, Israeli military engineers
mustered that earth-moving stalwart – the bulldozer – to carve out and fashion a new,
linear, monumental landscape above the east bank of the waterway. This was a great
earthen rampart, up to 25 metres high, that rose form the water’s edge at an angle of
45 to 65 degrees,330 peppered with landmines and fronted with barbed wire.331 Such a
singular moulding of the face of the earth for military purposes had probably not been
undertaken since the digging of the great trench systems of the First World War, and it
would not be surpassed until the construction of the Moroccan berms in Western
Sahara. Behind this barrier, and incorporated within it were forts, called Maozim
(Hebrew for ‘castle keep’). Thirty-one were planned, but only seventeen were
constructed.332 Their sizes averaged out at 200 metres by 350 metres.333 They were
surrounded by barbed wire entanglements and land mines, and internally, they had
accommodation blocks, medical facilities, ammunition stores, observation posts,
command bunkers, mortar and anti-aircraft positions. Their traces were delineated by
sandbagged entrenchments which could be covered, and these included weapons
firing pits and machine gun bunkers.334 The forts were supposed to be spaced every
ten kilometres or so, with their garrisons being able to observe about half that distance
during the day, thereby covering all of the ground between them. But night time was a
problem, since the supplied electronic sensors proved unreliable.335
328
Weizman 2007: 59-60.
Gawrych 1996: 16.
330
Gawrych 1996: 16.
331
Dunstan 2008: 19.
332
Dunstan, 2008: 17 & 27 (map).
333
Gawrych 1996: 16.
334
Dunstan 2008: 16-17 & 22-23 (ill.).
335
Sterling 2009: 281.
329
109
In 1969, Arial Sharon (Chief of the Israeli Southern Command) reinforced the line
with an additional network of inland strong points, Taozim (to be differentiated from
Maozim), around 12 kilometres east of the canal, and disposed on tactically important
hills. Each semi-independent stronghold was able to support its neighbours, and they
were supplemented by mobile troops, tank battalions, and the Israeli air force. The
plan also included the creation of an expanded network of link roads. Again, the
bulldozer was put into action, and the desert was carved up into a militarised space.
‘The western Sinai Desert was fashioned by Sharon into a future battlefield, and the
desert seemed to Sharon to be perfect for this; it contained military installations,
bases, roads and minefields, with no civilians to disturb the war game’.336
The Bar Lev line appeared indestructible during the War of Attrition when it came
under nearly daily Egyptian bombardment, and no positions were evacuated or
irreparably damaged. The line only fell during the October War of 1973 by the failure
of the Israelis to keep it maintained and properly manned, and by the ingenuity of the
Egyptian military. The Egyptians successfully crossed the canal in an amphibious
assault. They broke their way through the great earthen bank of the line by carving out
gaps with high pressure water hoses, fed from the canal by high capacity pumps.
These eroded the 20 metre high sand banks into slurry, in gaps that were then neatly
bulldozed clear, allowing the Egyptians to successfully attack and over run all of the
Maozim. The Egyptians won the battle for the Bar Lev line, but in the end, the Israelis
held on to most of Sinai. They quickly moved enough troops and armour up to the
canal, and succeeded in preventing the different prongs of the Egyptian attack from
consolidating their front. At the end of hostilities, the Egyptians occupied most of the
east bank of the canal, while the Israelis succeeded in crossing it and occupying a
small part of ‘Africa’ in Egypt.337
Summary
This chapter has presented a brief introduction to the land and people of Western
Sahara. It has also explored some of the ways in which colonial spaces – both Spanish
336
Weizman 2007: 64-68.
For succinct descriptions of the Egyptian attack on the Bar Lev Line see Dunstan 2008: 46-55, and
Weizman 2007: 71-77
337
110
and Moroccan – have been shaped in Western Sahara, and it has given examples of
the ways in which spaces of colonialism and occupation elsewhere, particularly in the
context of conflict, have been carved out and shaped by the will of nations, armies and
individuals. The transfiguring of the earth can start quite simply in the digging up of
natural materials, for example mud, from which bricks can be made, or in the piling
up of stones, both of which can be used to create walls. With brute strength,
earthworks can be raised and trenches dug, but with the advent of earth moving
machines, whole landscapes could be altered relatively quickly. From the building of
desert outposts in the Sahara to the construction of the monumental Bar Lev Line,
land has been appropriated, contested and fought over. And in Western Sahara, there
exists the largest example of a fortified military barrier created in modern history – in
fact, probably the largest appropriation of land by bulldozer to date. By the very way
in which Morocco sought to regain territory lost to the Polisario up to 1980, through
the very sculpting of the earth to create a series of earth and stone walls, they
partitioned the very territory they appropriated. They constructed ‘the berm’ and
created a matrix of exclusion.
Frantz Fanon has pertinently written that, ‘the colonial world is a world divided into
compartments’.338 In the desert landscape of Western Sahara this is exemplified by the
‘Moroccan wall’ – ‘the berm’ – though more appropriately: ‘the berms’. Morocco’s
weakness in the face of Polisario fighters, especially after 1979, forced them to adopt
this extreme, defensive posture. They withdrew all of their garrisons and outposts up
into the northwest of the territory – taking in the Bou-Craa phosphate works, Smara,
and the capital El-Ayoun – into what became known as the ‘useful triangle’.339
Chapter 4 outlines the sequence of construction of Morocco’s berms – six in total, and
all constructed between 1980 and 1987. Its aim is to describe the materiality, and
shear monumentality of the walls, and their imprint on the desert landscape.
338
339
Fanon [1961] 1968: 37.
Hacene-Djaballah 1985: 105.
111
CHAPTER 4
TOWARDS AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE BERMS
Part 1
I had heard any number of stories about the wall, its size, its character and aspect, but
none of them prepared me for this cryptic blemish on the body of the desert. I had
imagined a structure that would be visible from a long way off; the bases situated…
along its length would surely dominate the landscape. The whole thing would rise out
of the desert, effortless and magisterial. But... it required hard work with the
binoculars and guidance from the local Polisario commander to pick out the defence
at all. In the event, it was a thin band of pallor standing out from the rest of the terrain,
which was darker by a shade. At the crest of a hill where the defence rose with the
contours of the land, there was a base, a wide circle of ground, paler still.340
Jeremy Harding
Studying the Moroccan Berms
The history of military defensive barriers in the 20th century, as outlined in Chapter 3,
clearly shows that Morocco’s adoption of a barrier defence was not a new one. But its
novelty has been in its size and monumentality. In six sweeping movements, the
Moroccans created, as already quoted from Hirst, a ‘spider’s web of earthworks’,
measuring approximately 4000 kilometres across virtually 80 percent of the territory
of Western Sahara. By mimicking the success of the Morice Line – incorporating
electronic surveillance – and by replacing barbed wire fencing with single and
multiple earthen banks, and incorporating extensive fields of landmines, the
Moroccans have set out to defend what they perceive as a large part of their national
territory, and to prevent the movement of people across space; to exclude one group of
people – Saharawi nationalists – from the settled areas of Moroccan occupied Western
Sahara. To this end, the berms have become an indelible, transfiguring inscription on
340
Harding 1993: 124-125.
112
the land, crossing great expanses of open desert, following the contours of mountains,
and cutting off wadi systems which would have been used as routeways, and as
pasturage, for millennia.
Morocco built its series of defensive barriers between August 1980 and April 1987.
Antecedents already existed defending El-Ayoun, Smara, Dakhla, Boujdour and the
phosphate works at Bou-Craa,341 but the success of Polisario in forcing Morocco to
withdraw from most of the territory, save the useful triangle (see Fig. 3.14), caused
them to develop the system even further, and to use the barriers as a means of clawing
back territory. According to a Polisario spokesman, Morocco conceived the idea of
building a barrier system from the Israelis,342 though advice on its construction
allegedly came from France and the United States as well.343
Throughout this matrix of earth and stone embankments, which can be up to 4 metres
in height,344 there are almost 2000 military installations. These include mural forts,
rear defence forts, fire support artillery bases, observation posts, mustering positions,
and garrison camps in the rear. There are anti-vehicular ditches, cordons of barbed
wire and mine fields. At least 120,000 Moroccan soldiers have manned the
defences.345 All mustered to keep at bay an estimated Saharawi force of 6000 Polisario
fighters346 whose main tactic has been the long range ghazi, though in the second half
of the twentieth century, a highly motorized one. In the light of this, and when
considering the massive efforts taken by the Moroccans to defend their occupied
territory, by using a ‘big war’ solution against ‘little war’ tactics, their efforts have
been highly disproportionate – like trying to swat a fly with a very large hammer.
Charting and Describing the Berms
The aim in this chapter is to come to an understanding of how, as military defences
and monuments, the barriers have left their mark on, and have partitioned, the Western
341
Pazzanita, 2006: 91. Zunes and Mundy also note the construction of defences around Dakhla
between 1982-1984, see their Map, p.7.
342
Muhammed Fadel, Interview.
343
Habua Breica, Interview.
344
Pazzanita 2006: 91-93.
345
Pazzanita 2006: 91-93.
346
Cordesman 2002: 90.
113
Saharan landscape, and concomitantly (continuing in Chapter 5) how people have
confronted them, both militarily and otherwise. It must be kept in mind that the
landscape of the barriers is still actively militarized – the barriers are still in use. Even
so, the berms have a material presence that can still be studied by a relatively
straightforward archaeological approach. But before I describe this, I will give an
overview of what is presently known about the berms through published maps and
written accounts. The purpose being to illustrate, as noted in Chapter 1, that the
renderings of the berms in the accounts of virtually all commentators on the Western
Sahara conflict are overly generalized, incomplete and inconsistent, and that the
materiality of the barriers has become obscured and marginalized. They have become
a taken for granted, while analysts have homed in on the geo-politics of the conflict.
As Buchli and Lucas might say, they have become ‘unconstituted’.
Studying the Berms – Published Maps
A small number of cartographic representations of the Moroccan berms, and the final
limit of the barrier demarcating the Moroccan occupied zone from the Polisario
controlled, ‘liberated’, zone exist in print and on the internet. Unfortunately, since
they are all generalisations, they do not represent the extent of the barriers in any way
that can be considered precise. For instance, the United Nations’ own map, posted on
the internet, does not show the barrier extending into Mauritanian territory at the
junction of the Western Saharan panhandle (Saguia Al-Hamra) and the southern two
thirds of the country (Rio D’Oro) thereby dividing the Polisario controlled zone in
two.347 However, this is more correctly shown by Land Mine Action (LMA), now
known as Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), on maps on their website, and in their
published documentation.348 Two of the more recently published maps showing all of
the berms are also very simplified. The first, by Zunes and Mundy in 2010,349 is
probably one of the better of any generalised, published map to date. It has been
compiled from a number of earlier sources, and although schematic, it clearly shows
all of the phases of the different barriers’ construction. It shows defences around
Dakhla, and it tries to show what it considers to be the full extent of the first barrier
347
MINURSO 2014.
AOAV 2008. Other relevant AOAV reports are available on their website at: http://aoav.org.uk/
accessed 4 April 2014.
349
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7.
348
114
through southern Morocco, and surrounding the useful triangle. However, it differs
markedly from the mapping compiled for this research.
The second, more recently published map, also in 2010, has been presented by San
Martin.350 Like the Zunes and Mundy map it shows the barrier encroaching on
Mauritanian territory, but its delineation of the first berm extends to the south of
Bojdour. This is contrary to the Zunes and Mundy map, which shows the western end
of the first barrier as situated north of Bojdour. Both maps show the second berm
extending to the south of Bojdour, while in an earlier map of 1985, Belkacem HaceneDjaballah351 shows the second barrier as an enclosure extending southeastwards from
the Smara to the Bou-Craa portion of the first berm. Although Hacene-Djaballah’s
map does not show the second barrier as encroaching into Mauritania, she shows it as
hugging the border, and thereby, still dividing the Polisario controlled zone in two. A
map published three years later, by Tusa,352 shows all of the barriers relatively clearly.
However, it does not show the barrier passing through Mauritania (though it hugs the
border), and it mistakenly shows one of the barriers as taking in Tifariti, which has
never been the case. All in all, one of the better maps of the Moroccan berms (though
still very schematic) was published in 2005, by Fuente Cobo and Mariño
Menéndez.353 Like the later Zunes and Mundy map, it shows the phasing of the
barriers quite clearly, but it still does not show the barriers as definitively encroaching
on Mauritanian territory, nor does it include the Dakhla defences.
One thing is certain, and that is that the maps readily available for Western Sahara,
showing the partitioning of the country, are essentially sketch maps, and they must be
viewed as such. Only a more detailed mapping of the barrier system will allow its
faithful description. Even written depictions of the berms are inadequate since they are
usually short, and highly generalized. Some of these accounts are described below.
Studying the Berms – Written Accounts
When describing the Moroccan berms, almost all commentators agree that they
include single, and/or multiple sand, or earth and stone embankments, that there are
350
San Martin 2010: xiv.
Hacene-Djaballah, 1985: 177.
352
Tusa 1988: 41.
353
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez 2005: 105.
351
115
minefields in front of the barriers with cordons of barbed wire, that forts are disposed
along the walls, that there are artillery installations, and that electronic sensors (radar
and the like) are deployed. Such a summary description was provided by Wenger, in
1982, when writing about Morocco’s first berm from the Zini Mountains to BouCraa.354 However, it is in the details about the barriers’ construction and make up
where most writers dealing with the Western Sahara disagree, and present conflicting
and contradictory information.
Hodges’ account of 1983, though like Wenger’s, added a height dimension for the
berms – up to three yards – and he also pointed out the presence of Moroccan army
reserves stationed behind the barriers with the potential to repel Polisario attacks.355
The first barrier securing the useful triangle, was portrayed by Damis as ‘Morocco’s
Great Wall’. He described it as seven feet high and fronted by a ditch, around twentythree feet wide. Besides barbed wire, mines, and ‘special’ radar, he noted that the
barrier’s observation posts and ‘fortified bases of operations’ were disposed
differentially according to the lie of the land. Once a sizable portion of the barrier was
built, the Moroccans added further fortifications to it. Damis also described the berm
as an ‘anti-vehicular sand barrier’ and a ‘trap for vehicles’, and pointed out that if
Polisario succeeded in breaking through the barrier, it would inhibit their fast escape
back across it. The barrier was constructed with bulldozers, protected by the
Moroccan Army’s mobile, ‘Zallaqa’ brigade.356
‘A great wall of sand’ is how Lewis described the berms in 1985. Besides the mines
and regularly placed sensing devices, ‘artillery units were deployed at critical
locations, small forts were interspersed, and mobile columns were stationed at main
centres to reinforce units located at or near the wall’.357 According to Dean, the
Moroccans referred to their defences, as a ceinture, a ‘belt’. Besides fortified
positions, mines and radar posts, there were strong points with ‘mobile reaction units,
and… quick access to air power based at El-Ayoun’.358 Seddon, in 1987, specifically
noted some of the architectural elements associated with the berms, in particular,
354
Wenger 1982: 22-26 & 30.
Hodges 1983: 289.
356
Damis, 1983: 97-98.
357
Lewis 1985: 129-130.
358
Dean 1986: 46.
355
116
‘artillery placements and observation posts.., protective dug-outs’, and ‘elaborate
underground quarters for the troops’ manning the barrier along its entire length.359
Visiting the Polisario controlled zone in 1986, Harding expected to see a barrier made
up of formidable, concrete forts, visible over fifty miles or so. But when he actually
saw the wall, he could only make out a low-lying, pale strip of ground in the distance.
The forts, which he had heard so much about, appeared only like ‘a wide circle of
ground, lighter in colour than the rest of the wall’.360 However, in the region east of
Smara, Harding presented a more detailed, ground level view of the wall:
It consisted of two sand-and-rubble parapets, three to four metres high, one behind the
other. These were separated by an alley where mobile artillery and armoured
personnel carriers could be deployed. Every twenty miles or so was a base, between
the bases a series of alarm-points, each with roughly forty men. On the other side of
the wall there were larger bases with still more troops. The radar and the sophisticated
surveillance equipment were said to be sited on the wall itself, with the ground
sensors in front. In some sections there was a barbed wire terrace and a random
scattering of land-mines.361
Brazier, visiting Tifariti in 1998, got close to the berm and described it literally as a
one and a half metres high ‘pile of rubble’. Polisario informed him that there were
Moroccan bases placed at five kilometre intervals, with 80 to 90 soldiers each, and
there were ‘watch posts’ positioned halfway between them. There were mine fields in
front and behind the barriers, and Moroccan soldiers passed through the rear
minefields along throughways referred to as ‘bridges’ by his Polisario informants.362
Cordesman referred to the Moroccan berms as ‘Hassan’s Walls’.363 He described the
barriers as two metres high, with barbed wire and mines. The Moroccan army manned
‘over 300 strong points on and behind the wall’, and these were supported by ‘mobile
desert strike units, firebases, attack helicopters and air support forces, and 20 ground
359
Seddon 1987: 105.
Harding 1989: 21.
361
Harding 1989: 25.
362
Brazier 2009.
363
Jane’s Defence Weekly 1989: 182, cited in Cordesman 2002
360
117
surveillance radar bases and other sensors’.364 In 2004, Forced Migration Online
described the berms as having an estimated one to two million anti-tank and antipersonnel mines with 100,000 to 200,000 troops manning the barrier. They also noted
240 heavy artillery units stationed every ten kilometres or so along the barrier, and all
equipped with ‘sophisticated surveillance equipment’.365
The Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara described the berms as two parallel lines
of embankments, around three to four metres high, and bulldozed out of the earth.
They included parking areas and revetments for Moroccan armour and artillery, along
with ‘foxholes and trenches’ for the troops, and with barbed wire and other obstacles
fronting the barriers. The Dictionary uses the term ‘blockhouse’ (postes avancés) to
describe positions manned by 600 to 800 troops, and positioned at approximate ten
kilometre intervals along the wall, with further detachments of 100 to 200 troops
positioned in sonnettes every three to four kilometres between them.366 The numbers
of soldiers noted here, as manning the individual fortifications, is markedly different
from the smaller numbers quoted by both Harding and Brazier.
Laschi notes the barrier as being three metres high by two metres wide, with its main
protection made up of ‘circular forts’ with garrisons of approximately 200 troops. On
either side of these there are smaller forts with around twenty soldiers each. The
minefield fronting the berm is described as extending 400 metres, while ‘behind the
wall, at a distance of 5-6 km, there are artillery units, a dense network of radar
screens, armoured vehicles, jeeps and all the equipment necessary for the
reinforcement divisions’.367
The latest description of Morocco’s ‘great wall’ is by Zunes and Mundy. They state
that in 1981 ‘Polisario reported that it had engaged Moroccan forces constructing a
large “earthwork defense system.” During the fight, the SPLA blew up several
364
Cordesman 2002: 61-62.
Smith 2004.
366
Pazzanita, 2006: 92-93. The use of term ‘blockhouse’ is anachronistic in relation to the Moroccan
berms. In terms of defensive military structures, they have a very specific meaning, bearing no
resemblance to the mural forts (or postes avancés, ie., advance posts or forward posts) positioned along
the Moroccan barriers. The term sonnettes (literally meaning bells or alarms, and matching well with
Hardings’ description of ‘alarm-points’ ), presumably refers to the smaller forts, or ‘fortlets’, positioned
between the larger mural forts.
367
Laschi 2009: 140.
365
118
“earthmoving machines” that were digging a double-walled trench’.368 They go on to
describe the wall in very generalised terms, just stating that its earth and stone
embankments are three to six feet high, and that they are topped with barbed wire, and
heavily mined on the Polisario side. Besides ‘sophisticated electronic sensing
devices’, it is ‘guarded by an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Moroccan soldiers, either
in frontal guard positions or in rapid-reaction bases’.369
The summaries presented above, represent the type of baseline data about the berms
that most commentators and analysts rely upon and employ. Obviously, the authors
are not interested in the material manifestations of the Western Sahara conflict, but
instead, with the geo-political history and machinations of the hostile parties, their
allies and supporters, so perhaps, more precise descriptions of the Moroccan walls
should not be expected. Also, their accounts may only reflect the quality of their
sources. Nevertheless, a thorough understanding of the materiality of the conflict is
not well served by this insufficiency of detail. The partitioning of Western Sahara is a
prime determinant inscribed on the land in the contested space of the territory, and the
study and characterisation of the Moroccan barrier system – the berms – requires
better descriptions, analyses, and improved mapping. This chapter, and the next, shall
amend this, and it will do so by looking at the berms with an archaeological
sensibility, as artefacts on the land. And in keeping with the tenets of an archaeology
of the present, this dissertation will retrieve them from the periphery, and bring them
back into focus. To draw upon Gonzáles-Ruibal, they will become ‘unconcealed’.
A ‘Virtual’ Survey of the Berms
If one could walk up to the barrier that is now the definitive dividing line between the
Moroccan controlled part of Western Sahara and the Polisario’s liberated zone, and if
it were a ruin – like any traditionally conceived archaeological feature – then it could
be measured, surveyed, its disposition in the landscape could be assessed, and its
constituent parts could be studied and recorded. All of this data could be collated and
put into a GIS and interrogated in an attempt to understand its growth and distributed
characteristics, its placement in the landscape, its workings as both an offensive and
368
369
Africa Confidential, 1 July 1981, cited in Zunes and Mundy 2010: 20.
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 21.
119
defensive barrier, and as a manifestation of political control writ large across an entire
country. But this is not the case. Land mines are distributed in front of the barrier, it is
manned by military garrisons, and there are strict terms governing access to the barrier
laid down by the United Nations ceasefire agreement of 1991. Also, as linear features,
all of the barriers extend over a total of approximately 4,000 kilometers. An
archaeology at such a macro scale requires a bird’s eye view – some form of remote
sensing – and aerial photography or satellite imagery is unquestionably required. By
drawing upon the archaeological examples cited in Chapter 2, the berms can be
‘virtually’ surveyed as distinct entities, and groups of entities in the landscape. To this
end Google Earth has been employed, and through its use this dissertation probably
represents the first ever archaeological analysis of a complex of features – the berms –
at such a countrywide scale.
Google Earth provides both high and low-resolution satellite imagery for Western
Sahara. The disposition of all of the berms, and associated features, can be seen on
both types of coverage, but there are many instances on the low-resolution imagery
where details are poorly defined. Therefore, the imagery that can be used most
effectively is the high resolution Digital Globe (and/or Geo-Eye) imagery which has
sub-metre resolution per pixel, but which only covered, at the beginning of this
research in 2010, an estimated 10 to 15 percent of the country (see Fig. 4.1).370 This is
not viewed as a problem, since it would be an overwhelming task to attempt to study
the entirety of the berms. In fact, the limited coverage of the country by high
resolution imagery acts as something akin to a clustered sampling mechanism,
allowing a practicable portion of the berms to be studied, and for generalisations to be
made from appropriately selected locations.
With Google Earth as a base, it is very easy to plot the disposition of all of Morocco’s
barriers across Western Sahara (Fig. 4.2 shows the general disposition of the different
berms with Google Earth imagery as a backdrop, while Fig. 4.3 shows the berms
overlaying a Spanish military map of 1960371). The method for charting the
370
Clarke and Brooks, in press.
Servicio Geográfico del Ejército de España 1960. This 1:2,000,000 scale map was produced in two
sheets between 1958 and 1960, based on surveys by the Spanish military between 1943 and 1949
(Rodriguez Esteban 2011).
371
120
delineations, or ‘traces’, of the berms is very straightforward. Google Earth has a line
drawing facility, called a ‘path’ tool, and by selecting it a line can be drawn
(digitised), and properties can be ascribed to it. Every plotted line segment was given
a unique numeric (or alphanumeric) designation, and a very brief, one or two word
description, usually noting whether or not a berm was single, double, or multiple
embanked, and/or with additional configurations of multiple banks (see Fig. 4.4).
Additional qualitative observations were also added in some instances. The traces
created in Google Earth were saved as Google Earth KML files, and they were
imported into the free, open source GIS, Quantum GIS (QGIS). Once imported, they
were converted into ‘shape’ files – the commonest file format in GISs. The length of
each trace could also be tabulated in the GIS, and the total length of all of the berms
(excluding the defences around Dakhla and the earlier defences around Smara and
Bou-Craa) came to 3822 kilometres. Of course, the barrier system is not complete.
Natural features are incorporated, as for example, in the mountainous region north of
Guelta Zemmour. Here the barrier consists of forts and artillery bases only, positioned
amidst the hills and troughs of a naturally interdigitated terrain. The lengths of such
un-walled sections, undoubtedly boosts the overall length of all of the territorial
barriers to over 4000 kilometres.
Once the linear traces of the berms were digitised, the forts and other fortifications,
and installations, had to be plotted, also in Google Earth. This was done with Google
Earth’s ‘place mark’ tool. The position of each installation was marked, and described
by a code representing its type, based on a visual inspection. The ‘types’ of forts and
installations included; mural forts; forts in the rear; mural forts with integral firebases;
mural forts with firebases subsequently added; small mural forts (described as
fortlets); small occupied positions (specific to Berm No. 4),372 non-mural fire support
bases; non-mural, and mural compounds; and garrisons or camps set behind the berms
and usually without a defensive enclosure. Not all of the features associated with the
barriers were plotted, such as individual artillery gun pits and vehicular, or ‘tank’
slots, and small bastion like positions (under 50m in size) found along some parts of
372
These could be described as very small fortlets, and they are very numerous on that part of Berm No.
4 facing the Algerian border. Because of their number, they have only been recorded in the sampling
square selected for detailed recording close to Algeria, to indicate how they contribute to the Moroccan
defensive scheme.
121
the berms, usually without internal features.373 The table in Fig. 4.5 provides basic
descriptive information on the types of installations recorded (with their descriptive
codes). This simple plotting by type was then imported into QGIS, and converted to
shape files. Longitude and latitude coordinates were also generated. This ‘virtual’
survey has recorded at least 1,820 military installations on, or associated with the
Moroccan barriers. Nevertheless, the plots created of the berms and their associated
installations should not be presumed to be exhaustive. The low resolution Google
Earth imagery can appear unfocussed in places, making it hard to discern the details of
features. There is also the possibility of human error, whereby some features or
installations have simply been missed out during the plotting process.
‘Snapshooting’ the Berms
With Western Sahara traversed by thousands of kilometres of barriers, and with close
to 2000 associated military installations – many of which could share the same
characteristics – a practical way of illustrating and describing the barriers, through
samples, or ‘snapshots’, had to be devised. The first notion was to compile an
expanded inventory of all of the features associated with the berms, based on the
original digitisations from Google Earth, but only in those areas covered by highresolution imagery. This proved too time consuming, and it soon became obvious that
it would create data far above the needs of this dissertation as it is structured. As a
result, a sampling strategy was devised incorporating grided sample areas – rectangles
– measuring twenty-five kilometres east to west, by twenty-eight kilometres north to
south.374 Only those rectangles, located over Google Earth’s high resolution imagery,
and including the berms were then selected, and out of them, a 50 percent random
sample was made, along with some purposively selected deletions and additions. This
resulted in a total of up to 22 rectangles from which descriptive examples, as
‘snapshots’, of the berms and associated installations could be selected (see Fig.
373
Essentially, this project has limited itself to the recording of easily identifiable and distinct
defensive, offensive, and support entities. To additionally record the many, and various, small features
distributed behind and along the berms, would demand an extensive research dissertation of its own. In
the light of this, it has to be kept in mind that an analysis of the Moroccan berms is only one consituent
part of this research.
374
These are average dimensions, since the dimensions of the rectangles, both longitudinally and
latitudinally were set using decimal degrees, and as such, the dimensions of the rectangles vary from
north to south on the globe.
122
4.6).375 Such examples of Google Earth, high-resolution imagery of berm lengths and
installations, taken from these sample areas are incorporated throughout Parts 1 and 2
of this chapter. These ‘snapshots’ are integral to the text, and they clearly illustrate the
materiality of the berms in a surprisingly direct way. GIS examples, or ‘snapshots’,
generated in QGIS, have also been based on, and around, the randomly selected
sampling rectangles, and they too illustrate this chapter.
Additional Cartography
Besides Google Earth, and as already noted above, Spanish military mapping from
1960 has been employed in this research. Although the scale is only 1:2,000,000 it has
been very useful in providing names of places and natural features, and in clearly
illustrating the topography of the territory. Some Soviet Russian mapping has been
consulted too, and used as background mapping. Russian maps were produced during
the Cold War for many of the landmasses on the planet, and the coverage for Western
Sahara is of a reasonable quality.376 French mapping of 1945, republished by the
United States military,377 has also been occasionally consulted, but only for
comparative purposes with the Spanish mapping.
Chronology and Outline Descriptions of the Territorial Berms
Disposition of Berm No. 1
Writing in 1979, John Mercer noted:
Moroccan energies, after the initial phase [of the conflict], were concentrated on
defence fortification, the main posts being ringed with concentric trenching and
375
These rectangular ‘snapshot’ areas were created, numbered and randomly selected in QGIS. Their
numeric designations are: 28*, 62*, 92*, 100, 124, 126, 157, 187, 215, 221*, 248, 359, 482, 491, 520,
549, 553, 583, 850, 853, 854, 952**. Rectangles numbers with ‘*’ represent those that were
additionally, and purposively, selected to cover regions not included in the initial random sample of
rectangles, and 952** is a rectangle that was manually positioned over berm four, in Morocco, near the
border with Algeria. There are instances where the randomly selected rectangles lay only partially over
Google Earth high resolution imagery. Where this has occurred, as in the case of Berm No. 2 (and for
part of Berm No. 1) its sampled ‘snapshot’ has been taken outside of the nearby rectangles (see Fig.
4.11).
376
The full range of available Russian Soviet mapping for Western Sahara, produced between 1980 and
1987 (as noted on individual map sheets), is available at: http://mapstor.com/map-sets/countrymaps/western-sahara.html. It should be noted, however, that the berms do not appear on the maps. This
suggests, and it would not be surprising, that the data for the maps was compiled prior to the
commencement of the building of the berms.
377
U.S. Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, 1958.
123
barbed wire. From time to time a large contingent crosses the open desert, either on a
supply run or to help another post under siege by the Sahrawis. For these Moroccan
troops, now comparatively aware of the true nature of the conflict, the war, like the
desert, must appear, endless, barren, difficult to survive: they have every reason to
think back with bitterness of their fervour during the ‘victory [Green] march’.378
With the precedent of large defended areas already established, at Smara and BouCraa, the Moroccans embarked in August 1980 on the construction of its first
defensive territorial barrier – Berm No. 1. The aim of this wall was to defend Smara,
El-Ayoun and Bou-Craa, and to exclude Polisario fighters from the northwest corner
of Western Sahara – the ‘useful triangle’. The barrier was built in two phases. The
first phase, Part 1 (from Jebel Zini to Bou-Craa), started at the southern end of the
Jebel Zini massif, at the western end of the Ouarkziz Mountains, south-southwest of
Tan-Tan, and around 140 kilometres east-southeast of Tarfaya (Cape Juby). The
barrier extended southwards into Western Sahara territory and its first stretch reached
Smara by March 2nd 1981. It was extended to Bou-Craa by May 11th of the same
year, where it linked up with the Phosphate works’ earlier perimeter defences that led
to the coast, southwest of El-Ayoun. The second phase of the barrier, Part 2 (from
Bou-Craa to the Atlantic), was completed by May 1982 with the berm reaching the
sea south of Bojdour.379
Zunes and Mundy have presented the first berm as initially extending from Zag, close
to Morocco’s border with Algeria, where a salient of defences was created in May
1980, just two months prior to the commencement of the barrier southwards from
Jebel Zini.380 It includes the southern escarpment of the Ouarkziz Mountains, upon
which (according to Google Earth imagery), there are no defences of any kind. Tusa,
and Laschi, also consider the very first berm as extending across the Ouarkziz
Mountains from Zag, but it is the intention here to treat Berm No. 1 as only starting
from Jebel Zini, in line with the majority of the published accounts already
summarised, of which Zunes and Mundy, Laschi, and Tusa are the only exceptions.381
378
Mercer 1979: 12.
Seddon, 1987: 105 and Hodges 1983: 289-290
380
Hodges, 1983: 288-289.
381
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7, Laschi 2009: 139, and Tusa 1988: 40-41.
379
124
Berm No.1 – the first of the territorial berms – is shown in Fig. 4.7. Part 1 of the
barrier (as already noted) starts on low ground beneath the southwest end of the Jebel
Zini massif, at an elevation of around 230 metres. Above it is the spur-like Ras elKhanfra, where there are forts, enclosures and fire support bases.
Running southwards to Smara (around 110 kilometres away), the barrier rises to the
300 metre382 contour to which it more or less clings, overlooking the Gaat Chbabien
depression, at least 100 metres lower, and to the east. The 300 metre contour
delineates a relatively level area that slopes downwards to the west, and at its southern
end, the berm drops towards the Saguia al-Hamra, at an elevation of just over 150
metres, around 15 kilometres north of Smara. The Saguia al-Hamra marks the
northern limits of the earlier Moroccan defences surrounding the city, made up of two,
though incomplete, defensive traces. When the berm reaches the Saguia, it partly turns
to the west for a very short distance, to align with an extension to the earlier Smara
defences. A gap is preserved between the two, presumably to allow the Saguia to
drain. But at this point, along the northern bank of the Saguia, the barrier’s main
course continues east-southeast across it (though leaving another gap for drainage)
creating a convex, easterly salient around Smara and its earlier defences. At around 19
kilometres south-southeast of Smara, the barrier turns west-southwest, and an
extension of it heads backwards, in a northeasterly direction, to join up with the earlier
defences.
The berm, southwest of Smara, arcs southwards cutting across an undulating terrain. It
heads towards Bou-Craa, and joins up with the earlier perimeter embankments
delineating the phosphate works. The Bou-Craa perimeter was not well defended, and
the trace is mainly a single earthen bank with no substantial strong points. Google
Earth imagery makes it appear much more like a simple earthen boundary bank, rather
than a defendable bulwark. Summary statistics for Part 1 of Berm No.1 are shown in
Fig. 4.8.
Part 2 of the barrier starts at approximately 35 kilometres east-northeast of Bou-Craa,
as an extension out of the south flank of the Part 1 berm. It descends southwesterly
382
References to heights above sea level should not be considered as absolute values. They are taken
either from Google Earth or Soviet mapping.
125
again, cutting across wadis and keeping to the high ground where it can. Where it
resumes a west-northwesterly route, it keeps to the watershed between two wadis
before it drops into the north-south Wadi El Jat, then climbs onto the southern, portion
of the Izik plateau. It actually reaches an embayment in the plateau, and its steep sides
are incorporated into the barrier as a natural feature, though supplemented by cliff-top
forts. There are also, further trench and berm constructions at the northern end of the
embayment.
The berm heads west-southwest across a north-south strip of sand dune country, and
gradually follows the downward sloping terrain, towards the sea. The berm
incorporates the Sabkhat Aridal as a natural barrier, and then resumes its course to the
coast, around 28 kilometres south of Bojdour. At 15 kilometres from the coast, it
bifurcates. A short westerly extension has been added as a secondary barrier,
terminating at the coast 10 kilometres north of the original berm. Summary statistics
for Part 2 of Berm No.1 are shown in Fig. 4.9.
Fig. 4.10 tabulates the basic elements for the whole of Berm No. 1. Made up of single,
double and multiple configurations of embankments (as illustrated in Fig. 4.7), its
overall length from Jebel Zinni to the Atlantic is 634 kilometres. It is striking that 74%
of the barrier is made up of single earthen embankments, while natural barriers
account for 16%, leaving 10% made up of double and multiple configurations of
embankments. As Fig. 4.7 indicates, there are double and multiple embankments
along the ‘front’ of the Smara salient (27 kilometres in length), while there is another
double embanked section of 13 kilometres between Bou-Craa and Smara, and another
double and multiple embanked section overlooking the Gaat Chbabien, at 23
kilometres in length. As a broad indicator of density of military installations along and
behind the entirety of Berm No.1, and excluding the installations constructed at an
earlier date in and around Smara, there is one installation for every two kilometre of
built (and natural) barrier.383
383
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1 at 634 kms (including natural barriers) from Jebel
Zinni to the Atlantic coast, divided by the total number of installations, numbering 325, resulting in a
density of one installation for every 1.95 km of barrier.
126
Forts (ft), fortlets (flt), forts with an integrated firebase (ftfb), and forts with an added
firebase (ftfba) which are all situated on the barrier itself, or adjacent, account for 66%
of all of the installations associated with Berm No. 1. They number 220 in total and
their density along the berm amounts to one fortified mural installation for every 2.9
kilometres.384 Fire support bases (fsb) in the rear, number 40 in all, and their density
works out at one firebase for every 15.9 kilometres of barrier.385
GIS snapshots illustrating how these installations are disposed along Berm No. 1 are
shown in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12. The first, Fig. 4.11 (showing rectangles 124 and 157
from Fig. 4.6), illustrates the Smara salient and includes a part of Berm No. 2. The
overwhelming majority of mural installations are forts (ft) with numerous fire support
bases (fsb) in the rear. Also, there are forts in the rear (rft), relatively close to the
barrier. That portion of Berm No. 1 in rectangle 215, shown in Fig. 4.12, is close to
the Atlantic, and crosses flat open desert. This is in stark contrast to the hilly terrain of
the Smara salient. The installations along the berm in Fig. 4.12 are mainly fortlets (flt)
with some mural forts (ft), and mural forts with firebases (ftfb and/or ftfba). It is the
difference in terrain, the predominance of fortlets, and the lack of firebases (fsb) in the
rear that differentiate this section of Berm No. 1 from that portion defending the
Smara salient. Though it should not be a surprise that Smara was, and still is, heavily
defended.
Disposition of Berm No. 2
In December 1983,386 construction began on a second barrier, Berm No.2 (see Fig.
4.13). It was completed in January 1984.387 The barrier began close to a mural fort
with a firebase attached, at around 23 kilometres southeast of Bou-Craa. With the fort
being on slightly high ground, at around 250 metres, the new wall drops slightly, then
steadily, towards the Mauritanian frontier to the east-southeast. Just before crossing
the border, the barrier splits in two, creating a polygon, at around 400 metres in
elevation and situated on a northern extension of the Guelta Zemmour massif. The
polygon joins up with a mural fort just inside Mauritanian territory, where there is also
384
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1, at 634 kms, divided by 220 fortified mural
installations, resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.9 kms of barrier.
385
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.1, at 634 kms, divided by 40 firebases, resulting in a
density of one installation for every 15.9 kms of barrier.
386
Seddon 1987: 107.
387
UPES 2008.
127
a break through the berm. To the east of the fort, the berm splits again, incorporating
north-south ridges of the Guelta Zemmour massif, at an elevation of about 460 metres.
Still in Mauritanian territory, the barrier proceeds due east, over north to south
alternating hills and wadis, dropping from a height of approximately 430 metres to
about 350 metres above sea level into a wadi, where it then extends northwards at
around 390 metres elevation. The barrier crosses the Mauritanian frontier back into
Western Sahara where a mural fort is situated, and then proceeds northwards,
following the contours on the high ground along the west bank of the Wadi Uein
Terghit (Terguet), running at an average elevation of just over 350 metres. At 37
kilometres south-southeast of Smara, north of Amgala, the berm drops down (almost
100 metres) to follow the watershed of a ridge running parallel with the Wadi Uein
Terghit. The barrier, running to the northeast, creates a salient, around 40 kilometres
due east of Smara, and follows the wadi to the northwest where the barrier then
crosses the Wadi Lejcheibi, a tributary to the Saguia Al-Hamra. The Wadi Lejcheibi
lies at an elevation of approximately 200 metres, and from there, the berm extends
north-northwest, rising up and then dropping to under 200 metres elevation at the
Saguia Al-Hamra. Crossing the Saguia, the north-northwest course of the barrier
continues with the berm descending along the south most reaches of the Gaat
Chbabien, then rises up to the first berm, joining it at a mural fort east of the area of
Khreibichat.
The table in Fig. 4.14 summarises the basic statistics for Berm No. 2. Of its 357
kilometre length, 66% of it consists of a single embanked barrier, with the remaining
34% made up of double and multiple embankments along with multiple
configurations of barriers. With, on average, 202 military installations associated with
the barrier, there is one installation for every 1.8 kilometres of berm. Where the
barrier extends through Mauritania (see Fig. 4.13), it is made up of mixed sections of
double
(or
multiple)
embankments,
and
single
embankments.
Continuing
northeastwards, there are also alternating sections of double, multiple, and single
embankments overlooking the Wadi Uein Terghit, and where the wall runs parallel to
the Smara salient, it is again made up of double, or multiple arrangements of
embankments (see Fig 4.13). This overall stretch of wall (from just south of the
Mauritanian frontier to where Berm No.2 is joined by Berm No.3 at the Wadi
128
Lejcheibi) is 137 kilometres long with only 28 kilometres made up of single
embankments. Mural forts (ft) and fortlets (flt) account for 65 % of all of the
installations associated with Berm No.2. They number 132 in total and their density
along the barrier amounts to one fortified mural installation for every 2.7 kilometres of
built barrier.388 There are 24 fire support bases behind the barrier, making up 12% of
all of the installations associated with it, and their relatively regular distribution
averages out at one firebase for every 14.9 kilometres.389 There are no firebase come
fort variations on the berm itself.
A GIS snapshot of Berm No. 2 is shown in Fig. 4.11. It illustrates a sample
distribution of the installations on the barrier along the Smara salient (just to the east
of rectangles 124 and 157 from Fig. 4.6). It almost mirrors the disposition of
installations along Berm No. 1 which it superseded. The two berms, along with the
earlier concentric defences around Smara, with all of their combined fire support
bases, illustrate the effort that was made to defend Smara, a city between 30 and 40
kilometres from the Polisario controlled, liberated zone.
Disposition of Berm No. 3
Like the second berm, Berm No.3 was constructed within two months, from April to
May 1984.390 The aim of this barrier (see Fig. 4.15) was to defend the southern border
of Morocco with Western Sahara, and to diagonally cut across the Western Sahara
panhandle taking in the former Spanish posts of Echdeiria and Hausa. The barrier
starts at the southern, upper lip of the depression in which the Moroccan town of Zag
is situated, 32 kilometres from the border with Western Sahara, to the south. The rim
of the Zag depression had earlier fortifications, including intermittant berms and forts,
and fire support bases (and as already mentioned, Zunes and Mundy, Laschi and Tusa,
have considered these features part of the first Moroccan berm391).
388
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.2, at 357 kms, divided by the total of 130 forts and 2
fortlets (that is 132 fortified mural installations), resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.7
kms of barrier.
389
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.2, at 357 kms, divided by 24 firebases, resulting in a
density of one installation for every 14.9 kms of barrier.
390
UPES 2008.
391
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 7, Laschi 2009: 139, and Tusa 1988.
129
The berm heads southwest at an average elevation of just over 500 metres, starting out
as a double embanked barrier (for 26 kilometres) until it gets within around eight
kilometres of the Western Sahara border. Thereafter it consists of a single
embankment running for 142 kilometres across open hamada desert, until it reaches
the greater valley system of the Saguia al-Hamra. Here, the berm terminates on an
escarpment overlooking the Wadi Mesuar, a parallel and tributary wadi running to the
north of the Saguia. The escarpment is approximately 200 metres higher than the wadi
system, and its precipitousness has allowed the barrier to consist of only a string of
forts, running in a west-northwesterly direction, for fifty-two kilometres (southwest of
Echdeiria). Less than a kilometre south of the most westerly fortification along the
escarpment (and at an elevation around 130 metres lower), the berm resumes, with
double and multiple embankments on a south-southwesterly course, crossing a broad
expanse of the Wadi Mesuar before crossing the Saguia al-Hamra, and then heading
almost due south to an escarpment overlooking the Wadi Dirt and the Wadi Leicheibi.
The escarpment is the better part of 50 metres above the Wadi Leicheibi, and the
barrier turns westward meeting up with Berm No. 2 at a mural fort where the Wadi
Leicheibi joins another wadi (the Wadi Uein Terghit), which drains into the Saguia alHamra. The length of the barrier from where it resumed, until joining up with Berm
No. 2, is 118 kilometres, with only three kilometres consisting of a single embanked
barrier.
The berm along the top of the escarpment over looking the Wadis Dirt and Leicheibi
is very complex. It hugs the heights, following every twist, inlet and turn. It mainly
has double and multiple configurations of embankments, and in many instances, they
are also designed to cut off the lower reaches of the myriad natural embayments that
mark out the high ground (for an example of such barriers see Fig. 4.52). Fifteen
percent of the barrier is made up by the natural obstacle of the escarpment over the
Wadi Mesuar, while 43% of the barrier consists of a single embankment. Double and
multiple embanked barriers, and those with multiple configurations of banks make up
42% of the barrier. Of the 181 military installations associated with the barrier, 113
are fortified mural installations, mainly forts (ft), but including one fortlet (flt) and one
fort with an integrated firebase (ftfb). These make up 62% of all the installations
associated with the barrier (see Fig. 4.16), and their distribution averages out at one
fortified installation for every three kilometres of barrier (including the Wadi Mesuar
130
escarpment).392 There are forty-one fire support bases behind the barrier. These make
up 23% of the associated installations, and their distribution averages out at one
firebase for every 8.2 kilometres.393 The distribution of all types of installations
associated with the entirety of the barrier averages out at one installation for every 1.9
kilometre of built and natural barriers.
Fig. 4.17, showing rectangles 92 and 126 from Fig. 4.6, is a GIS snapshot illustrating
how installations along Berm No. 3 are disposed. It also illustrates the circuitous
nature of the barrier (along with Berm No. 4 extending to the east) on the high ground
above the wadi (the Wadi Dirt) to the south. That portion of Berm No. 3 that extends
to the north is clearly straighter, and it covers ground that is not very undulating.
Disposition of Berm No. 4
The fourth berm extended Morocco’s control over most of the Western Sahara
panhandle, reaching very close to the border with Algeria (see Fig. 4.18). Its
construction commenced in December 1984 and it was completed in January 1985.394
The barrier begins deep in Moroccan territory, at a terminal fort on a north facing
escarpment, overlooking the greater Wadi Draa basin, 35 kilometres due south of the
Wadi Draa itself, and 77 kilometres north of the border with Western Sahara, and 16
kilometres due west of the Moroccan-Algerian border. The barrier runs southwards
across open hamada desert, passing the older Spanish post at Mahbes, to the west. It
enters a region of dissected terrain with wadis running to the west and to the south,
and at a mural fort overlooking the Wadi Ben Amera to the south, the berm turns
westward. The barrier is made up of either double or multiple embankments, and
multiple configurations of embankments along the entirety of its route, save for a trace
of a single embankment (41 kilometres in length) while crossing the Graret Quercha,
and a similar, but very much shorter length, approximately twenty-two kilometres to
the northeast, where there is also a very short length of natural escarpment
incorporated as part of the barrier.
392
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.3, at 338 kms, divided by the total of 111 forts, 1
fortlet, and 1 fort with an integral firebase (that is 113 fortified mural installations), resulting in a
density of one installation for every 3 kms of barrier.
393
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.3, at 338 kms, divided by 41 firebases, resulting in a
density of one installation for every 8.2 kms of barrier.
394
UPES 2008.
131
Behind and to the west of this substantial barrier, by around 10 kilometres, there is a
subsidiary berm consisting of a single earthen bank, 138 kilometres long. It more or
less mirrors the trace of the main barrier along the Algerian frontier, but instead of
extending to the Wadi Draa in the north, at approximately 12 kilometres north of the
Western Sahara-Moroccan border, it turns to the west and joins up with Berm No. 3
close to a track between Mahbes and Zag. It also heads westerly at its southern end,
tying up with some rear installations associated with the barrier.
The east to west, southern trace of Berm No.4, starts by following a latitudinal
watershed. It dog-legs to the southwest and then arcs southward following the
watershed of eastward flowing wadis (including tributaries to the Wadi Ben Amera).
Crossing the Graret Quercha, the berm heads west-northwest on an escarpment
overlooking the headwaters of the Wadi Ternit, but then follows the Wadi Dirt, which
joins up with the Wadi Leicheibi. On the high ground above the wadis, the barrier
clings to the high ground, and mirrors every bend and embayment, and it is here that
the barrier is its most complex, with multiple embankments and additional
configurations of barriers. It joins up with Berm No. 3 along the same escarpment, and
the two barriers create a formidable obstacle facing southwards, overlooking Polisario
controlled territory. With the construction of this berm, linked to the third berm, which
in turn joined Berm No. 2, the Moroccans secured their southern border, excluding
Polisario and the Saharawis in the Tindouf refugee camps from the Saguia al-Hamra
and much of the Western Sahara panhandle.
The table in Fig. 4.19 provides basic statistics for Berm No.4. There is an average
density of one military installation for every 1.7 kilometres of built barrier
(discounting the small occupation positions [sop] only recorded in sampling rectangle
952 – see Fig. 4.6, and the reference in Fig. 4.5). In contrast, the main frontal barrier,
at 486 kilometres (78% of the barrier),395 has a density of mural installations,
comprising, forts (ft), fortlets (flt) and forts with firebases attached (ftfba) of one
installation for every 2.2 kilometres.396 These total 186 in number and make up 49%
395
If the rear, subsidiary barrier, at 138 kms in length, is deducted from the total length of all of Berm
No.4 (including natural barriers), then the distance of the barrier’s frontal trace is 486 kms.
396
This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.4, at 486 kms, divided by the total
of 153 forts, 31 fortlets, and 2 forts with an added firebase (that is 186 fortified mural installations),
resulting in a density of one installation for every 2.2 kms of barrier.
132
of all of the installations associated with the barrier. The fifty-three firebases (fsb) set
behind the barrier, are spread out at average intervals of 9.2 kilometres.397 They make
up 14% of all of the installations associated with the barrier.
Two GIS snapshots illustrate the disposition of installations along Berm No. 4 (Figs.
4.20 and 4.21). In Fig. 4.20 (showing rectangle 100 from Fig. 4.6) there is a relatively
even distribution of mural forts along the barrier looking southwards, into Polisario
controlled territory, while there are only a few fire support bases in the rear. In
contrast, Fig. 4.21 (showing rectangle 952 from Fig. 4.6) has a greater density of
mural forts along with forts in the rear, and a greater number of firebases. In
particular, there are small occupied positions (sop), since the Moroccans built a
substantial number of these small, half circle, fortified positions along this
westernmost stretch of berm directly facing Algeria. These are described further in
Part 2 of this chapter, but this snapshot shows that they are distributed very densely,
with one positioned at just over every half kilometre.398
Disposition of Berm No. 5
With the Moroccan frontier secured, and with much of the Western Sahara panhandle,
literally corralled, and with the territory cut in two by Berm No. 2, the Moroccans
embarked on building Berm No.5 in May 1985. The barrier was completed in
September, later that year (see Fig 4.22).399
The barrier begins within Mauritanian territory, at 21 kilometres southwest of Amgala
where it links a north-south ridge in the northern part of the Goleta Zemmour massif
with the south most limit of Berm No. 2 (where there is also a mural fort). The rocky
and very hilly terrain north of Guelta Zemmour is very corrugated, with a number of
interdigitated hills running south-southwest to north-northeast. The dips and troughs
of the terrain, spread over a latitudinal distance of approximately twelve kilometres,
rises eastwards from an elevation of under 320 metres in the west, to a peak of almost
500 metres, and then, dropping to the east to under 400 metres. The terrain rises again,
397
This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.4, at 486 kms, divided by 53
firebases, resulting in a density of one installation for every 9.2 kms of barrier.
398
Fig. 4.21 shows sampling rectangle 952, within which the length of Berm No. 4 is 30.2 kms long.
There are 53 sop installations in this rectangle which results in a distribution of one sop for every 0.57
km of barrier.
399
UPES 2008.
133
to 420 metres, dropping to under 380 metres, and then rising to 450 metres. In its
eastward direction, the land drops again, this time to just over 380 metres, and rises to
410 metres. The very eastern limit of the high ground finally drops to under 360
metres before gently rising to the east, in Mauritanian territory. This corrugated terrain
is a major element of Berm No.5 for a distance of around sixty-three kilometres north
of Guelta Zemmour, where only relatively short lengths of earth embankments have
been constructed between hills and across wadis, along with strategically placed forts
and fire support bases. These short lengths of barrier block wadis and inlets within the
massif, and are usually double banked.
At around thirty-eight kilometres northeast of Guelta Zemmour, and five kilometres
due west of the Mauritanian frontier, the berm resumes as a continuous construction,
made up of single and multiple embankment arrangements. At this point it starts on a
490 metre high peak, and immediately drops by sixty metres to the south. It then
heads in a southwesterly direction, outlining the eastern limit of the main part of the
Guelta Zemmour massif. For much of the course of the barrier, south of Guelta
Zemmour, there is a matrix of subsidiary embankments, creating multiple enclosures
behind the primary, frontal trace (which includes multiple configurations of double
and single embankments). These link up hills, and have forts and other types of
installations associated with them. The mesh of barriers passes to the northwest of the
Sebkhat Aqsumal, by only a few kilometres, and links up with the hills (and
incorporating the escarpments) of the Gor Lefcih (or Gour Lafkah). When reaching
the southern limit of the Gor Lefcih, with Oum Dreiga to the northwest by twentyseven kilometres, the barrier heads west-southwest. Here, it is no longer a matrix of
barriers, creating enclosures between rocky outcrops in the desert, but it is a frontal
trace made up of sections of single and multiple embankments, with a meandering,
subsidiary rampart in the rear, situated at a variable distance of anywhere between one
and 13 kilometres. There is also evidence for an apparently earlier alignment of the
frontal trace along part of the barrier.
At approximately 135 kilometres east of Dakhla, and at around 19 kilometres
northwest of the Sebkhat Tennuaca, the barrier becomes a consistent single
embankment that heads westward to the sea, via a sabkha depression, just south of
Imlilli. Here, there is a two kilometre break in the berm, but the sabkha has been
134
incorporated as part of the barrier. The barrier ends with a mural fort around one
kilometre from the sea and 50 kilometres south-southwest of Dakhla.
The table in Fig. 4.23 provides basic statistics for Berm No.5. Of the total 1002
kilometres of built and natural barriers making up the berm, there are 321 associated
military installations, averaging one installation for every 3.1 kilometres of barrier.
Along the frontal trace (at 648 kilometres long and making up 65% of the total
barrier400) there are 203 forts (ft), and 19 fortlets (flt), located at an average interval of
2.9 kilometres.401 Firebases (fsb) behind the frontal trace average out at one for every
14 kilometres.402 The forts and fortlets make up 69% of all of the installations
associated with the barrier, while the firebases make up 14%.
GIS snapshots illustrating how these installations are disposed along Berm No. 5 are
shown in Figs. 4.24 and 4.25. The main difference between these is terrain. Fig. 4.24
shows a portion of the barrier through the southern part of the Guelta Zemmour region
(in rectangle 359 of Fig.4.6) with the berm situated on high ground with natural
drainage running to the southeast. In contrast, the berm in Fig. 4.25 (which is close to
the coast in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6) is laid out in straight segments, and the barrier
cuts across ground that slightly rises and dips. Strikingly, there are a considerable
number of forts in the rear in this latter sample of the berm.
Disposition of Berm No. 6
In February 1987, the Moroccans embarked on the final part of their partition of
Western Sahara, attempting to completely exclude Saharawi nationalists and Polisario
fighters from the bulk of the territory. The final, and sixth barrier (see Fig. 4.26), was
completed in April 1987.403 It started at a mural fort on Berm No.5, at around 170
kilometres due west of the Mauritanian border and around 230 kilometres east of
Dakhla, and about 160 kilometres northwest of F’derik (Idjil). It heads southsouthwest, bypassing Ausserd, twenty kilometres to the west. Further south, it passes
400
This is based on subtracting 354 kms of rear, subsidiary berms, from the total length of 1002 kms for
all of the barriers making up Berm No.5.
401
This is based on the total distance of Berm No. 5, at 1002 kms, divided by a total of 222 forts and
fortlets, resulting in a density of one fortified mural installation for every 2.9 kms of barrier.
402
This is based on the total distance of Berm No.4, at 1002 kms, divided by 46 firebases, resulting in a
density of one firebase for every 14 kms of barrier.
403
UPES 2008.
135
Zug, forty kilometres to the east, and then it clearly arcs to the southwest, and Western
Sahara’s southern border with Mauritania. It passes the earlier Spanish post of Tichla,
twenty-eight kilometres to the north. The barrier runs parallel with the Mauritanian
frontier, and even overlaps it in places. It reaches the Atlantic at a terminal fort,
situated on a low level cliff overlooking the sea and around fifty-six kilometres north
of La Guera.
The barrier is made up of double and multiple configurations of embankments for
most of its north-northeast to south-southwest frontal trace. From around ninety-four
kilometres north of the Mauritanian frontier, the frontal trace becomes a continuous
single embankment. For a great deal of the barrier’s length, there are subsidiary, rear
and parallel, single embankments (though well under three kilometres of these are
double embanked). They are situated anywhere from one to twenty-four kilometres
behind the frontal trace, and some of these have integral forts and other associated
installations as well. Sizable portions of these secondary berms, incorporate the few
rocky, spike like hills (guelbs) that are present in the southern quarter of Western
Sahara, undoubted beacons in an otherwise flat, hamada desert landscape – the Tiris
plateau.404 Far to the west, however, there are occasional sand dunes within fifty
kilometres of the Atlantic.
The table in Fig. 4.27 outlines the basic statistics of Berm No.6. The total length of all
of the berms making up this barrier is 1168 kilometres, and on average, there is one
military installation for every 3.2 kilometres of barrier. There are 611 kilometres of
single embanked, rear, subsidiary ramparts (save for three short sections of two banks
or more, at a total length of under four kilometres), making up 52% of the whole of
Berm No.6. However, unlike the fourth and fifth berms, where subsidiary barriers do
not have forts (ft) and fortlets (flt) associated with them, this berm does. At the
northern end of the barrier, where a subsidiary berm heads in a northwesterly direction
toward Berm No.5, passing the Sabkhet Tennuaca to its immediate west, there are six
mural forts and fortlets on the secondary barrier. Also, just before Berm No.6 heads
westwards to the Atlantic, between Zug and Tichla, the barrier splits. Here, the
subsidiary barrier (up to 24 kilometres behind the frontal trace) includes 24 mural
404
Mercer 1976: 23.
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forts and fortlets. These account for 34 forts and fortlets leaving a total of 272 forts
and fortlets on the frontal trace of the barrier (557 kilometres long405). The frontal
trace, therefore, has a distribution of one mural fortification for every two kilometres
along its length.406 Also, in relation to the frontal trace, where there are 25 firebases
(fsb) in the rear, their distribution averages out at one firebase for every 22.3
kilometres.407 All forts and fortlets make up 84% of all of the installations associated
with the entirety of the barrier, while the firebases make up 7%.
A sample distribution of some of the installations along Berm No. 6, along the
Mauritanian frontier (in rectangle 853 of Fig. 4.6), is shown in Fig. 4.28. There is
almost an even number of mural forts and fortlets, there are extensive sand dune areas,
and although there is a garrison and one fort in the rear, there are no fire support
bases. This is very indicative of Berm No. 6 within 150 kilometres of the coast.
PART 2
Towards an Anatomy of the Berms
As has been pointed out in Part 1 of this chapter, descriptions of the Moroccan walls,
the berms, are incomplete, imprecise and contradictory. Commentators have obviously
tried to describe a complex series of structures as if it were a single build wall with a
conformity of features. But the ‘Great Wall of Morocco’ is not that. The very fact that
as a series of barriers, the matrix of defences was constructed across differing terrains,
at different times, means that its construction adapted to changing topography and
strategic and political contingencies. These changes, including the chronology and
disposition of the Moroccan barriers, have been indicated by employing Google Earth,
and the details made evident are the basis for the following, descriptions and
characterisations of the salient components of the berms. The aim is now, therefore, to
405
This is based on the total distance of Berm No. 6 at 1168 kms, having 611 kms of rear, subsidiary
berms subtracted from it, resulting in 557 kms of frontal barriers.
406
This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.6, at 557 kms, divided by 272
fortified mural installations, resulting in a density of one fortified mural installation for every 2 kms of
barrier.
407
This is based on the total distance of the frontal trace of Berm No.6, at 557 kms, divided by 25
firebases, resulting in a density of one firebase for every 22.3 kms of barrier.
137
apprehend the make up of the different barrier components, and how they have created
an ensemble of features marking out, and partitioning the very land of Western
Sahara. By being in existence for only some thirty odd years, the barriers bring to
mind Olivier’s proposition of ‘an archaeology of the short term’. An archaeology that
does not mimic ‘more classical periods’, but seeks out its own methodologies, unique
and sometimes contingent, to the study of the particularities of the very recent past.408
The Architecture of the Moroccan Barriers
The nomenclature drawn upon in this research for describing the various features, or
installations, that is the ‘architecture’, associated with Morocco’s Great Wall does not
directly marry with modern military terminology. The use of descriptors such as
‘forts’ and ‘fortlets’, in particular, harks back to Roman period archaeology when
describing Roman fortified positions in Britain and elsewhere, and they are not to be
found in modern military glossaries.409 Instead, modern military concepts of defence
centre around ideas of protection and ‘survivability’,410 and under this umbrella,
particular types of defensive structures and contingencies are to be found. For
instance, the term ‘base’, as opposed to ‘fort’, is used for any ‘locality from which
operations are projected or supported’, or ‘an area or locality containing installations
which provide logistic or other support’,411 while the contingencies of protecting such
bases fall under the rubric of ‘base defence’, which is defined as
the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce
the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the
maximum capacity of its facilities is available to [in the dictionary quoted] US
forces.412
Not withstanding these examples, the terms ‘fort’ and fortlet’ have still been used in
this study, as have references to them being ‘mural’ or ‘non-mural’. In contrast, the
modern term ‘fire support base’, which first came into use during the Vietnam War,413
408
Olivier 2001.
US Department of Defence 1995.
410
US Department of Defence 1985.
411
US Department of Defence 1995: 54.
412
US Department of Defence 1995: 54.
413
Ott [1975] 1995.
409
138
will continue to be used alongside these anachronisms. Other descriptive terms for
elements or installations associated with the berms that have been devised for this
research, and have been described in Fig. 4.5, will be elaborated upon below.
It is easy to look at the Moroccan barriers and compare them with other strategic
geographic barriers from history, such as Hadrian’s Wall and the Great Wall of China.
The very nature of the berms in their range and extent beg the comparison. But there
are real discontinuities in space and time – geography and era – separating these
ancient barriers from the Moroccan berms, and other defensive systems of today, and
because of this it could be considered wise not to pursue direct comparisons.
However, correspondences can occasionally be found as to make it a misjudgement
not to note the apparent commonalities where they occur. Analogies are of value, and
relevant analogues will occasionally be incorporated to explore the ways and means of
people’s engagement with the materiality of their surroundings,414 in this case, the
materialities of the militarised landscape of the Moroccan berms. This also applies,
even more pertinently, to American fortifications of the Vietnam War era, and here
analogues of real value can be found.
Ramparts to Berms
The term ‘ramparts’ is not to be found in modern military jargon. As a generic term, it
easily describes the earth and stone barriers that make up the Moroccan berms. In
traditional usage, a ‘berm’, is the edge, or ledge, of flat ground between a wall or
rampart, and a ditch. Hadrian’s Wall has a clearly defined ‘berm’. But the more
modern use of ‘berm’ as an earthen bank (defensive or otherwise), comes from the
United States where its first instance is recorded in 1854 as a ‘birm-bank’ associated
with the towpath of a canal.415 By referring to an embankment in this instance, the
term has been used by the American military to denote a protective, defensible earthen
mound or bank of any size and length, and this definition has spread into general
military usage. The berms can also be generically described as ‘parapets’. But this too
is a word not easily found in modern military usage even though it was used in both
414
Wylie 1985: 107.
From the Oxford English Dictionary, online,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/17945?redirectedFrom=berm& accessed 13 September 2012.
415
139
world wars for defensive earthworks instead of the more modern ‘berm’.416 In fact, the
term parapet was used up into the 1970s when the use of ‘berm’, in conjunction with
bulldozing, started to gain prominence.417
The ramparts or parapets, berms, or earth embankments, that make up the Moroccan
barriers, are essentially obstacles designed to hinder the movement of mobile Polisario
forces into the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara. They were designed to
serve as a ‘tripwire’, and as an obvious testimony of Morocco’s presence.418 As the
various descriptions by commentators and journalists have stated, and observations
through Google Earth have confirmed, the berms could be single or multiple
embankments, they could have ditches associated with them, and they could include
stone revetments or walls, all tying together the various installations situated on the
barriers themselves. Their recorded heights can range anywhere from one to four
metres. By taking ‘snapshot’ views of high resolution Google Earth imagery from the
22 sampled rectangles selected (see Fig. 4.6), and by looking further at terrestrial and
low level aerial imagery available on the internet (in essence, further snapshots), we
can take a good look at the various configurations of the sand and stone embankments
making up the berms.
When looking at the basic earthen berms as features in their own right, Google Earth
and other imagery can do more than just indicate type. They can even provide
indicators of how the barriers were built. For instance, individual embankments
appear to be from five to eight metres wide, and even more in some instances. They
can show signs of being bulldozed from both sides to create a linear mound, while
there are instances of the barriers being bulldozed from only one side – the Moroccan
side. The bulldozer tracks can range from around 10 to 20 metres in length.
Fig. 4.29 shows a single embankment along Berm No.1 in the Smara salient (located
in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The bulldozer tracks are clearly visible only on the
416
See Imperial War Museum 1998 and U.S. War Department 1944. In this latter publication, ‘berms’
are referred to in their traditional sense, as a ledge between a parapet and an excavated feature, e.g., a
fighting position pit, or foxhole.
417
Ott [1975] 1995. Throughout this publication, General Ott almost always describes the earthen
banks around field artillery as parapets (he even uses ‘breastwork’), but he specifically talks about
berms (pp. 162-163) only in conjunction with bulldozing.
418
Tusa 1988.
140
western side of the earthen bank. They extend for around 15 to 25 metres. The sharp
shadow on the west side of the berm indicates that there is a single apex at the top of
the bank suggesting that its section is more or less triangular. In contrast, Fig. 4.30,
which illustrates another section of Berm No.1 (but this time close to the Atlantic in
rectangle 215 of Fig. 4.6), shows the barrier as having an almost flat top, and even
with a hint of a depression, giving it more or less a trapezoidal profile. The image may
not indicate it, since bulldozer tracks are not visible, but it is possible that the flatter
top of the barrier might be due to it being bulldozed from both sides. Fig. 4.31 (from
rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6) provides another view of a section of the bank along Berm
No.1. It has definitely been built by being bulldozed from both sides, and its possibly
trapezoidal profile indicates a very slight depression along its top. Though the bank is
more triangular in the lower right of the image.
Double and multiple embankments can show a variety of configurations. Besides the
plain embankments already illustrated, there are single embankments with short
stretches of secondary banks. An example from Berm No.5 illustrates this in Fig. 4.32
(from rectangle 583 in Fig. 4.6). It shows secondary embankments along the rear of a
single embankment where the barrier crosses wadis.
The barriers show greater complexity when the embankments multiply in number.
Fig. 4.33 shows a part of Berm No.1 (located between rectangles 124 and 157 of Fig.
4.6) with a secondary bank to the rear (by an average of 250 metres), which follows
some of the contours of a watershed. There is also a track to the west, running parallel
to the barrier, and another track (along a wadi) passing west to east through the
barrier. Both barriers were constructed by being bulldozed only from one side – from
the west. Often, however, double embanked barriers are much more uniform, as
illustrated in Fig. 4.34. Here, the two banks making up a part of Berm No.2, along the
Smara salient (and located around nine kilometres southeast of rectangle 157 in Fig.
4.6), are under 15 metres apart, and they are truly parallel. The image is low
resolution, but a parallel track just behind the barrier is visible, as is another track (in
all actuality a braided track, but it too is unclear) heading north-northeast, away from
the barrier.
141
Double embanked barriers can also have short sections of intermediate, subsidiary
banks, similar to those shown in Fig. 4.32. Fig. 4.35 shows a portion of Berm No.5
(located just west of rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6), which includes variable lengths of
longitudinal, subsidiary banks, about 10 metres behind the frontal barrier, with a
second defensive barrier in the rear. What is distinctive here is that the rear
embankment includes a ditch just in front of it. So the sequence is, from the south, an
east to west frontal embankment with short lengths of subsidiary banks immediately
behind, then an area of flat ground around 15 to 50 metres wide, followed by a ditch
with a bank immediately on its northern side. The bank has undoubtedly been raised
from the earth excavated to make the ditch since there are no apparent bulldozing
tracks associated with it. Fig. 4.35 also shows a break in the rear ditch and bank, like a
short causeway, which would give easy access to the frontal rampart.
In many parts of Western Sahara, as shown in Fig. 4.35, there are multiple embanked
configurations of barriers, with a ditch in front of the rear embankment. Fig. 4.36
illustrates a section from Berm No.5 (located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6) where there
is a frontal barrier with a building or bunker type structure incorporated into it. The
area behind the frontal barrier is probably at a slightly lower level than the ground in
front of it, to the southeast. This is because it must have been created by bulldozing
from its rear (the northwest) since the natural drainage in front of the barrier has not
been disturbed. Close examination of the image shows that the frontal barrier has two
ridges, so it is likely that it was constructed in at least two bulldozing phases. There is
a central bank at about 12 metres behind the frontal barrier, and at another 10 metres
or so, there is a ditch with a bank on its northwest side. The overall depth of this
stretch of berm is up to 30 metres. There are also two breastworks behind the barrier,
in the upper half of the image, which represent vehicular (or ‘tank’) slots. However,
these are probably for jeeps, or other similar vehicles, since they are apparently less
than four metres wide. There is also a break in part of the bank and ditch near the
bottom of the image, which presumably gives or aids access to the mural building, or
bunker, nearby.
Multiple embanked berms can be even more complex then the length shown in Fig.
4.36. Fig. 4.37 shows a section of Berm No.4 located in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6. In
this image it is clear that the barrier was constructed along an east to west watershed,
142
since natural drainage gullies can be seen to run off to the south. As in Fig. 4.36, there
are three banks with the rear bank including a ditch just in front of it. There are a
number of routeways (causeways) through the barriers, and between the central bank
and the frontal bank there are at least two right-angled embankments that
compartmentalise the front half of the barrier. There are numerous bunkers associated
with the front of the barrier, and there is even a dog-leg entry giving access to the
string of structures, and positions, in the lower part of the stretch of barrier shown.
The barrier has an average, overall, north to south depth of under 40 metres, with an
approximate distance of less than 20 metres between the frontal bank and the central
one. It is very light, but there is a pale line roughly seven metres in front of the barrier,
which might represent barbed wire. It is not always easy to see barbed wire on Google
Earth imagery, and it is more often found only in front of mural forts. There are motor
tracks behind the barrier running east to west, and there are two sub-circular
earthworks, more than 125 metres north of the barrier (to the left), and roughly 11
metres in diameter. These might represent single gun artillery positions.
Fig. 4.38 is a low level aerial photograph of Berm No.2, within Mauritania, at the
corner of the Western Sahara panhandle.419 It illustrates a treble embanked section of
the Moroccan barrier similar to that shown in Fig. 4.37. The photo shows a rally car
from one of the Paris-Dakar rallies. Rallies went directly from Smara to Zouerate in
Mauritania, in 1996, 1998-99, 2001, and 2004 to 2007,420 so the photo could have
been taken in any one of those years. The approximate location of the photograph is
shown in Fig. 4.39, situated due south of rectangle 157 in Fig. 4.6, in Mauritanian
territory. Fig. 4.38 shows a cleared gap in the Moroccan wall through which the car is
being driven. The cut flanks of the recently bulldozed track are clear. Soldiers are
standing on either side of the cutting, watching the blue car pass, which is heading
south into Mauritania. It is interesting to note that just in front of it, there is a large ‘no
parking’ sign, presumably set up to tell the drivers not to stop while within the
militarised barrier. This photograph says much about the make up of the berms. The
soldiers give a definite sense of scale to the barrier, and it is obvious that the central
and rear banks (the front of the barrier is to the left of the photo) are triangular in
section and considerably higher then the men, with the frontal bank appearing lower
419
420
This is an undated, and unattributed photograph of the Moroccan Berm from Origo 2009.
Dakar Rally 2009.
143
than the stone buildings (or bunkers) just behind it. There are further, apparently
unroofed, stone structures that appear to be integral with the frontal bank, and these
might represent fighting and/or observation positions. There are clear bulldozer
impressions behind the barrier, and visible at the right of the photograph. There are
also stones painted white along the sides of the bulldozer impressions, and these might
point to the impressions being deliberately created to serve as vehicle parking areas.
The ditch in the photograph has relatively steep sides, and its depth can be visually
estimated to be at least three quarters of the height of a man – based solely on the men
in the picture.
Although the barrier consists of three banks and a ditch, further in the immediate
background, there is a fourth embankment to the north, while even further into the
background, at the upper left of the photograph, there is an additional frontal barrier
heading away to the west, from a shallow wadi shown by relatively dense vegetation.
There is a fair sized zariba-like enclosure in the very centre of the photograph,
presumably made up of thorn bushes, while just in front of it, and slightly to the left,
there is another, smaller zariba-like structure. There is a possible open topped stone
structure just in front of the ditch, and just beyond the track that has been cut through
the barrier for rally cars to pass. The stone buildings, or bunkers, are at least as high as
a man. Their floors may be partially sunken and their roofs are flat. An illustration of
low lying profiles of buildings behind the berm (Berm No. 4, near Algeria), are shown
in Fig. 4.40. It gives an impression of what a section of the Moroccan barrier, perhaps
similar to that shown in Fig. 4.38, might look like when viewed from the front.
Stone walling has been incorporated into the Moroccan berms where the ground is not
very sandy, and stones are obviously readily available. This is the case in portions of
the Western Sahara panhandle, and an instance of stone walling is shown in Fig. 4.41.
This photograph was taken somewhere within easy reach of Tifariti by an Italian
photo journalist and it shows a barrier made up of three linear elements.421 Salek
Labaidi Bachir, now a Saharawi journalist, crossed the Moroccan barrier southeast of
421
Photograph of the Moroccan ‘wall’ (dated: 19 February 2010) taken by Bruno Zanzottera ‘not far
from the village of Tifariti’ for Parallelozero, an Italian photo journalism agency based in Milan.
Available at: http://stock.parallelozero.com/?p=5 and
http://www.parallelozero.com/images/stock/mid/c72e465d7af3494aa14600a8956d98bb5fa097fc.jpg
accessed 13 January 2014.
144
Smara in 2004 (then aged 17), into the Polisario controlled liberated zone. The barrier
he crossed was identical to that shown in the photograph. It consisted, from the
Moroccan side, of a dry stone wall, around 1.5 metres high by 0.75 metres wide, then
at around three metres further on there was an earthen bank, approximately two metres
high, followed by a further earthen bank beyond which was a barbed wire fence.422
Fig. 4.41 does not show the barbed wire, but the frontal barrier (at the very left of the
photograph) has two ridges presumably caused either by being bulldozed from both
sides, or by being bulldozed from the rear side in two phases of earth moving. Such a
double-ridged frontal embankment is visible in Fig. 4.36.
There are also instances of the barriers having a frontal rampart with a dry stone
revetment (facing the Polisario controlled zone). In 2008, a Saharawi protest was
staged in front of the Moroccan barrier near Mehairis. Here the protesters made their
way through a flimsy fence of barbed wire, and actually approached the barrier which
was around two metres high and faced with dry stone walling. While Moroccan
soldiers watched and did nothing, some protesters climbed on top of the frontal
rampart and started to dismantle some of its stone facing. There was also a second
barrier behind the frontal embankment with a depression between the two. The protest
was staged near a small mural post where there were fighting positions in the rampart
as well.423
Other features that make-up the Moroccan barriers are minefields and barbed wire.
The ramparts never had dense fields of barbed wire in front of them as in the trench
systems of the First World War. On Google Earth, barbed wire is only most evident in
front of forts and fortlets. The distribution of mines in front of the barrier are,
apparently, quite differential too. A sizable proportion of people successfully cross the
barrier into the liberated zone unscathed, and the Polisario have, before the 2001
422
Bachir, Interview.
Malainin Larkhal showed me a video of this protest when I was in the Tindouf refugee camps on 12
October 2011, and I could clearly make out the details of the Moroccan barrier construction. I was also
able to talk with Hamdi Touballi who took part in the protest and was visible in the video. For more on
Larkhal and Touballi, see Chapter 5.
423
145
ceasefire, actually removed mines and covertly repositioned them behind the
Moroccan lines.424
On Forts and Fortlets
A ‘fort’ is used here, generically, to describe an enclosed fortified position, while the
term ‘fortlet’ has been borrowed from archaeological usage. Both terms have little
currency in contemporary military jargon and are anachronisms. For instance, ‘fort’ is
not to be found in compendia of military jargon, such as the United States Department
of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms,425 The Oxford Companion to Military
History,426 nor The Penguin Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology.427 In
practice, the overarching term ‘fortification’ is always preferred. But the word ‘fort’ is
commonly known and understood, and its diminutive, ‘fortlet’, speaks for itself; it is
literally a small ‘fort’ – but size is relative. The term ‘fort’ is also to be found in
virtually all publications about the Moroccan barriers and it is commonly used in
overviews of all types of fortifications, including modern ones.428
In modern military usage, the concept of fortified positions has a variety of
descriptors, and in Anglophone literature, these have apparently evolved since the
beginning of the twentieth century, spurred on by the contingencies of field operations
and their concomitant fortifications. The term ‘fort’ appears to have been superseded
by ‘strong point’,429 and ‘defensible post’ and ‘redoubt’.430 Even though, earlier, well
established forts were integrated into the massive trench systems of World War One,
the new European defensive systems devised between the world wars did not use the
term ‘fort’. The grandest of all, the Maginot line referred to its main fortified
positions, its fortresses, as ouvrages, (‘works’ in English). There were ‘large works’,
‘small works’ and ‘artillery works’.431
424
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 22, and Malainin Larkhal, Interview. Also, during my visit to Western
Sahara and the refugee camps in 2011, Saharawis took it as fact that Polisario/SADR fighters had often
removed Moroccan mines and placed them behind the barriers, on the Moroccan side.
425
US Department of Defence 1995.
426
Holmes 2003.
427
Macksey 1995.
428
For example, see Hughes 1974.
429
Wheeler 1893.
430
War Office 1911 and Imperial War Museum 1998. Thuillier 1902 uses the terms ‘defensible post’,
‘redoubt’ and ‘fort’ interchangeably.
431
Kaufmann and Jurga 1999: 19.
146
The Vietnam War saw a reinvigoration of the traditional fort, ‘more akin to Old West
frontier army posts within Indian Territory and surrounded by hostile and capable
foes’; and in 1966 these Special Forces installations were simply referred to as
‘fighting camps’.432 Numerous other terms were used to describe fighting positions
and bases of operations, and surprisingly, there was no consistent terminology in the
Vietnam theatre. The commonest were firebases, or fire support bases, forward fire
support base, patrol base, fire support patrol base, landing zone, camp and base camp.
The term ‘fort’ was reserved for the older French fortifications situated throughout the
country.433 Israel’s Bar-Lev line was contemporary with the Vietnam conflict, and as
already pointed out, it was provided with strong points called Maozim (the singular,
Maoz, means castle-keep in Hebrew).434 More up to date terms for fortifications
include advanced operations bases, forward operations bases and main operations
bases.435 In Afghanistan today, the lone outpost appears to have made a comeback in
the deployment of fortified ‘checkpoints’. In some instances, these are not too
dissimilar to the frontier like fighting camps of 1960s Vietnam.436
This very brief review of military jargon has shown that 20th and 21st century terms
for fortified positions is so mixed, that the generic term, ‘fort’ (and its diminutive
‘fortlet’), is more than adequate for describing fortified positions along the Moroccan
berms. It is therefore appropriate to now describe these in more detail, along with the
other installations that are integral to the Moroccan barriers.
Mural Forts and Fortlets
The difference between mural forts and fortlets could be considered somewhat
arbitrary. In this study, the distinction between the two came about through the very
processes of plotting the mural forts on Google Earth, when an apparent pattern
seemed to emerge with strings of smaller forts situated between larger ones. Such a
grading of fortified positions can be found in many types of fortification systems, and
432
Rottman 2005a: 5.
Kelley 2002: xviii-xx
434
Dunstan 2008: 17-19.
435
US Department of Defence 1995.
436
Refer to ‘Flashman’s Fort’ in Harnden 2011.
433
147
in Britain for instance, such distinctions are common on both the Antonine and
Hadrian’s Walls.437 What have been designated as fortlets along the Moroccan berms
rarely cover more than 1,000 square metres, while some heavily defended forts can be
more than 300,000 square metres in area. Some installations are concentric in plan
with multiple perimeter embankments of sand and stone, and most are
compartmentalised with earthen blast barriers. Fighting and/or observation positions
are placed along the fort perimeters, and internally there can be mortar pits and other
artillery positions. Most, if not all of the internal buildings are partially subterranean
and bunker-like. As already shown in Part 1 of this chapter, a relatively small number
of mural forts have artillery firebases attached to them, though it is more usual for
firebases to be hidden from view, and set back, behind the barriers. Forts and fortlets,
along with other installations, can be positioned in flat open desert, or on hilltops and
along escarpment edges. The distances between them can vary from around 650
metres to up to four kilometres.
As with the different territorial berms, all of the forts and fortlets have been created
through bulldozing and digging. They can be quite variable in outline, but they fall
into four broad morphological (though mainly descriptive) categories, and these are
described below. Indicative examples of these can be illustrated by looking at
‘snapshots’, visible through Google Earth, from some of the 22 sampled survey
rectangles (see Fig. 4.6), and by looking at additional terrestrial and low level aerial
imagery, accessible on the internet.
Polygonal:
These can include forts and fortlets with approximately rectangular, square and
trapezoidal outlines. Triangular and multi-sided traces are also included in this
grouping. The corners can be sharp or rounded, and the sides can even be ‘bent’ in
some instances. Four examples of polygonal forts are described below. Fig. 4.42
clearly shows a fortlet (flt 10) on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 215 of Fig. 4.6). It
is obviously rectangular (about 70 metres long by 60 metres wide, with an area of
around 3,993 square metres) and it almost straddles the berm centrally. It also has a
clear, rectangular central area. Since Berm No. 1 is now redundant, the bunkers and
437
Breeze and Dobson 1987.
148
other types of structures around its perimeter, and internally, are roofless. Roofing
materials and other portable materials were presumably removed when the post was
evacuated. Internal blast barriers are minimal though there is an external barrier just
outside, and protecting the entrance into the fortlet, on its northwest side. There is one
external building, and on either side of the fortlet, there are fighting/observation
positions in the berm itself – where there are also additional entries into the fortlet.
Another mural installation, a fort (ft 163) on Berm No. 1, is shown in Fig. 4.43
(located just outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It is essentially
an uncluttered trapezium with two concentric perimeter ramparts (about 335 metres
long by 256 metres wide, with an area of around 75,608 square metres). It too
straddles Berm No. 1 and it is longitudinally divided in two. There are clear indents in
the outer rampart, along the south front of the fort, that represent fighting/observation
positions. There are also smaller enclosures, mainly along the inside of the southern
perimeter with hints of structures, one of which might be a mortar pit. Evidence for
the bulldozing of the embankments, mainly from north to south, is clearly visible.
Being along Berm No. 1, the fort is now redundant.
A polygonal fort (around 250 metres long by 125 metres wide, with an area of around
22,826 square metres) with rounded corners and sides is shown in Fig. 4.44. This is a
fort (ft 685) on a portion of Berm No. 3 which faces the Polisario controlled liberated
zone (located in rectangle 126 of Fig. 4.6). The berm is made up of multiple
embankments visible at both ends of the fort. The perimeter of the fort is defined by
two concentric embankments, with bunkers and fighting positions facing south and
east. The north-northwest, outer trace of the fort is very well-defined. It is probably
revetted with stones on the outside, and there are visible bulldozing tracks from the
making of the ramparts. The entrance into the fort in its northwest flank is ambiguous.
There is a motor track that runs parallel to the longitudinal alignment of the fort, but
from it, from the northeast, an off-shoot track approaches the fort through what might
be a fenced off, rectangular enclosure. The offshoot track appears to head to the fort’s
perimeter at a point where there is a small group of structures in the outer trace – the
apparent entry into the installation – but the entrance cannot be clearly seen. It is
probable, therefore, that the entrance is very narrow indeed, perhaps only capable of
allowing one motor vehicle to pass through at a time, if at all. The fort is divided
internally by earthen embankments, and there are many semi-subterranean structures
149
which are all roofed. It is also possible that there is at least one mortar pit visible in
the south-southeast part of the fort. There are clear areas in the central part of the
installation.
Fig. 4.45 shows a redundant fort (ft 1335) along Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 583
of Fig. 4.6). Drifting sand has accumulated around it therefore some of its details are
obscured, in particular, the location of its entrance which might be on either the east or
west ends of the installation, adjacent to the territorial berm. This fort is a long,
rounded polygon with two concentric perimeter banks (around 545 metres long by 175
metres wide, with an area of about 69,109 square metres). It has been subdivided into
around 34 small compounds by internal earthen blast barriers, within which are the
remains of a small number of buildings. The southern trace of the fort has
fighting/observation positions, and bunkers that are just visible. A trough caused by
the bulldozing of the northern outline of the fort, and the territorial berm, is just
visible. It is partially filled with wind blown sand. There are also two short lengths of
earthen banks just outside the northern perimeter of the fort.
Circular:
There are no truly circular forts or fortlets, but sub-circular outlines are not
uncommon, as are semi-circular traces. This grouping includes oval to kidney shaped
fortifications and sub-circular delineations that are similar to fans (or tear drops).
There are also shapes that hint at being diamond like, in that they are sub-circular, but
with opposing apexes.
The first of four examples of circular forts is a semi circular fortlet (flt 1252) on Berm
No. 4, shown in Fig. 4.46 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This installation
(about 125 metres long by 70 metres wide, with an area of around 7,250 square
metres) is concentric with two embankments making up its east facing front, but with
up to four embankments making up its semi-circular rear. The rear defences appear to
be integrated extensions of the secondary, rear ramparts of Berm No. 4. There are
some earthen blast barriers compartmentalising the fortlet, and there is an entrance on
its western side, accessed via two dog-legs, through the outermost defensive rampart.
There are some buildings inside the fort, along with similar structures – bunkers –
along the east facing front, where there are also some fighting/observation positions.
150
There is an apparent cordon of barbed wire in front of the installation, along its east
facing flank. This fortlet is on that part of Berm No. 4 which is in Moroccan sovereign
territory, north of Western Sahara. It is active and faces Algeria to the east.
Also on Berm No. 4, and actively facing Algeria from sovereign Moroccan territory,
(located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6), is the half egg shaped fort (ft 1250) shown in
Fig. 4.47 (about 345 metres long by 170 metres wide, with an area of around 45,964
square metres). This installation’s northeast facing front is crowded with bunkers and
fighting/observation positions. There are some further structures closer to the centre of
the installation and some mortar pits. The interior of the fort is subdivided by earthen
blast barriers, which clearly show the bulldozer tracks from their creation, or upkeep.
There are avenue like routeways within the compound and there is a clear entrance in
the western perimeter, which also has an earthen barrier in front of it. The southern
and western trace of the fort is concentric with multiple embankments. It is possible
that there is also an earth embanked ‘U’ shaped position for a large vehicle, possibly a
tank or a self-propelled artillery piece. There is barbed wire in front of the fort,
roughly parallel with its eastern side, which is barely visible in the figure as a pale
line.
Fig. 4.48 is a very clear image of a sub-circular fort (ft 1597), still in active use on
Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6). This fort (about 245 metres long by
180 metres wide, with an area of around 35,184 square metres) has a perimeter of two
concentric ramparts that are very well-defined. They appear, in the main, to be
revetted (presumably with stones). There are also clearly defined fighting/observation
positions along the east facing front of the fort, along with bunkers just behind. The
fort is subdivided by earthen blast barriers, and there are some revetted, trench like
passageways, one of which links an area with two obvious mortar pits with the eastern
front of the fort, and one other type of gun pit. The entrance to the installation is
clearly open, and nearby is a helicopter landing zone, immediately to the northwest.
Some tracks from bulldozing, presumably to maintain the outer defences, are visible
along the west and northern exterior of the fort, with a hint of clearance activity along
part of the eastern front.
151
The last example of a fort in the circular category is an installation that is kidney
shaped and located along the redundant, southern portion of Berm No. 5 (ft 1387). It is
shown in Fig. 4.49 (and located in rectangle 553 of Fig. 4.6). The fort (about 330
metres long by 185 metres wide, with an area of around 45,646 square metres) has a
perimeter of two concentric banks, and it is subdivided into multiple compartments by
earthen blast barriers. Many of the embankments, including those portions of the outer
trace behind Berm No. 5, show signs of the bulldozing which created them. There are
three entry points into the fort with one including a spur embankment extending out of
a rectangular outwork. The figure shows that windblown sand has accumulated within
and
around
the
fort
and
it
obscures
details.
Nevertheless,
there
are
fighting/observation positions, and some bunkers, along the southern, outward facing
trace of the fort.
Irregular:
These include forts and fortlets with sinuous outlines, or outlines that follow natural
contours. The latter are more commonly found in the hillier parts of Western Sahara.
Surprisingly, though, irregular traces of fortifications can also be found in relatively
flat desert areas.
An irregular fort (ft 1391) along Berm No. 5, and situated in an area of desert with
low relief is shown in Fig. 4.50 (located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6). It is a double
embanked, concentric installation with a single embanked extension along its south
front and with multiple compartments divided by earthen blast barriers. The fort
(about 580 metres long by 320 metres wide, with an area of around 122,201 square
metres) is situated along a now redundant part of Berm No. 5, and wind blown sand
has accumulated in places. There are roofless buildings and bunkers, many of which
are along the fort’s southern trace where there are also fighting/observation positions.
Traces of bulldozing from the construction (and upkeep) of the fort, and the territorial
berm, are visible. There are also indicators of a single gun pit for a piece of artillery.
The entrance into the fort is on its northern side, and there is an earth embankment
protecting it. There is also a break in the western perimeter of the fort that might
represent another entry point.
152
Fig. 4.51 shows a still occupied fort (ft 681) along Berm No. 3 (located in rectangle
126 of Fig. 4.6). It follows the contours of a serpentine escarpment looking over
Polisario controlled territory to the south. The fort (about 520 metres long by 270
metres wide, with an area of around 62,564 square metres) has a concentric perimeter,
consisting of two earthen banks, and the interior has been sub-divided by numerous
earthen blast barriers. There are also well-defined routeways within the installation.
Fig. 4.52 is a lower level aerial view of the same fort, and it shows that most of the
embankments are revetted with stones. It also shows that most of the buildings, or
bunkers, are partly subterranean. Additionally, Fig. 4.52 shows that the frontal
embankment of the fort is at a lower level than the second rampart, therefore, as
indicated in Fig. 4.51, there are fewer bunkers and fighting/observation positions
along the very front of the installation, with a greater number of bunkers positioned on
the slightly higher, second earthen bank. There are four probable mortar pits in the
fort, while Fig. 4.52 clearly shows an additional gun pit close to the west most
extremity of the fort (where an apparently blocked entry into the installation is
visible). A turning circle for vehicles, visible in Fig. 4.51, indicates the main entrance
into the fort as being at its northern extremity. However, the figure does not show the
entrance clearly, so perhaps it is either obscured or very narrow indeed. To the north
of the entrance, within 200 to 600 metres from the fort, there are three helicopter
landing zones. These are not shown in Fig. 4.51.
The junction of Berms Nos. 3 and 4 is shown in Fig. 4.53 where there is another
indicative example of a still active, irregularly shaped, concentric mural fort (ft 687),
located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6. Like ft 681, this installation (about 450 metres long
by 305 metres wide, with an area of around 60,089 square metres) follows the natural
contours of the escarpment upon which it is positioned. There are fighting/observation
positions, and some bunkers along the southern perimeter of the fort, and there are
numerous bunkers and other buildings inside the installation. There are multiple
compartments outlined by earthen blast barriers, with well-defined routeways
extending across the installation. As with forts ft 681 and ft 685, the main entrance
appears to be obscured, or perhaps even blocked with a building, though just to its
west there is a break in the rampart that is clearly another entry point into the fort.
There are two helicopter landing zones to the immediate north, where also, the portion
of Berm No. 3 which previously extended from the fort northwards (to the west of the
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more square-like landing zone at the far left of the image) has since been bulldozed
away (bulldozer tracks and the faint shadow of an alignment indicate the former
position of the berm). There is also an installation identifier inscribed on the ground
just outside the entrance to the fort. Two small oblong earthworks are also visible just
outside the northern limit of the installation.
An irregular mural fort (ft 1269) that started life as a half circular installation, situated
on Berm No. 4, is shown in Fig. 4.54 (about 350 metres long by 70 metres wide, with
an area of around 24,365 square metres). It is located in sovereign Moroccan territory
close to, and facing east towards the border with Algeria (within rectangle 952 of Fig.
4.6). It is still active. The earlier frontal barriers of the installation, along with a
sizable portion of its internal earthen blast barriers, have been bulldozed away, leaving
a fort that arcs from south to north and opening to the east. Its perimeter is concentric
with multiple earthen embankments. There are clear fighting/observation positions in
the outer rampart facing Algeria with, apparently, very few bunkers. Instead, the bulk
of the fort’s buildings and bunkers are situated within and behind the second frontal
rampart. The fort is compartmentalised with earthen blast barriers and there is a clear
entrance on the northwest side. It includes a protective, and partly masking, earthen
bank in front of it. There is a very clear cordon of barbed wire in front of the fort, and
additionally, some small circular earthworks to the southwest that might represent
temporary gun emplacements.
Complex:
This term does not apply to the shape of a fort per se. Instead, it denotes a layout that
is literally more complex (to lesser or greater degrees) than the delineations noted
above, and usually made more ‘complex’ by being made up of different types of
sections or compounds of varying shapes (multi-part). Four indicative examples are
described below.
A straightforward, complex mural fort (ft 1648) situated on a knoll along the southern
limit of Berm No. 6 (active and facing Mauritania) is shown in Fig. 4.55. Located in
rectangle 850 of Fig. 4.6, it is about 130 metres long by 85 metres wide, with an area
154
of around 7,554 square metres438. Its shape follows the contours of the knoll on which
it is situated and its trace is made up of a single defensive embankment, which is
revetted on the inside. In all probability, the perimeter rampart was constructed by
clearing away loose earth from the top of the knoll and banking it up along the
perimeter, then facing it with stones along its inner face. This has resulted in a very
well-defined outline in which there are numerous niches representing fighting and
observation positions. There are bunkers and buildings inside the fort and two clear
gun pits. The fort is accessed by a ramp and there is a bulldozed embankment around
the base of the knoll, behind the territorial berm. The berm itself has an accumulation
of drifted sand along its southern face, but its northern side has been maintained by
bulldozing. Outside the fort, to its southeast, is a further embanked enclosure taking in
a smaller knoll, which also has some dugout fighting and observation positions on its
top. There is also a helicopter landing zone to the immediate northwest of the
installation.
Another complex, mural fort (ft 145) is shown in Fig. 4.56 (about 330 metres long by
185 metres wide, with an area of around 34,001 square metres). It is situated along
Berm No. 1 and it lies in an area of desert with very low relief (located close to, but
outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). Although it has been out of
use for some time, with all of its buildings and bunkers roofless, the scouring in the
sand caused by the bulldozing in its construction and upkeep is still quite evident. The
fort seems to have been initially conceived as a simple double embanked, partly
concentric installation, subdivided by earthen blast barriers. The eastward facing outer
embankment appears to incorporate a trench-like passageway, within and along its
length, along with niches representing fighting/observation positions. Behind these are
bunkers, incorporated into the second perimeter rampart. The fort has been expanded
with an additional rampart added to the west, which includes a right-angled entry into
the installation. A further enclosure was added to the north, with an observation
passage (or trench) looking eastwards. Bunkers and buildings were constructed in the
extensions to the fort, along with two gun (probably mortar) pits. Additional
438
In the far southwest of Berm No. 6, the overwhelming majority of forts are under 10,000 square
meters in area, therefore, and on the face of it, it is hard to differentiate between forts and fortlets.
Nevertheless, fortlets have still been marked out by their smaller size, designated in the southernmost
part of Western Sahara by being under 5000 square metres in area.
155
embankments with some buildings were also constructed outside the fort to the west,
where an identifier for the installation was also inscribed on the ground.
A third example of a complex fort (ft 1274) is visible in Fig. 4.57 (about 470 metres
long by 140 metres wide, with an area of around 50,789 square metres). It is on Berm
No. 4, in sovereign Moroccan territory, and near the border with Algeria. This still
active fort was originally a sub-circular double embanked fortification (around 160
metres in diameter), which was subsequently extended to the north. The initial, near
circular trace includes fighting/observation positions in the outer embankment facing
east, with bunkers and other buildings within the second rampart. There is a clear
entrance on the western side of the fort. Subsequently, the fort had a rectangular
extension added to the north. This too is concentric with multiple embankments, and
with fighting and observation positions in the outer rampart (formerly part of the
frontal bank of Berm No. 4) facing Algeria to the east. There are bunkers and other
buildings within the second frontal embankment, and there is a rectilinear area within
the extension that is possibly a helicopter landing zone. The entry to the fort was made
quite elaborate when the installation was enlarged, with protective earthen banks
being added. There are circular embanked artillery gun emplacements, just outside the
fort to the west, where there is also an installation identifier inscribed on the ground.
Fig. 4.58 shows a distinctive complex fort (ft 290) situated along the Smara salient on
Berm No. 1. This is a large group of enclosures utilising high ground and a spur, and
at least four knolls overlooking a wadi to the east (covering a large area of around
205,581 square kilometres). The core enclosure (around 520 metres long by 360
metres wide) at the lower left centre of the figure has concentric, double embanked
defences with observation and fighting positions facing the east. Behind these are
subterranean bunkers that appear to be roofless, indicating that the fort is redundant.
Similar structures are visible within sub-circular enclosures within the fort, and there
are additional earthen banks. The serpentine, contoured extension to the east also has
fighting and observation posts facing the east, in salient positions and on a knoll,
linked by a communication trench. The single embanked outer perimeter (probably the
latest phase of the defensive ensemble) links a number of knolls which are all fortified
with fighting positions and bunkers, and two of these have communication trenches
156
heading back to the core fortifications. This installation is indeed, a good example of a
multi-part, complex fort.
In summary, from the examples cited here, all mural forts and fortlets have at least
one earthen (sand and stone) rampart or embankment (a berm) surrounding them,
though most have multiple embankments that follow the whole or at least part of the
trace of any given fortification. These encircling banks are not very different from the
linear embankments of the territorial berms, and judging from Google Earth imagery
and terrestrial photography, their profiles and methods of construction (through
bulldozing) are exactly the same. Google Earth imagery shows that in almost all
instances, there are observation and fighting positions along the fronts of the forts and
fortlets. Some of these are open while others are, or were, covered. The latter would
include semi-subterranean bunkers. There are also bunkers within the compounds,
which are undoubtedly for accommodation, command, communication, stores and
munitions (see fig. 4.52). The examples illustrated show that it is not unusual for forts
and fortlets to be internally compartmentalised by earthen blast barriers (see fig. 4.59).
These would protect personnel and facilities if the position was shelled while under
attack, and they could be used to secure internal portions of a fort if an enemy actually
occupied any part of it.
The fighting and observation positions along the perimeter of a fort or fortlet can be
covered or uncovered. Where they are uncovered, they can often appear to be simple
niches within the internal face of a bank or rampart, presumably revetted with stones
or sandbags. Such niches can be seen in Fig. 4.60, where along the trace of the fort,
there is a raised walkway with obvious fighting/observation positions constructed in
the perimeter bank. A comparative example from Israel’s bar Lev line is shown in Fig.
4.61. In this instance, small revetted fighting positions are clearly discernable along
the perimeter of an Israeli Moazim. Such open positions, as would also be the case
with covered positions (bunkers), could undoubtedly accommodate small arms and
machine guns, and as in fig. 4.62, even recoilless guns. Mortar positions could also be
included, but these might be placed deeper within a fort along with limited artillery,
presumably howitzers. It is more usual for ‘big’ guns to be placed in fire support bases
in the rear. Though in contrast to this usual practice, Berm No.1 (and in some
occasional instances Berms No. 3 and 4) has fire support batteries attached, and in
157
some cases constructed as integral to some of its mural forts. But before continuing
with a description of fire support bases (firebases), an overview of other, smaller
mural installations is in order.
Small Mural Installations and Mural Compounds
There are numerous installations attached to the berms that are compounds and/or
fighting positions. Mural compounds (‘mcomp’ in Fig. 4.5) can be of almost any
shape and almost always without internal features. They are apparently cleared areas
enclosed by a single bank. Examples (see Fig. 4.63) are mcomp 251 (about 195 metres
long by 55 metres wide) and mcomp 252 (about 120 metres long by 65 metres wide)
along Berm No. 1, and located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6. There are also, long and
thin rectilinear compounds that can be found attached to, and running longitudinally
along some of the berms. Fig. 4.64 illustrates one such ‘parallel’ compound (‘pcomp’
in Fig. 4.5). Here, the compound (pcomp 132 on Berm No. 1, and located in rectangle
187 of Fig. 4.6) is long and thin (about 370 metres long by 40 metres wide), with a
clear entrance, and an additional longitudinal bank close behind the frontal trace,
facing east. There are no obvious internal buildings, but fighting and/or observation
positions can be made out in the front. It is possible that mural compounds are some
kind of ad hoc troop and material marshalling areas, while parallel compounds are
occupiable fighting and observation positions. Both could have been used on a
contingency basis by Moroccan reaction forces, to counter Polisario attacks or
incursions.
In numerous instances, and along many lengths of the berms, there are small (under 50
metres along their longest side) bastion like features that may very well be smaller
versions of the larger compounds evident along the berms. They may have served as
small mustering positions, or observation and/or ad hoc fighting positions, perhaps
designed to accommodate small detachments of quick reaction forces. They have not
been individually plotted on the project GIS, but elaborate versions of these have been
plotted within sampling rectangle 952 (see Fig. 4.6) at the eastern most extent of Berm
No. 4. Recorded as ‘small occupation positions’ (‘sop’ in Fig. 4.5), they are in effect,
small fortlets, (usually up to 50 to 60 metres along their greatest length) with bunkers
and other structures, and observation and fighting positions. They are very densely
158
distributed along Berm No. 4, facing Algeria (Fig. 4.21), and examples of them are
shown in Fig. 4.65 (sop 2097 and sop 2098).
Many portions of the berms also include individual artillery gun pits just behind them,
and earth embanked vehicular slots – or tank slots – similarly emplaced. There are
also many instances where vehicular slots, for self propelled artillery or tanks, were
constructed up against the berms themselves, presumably to accommodate mobile
firepower that could move along any given length of barrier in a reactive capacity to
any form of attack.439 Examples of vehicular slots and gun pits outside of fortifications
and behind the berms can be seen in Figs. 4.36, 4.37, 4.53, 4.54, 4.57, 4.63 and 4.65.
Fire Support Bases
The fire support base (or firebase) as a distinct entity came into being during the
Vietnam War,440 in an environment where artillery firepower had to be delivered over
all points of the compass. In Vietnam, there was no ‘front line’ as would be commonly
understood, instead, the American military and its allies had to contend with enemy
operations that could ‘erupt’ from almost any location. Because of this, fire support
bases were mainly disposed in a network with the ability to give interlocking and
supportive artillery fire.441
Kelley depicts fire support bases in Vietnam as
ground installations designed to house artillery and/or mortar units firing in support of
maneuvering infantry elements and of other bases within the range of their weapons.
Firebases typically housed infantry security forces and communication elements, units
that varied in size according to the dictates of the terrain, the number of artillery
pieces in place, the estimated size of nearby enemy forces and degree of threat.
Most were generally circular in design (or built in any shape necessary to conform to
the terrain) and contained any number of artillery pieces and/or mortars defended by
various
combinations
of
exterior
439
concertina
wire,
trenches,
sandbagged
Similar positions, constructed for reactive tanks and self propelled artillery were incorporated into
Israel’s Bar Lev Line defences along the Suez Canal (Dunstan 2008: 28).
440
Hay [1974] 1989: 97.
441
Foster 2007: 14.
159
bunkers/foxholes and dirt berms. …landing pads for helicopters were normally built
within or adjacent to most firebases…
442
While Picken, recounting the Australian experience in Vietnam, succinctly describes a
fire support base (FSB) as:
In its simplest sense, the FSB was a rapidly constructed fortified artillery base
position (gun area), usually sited near the centre of the area of operations (AO) and
used as a support base for task force, battalion or company operations. The role of the
FSB was to bring artillery and mortar fire within range of friendly forces operating in
depth.443
Fire Support Bases on the Berms
Although the Moroccan defensive barriers against Polisario are linear, the concept of
the fire support base has obviously been applied to them. Along all of the berms,
firebases are to be found well behind the frontal barriers. However, along segments of
Berm No.1, there are thirteen instances of firebases being part of, or attached to mural
forts (with forty-two further firebases in the rear). This is counter to all of the other
berms, except for Berm No. 3, which has one such installation, and Berm No. 4,
which has four. Two indicative examples of mural forts with integrated firebases,
from Berm No.1, are shown in Figs. 4.66 and 4.67 (mural firebases are abbreviated in
the table in Fig. 4.5 as either ‘ftfb’ – a fort with a firebase as an integral part, or ‘ftfba’
– a fort with a firebase apparently added at a later date).
The first of these, Fig. 4.66, shows a mural fort with an integrated firebase within its
enceinte. This is ftfb 133, on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It
measures about 660 metres by 440 metres, with an area of around 208,701 square
metres. This installation is very much a complex fortification. There appears to be an
initial phase that consisted of an irregular mural fort in an area of low desert relief.
The front of the fort, with its narrow double embankment, and multiple fighting
positions and bunkers, follows natural contours and faces southeast. Its interior is
subdivided with a single embanked enclosure, or compound, that includes four
442
443
Kelley 2002: xix.
Picken 2012.
160
artillery gun pits (measuring between 20 and 26 metres in diameter, and possibly for
self propelled artillery). There are further subdivisions within this compound, and
further buildings or bunkers. Subsequently, the irregular fort, with its internal fire
support capabilities, had added to it, another compound around its northwest side.
This is a single embanked enclosure that is subdivided, including rectilinear
enclosures and one large circular enclosure. There are also, open, ‘U’ shaped
vehicular slots. Traces of the bulldozing to construct the installation are faintly visible
in places, though wind blown sand has masked these. The buildings and bunkers that
are visible are all roofless since this fortification is on a redundant berm.
The second figure, Fig. 4.67, shows a rectilinear mural fort (around 120 metres by 300
metres in area), also on Berm No.1, but with a firebase added onto its northwest flank
(ftfba 16). Located in rectangle 215 of Fig, 4.6, the original mural fort is very clear
and its compartmentalisation with earthen blast barriers, and with routeways, is
sharply delineated. The fort is now redundant, so its internal bunkers and buildings,
which are all roofless, can be easily made out. The rampart surrounding the fort is
single banked, and along its southeast, frontal trace, there is a string of bunkers, and
buildings that presumably represent accommodation as well as observation and
fighting positions. In fact there are probably up to six fighting positions (though faint)
that extend out slightly from the frontal trace like small stubby bastions. The fort has
two right-angled entrances on its northwest flank, and further gaps or entry points
adjacent to where it joins with Berm No. 1. The added firebase compound is
rectilinear in shape (around 80 metres by 230 metres in area) with a very sharply
defined perimeter. It has an entry at its southwest corner, which is shared with the
mural fort. The firebase has few structures in it save for four gun pits, around five
metres in diameter. There is an entry into the fort where there is a concentration of
buildings, which might, by virtue of their closeness to the firebase, represent a fire
command centre. The overall area of the installation is 60,339 square metres.
Fire Support Bases Behind the Berms
As already pointed out, the overwhelming majority of fire support bases are located
behind the territorial berms. The distances vary from anywhere between, less than 200
metres to more than 14 kilometres. Because the berms are usually sited on relatively
high ground so as to get a good view of the terrain in front of them, firebases are
161
commonly found on slightly lower ground behind them. There are even instances
where a firebase is deliberately positioned behind a hill or hillock. Firebases are
usually surrounded by an earth embankment, and within them, there can be from two
to 13 artillery gun emplacements (usually gun pits). Single gun installations are very
uncommon, but there are also firebases built to accommodate self-propelled artillery,
and in these instances the guns can be sited in large vehicular slots. Seven indicative
examples of firebases are described below, mainly to illustrate apparent trends in the
construction of the installations and the disposition of their guns. As in the foregoing
descriptions of other installations along the berms, the following ‘snapshots’ have
been taken from, or close to, the sampled rectangles selected from Google Earth.
Fig. 4.68 illustrates a polygonal shaped firebase (fsb 1470), positioned more than four
kilometres behind, and to the northwest of Berm No. 5 (and located to the west of
rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6). The firebase was originally sub-square in plan, but its
northeast corner had been cut back, perhaps to allow the stagnant water that
apparently accumulated in the wadi, against the base’s northern perimeter, to drain
away (though perhaps, unsuccessfully). The firebase is surrounded by a single
embankment, which has been constructed and maintained by bulldozing. It has an area
of around 103,436 square metres with sides measuring approximately 390 metres by
340 metres. The firebase is on an active length of Berm No. 5, facing Polisario
controlled territory. There are numerous buildings and bunkers clearly visible within
the compound, along with marked out routeways and some less clear vehicular slots.
The entrance to the firebase is from the north and a helicopter landing zone (partly
surrounded by stagnant water) is nearby. There are three gun pits in a line from westnorthwest to east-southeast and they have an average internal diameter of 23 metres.
They all have structures on both sides of their open ends, which are probably crew
shelters, and/or ammunition stores. The Google Earth image actually shows selfpropelled artillery within each gun pit, and their large diameters would be necessary
for such mobile guns to manoeuvre.
An example of a more rectilinear firebase (fsb 1255), located just over five kilometres
behind Berm No. 4, is clearly shown in Fig. 4.69 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6).
It has an area of around 70,000 square metres with sides measuring approximately 335
metres by 265 metres. This installation is within sovereign Moroccan territory facing
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the border with Algeria to the east, and it is clearly occupied with artillery in its gun
pits and with its bunkers and buildings roofed. This base could also be considered a
‘complex’ installation since it has a compartmentalised extension to the north. The
firebase has a double embanked perimeter along three of its sides, along which are
observation positions and bunkers. There are also other bunkers and buildings
distributed throughout the installation. There are right-angled entries into the base, at
the north and southwest corners, and there are four gun pits with well-defined circular
embankments. Their internal diameters average out at under 17 metres. Three of them,
which are linked by earthen banks, have external, oblong earthworks attached to them.
These are possibly for ammunition storage or other vehicles, while within the parapets
outlining the gun pits, there are small square structures or bunkers – possibly crew
shelters. The Google Earth image clearly shows that there are self-propelled artillery
pieces in each gun pit. There is at least one clearly defined, possible gun pit outside
the firebase, and being at around 10 metres in diameter, it could accommodate a
howitzer, or just serve as an observation post. There is a cleared square area just
outside the base’s southern perimeter, which is barely visible, and this might be a
helicopter landing zone.
An example of a sub-circular fire support base (fsb 1327), positioned around 4.25
kilometres behind Berm No. 5 is shown in Fig. 4.70 (located in rectangle 583 of Fig.
4.6). The firebase is positioned behind the redundant portion of Berm No. 5 to the
west of Berm No. 6, and it is obviously out of use since all of its bunkers and
buildings are roofless. Nevertheless, (with an area of around 26,876 square metres,
and with a diameter of nearly 200 metres) this is a good example of a well-defined
firebase with a total of five gun pits, all with internal diameters of around 18 metres.
Four of the gun positions are along the southern perimeter of the base with the fifth
gun pit just north of centre. The firebase has a single perimeter embankment, and
observation positions are distributed along it. There are bunkers associated with the
gun pits and there are a variety of buildings within the northern trace of the base.
There is also a half circular enclosure within the northern side of the installation. The
entrance to the base is from the northeast, and it is protected by an external blast
barrier. There are depressions from bulldozing around the installation, presumably
from its maintenance as well as construction.
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The redundant fire support base (fsb 1257) shown in Fig. 4.71 is situated two
kilometres east-southeast of fsb 1255 (described above) and west-northwest of Berm
No. 4. This part of Berm No. 4 is still actively occupied, but fsb 1257 obviously went
out of use at some time, presumably to be replaced by fsb 1255 (both firebases are in
rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). The firebase can be considered as being irregular in shape,
though it is essentially a bent oblong with its convex side facing the Algerian frontier
to the east. Its length is around 455 metres with a width of roughly 270 metres, and
with an area of 67,737 square metres. The installation is surrounded by a single
earthen bank, and there are additional enclosures along its western side. There are two
entrances into the base. One is at the northwest end, protected by a blast barrier, while
the second is at the southwest end, passing through an outer enclosure. There are the
remains of roofless bunkers along the base’s eastern trace along with depressions and
mounds at the very south of the installation. There are four obvious gun pits, more or
less in a line arcing to the east. Their internal diameters average out at around 19
metres and most have small rectangular earthworks at their openings, which are
probably the remains of crew shelters. There is a further arced parapet, immediately
north of the gun pits, and this has an internal earthwork. Superficially, this looks like a
gun pit, but it might be the remains of some kind of command position. The size of the
gun pits suggests that they were designed for self-propelled artillery.
A complex fire support base (fsb 237) is illustrated in Fig. 4.72 (located in rectangle
157 of Fig. 4.6). This redundant installation is just over one kilometre north of Berm
No. 1. Its overall dimensions are around 230 metres by 223 metres with an area of
about 32,305 square metres. The main part of the firebase is a sub-circular, earthen
enclosure with four gun pits integrated into its perimeter. There is also a central gun
pit and just to the north, a sub-rectangular embanked enclosure, capable of housing
another gun. Two further compounds are up against the immediate perimeter to the
north. The main sub-circular enclosure has an additional, mantle like, compound
around its northern end wherein there are two further gun pits, unroofed bunkers, and
vehicular slots. The entrance into the firebase is from the north. The five gun pits in
the southern half of the main part of the installation have internal diameters averaging
eight metres. This indicates that they were probably designed for towed artillery. The
two perimeter compounds north of these average, internally, at just over 12 metres in
diameter, while the rectilinear enclosure (north of centre) is eight by 14 metres in area.
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These last three positions might have been designed for self-propelled artillery
(perhaps turreted howitzers). The two gun pits in the northern, outer part of the
installation, have internal diameters of around 10 metres. These could house either
towed artillery or self-propelled howitzers.
Fig. 4.73 shows a firebase (fsb 703, located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6) designed to
accommodate self-propelled artillery. The installation is located about one kilometre
northwest of Berm No. 3, and it measures around 225 metres by 250 metres, with an
approximate area of 47,596 square metres. It is partly surrounded by a sub-circular
embankment that is incomplete, incorporating a plateau like rise in the ground to the
east-southeast. This would also mask the firebase from the territorial berm. This
firebase is redundant, as is the section of Berm No. 3 that it is associated with, being
situated behind Berm No. 4. Tracks from the bulldozing to construct this base are
clearly visible in the Google Earth image. The main features in the installation are the
four, open vehicular slots that face east-southeast towards Berm No. 3. They are
between nine and 10 metres long by around six metres wide, internally, and at least
three of them have the remains of bunker-like structures (now roofless) associated
with them. These would have served as shelters for the gun crews. Because these
vehicular slots are mono-directional, it is probable that they were intended for selfpropelled howitzers with rotating turrets. There is a round dugout behind the slots, and
to the west, there are the remains of a couple of features that might be roofless
bunkers.
The last illustrative example of a fire support base (fsb 682) is shown in Fig. 4.74
(located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It too is situated behind Berm No. 3, and it
appears to have been abandoned, even though the barrier to its south is still active. In
fact, it is only around 1.5 kilometres north-northeast of fort ft 681 (described above).
This firebase is an example of an unenclosed artillery position, covering an area of
around 190 metres by 180 metres, at approximately 36,693 square metres in area. It is
hidden behind a knoll to the south, and a second to the northwest. The southern knoll
has been fortified with earth embankments and dugouts, and at least two vehicular
slots for tanks or self-propelled guns. There are also dugout positions on the eastern
slope of the northwesterly knoll. There are three artillery gun pits laid out in a
triangular fashion. They have dugouts and earthworks that probably represent bunkers
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associated with them. The average internal diameter of the gun pits is 17 metres (and
they are around 60 to 80 metres apart), so it is likely that they housed self-propelled
artillery. But one of the gun pits appears to have the roofless remains of a bunker
within it, and this might very well represent a later phase when the function of the
position might have changed, perhaps from a firebase to a field encampment.
The examples of fire support bases depicted here (including the mural forts with
firebases) indicate the generalised range of morphology, and fixtures, of firebases
behind the Moroccan berms. All have a single earth embankment surrounding them,
except for one, and the majority of gun pits are large enough for self-propelled
artillery. Of the examples cited, the numbers of gun pits range from three to five (with
the potential, elsewhere along the berms, of up to 10 in one installation). Additional
structures include bunkers for shelter and accommodation, with the largest associated
building or bunker probably representing a command and communications post.444
For comparative purposes, see Fig. 4.75, which is a contemporary sketch of firebase
Kramer in Vietnam. There are real schematic similarities in this drawing with the
firebases along the Moroccan berms, especially if the tents are replaced with mud
brick or stone structures, and bunkers. See also Fig. 4.76, which clearly shows the
layout of firebase Roy in Vietnam. This base accommodated self-propelled artillery,
and the photograph shows the immediate buildings and structures associated with the
gun pits, with further ancillary structures and tents. However, unlike in Vietnam,
where American firebase gun pits were laid out in a circular or star like formation,445
in Western Sahara, many of the bases have their guns laid out in arcs, convexly
directed toward the nearby territorial berm. Nevertheless, the artillery employed
would still be able to give all round fire support if required. A low level aerial view of
such a Moroccan firebase, unfortunately at an unknown location, is shown in Fig.
4.77, and this clearly shows an arc of self-propelled guns with associated parapets and
buildings, some of which are semi-subterranean.
444
445
For descriptions of fire support bases see Arnold 1987, Foster 2007, and Ott 1995
Arnold 1987, Foster 2007, and Ott 1995.
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Other Installations: installations in the rear
There are support installations and facilities behind all of the territorial berms. These
can be simple compounds (‘comp’ in Fig. 4.5) with no, or very minimal internal
features, but similar to the mural compounds visible along the territorial berms.
Examples of such compounds from Berm No. 1 (comps 256 and 257) are shown in
Fig. 4.78 (they are both around 60 metres by 40 metres in area). Here, the compounds
are situated in a broad wadi beneath higher ground to the west, with the territorial
berm around 1.25 kilometres to the south. The southern compound (comp 257) is in
two parts (a dividing embankment is faintly visible), while comp 256, to the north,
includes a faint circular feature that could have housed a gun. As with mural
compounds, it is possible that these installations were constructed to serve as
mustering positions and temporary storage compounds. Both compounds are located
in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6.
There are also forts positioned in the rear (‘raft’ in Fig. 4.5), and these can include
enclosures with single embankments surrounding a military camp, or garrison, as in
the example shown in Fig. 4.79. In this view from Berm No. 6 (located to the north of
rectangle 853 in Fig. 4.6), the fort (rft 1674) is subdivided into three large
compartments by slight embankments, and there are various buildings spread
throughout the installation. The boundary rampart is irregularly delineated, and the
main entrance is along the south side. This installation is just under 10 kilometres
north of Berm No. 6, and it measures around 415 metres by 380 meters, with an area
of approximately 119,763 square metres. The facility is very much a camp as opposed
to a fort, strong point, or fighting base. Another example, this time of a very
developed camp just east of Smara and immediately behind Berm No. 1 is rft 282,
shown in Fig. 4.80 (located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The irregular outline of this
facility follows the contours of the higher ground that it is situated on, and its
perimeter rampart includes observation and fighting positions. There are many
buildings and vehicle parks, plus a sports field. There are clearly marked out
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routeways, helicopter pads and a communications pylon. This installation is around
550 metres by 385 metres in plan, with an area of around 115,184 square metres.
However, some forts in the rear are constructed just like mural forts, and in these
instances they are usually positioned very close to the berm. One such example is rft
236 (see Fig. 4.81), a now redundant fort only around half a kilometre north of Berm
No. 1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). It conforms to the expected layouts of
polygonal mural forts: it is concentric with two ramparts, and it measures around 235
metres by 150 metres, with an area of about 27,465 square metres. The outer bank has
fighting positions and observation posts (presumably including bunkers – now
unroofed), while the inner compound has been subdivided by earthen blast barriers.
The entrance is protected by a blast barrier, and traces of bulldozing, presumably from
upkeep as well as construction, are clearly visible. For all intents and purposes, this is
a mural fort, which for reasons of military contingency has been positioned behind
Berm No. 1, as opposed to being positioned on it. Another example of a fort in the
rear is rft 706 (see Fig. 4.82), less than four kilometres northwest of the redundant part
of Berm No. 3. This fort has an irregular single rampart around it, and there are
extensions to the north and west. The installation is compartmentalised, and possible
earthen bunkers or partly subterranean structures, though now roofless, are just
visible. There are also three bulldozed vehicular slots that could have accommodated
self-propelled artillery. What looks like the main entrance into the fort is from the
south, and it has a blast barrier in front of it. Also, it is interesting to note that this
redundant installation is in relatively low-lying ground, which has caused water from
seasonal rains, to accumulate within its southern compound. The fort covers an area of
around 97,070 square metres, measuring overall, about 425 metres by 370 metres. It is
located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6.
In the Guelta Zemmour region, it is not unusual to find forts in the rear that are
situated on top of rocky hills, or along ridges. One such fort (rft 1588), at around one
kilometre northwest of Berm No. 5, is shown in Fig. 4.83 (located in rectangle 359 of
Fig. 4.6). Here, a narrow ridge top enclosure (around 35 metres wide by 205 metres
long, with an area of just under 4,500 square metres) is clearly shown with buildings,
undoubtedly including bunkers, hugging the frontal trace of an installation that
obviously follows natural contours. There is a clear entry via a track that passes a
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probable, helicopter landing zone to the immediate northwest. There is also a ridge top
rampart that extends northwards, following the lie of the land. A low level aerial
photograph of a similar ridge type installation (though more densely packed with
buildings) is shown in Fig. 4.84. In this image (though its precise position is
unknown), buildings and bunkers cling to the ridge of a hill much like a closely
packed hill top village from, for instance, the Mediterranean or the Levant. It is also
fortified, in that a trench or parapet can be made out along the farther edge of the
buildings.
There are also enclosed and unenclosed military camps or garrisons (‘gar’ in Fig. 4.5)
behind the berms. They consist of numerous buildings similar to those in Fig. 4.84 but
more spread out, especially if situated on flatter ground. A Google Earth image of part
of an unenclosed camp (gar 1112) around 8.5 kilometres north of Berm No. 4
(measuring around 775 metres by 575 metres in area) is shown in Fig. 4.85 (located in
rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6), while Fig. 4.86 illustrates the nature of such a camp from a
low level aerial view. In fact, this unattributed aerial photograph is an image of gar
1112 taken from the north, and it shows the buildings along the wadi that runs
diagonally in the lower left corner of Fig. 4.85 (and marked out with a rectangle).
These images clearly illustrate the nature of a Moroccan military camp in the desert. It
shows the irregularity of the camp’s layout with a variety of relatively small buildings,
some of which are above ground while others are partially subterranean, and it shows
lines of armoured personnel carriers indicating that this is a base for a rapid reaction
force. The Google Earth satellite image (Fig. 4.85) of gar 1112 also shows lines of
vehicles, and these are probably armoured personnel carriers just like the ones in Fig.
4.86.
Summary
This chapter has had the sole aim of trying to present, in a comprehensive manner, the
monumental materiality of the Moroccan berms. This has been in stark contrast to the
limited descriptions and anecdotes about the barriers usually put forward by analysts,
commentators,
and
journalists.
The
methodology
has
been
traditionally
archaeological, relying on description and a form of sampling, though dependant on
169
remotely collected imagery, mainly from Google Earth. Such an approach is within
the forensic range of archaeological methodologies.
Other great military barriers can be directly engaged with, such as the Great Wall of
China and Hadrian’s Wall. To anyone on the ground, they are constituted and
apprehendable. Even the Palestinian barrier built by Israel can be encountered
materially, and therefore directly. As pedestrians, these barriers can be walked along,
and upon, though of course, the Palestinian barrier can only be observed from ground
level. With the Moroccan barrier dividing Western Sahara still manned and mined, it
is unapproachable. Its scale is immense. By covering a national territory, and by
varying in its makeup across that territory, the barriers are hard to conceive of
holistically. The tables and plots presented here, along with satellite and other
imagery, therefore, have had the main aim of trying to mitigate this. Counts of forts,
lengths and types of earthen banks, along with maps and photo images, do not have to
be used for statistical presentation and analysis only; they can be used by our
imaginations and our critical faculties, to gain an understanding and appreciation of
the monumental character of the barriers dividing and partitioning Western Sahara.
Although we can only look at, and chart, the Moroccan berms from afar, there are
those who have faced the barriers directly, either as combatants, as journalists, or as
refugees trying to cross the barriers from the Moroccan side to the Polisario controlled
Free Zone. Such people have had direct experiences of the berms, and concomitant to
this chapter, it is their confrontations with Morocco’s ‘Great Wall’ that are dealt with
next, in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
CONFRONTING THE BERMS
This chapter continues on from Chapter 4, with an aim of giving greater presence to
the materiality of the Moroccan berms: but not through the panoptic gaze of Google
Earth. Instead, it will give the distanced view of the berms, and the desert in which
they are disposed, a greater depth by bringing the Moroccan barriers down to a human
scale. The emphasis is on how desert regions have been fought over in asymmetrical
war, and by extension, how the barriers have been perceived, confronted and
negotiated on the ground, by either attacking fighters, occupiers, observers, or
civilians desperately trying to cross from Moroccan occupied Western Sahara to the
Polisario controlled Free Zone.
Mobile Guerrilla Tactics
Before the berms were completed – enclosing most of Western Sahara –
Polisario/SPLA held sway over the territory’s open desert. Their long-range raids,
even into Morocco and Mauritania, were audacious. But since in the end they could
never match the manpower and material of the Moroccan armed forces, their fighting
strength could only lay in their revival of the traditional Arab raid, or ghazi.
Chapter 3 has already described the revival of the ghazi in the context of the anticolonial hostilities that took place in the western Sahara, from the late 19th century up
to the Ifni-Sahara War of the late 1950s, and further still up into the last quarter of the
20th century. Outside of the context of inter-tribal conflict, the employment of the
surprise, lightening raid has been an important tactic for any weaker hostile in an
asymmetric war. Hugh Kennedy noted a 7th century occurrence where ‘a wily old
Bedouin leader’ gave advice to a force of inexperienced Iraqis invading Syria. He
encouraged them to reconnoitre the position of the nearest water source and to use
their mounted mobility to position themselves between the water source and the
171
enemy. They were urged not to fight on open ground so that the larger Syrian force
could not surround them.
They should not stand still or form a traditional line of battle because their opponents
had both horsemen and foot soldiers and each group would support the other in closequarter combat. If the[ir] line was broken, it would be disastrous. Instead, they should
keep the advantages offered by their mobility and divide the[ir] army into small
squadrons (katā’ib), each of which could support the others.446
This is clearly a description, from a Bedouin perspective, of a fast moving, mounted
engagement, where knowledge of terrain, unconventional fighting, and fighting in
small groups, with a flexibility of manoeuvre and mutual support is described in an
asymmetric situation. This too was the essence of partisan warfare, for instance, in
Spain during the Peninsular War of 1808-1814. With a superior knowledge of the
countryside, insurgents harassed the occupying French army in small groups. They
would quickly attack and then withdraw, and attack again, incessantly harassing the
enemy,447 giving us the term guerrilla, from the Spanish for ‘little war’ or petit
guerre.
Guerrilla tactics stem from the basic tenet of their forces seeking only to give battle
on their terms, which entails knowing their opponent’s position and strength, knowing
when it is possible to isolate him from help or escape before help arrives, having the
element of surprise on their side and fighting at a time of their choosing… The
ambush and raid are their favoured tactical methods.448
This method of warfare was honed by T.E. Lawrence in the Hejaz, during the Arab
Revolt of 1916-1918, during the First World War. Lawrence could not reconcile
warfare as practiced by the established armies of the time, with the tactics of the
irregular tribesman that were the bulwark of the Arab revolt against Turkey, especially
within the geographic expanse of Arabia. So Lawrence went back to first principles,
as he wrote, he realigned his thinking by re-contextualising it, and as he said, taking
446
Kennedy 2007: 60.
Chartrand 1999: 165-166.
448
Smith 2006: 157.
447
172
‘refuge in Arabia’, and thereby, looking at the very land area the Arabs ‘wished to
deliver’.
I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps
one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all
that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with
banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing
intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were
like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We
might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s head;
and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to
the killing.449
This echoes a view expressed by Clauswitz more than 80 years earlier, who when
writing about a ‘people in arms’, described a guerrilla war as one which by its nature,
would not consist of concentrated actions and troops movements. Instead, such an
insurgency would be spread out spatially and temporally, and be more like a ‘process
of evaporation’, depending ‘on how much surface is exposed’.
The greater the surface and the area of contact between it [the insurgents] and the
enemy forces, the thinner the latter have to be spread, the greater the effect of a
general uprising. Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the
enemy forces.450
And presaging Lawrence, Clauswitz went on to describe a popular uprising as one that
‘should be nebulous and elusive’ and never materializing ‘as a concrete body’, so that
the enemy could not strike at it decisively. Nevertheless, guerrillas should still be able
to hit their enemy in a concentrated way. Though described like a ‘fog’, they ‘must
thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightning may
strike at any time’.451 Lawrence recognised that the Arabs of the Hejaz, as with
Polisario combatants, had ‘range over force’. They had strategic, not tactical strength.
‘Their cards were speed and time, not hitting power’,452 and this was only possible
449
Lawrence [1926] 1974: 197-198.
Clauswitz 1993: 579.
451
Clauswitz 1993: 581.
452
Lawrence [1929] 2005: 280-281.
450
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because of the camel and the Bedouin’s knowledge of the desert. Though added to this
was the employment of armoured cars, which became integral to the campaigns in the
Middle East, including the Hejaz. With Europeans becoming comfortable with the use
of armed motor vehicles in rough, desert terrains, they eventually developed ‘a style
and art of sand-driving’,453 which would evolve into a truly 20th century approach to
desert warfare, of which the Polisario/SPLA would become beneficiaries.
The Italians first used armoured cars in Libya in 1912.454 But the British, besides
employing heavy and light armoured cars in the Middle East in World War One, also
organised Light Car Patrols in Egypt’s Western Desert, from 1916 to 1919.455 These
were cut down Model T Fords, with some armed with machine guns, which proved
highly effective for reconnaissance patrols and raiding against Sanusi insurgents from
Italian occupied Libya during 1915-1917. Rolls Royce armoured cars had proved their
worth as attack vehicles, but in facing the Sanusi, the lighter Ford’s, with their ease of
maintenance and high wheel bases became vehicles of choice.456 Theses cars proved
that the deeper desert could be accessed by appropriately fitted out motor vehicles,
and could be used in desert warfare. They became the inspiration for R.A. Bagnold’s
use of motorcars in his explorations of the Libyan Desert from 1929 to 1938,457 and
equally, the inspiration for the Long Range Desert Group of the Second World War.458
Closer to Western Sahara, however, the French employed motorised Foreign Legion
units, which took part in their occupation of the western reaches of the Sahara. These
were mainly armoured cars patrolling throughout the Algerian Sahara, southern
Morocco, and Mauritania, and supporting French actions in ensuring the pacification
of the tribes based in Western Sahara and northern Mauritania.459 The Italians also
developed their offensive desert motorized capabilities between the two World Wars.
In 1938, their Libyan Saharan Companies were reorganised and motorised and they
developed the Sahariana desert patrol car – designed specifically for long distance
desert travel and fighting.460
453
Lawrence [1926] 1974: 177.
Macksey 1995: 37.
455
Harold 2005.
456
McGuirk 2007: 261.
457
Bagnold [1935] 2010.
458
Kennedy Shaw 1945: 11-13.
459
Windrow 2011: 603-605.
460
Molinari 2007: 12 & 27, and Trye 1999: 121-122.
454
174
With the onset of World War Two, and with the threat of an Italian invasion of British
held Egypt, Ralph Bagnold proposed an approach to desert fighting that would not
have been out of place to Lawrence some 25 years earlier, and the Polisario in the last
quarter of the 20th century. In 1940, Bagnold approached Sir Archibald Wavell,
Britain’s Commander in Chief in the Middle East, with the idea of self contained,
motorised units being employed to enter Libya through the deeper desert – where he
explored between the wars – to reconnoitre and harass Italian forces. In short, in
Bagnold’s own words, to carry out ‘piracy on the high desert’.461 This comparison
with piracy, with war on the high seas, was an analogue used by Lawrence in
describing the Hejaz campaign against the Turks.
In character these operations were like naval warfare, in their mobility, their ubiquity,
their independence of bases and communications, in their ignoring of ground features,
of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. ‘He who commands the sea is at
great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will’: he who
commands the desert is equally fortunate. Camel raiding parties, self-contained like
ships, could cruise securely along the enemy’s land-frontier, just out of sight of his
posts along the edge of cultivation, and tap or raid into his lines where it seemed
fittest or easiest or most profitable, with a sure retreat always behind them into an
element which the Turks could not enter.462
This description by Lawrence can equally apply to the tactics of the Polisario/SPLA in
their war with Morocco and Mauritania. While Lawrence’s fighters were camel
mounted, the raiders of the LRDG and Polisario were vehicle mounted. As such, their
ranges were greater, and they could carry adequate fuel and supplies and be selfsufficient. While Polisario undertook long-range raids into sovereign Mauritanian and
Moroccan territory, just as the LRDG did in their raids into Italian Libya, their
embracing of motorized guerrilla tactics affected how they confronted the Moroccan
berms, and their raids affected the reactions of the Moroccan military.
461
462
Thompson 1998: 17, citing Bagnold (n.d.).
Lawrence [1929] 2005: 281.
175
Polisario Confronting the Berms
In 1986, the journalist Jeremy Harding visited Western Sahara and saw a portion of
the berms at close quarters. His Polisario guide, Nuruddin, though able to speak a
number of European languages often condemned the wall with the French term ‘la
pourriture’, referring to the barrier as something rotting, something in decay. His view
was simple and contemptuous. If the wall were left alone, it would just crumble away,
it would return to the desert from which it was made.463 But the archaeology of the
berms tells a different story, and in time, traces of the walls will be indelibly inscribed
onto the desert’s surface, save perhaps, in those extremely sandy regions where the
desert winds are their strongest.
Polisario insurgents undoubtedly had the upper hand in their fight against Mauritania
and Morocco, and then Morocco on its own, in the vast desert spaces of Western
Sahara. Like Lawrence’s camel mounted raiders, and Bagnold’s LRDG, they would
exploit their intimate knowledge of the desert, and they would harass and attack
Moroccan positions. Their guerrilla tactics were finely honed, and with small groups
of armed Land Rovers they would always attack Moroccan positions, on the move,
and then quickly withdraw. Additionally, when Polisario forces occupied a Moroccan
position they would not stay long, but again withdraw, and rapidly attack another
Moroccan strong point. Such continued harrying of the Moroccans improved the
SPLA’s fighting abilities, and the Moroccans were even more vulnerable when the
attacks occurred in the hotter times of the year, with the Saharawis being much more
comfortable in the Summer heat than the majority of Moroccan soldiers.464
Although Saharawi tactics could include large columns of tens of vehicles, even up to
a hundred or more at a time (also including armoured vehicles), in the end, their
strength lay with their own modern and mechanized form of the smaller scale ghazi.
As Chapter 6 will show, as at Tifariti, these tactics were highly successful in taking
Moroccan occupied positions in the badiya. But when the berms were constructed, for
all of Nuruddin’s contempt, the Moroccan barriers did put a substantial break on
463
464
Harding 1989: 25.
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez 2005: 77-78.
176
Polisario’s offensive effectiveness.465 This being the case, Jon Anderson sardonically
described the war with Morocco as turning into a ‘kind of military pantomime’, where
appearing to be at war took the place of real hostilities. To Anderson, who visited
Western Sahara between 1988 and 1991, Polisario’s offensiveness merely became
orchestrated ‘displays of their military prowess’. The berms made a ‘mockery’ of the
war, forcing the Saharawis to symbolically continue to assault the barriers, to breath
life into the conflict as a sort of ‘bellicose ritual or blood sport. Like a family seeking
to retain the semblance of a nobler lineage than present appearances suggest’.
Anderson additionally observed that Saharawi participants in these actions talked
about them for months after the fact. He went on to say:
Indeed, these battles amount to precious heirlooms, material for the carefully tended
oral history of a war that now exists mostly in name. Guerilla veterans like Moulay
[Anderson’s guide] are discernibly wistful, speaking as if their best times were behind
them, back in the days before the wall.466
Contrary to this, Polisario combatants were still able to occasionally attack the berms
in a relatively conventional way and bloody the Moroccan defenders. One very bad
year for Morocco was 1987 when substantial Polisario forces attacked the Moroccan
military in 16 locations.467 A common Polisario attack on the barrier, according to
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez, could target two mutually supporting mural posts
at the same time, approached at night to avoid detection. The first phase would be a
mechanised incursion across the barrier followed by a second phase of further
vehicular and tank attacks on the two posts. While holding the forts, the force that
crossed the berm would wait and engage the Moroccan rapid reaction force that would
be called into the battle (in a third phase), and deal them as fatal a blow as possible.
Another Polisario motorised unit would give back up to the attackers and take
captured material and prisoners to the rear.468 Such a surprise attack could only shock
the Moroccans, cause them to deploy forces away from other positions, destroy
material and give the Moroccans a ‘bloody nose’. But a territorial inroad would not be
made. These were essentially harrying attacks, and that was all the SPLA was able to
465
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 23.
Anderson 2006: 158-159.
467
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez 2005: 112.
468
Fuente Cobo and Mariño Menéndez 2005, pp. 112-114.
466
177
do to a lesser or greater degree. But Polisario and the SPLA could be mischievous in
their relationship with the berms. It was not unusual for them to approach the berms at
night, and as already pointed out, remove mines from in front of the barriers and
rebury them behind the Moroccan positions.469 Such a simple attritional tactic could
only add to the spectre like quality of the Saharawi insurgents.
Moroccan Soldiers and the Berms
The Moroccan forces manning the berms (and numbering up to 120,000470) have
mainly been conscripts, save for the officer class, and many came from the more
temperate parts of Morocco north of the Wadis Draa and Sus, and including the very
clement Rif and Atlas mountain regions.471 Because of this, they were not used to the
extreme heat of Western Saharan summers, when Polisario would increase their
operations, and this definitely took its toll on them.472 Although, as already pointed
out, this research mainly looks at the Western Sahara conflict from the Saharawi
perspective, there is at least one Moroccan soldier whose experiences of manning the
berms can inform this dissertation.
In 2010 the Algerian journalist and writer on Arab affairs, Anouar (Anwar) Malek
interviewed a Moroccan army deserter for the Algerian newspaper Echourak, and it
was published online. The soldier was an infantry officer named Abdelilahou Issou
who was commissioned in 1988 and rose to become the head of an infantry company.
Stationed along one of the berms facing Polisario held territory, he explained that an
infantry company could be split up and stationed at different posts along the barrier,
between which were unmonitored lengths of berm fronted by land mines and barbed
wire. The minefields and barbed wire failed to prevent the SPLA from infiltrating the
barrier, and, according to Issou, the Moroccan units facing a mechanised Polisario
attack would often flee ‘in disarray’.473 This might be an exaggeration, but it tallies
with some of the comments made by Polisario interviewees, Mohammed Deya and
Habua Breica – that Moroccan soldiers would easily give up after a fight and that
469
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 22.
Pazzanita 2006: 92.
471
Hodges 1984: 103.
472
Jensen 2013: 35.
473
Malek 2010.
470
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Polisario tactics were a psychological strain on them.474 Issou claims to have thwarted
a number of Polisario incursions between 1988 and 1990 but he became bitter when
his resources were reduced (for instance, he described himself as being ‘downsized’ –
presumably he meant that the number of men under his command was reduced).
In his interview, Abdelilahou Issou never mentioned where he was stationed along the
berms, but he talked about continual attacks by the SPLA. Saying that ‘Polisario
fighters pounded daily our positions with heavy machine-guns causing many
casualties among the Moroccan troops’. He added that the soldiers’ lives became a
‘nightmare’ from Polisario’s ‘relentless and ill-fated attacks’. Though he also claimed
that Saharawi ‘commandos’ would sneak into Moroccan army barracks and slit the
throats of sleeping soldiers, which made him very fearful and kept him up at night.475
This last point is out of keeping with the way in which Polisario have presented
themselves as behaving throughout the sixteen years of war. As Anderson noted:
Polisario has refrained from using terrorism to strike at Morocco beyond the wall.
Because it pretends to nationhood, the Polisario affects the sober demeanor seemingly
appropriate for a sovereign state: Its fighters aren’t called guerrillas, but soldiers – and
soldiers, of course, don’t commit acts of terrorism. This is war with a sense of honour,
fought on the battlefield.476
But a sense of honour was not apparent on the battlefield, according to one Moroccan
army doctor who was captured by Polisario during the fighting at Lebouirate in 1979,
and recounted that he saw Polisario fighters kill wounded Moroccan soldiers in their
hospital beds.477 Honest accounts of all wars will show that extreme brutality can
occur on all sides. Even one of my informants, Malainin Larkhal, who has maintained
that Polisario fought honourably since it was against their ‘Saharawi culture’ to do
otherwise, has commented that if hostilities were to resume between Morocco and the
SADR, the younger fighters of today, out of frustration with the political impasse that
exists over Western Sahara and the maltreatment of Saharawis in the occupied
474
Deya, Interview and Breica, Interview, 2 November.
Malek 2010.
476
Anderson [1992] 2006: 159-160.
477
Account of Dr. Azeddine Benmansour, captured by Polisario/SPLA at Lebouirate, Morocco, 24
August 1979. In Hollowell 2009: 37-39.
475
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territories, would fight with a greater brutality than any of that which might have
occurred in the war before the 1991 ceasefire.478
Crossing the Berms
There are those who have taken the extreme step of leaving the Moroccan occupied
zone for the Polisario liberated one, and have done so by walking hundreds of
kilometres across open desert, crossing over the berms, and traversing the minefields.
Many have been activists who would have faced imprisonment for their political
activities, such as Malainin Larkhal and Hamdi Touballi, or they have been idealistic
teenagers like Salek Labaidi Bachir. These individuals have had a very direct
experience of the Moroccan barriers, and not as military personnel cosseted within
defended camps and positions, but as vulnerable civilians, pedestrians, facing first the
open desert, and then the complete panoply of the fortified berms.
Salek Labaidi’s ‘story’ began in 2004, when as a teenager of seventeen, he and some
friends were appalled by the treatment of corralled camels by the Moroccan army in
the city of Smara, in the occupied zone. As Salek recounted in an interview:
[The] Moroccan soldiers had caught the camels close to the Moroccan wall, and they
were taken to Smara where I lived. The soldiers didn’t feed or water them, but the
camel means our [Saharawi way of] life, our culture. We, and the people of Smara,
felt strongly that the soldiers did something bad.479
So Salek, with four friends broke into the camel compound and freed the camels, and
as a result, the friends found themselves crossing the desert, and escaping into the
liberated Polisario held territory southeast of Smara. What is striking, is that this was
not an obviously political act, instead, the teenagers were moved by a perceived
societal imperative to liberate an animal which represented the essence of Saharawi
culture. The camel is the animal upon which their traditional, nomadic, pastoral
society depended, and since there are no oases as such in Western Sahara (save for the
valley of the Saguia al-Hamra), the following of the rains by camel, across vast ranges
478
479
Larkhal, Interview.
Bachir, Interview.
180
to seek out pasture and temporary water sources, was integral to the centuries old
lifeways of the Saharawi tribes. As already noted, this was why the largest of the
Saharawi tribes, the Reguibat, used to be known as ‘the people of the clouds’,480
meaning that they would follow the clouds that bring the rains, and this could only be
done by camel.
This act of ‘animal liberation’ caused Salek and his companions to walk seventy
kilometres, towards and across the berms that surround Smara, and into the liberated
zone. They passed a rear support base, and then ten kilometres further, to the southsoutheast, they stood on a hill which overlooked the barrier. ‘After a short walk, we
saw the berm, it was very big, like a snake’.481 It was one o’clock in the morning and
the moon was out. Salek described the land around the berm as barren, and there were
lights from the small bases along the barrier. Upon encountering the barrier, Salek was
initially confronted by a dry-stone wall around one and a half metres high by three
quarters of a metre thick (see Fig. 4.41). Then at about three metres distant, a two
metre high earthen bank, followed again by a second similar bank with a single fence
of barbed wire in the front. There was a military base nearby, encircled with barbed
wire, and Salek remarked that there was something which he interpreted as a radar
installation. The teenagers had stopped to rest between the second and third barriers,
but when they thought that they were seen by a Moroccan soldier, only a few metres
away, they ran over the third barrier and through the barbed wire. Surprisingly, Salek
could not remember how he got through the wire, but he obviously did, and he and his
companions made it safely through the minefield. The five youths eventually made
their way to Bedouin grazing their camels in the liberated zone. Their journey took
four days, and they eventually moved on to the Saharawi refugee camps near Tindouf,
Algeria, where Salek is now a journalist.482
Malainin Larkhal’s case was different. He was a high profile activist in the Moroccan
occupied capital of Western Sahara, El-Ayoun (he is now Secretary General of the
Saharawi Journalists and Writers Union). Speaking in an interview, he recounted how
he had been arrested a number of times and even tortured, so for his own safety, and
480
Thompson & Adloff 1980: 309. Also referred to as ‘sons’ or ‘children of the clouds’: this moniker
has also been applied to all Saharawi tribes. See Hodges 1983.
481
Bachir, Interview.
482
Bachir, Interview.
181
for that of his fellow activists, he left the occupied territory in the Summer of 2000
when he was threatened with a further arrest.
He travelled southwards, towards Mauritania, with his brother and a friend. First by
car to Bojdour, and then by another car driven by a smuggler who agreed to take them
close to the berm by the border with Mauritania. They were then to travel southwards
by foot, but their trek to the wall was much longer than expected. Malainin knew that
he and his friends were at a disadvantage being, as he said, ‘city boys’. They didn’t
know the ‘ways of the desert’, and they were travelling in the southwest of the country
where there are many sand dunes which made walking very difficult, but luckily, they
had the ‘strength of youth’ on their side. When they made it to the berm, they first
came upon a Moroccan base where they saw Moroccan soldiers milling about, and
Malainin even took the time to note the base’s mud brick buildings. The smuggler had
told the three that when approaching the berm, they would first come across a track
that the Moroccans maintained and swept clear, so as to detect the foot prints of
people approaching and trying to cross the barrier. They located the path, and
afterward came upon a sand embankment. After this, they found the larger frontal
embankment of the barrier, but between the two the ground was strewn with flat
stones and this created a distinctive tactile experience for the refugees. In Malainin’s
words:
I remember that they were also using rocks between the small embankment and the
first big wall [embankment]. They were putting some kinds of rocks, like flat rocks,
and the problem was that when you’re walking, you make noise, because they start
hitting each other… it was unnatural, their presence was unnatural, and I remember
that. Walking on these walls, when you’re walking under these conditions, you think
that everyone is looking at you, and that any sound you make will bring soldiers.483
Malainin encountered no barbed wire in front of the barrier and made it safely through
the land mines in front of it. After crossing the border into Mauritania, the three
refugees eventually made their way northwards to the Saharawi camps, near Tindouf.
483
Larkhal, Interview.
182
Seven years after Malainin Larkhal crossed the berms, the young Saharawi activist
Hamdi Touballi was compelled to leave his home in El-Ayoun for the Polisario
controlled free zone. Hamdi had become very involved in protests in the capital and
was arrested on the first day of the Saharawi civilian uprising (or intifada) that started
in the occupied territories in May 2005. He was subsequently arrested a number of
times and kept under surveillance, so in January 2007 he decided to leave his home
and cross the berms. A friend of his first drove him into the desert southeast of Dakhla
and then walked with him part of the way toward the berm. They got within 30
kilometres or so of the barrier, and Hamdi then walked on by himself. Hamdi
recounted to me his crossing of the barrier:
I remember, it was maybe half past two or three in the morning [when] I found myself
at the wall. When I was close to the wall I could hear Moroccan soldiers talking near
to me, but I was lucky because I was alone. I was very, very scared, not from the
soldiers, but from the mines. I thought, that if I exploded a mine the problem was that
no one was with me, no one could help me. And of course, the Moroccan soldiers
would not help me.
Hamdi described the barrier he crossed as consisting of two earthen banks, with the
frontal barrier higher than the rear embankment, around eight metres behind it. There
was barbed wire in front of the berm, but Hamdi could not recall how he got through
it.484
Malainin, Hamdi and Salek all made it successfully across the berms. In the locations
in which they crossed, they all describe a line of parallel barriers, though the first of
these was made of stone in the north of the country. The barriers could be climbed and
walked over easily, but they were obviously designed (essentially as steep sided sand
banks) to stop vehicles – the motorised raiding parties of the Polisario/SPLA. It is
striking that the barbed wire, noted in all published descriptions of the berms, was
meagre in the sections crossed by Salek and Hamdi, and non-existent in the south,
near the Mauritanian frontier. It is also noteworthy that the minefields were easily, and
safely crossed by foot. Malainin Larkhal is of the opinion that the mine fields and
barbed wire fences have not been maintained by the Moroccans, because over the
484
Touballi, Interview.
183
years, as already noted, SPLA soldiers have removed the mines and barbed wire in
many places.485
Importantly, these three accounts give us something of an experiential view of the
Moroccan barriers, and for the durations of their journeys, Malainin, Hamdi and Salek
became immersed in their undertakings, and ‘dwelled’486 in the hostile environment of
the desert and the berms. They had to confront the barriers they crossed in an
undeniably direct, bodily way. They had to carefully navigate across an unknown
space, as Ingold would say as ‘wayfarers’,487 using all of their senses to make their
way, in a ‘kinesthetic interplay’ of the tactile, sonic and visual,488 while filled with
fear and other strong emotions. Tilley would describe their visceral experiences as
‘holistic’ and even ‘carnal’,489 though in the real life context of individuals facing the
possibility of death in a hostile environment (from armed soldiers and land mines)
these terms might appear inadequate, perhaps even trite. Trying to understand a
landscape, especially a contested one through the experiences of intimately involved
individuals, ‘is much more than an academic exercise – it is about the complexity of
people’s lives, historical contingency, contestation, motion and change’.490
Salek’s distinctive description of the barrier as a large ‘snake’ is reminiscent of the
sinuousness of the trenches and wire entanglements of the First World War. In fact,
when viewed from above, in Google Earth for instance, the berms can appear graceful.
They can appear serpentine or angular, to sweep or glide, and the forts can appear
organic in form. But when viewed from the ground, Malainin had this to say about
Morocco’s ‘great’ wall:
It is very ugly. When I’ve seen, for example, the Berlin wall, you can draw graffiti on
it, you can express yourself, it is something physical.., I mean, when you see the
485
Fadel and Larkhal, Interviews.
Ingold 1995.
487
Ingold 2007.
488
Feld 2005: 181.
489
Tilley 2004.
490
Bender 2001: 2.
486
184
Israeli wall, it’s similar, it’s very imposing and big, this one is just a berm, it’s just
dirt, some embankment. Even if you take it in photos it isn’t interesting…491
This brings us back to the contemptuous view of the berms expressed by Jeremy
Harding’s guide, Nuruddin. Although the barriers definitely limited Polisario’s
offensive operations they are still viewed as impotent. So impotent, that Saharawi
youths periodically march up to the wall in the north of the country, in protest, and
even try to dismantle it.492 Of course, this impotency has not been tested in battle, and
it will take a resumption of hostilities to see if the Saharawi contempt for the barrier is
truly well founded.
Summary
This chapter, along with its predecessor, has aimed to give presence to the materiality
of the Moroccan berms that partition Western Sahara. Chapter 4 has shown, through
description and characterisation of the barriers, the extreme lengths that a nation can
take to appropriate another, while this chapter has more than indicated, the nature of
direct human interactions with the physical result of those lengths – Morocco’s ‘Great
Wall’. As an archaeological feature (complex and multi-phased), it is one of the
largest of its kind, though the Great Wall of China exceeds it by at least 2700
kilometres.493 As an archaeological phenomenon that literally traverses great swathes
of an entire country, it is archaeology at a truly macro scale.
When the berms are viewed through Google Earth, they are a visual expression of
Harrison’s view that an archaeology of the present should be perceived as a single
stratum upon which the past and present is manifest. When looking at the geography
across which the berms traverse, then the very places where soldiers have undoubtedly
fought, and where civilians have found themselves forced to ‘dwell’ (and some still
491
Larkhal, Interview.
While I was in the Tindouf refugee camps in November, 2011, Malainin Larkhal and Hamdi
Touballi showed me a video of such a protest, where Hamdi and other youths walked up to the stone
wall fronting the barrier, and under the gaze of Moroccan soldiers, started to dismantle a small portion
of it.
493
Turnbull 2007: 59. However, the real length of the Great Wall of China is not known since it
consisted of many different ‘walls’ constructed at different times (see Waldron 1990), and even
Turnbull notes that 2200 km of the walls making up the ‘Great Wall’ no longer survive.
492
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do) in an unfamiliar environment – in their bid to cross the barriers – indicate that this
multi-faceted study of the berms is undoubtedly an archaeology in and of the present.
The immensity of the berms, and perhaps more importantly, the will to build them
across a national territory, indicates, as Gonzáles-Ruibal might put it, ‘reason’ that has
gone ‘berserk’. The berms are exaggerated and baroque. In a theatre of war that has
been asymmetrical, they are excessive – they are super modern. And when the
archaeology of the berms is augmented by the experiences of those who have
confronted them directly, now and in the recent past, then the traumatic materiality of
the Western Sahara conflict can be disclosed and made bare.
But the berms are also, quite fundamentally, a material expression of the three issues
or themes that infuse this research: colonialism, conflict and exclusion. They manifest
the colonial will of Morocco to keep hold of Western Sahara, they were born out of
conflict – warfare in the open desert – and their aim has been to mitigate Polisario’s
advantages as desert, guerilla fighters. In the end, they have partitioned the country
and excluded those Saharawis in exile, in Tindouf in Algeria, from around 80 percent
of their country. It has also turned the 20 percent of the country under SADR control
into a liminal zone, a threshold outside the Moroccan edifice of the berms, and with
one location specific to, and within it – the settlement of Tifariti – being of special
importance to the Saharawi people.
The materiality of Tifariti, and how its archaeology indicates the part the settlement
has played in the story of Western Sahara is dealt with next, in Chapter 6. In the
relative terms of this research, it is landscape archaeology at the meso scale. It
examines the palimpsest of the immediate Tifariti region from the Middle Holocene
up to the present day. It too is an archaeology, in and of the present.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LANDSCAPES OF TIFARITI
Pre-Islamic Archaeology in the Tifariti Area
Western Sahara is rich in prehistoric remains. A very small number of archaeological
teams, mainly from Spain, work in the country, but a relatively substantial number of
sites and features have been recorded and published. Nevertheless, what has been
published is only the tip of the iceberg, since so much of the fieldwork carried out to
date has been mainly exploratory, and there have been very few systematic
excavations of stratified sites.494
The University of East Anglia has been involved in fieldwork in the territory since
2002, and since 2007, its Western Sahara Project (WSP) started to intensively survey
an area 14 kilometres north of Tifariti, referred to as the TF1 Study Area (see Fig.
6.1). The study area covers approximately 9.5 square kilometres, and includes 411
prehistoric monuments, which it is presumed range in date anywhere from around
3000 B.C. to A.D. 1000. Virtually all of the monuments are funerary or ideational (or
ritual) and relate to a period (recognised in many other parts of the Sahara as well)
when a cultural shift into pastoralism occurred, spurred on by the aridification of the
Sahara around 5200 years ago. There is also evidence for occupation sites dating to
the Early and early Middle Holocene, representing the seventh to ninth millennia
B.P.495
This prehistoric/pre-Islamic archaeology with its rich funerary remains is viewed, in
the context of this research, as the base stratum upon which the archaeology of later
periods lie. It is a rich layer, which, based on fieldwork carried out by the WSP, is
visible in most areas, especially where the ground is particularly hilly and rocky. From
the results of the WSP’s fieldwork carried out in 2005, 2007, 2008 and in 2009 (and
incorporating plots of monuments identified on Google Earth imagery by Yves
494
495
Clarke and Brooks, in press.
Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks, in press.
187
Gauthier for the 2009 field season), and taking into account fieldwork for this
dissertation carried in 2011, at Tifariti, it is obvious that funerary monuments extend
from Tifariti, where the topography changes from flat hamada desert in the south, to
the rocky and undulating terrain of the Zemmour region to the immediate north (see
Fig. 6.2). The desert in the south is open with virtually no landmarks, while in the
north the landscape is enfolding with a complex network of connected wadis. Tifariti
is at the junction of these two lands and, presumably, people at all times would
perceive and interact with these distinct regions differently. It has been proposed that
the Zemmour region, including the Tifariti area, was one of many refuges (or refugia)
for Saharan peoples in the Middle Holocene.496 Such areas remained relatively
verdant, while other regions of the Sahara were becoming arid and approaching the
aridity of today. Even now, the Tifariti area is seen by Saharawis as a good place to
live, where there is good pasture, and the climate is clement. For example, Fig. 6.3
shows the amount of vegetation present in the Wadi Tifariti today.
Fig. 6.4, as well as Fig. 6.2, clearly illustrate the generalised distribution of recorded
funerary remains around Tifariti, and within the Tifariti Study Area (which measures
14.5 kilometres, east to west, by 16.6 kilometres, north to south, with the settlement of
Tifariti just north of centre). They show that by being located amidst hilly and
dissected terrain, funerary remains are situated where there are the raw materials – that
is to say stones – to build them. There may also be areas of dense concentrations of
monuments, suggesting recognised ‘lands’ or ‘zones’ of the dead (or ‘the spirits’)497 as
distinct from habitation areas. However, if talking about pastoralists, is it correct to
apply such a dichotomy at all? Surely, and in an arid environment with scant pasture,
grazing animals would follow fertile wadis irregardless of any areas of intense
funerary remains, especially since the steeper sided wadis in the rockier parts of the
desert will collect more water during the occasional rains that occur, resulting in more
succulent herbage. Such a situation might encourage a certain amount of opportunism
in the placing of funerary constructions close to wadi routeways; and as with those
496
Brooks and Clarke 2010, and Clarke and Brooks, in press.
For instance, the location of these types of monuments on higher rocky ground resonates with some
aspects of traditional African religions. Amongst the Hausa for instance, hills and inselbergs were
traditionally the dwelling places of the spirits, in particular, the ‘Iskoki’, who were the arbiters of
human affairs (Insoll 2003: 27, 293 & 295).
497
188
ancient societies where the dead might be buried within domestic spaces,498 here too
can be the sepulchres of the dead in what is in effect a lived in, pastoral landscape of
wadis and pasture. The dead and the living can share the same space. The living can
continue to utilise the routes that meander through this so called ‘land of dead’ for
centuries afterwards, all because of the imperative to find pasture for grazing animals
and beasts of burden, and for the need of pasturalists to get from one location to
another.
Two burial cairns in the TF1 Study Area were excavated by the WSP in 2005, and the
skeletons found were carbon dated. The dates were (when calibrated) A.D. 420-770
and A.D. 430-595499 indicating that stone burial mounds, and the customs associated
with them were still in use within a couple of centuries before the coming of Islam
into the region. The Berber, Sanhaja tribes of the western Sahara converted gradually,
though superficially to Islam by the mid 8th century, but their attachment ‘to Islam
prior to the Almoravid period was superficial, and animist notions retained much of
their hold’.500 As with other parts of the Sahara, Sahel and Sudan,501 their conversion
was partial and their practices were obviously mixed with earlier, traditional African
religious practices. With this in mind, it is conceivable that some funerary
monuments, for example burial cairns, could have been constructed after the 8th
century, and if not, they could have still been a focus for early Islamic burials since a
considerable number of Islamic graves (‘kerb burials’)502 have been found amidst, and
close to tumuli in the TF1 study area (often disposed as ‘satellite’ burials). This could
indicate that such an area of pre-Islamic burials may have continued as an area of
ideational significance, perhaps until the reinvigorated evangelisation of the far west
of the Sahara during the early rise of the Almoravids in the 11th century.
Archaeology From the Arrival of Islam to the Spanish Colonial Era
Except for occasional Islamic burials recorded throughout the areas surveyed by the
WSP, and those kerb burials found specifically amidst earlier funerary remains, as in
498
The prehistoric village of Catalhöyük, in Turkey, is well known for its numerous interments in
houses. For an overview, see Hodder 2007.
499
Clarke and Brooks in press.
500
Pazzanita and Hodges 1994: 39 & 400
501
Insoll 2003.
502
‘Kerb burials’ is the descriptive term used by the WSP for these, apparently Islamic burials. See
Brooks et al 2009, and Clarke and Brooks in press.
189
the TF1 area (see Fig. 6.5), very little else has come to light archaeologically that can
indicate human activity around Tifariti from the earlier centuries of Islam to the
modern era. Meagre stone outlines, perhaps indicating the footings of simple shelters
have occasionally come to light, as have hearths. But without excavating these
features their dates will never be known, and where the WSP has investigated what
appear to be open air camp sites, they have been dated to the Early and early Middle
Holocene. It is highly likely that there are identifiable remains of early habitation
sites, both pre-Islamic and later, throughout the areas explored by the WSP (and other
archaeological missions), but they have not unequivocally come to light as yet. They
are either hard to recognise or the survey methods employed have been inadequate.
Since there are no oases in Western Sahara (save for the lower Saguia al-Hamra) and
Saharawi pastoralists have traditionally had to rely on, and follow the rains for their
sustenance – and as Hart has pointed out, ‘every schoolboy… knows, Bedouin life is
built around camels, grass and water’503 – it is probable that the one artefact reflecting
the human occupation of the Tifariti area, and probably much of Western Sahara from
the arrival of Islam to the modern era, is the landscape itself. This is a landscape not
so much moulded by people, but one utilised by people in the most basic, experiential
and embedded ways.
Tilley has pointed out that a landscape is ‘a series of named locales, a set of relational
places, linked by paths, movements and narratives’.504 Richard Bradley has written of
an ‘archaeology of natural places’, observing that ‘natural places have an archaeology
because they acquired a significance in the minds of people in the past’.505 While in
the context of the Sahara (and drawing upon the example of a locale known as
Taouardi, near Gao in Mali), Calegari has defined what he calls a ‘symbolicfunctional place’ which is ‘a meeting point, full of history and archaeological
evidences that, when seasonally attended by the Tuareg people… reveals itself as a
sort of “invisible” village’,506 where there are locations for specific practices,
mundane and otherwise, including places with historical, mythical and symbolic
importance. The TF1 study area might be an example of such a place, such an
‘invisible’ locus. There is the routeway of the Wadi Tifariti that links the open desert,
503
Hart 1998: 31.
Tilley 1994: 34.
505
Bradley 2000: 35.
506
Calegari 2005.
504
190
just south of Tifariti, with the long distance wadi system (itself, a system of paths and
grazing areas) that eventually drains into the Saguia al-Hamra to the north. The
prehistoric burials in the area had an importance that transcended the coming of Islam
testified by the presence of Islamic graves in their midsts. In fact, eight Islamic burials
were incorporated into an impressive prehistoric standing stones site (see Fig. 6.6).
The greater wadi system itself, as a series of linked natural routeways with areas for
grazing, camp sites, and burial of the dead, can be viewed as a single archaeological
site: a place of pastoral habitation with a myriad of meanings, symbolism and
histories. The Wadi Tifariti could also have been a part of one of the many north to
south corridors that were used by the long distance caravans that traversed the western
fringe of the Sahara from the Moroccan Wadi Nun, including the towns of Goulmim
and Aqqa (or Tamdult Aqa), to the Senegal.507 A map indicating caravan routes
through the western Sahara in the 18th and 19th centuries, possibly reflecting more
ancient routes, is shown in Fig. 6.7.
Archaeology of the Spanish Colonial Period at Tifariti
As already discussed in Chapter 3, it took the Spanish 50 years before they occupied
any parts of the interior of Western (Spanish) Sahara. However, it is conceivable that
the Wadi Tifariti saw martial activity associated with the anti-colonial struggle of
Sheikh Ma el-Ainin and his sons, after he founded the town and religious centre of
Smara, just south of the Saguia el-Hamra in 1898, from whence he lead those regional
tribes that allied themselves with him in opposition to French expansion in the west of
the Sahara. The immediate Tifariti area at this time was probably a locus for seasonal
Bedouin pastoralists since, according to local knowledge, spring water was accessible
at Tifariti by at least 1912.508 This was two years after Ma el-Ainin died (though anticolonial hostilities continued under his son Ahmed el-Hiba509), and one year before a
French expeditionary column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mouret
occupied Smara, and destroyed part of it on March 1st, 1913. On the column’s return
507
For discussions on these routes across the west of the Sahara see: Norris 1986, Blanchard 2005, and
Lydon 2009.
508
See the Appendix 1, though Fadel (Interview), claims that the very first ‘well’ at Tifariti was dug in
1912.
509
Hodges 1983: 60.
191
to Attar, it travelled southeasterly from Smara in the direction of the Wadi Tagliat
(Tagliatt or Tachleieft), a place name in the vicinity of Akchach, around 30 kilometres
northeast of Tifariti. While in the Wadi Tagliat, it was attacked by a force of
tribesmen under the leadership of Mohammed Laghdaf (another of Ma el-Ainin’s
sons),510 and after the column extricated itself it headed back to the Adrar, arriving in
Attar on March 28th. Nevertheless, Berthome recounts that while in the area of the
Wadi Tagliat, the French troops found an abundance of good pasture and water in
shallow wells.511 This points to the Tifariti region as being conducive to pastoral
occupation, then as now, and it is even imaginable that Tifariti could have been visited
for water by the French column on its southwesterly route towards Bir Moghrein (Fig.
6.8, shows the route of Mouret’s column).
Western Sahara was deemed pacified by 1934 and in that year the Spanish camel
corps, the Tropas Nomadas, entered Smara, though it would take another two years
for a permanent Spanish presence and garrison to be set up in the town. The Spanish
had yet to occupy Tifariti (around 130 kilometres southeast of Smara), but a Spanish
military survey team must have visited the place in 1944 or 1945 since an
astronomical survey point was set up at Tifariti and recorded on the 1949, 1/500,000
scale map of the territory. This map also shows two permanent wells with the
descriptor hasi512 (or hassi), being wells of only 6 metres or so in depth.513 A further
well was dug in 1951-1952 and also described as a hassi.514 It is probable that these
wells were dug by the local Bedouin seasonally occupying Tifariti, since it was only
in the decade of the 1960s, that the Spanish authorities started to increase the
territory’s water supply in earnest by the digging of new wells.515
510
The location of this engagement is noted on the U.S. Army Map Service map: Mauritanie, North
Africa (1:2,000,000 scale) 1958, as Gleib el Fertouna. Gebel El Fertuna (another transliteration of the
place-name) is also indicated on the 1949 (1:500,000 scale) Spanish military map of Western Sahara
(Rodriguez Esteban 2011). For an account of the 1913 Mouret expedition which covered 1,700 kms in a
return journey – departing from Attar on February 9th and returning on March 28th – see Trout 1969:
211, Mercer 1976: 114-115, Hodges 1983: 60-61 and Berthome 1996.
511
Berthome 1996.
512
Rodriguez Esteban 2011.
513
Mercer 1976: 194. Though Pazzanita 2006: 200, puts a hassi (hasi) at a maximum depth of 12
metres.
514
Although wells were recorded at Tifariti by 1949 on the Spanish 1/500,000 map of the territory
(Rodriguez Esteban 2011), this later hasi is described on the Tifariti History Plaque (see Appendix 1) as
‘the first’ well of Tifariti, superseding the spring which the plaque notes as existing in 1912.
515
Mercer 1976: 194.
192
A Spanish colonial presence was eventually realised at Tifariti in 1964516 when the
place became an outpost for the Spanish Foreign Legion who built one of the new,
small forts that were being established in the further reaches of the territory, after the
insurgency of the Ifni-Sahara War of 1957-1958. Tifariti received its first community,
and colonial government facilities in 1968.517 But this might have been preparatory to
the decision to build a tourism complex that year, with the intention of turning Tifariti
into ‘the Costa Brava of the desert’.518 Needless to say, the scheme was never carried
out, but some developments did take place and the remains of these make up a
substantial part of late 20th century archaeology at Tifariti.
A suggested, though undoubtedly partial, plan of Tifariti during the Spanish
occupation (1964 to 1975) is shown Fig. 6.9. It is based on Google Earth imagery and
historical photographs available on the Internet,519 also my visits to Tifariti in 2007
and 2008 as part of the WSP, and the further survey season I undertook at Tifariti in
2011. The figure shows the heart of the settlement. The scrub vegetation in the
western half of the Google Earth image clearly indicates the Wadi Tifariti with a
tributary. The ground is relatively flat, and the wadis drain to the north at the top of
the image. Nonetheless, the ground in the upper centre and upper right (northeast) of
the image is very rocky, and it rises above the wadis. It actually creates a shallow
basin in which Tifariti sits.
Fig. 6.9 also shows 11 features (including one group of features) from the Spanish
colonial occupation, which it has been possible to easily plot. They are (the numbers
match the numbers in Figs. 6.9 and 6.10):
1. Fort built by the Spanish Foreign Legion, reputedly in 1964.
2. Infirmary associated with the Spanish fort.
3. Three external buildings near and/or associated with the fort.
4. The post commander’s accommodation and/or office.
5. Bake house.
6. Main water cistern (linked by a pipe on stanchions to the fort).
516
Bachir Achmed, Saharawi facilitator to the WSP, per. comm.
See Appendix 1.
518
Mercer 1976: 217.
519
Hermandad de Veteranos de Tropas Nómadas del Sáhara (2011) and La Mili en el Sáhara (20012013).
517
193
7. Subsidiary water cistern (linked by pipes on stanchions to the main water
cistern and the commander’s accommodation).
8. Rubbish dump.
9. Well site.
10. The ‘Colonia’: prefabricated, low cost accommodation built by the Spanish for
the local Bedouin.
11. Islamic Cemetery
These 11 features are discussed below, though there is an additional feature from the
Spanish occupation not listed or shown in the figure, and that is the airstrip that is
located 700 metres to the southwest. Instead, its disposition is shown in Fig. 6.59.
1. The Spanish Fort
If the fort was the earliest manifestation of a Spanish presence at Tifariti, then it must
have been a very lonely outpost indeed for the first four years of its existence, very
much like the fort at Tichla in the 1940s (see Chapter 3). There are two photographs
of the fort available on the Internet that show what it looked like by 1975-76. The first
is Fig. 6.10, which shows the fort amidst a number of the buildings plotted in Fig. 6.9.
The second, Fig. 3.11, in Chapter 3, clearly shows the fort garrisoned and in defensive
readiness since sandbags line the corner blockhouse parapets. Even though the fort is
now in poor condition due to a Moroccan air attack in 1991 (see Fig. 6.11), the record
I made of it in 2011 (along with the earlier photographs I took of it in 2007) coupled
with photographs of the identical and contemporary posts constructed at Hausa, Bir
Enzaren, Mahbes and Echdeiria (see below) can give us a very good view of what the
Tifariti fort and outpost was like between 1964 and 1976.
An outline plan of the fort is shown in Fig. 6.12. It is a partial reconstruction, and
photographs of some of the post’s external elevations, as they appear today and as
they would have looked before 1975-76 are shown in Figs. 6.13 to 6.18. The
maximum, overall dimensions of the outpost are 37 metres east to west by 37 metres
north to south.520 The fort was constructed around a central rectangular courtyard
aligned east to west, measuring 24 metres by 15.5 metres (see Figs. 6.19 to 6.22).
520
The curtain walls are battered and these dimensions were recorded at around 1.4 metres above the
ground.
194
There was a blockhouse type structure at every corner and these were approximately
4.4 metres high, while the curtain walls connecting them were approximately 3.5m
high. The blockhouses were rectangular in plan with the largest at the northeast corner
of the fort measuring six metres by 13.5 metres, and the smallest at 6.5 metres by 8.5
metres at the northwest corner of the fort. There was a dog-leg shaped blockhouse at
the southeast corner extending over an overall area of 11.5 metres square. This was
linked to a right-angled entrance into the fort from the west. This only had a bar across
it where there was also a door, presumably into a guardroom (these are only just
visible in Fig. 3.11, while an entry bar is also visible in the entrance to the fort at
Echdeiria in Fig. 6.16).
The central courtyard was surrounded by rooms, averaging 5.5 metres in depth.
Externally they, and the corner blockhouses, had narrow, vertical slits (loopholes) for
windows, testifying to the defensive nature of the building, while internally, there
were more standard sized windows with shutters facing into the courtyard. Access to
the roofs was by external, vertical ladders of steel rungs built into the walls of the
courtyard. The roofs all had very low parapets, though the parapets of the corner
blockhouses were 1.22 metres high. They were not crenellated but they were
decorated with repeating geometric motifs in rectilinear panels. The external walls of
the fort (averaging 0.45 metres thick) were made of cast concrete and apparently
raised in horizontal stages; first to window sill level, then to window head, and finally
up to roof level. The interior walls were made of cement blocks, as were all the
parapets (0.3 metres thick), while the concrete roofs had metal rod reinforcements. All
the walls were painted white (though now discoloured). This was unlike the earlier
fort at Tichla, for instance, which was constructed of stone rubble with a rough render
(see Fig. 6.23). There is now rubble in the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti, but a
photograph exists showing a small walled off area, surrounded by a low decorative
parapet, with low pillars and trailing plants in which there was, what could best be
described as a menagerie (see Fig. 6.22). There are wired enclosures and kennels for
goats, or perhaps a gazelle, and a possible aviary, perhaps for a bird of prey. There is
also a dovecote on the roof of the fort. The low parapet of the enclosure would not
have been out of keeping on a Mediterranean patio, and the animals may have been
tended as pets, as well as sources of additional food to presumably improve a
monotonous military diet.
195
The domestication of space within the forts was apparently common. Although these
were military establishments, the officers and soldiers obviously wanted their living
and working space to provide them with comfort within the harsh desert environment
in which they found themselves. A photograph (Fig. 6.24) of the interior of the fort at
Hausa (a fort identical to Tifariti) shows the courtyard consisting of ‘crazy paving’,
and with a solid awning under which there was a seating area for the soldiers to relax.
Another photograph (Fig. 6.25), this time of the similar fort at Bir Enzaren, obviously
shows that the courtyard was filled with trees, making the white walled central space a
cool, and presumably welcoming place.
At Tifariti (and this presumably applies to the other similar forts), the northeast corner
of the courtyard gave access to a shower block, while there were laundry facilities in
the east range near by, along with a canteen which had a built in bench with sink, and
a decorated bar. Alterations were made to the fort over time, presumably from the
initial Spanish occupation up to 1975-76, to the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti
(1977-1979), and to the occupation of the post by the Polisario/SADR forces up to
1991. Fig. 6.12 shows the salient constructional phases in plan, and they can be
tentatively described as:
Phase 1: This represents the initial construction of the fort.
Phase 2: Alterations were carried out on the fort, mainly in the eastern range. These
apparently consisted of alterations, and/or blockages to doorways. These were
probably carried out during the Spanish occupation since they were finished
(rendered) to match the initial construction of the fort.
Phase 3: This phase consists of further alterations – blockages of doors and infill, but
in course un-rendered stonework, laid in a cement mortar and painted to match the
existing paintwork. It is possible that this phase is Spanish too, primarily based on the
painting of the alterations.
Phase 4: It cannot be certain whether or not this phase is separate from Phase 5, but it
is structurally different. It is mainly represented by two large stone rubble walls (in a
mud plaster) added to the outside of the north wall of the fort. The purpose of these
walls is not known, nor if they had a cross wall connecting them (their northern ends
are denuded and the ground is covered in rubble and sand). There is also a stone and
196
mud mortar infill in one of the doors in the east range of the fort, and this too might
belong to this phase.
Phase 5: As noted above, this phase of alterations might be the same as Phase 4.
However, it is characterised by mud brick infill, for instance, in the southeast corner
of the southeastern corner blockhouse (where a door has also been inserted), and there
are a couple of replacement partition walls, plus external walling outside the north
wall of the fort. What can separate this phase from Phase 4, though, is the fact that the
mud mortar used in this phase is lighter than that used in the previous phase. Perhaps
Phase 4 represents some alterations made during the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti,
while this latter phase was carried out solely during the Polisario reoccupation of the
fort from 1979 onwards.
2. The Spanish Infirmary
When interviewed in October 2011, Bahia Awah (formerly a soldier in the
Poliosario/SPLA and stationed in Tifariti during the latter 1980s)521 made the point
that there was an infirmary in Tifariti during the Spanish occupation. He was
ambiguous about its location, and when interviewed, I was uncertain as to whether he
was talking about an infirmary built by Polisario after the Moroccans left the
settlement in 1979, or he was actually talking about a Spanish built building.
Nevertheless, photographs of three Spanish posts in Western Sahara from the 1970s,
available on the internet, appear to have cleared the matter up.
First, Fig. 6.26 shows the fort at Bir Enzaren with a smaller building away from it and
to the right. It is constructed in a similar way to the fort in that it has low parapets on
its roof and an apparently matching render. From what can be seen, the building
consists of two parts. The larger part has a long horizontal window, with a doorway
just beyond it, and there is a nib of an extension towards the fort at the far end of the
structure. The second part of the building (closer to the viewer) is smaller, and slightly
lower and it has two small windows that are visible. Matching this, and in a
photograph of the Spanish post at Hausa, is another similar building (see Fig. 6.27).
The windows and door are the same, as is the roofline, though in this instance the roof
has eaves and no parapet. The angle of the photograph makes it hard to discern
521
Awah, Interview.
197
whether or not there is a small extension at its furthest corner, nevertheless, the two
buildings are apparently identical in form. But what makes this image most important
is that it has a caption stating that it is a ‘view of the school’ (presumably the treble
domed structure on the left), the ‘medical clinic’ (presumably the central building) and
the ‘Territorial Police Headquarters’ (the fort in the distance). An identical building at
Mahbes is visible at the far right of Fig. 6.40. It too has a flat roof with eaves, and its
close juxtaposition to the fort is very similar to that at Tifariti, Bir Enzaren and Hausa.
These three photographs have helped to identify the Spanish period infirmary, or
clinic, at Tifariti, as marked out in Fig. 6.8, and which is visible to the right of the fort
in Fig. 6.9 (and distant by around 25 metres). The elevation that can be made out is
virtually the same as the building elevations seen in Figs. 6.26, 6.27 and 6.40, except
that there is a further extension to the right (though this part of the building at Tifariti
would have been out of site in the photos of Hausa, Bir Enzaren and Mahbes). The
infirmary was hit during the Moroccan air attack of August 1991 and the elevation
visible in Fig. 6.9 has been destroyed (see Fig. 6.28). A view of the building from its
south side is shown in Fig. 6.29. It is now the office of the Mayor of Tifariti.
3. External Buildings near the Fort (including 3a and 3b)
An external single storey building associated with the fort at Tifariti is visible to its
left, and just beyond it in Fig. 6.9. It was long and thin, rendered, and painted just like
the fort. Its estimated footprint (up to 45 metres long by six metres wide) is outlined in
Fig. 6.8. With the building no longer present, there are newer buildings standing in its
place. The building was under 20 metres south of the fort, and similar buildings can be
found in photographs of other Spanish bases in Western Sahara. For instance, such a
building (though associated with other structures and with a courtyard) is shown in
Fig. 6.16, just in front of the fort at Echdeiria.
Two further buildings, external to the fort and no longer standing are clearly shown in
Fig. 6.9 (and indicated in Fig. 6.8). Just north of the infirmary was a building (3a)
made up of two parallel ranges on a north to south axis with a narrow courtyard
between them. The building seems to have not been rendered in the same manner as
the fort, so it is possible that it was not associated with the military. Perhaps it was the
settlement’s school during the Spanish occupation of Tifariti. Additionally, offset to
198
the west, and further north of the infirmary was another courtyard structure (3b). What
this building was can only be guessed at, but as with the possible school, its imprint
was slightly visible on the ground in 2011.
4. The Commander’s Accommodation/Office
The Spanish Commandant’s accommodation was identified as such by Bahia
Awah.522 It was built in its own trapezium shaped compound (around 35 metres by 35
metres in area) and it can just be seen at the right hand edge of Fig. 6.9. It is also
vaguely visible in Fig. 6.22, beyond the fort and just below the hills in the upper right
of the photograph. Its present condition in 2011 is shown in Fig. 6.30. The
Commander’s quarters measure around 10 metres by 10 metres in area. It was
rendered and painted in the same manner as the fort and infirmary, and the present
enclosure wall of rubble masonry (with some parts in mud brick) has been raised on
top of earlier, much more neatly built masonry – probably the remains of the original
compound wall.
5. The Bake House
Behind and to the immediate north of the fort (by around 30 metres) are the ruins of
the post’s bake house, as identified by Bahia Awah.523 It can be seen just below the
fort in Fig. 6.9, and like the fort and the other buildings already described, it was
rendered and painted in white, though the building was of mud brick construction. It
had multiple rooms and a beehive type oven, and there are the impressions of wall
tiles on one of the interior walls. It is now in a very ruinous state with building rubble
spread around it (see Fig. 6.31). Some alterations occurred to it in its lifetime since its
doorways had been blocked with stones set in a mud mortar. Its size was
approximately nine metres by eight metres in area with a narrow, channelled,
extension out to the northwest for around 15 metres. This extension is still surrounded
by dark earth – probably made dark by ash and soot. The precise purpose of this
feature is not known, but it might have been some kind of flue (see Fig. 6.32).
522
523
Awah, Interview.
Awah, Interview.
199
6. Main Water Cistern, and 7. The Subsidiary Water Cistern
There used to be a water cistern (see Fig. 6.9) situated on the higher, rocky ground
north of the fort by about 130 metres. According to Bahia Awah,524 it was similar to
the cistern presently behind the modern infirmary in Tifariti, and roughly at the same
elevation – at just a few metres higher than the fort (producing a gravity feed). Its
precise size is not known since the place where it was situated is now totally devoid of
any remains. Nevertheless, its position is indicated by the series of white washed
concrete posts that carried the water pipe that fed the fort (see Fig. 6.32). Also, there is
a second line of similar posts (see Fig. 6.33) that link the position of the cistern with a
subsidiary, rectangular cistern (No. 7 in Fig. 6.9, and almost 180 metres to the
southwest), which provided the Commander’s quarters with water.
8. Spanish Army Rubbish Dump
Amidst boulder outcrops around 100 metres north-northwest of the fort is a sheet
midden, primarily made up of broken glass from wine, beer and other bottles. This
was, as Bahia Awah525 described it, the rubbish dump for the soldiers of the Spanish
garrison at Tifariti. It covers an area of approximately 100 by 60 metres and it is
shown in Figs. 6.33 and 6.34.
9. The Well Site
Bahia Awah526 informed me that the well which provided water for Tifariti and the
Spanish garrison (and is probably the location of the well, or hassi dug in 1951-52)
was situated around 250 metres west of the Spanish fort (see Fig. 6.9). Its remains are
very obvious, and it is within a low earth embanked area at the southern end of the
compound of a recent experimental/model farm. There are at least four visible shafts
(lined with stones and in variable states of disrepair), amidst weathered spoil tips,
from the digging and re-digging of the wells, which seems to have continued until
quite recently (see Fig. 6.35). There are pipes in and on the ground, including one
associated with a small concrete lined water cistern. There are further, substantial
diggings for water around 140 metres to the south-southeast and it is probable that
these have superseded this earlier well site.
524
Awah, Interview.
Awah, Interview.
526
Awah, Interview.
525
200
10. The Spanish Colonia
As part of the Spanish occupation of Tifariti, a colonia, that is a planned arrangement
of housing for the local Bedouin, was constructed around 200 metres southeast of the
fort. It was destroyed as a result of the war, but its remains cover an area of
approximately 130 metres by 150 metres. It mainly consisted of 10 gridded blocks of
pre-fabricated houses with other, mud brick buildings and amenities. Fig. 6.36 shows
its layout. The present track into Tifariti, from the east, bisects the colonia remains,
utilising an earlier avenue between the housing blocks. There are six low-lying
concrete platforms on the north side of the track, equidistantly spaced in a grid pattern.
Each measures about 13 by 38 metres. At the eastern end of these, and to the south of
the track, there are four more identical platforms. These all represent the foundations
for housing, perhaps similar to the houses shown in Fig. 6.37. To the west of these
latter foundations are the remains of mud brick buildings. They too are laid out in a
grid, but one that is slightly askew to that of the concrete house platforms.
Both Bahia Awah527 and Muhammed Deya,528 the Mayor of Tifariti, agreed that there
were around 300 ‘houses’ in Tifariti during the Spanish occupation. This is probably
an exaggeration since in the years 1968 to 1972 a total of 1319 houses were built in
Western Sahara.529 If 300 of these were in Tifariti, then these would have accounted
for almost one quarter of all the accommodation built in the territory, and this was
probably unlikely. Tifariti was only a small settlement, situated far out in the badiya.
Nevertheless, Muhammed Deya530 did say that there were about 600 families living in
the Tifariti area at the start of the war and that many of these were still living in
Bedouin encampments since there was not enough permanent housing. Also, and
perhaps most importantly, virtually all of the families were still pastoral, and they, or
at least some family members, seasonally travelled with their herds in and around the
Tifariti region. In fact, Kalthoum Salma,531 a Bedouin woman from the Tifariti area,
recounted in an interview that in the past many nomads, from Mauritania as well as
Western Sahara, would encamp together in the Tifariti area and graze their herds.
527
Awah, Interview.
Deya, Interview.
529
Mercer 1976: 209, Table 9.
530
Deya, Interview.
531
Salma, Interview.
528
201
They would also range from Tifariti to Mahbes and Echdeiria in the north of the
territory. However, this diminished after a severe drought in 1961,532 with families
settling in the towns, and with many men joining the Spanish colonial military.
11. Islamic Cemetery
There is a walled off Islamic cemetery roughly 275 metres southwest of the fort at
Tifariti. It covers an area of around 80 by 45 metres, and is surrounded by a stone
rubble wall. The bulk of the graves are aligned, more or less, north to south, so that
the interred can lie on their right sides and have their heads turned towards Mecca.
However, within the northern third of the cemetery, the graves are aligned northeast to
southwest and these are the graves of Moroccan soldiers who died at Tifariti during
the Moroccan occupation. The graves, according to Bahia Awah,533 include multiple
burials and they are much plainer than the nearby Saharawi graves. The Moroccan
graves are, on the whole, simple earthen mounds with a head and footstone (see Fig.
6.38). In contrast, the Saharawi graves (see Fig. 6.39) have kerbs around them with
very sizable head and footstones, and in some instances, decorative arrangements of
quartz stones, usually in a longitudinal line along the length of the grave mound.
Although considerably more elaborate, these graves are similar to the ‘kerb burials’
recorded in the field surveys of the WSP, and the use of quartz to decorate them harks
back to prehistoric times, since the WSP has recorded scatters of quartz on top of, and
around, a number of pre-Islamic tumuli.534 They are visible on the ground in Fig. 6.5,
spread out within the standing stones site in the TF1 study area.
In summary, it has already been noted that the military outposts established by Spain
throughout the territory were more than isolated Beau Geste type forts. They were
central to the control, if not at least the surveillance, of the colonized by the colonizer.
These posts were foci providing services (including basic shops), medical facilities,
housing, basic education, and security. They attracted many Bedouin, and as
Muhammed Deya535 pointed out in an interview, in the case of Tifariti, the Bedouin
stayed relatively close, taking their herds out along the wadis nearby when there was
532
Kalthoum Salma’s testimony is reflected in the drop of camel numbers throughout Western Sahara
from 50,000 in 1960 to 24,000 in 1961. Mercer, 1976: 165, Table 4.
533
Awah, Interview.
534
Clarke and Brooks in press.
535
Deya, Interview.
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rain, and in the dry season returning to the settlement, or to a camp close by. At these
times the settlement might have looked like the scene in Fig. 6.40, which is a
photograph of the Spanish post at Mahbes taken in 1974, with its fort (just like the one
at Tifariti), ancillary buildings, an infirmary, and a large Bedouin encampment close
by.
The Archaeology of War at Tifariti
The pastoral way of life of those Saharawis who lived in the badiya around Tifariti,
and of those who were semi-sedentary in the settlement, was to change in an
unimaginable way by the end of 1975. On October 31st of that year, the northeast
corner of Western Sahara was invaded by elements of the Moroccan military and this
was the start of a war that would last until 1991.536 The Moroccans attacked Echdeiria,
Hausa and Farsia, outposts that had been abandoned by the Spanish the day before.
Polisario forces put up stiff resistance but were unsuccessful, while remaining Spanish
forces made no attempt to stop the clashes.537 Mauritanian troops also started to
invade the southern part of Western Sahara in the third week of December.
In accordance with the Madrid Agreement of November 14th 1975, and after ironing
out the practicalities of withdrawal on the ground, the last Spanish garrison in the
territory left Villa Cisneros on January 12th 1976. In response to the Moroccan
occupation of the country, Polisario, with its very limited resources, tried to occupy
and defend those towns and settlements where the Spanish left a vacuum. However,
with Morocco’s advantage in manpower and material, and with Polisario’s need to
look after the exodus of refugees heading eastwards out of Western Sahara, this could
not be sustained.538 Small settlements throughout the Territory, including Oum
Dreiga, Tifariti, and Guelta Zemmour, which had become important sanctuaries for
Saharawi refugees, were being attacked if not taken one by one in the first few months
of 1976,539 and after an air bombardment of Tifariti, in January 1976,540 it was
536
Zunes and Mundy 2010: 6.
This invasion of Western Sahara was also aimed at diverting Polisario’s attention from King
Hassan’s ‘Green March’, which did not commence until November 6th 1975. Hodges 1983: 219-220.
538
Hodges 1983: 230.
539
Damis 1983: 71.
540
See Appendix 1. As a boy of 14, Bahia Awah experienced bombardment and the dropping of napalm
when he was a refugee travelling from his home in Ausserd, in Tiris, to Tifariti. He arrived in Tifariti
537
203
claimed by Morocco that their troops occupied the settlement on the 5th of
February.541 But according to the New York Times in March 1977, Tifariti was a
‘ghost town’, abandoned by Polisario as a result of the 1976 bombing, and the
Moroccans had ‘not moved in’. Instead, the ‘Saharan Guerillas’ were described as
having complete freedom of movement throughout the Tifariti region.542
It has been estimated that approximately one third to one half of the Saharawi
population left the towns and badiya as a result of the Moroccan and Mauritanian
invasions of 1975 into 1976.543 Temporary centres for the refugees moving out of the
country were systematically bombarded by air, and livestock as well as people were
attacked. It has also been claimed that water sources were poisoned.544 These attacks
are recalled ‘with horror’ by older Saharawis.545 Morocco’s intention was to
concentrate the population in the larger towns, in effect, in a concentration of
population that has been a hallmark of many counterinsurgency operations, from the
Spanish in Cuba in the latter 19th century546 to the Americans in Vietnam.547 A
population in towns can be watched and controlled, and they can be isolated from the
insurgents in the countryside who they might want to support. In response, Polisario
set up refugee camps near Tindouf, in Algeria, and during the years of hostilities,
these had a very high proportion of women, children and the elderly, since many men
of fighting age were in the Polisario/SADR army – the SPLA.548
Since the aim of the Moroccans at the beginning of the war was to clear the regions,
they only moved into the ‘ghost town’ of Tifariti in August 1977 – they eventually
withdrew on March 12th 1979.549 According to Muhammed Deya, the Moroccan
occupation of the settlement was part of a large offensive made up of four Moroccan
about one week after the January 1976 bombardment. He had set out from Tiris on the 25th of
December 1975 (Awah, Interview).
541
Hodges 1983: 230-232.
542
Howe 1977: 2.
543
Damis 1983, p. 41.
544
Salma, Interview.
545
Shelley 2004: 190.
546
Hyslop 2011.
547
Karnow 1983: 253-258.
548
Damis 1983: 41.
549
See Appendix 1, and Fadel, Interview. The precise date of 12 March is from Knight 1979.
204
battalions.550 Although Tifariti had been bombarded at the beginning of the previous
year, many of the buildings were still intact, so the troops occupied the houses of the
colonia along with the Spanish fort and associated buildings.551 From this period too,
the Moroccans started to fortify Tifariti with ‘embankments and trenches around four
kilometres [to] five kilometres’ around the settlement.552 They ‘dug in’, as they had
done so, and would continue to do at other locations throughout Western Sahara, with
the overall extent of their fortifications highlighting that the invaders were definitely
occupying an alien, contested landscape; one which Polisario fighters knew
intimately, and wherein they knew how to survive and to fight.
‘It isn’t enough to hold the posts – the land in between has to be occupied, and if it
isn’t, it will be hell for them,’ said a [Polisario] military leader, referring to the
Moroccan and Mauritanian ‘occupiers’.
‘But in between, there is nothing…’
‘That is where we are at home,’ he replied imperturbably.553
The Moroccan ‘post’ at Tifariti was reminiscent of the defensive ‘boxes’ used by the
British in World War Two in the Libyan Desert. These could hold three battalions
with support and artillery. ‘The perimeter would consist of slit trenches to hold the
infantry with some more elaborately constructed gun pits for the artillery’.554 The
whole would have frontages of one to two miles (up to more than three kilometres)
surrounded by barbed wire and minefields.555 There is no evidence of there ever being
a cordon of barbed wire around Tifariti, and AOAV/LMA has only found limited
minefields. Also, the extent of the Moroccan ‘box’ was more than double that of the
boxes laid out in Libya. Nevertheless, the analogy is a useful one, hence the term
‘box’ is a convenient descriptor of the Moroccan defences at Tifariti.
550
Deya, Interview. Muhammed Deya estimated there were 4000 to 5000 troops in the four battalions.
This is probably correct since a modern army battalion can consist of approximately 1000 men. He also
said that there were earlier attempts by the Moroccans to occupy the Tifariti region, but these were
successfully prevented by the battle tactics of Polisario.
551
Fadel, Interview.
552
Deya, Interview.
553
Weexsteen 1976: 3.
554
Gilbert 1992: 116.
555
Moorhead 1943: 50-51. Moorhead describes the ‘boxes’ as square, but this was not so. They were
boxes in that they were enclosed and self contained, and supposedly, able to resist attack from all sides,
much like an infantry box formation in the Napoleonic Wars. One just has to look at the remains of the
World War Two box at Bir Hacheim on Google Earth, for example, to see that the layout of such dug in
defences where far from rectangular.
205
The Defensive ‘Box’ at Tifariti
When talking about the Moroccan army in the field, Muhammed Deya disparagingly
said that whenever they would stop, no matter what they were doing, they would
always dig and fortify their positions. Then, after a few attacks by Polisario, they
would be forced to abandon the positions that they laboured so hard to make. On the
other hand, Polisario never created defended outposts, they never ‘dug in’, they were
always on the move in light vehicles.556 However, the remains of the labours of the
Moroccan army at Tifariti are impressive. The various feature types had specific
purposes and the materiality of their presence, cut into the ground, has a story to tell.
Muhammed Fadel,557 Chief of Reconnaissance of the SPLA in the Tifariti Region, has
provided a very generalised overview of the disposition of Moroccan forces in and
around Tifariti. With their command post east of the Wadi Tifariti, at the Spanish fort
and colonia, he maintained that they positioned their artillery and tanks within the
higher ground west of the wadi. A ring of dug out defences surrounded this core area,
but their west flank did not extend as far as the Wadi Legtaf, the next large wadi to the
west. In turn, this defensive trace was encircled by a further ring which extended, as
has already been noted, around four to five kilometres out from the centre of Tifariti,
and this, according to Fadel, was encircled by land mines.558
The Archaeology of the Tifariti Box: the salient features
Tifariti is set within a terrain that generally slopes downward to the north. The
tributaries to the Wadi Tifariti, and the Wadi Legtaf (both draining to the north – see
Figs. 6.4 and 6.60) have their watersheds around five to nine kilometres south of
556
Deya, Interview. This has also been reiterated by Bachir Ahmed (facilitator to the WSP) to Nick
Brooks (co-director of the WSP) per. comm. However, ‘digging in’, even for a single night’s stay,
especially in a hostile environment, is common practice for any conventional army.
557
Besides the archaeology on the ground (which is mainly examined through satellite imagery), the
oral account and descriptions of Muhammed Fadel (who took part in the Polisario operations in and
around Tifariti, and in the greater Zemmour region during the war) and Habua Breica (who only joined
the SPLA in the 1980s) are my major sources for describing the ‘siege of Tifariti’. These are
undoubtedly limited and one sided, but they present two unique accounts of an arena of conflict that is
not described anywhere else. Their inclusion is in keeping with the hybrid approach of modern conflict
archaeology where all types of knowledge are examined, with an ‘aim… to foster an intellectually
coherent interdisciplinary approach to the study of… twentieth-century conflict’ (Saunders 2004, p. 3).
558
Fadel, Interview.
206
Tifariti. This is more or less in an arc outlining the south most limit of the basin in
which Tifariti is situated (and from which open hamada desert extends southwards
into nearby Mauritania). Just north of the colonial settlement the ground rises
abruptly, though slightly, with roughly southwest to northeast trending folds of very
rocky ground (including hard linear, igneous intrusions) dissected by the Wadi Tifariti
and its tributaries. This higher ground is a watershed for minor tributaries into the
Wadi from the east, and it outlines the Wadi Legtaf on the west. On the north side of
the Wadi Legtaf the ground rises in folds again (with numerous linear, igneous
intrusions). It also extends to the northeast, creating another watershed (also cut by the
Wadi Tifariti) from which further tributaries flow northwards to the Wadi Tifariti.
Descriptions of Defensive Features at Tifariti
I visited Tifariti in October and November of 2011, when one of my survey goals was
to familiarise myself with the Moroccan positions on the ground so that I could
identify and plot them more effectively on Google Earth. To this end, I photographed
and made notes on numerous defensive features in an area of more than 6.5 square
kilometres. Upon returning to the U.K, I mapped most, if not all, of the defensive
features easily identifiable on Google Earth in the rectangular Tifariti Study Area
(14.5 kilometres east to west by 16.6 kilometres north to south) shown in Fig. 6.2.
This figure also shows that the Moroccans had to lay out their defensive box within a
landscape of prehistoric remains that extends southwards from the TF1 study area of
the WSP, into the rocky ground surrounding the settlement of Tifariti.
As already pointed out in Chapter 4, the modern military concept of defence,
especially the defence of a fighting force, hinges on the notion of ‘survivability’. The
following, therefore, is an outline description of the salient types of defensive feature
constructed by the Moroccan army so that it could ‘survive’ while occupying Tifariti
from 1977 to 1979 (these were additional to those Spanish colonial structures
occupied by the Moroccan army). They are described within six overarching
categories, or groups of features, and although there are variations and sub-types
within each group, it is the larger group designation that has been applied to each
plotted feature in the accompanying mapping. This is because the details that
207
differentiate the specific sub-types cannot be easily made out in the satellite imagery
of Google Earth. Also, I was only able to investigate a small part of the Tifariti
defensive box while in the field (the box covers a total area of more than 90 square
kilometres) so the cartographic representation of it, like that of the berms in Chapter 4,
has been solely dependent on Google Earth imagery, and must be viewed as a remote
sensing exercise with all of its inherent limitations. Nevertheless, the descriptive
groups are:
Dug Out Positions
The Moroccans did not build earthen barriers (berms) around Tifariti, nor did they dig
trench systems. Instead, their defences relied on strings, or concentrations, of dug out
fighting positions for one or two soldiers – perhaps more in some instances. Such
features are ubiquitous when an army ‘digs in’ in virtually any terrain. Individual
fighting positions can vary from single soldier, scraped out positions,559 also known as
‘skirmisher trenches’ (or ‘skirmisher pits’)560 – shallow diggings with the spoil heaped
in front, in which a soldier can lie to reduce his frontal profile while defending himself
(see Fig. 6.41) – to ‘foxholes’,561 also referred to as ‘slit trenches’,562 which can be up
to a metre or more deep (depending on the subsoil) with their excavated spoil spread
around them as a parapet, and excavated to accommodate one or two soldiers (see
Figs. 6.42 and 6.43). Besides serving as fighting positions, foxhole type diggings can
be found away from forward areas as shelters for soldiers,563 and they can serve as
observation posts appropriately positioned.564 Where the ground is rocky and the
bedrock is close to the surface, as at Tifariti, dug out defensive features will not be
deep and they will often have low stone parapets around them. Other dug out positions
include machine gun and mortar pits (see Figs. 6.44 to 6.47). These are usually larger
than two man foxholes (mortar pits can be up to four metres in diameter), and since
most dug out positions at Tifariti are partially filled in with side wall collapse and
wind blown sand, it is hard to be precise about the original size and depth of many of
them, on the ground, let alone through the processes of mapping with a facility like
Google Earth. Nevertheless, spot recordings at Tifariti in 2011 indicate that single
559
Rottman 2007: 7.
Rottman 2005b: 31, and 2007: 31.
561
U.S. War Department 1944: 47-51.
562
Holmes 2003: 298.
563
U.S. War Department 1944: 52.
564
U.S. War Department 1944: 54.
560
208
man foxholes can be 1.3 to 1.6 metres wide by 1.9 to 2.3 metres long, while presumed
double man foxholes, which could also be machine gun positions, mortar positions or
even positions for hand held rockets, could range from 3.0 by 2.0 metres to 3.0 by 4.0
metres in area. Though small features have been pointed out to me as small mortar
pits, at only 1.4 to 1.9 metres in diameter.565 With dug out fighting (and other)
positions being the mainstay of the Moroccan defences at Tifariti, the overall
distribution of all defensive positions can be seen in Fig. 6.60.
Entrenchments
Single and small groups of dug out fighting positions occasionally have approach
trenches associated with them. These are usually short linear features that originate
behind the fighting positions, and they presumably gave protection to soldiers
accessing them – perhaps in situations where certain fighting and observation
positions were more liable to attack than others (see Fig. 6.48). There are also distinct
groups of fighting positions linked along trenches, and it is possible that these
represent mini strong points. By being linked, soldiers could move between the
different fighting pits (foxholes or slit trenches), responding to any specific threat and
giving each other support (see Figs. 6.49 and 6.50). The distribution of entrenched
positions is usually along the outermost defences of the Tifariti box and they are
discussed further below.
Built-up Positions
At Tifariti, these are often stone built, enclosed structures that are usually above
ground, though in most cases, they are partly dug into the earth. Where it has been
possible to examine them in the field, they are made up of stone rubble (on mud bricks
in some cases) with a mud mortar, and they would have been roofed when they were
occupied. Many of these were probably shelters, or accommodation huts for soldiers,
and there are instances of windows in their side walls, made from wooden crates and
large tin cans with their bases removed (see Figs. 6.51 to 6.53). Their plans can be
rectilinear, or ovoid, and the individual structures can measure around 1.25 to 4.0
metres by 1.75 to 4.0 metres in area. They can be single and/or on their own, close
together or in contiguous groups. The bulk of these shelters are in an area I have
565
Fadel, Interview.
209
called the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ (discussed below). There are similar structures in the TF1
study area of the WSP, but these are mainly made of mud bricks (see Fig. 6.54). Also,
similar accommodation features occur along the berms, and they have been noted in
Chapter 4, and in particular, see Figs. 4.30, 4.32, 4.52, 4.69, 4.76, and 4.78.
When structures similar in construction to these are on defensive front lines, then they
are probably not structures built solely for accommodation, but either sangars or
bunkers. However, when viewing these two specific types of features on Google
Earth, it is hard to differentiate between them. This is especially the case since all
built-up structures are now roofless, and there are instances where these types of
features are obviously embanked with earth. This can blur the definition of their
outlines, making it nearly impossible to distinguish sangars from roofless bunkers, and
both of these from large, revetted dugouts.
Vehicular Slots
As already noted in Chapter 4, vehicular slots are also known as ‘tank slots’,566 though
this does not mean that they can only accommodate tanks. They are also known as
‘hull-down scrapes’ or ‘AFV revetments’,567 and as ‘hull defilade pits’.568 They are
created by excavating a rectangular pit into which a vehicle can be easily driven in
and out of. They are surrounded on three sides by earthen parapets. These ‘U’ shaped
features are protective, from which tanks or self-propelled howitzers can safely
discharge fire. They can also accommodate trucks or jeeps with recoilless guns, and
they can be made to simply protect vehicles behind forward areas. Examples are
shown in Figs. 6.55 and 6.56. Small ‘U’ shaped vehicular slots are apparently 2.3 to
3.0 metres wide, but from the spot records made in the field in 2011, their lengths
appear to be no longer than 5.75 metres. Larger vehicular slots, for tanks or artillery,
are definitely no smaller than 3.5 metres wide, and from Google Earth, their lengths
can be observed up to, and at more than 10 metres. There are few, small vehicular
slots along the southern limits of the Tifariti box, but they are very evident north of
the Wadi Legtaf. On the whole, they can be found between the limits of the inner and
566
Rottman 2005b: 22.
Dunstan 2008: 29. AFV is an acronym for an armoured fighting vehicle.
568
Rottman 2007: 51.
567
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outer Tifariti boxes, and there is a great concentration in the Tifariti redoubt (see
below).
Gun Pits
Artillery gun pits are circular or sub-circular in shape. They can vary in size
depending on the type of gun they have been designed for. They can be as small as
four metres in diameter, and even smaller, mainly as mortar pits, or they can be more
than 10 metres in diameter to accommodate towed artillery or self-propelled guns.
They are created by excavating a shallow hollow in the ground and using the spoil to
create a circular parapet around them. This can be simply embanked, or revetted
internally with stones and/or sandbags. Access is by a ramp through which artillery
can be emplaced in the pit, though in Vietnam for instance, the pits were nearly closed
with the artillery pieces dropped into them by helicopter.569 Very often, these pits have
small bunkers or shelters associated with them, and storage areas for gun shells (see
Figs. 6.57 and 6.58). The distribution of gun pits at Tifariti is discussed below.
It seems that circular gun pits really came into being during World War Two. The
mono-directional linearity of defence and offence that was a hallmark of World War
One was replaced by an all round approach to tactics, since armed forces became
highly mobile with multi-directional troop movements. Occupied positions could be
outflanked and attacked from unforeseen directions, therefore support artillery had to
be able to pivot around to cover a number of different angles. This really became
obvious during the Vietnam War with the creation of fire support bases, which has
already been discussed in Chapter 4.
Other Features
Besides occupying the buildings at the very centre of Tifariti, the Moroccans also
utilised the old Spanish airstrip (see Fig. 6.59) located around 700 metres south of the
Spanish fort. They, or the Spanish, might have been responsible for the three conical
cairns on high ground, around 480 metres to the north of the airstrip (and almost in
line with it) which might have served as some kind of landing markers. Also, along
the lower slopes near the markers, there are large inscriptions on the ground laid out in
569
Foster 2007: 22-23.
211
stones. One is in Arabic and it is visible on Google Earth – it reads ‘God, The Nation,
The King’, and it includes a crown laid out in stones.570 The other is in capital Latin
letters inscribing ‘ALTEA’, but the meaning of this is not known. LMA/AOAV has
mapped the locations of four contained minefields and other areas of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) in and around Tifariti (see Fig. 6.66). The minefields are a part of the
Moroccan defences around the northern half of Tifariti, while many of the UXOs are
probably related to air attacks by Morocco. Fortunately, LMA/AOAV has removed
most, if not all UXOs from Tifariti, making it a much safer place today.571
The Archaeology of the Tifariti box: a landscape of defence
From August 1977 until March 1979 the Moroccan army ‘dug in’ at Tifariti, more or
less in a continual state of siege.572 Throughout this period, Polisario/SPLA forces
carried out a war of attrition against the Moroccan forces occupying key positions
throughout the badiya. Their tactics mainly consisted of repeated harassment strikes
by small motorised units, unpredictably executed in time and space. Their aims were
to isolate the Moroccans in their strongholds by cutting communications and supplies,
and to demoralise them, thereby forcing them to withdraw from their positions.573 At
Tifariti, as Muhammed Fadel described, the Moroccan defences consisted of an inner
line and an outer line. This is illustrated in Figs. 6.60 and 6.62, and the disposition of
these defences can be best described using the KOCOA scheme of battlescape
analysis.
KOCOA574 is a methodology for understanding the landscape character of a
battlespace. It was originally devised in its present form by the United States military,
though in general, some type of systematised battlescape analysis has been a hallmark
of all tactical planning in war. It is now increasingly used by conflict archaeologists as
a tool for analysing battlescapes.575 It is undeniably similar to general landscape
characterisation which is a methodology used by landscape archaeologists and the
570
Translated by A. Wasse. Email message, 7 November 2013.
AOAV 2008 & 2011.
572
Fadel, Interview and Breica, Interview 2 November.
573
Fadel, Interview.
574
A thorough description of KOCOA (also known as OAKOC) can be found in U.S. Department of
the Army 2009.
575
Bleed and Scott 2011.
571
212
heritage management sector, to understand and appreciate historical landscape
evolution. KOCOA stands for:
Key terrain: This is any locality whose occupation affords a ‘marked advantage’ to
whichever combatant group controls it. High ground is an obvious example of key
terrain since it can dominate an area and thereby afford good observational views and
fields of fire. Another example might be a valley or wadi, since its occupation could
facilitate the control of movement.
Observation: Essentially viewshed – what can be seen from any given position. This
also highlights intervisibility and those spaces that cannot be viewed, referred to as
dead space. Observation also relates to fields of fire.
Cover and concealment: These relate to protection from enemy fire and observation.
They can be natural and/or man-made – therefore, they include defensive features.
Obstacles: Any obstruction that is designed or employed to impede, or stop, a
combatant force is an obstacle. These can be natural or man made.
Avenues of approach: These are natural or man made features that facilitate the
movement of combatants towards their objectives. They can be summed up as
corridors of mobility.
Applying KOCOA to the Tifariti Box
Fig. 6.60 shows the overall distribution of defensive features in the Tifariti box as
more or less concentrically placed, but on closer examination this is not so
straightforward. There are multiple inner and outer lines of dug out fighting positions.
Some are lengthy and well-defined while others are not. There are blocks and lines of
features, all related to terrain in and outside of the box. A KOCOA characterisation
can help explain them.
213
Key Terrain and Observation
Although the terrain in and around Tifariti is low lying, it does have topographic
variance. Tifariti lies in a slight basin or depression, with natural drainage flowing
northwards from the watershed delineating the southern edge of the depression. The
northern side of the basin is demarcated by a zone of folding rock formations with
dense concentrations of linear igneous intrusions that are ridge-like since they are
harder than the rock through which they intrude. There is also slightly higher ground
within and outside of the basin, and this lies at an elevation of 480 metres or more.
This ground, within and around the Tifariti box, constitutes a zone of key terrain on
which the bulk of the Moroccan defensive positions are located (see Fig. 6.61). In the
center of the box, and south of the Wadi Legtaf, though also extending east of the
Wadi Tifariti, are the inner lines of defensive positions – an ‘inner’ box. This utilises
all of the higher ground around the earlier Spanish settlement, including a salient,
though low lying east to west ridge of intrusive igneous rock south of the settlement –
just south of the Spanish airstrip (see Fig. 6.62).
What can be observed from the inner defensive box, its viewshed, is quite striking. As
Fig. 6.63 shows, by selecting six viewpoint positions along the inner box and using a
GIS tool576 to highlight the ground visible from those viewpoints, a generalised
viewshed around the Tifariti inner box can be created. Surprisingly, the viewshed
extends southwards only as far as the arcing southern limit of the basin in which
Tifariti lies. Here there is an arcing ridge of higher ground at around 480 metres
(highlighted by a ring of outer defensive positions), and beyond this arc, the ground
apparently rises slightly (as a watershed) before dipping again to the south, thereby
producing dead ground. On the western side of this arc there is a tributary to the Wadi
Legtaf, and this too is in dead ground. Visibility only increases on the western upward
slopes of the tributary, where further, outer defensive positions lie on the 480 metre
contour. This higher ground extends to the north side of the Wadi Legtaf, and arcs to
the northeast as a further ridge of high ground (also, intermittently at 480 metres
elevation) extending east-northeast beyond the Wadi Tifariti. This high ground, this
key terrain, is also the location of further outer defensive positions.
576
This is the internet application, Hey What’s That, available at http://www.heywhatsthat.com/.
214
The 480 metre high ground that marks the east side of the inner box, extends
eastwards, but visibility along it is intermittent, with areas of dead ground. Further
dead ground is to the east, and there is dead ground to the northeast of the inner box
too. Here, the viewshed from the inner box only follows a well delineated northnortwesterly line of extended defences with more dead ground to the east. This
indicates that the ground to the east slopes downwards, out of sight from the inner
box, and then rises again further to the east, as is shown in the northeast (upper right)
corner of Fig. 6.63.
It is conspicuous how, in the main, the viewshed from the inner defensive box extends
out only as far as the 480 metre high ground upon which Tifariti’s outer defences – the
outline of its outer box – lie. Presumably, it was the limit of this viewshed that
contributed to the placing of Tifariti’s outer defences where they are. From these
slight rises in the ground surrounding the inner box, the outer box could extend the
defensive gaze over greater ground, but not everywhere. The viewshed from this outer
key terrain is shown in Fig. 6.64 – it is based on 17 viewpoints. When comparing this
to the viewshed shown in Fig. 6.63, it is obvious that there are fewer white areas
representing dead ground. It also shows how the defences of the outer box had a good
reverse view over the inner box. When the two viewsheds are combined, however (see
Fig. 6.65), they show that the dead ground within and close to the outer box is
diminished greatly, but unexpectedly, the ground to the southeast (and the very
southwest) of the outer most defences is still dead. Also there is still some dead
ground to the east, and to the northwest. On the face of it, this might appear as a
handicap for the Moroccans, but what follows, on issues of ‘cover and concealment’
might clarify things.
Cover and Concealment
Dug out fighting positions are by their very nature designed to facilitate their own
concealment. By being earth embanked and low lying, especially in open country, as
in a desert, they also give cover from attack. As already noted, the Tifariti box covers
an area of more than 90 square kilometres, and within this the Moroccans dug and
constructed at least 7170 defensive positions,577 with the overwhelming majority
577
This is the count of defensive positions plotted using Google Earth.
215
being concealed (and thereby covered). The nature of the dugouts, in relation to the
firepower and tactics of Polisario/SPLA attackers, probably enhanced the survivability
of the Moroccan troops. Also, and perhaps most crucially for much of the southern
limit of the Moroccan defences, their outer positions were placed just a few hundred
metres behind and down hill of slightly higher ground (where the open hamada desert
opens up to the south) increasing their concealment from SPLA attackers approaching
from the south and southeast. These reverse slope, defensive positions could also
surprise attackers, especially in their first encounter with them, since they would
become visible to the attackers only when they would be in range of the smaller arms
(assault rifles, sub machine guns, and machine guns) deployed by the troops
occupying the defences.578 Similarly, the majority of artillery gun pits were placed
within, and south of, the inner defensive box (see Fig. 6.68), and these too would not
have been immediately visible to Polisario’s motorised attackers.
Obstacles
Tifariti has no natural obstacles to the south, and the openness of the terrain would
make attackers relatively visible from a considerable distance. Even if an enemy
cannot be seen directly, if they approach by motor vehicle, as the Polisario/SPLA
would have done, their dust streams would be visible for many kilometres.
Nevertheless, if they did break through the outermost defences of the box, they would
have had to negotiate at least two lateral ridges of intrusive igneous rock, which would
have slowed down their movement, and in some instances, even dictate their route of
attack through limited gaps in the ridges. Similarly, the undulating hills that are
present in the northern half, or so, of the Tifariti box, and which extend northwards for
a good many kilometres, do present real obstacles to motorised attack. As Figs. 6.4
and 6.61 indicate, these are numerous, lateral intrusions of hard igneous rock that
break up the terrain into ridges and troughs. With the troughs running roughly parallel
with the Tifariti defences, the terrain suggests that it would have been difficult, or at
least slow going, for the Polisario/SPLA to make direct, head on, hit and run attacks
that were their hallmark. Their movements would have undoubtedly been hampered
causing them to relinquish, to some degree, the element of total surprise. Also, even if
a motorised attack was successful, the raiding party would possibly be forced to
578
The types of small arms used by Morocco, as noted in Denis 1976: 653, had a range of around 300
to 800 metres.
216
withdraw through a route not of their choosing, but one dictated by the configurations
of the ridges and troughs. This would have been an operational handicap, making
them vulnerable to potential counter attacks and maybe even driving them into a
minefield.
The minefields (shown in Fig. 6.66) were distinctly placed only around the northern
half of the Tifariti box on, or adjacent to, wadis in three out of four instances. This is
in stark contrast to the claim made by Muhammed Fadel, that the settlement was
surrounded by mines. Also, no mines were located by LMA/AOAV and MINURSO
around the southern half of the Moroccan defences. Perhaps this was a matter of
economy since the open desert to the south would have required too many mines,
while in the north, the obstacles posed by the ridge and trough character of the terrain
might have forced SPLA attackers into the wadis where their movement could be
swift (if staying out of the sandy centre of the wadis), but predictable and limited, and
unfortunately for them, channelled into the minefields.
The defences themselves must not be ignored as an obstacle, or better, as a series of
obstacles to SPLA attackers. That is what they were constructed for, and the
distribution of their different types is shown in Figs. 6.66 to 6.69. The greater
concentration of defences is disposed in the northern half of the Tifariti box, and this
is supported by the density plot shown in Fig. 6.70. Such a distribution would
additionally suggest that the north of Tifariti was more liable to being attacked, but as
already pointed out, the very terrain could hamper attacks by fast motor vehicles, and
this would have been exacerbated by the mine fields associated with the natural
routeways – the wadis. With this being the case, and as a result, with the SPLA being
deterred from attacking from the north, the density of defences there might not
accurately reflect the SPLA threat. On the other hand, the defences in the south appear
to have been laid out with the concept of defence in depth in mind, and with a
considerable variation of different types of positions. If SPLA attackers made it past
the outer ring of defences, the system, theoretically, could have bogged them down
within a matrix of obstacles made up of defensive lines of dugouts (many enhanced as
entrenchments) and gun positions, prior to their reaching the inner defensive box. Be
that as it may, in the last two months of the Moroccan occupation of Tifariti, it was
217
from the south, southwest and southeast that the SPLA/Polisario attacked, compelling
the Moroccan army to withdraw from Tifariti.579 More of this is discussed below.
Avenues of Approach
The corridors of mobility for the SPLA into and around Tifariti were the wadis to the
north, and what could be called a ‘plain of mobility’ to the south – the open hamada
desert (see Fig. 6.71). The northern wadi routes were limited in number, and the
folding igneous landscape in between them did not make travel across country easy.
The wadis could also be mined, as already noted, and most could be observed from
many positions along Tifariti’s outer defences. In contrast, the desert to the south gave
easy movement to motorised SPLA units (much of it was dead ground), and when far
enough away from Tifariti, they could circle back into the rockier terrain on either
side of the settlement, and beyond, to seek cover after a sortie. Also, attacks from the
south had the added advantage of being driven into the prevailing northerly winds. For
instance, SPLA units could drive up close to Moroccan forward positions at night
when the dust streams from their vehicles could not be seen, and the sound of their
motors could drift away to the south on the prevailing winds, furthering their ability to
surprise the Moroccan garrison. But the open desert may not have always been to their
advantage. While moving throughout the flat hamada, Polisario raiders were always
vulnerable to potential air surveillance and attack. Be that as it may, and for all of their
superiority in material, the Moroccans may have held crucial outposts dotted around
the badiya, but in the empty areas in between, the Saharawi fighters – the ‘sons of the
clouds’ – really did predominate, and were always ‘at home’.
The Archaeology of the Tifariti box: Tifariti besieged
It has not been possible to find published descriptive references to the fighting that
took place in and around Tifariti between 1977 and 1979. This was a period when the
Polisario/SPLA held sway throughout the badiya, and what could be called ‘the siege’
of Tifariti was part of a continual war of attrition, in which most if not all Moroccan
positions away from the main urbanised centres of the territory, were being
continually harassed by Polisario. In a place like Tifariti, the aim was to remove the
579
Breica, Interview 2 November.
218
Moroccan occupiers, and not to destroy them in battle.580 This is contrary to the view
that when a force is encircled, as the Moroccans were at Tifariti, it would usually be
‘followed by a battle of annihilation, the classic goal of all types of ground combat’.581
Saharawi forces were more inclined to rout their enemy in battle, more in keeping
with the longer term, historical approach to warfare as described by John Keegan.582
And as T.E. Lawrence explained in his Science of Guerilla Warfare (though with
reference to Turkey and Arabia):
Now the Arab aim was unmistakably geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking
lands in Asia. In the doing of it Turks might be killed, yet ‘killing Turks’ would never
be an excuse or aim. If they would go quietly, the war would end. If not, they must be
driven out: but at the cheapest possible price, since the Arabs were fighting for
freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive.583
In fact, Malainin Larkhal has even pointed out that in the fighting prior to the 1991
ceasefire, Polisario fought with a chivalric ‘spirit’.584 In describing the tactics
employed by Polsario/SPLA in 1976, John Damis has written:
Polisario military tactics stressed mobility and the element of surprise. …the front
operated in groups of five to eight Land Rovers, units small enough to conceal
themselves in the hills during the day. At night, moving under the cover of darkness,
Polisario guerrillas were able to employ a variety of light weapons – rifles, machine
guns, land mines, mortars, antitank launchers, SA-7 shoulder-mounted missiles – and
engage in hit-and-run operations to harass Moroccan forces and interdict supply
columns.585
Damis went on to say that in the hillier areas of Western Sahara, the guerrillas had an
‘abundance of caves and hideouts’ in which to conceal themselves (see Fig. 6.72).
Also, that in 1977 and 1978 their raiding parties became more ambitious, consisting of
up to 150 vehicles that could, apparently, move freely across the badiya with little
580
Breica, Interview 2 November.
U.S. Department of the Army 1952: 1.
582
Keegan 1978.
583
Lawrence [1929] 2005: 277.
584
Larkhal, Interview.
585
Damis 1983: 83.
581
219
interference. ‘The guerrillas began to employ heavier, Soviet-made weapons,
including 122-millimeter rockets, cannons, and Kalashnikov assault rifles’.586
Muhammed Fadel emphasised that while the Moroccans occupied Tifariti, the
Polisario/SPLA aim was to continuously attack them ‘in guerrilla style, so as never to
give… the enemy a chance to rest’ and to cut off their supply lines, and by doing so,
‘to attack their morale’.587 By making it hard for the garrison to receive supplies
overland, the Moroccans were forced to supply and stay linked with Tifariti solely by
air. However, the airstrip was obviously vulnerable, because the SPLA invested
Tifariti from the south.588
Habua Breica – though not a contemporary of Muhammed Fadel – has additionally
described the SPLA investment of Tifariti. He summarised the Polisario tactics as
those of a war of attrition. SPLA units would frequently select different parts of the
Moroccan defensive perimeter and attack them using two to four land rovers. These
would be rapid attacks with all guns continually firing. Shock and awe tactics, but on
a relatively small scale, aiming at weak points in the Moroccan defences, and
repeatedly attacking from different directions. The Saharawis would aim to over run
selected locations, and to take prisoners for intelligence. These attacks also drew
Moroccan mortar and artillery fire, and by so doing, the Saharawis would learn where
the Moroccan guns were. Such tactics were de-moralising for the Moroccans, 589 and
as Che Guevara has written, after a furious surprise attack, the battlefield
suddenly converts itself into total passivity. The surviving enemy, resting, believes
that the attacker has departed; he begins to relax, to return to the routine life of the
camp or fortress, when suddenly a new attack bursts forth in another place, with the
same characteristics… The fundamental thing is surprise and rapidity of attack.590
Habua Breica is of the opinion that during the war many Moroccan soldiers had
nervous breakdowns from these types of assaults. This was made worse at Tifariti
586
Damis 1983: 83.
Fadel, Interview.
588
Fadel, Interview.
589
Breica, Interview 2 November.
590
Che Guevara 2007: 17.
587
220
when the Moroccans were cut off and could only receive air dropped supplies. This
was in 1978, and presumably at the end of the year, since this supposedly went on for
at least two months culminating in a Moroccan withdrawal in March 1979, after a
substantial SPLA attack. In the assault, Tifariti was attacked from three sides – the
east, south and west – and the Morrocans had an avenue of escape to the north.591
When investing Tifariti, Muhammed Fadel emphasised that the SPLA first attacked
the outlying Moroccan defences – the outer limits of the Tifariti box (the ‘wings’ as he
described them to me).592 The need for the Moroccans to bolster the outer perimeter,
or ‘wings’, in response to the threat of SPLA attacks, is perhaps illustrated by the fact
that many of the outer dugout fighting positions, especially in the south, were grouped
in clusters linked by trenches. This made each group of around five to more than 10
dugouts a mini-strongpoint (see Figs. 6.49 and 6.50). Also, some of these southern
positions included protective approach trenches, as did many of the fighting positions
on the outer perimeter on the high ground north of the Wadi Legtaf (see Fig. 6.66).
Here too, there were many built up positions (sangar-like features), perhaps testifying
to the need for more solidly constructed fighting positions, or illustrating that the
ground was simply too rocky for digging into easily (see Fig. 6.67). The southern
perimeter of the Tifariti box was also supported by artillery, since there were many
gun positions dispersed within the flatter ground behind the outermost perimeter.
These included small gun pits, presumably for mortars, and larger pits (more than four
metres wide) which could also include associated dugouts and/or built up features,
plus vehicular slots large enough to accommodate tanks and/or self propelled artillery
(see Figs. 6.68 and 6.69). It is interesting to note that there is no clear preference to the
siting of artillery positions west of the Wadi Tifariti, as maintained by Muhammed
Fadel. The archaeology, as mapped, obviously shows otherwise.
Polisario tactics proved successful, especially once the guerrillas were able to prevent
airplanes from landing and bringing in supplies. Without air support, the Moroccans
eventually withdrew into the centre of Tifariti, and also, according to Muhammed
Fadel, the protective wadis and high ground west to west-northwest (from 400m to 1.7
591
592
Breica, Interview 2 November.
Fadel, Interview.
221
kilometres) of the old Spanish fort (all well within the inner Tifariti box).593 The
approximate extent of this ‘redoubt’, so to speak, is shown in Fig. 6.73 (and a Google
Earth close-up of its central part is shown in Fig. 6.74). It was obviously chosen for its
survivability (its ‘cover and concealment’) value, and from its higher elevations (its
‘key terrain’) a very good view (or ‘observation’ through viewshed) could be had over
much of the ground as far out as the original, outer Tifariti box. The hilly nature of the
terrain in which this redoubt was situated was obstructive to access (with ‘obstacles’
to movement caused by constrictive ‘avenues of approach’), so the Moroccans must
have thought that this was a reasonably occupiable pocket of defence.594 It is also
possible, that the gun pits and large vehicular slots in and around the centre of Tifariti
date to the contraction of the defences, when artillery would have been pulled in from
the outer defensive box. Nevertheless, from these positions, they could still rain
accurate fire on SPLA attackers.
Habua Breica maintained that the Moroccan infantry stationed at Tifariti were a
mobile force, mainly employing armed Jeeps and Land Rovers to counter the mobility
of the small motorised Polisario units. The troops, he additionally maintained, were
around 1200 in number,595 though in 1979, Polisario claimed that there were 6000
Moroccan troops in Tifariti.596 Nevertheless, those soldiers occupying the redoubt,
built rubble and mud shelters (bivouacs), and numerous vehicular slots that could only
have been constructed for jeeps or trucks since their remains indicate that they were
too small for tanks or self propelled guns (on average they are 2.5m wide by well
under six metres long). Fig. 6.75 shows a captured Moroccan jeep with a 105mm
direct fire recoilless gun mounted on it. According to Habua Breica, these were the
mainstay of Morocco’s mobile infantry.597 Some of the vehicular slots at Tifariti are
positioned such that they could have a view over the surrounding terrain, thereby
facilitating the use of direct fire guns that could have been mounted on the jeeps
positioned in them (see Fig. 6.76). Other slots are situated in lower lying areas
suggesting that these were simply protective parking places (see Figs. 6.56 and 6.77).
593
Fadel, Interview.
In this instance, ‘pockets are formed as the result of operations in which the attacker entirely
surrounds a large number of the opposing forces’ (U.S. Department of the Army 1952: 1).
595
Breica, Interview 2 November.
596
Knight 1979.
597
Breica, Interview 2 November.
594
222
All of the vehicular slots were also situated in such a way as to make driving in and
out of them easy.
As already described, the shelters, or bivouacs, could be multi-celled or single room
huts, constructed of random rubble in mud mortar, and partly dug into the ground.
They could be single, free-standing cells or a complex of rooms. Some had windows,
really lights, framed by large re-used tin cans with their bases cut out, or wooden
crates, also without bottoms. Their roofs, now missing and with no evident remnants
nearby, were probably flat, as in Figs. 4.38, 4.52, 4.60, 4.77, 4.79, 4.84 and 4.86. One
three celled structure was pointed out by Muhammed Fadel as being a mortar position
in the Tifariti redoubt.598 If this was a mortar post then it was the only one of its kind
since fortified mortar positions were usually dug-in with a circular parapet of earth,
and there are apt examples of these along the northern edge of the redoubt. Instead,
the structure was probably a makeshift mortar position, taking advantage of the
relatively high sheltering walls of a previously built up stone shelter, and maybe even
occupied only in the lattermost stages of the fighting at Tifariti as part of ‘last ditch’
efforts by the garrison to defend itself. Examples of some of the shelters are shown in
Figs. 6.51 to 6.53 and 6.78. The Moroccans also built some structures into the odd
ancient stone tumulus. One in particular, with adjacent areas of cleared of stones as a
kind of assembly area, is shown in Fig. 6.79. Nearby was also the laid out stone
inscription (already referred to) proclaiming ‘God, The Nation, The King’, along with
the stones spelling out ‘ALTEA’. Both would have been visible from the air, with the
former still visible on Google Earth (see Fig. 6.80).
After repeated harassment attacks, and by becoming more and more isolated, the
Moroccan garrison at Tifariti was in an untenable position by the end of 1978. With at
least two months of concentrated assaults by Polisario/SPLA forces, culminating in
one big Polisario push from the southern quarters of the compass, the Moroccans have
been described as leaving Tifariti in disarray.599 However, the precipitousness of the
Moroccan departure can be looked at in a different light. When Richard Knight, then
working for the American Committee on Africa, visited Western Sahara in 1979, he
had this to say:
598
599
Fadel, Interview.
Fadel, Interview and Breica, Interview 2 November.
223
I actually saw part of a battle near Tifariti. It was getting dark, but we could
see the mortar explosions. In fact our guides pulled us back when a mortar
exploded about 90 feet away. I later learned from POLISARIO that by March
12 the 6,000 Moroccans who had occupied Tifariti had retreated and been sent
to reinforce Semara [Smara], a town closer to the coast which is also under
attack by POLISARIO.600
It is interesting that Polisario did not tell Knight that they had routed the Moroccans.
Here was an ample opportunity for letting the word out (to a sympathetic American
activist) that the SPLA was able to siege an occupied town and re-take it by force of
arms. Instead, from whatever Knight was told, he got the impression that yes, the
Moroccans retreated from Tifariti, but also, they were sent to reinforce Smara. It is
undoubtedly the case that Moroccan troops could no longer hold positions in the
badiya, and that Morocco was changing its strategy to one of defending Smara, Bou
Craa and El-Ayoun – the so called ‘useful triangle’. It is possible, therefore, that the
Moroccans did not leave Tifariti because they were pushed out in a decisive assault,
but instead, were ordered to withdraw to defend Smara, when the Moroccans realised
that all of their positions in the badiya were unsustainable. In support of the notion
that the Moroccans did not leave Tifariti too precipitously, Muhammed Fadel made it
clear to me that when the Moroccans withdrew from the settlement they destroyed the
colonia which they had occupied, and they laid mines all around the town.601 Bahia
Awah saw the colonia in a ruinous, destroyed condition, when he arrived in Tifariti in
1986,602 but LMA/AOAV, and Minurso, have found no evidence for extensive
minefields around the settlement.
With the Moroccans leaving Tifariti on 12 March 1979, the Polisario/SPLA was free
to re-occupy the settlement. This heralded a new phase in the archaeology of Tifariti –
one of re-appropriation. Still, constructive attempts at re-settling only started after
1991 when the United Nations brokered the present ceasefire between the SADR and
Morocco.
600
Knight 1979.
Fadel, Interview.
602
Awah, Interview.
601
224
The Archaeology of Post War Tifariti
With the construction of the Moroccan berms completed in 1988, Tifariti was securely
located within a defacto, Polisario controlled liberated zone. From camps within the
zone, as well as from the Tindouf region, SPLA units were still conducting
harassment attacks on the Moroccan berms. For all intents and purposes, Tifariti was
still in a war zone and this was made very clear when Moroccan planes attacked the
settlement in August 1991, just before the United Nations ceasefire came into effect
on the 6th of September. It has been recorded in Tifariti that the remnants of the
community facilities were destroyed at that time,603 including parts of the old Spanish
fort, part of the adjacent infirmary, and according to Bahia Awah, the school.604
The exodus of refugees at the start of the conflict, and the continuance of hostilities
throughout the badiya really did depopulate the territory. The open desert became a
dedicated arena for battle, and in the Western Sahara panhandle, that was solely
between Polisario and Morocco. According to Kalthoum Salma – a Bedouin woman
who lived in the Tifariti area before the war and has since returned – after the defacto
partition of the country, and even after the mid 1980s, there was a trickle of some
Saharawis returning to the liberated territories under the protection of the SPLA. At
this time, Polisario was trying to increase livestock in the region,605 but this really only
developed after the ceasefire with the development of a new cash economy in the
refugee camps. This was, and still is, contributed to by Spanish pensions to Saharawi
veterans of the colonial military, the development of internal and regional trade,
donations from Spanish families supporting the families of children they have
fostered, solidarity tourism (and NGO workers and the like) and remittances from
Saharawis working abroad. The increase in such available money has resulted in the
revival of mobile pastoralism, with many families grazing herds of camels and goats
in, for example, the greener pastures of the Zemmour region in the free zone. Some
families do this seasonally, others send out only some members of their family to tend
603
See Appendix 1: the Tifariti History Plaque records that during the attacks on Tifariti two Moroccan
planes were shot down – on the 4th and 26th of August 1991. The first plane was a French Mirage while
the second was an American F5E. Both pilots were captured.
604
Awah, Interview.
605
Salma, Interview.
225
the animals, while others have de-camped totally to the liberated badiya. Also, since
the ceasefire, and since the resettlement of Bedouin families with their herds, many
Saharawis enjoy visiting their relations in the badiya – in their homeland – and in an
environment that is very different from the stark hamada of the camps.606 As a
Saharawi guide told the researcher Pablo San Martin:
Some of these Saharawis whom we’re seeing going to Bir Lehlu, Tiris… don’t go
because they have animals there; they go to visit relatives and friends. Well, in fact,
they go on holidays! We like the desert… and we also like to go on holidays…607
The Tifariti area is seen as being very inviting, and it has a special resonance for the
Saharawi people. To use Hirsch’s words, it is a place that ‘is a source of restorative
power’.608 In fact, it is restorative on a variety of levels – from the practical and
concrete to the ideational. Since the ceasefire, the SADR government has inaugurated
infrastructural developments with the aim of repopulating the Tifariti area. For
instance, (and with the assistance of NGOs and some Spanish municipalities) a new
well was dug in 1991, and a new water pump was fitted in 1998. A school and
hospital were constructed in 1999, while a regional museum was also established. A
small experimental/model farm was created and provided with farm equipment. In
2005 a new housing development was started, called the ‘Solidarity District’, and in
the same year, the first telephone and Internet link was made with the settlement.
Tifariti is seen as a future Saharawi capital within the liberated territories, and the
foundation stone for a Saharawi National Council headquarters building was laid in
2005. Also, assemblies of the Polisario ‘Congress of the Popular Front’ have been
held in the settlement every four years since October 2003.609 United Nations’
ceasefire observers (MINURSO) have a base and airfield in Tifariti,610 while
LMA/AOAV land mine clearance operations are based in the settlement.611 In 2009 it
was even proposed that a ‘University of the Desert’ be based in Tifariti, but that
606
San Martin 2010: 157-164.
San Martin 2010: 164, citing a conversation with a Saharawi guide in the Free Zone, November
2005.
608
Hirsch 1995: 5.
609
See Appendix 1.
610
See the MINURSO website at http://minurso.unmissions.org/ and
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/index.shtml.
611
AOAV 2008.
607
226
initiative has evolved, in the first instance, into an art school based in the refugee
camps in Tindouf, Algeria.612 For a plan of contemporary Tifariti, see Fig. 6.81.
The weather of the Tifariti region is considered very clement indeed.613 It is cooler
than the hamada at Tindouf, and the air is considered very fresh, much fresher and
clearer than in the camps. Because of this, people have re-settled in the Tifariti area
for their health, encouraged by Polisario programmes for the sick and the elderly. This
was the reason why one Saharawi woman I spoke to, Lamat Brahim, came to Tifariti –
her mother was suffering from asthma.614 Kalthoum Salma also has asthma, and her
renewed semi-pastoral life in the open spaces of Tifariti suits her.615 Rains
occasionally fall in the Zemmour region, and as Fig. 6.3 shows, the Wadi Tifariti is
relatively verdant. Westerners from temperate climes might view the Tifariti area as
dry and harsh, with just a little bit of scrub vegetation, but Saharawis like Lamat
Brahim, think that the region is ‘beautiful’. In the mornings she would go out for
pleasurable walks if she has little to do, and in all, she feels very attached to the
place.616 The Saharawi poet. Sidi Brahim Salama J’Dud summed up such sentiments
in a few lines from a very impromptu composition he recited for me in 2011:
You are very dear my country,
And you know it is true,
You are beautiful with your verdancy
And with your good weather… 617
At present, Lamat Brahim only has goats, but she would like to increase their number,
and acquire camels.618 Kalthoum Salma’s family grazes both goats and camels. She
commented on how families used to have hundreds of camels before the war, while
now they may only have as many as ten.619 This small number of animals might be
true for some families, but I and other members of the WSP, when travelling between
612
Rigg 2009. The Saharawi School of Art was inaugurated in the Bojdour refugee camp in Tindouf,
Algeria, in November 2013. See http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/inaugurada-la-primera-escuelade-arte-y.html accessed 28 March 2014.
613
Deya, Interview.
614
Brahim, Interview.
615
Salma, Interview.
616
Brahim, Interview.
617
Salama J’Dud, Interview.
618
Brahim, Interview.
619
Salma, Interview.
227
Tindouf and Tifariti, have seen camel herds probably numbering more than a hundred.
Also such a high number of animals in any given herd makes it worthwhile, and
necessary, to follow the rains across a broad range, as Kalthoum has additionally
maintained. In the past, such ranges from Tifariti extended in a northerly direction to
Mahbes and Echdeiria, but because of the berm, they now extend to the south (see Fig.
6.82). Much of the livestock in the badiya was supposedly killed off by the Moroccan
military in their invasion of the country, in an attempt to drive the Bedouin into the
towns. As a consequence, the animals seen today around Tifariti have been brought
out by trucks from the Tindouf area and Mauritania.620 In all, Polisario has been
relatively successful in getting Saharawis to start resettling the Tifariti area.
Undoubtedly, the development of facilities such as the regional infirmary and the
digging of new wells in the wadis,621 and the presence of a school, 622 along with land
mine clearance by LMA/AOAV, have had a positive effect on increased pastoralism
in and around the clement, naturally inviting Wadi Tifariti.
Recent Pastoral Settlement at Tifariti
The evidence of post 1991 pastoral settlement at Tifariti constitutes some of the latest
strata of contemporary archaeology that has impressed itself onto the Tifariti
palimpsest. It shares space with the remains of war, the colonial past and the
prehistoric past. Although pastoralism has been on the increase since 1991, its present
spread in and around Tifariti (in the Tifariti Study Area) can be observed and mapped
for the years 2006 to 2008 using Google Earth.623 The dated satellite imagery
available on Google Earth makes it possible to map the sites of Bedouin tents that
were occupied, theoretically at least, from 1991 up to 14 May 2008. These are:
620
Salma, Interview.
In 2011, I saw small sheds in open locations in the Wadi Tifariti and its tributaries. According to
Malainin Larkhal, who was with me at the time, these were shelters for new well diggings. I can also
affirm that there were very few of these in 2007 when I first worked in the Tifariti area, so their
numbers have obviously increased.
622
Brahim, Interview. She told me in 2011 that she was very happy with the school and its teachers. For
her, it was a contributing reason for living close to Tifariti.
623
During the later phases of writing this dissertation, in early 2014, Google Earth released new
satellite imagery dated to 2013. However, because this imagery was released at such a late date, it has
not been included in this research.
621
228
The imprints of tent encampments that existed prior to 21 February 2006 (see
Fig. 6.83).
Tent sites, occupied and visible on 21 February 2006 (see Fig. 6.84).
The imprints of tent sites that were set up after 21 February 2006 but were
deserted by 14 May 2008 (see Fig. 6.85), and finally,
Tent sites, occupied and visible on 14 May 2008 (see Fig. 6.86).
Modern Saharawi tents are very different from the traditional tents of the Maghreb
and the western Sahara. The traditional tent was usually made of goat and camel hair,
and it had a low wind resistant profile with a central peak.624 On the other hand, the
modern tent is square or rectangular, made of canvas, and tall enough for an adult to
stand up in. In plan, modern tents can measure anywhere from five to seven metres
along a side, while the traditional tent would have measured, on average, seven metres
in width by five metres in depth.625 The two types of tents are shown in Fig. 6.87, and
the relatively square and uniform footprint of a modern canvas tent can be easily seen
on Google Earth (see Fig. 6.88). Contemporary tented sites in the Tifariti area can
consist of one or more tents, while some campsites might include domestic mud brick
structures.626
The distribution of tent sites that were occupied, presumably since 1991 and up to 21
February 2006 is shown in Fig. 6.83. There were 305 individual tent ‘footprints’
(impressions) including three sites that were probably the remains of built structures.
Unfortunately, since these cannot be broken down into individual years, then the
growth in numbers and the movement of tents within the study area, over time, cannot
be enumerated. Nevertheless, the figure shows that tent sites stayed relatively clear of
those areas in which there are many intrusive igneous ridges. Tents were positioned
close to wadis and wadi tributaries, on lower ground where there is good pasture, with
an increasing density towards the Wadi Legtaf, westwards from the Wadi Tifariti.
624
Andrews 1971.
Modern tent dimensions have come from measurements I took in the field while dimensions for the
traditional Maghrebi tent are from Andrews 1971: 141.
626
When I interviewed Kalthoum Salma, for instance, I was taken into a mud brick building which was
white washed and well maintained. It served as a majlis – a room (or space) for meeting visitors.
However, when I visited the semi permanent camp of Muhammed Deya, the Mayor of Tifariti, the tent
served as a majlis, in which I and other guests had a meal. This latter use of the tent is also more in
keeping with the domestic arrangements of Saharawi households in the refugee camps.
625
229
Unsurprisingly there were few tent sites in the open hamada desert to the south,
though apparently, the wadis cutting through the hamada obviously gave shelter to
some tent sites.
Google Earth imagery, dated 21 February 2006, provides a snapshot view of the
disposition and spread of occupied Bedouin tent sites in and around Tifariti on that
specific day. The plotted tents are shown in Fig. 6.84. Here, there are 130 sites of
individual, newly set up and occupied tents, which include three possible built
structures and four associated enclosures or zaribas. The majority of the tent sites are
within the shallow basin in which Tifariti is situated, and they are in sheltered
locations either on, or next to, wadis or wadi tributaries. Only one group of tents is
north of the Wadi Legtaf, while seven groups of tents are located amidst the wadis and
tributaries southeast of the Tifariti basin, in the more open hamada desert.
According to Google Earth imagery, in the two years between 21 February 2006 and
up to 14 May 2008, 139 newly sited tents were set up in and around Tifariti, including
one built structure. As Fig. 6.85 shows, the preference was to site tents and tent groups
within the shallow Tifariti basin, south and southeast of the Wadi Legtaf and east of
the Wadi Tifariti. The tent sites in the hamada to the southeast diminished, while tent
sites increased northeast of Tifariti along the tributaries draining from the east. The
area of intrusive igneous ridges north of the Wadi Legtaf and west of the Wadi Tifariti
was still a deterrent to tent site placement, but beyond this area, tent sites were
established in the far northwest of the study area. Again, the preference for tent sites
was still on the lower ground, usually close to or on wadis and their tributaries. This
distribution changes in the Google Earth image of the settlement taken on 14 May
2008. The distribution of occupied tent sites on that day is shown in Fig. 6.86. The
number of newly set up and occupied tents has risen from 139 for the previous two
years to 169 (including two compounds and two possible built structures). Their
distribution has altered distinctly in that there are now very few along the Wadi Legtaf
and there has been a concentration of tent sites closer in to the centre of Tifariti. There
has also been an increase of sites amidst the tributaries to the Wadi Tifariti in the
northeast of the study area. Overall, if looking only at the Google Earth snapshots of
21 February 2006 and 14 may 2008, since they represent single moments in the
230
occupation of the settlement, there has been a marked movement of tent sites towards
the northeast. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.89.
Movement of tent sites and camps should be expected of people who rely on having
good grazing for their animals. The movement of tents and camps around Tifariti, and
the overall increase in numbers, can only reinforce the notion that people have a
positive attitude to Tifariti, be it the good weather, the pasture along the wadis, or the
provision of facilities such as a school and infirmary. The increase of tent sites as
illustrated on 14 May 2008, can also reflect that the potential hazards of UXOs has
been extensively diminished – through the efforts of LMA/AOAV – and as a
consequence, Saharawis are increasingly more willing to occupy the badiya in and
around the settlement.
Sites of Political Re-Appropriation
There are other ‘footprints’ of tents around Tifariti, which are visible in the satellite
imagery from Google Earth (see Fig. 6.90). These are modern, square Saharawi tents
that have been set up in neat rows as accommodation for the delegates and visitors
(and additional SPLA soldiers) who come to Tifariti for the Polisario National
Congresses that have been held every four years at the settlement. These are very
much acts of re-appropriation by the SADR government, aiming to show that there is
a tangible link between the government of the refugees and their territory – their
country. That is why, as already mentioned, there is a SADR government building
under construction in the centre of Tifariti, with the aim being to develop Tifariti into
a Saharawi capital in the Liberated Territory.
Polisario National Congresses have been held at Tifariti since 2003, when previously,
they were held in the Tindouf refugee camps. The 11th Congress was held on 12-19
October 2003, the 12th Congress was held on 15-21 December 2007 while the 13th
Congress was held on 15-21 December 2011. When these occur, Tifariti has a great
influx of people, more than a thousand in number (almost 2000), and made up of
Saharawis from the camps and the Saharawi Diaspora, foreign visitors and dignitaries,
Polisario/SADR workers and officials, and members of the SPLA. Tents are set up to
231
accommodate the influx, all aligned in neat rows. There is a ‘festival’ feel to the
gatherings, with the flying of flags and bunting. A view of Tifariti during one of the
congresses is shown in Fig. 6.91. Google Earth imagery can actually indicate the
change in size of the congresses based on the spread of tent footprints. The imagery
dated to 21 February 2006 shows that the area occupied by orderly rows of tents,
presumably for the 2003 congress, were only set up close to the eastern entrance to the
settlement and the old colonia, and the building complex which houses the school and
museum – where large meetings could be accommodated. Fig. 6.92 shows the
disposition of the tents from the 2003 and 2007 congresses. During the latter congress,
many additional tents were set up to the west of the Spanish airstrip, and this
undoubtedly reflected an increase in attendance at the congress.
The old Spanish airstrip is a large, compacted area at a uniform level. It measures
approximately 1.25 kilometres long by 42 metres wide, and is aligned 17 degrees west
of due north. It is used for the assembling of SPLA troops in parades, which are an
integral part of the National Congresses. There is a spectator stand positioned along
the eastern edge of the airstrip, with two flanking platforms for viewing parades and
displays, and in 2011, there were the visible remains of associated ancillary structures
behind the stand and platforms. Opposite is a flagpole, and decorative walls (see Fig.
6.93). There are concrete podiums north and south of the stands, and one concrete disc
with a map of Western Sahara rendered on it (see Fig. 6.94). This space is unique to
Tifariti. Along with the SADR building under construction, the infirmary and school,
and the new housing under construction, the people of Western Sahara are asserting
their rights to ownership to, and their right of self-determination within, the territory
of Western Sahara. These acts are deliberately political, and because of this, the
archaeology of contemporary Tifariti is not just a social archaeology, but a political
one as well.
There is one other feature, inscribed on the ground that is visible to all who visit
Tifariti, and it is clearly visible on Google Earth. It too has a political presence. It is a
large pavement of stones, rectangular in shape (measuring around 30 metres uphill by
12 metres or so in width) and painted as a representation of the Saharawi flag (see Fig.
6.95). Beneath it, also laid out in painted stones at 12 metres high, and also visible on
Google Earth, are the letters RASD (for the SADR), and Libertad, ‘Liberty’ in
232
Spanish. It is situated on a northeast facing slope, around 670 metres west-northwest
of the old Spanish fort. It is at the approximate southeast limit of the Tifariti redoubt,
but also, only 300 metres east of the Moroccan inscribed hillside slogan, ‘God, The
Nation, The King’, already noted.
A Multiplicity of Layers – a Multiplicity of Meanings
There is a diversity and continuity of archaeological strata in the Tifariti area. This is
undoubtedly true for all places on the globe, but Tifariti and Western Sahara are the
focus of study here. These strata, from the prehistoric to the contemporary, have each
had different meanings for the social groupings that inhabited the space making up the
area of study, and there have been ideational and sensorial phenomena unique, and not
so unique, to the inhabitants of each archaeological ‘period’. These periods, these
strata, as I prefer to describe them, are all juxtaposed one with each other, on top of,
alongside and interdigitated. Because of the nature of my fieldwork, and the nature of
field survey as something akin to wandering,627 they are surficial. The materiality
present on the ground is an assemblage628 and a collage of the things visible, as only
seen by an observer on the ground, and additionally for me, in my own face-to-face
interaction with Saharawis telling me their ‘stories’ – both official and unofficial.629
There is a distinct horizontality to this archaeology since things from the past are only
percolations up to the surface,630 and these include the thoughts and memories (and
imaginings) of my informants as well as the evidence of material remains on the
ground – which can also include the imaginings of ‘the archaeologist’ when
contemplating what those, and any, remains are.
The contemporary archaeology of Tifariti does not end here, however, and an
additional stratum of materiality and meaning has been added to the Tifariti
palimpsest. This is the ARTifariti art festival, and this addition to the collage is the
subject of the next chapter.
627
Graves-Brown 2012.
Harrison 2011 and 2013.
629
Yaron 2006: 10.
630
Witmore 2006.
628
233
CHAPTER 7
ARTifariti
Soon after it went online, the panopticon view provided by Google Earth had a
singular, reverse panopticon effect on an artist from Seville in Spain. Fernando Peraita
had been a conscript in the Spanish Army in Western (Spanish) Sahara during 197576, and as a result of the events of that winter he, as with many other Spaniards, has
had a continuing, positive predisposition towards the Saharawi people and their cause.
In 2005 he found himself looking at Google Earth imagery over Western Sahara and
was astounded at the land art quality of the Moroccan berms. To borrow from Roland
Barthes, he experienced a punctum, it could be said that he felt ‘pierced’ by the image,
‘bruised’ even.631 Here was a design etched upon the surface of the earth, extensive
and bold, and as Peraita expressed it: ‘the berm is a piece of [land] art tied to death, to
suffering, and to separate the people, terrible, no? Culture [art] is usually used for
peace, for good things’.632 With this in mind, he set upon gathering together a group of
Spanish artists who could create a piece of land art in the Saharawi liberated zone,
situated opposite the berm. But this was impractical, so Peraita and his colleagues
changed tack:
Instead of making one [work of] land art we (were) going to create a centre of
contemporary art (dedicated) to peace and human rights that can be a weapon (against
the wall), in the middle of the desert, in a no-man’s land. We can create a centre of art
in a city that has been bombed by Moroccan planes, and where a lot of fighting has
taken place, but nobody in the world knows about it, and, near the archaeological rock
art sites of Rekeiz.633
The ‘city’ that had been bombed was Tifariti, and so ARTifariti was inaugurated in
2007. For two weeks every October to November, up to 2010, groups of artists
631
Barthes 2000.
Peraita, Interview.
633
Peraita, Interview.
632
234
(mainly from the Spanish speaking world, plus Saharawi artists and a mix of other
foreign artists) would descend on the town of Tifariti adding an expanding stratum of
contemporary archaeology in the form of art interventions on top of the strata of
earlier occupations and archaeological periods. On the ARTifariti blog, the festival
describes itself as
a Festival of Art and Human Rights which aims to give visibility and voice to the
Saharawi people, a community that survives between occupation and exile claiming
through artistic practices the right of individuals and peoples to their land, their
culture, their roots and their freedom.634
This message is at the core of ARTifariti’s ethos, believing that Art can be a tool in
developing a people’s international presence and domestic well being just as much as
those NGOs that provide material and infrastructural aid.635 As the 2012 open call for
participants to the 6th ARTifariti festival presented it:
ARTifariti is a working context in which artistic practices play a provocative,
reflective and transformative role. The focus is the Sahara conflict, but from here
expands into other territories, questioning any situation where individual and
collective human rights are violated.
…ARTifariti is an appointment with artistic practices as a tool to vindicate Human
Rights; the right of the people to their land, their culture, their roots and their freedom.
It is an annual encounter of public art to reflect on creation, politics and society, and a
point of contact for artists interested in the capacity of art to question and transform
reality. ARTifariti also aims to promote intercultural relations, fomenting the
interchange of experiences and skills between local artists and artists from other parts
of the world in order to contribute to the international widespread coverage of the
Sahrawi reality. It provides a reflection point from the world of Art and Culture
through direct knowledge and promotes the development of the Saharawi people
through their Cultural Heritage.636
634
ARTifariti n.d.
GraDCAM 2012.
636
ARTifariti 2012
635
235
The festival is also seen by Saharawis as an assertion of their sovereignty over their
country: it is a means of re-appropriation, even if it is undertaken mainly by foreign
artists, as a kind or re-appropriation by proxy. ARTifariti is also seen as reinforcing a
Hispanic-Arab culture that undoubtedly makes Saharawis unique, and feel unique,
within the Arab world. As the Commander of the SPLA in the Tifariti region put it:
ARTifariti is a means of exercising sovereignty over our territory [and] the liberated
territory, besides contributing to the preservation of our national identity and our
Spanish-Arabic culture. It is the foundation stone of a road that can only lead to
freedom.637
ARTifariti is more than just a collection of artists creating works of art in Western
Sahara. Fernando Peraita has described it as a tree with many branches.638 The
branches are projects that have extended the original purpose of the festival and some
have developed lives of their own. It is the purpose in this chapter to deal only with art
within the context of the landscape of Tifariti; but briefly, examples of some of the
extended projects of ARTifariti include:
Exhibitions in numerous locations throughout Europe and the Americas.
‘Disappeared Saharawis’ – this is a project whereby artists working with
Saharawi families produce ‘psychological portraits’ of family members who
have ‘disappeared’ in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and whose families
never had photographs of them.
ARTifariti artists have spent time with Saharawi families in the occupied zone,
recording evidence of physical maltreatment in conjunction with medical
examinations of torture victims. It is planned that this work will be compiled
into a book for presentation to the United Nations.
The production of audio and video records of the experiences of Saharawi
people.
ARTifariti has already worked with the school in Tifariti, but they have set up
a school of art in the refugee camps as part of the ‘University of Tifariti’.
637
638
Brahim Ahmed Mahmud, Head of the 2nd SADR Military Region, quoted in ARTifariti 2007: 5.
GraDCAM 2012.
236
ARTifariti artists will give master classes at this new ‘University of the
Desert’.639
ARTifariti runs a parallel programme to its main festival aimed at international
art students, giving them the opportunity to live and work with Saharawis in
the refugee camps, learning from the experience and producing original art.
Sahara Libre Wear – this is a fashion project producing hand printed and
manufactured clothing in the Refugee camps for sale abroad. Every year,
ARTifariti, includes a Sahara Libre fashion show.
These examples give only an indication of the range of projects undertaken by
ARTifariti, while the annual catalogues produced by the festival describe even more
undertakings.640 Nevertheless, the festival started out as a meeting of artists and
Saharawis in the desert landscape of Tifariti – an encounter between peoples, and also
an encounter between the visiting artists and the Western Sahara badiya. That context
had a bearing on the artists and the art they produced.
Art on the Land
In all, the range of art produced at Tifariti between 2007 and 2010 consisted of indoor
and outdoor works – three dimensional works and constructions (installations and
sculptures), and more traditional flat surface – painted – artworks, and photography
(besides other types of art activities and interventions, such as the work of Francis
Gomila and Bettina Semmer in 2009, described below). The bulk of the art created by
Saharawi artists (making up, for instance, around a third of the artists in 2010) has
been in flat painted works, or small scale three dimensional pieces, and much of it is
on show in the Tifariti Museum. In fact, there are only a handful of pieces created by
Saharawi artists that have been painted out-of-doors. These have not been sizable,
though exceptionally, there is one large painting that has been executed on a
substantial rock outcrop, which will be described and discussed below. With almost
639
The Saharawi School of Art, founded through the initiatives of ARTifariti, was opened in November
2013 in the Bojdour Camp, one of the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. This was the result
of the efforts to create a ‘University of the Desert’, started in 2009. See Rigg 2009 and ARTifariti n.d.:
http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/inaugurada-la-primera-escuela-de-arte-y.html accessed 28
March 2014.
640
Electronic versions of the catalogues can be viewed and downloaded from ARTifariti n.d.
237
no Saharawi artists producing art on the land, and because this research is essentially a
landscape study, it is the outdoor installations in open spaces which will be explored
here, and as a result, this account will be biased in favour of the foreign artists who
have attended the ARTifariti festivals. In the four years in which the festival was held
at Tifariti, the numbers of artists per year ranged from 25 to almost 50 and they hailed
from at least 16 countries.641 Out of these, the work of only 18 artists will be discussed
in detail here, and it is the emplacement of their work in the landscape (though two of
the works were carried out virtually, employing Google Earth), and their recorded
experiences at Tifariti, which is just as important as the content of their creations. But
first, the setting of Tifariti as a place for out-of-doors art will be addressed.
The basic topography of the Tifariti basin has been described in Chapter 6. When I
undertook fieldwork in Tifariti in the Autumn of 2011, besides exploring the conflict
landscape around the settlement, I also recorded as many of the remaining art
installations as could be easily located out of doors. In all, I noted up to 24 locations
of individual, or groups of, artworks (all given alphanumeric descriptors of AR1 to
AR24), but this number should not be viewed as exhaustive. For instance, some
outdoor installations have undoubtedly been removed (judging from the ARTifariti
catalogues, they were portable), while there are others that quite simply could not be
located. Since there is no obvious curation of the art produced at Tifariti, many of the
installations are in poor condition and they have not fared well in the harsh desert
climate. And since no map of any kind exists, indicating the location of the artworks, I
had to depend solely on finding them by simply looking over the landscape, and
walking over it as in any standard archaeological landscape survey. A gazetteer of the
artworks recorded in the field is in Appendix 3.
A plot of the locations of the artworks recorded in 2011 is shown in Fig. 7.1. The
location of the south-most intervention, however, has been taken from satellite
imagery dated to 2013, available on Google Earth. I was not able to find the artwork
in 2011 because of the very shallow profile of its remains, but it is a notable piece so it
has been included in the work of the 18 artists discussed here (and it has been given
641
The countries are (in alphabetical order): Algeria, Argentina, Columbia, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Mexico, Portugal, Senegal, South, Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United States, Uraguay, and Western
Sahara.
238
the alphanumeric descriptor of AR25). With the artists resident and based in the
Tifariti school and museum complex during their stays in the settlement, it appears
that no individual pieces were created more than around 1.1 kilometres from their
base. In all, the artist’s works have been created over an area extending about 1.4
kilometres (northwest to southeast) by one kilometre (northeast to southwest), with the
outermost northern installations positioned on the threshold of the rockier, and
enfolding landscape that extends from Tifariti northwards. Also, there was a marked
shift in the disposition of the recorded out-of-doors artworks, or installations, moving
from west to east across the landscape.
ARTifariti 2007
In 2007,642 most of the festival’s artists (Saharawi, Spanish and Portuguese at that
time) were working in and around the compound of the Tifariti School, where the
festival was always based. However, the expansiveness of the desert and the open
spaces around Tifariti, apparently led to the creation of three pieces of art, of which
two could be described as ‘land art’ while one could be termed ‘trench art’643 (and
their distribution is shown in Fig. 7.2). It is possible that at this stage, the artists were
trying to fulfil the original idea of Fernando Peraita by creating land art that could be
seen, like the Moroccan berms, from space, and they succeeded in doing so with at
least one piece. This was the large inscription: Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22), laid out in
stones painted pink, and extending over an area of around 37 metres by 15 metres.
It is an undeniably whimsical artwork (see Fig. 7.3), quite out of keeping with the
profound sense of purpose as originally espoused by Peraita, but its irony is
purposeful. By being positioned close to the Moroccan military dugouts nearby, it was
intended as an ‘absurd invitation’ to be visible on Google Earth (see Fig. 7.4).
According to its creator, the artist Fernando Pinteño, its purpose was to compare the
plight of the Saharawi people – who feel forgotten by the international community and
lead a subsistence existence – with the ‘effeminacy’ and ‘luxury’ of the well known
film Breakfast at Tiffany’s.644 This is clearly a socio-political play on words, literally
pasted (like a protest poster) on the surface of the earth to be visible on Google Earth,
642
ARTifariti 2007 was held on the 10th to 17th of October 2007.
Saunders 2003.
644
ARTifariti 2007: 50-51.
643
239
close to the SADR flag which is similarly delineated by painted stones and equally
visible on Google Earth, and only some 90 odd metres to the northwest.
The other piece of land art is the Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return (AR21)
shown in Fig. 7.5. This was seen as a work in progress, and indeed, it was extended in
2008 and re-titled Camino del Aaiún or The Way to El-Ayoun. Its form as of 2008 (and
recorded by me in 2011) essentially consisted of a linear routeway of stones laid out
as two kerbs meandering from the southeast (where a stela was raised as a starting
point) to the northwest (see Fig. 7.6). This was a cooperative work by all of the
ARTifariti participants, and they each laid stones and other objects within the kerbs,
including messages in many instances. The objects included the detritus of war
including, for example, metal fragments and shrapnel, pieces of tank treads, a child’s
shoe and animal bones. The work was conceived as something hopeful, with the
SADR Premier commenting about the work, as ‘… the first step of a thousand steps
we take to Aiun’.645
A third piece of art was created only 100 metres north of The Way to El-Ayoun. This
was Proyecto de Eliminación – 2, or Removal Project – 2, by Carlos de Gredos
(AR24).646 This artwork, like two others, which will be discussed below, is a piece
that has its roots outside of Western Sahara. Carlos de Gredos, like the other foreign
participating artists is a link between Western Sahara, its people, and the outside
world. His artwork too, is a similar link. It is trans-national in nature since a sister
artwork, Removal Project – 1, was created in Spain on the Cerro Gallinaro headland
near Hoyocasero, Avila, Spain, in March 2007.647
Removal Project – 1 was not a piece of land art per se, instead it was conceived as an
‘ephemeral’ artwork, disposed on the land, and based on the burnt out and rusted
wreck of a car that the artist found in the countryside on the Cerro Gallinaro. Here,
the artist painted in red, the word FUEGO on the side of the car, but the ‘FU’, though
in capitals, was painted at a smaller scale. Fuego means ‘fire’, and the artist has
645
ARTifariti 2007: 58-59 and ARTifariti 2008: 102-103.
ARTifariti 2007: 28-29.
647
This became part of a larger land art project, started and coordinated by Carlos de Gredo in 2008,
creating a centre for art and nature on the Cerro Gallinero headland in Spain. See
http://cerrogallinero.com/ accessed 1 May 2013.
646
240
written that he deliberately wanted to create ‘a pun’ on the word, emphasising that our
egos – painted in larger letters as ‘EGO’ – can have as great, if not a greater
destructive capability than fire. This wreck, which was to be left in the countryside as
a piece of outdoor art, eventually went through its own destructive transformation
which the artist could not foresee. Between March 2007 and May 2011 Carlos de
Gredos photographed the car and during that time, its position changed – it was even
set upright (see Fig. 7.7), and eventually it was robbed of body and chassis parts until
it was left as an unrecognisable fraction of itself. Indeed, the destructiveness of its
original fire, making it a wreck, made it vulnerable to near obliteration. The work of
vandals made the destruction of the ‘EGO’ complete.648
Seven months later, in October 2007, Carlos de Gredos was in Tifariti, and there he
found the wrecked hulk of a Moroccan army tank, and he decided to paint it exactly as
he had painted the burnt out car in Spain, with the word FUEGO (‘fire’) on its side.
This piece of military hardware is situated on rising ground, amidst the Tifariti
redoubt, less than a kilometre northwest of the old Spanish fort. It has presumably
been in its present location since the Moroccans left the settlement in 1979, and it has
been robbed of all of its removable parts. It is a medium sized Russian T54 tank,
produced by the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1963.649 According to the SPLA the tank
was originally in Egyptian service, but given, presumably with other material, to
Morocco after the October War of 1973 between Egypt and Syria, and Israel.650 This
gives the tank, as an artefact, a very distinctive biography. In short, it was produced
some time before 1963 in a Russian factory; it saw service with the Egyptian army; it
was acquired by Morocco some time after 1973, eventually ending up in the war zone
of Western Sahara; and it was obviously disabled at Tifariti where the Moroccans left
it in 1979. It was subsequently cannibalised by the SPLA with its impotent,
unmovable hulk left in the desert amidst the abandoned dugouts of the Moroccan
occupiers of Tifariti.
Just as with Removal Project – 1, Carlos de Gredos obviously played with the concept
of ‘fire’. He painted FUEGO on the turret of the tank, with the ‘EGO’ larger than the
648
De Gredos 2007-2011.
Milsom 1970: 112-115.
650
Breica, additional conversation, when interviewed 2 November 2011.
649
241
‘FU’, in red, and in the same manner in which he painted the car in Spain. The tank is
a destructive machine, just as destructive as fire, and the tank ‘fires’ its weapon.
Above all, a human decision is involved – a decision of the ego – to be violent, to fire
an armament, to unleash fire and death. But the bringer of such destruction – the tank
– is now a dead carcass, and only saved from rusting away by the dry climate of the
desert. Nevertheless, the tank had already been diminished by being robbed for parts,
and perhaps it would be diminished more so. So in keeping with his earlier work,
Carlos de Gredos called his painted tank, Removal Project – 2 (see Fig. 7.8), and by
appropriating an object of war material and transforming it, especially with a new
meaning that goes beyond the Western Sahara conflict, and as a reflection on the
human condition, it can be considered a rather large piece of ‘trench art’.
ARTifariti 2008
In 2008,651 the number of ARTifariti participating artists increased to 47. In this year
they did not stray very far from their base in the Tifariti school complex, and the
furthest they went away was only around half a kilometre. I recorded artworks created
in 2008 at six locations, shown on Fig. 7.9, though the selected works discussed below
include one piece which I could not locate (though as already noted, its location was
made evident on 2013 Google Earth satellite imagery). Also, as already noted, the The
Way to El-Ayoun was extended in this year too.
Of the outdoor artworks created during the 2008 festival, there were two large and
distinctive works that were also good examples of trench art. One is the Caballo de
Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13),652 by the Mexican sculptor
Rolando De la Rosa (with the Mexican journalist Susana Cato).653 Shown in Fig. 7.10,
this was a five metre long by 7.5m high, three metre wide sculpture of a horse mainly
made from oil drums and fragments of exploded ordnance, metal rods, steel girders,
and empty cartridge cases. Upon arriving in Tifariti, De la Rosa was told about a
goatherd who lost his right arm from a bomb during a Moroccan air strike in the
Tifariti area. Upon finding the herder, the artist was taken to the site of the bomb
651
ARTifariti 2008, was held on the 22nd of November to the 6th of December 2008.
ARTifariti n.d.: http://artifariti.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/el-caballo-de-troya.html accessed 1 May
2013.
653
De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Escultor_Mexicano.html
accessed 3 April 2014.
652
242
strike, and there he retrieved shrapnel from the explosion to use in his sculpture, and
specifically, in the Trojan Horse’s skull (see Fig. 7.11). The distorted shrapnel gave
the skull a deformed appearance, as if exploded. Fragmentation grenades were used
for the eyes, and spent cartridges for the teeth. An improvised spear was put in the
mouth of the skull, emulating the sharp tongue of the agonised horse in Picasso’s
Guernica, and the artwork was made eerie by the whistling sound of wind through the
spent cartridges used to make up the horse’s mane. The body of the horse was made
up of oil drums painted red, with black, white and grey abstract designs, representing
the wounding of the goatherd and the death of a child, and with skulls, according to
the artist, denouncing the indiscriminate bombing of civilians that took place during
the sixteen year war.
The piece was constructed facing eastwards, on a platform of large stone slabs set
within a ring of black and red stones. On the 11th of December, just five days after the
official end of ARTifariti 2008, this ‘Trojan Horse’ was transported by truck, in what
De la Rosa called a ‘White March of Peace’ (in opposition to King Hassan’s Green
March of 1975), to the Moroccan berm closest to Tifariti to stand sentinel over it.
There, a placard was placed in front of it with a picture of the 19th century President of
Mexico, Benito Juárez,654 with a quote of his in Arabic, Spanish, English and French
declaring: ‘Among individuals as well as among nations, to respect other people’s
rights is Peace’. The artist also placed inside the sculpture, United Nations resolutions
issued in favour of the Saharawi people.655
As with Removal Project – 2, this sculpture is a trans-national piece of art. In fact, in a
recorded interview in 2008 De la Rosa said that this was his seventh ‘Trojan
Horse’.656 His first horse was constructed in 2005657 and his ninth ‘Trojan Horse’ was
654
Benito Juárez was President of Mexico in 1862 when France invaded the country and installed the
Hapsburg, Maximillian, as France’s Emperor of Mexico. Juárez led the revolt against the French who
were expelled by 1867.
655
ARTifariti 2008: 24-25 & 117.
656
Puerco Radio 2008.
657
De la Rosa n.d.:
http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/El_caballo_de_Troya_Mexicano.html accessed 3
April 2014.
243
made in 2010-2011.658 All, except the Saharawi horse, were made in Mexico, though
the ninth was destined to take part in a march in Buenos Aires on the 35th anniversary
of the 1976 military coup in Argentina. It, like the Saharawi horse, carried content, but
in this instance it was books, papers, videos and testimonies of Argentinian exiles who
lived and died in Mexico – their adopted country – during the period of the
Argentinian dictatorship. So, around the globe, De la Rosa has installed ‘Trojan
Horses’ in Mexico, Western Sahara and Argentina, and all as public art with a sense
of social advocacy, resistance to injustice, and people’s struggles for freedom.659 To
De la Rosa, his ‘Trojan Horses’ are ‘a symbol of victory over Walled power’,660 and
in Western Sahara it is the Moroccan Wall that is the symbol of a foreign and illegal
occupation of one country by another.
The Mexican made horses were constructed from wooden crates, the common types
that can be found in market places throughout the world. They have all been painted
with patterns and images, and slogans, as in the case of the Saharawi horse. In fact, in
2010 De la Rosa commemorated Aminatou Haidar, the most high profile woman
activist in the Saharawi cause, and Lubna Masarwa, a leading feminist Palestinian
activist, with such a ‘Trojan Horse of Crates’. It was painted with motifs reminiscent
of pre-Columbian Mexican art, and with a portrait of Emiliano Zapata (an important
Mexican revolutionary leader in the early 20th century), and most importantly in this
instance, images of armed, revolutionary women fighters.661 Symbolism in art is very
important to De la Rosa, and to quote the artist from the ARTifariti 2008 catalogue:
For me, in times of uncertainty, redefinition and [new] paradigms, there is something
that endures from remote times: the strength of symbols. The use of symbols in art is
able [sic] to penetrate people’s deepest heartstrings.662
658
De la Rosa collaborated with another artist, Real Yamina, on this work: see De la Rosa n.d.:
http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Caballo_de_Troya_en_Argentina.html accessed 3
April 2014.
659
De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Caballo_de_Troya_ArgenMex.html accessed 3 April 2014.
660
De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/RolandodelaRosa.html
accessed 3 April 2014.
661
De la Rosa n.d.: http://www.rolandodelarosa.com/RolandodelaRosa/Photos.html#grid accessed 3
April 2014.
662
ARTifariti 2008: 24-25 & p. 117.
244
The second piece of trench art in 2008 was an outdoor installation created by the
Spanish artist Federico Guzman, called El Muro de la Vergüenza, or the Wall of
Shame (AR10), a common epithet for the Moroccan berms. As already noted, the
charity Action on Armed Violence, formerly Land Mine Action (LMA/AOAV), has
its Western Sahara headquarters in Tifariti, and in their offices they have a small
museum displaying the range of lethal ordnance that can be found across the
landscape of Western Sahara as a result of the war. They use these to educate local
people to the dangers of unexploded ordnance (UXOs) – though now the Tifariti area
is free of UXOs. But when Guzman saw the display of armaments and became aware
of the accounts of accidents and fatalities caused by the then uncleared ordnance he
gladly agreed, when asked by LMA/AOAV, to create a sculpture outside their offices
in Tifariti.663
His first idea was ‘to make a tree with all the mines, bombs and grenades hanging
from it, as if to transform death into life’.664 But he had little time, so he chose to
create a short wall out of sheet metal, shaped like a simple explosion. On it he welded
a grid of rods, and onto these he welded many decommissioned examples of the types
of ordnance that can be found in the open desert, from gun shells, to mortar rounds,
bombs, bomblets and grenades. All to hammer home the reality of UXOs and their
dangers, or as Guzman has noted, to create a catalogue of ‘objects that… only belong
in a museum as the vestiges of history’s senseless violence’. The sculpture stands
outside the LMA/AOAV offices in Tifariti (see Fig. 7.12), and the blatant display of
ordnance serves as a stark reminder of the conflict. And as Guzman thought at the
time, ‘it really looks like a “wall of shame”’.665
663
ARTifariti 2008: 86-87 & 123, and Guzmán n.d.
Guzmán n.d. Both De La Rosa’s and Guzman’s artworks resonate with the sculptures made out of
decommissioned weapons and ordnance by Mozambiquen artists through the ‘Transforming Arms into
Tools’ project, established by the Christian Council of Mozambique and Christian Aid in the 1990s. In
the U.K., this resulted in an exhibition at the OXO Gallery in London, and with the British Museum
acquiring (in 2002) an iconic sculpture: the ‘Throne of Weapons’ (British Museum 2006), and
commissioning a new sculpture in 2005, called the ‘Tree of Life’. Like Guznam’s original idea, ths
latter work is a tree, representing life and its longevity, yet it has been constructed out of the residue of
weapons of war, materials that exist to end life. See the British Museum website at
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/aoa/t/throne_of_weapons.aspx and
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=157
9948&partId=1&searchText=tree+of+life&page=1
665
Guzmán n.d.
664
245
Both Guzman’s and de la Rosa’s installations, and Carlos de Gredos’ appropriated and
painted tank (from 2007), are undoubtedly works of trench art reusing ‘industrial
scrap’ and war material, and as Saunders has succinctly put it:
Whether recycled from the metals of war, scraps of wood, bone or textile, the
majority of trench art is a reworking of both matter and material worlds to make
something new… It is bricolage – the making of something new and single from a
plethora of old things, something of peace from war, something harmless from objects
designed to kill, something from the battlefield brought into the home and the
museum, and therefore both dramatically ‘out of context’ and recontextalized at the
same time.666
This clearly presented appraisal of trench art can extend to some outdoor, painted
artworks at Tifariti too. The ruined Spanish fort and the old infirmary nearby have
been appropriated as canvases for new painted pieces. Here, martial buildings have
been ruined through the violent actions of war – by bombing – and have been left in a
ruinous state, but it has still been possible through artistic intervention for them to be
redefined as ‘something of peace from war’.
A delegation of nine Algerian artists took part in ARTifariti in 2008. Most of them set
themselves the task of painting and working on the ruins of the Spanish Foreign
Legion fort and the post’s old infirmary, now the Tifariti mayor’s office just to the
west. In effect, the result has been the transmutation of ruined and jaggedly broken
buildings into colourful derelicts that would not be out of place on an urban
demolition site where graffiti artists have had access. Their work, in places, is
mischievous and child like, while in other instances they have transformed the ruined
parts of the fort and infirmary with weighty imagery. Unfortunately, their paintings
were all quite faded by 2011 when I recorded them, and they no longer possessed the
vibrancy reproduced in the 2008 ARTifariti Catalogue. Nevertheless, these
interventions are the latest phase in the archaeological biography of these Spanish
period buildings.
666
Saunders 2003: 184.
246
The north and east sides of the old Spanish infirmary were hit during the Moroccan air
strikes of 1991, and a part of its roof collapsed. The collapse on the eastern end of the
building was consolidated, and the resultant sloping roof with its black bitumen
surface became a surface for the Algerian artist, Karim Sergoua, to paint a mural
(around 6.5 metres wide) simply entitled Víctimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims
(AR8). Fig. 7.13 shows the finished work as it looked in 2011. It is primarily black
and white with additional motifs sprayed on in purple. The artist painted in white, as if
in negative, on the black bitumen base, and this created a series of black and white,
shadowy silhouettes: standing human figures and portraits, and abstract designs. A
number of the portraits are also presented like ‘mug shots’, or the portrait photographs
or drawings, of missing Saharawis.667 Though painted onto a solid background, these
anonymous vignettes appear like posters or ‘paste-ups’, and this is a real link with
graffiti, or street art as manifest today.
Poster or paste-ups are amongst the more recent instances of graffiti/art production.
They are predominantly black ink on white paper with a contrasting graphic
appearance… They fade and easily tear or peel away. The weathered affect may well
be a sought after aesthetic or it may be a direct reposte to the much-maligned
advertising posters… The paste-up’s fragility reiterates the ephemerality of graffiti/art
or the specific content of the graffiti artist’s message…668
In fact, the artist’s message is that the ‘innocent victims’ of the Western Sahara war
are fragile. In effect, they are ephemeral – ‘traces, torn bodies of children, women
[and] combatants’ who were ‘rained’ upon by bombs from the sky.669 Additional
motifs were added in purple to the work, sprayed over and around the black outlines,
and many of these were applied with stencils – another link between this artwork and
graffiti.670
667
These are like the photographs of missing persons that are often presented by the relations of people
who have ‘disappeared’ in authoritarian regimes throughout the world. In 2010, a number of ARTifariti
artists applied themselves to the issue of missing, or ‘disappeared’ Saharawis in the Moroccan occupied
zone. See ARTifariti 2010: 109-133.
668
Frederick 2009: 217.
669
ARTifariti 2008: 45 & 118.
670
Frederick 2009: 217.
247
Further pieces of graffiti type art, executed on the ruins of the Foreign Legion fort
include a piece entitled Gritos bajo los escombros de Tifariti or Cries under the ruins
of Tifariti (AR23), by the Algerian Abd el Kader Belhorissat (see Fig. 7.14). This is
similar to Innocent Victims, since it too has been painted onto a collapsed roof – the
remains of the roof of the fort’s blockhouse at its southwest corner – but it is visually
more complex. It is polychromatic as compared to the near monochrome of Innocent
Victims. It is also three dimensional, since the roof has fallen and broken unevenly,
and fragments of broken parapets lay on the roof’s surface. As many surfaces as
possible have been painted, and there is a mix of abstract designs and stylised human
figures culminating in a work that is very cluttered and chaotic. It is perhaps this
apparent chaos that reflects the artist’s intention to ‘describe the continuous cry… of
being [in] a place of crime’.671
Just around the corner from Cries under the ruins of Tifariti, along the western range
of the Spanish fort, is a further graffiti-like intervention. Here the Algerian artist
Djeffal Adlane has painted a piece, entitled El renacimiento de un pueblo or The
rebirth of a nation (AR23a). The piece (see Fig. 7.15) has sculptural elements added
to it in the guise of a figure outlined by wire and freestanding in front of the painted
wall, with spent gun cartridges and a projectile container set into concrete at its base.
The piece incorporates into its design, the metal ladder grips that are built into the wall
and gave access to the roof of the fort. The artist also painted the window shutters
with the silhouettes of people, and added his own mock window. The colours were
bright and brash but they were extremely faded in 2011. There are plant-like motifs
and a schematic human figure holding a gun. Slogans in French, English and Arabic
were also painted onto the wall espousing peace and liberty, and stating that the real
beast which a man has to fear is himself.672 In summary, the artist has written this
about the piece:
671
ARTifariti 2008: 46 & 119.
‘Homme sait tu il n'ya pas pire bete a craindre a l'homme que l'homme lui meme.’ Translated as:
‘Man[kind], you know there is no worse beast for a man to fear than Man himself.’ This can be made
out from photographs taken by myself in 2011, and from a photo of the artwork in ARTifariti 2008: 47.
672
248
In the ruins of a house, the colours that symbolize… life, …writing that marks [out]
peace and a metal silhouette that straightens up towards the sky that testifies [to] the
strength of [the] survival of a whole nation.673
Another graffiti-like artwork that shares the western range of the Spanish fort with
The rebirth of a nation is Un orden estblecido or An established order (AR23b) by
Barris Syphax, another Algerian artist.674 This is an apparently unfinished, black and
white intervention on fragments of collapsed roof (see Fig. 7.16). It includes three
‘paste-up’ like portraits which, according to the artist, represent a Saharawi family
from when ‘Tifariti was free’, and a three point proclamation stating: ‘An established
order: …of a power that claims others’ land. An escape: …of a nation that was
expelled from his land. A search: …of a cry that rises against injustice [sic]’.675
Another Algerian artist worked on the remains of the south facing wall of the
southeast corner of the Spanish fort, creating further graffiti-like artwork. This was
Azzouz Seïf El Islem who painted a piece he entitled S/T (AR23c).676 Here, shown in
Fig. 7.17, he painted the partial silhouette of a person above the door in the later mud
brick corner infill, and he painted a shadowy person, upside down on the door itself.
To the immediate left, he painted false loopholes and extended two of the real ones.
Beneath these, a cluster of people was painted in red, yellow and black, with
additional abstract patterns and text, which in effect, proclaims that through the
intervention of ordinary people, the ‘murderers’, presumably Morocco, can no longer
occupy Western Sahara.677
The most striking artwork applied to the crumbling walls of the old fort, however, has
been carried out by the Algerian artist, Bessaï Zineddine (though he signed the work:
T-Kharbishíne). This is a salient piece of anti-war graffiti art painted in a right angle
of walls (the original southern wall of the Spanish fort, and a later wall abutting it)
entitled, No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards (AR3).678 The intent of
673
ARTifariti 2008: 47 & p. 119.
ARTifariti 2008: 49 & p. 119.
675
ARTifariti 2008: 119. The three point proclamation can also be made out from a photograph taken
by myself in 2011.
676
ARTifariti 2008: 51 & p. 119.
677
The text (in French) can be made out in a photograph in ARTifariti 2008: 51.
678
ARTifariti 2008: 50 & 119.
674
249
the piece has been encapsulated by the artist as: ‘they came, they saw, we expelled
them and we defeated them’.679
It was originally a very colourful piece (see Fig. 7.18), though now it is very faded.
The central feature of the painting is a stylised human figure with elongated arms
stretching horizontally to either side. The figure is black, with colourful faces and
circular patterns painted within it. The arms have dots extending within, and along
them, and they end bulbously as opposed to having hands. The entire figure is outlined
with protruding red nibs, which are reminiscent of tank treads. In fact, the heads and
other circular motifs painted within the figure brings to mind gears, or the wheels of a
tank. There is the hint of a bluish sky with black rectilinear outlines delineating the
possible outlines of yellow to buff buildings. However, the possible building outlines
have numerous short cross-bars, that suggest that they might be machine-cranks, or
cam-shafts. The arms of the figure have long drips of black paint extending from them
reinforcing the idea that this is a human machine, perhaps bleeding. Though it cannot
be discerned whether or not the figure (or ‘machine man’) is Moroccan or Saharawi.
Slogans have been painted on the piece in Spanish and French: ‘not me’, ‘walking’,
and ‘move back’.680
There are fragments of collapsed walling from the fort lying in front of the piece, and
on these, abstract outlines have been drawn (AR5). They appear to have been done by
different hands, presumably all from the Algerian delegation, and the patterns include
green and blue sprayed circles with dots, a face, and other linear patterns. Also, an
arrangement of painted stones was laid on the foundation of the turret that existed at
the western end of the collapsed southern wall of the fort (AR6). On the north side of
that part of the southern wall still standing, Lalidji Walid painted a group portrait of
all of the Algerian artists who took part in ARTifariti 2008. Called El Grupo or The
Group (AR3a), this was not a conventional group portrait, instead, all of the artists
stood up against the wall and had their outlines marked out and infilled with black
spray paint (see Fig. 7.19). All of their names where spray-painted above their painted
silhouettes, and the piece had an element of jolliness about it. This was made
679
ARTifariti 2008: 119. The quote is an obvious play on ‘I came, I saw, I conquered’.
NO ME (Spanish): NOT ME; MUEVO PARA ATRÁS (Spanish): MOVE BACK, or MOVE TO
THE BACK; MAKENCHE (unknown), and MARCHE (French): WALKING.
680
250
especially obvious in a photograph of the artists standing in front of the piece in the
2008 ARTifariti catalogue.681 Further graffiti-like painting (AR23d) was applied to the
north and east walls of the fort’s courtyard (see Fig. 7.20). These mainly consisted of
sprayed on geometric motifs and the painting of some stone infill along with the
painting of a wooden door. Unfortunately, half of the painting on the door was
missing when I recorded it in 2011.
The Algerian artists expressed a sincere desire to create a statement that would
illustrate their sympathy for the Saharawi people and their cause. They believed that
their
works tell a story from the past. It is the history of a nation that has not decided his
fate. They reflect, in a virtual way, the traces of the past, a fresco, a portrait or a
collective signature to immortalize the moment of a whole group that sympathize and
feel [a] friend of the Saharan people [sic].682
Approximately 225 metres to the east-southeast of the old fort is a building that has
been constructed on top of the foundation platform of a former Spanish colonia
building. On the easterly facing wall of the building, a mural was painted in 2008 by
the Spanish artist María Ortega Estepa,683 and it was called Viajando al Paraíso or
Travelling Paradise684 (AR11). This painting, like the interventions of Carlos de
Gredos, and Rolando de la Rosa, already described, is a trans-national artwork. Estepa
is obviously intrigued by woodland trees and flora, and she has painted companion
murals in Barcelona, Madrid and Córdoba, and according to the Arte Sostenible
website she had plans, as of 2010, to undertake similar paintings in Alicante, Huelva,
and in other cities in Spain, and in Zacatecas, Mexico.685 Estepa is not a protest artist
and she combines her creative work with art education and therapy. In an art
workshop presented on YouTube she said ‘… there is no big theoretical foundation
behind my work, nothing like that, only my relationships and connections and my way
of looking at the world; how I see the world, how I see other people and how I see life
681
ARTifariti 2008: 44 & 118.
ARTifariti 2008: 118.
683
Ortega Estepa n.d.: http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/obramenu.html accessed 14 May 2013.
684
ARTifariti 2008: 64-65 & 120 and Ortega Estepa n.d.:
http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/obra_viajandoelparaiso.html accessed 14 May 2013.
685
Asociación Arte Sostenible 2008-2013.
682
251
in general’.686 In Travelling Paradise she explores our close and intimate relationship
with nature and landscapes, and in particular, as at Tifariti, in an environment far
removed from that which she has painted. She sees this as a kind of dialogue with the
environment that is renewed in every place that she has created a companion piece of
art.687
Travelling Paradise is 7.6 metres wide by 3.2 metres high (see Fig. 7.21). It is a
painted forest scene out of place in the arid desert of Western Sahara. Only the trunks
of trees are visible with a horizon line high up near the top of the painting. The trees,
apparently, have no canopy so the only shadows evident are those of the trunks. The
colours move from pale yellows to greens and blues, and in all, they are very soothing
– cooling even. They suggest grass in a wooded glade. There are flowers and prickly
pears. The artist even created free-standing flowers placed in front of the mural as
well as a tree trunk, leaning up against the artwork, extending above it, and painted in
an identical way to the trees painted onto the wall. Trees, other types of plants and
flowers are an inspiration to Estepa, they are her starting point,688 and apparently, they
are a part of what she thinks of as paradise. In Estepa’s words:
I wanted to bring what I consider to be my own kind of paradise; therefore I’ve
worked with colour to paint a forest, so that a person here, can dream and forget a
little about the reality in which they are living in. Well, I believe that paradise can be
anything that you want it to be, a moment that you lived with someone, and I leave
with that sensation, with the conclusion that this country – the people who inhabit the
whole Sahrawi Nation – is, for me, a paradise.689
The last piece of art from 2008, which will be discussed here, is one which was not
found in 2011, and its position on Fig. 7.9 has been derived from Google Earth
imagery dated to 2013. It is an interesting intervention since it harks back to the
prehistoric remains that abound in the Tifariti region, but the artist, judging from the
2008 ARTifariti catalogue and his own web site,690 has not consciously made the link.
686
Olivares 2010.
687
Ortega Estepa n.d.: http://www.mariaortegaestepa.com/bio.html accessed 14 May 2013.
Olivares 2010.
689
ARTifariti 2009b.
690
Roiz de la Parra 2008.
688
252
The artwork is a political piece of land art entitled La sombra del gnomon or The
shadow of the gnomon (AR25) by Guillermo Roiz. It is spread out over an area of at
least 35 metres, and it consists of a gnomon in the shape of a hand, painted red and
representing Morocco, with two eight metre wide rings of stone on either side (see
Fig. 7.22). One ring was made of quartz, representing salt, which was traded along the
caravan routes that went through Western Sahara, and also by extension, representing
a traditional, nomadic way of life. The other ring was made of red stones symbolizing
the Saharawi people’s land. At dawn, the shadow of the gnomon – the shadow of the
occupying Moroccans – would be cast over the white circle: cast over traditional
Saharawi lifeways. At sunset it would be cast over the red circle: cast over the land of
Western Sahara itself.691
It is probable that the hand-shaped gnomen has fallen down or been removed, leaving
only the stone rings, which, with their lack of height could not be easily located three
years after the piece was created. Nevertheless, and unbeknown to the artist, he has
created stone rings that would not be out of place amidst the ancient monuments in the
vicinity, and would only stand out as anomalies because of his selective use of
coloured stones. This anomalousness, however, might very well lessen when the
stones undoubtedly sustain future erosion by motor and foot traffic, and even acquire a
venerable patina of age. Guillermo Roiz, through this modern intervention, has
unwittingly created a physical link between Tifariti’s pre-Islamic past and the present.
He has imbued his rings with meaning, just as the stone monuments of prehistory
would similarly have been meaningful to those who created them millennia ago.
ARTifariti 2009
ARTifariti 2009 was held in the settlement from the 17th to the 31st of October of that
year. There were 45 contributing artists from ten countries (eight of which were
Saharawi), and as in 2008, and judging from the artworks that I could record in 2011,
out-of-doors interventions were created at a maximum of around 600 metres from the
artist’s base in the Tifariti school. Fig. 7.23 shows the location of ARTifariti 2009
artworks recorded in 2011. However, during the 2009 festival some artists undertook
landscape works based on the digital globe of Google Earth, and since Google Earth
691
ARTifariti 2008: 62-63 & 120.
253
has been an important tool in this research, it is appropriate to briefly describe them
here. These were ‘virtual’ inscriptions on the land, in effect, taking Fernando Peraita’s
original intention and attempting to realise it in digital space. One work in particular
was Francis Gomila’s video,692 posted on the internet (see Fig. 7.24) entitled Muro de
la Vergüenza ‘F Word’ Tour 2010 or Wall of Shame ‘F Word’ Tour. In it,
Gomila travels close to the northern end of the… wall erected by Morocco to keep the
Saharawi people from returning to their homeland. As Saharawi activists protest,
under the surveillance of the Moroccan army guarding the wall, Gomila traces a GPS
track forming the words ‘FUCK OFF’. The GPS data drawing was uploaded to
Google Earth as a protest to the continuing occupation of the Western Sahara. 693
Gomila and another artist, Bettina Semmer from Germany, undertook another similar
piece entitled Fósforo: Piss for peace or PHOSPHOR: Piss for peace. This
intervention was created as a protest against phosphate extraction by Morocco, in the
occupied territories. It was carried out in two parts. First, Gomila and Semmer
collected urine from people in Tifariti and they proposed to do some kind of
phosphate test on it – unfortunately, the description of their ‘experiment’ is unclear in
the 2009 ARTifariti catalogue. From the point of view of digital landscapes, however,
they did ‘etch’ onto the digital globe of Google Earth the ancient alchemist’s symbol
for phosphorus by creating a 130 metre long ‘in-situ GPS earth drawing’ at Tifariti. A
photo record of the intervention was uploaded onto the Internet, along with a Google
Maps plot of the ‘virtual’ piece of landscape art (see Fig. 7.25).694 This kind of work
explores our relationship with digital globes, topography and geography. It adds a
‘virtual’ layer of landscape features onto the stratum of contemporary archaeology as
it has been defined so far. It has very great potential, especially since it can actually
facilitate the kind of aspiration that was the very impetus for ARTifariti.
At a more terrestrial level, an Algerian artist, Kenza Mebarak added the words ‘THE
END’, painted white on black onto the south wall of the old Spanish infirmary, now
the office of the Mayor of Tifariti. The piece is called Ficción o realidad or Fiction or
reality (AR8a) and the style of the painting clearly mimics a film frame with white
692
Francis Gomila is an artist based in Gibraltar and Germany.
ARTifariti 2009: 76 & 94, and Gomila and Semmer 2009.
694
ARTifariti 2009: 77 & 94, and Gomila and Semmer 2010.
693
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sprocket holes painted vertically along both side edges. At the time, the artist also
created a temporary installation in front of the wall painting (see Fig. 7.26), using the
fence already there and covering it with fragments of cloth and clothing, and by
adding animal bones picked up from the desert and blanched by the sun. Some of the
fence posts had tins, and even an apparent helmet placed on top of them, and tins or
canisters with their tops painted white were lined up in front of the fence. The artist
wanted to point out that although a film might include horrible things, it will always
end, punctuated with the words, ‘The End’. But the horrors of a real war are different,
they can linger on, and by juxtaposing this filmic trope with the reality of contestation
in Western Sahara, the artist hoped that his work would remind people ‘never [to] get
used to violence and injustice’.695
ARTifariti 2010
The year 2010 was the last in which the ARTifariti festival was held at Tifariti. There
were 41 participating artists from ten countries, of which 13 were Saharawi, and the
festival took place from the 16th to the 30th of October 2010. In that year, judging from
the artworks that could be located in 2011, there was a shift of outdoor interventions
to the north and east of the Tifariti school (see Fig. 7.27), even going into an area
which was previously deemed unsafe by LMA/AOAV but was by then cleared of
UXOs. The old Spanish fort had one new intervention painted onto it. This was a
portrait of the 14 year old, Nayem El Garhi who was shot dead by Moroccan security
forces at the Saharawi Gdeim Izik protest camp outside El-Ayoun in the occupied
territories on October 24th 2010. The camp was set up on October 9th and it was
violently dismantled by Moroccan police on November 8th. When the death of the
teenager was made known, it had an immediate effect on the ARTifariti participants.
They prepared a letter of protest for Ban Ki-Moon, the U.N. General Secretary, and
presented it to the Commander of the United Nations’ MINURSO base at Tifariti, and
on their last full day in Tifariti, Federico Guzman painted the portrait on the remnant
of the old Spanish fort’s south facing wall.696 The work (AR4) is monochrome and
695
696
ARTifariti 2009: 71 & 93.
ARTifariti 2010: 148 & 152.
255
apparently based on a photograph of the teenager released at the time (see Fig.
7.28).697
The last art intervention that will be singled out in this chapter is U’m Dreiga or Oum
Dreiga (AR18), by the Saharawi artist Mohamed Moulud Yeslam. This is a very
distinctive artwork, painted on the south facing side of a sizable outcrop of boulders
almost half a kilometre east-northeast of the old Spanish fort (see Fig. 7.29). It is bold
in colour, composition and size, measuring at least 10 metres long by 4.25 metres
high. The artist has described it as a ‘Guernica of the desert’,698 ‘dedicated to the
memory of the civilians killed in the bombings of Tifariti and Um Draiga where,
during the Moroccan invasion… the Saharawi people who fled from the cities… were
bombed in the desert with napalm and white phosphorous’.699
The rock outcrop that the piece was painted on was naturally fractured into at least
five pinnacles, presenting an irregular front with some of the rock faces set back from
their neighbours. This gave depth to the piece with alternating backgrounds and
foregrounds. In the foreground, there are crouching figures painted with traditional
black tents behind them. In places they are presented as if they are just squatting on
the ground carrying out daily activities (see Fig. 7.30), but in other parts of the piece
they have agitated faces and at least one figure has arms in a distorted pose. A camel
looms, and beneath it a mother holds a baby while a man stands alongside with his
head downcast. All of the figures have streaks of red paint running down them, like
blood (see Fig. 7.31). There are two large faces on either side of the outcrop (a detail
of one is shown in Fig. 7.32), while in the left third of the work, there is a large raven,
or crow, holding a baby in its claws (see Fig. 7.33). The baby is kicking and
screaming, and judging by a painting that the artist made later, entitled The Massacre
of Gdaeim Izik, the crow or raven represents Morocco. In the latter painting Yeslam
shows the birds eating Saharawi children (see Fig. 7.34).700
697
The painting was based on a photo of the teenager, available from the Spanish El Mundo newspaper
at the time, and released on their website:
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/10/24/internacional/1287956073.html accessed 17 May 2013.
698
ARTifariti 2010: 69.
699
ARTifariti 2010: 147.
700
Yeslem 2012.
256
When I recorded the piece in 2011, the colours were faded a good deal, and the colour
pink, which the artist says he used to represent exploding phosphorus (shown in the
artwork as raining from the sky and clearly visible in Fig. 7.29) was barely visible. He
also employed fluorescent paint so that it would glow at night, but that effect was lost
after the passing of a year. At the base of the work, Yeslem also placed items he
collected locally, such as old shoe fragments, bleached bones, pieces of shrapnel and a
part of a tank tread, all the detritus of war and the leftovers of people who passed
through Tifariti.701 In all, the work has a narrative; there are refugees, at Oum Dreiga
and Tifariti, and they have set up tents and are carrying on with their lives; they are
attacked from the air with phosphorous and napalm and they suffer and agonise;
innocents die at the hands of the Moroccan invaders. To Yeslem, the aerial bombing
of Saharawi refugees in 1976, in their makeshift transit camps, was a ‘forgotten
Guernica’, and these rocks were a silent witness to those attacks. They could now
‘speak’ through his art.702
A Landscape of Solidarity, Commemoration and Protest
It is not necessarily the artworks produced at Tifariti that are important in this study;
instead, it is the sentiments of the artists and what they feel about Western Sahara and
its people, and about their realising their art in the territory. For the artists, it is an act
of solidarity with the Saharawi cause, engendered through the personal production of
art, and in the belief that art can further that cause. Their work is not high art, and by
the very nature of the interventions described herein it is highly ephemeral. In
particular, the out-of-doors works do not fare well, exposed to the extreme weather
conditions of the Sahara. Nevertheless, the art produced during the ARTifariti
festivals can, undoubtedly, be viewed as war art (including war specific protest art),
trench art, and solidarity art.
Laura Brandon summed up the meaning of ‘war art’ as ‘art shaped by war. …war
inspires permanent and impermanent art that may be propaganda, memorial, protest,
and/or record’.703 Saunders is of the opinion that traditional war art and memorials are
701
Yeslem 2012.
Yeslem 2012.
703
Brandon 2009: 3.
702
257
impressionistic, representing war from a distance in time and place. In contrast, trench
art has a sensuousness and ‘tactile immediacy… particularly [those] items made from
the metal waste of war’, incorporating the very ‘agents of death and mutilation
directly’.704 Solidarity art has been defined by Jacqueline Adams as ‘a little-studied
subset of resistance art’,705 which in particular ‘is art that individuals buy or help sell
or export in large part so as to help a group of people’.706 Notwithstanding this,
solidarity art, like the art of social and political movements is employed symbolically,
‘to frame the message, to attract resources, to communicate information, and foster
emotions’.707 And it is in this broader, symbolic sense – especially from the position
of the foreign artists who have taken part in ARTifariti – that the term ‘solidarity art’
is applicable here.
It is the sense of solidarity with the Saharawi people, as expressed by the foreign
artists in their art and sentiments that is so striking. They have invested emotion and
physical work into creating a landscape of solidarity. As already noted, the bulk of art
produced by Saharawi artists have been traditional paintings, produced indoors. But
since many of the foreign artists work in three dimensions in the first place, their work
lends itself to being created out-of-doors. These artistic interventions are ‘one small
but significant dimension to an ever-expanding archaeological record’.708 They have
created an archaeological stratum with their personal handiwork as features, as
markers. This marking the land in the support of a cause, as a protest and an
affirmation, and as a re-appropriation of a locale by, or for, its former inhabitants who
were driven away by conflict, can also be seen at District Six in Cape Town, South
Africa.
District Six, South Africa
District Six was a distinctively mixed race, working class area that prospered in Cape
Town until the South African, apartheid regime declared it a ‘whites only’ area under
the Group Areas Act of 1966. As a result, the entire community was removed by
704
Saunders 2003: 14.
Adams 2009: 1.
706
Adams 2009: 3-4.
707
Ferrer 2009: 41.
708
Schofield 2011: 187.
705
258
1984, and the townscape that existed was razed to the ground, leaving only the
outlines of streets and churches standing.709 The rich mix of peoples living in District
Six from the colonial period to its erasure inevitably resulted in contestation,
‘struggles’ and at times, ‘fierce battles’. However, these have been seen as
generative ones which have ploughed deep furrows into the South African landscape,
and from which have grown authentic cultural and social practices and formations. A
surprising diversity of South African experiences take their roots or have been
fertilized by these struggles. In looking at the emergence of a new single South
African identity an awareness of this aspect of District Six history is not an
insignificant fact. The mission… is, therefore, to emphasise the symbolic importance
of this small patch of ground in that much grander [South African] endeavour.710
This sense of national and cultural resonance ascribed to a specific location, and born
out of adversity is something that District Six shares with Tifariti. They are both
places where the narratives of people have been ‘arrested’ and have therefore become
laden with emotion, and in the case of District Six, even seen as an area of ‘salted
earth’.711 With such a strength of feeling, the District Six Sculpture Festival opened on
September 24th 1997 for six weeks. As at Tifariti, though running as a single event,
outdoor art interventions were created by 62 artists ranging from sculptures to
paintings and with performances and interactions. This outdoor sculpture garden was
meant to be short lived. The artworks, as at Tifariti, were mainly made of cheap or
locally found materials, and many works were made on the day.712
The notion of permanent fixtures gave way to the idea of monuments which can be
anti-monumental, existing as transient markers and triggers of recognition, association
and memory, and the physically vulnerable structures are indicative of the fragilities
that they infer/recall. They do not have to exist as towering statuesque monoliths,
resisting questions regarding their suitability. Many are offerings rather than
dogmas.713
709
Schofield 2011: 35.
Layne n.d.: 5.
711
Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 13. Additionally, for a discussion of District Six, as embodying an
‘archaeology of memory’ see Coombes 2003.
712
Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 22.
713
Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 13.
710
259
Both the ARTifariti festivals and the District Six Public Sculpture Project have
brought in artists with a strong sense of solidarity and empathy to ‘declare worth’ to
lands and people who were victims of governments that wanted them to ‘vanish’ and
to pay homage to their sufferings ‘during... [their] forced removals’.714 With reference
to District Six, but also applicable to Tifariti and Western Sahara:
Through their various works, artists drew our attention not only to District Six as a
place, a physical landscape once densely populated and now scarred and barren, but
as a metaphor for a range of displacements. The wholeness of the place and the
totality of its meanings were vividly contrasted with the lost and broken: fragments
indicating the break-up and fracturing of society and the loss of things precious to the
soul. The project should be approached in a similar way; understanding it as an
attempt by a group of artists to gather the many fragments, both physical and
narrative, that commemorate both an era and its people… Many sought to re-invest
spaces, revaluing not only the physical land and its social and cultural traditions, but
also the place it holds in the psyche of South Africans.715
In fact, the above quote also holds true for archaeology – it illustrates how art can
explore the past, and the contemporary past, and present new and parallel insights for
archaeologists and the formation of archaeological knowledge.716
Being seen as an ephemeral project from the start, the sculpture park at District Six
has been deteriorating since its inception, and the sense of it being an archaeological
site of the contemporary past was remarked upon by John Schofield when he matterof-factly stated: ‘the archaeology of some of these interventions remained when I
visited [District Six] in 2001’.717 ‘Some’ of the interventions ‘remained’ and they
remained as ‘archaeology’ – this is undeniably the same at Tifariti. This is also the
same across the Atlantic, in the Nevada desert, where there are the remains of a Cold
War era protest camp outside the United States government’s nuclear arms, Nevada
Test Site.
714
Bedford and Murinik n.d.: 13.
Bedford & Murinik n.d.: 13-14.
716
Renfrew 2003: 8 & 103-106.
717
Schofield 2011: 187.
715
260
Peace Camp, Nevada
As at Tifariti and District Six, similar land art, though not necessarily created by
artists, has also been created within a landscape of protest adjacent to the United
States’ nuclear weapons Nevada Test Site, around 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas.
Starting in the 1950s and continuing into the present day, a series of three protest
camps now referred to as the Peace Camp, were set up outside the entrance to the
Nuclear Test Site, and served as a locus for thousands of anti-nuclear activists and
demonstrators. Here, a distinctive ‘archaeology of opposition’718 has materialised in a
desert area not that different from Tifariti – rocky and with scrub vegetation. A camp
and place of congregation has come into being for individuals, and
over 200 groups with different and coeval environmental and social interests,
including pacifists, anti-war groups, anti-nuclear coalitions, environmentalists, and the
Western Shoshone tribe – the traditional [land] owners in the area.719
The protesters have come from different backgrounds, and at the camp they would
coalesce into short-lived, loosely organised social groups expressing their opposition
to nuclear arms testing and proliferation around the world. ‘The nature of the camp
reflects their short-term social activities, and to some extent, their marginalized
relationship to society as a whole’.720
Beck, Drollinger and Schofield carried out two archaeological field seasons at the
Peace Camp in 2002. The Camp covered an area of 240 hectares, and 771 cultural
features were recorded. Most of these were built with local stones, though some were
brought in for specific pieces of art. The stone features included cairns, rock caches,
stone circles (rings), foundations for sculptures and the like, geoglyphs, path outlines,
‘gardens’ with stone outlines, hearths and low stacks of stones. Areas cleared of
stones were occasionally found close to stone features, probably for a tent or open-air
sleeping place. Wood and metal artefacts were rare, and logs were imported for fires
and for building, along with wooden crates. Other features ranged from concrete
718
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2003: 47-49.
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 77.
720
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 77.
719
261
statuary foundations to fencing materials, paths and tracks, statues and sculptures,
willow branch structures, laid out symbols, prayer poles, masks, graffiti (in drainage
tunnels), and a porta-loo.721
The Camp has a great deal of ‘symbolic art’. Such artworks were usually laid out on
flat ground and were made from locally collected rocks. The works consisted of peace
symbols, stone spirals and stone platforms. Large stone circles were created with
objects (for instance, ceramic and metal masks) placed at the cardinal points. There
was even a relatively large abstract flower design and a group of sculptures of
children, called ‘the shadow children’. The word ‘peace’ was laid out in stone on one
low ridge and written in English, French, Russian and Japanese, representing the
countries with nuclear capabilities in the 1980s.722
Summary
As with the artists of ARTifariti and those that took part in the District Six Sculpture
Projects, the protestors at the Peace Camp put a good deal of energy into expressing
their aspirations through art. At Tifariti the goal has been to forward the cause of selfdetermination and human rights for the Saharawi people. At District Six it was to
commemorate, and to seek justice for the displacement and ruin of a thriving
community, which once again, could be representative of a way forward for postapartheid South Africa. At the Nevada Peace Camp, the goal has been to rid the earth
of nuclear weapons, and to aim for a just world – a world at peace and in harmony
with ‘Mother Earth’.
The Peace Camp was and continues to be active concurrently with the government
power structure that is the focus of the dissent. Instead of engaging in acts of
destruction to express their desires, the people at the Peace Camp have put their
efforts into creating symbols in the desert as testimony to their intent and hopes,
establishing their own, separate permanent cultural legacy.723
721
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 77 -78.
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 82-83.
723
Schofield , Beck and Drollinger 2011: 86.
722
262
However, the sculptures and artworks created in Nevada are, just like those at Tifariti
and District Six, anti-monuments. There is no ostentation and they speak in a language
which their creators (and hopefully other people) understand. The fact that they are
created on the land and heavily laden with meaning (and in the case of the Peace
Camp) by non-artists, makes them analogous in the broadest of terms, with the
prehistoric petroforms and other stone monument types that populate, for instance, the
Tifariti region. The archaeology of recent conflict has been described as being similar
to prehistoric archaeology, since documentation for such very recent contestations is
often deemed ‘classified’ by the countries or parties involved, and their own accounts
of their actions can be unreliable, since often they would wish to keep unclear their
aims and goals.724 The enquiring archaeologist, therefore, has to rely on traditional
fieldwork and the inherently forensic qualities of archaeological interpretation. This
specifically methodological, and evidential affinity with prehistoric archaeology,
conceptually links the strata of archaeology at Tifariti, from 1975-76 up to the very
present, with the archaeology of those pre-Islamic peoples who populated the Tifariti
region some 5000 years ago.
724
Schofield 2005: 39-40.
263
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Introduction
As the preceding chapters illustrate, this dissertation has tried to tell what could best
be described as a ‘big story’. The much-used analogies of weaving a rich tapestry, or
painting a large canvas, are not inappropriate in describing it. The core of the project
has been the materiality of the Western Sahara conflict from late 1975 to 1991, and its
aftermath. However, to successfully describe, characterise, and contextualise that
materiality, forays have been taken into Saharan prehistory and pastoralism, Saharan
trade, European colonialism, modern era warfare (for both conventional and
unconventional wars, and ranging from Asia to Africa and the Americas), the geopolitics of the Maghreb, land art, protest and war art
– including trench art –
contemporary interactions on the internet (including websites, blogs, videos and
online archives), oral testimony/history, neo-geography, and even satellite imagery
activism. As a whole, these all accentuate the breadth of the story to tell. Open source
and/or free GISs have been employed, and Google Earth has been utilized as a
primary visual and topographic source for archaeological survey (both virtual and on
the ground).
This research has been multidisciplinary, multi-vocal and multidimensional, and its
aim has been to explore and give presence to the overwhelming reality of an entire
territory (Western Sahara) transformed by the ‘works’ of modern war in the last
quarter of the 20th century and well into the 21st. The way in which this has been done
has of necessity been selective, and the resources drawn upon have been incomplete.
Therefore, it is appropriate to say that the results are collage-like – and as an
archaeological study of the materiality of a contemporary conflict, this project has
undoubtedly been singular.
264
Recapitulation of Content
As an archaeological landscape study, this dissertation is grounded in the idea that
landscapes are a palimpsest, and that within any place or landscape the materiality of
the past and present can exist and be visible side by side. My view, as expressed in
Chapter 1, is that the best way of studying a landscape, especially one of modern
conflict – with all of its complexities – is not to give preference to any specific type of
knowledge or data, but to include a variety of relevant sources and avenues of
approach. Essentially, this has been accomplished through combining the practical and
forensic skills of traditional landscape archaeology with oral testimony and historical
accounts (in all the various forms noted in Chapter 2). This connects the past and the
present, and brings into being, as Rodney Harrison would put it, an archaeology ‘of
and in the present’. This is poignant in the context of Western Sahara since the
conflict is still unresolved, and the country is partitioned by Morocco’s monumental
and fortified berms. As a result, the conflict and its materiality persists into the present
day, becoming something new for every generation of Saharawis. This conceptual
approach has given presence and voice to the materiality of the Western Sahara
conflict in a public – or forensic – way (as would be expressed by Eyal Weizman),
through the very medium of this dissertation: and this is very much in keeping with
the idea of forensics within archaeology as being something much more than
meticulous note taking.
The issue of colonialism, with its concomitance of conflict, has been fundamental to
this research. The power imbalance between the coloniser and the colonised has been
expressed at a macro (national) scale, through the carving out of the desert sands
(through mechanical earth-moving) of the territory-wide matrix of earthen barriers –
the berms. These are a physical embodiment of exclusion, dividing the territory and
separating the majority of the indigenous Saharawi population (mainly in Algerian
refugee camps) from around four fifths of their national territory, as appropriated by
Morocco. Such a barrier system, made up of almost 4000 kilometres of earth and
stone banks, and fully fortified (with nearly 2000 military installations, landmines, and
barbed wire), can only be appreciated and studied through satellite imagery, and in
this dissertation, that has been successfully done through the employment of Google
265
Earth. The centrality of this online tool to this research cannot be overstated, and it is
probable that this has been the first time that a war-work as monumental as the berms,
has been studied through the application. But Google Earth has also been instrumental
in studying Western Sahara’s conflict landscape at a regional (meso) scale, where, in
and around the settlement of Tifariti, it has successfully made visible a palimpsest of
archaeology that ranges from the prehistoric to the contemporary.
This unique use of Google Earth has not only been instrumental in undertaking this
study – recording and analysing a range of archaeological phenomena – but by being
used in conjunction with the other resources employed in this research, it has created
an archaeology, or better still, it has brought into being an archaeology of the conflict
in Western Sahara. As with all archaeological endeavours, what is examined is partial
– fragments of a past reality – and by being mediated through satellite imagery, a
concrete reality on the ground has been transformed into pixellated re-presentations on
a computer screen. Conjoined with this are the actions of the archaeologist who, with
human senses and fore-knowledge, also mediates and translates the material under
investigation into new data and interpretations, reconstituting it through a creative act,
yet never being certain of the authenticity of the final confection. To mitigate this, this
research has taken a very catholic approach. It has situated the interdisciplinary and
multidimensional nature of the archaeology of modern conflict within the overall
‘craft’ of archaeology – with its naturally heuristic approaches – and through utilising
the resources and ‘tool kit’ elaborated upon in Chapter 2, it has foregrounded, and
given presence to, the materiality of conflict and contestation in Western Sahara.
That materiality, however, has not appeared in a vacuum. The Western Sahara conflict
is but one episode (though one that started forty years ago and is still unresolved) in
the history of the region. The narrative presented in Chapter 3 contextualises this. It
gives a relatively compact overview of the land and people, and the history of Western
Sahara. It has shown that the materiality of the territory as a place on the globe is a
recent invention, jointly marked out by Spain and France after a series of negotiations,
and only settled in 1912. The inhabitants of the region had no say in the matter. They
were embedded in the land – they were a part of it – so they too were partitioned along
with the landscape itself. This started a chain of events that, with the hostile invasions
carried out by Morocco and Mauritania in the winter of 1975-76 (though the latter
266
relinquished its territorial claims in 1979), would turn the territory into a unique
landscape of colonialism and imperialism, late 20th century conflict, and partition and
exclusion, forging what the country of Western Sahara has become today.
Additionally, Chapter 3 situates the Moroccan means of partition and exclusion – the
berms – amidst some of the salient barrier systems of the 20th century. From European
inter-world war defensive barriers, to barriers in Asia, the Middle East and North
Africa, it illustrates how countries can be delimited, carved up, and shaped by the will
of nations, armies and individuals.
The Moroccan berms are probably the largest appropriation of land by bulldozer that
has ever occurred on the planet, and the mapping and collated data presented in
Chapter 4 clearly illustrates the excessive, indeed, super modern extent that a modern
nation will go to, to appropriate another, and confine it. These earthen, and mined,
defences have been described by numerous commentators, but they have all been
sketchy with conflicting details and statistics, and as a result, the material presence of
the berms has never been appropriately explained to any audience. The berms have
been a ‘taken for granted’, and as such, they have not received detailed attention since
there have been other humanitarian and geo-political factors in the Western Sahara
conflict that have understandably required greater attention. However, this ‘taken for
granted-ness’ is exactly why the materiality of the berms has been elaborated on, and
archaeologically characterised here for the first time. Without this, and through the
employment of Google Earth (and other freely accessible Internet resources), their
composition and make-up, and disposition, would be little known. In short, by
applying the acute sensitivity to material remains that is the hallmark of modern
archaeology, even through remote observation, and (in Chapter 5) by incorporating
interviews with individuals who have crossed the berms, along with the commentaries
of journalists who have confronted the barriers, and accounts of Polisario fighters and
Moroccan soldiers at war (adding a distinctly human and experiential element to the
archaeological description of the barriers), the Moroccan berms have now been given
a presence they would otherwise not have had. They would have remained unconstituted in the vague descriptions composed by the majority of writers and analysts
on the Western Sahara conflict.
267
This dissertation moves from the macro (national) scale to the meso, or regional scale,
in Chapter 6. Here, there is a sequence of archaeological periods, or overarching
strata, in and around the settlement of Tifariti that is clearly evident. This sequence
includes the distribution of numerous funerary monuments that probably range in date
from around 3000 B.C to A.D. 1000, followed by the remains of the Spanish colonial
period, and the subsequent remains of the occupation of Tifariti by Moroccan forces
and its investment by Polisario in 1977-1979. These are made up of a defensive ‘box’
with inner and outer defences, and with up to 7000 individual foxholes, sangars, gun
pits, defensive bulwarks, and troop accommodations covering an area of roughly 90
square kilometres. In turn, these are surmounted by the physical manifestations of the
various ways in which the Saharawi people are presently re-appropriating their
patrimony in the liberated zone, especially at Tifariti – through new building works,
Bedouin resettlement, and through the holding of Polisario/SADR national events.
Overall, this materiality makes up a vast single stratum of features inscribed on the
land, juxtaposed with each other and interdigitated. They are essentially an
assemblage, and when enhanced by oral testimony (both official and unofficial) and
the results of archaeological fieldwork, they make up a narrative that is akin to a
collage.
In Chapter 7, the archaeology of the Tifariti region moves from the meso to the micro
scale. The term ‘micro’ has been used to indicate that at this juncture, this dissertation
has directed its gaze at specific artefacts on the land – artworks – limited in number
and extent, and created episodically over four years, all as part of the ARTifariti art
festivals that were held in Tifariti from 2007 until 2010. This chapter caps the
archaeology of Tifariti as described in Chapter 6, and the artworks are viewed as a
part of the continuum of the settlement’s archaeology, from prehistoric times to the
present day. The artworks examined in this chapter are all out of doors, as mainly
free-standing sculptures or installations, and as murals. They are an expression of
sentiment on the part of their creators – almost all foreign artists – in solidarity with
the Saharawi people in their struggle for self-determination and recognition as an
independent nation. Much of the artwork created has been made with cast off
materials and the remains of unexploded ordnance. Many fall within the category of
trench art, and/or protest art, though none are portable. They have been created in a
contested territory, and one that is technically still in a state of war, since only a
268
United Nations brokered cease-fire keeps the peace. These are war art, but also
memorial art, and to the artists they are solidarity art. The founders of ARTifariti, and
the participating artists, see their creations as agents that can mediate change, and as
positive, contributing additions – weapons even – to the arsenal of the Saharawi
people in their struggle over the fate of their nation. The artworks are manifestations
of the collective sub-culture, or community, that the artists belong to (at least while
they are in Western Sahara). They work together as an aggregate and their creations
are a manifestation of their individual and group sentiments. To borrow from Alfred
Gell, the ARTifariti artworks are ‘enculturated beings’ and examples of ‘distributed
personhood’. And this enculturated entity, consisting of artefacts imbued with the
sentiments of their creators, individually and as a group, make up the latest stratum of
archaeology in and of the present – amidst the vestiges of Spanish colonialism, and of
Moroccan occupation and late 20th century war – at the settlement of Tifariti.
Archaeological Consequences
There are two research questions around which this dissertation rotates. (1) How has
the landscape of Western Sahara been transformed by the 1975-1991 war, as
manifested by the material remains of conflict? And (2), how are the Saharawi people
manifesting the re-appropriation of their land, in particular, at the settlement of
Tifariti, which has a special resonance for them? These questions have been situated
throughout this dissertation within the themes of colonialism, conflict and exclusion –
and they have been viewed through three scales of resolution: the national, or macro,
the regional, or meso, and the micro, being locus and episode specific. These are not
hierarchical but, essentially, different aspects from which to view the profound
materiality of conflict on the landscape of Western Sahara.
The Material Remains of Conflict
By employing the strategic methodology and resources described in Chapter 2, this
research has undoubtedly shown how 20th century conflict has literally transfigured
the landscape of Western Sahara through the material manifestations of war and
contestation. It has charted the initial enclosure of the territory through the
establishment of Spanish colonial outposts along its Atlantic coast, and through the
269
creation of the French (Mauritanian) limes of the Piste Imperiale, with its six forts on
a front facing westwards into Western Sahara. It has shown how a place – Tifariti –
known only for having a well, was transformed in the 1960s into a Spanish military
outpost, though one which also served as a locus for the Bedouin in the region. It has
also presented, for the first time, an archaeological survey of a Spanish Foreign
Legion fort situated in the deep desert.
The crux of this research, however, are the works of war from the conflict of 19751991, and in particular, the six territorial barriers – the Moroccan berms – constructed
in waves across the territory between 1980 and 1987. The mappings, illustrations,
statistics, and descriptions that make up Chapter 4 (based on a comprehensive use of
Google Earth) show how the landscape of Western Sahara has been transformed by
this modern conflict. Although an overwhelming majority of Saharawis evacuated the
territory in the wake of the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasions of 1975-1976, those
who stayed in the territory, and those who still clung to a traditional nomadic
existence in the badiya, had their pastoral way of life irreparably disrupted. The
berms, with their forts, barbed wire and minefields cut off traditional route-ways and
pastures, and confined a sizable proportion of Saharawis behind the barriers (in what
has been described as the largest prison on the planet), while excluding an even
greater number without. Additionally, the land near the barriers is still unsafe due to
minefields and unexploded ordnance, and this is also the case along stretches of
redundant barriers within the Moroccan occupied zone.
With the berms transfiguring Western Sahara at a national scale, the hostilities
between Polisario and Morocco (and Mauritania) also caused the territory to be
transformed at the regional level. The Tifariti region was one such locus, being
occupied by Moroccan forces from 1977 to 1979. As a result, Polisario/SPLA invested
the settlement through long-term attritional guerrilla tactics, and to defend themselves,
the Moroccans turned the settlement into a fortress. Through the use of Google Earth,
oral testimony, and traditional archaeological survey, this research has been able to
present, for the first time, an archaeological analysis of this deep desert battlescape,
and this is probably the first study of its kind of any such battlespace from the latter
twentieth century.
270
As with the berms, the archaeological data, analyses, mappings and illustrations
generated for Chapter 6 clearly show how the Tifariti landscape was transformed by
war. When coupled with oral testimony on how the war was fought, this dissertation
has been able to present a holistic view of modern asymmetrical war. By situating
Polisario tactics within the overall history of guerrilla warfare (and the history of the
traditional Arab raid – the ghazi) this dissertation has shown how the attritional,
mainly small scale, raiding tactics of Polisario was a way in which the Saharawi
fighters could draw upon their intimate knowledge of the Sahara, as the so called
‘children of the clouds’, and be at home in the vast, ‘in between’ desert spaces – the
voids – between the ‘dug in’ Moroccan garrisons and strong points, for which
Polisario/SPLA still showed (in 2011) a marked degree of contempt. The multifaceted archaeology of the Tifariti warscape shows that the defended settlement, even
with its modern armaments, was not immune to the multiple and unpredictable, small
scale and lightning raids of Polisario/SPLA, and that defences without continuous
barriers could be easily over run by committed, well trained and experienced guerrilla
fighters (even drawing upon techniques of warfare that harked back to pre-modern
times). However, as pointed out in Chapter 5, when formidable barriers, such as the
berms are constructed, highly mobile raiders can undoubtedly attack and disrupt the
garrisons manning them, but in real terms, the barriers will continue to check the
insurgents unless the will of the defenders is totally broken, or the guerrilla fighters
turn to conventional warfare. From interviews carried out for this research,
Polisario/SPLA does not seem to cling to the ghazi-like raid as its only offensive
strategy. They have at times deployed large columns with tanks and mobile artillery,
and they believe that they can truly breach the berms in a future war. This might be
wishful thinking, since the Saharawis have no air force (a crucial arm in modern
warfare), but when I visited Polisario/SPLA garrisons northeast of Tifariti in 2007,
there were vehicle parks with numerous tanks and self-propelled artillery, clearly
indicating that Polisario does not shy away from the conventional weapons of war.
Territorial Re-appropriation
The berms have created two Western Saharas. One cleansed of Polisario fighters and
occupied by Morocco, and another, the hostile desert populated by a small number of
Bedouin and the SPLA under Polisario/SADR control. The second Western Sahara
can be interpreted as a liminal zone. It is the threshold in front of a curtain – the berms
271
– that cannot be passed through, and additionally, it is confined by further borders
with Mauritania and Algeria. It is a self-contained geographical unit, though its
eastern frontier is permeable. This in-between-land, if Malainin Larkhal’s
interpretation is correct, symbolizes potentialities.725 It represents the fact that it is
possible for the Saharawis to confront the Moroccan military, and to liberate a part of
their country – so why not the rest of it? The very existence of a liberated zone (even
with a small population and little infrastructure) also impresses upon the Saharawi
people the fact that their land is occupied, and that it still has to be wrested free from
its unwelcome occupiers. This clearly reflects the persistence of the materiality of the
Western Sahara conflict into the present day.
The archaeology of Tifariti, as brought to light through the examination of Google
Earth imagery, and through targeted fieldwork and interviews in 2011, has clearly
illustrated some of the ways in which the Saharawi people are re-appropriating their
country in and around the settlement. The place is seen as a potential capital for the
Liberated Zone. It too is a liminal locus, floating, cut off by the berms from the routes
that used to connect it to the settlements now in Moroccan territory, and only linked
umbilically by desert tracks to the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. As such, it
serves as a kind of vestibule into the Liberated Zone. It is also liminal in that it is at
the juncture of an undulating and rocky terrain that extends northwards, and the flat
hamada desert that extends to the south. And as its archaeology indicates, this distinct
situation puts it at the southern limit of an area rich in prehistoric funerary remains.
Tifariti is a quiet settlement and it is very underdeveloped, but its archaeology
(elaborated on in Chapter 6) clearly shows how a new and growing population of
Bedouin pastoralists, have been inhabiting the wadis in and around the settlement in
numerous familial tent encampments since the ceasefire of 1991. These new settlers
have a strong and positive feeling towards the place. Its weather is clement, and
Tifariti serves as a service centre with a water supply, a school, infirmary, new
housing, a municipality office, an office for the regional SPLA commander, and a
SADR government building under construction. Tifariti is a place poised to become
something else – it is in the process of becoming actualised – and importantly, it is a
725
Larkhal, Interview.
272
meeting place for National Polisario/SADR celebratory events like the Polisario
National Congresses that have been held there since 2003. When these occur, Tifariti
swells by the addition of tent encampments for the delegates and soldiers visiting, and
taking part in the event. These usually occupy the eastern part of the settlement and
the area close to the old Spanish airstrip, where martial parades and associated cultural
gatherings occur. In fact, the airstrip has become a central ceremonial space for the
SADR. Here, fixed viewing stands have been built, with podiums, decorative
delimiting walls, and flagpoles. The re-appropriation of this barren patch of desert has
a clear materiality visible on the ground, and its archaeology has been clearly charted
in this research.
As a settlement that experienced the violence of war, Tifariti has acquired a special
resonance for the Saharawi people. Because of this – and its location not far from the
Rekeiz prehistoric rock art sites – it became the focus of the ARTifariti art festivals
dealt with in Chapter 7. As with the providing of services for local Bedouin, along
with housing, and national SADR events at Tifariti, the ARTifariti festivals have been
a definite form of re-appropriation of this liminal Saharawi locus. From the politically
charged artworks that have been recorded in this research, and from the oral and
published testimony of the artists involved, the festivals have been a statement of
intent that Western Sahara will one day be undivided and governed by the Saharawi
people, and that there would be no exclusion of the two thirds, or so, of the Saharawi
population on the eastern side of the berms. Strikingly, however, since nearly all of
the outdoor interventions have been carried out by foreign (mainly Hispanic) artists, in
solidarity with the Saharawi people, their sincere efforts can only be described as an
attempt at territorial re-appropriation by proxy.
Applications
Wars cover great expanses of ground. Studying them by commercially available
satellite imagery can be financially prohibitive. In consequence, therefore, this
dissertation and the archaeological examples cited in Chapter 2 illustrate how virtual
globes (in particular, Google Earth) can be successfully employed in studying past and
contemporary landscapes. This research also illustrates how blogs and personal
websites can be used in studying the materiality of modern wars, along with user
generated online videos. At this very moment, satellite imagery activists and
273
neogeographers are harnessing such readily available internet tools and resources, to
record and make known a multiplicity of crises across the planet. By working in this
vein conflict archaeology can become an applied archaeology, and as such, it would
sit well with the humanitarian focused satellite research that is being undertaken on
conflict zones by, for instance, the Satellite Sentinel Project726 and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.727
The use of publicly available internet resources, as in this research, tells us that
conflicts, and the scarred landscapes of conflicts, do not have to be unknown to us.
We can cast our gaze over them, and we can study, analyse and characterise them as
and when we want. We can even chart the progress of present day wars if our
resources (both graphic and otherwise) are up to date. This tells us that the nature of
conflict can be understood in geographic space in an accessible way, and that wars can
be undisclosed. Just as audio-visual news coverage can bring us face-to face with
conflict – with a sense of immediacy unknown in the past – seeing a conflict from
space, spread over 1000s of square kilometres in area, and understanding how it has
literally moved across a country, a territory, can indicate hitherto unknown aspects of
modern war. In particular, and as this dissertation shows, these can include, the nature
of power imbalances, the nature and character of battlespaces, degrees of destruction,
and the means by which an army can ‘dig in’ and be sieged. The partitioning of a
nation can be readily visualised, and the relationship between people (as both
combatants and non-combatants) with the terrain and built environments in which
they act out their lives can be characterised. Such geographies of militarised
landscapes and frontiers, and battlespaces, though specific to each and every conflict,
can, to an extent, be made bare. Wars – armed conflicts – have ‘big’ stories to tell, and
the insights acquired, and the methods employed in carrying out this research, are
applicable to other modern conflict landscapes, especially those that are relatively
recent, and in regions where there are dangers to life through unexploded ordnance
and/or hostile parties, and with very limited access.
The hostilities of the Western Sahara conflict ended almost a quarter of a century ago.
Since then, many other wars have erupted across the globe, and the material remains
726
727
At http://www.satsentinel.org/ accessed on 28 November 2013.
AAAS 2014.
274
of those conflicts, along with the remains of even earlier wars, are now visible on
virtual globes. Of course, the type of terrain in which a given conflict took place
dictates how well its various remains will have been preserved, and how easily they
can be seen through publicly available satellite imagery. Nevertheless, the works of
war, and the landscapes transfigured by war, can be readily studied in many instances,
especially in the arid regions of the world where ground cover is very limited. Some
examples of such conflict landscapes, from within the third quarter of the twentieth
century until now, can be found in Southwest Africa (Angola and Namibia), Ethiopia
and South Sudan, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, and of course, in Palestine. Conflicts
like these have been long term and devastating in their effects. They have histories of
real and imagined pasts, and materialities that will linger for a very long time – some
of which will never be erased. Their study deserves an archaeological sensitivity that
is concerned with both the living and the dead, and an approach that is not piecemeal,
but longitudinal in scope. By applying the conceptual and strategic tools elaborated
upon, and fruitfully employed in this research, this dissertation can lead the way,
indeed be a template, for further similar archaeological studies of conflicts, and
contested territories, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Future Directions
This research has undoubtedly opened up a broad arena of research for the
archaeological study of modern and contemporary conflict. As already made clear, the
Moroccan territorial berms cannot be studied at close quarters, but their make-up and
operational mechanisms, and the militarised geography of which they are a part can
undoubtedly be explored in much greater detail by further survey through remote
sensing. Such research, expanding upon what this dissertation has covered, can only
add to the story of Western Sahara, and the issues of land contestation and partition
that is occurring in the world today.
At a more regional level, with the ancient archaeology within the Liberated Zone
sitting in many places amidst a landscape of modern conflict, this latter period of
momentous activity should to be included in any further landscape studies carried out
in Western Sahara. This would be in keeping with the basic tenets of contemporary
275
landscape archaeology where a holistic approach is taken and no preference is given
to any specific period. Besides contextualising the more ancient landscape within the
present day geography of the country, it would contribute to the historical narrative of
the Saharawi people.
The colonial period should also be explored further, especially since the Saharawis
view their relationship with the Hispanic world as part of their heritage. They see
themselves as having a unique Arabic-Spanish culture, which sets them apart from the
former colonies of the French imperial project in Western Africa. This heritage has
come under attack in Dakhla (Villa Cisneros) where, for instance, the original Spanish
fort dating back to 1884 has been demolished by the Moroccan authorities. Other
Spanish period remains in the occupied zone are ruinous, and luckily, the Spanish
archaeologist Luis Blanco is surveying and recording some of them.728 In the
Liberated Zone, however, much further work can be carried out in Tifariti. This could
include more detailed architectural surveys of the fort, infirmary, and bake house, with
the latter including excavation. To get further information on the day-to-day lives of
the Spanish garrison, the rubbish dump northwest of the fort could be excavated.
There is also scope for colonial period archaeology in the south of the country, at Zug,
where the probable French fort could be surveyed and excavated. This would provide
valuable insights into early French military activity in the region, just as fieldwork at
Tifariti would contribute to our knowledge of the later Spanish occupation of the
badiya. It is also possible that surveys could be undertaken in the Wadi Tagliat,
northeast of Tifariti, to see if it is possible to identify the site of the French-Saharawi
battle that took place there in 1912, after the sacking of Smara. The materiality of the
European colonial period is a lacuna in our knowledge of the history of this part of the
Sahara. Little, if any, of such research is being undertaken in other parts of the Sahara,
therefore, such fieldwork would be a real contribution to colonial period studies.
The Moroccan defences around Tifariti should also be investigated in greater detail.
Here, there is the opportunity to explore a garrison – a whole martial community –
under siege. Detailed surveys of selected areas of defences could be carried out along
with excavations of selected groups of built structures, dug outs, trenches and artillery
728
Blanco Vázquez 2012.
276
gun pits. The open desert around Tifariti would be a perfect, and accessible,
environment to study late 20th century field fortifications (and soldier’s field
accommodations) with implications for understanding the materiality of place of
contemporary, and near contemporary war zones such as Vietnam, Southwest Africa,
the Falklands, and the Middle East, not to mention Afghanistan.
There is also a great deal of targeted oral history work on the conduct of the war that
can be undertaken. Much of the literature on Western Sahara has much to say on the
plight of the refugees fleeing the territory in 1975-1976, and there are oral history
projects looking at the Saharawi experience in its broadest sense, as in the case of the
work of the University of Roehampton’s Hispanic Research Centre.729 However, it is
the story of those people affected by the face of battle, the soldiers and veterans of the
SPLA who, as yet, still have a story to tell.
Further, more detailed recording of the remaining ARTifariti interventions could be
carried out, along with further interviews with the artists. If the festival were to return
to Tifariti, then its new art interventions should be plotted and recorded as part of any
future landscape archaeology project in the immediate region. These, like the remains
of the war with Morocco and the colonial period, as well as the surrounding
prehistoric landscape, are all part of the very ‘big story’ that is the archaeology of
Western Sahara.
729
Hispanic Research Centre (n.d.).
277
GLOSSARY
On transliteration
Throughout this dissertation there are words, names and place-names transliterated
from Arabic. For consistency, the spellings of these presented in Pazzanita 2006,
Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara (3rd edition), have been used. For those
words not found in the Historical Dictionary, then spellings (especially for placenames) from Servicio Geográfico del Ejército de España 1960, Mapa de las
Provincias de Ifni y Sahara y Archipielago de Canarias have been used.
Transliterations not used from these sources include: the Spanish ‘h’ sound for the
Arabic ‘kh’ sound, and the French ‘ch’ for the English ‘sh’ sound, for instance, in the
word sheikh (the latter transcriptions for both of these is preferred throughout this
dissertation). Also, the western Saharan word, ‘oued’, for a dry watercourse or valley,
has not been used, but instead, it has been replaced by the more commonly known
‘wadi’.
Selected Glossary730
AOAV
Action on Armed Violence, formerly known as Lind Mine Action
(LMA): often noted herein as LMA/AOAV
Badiya
(Arabic) The open desert, which can include pasture-grounds: those
regions outside of permanent settlement
Bedouin
Or Badouin (From Arabic): inhabitants of the badiya. Desert
nomads, or pastoralists
Berm
In modern military usage, this is generically an earthen bank, or
dyke: an earthen rampart or parapet
Bir
(Arabic) A deep well
Ghazi
(Arabic) The traditional Arab raid
Guelb
(Arabic) Igneous, plug-like rock outcrops and ridges
Guelta
(Arabic) Depressions or hollows of various sizes which collect
730
Most unfamiliar words and acronyms are defined when they initially appear in the text, but those
listed here are repeated often, well after their initial explanation.
278
rainwater
Hamada
(Arabic) Flat, open and stony desert: steppe-like
Hassi
Or Hasi (Arabic): a shallow well
Inselberg
Igneous outcrop of rocks: a ‘tor’, often ridge-like
Intifada
(Arabic) An uprising: a campaign of civil disobedience
LMA
Lind Mine Action, now known as Action on Armed Violence
(AOAV): often noted herein as LMA/AOAV
Mahdi
(Arabic) A religious and temporal leader who will restore justice and
religious observance
Marabout
(From Arabic) An Islamic hermit or monk-like holy man
Mehariste
(From Arabic) French term for camel mounted troops (Camel
Corps): the Spanish term is Tropas Nómadas
MINURSO
Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un referendum au
Sahara Occidental (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara)
Polisario
Polisario Front: Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia elHamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia
el-Hamra and the Rio de Oro)
Reg
(Arabic) Similar to hamada, but less steppe-like, being associated
with land that has natural run-off: in Western Sahara, reg landscapes
are closer to the coast
Regulares
Spanish colonial troops from Spanish Morocco
Sabkha
Or sebkha (Arabic): salt pans, though specific salt pan areas are
referred to as sebkhat
SADR
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic: also noted herein as
SADR/Polisario
Saguia
(Arabic) In Western Sahara: a water course or river
SPLA
Saharawi People’s Liberation Army: also noted herein as
SPLA/Polisario
UXO
Unexploded ordnance
Wadi
(Arabic) A dry water course or valley
WSP
Western Sahara Project of the University of East Anglia
Zariba
(Arabic) An enclosure made of scrub, or thorn bushes
279
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Awah, Bahia. [Saharawi poet and activist, and former SPLA soldier.] Interview in Spanish,
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Bachir, Salek Labaidi. [Saharawi journalist and activist.] Interview in English (at Rabuni,
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Billali, Dakhni Ali. [Saharawi war veteran.] Interview in Arabic, interpreter: Hamdi Touballi
(at 27th February Refugee Camp, Tindouf). 16 October 2011.
Brahim, Lamat. [Saharawi Bedouin resettled in the Tifariti area.] Interview in Arabic,
interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 31 October 2011.
Breica, Habua. [Head of the 1st Artillery Regiment, SPLA, 2nd (Tifariti) Military Region.]
Interview in Arabic, interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at 27th February Refugee Camp, Tindouf).
13 October 2011.
Breica, Habua. [Head of the 1st Artillery Regiment, SPLA, 2nd (Tifariti) Military Region.]
Interview in Arabic, interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 2 November 2011.
Deya, Muhammed. [Mayor of Tifariti, and former SPLA soldier.] Interview in Arabic,
interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 27 October 2011.
Fadel, Muhammed. [Long term SPLA soldier, Chief of Reconnaissance in the Tifariti Military
Region.] Interview in Arabic, interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 30 October 2011.
Guzman, Federico. [Participating artist with ARTifariti since 2008.] Interview in English (at
Smara Refugee Camp, Tindouf). 18 October 2011.
Larkhal, Malainin. [High profile Saharawi journalist and activist.] Interview in English (at
Tifariti). 2 November 2011.
Peraita, Fernando. [Artist and founder of ARTifariti.] Interview in English (at 27th February
Refugee Camp, Tindouf). 17 October 2011.
Salama J’dud, Sidi Brahim. [Poet and Saharawi war veteran.] Interview in Arabic, interpreter:
Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 23 October 2011.
Salma, Kalthoum. [Saharawi Bedouin resettled in the Tifariti area.] Interview in Arabic,
interpreter: Malainin Larkhal (at Tifariti). 31 October 2011.
Touballi, Hamdi. [Saharawi journalist and activist.] Interview in English (at 27th February
Refugee Camp, Tindouf). 15 October 2011.
298
An Archaeology of Colonialism, Conflict, and Exclusion:
Conflict Landscapes of Western Sahara
In Two Volumes:
Volume Two
Appendices and Figures
Salvatore Garfi
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
University of East Anglia
School of Art History and World Art Studies
August 2014
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone
who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with
the author and that use of any information derived there from must be
in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any
quotation or extract must include full attribution.
Appendix 1:
The Tifariti History Plaque
The Tifariti History Plaque is located in Tifariti, in the dining room of the Polisario
accommodation facility for visitors to the settlement.
2
This framed board (shown above), measuring around one metre high by three quarter
metre wide, and made of plywood with a plastic laminate surface, lists a number of
key events in the history of Tifariti. These range in date from 1912 to 2005.
As can be seen in the photograph (taken in 2011), the inscription is hand written in
Arabic, with dates in European Arabic numerals. There is more than one hand, and
events have been added to it over time: presumably by people associated with the
SADR or SPLA in Tifariti, and/or the Tifariti Mayor’s office. In this research,
therefore, this board is treated as a document representing ‘local knowledge’. There is
an outline of Western Sahara in the bottom two thirds of the plaque, and there are pale
hand impressions that underlie the writing. Dr. Alexander Wasse has kindly translated
the text, from the Arabic to English. It reads:
Water has been important and valued in all parts of the world throughout history.
Most civilisations were established and developed around water sources, especially in
the desert where water is equivalent to oxygen.
Before the well (BIR) was dug, there was water in a natural fissure [a spring] 1912.
The first well (HAASI) of Tifariti was dug in 1951-1952.
The initial construction of government and community facilities 17.5.1968.
Following the Tripartite Agreement and start of the Moroccan invasion of the nation,
the community was subjected to air bombardment by the Royal (Moroccan) Armed
Forces, targeting defenceless civilians, including women, children and the elderly
January 1976.
The community was occupied by Moroccan forces 1977-8.
It was liberated by fighters of the Saharawi People’s Liberation Army 3.79.
During ceasefire negotiations and before the arrival of foreign peace-keeping forces,
it was reoccupied [by Polisario/SADR] and what remained of the community facilities
3
were destroyed at the end of August 1991. During these hostilities, two aircraft of the
Royal Moroccan Air Force were shot down.
The first was a Mirage and its pilot, with the rank of Captain, was captured on 4.8.91
The second was a F5E and its pilot, with the rank of Lieutenant, was captured on
26.8.91.
The eleventh conference of the Popular Front [Polisario] was held on 12 to 19
October 2003.
The first telephone and internet office was erected 18.5.05.
The well (BIR) was dug deeper in 8.1991.
A pump was fitted to the well (BIR) on 8.05.1998.
Construction of the school 4.1999.
Construction of the hospital 10.4.1999.
The regional museum was established 06.1999.
The farm was equipped with machinery.
Commencement of the ‘Solidarity’ district [housing] development 21.05.2005.
Placement of the foundation stone of the [Tifariti] Saharawi National Council
headquarters 21.05.05.
4
Appendix 2:
Summary gazetteer of berm installations located within (or near) the ‘snapshot’
sampling rectangles described in Chapter 4
There is a single table for each of the Moroccan berms – from No. 1 to No. 6. The
fields include the ‘Name’, being the number applied to each installation during the
digitisation process; the ‘Type’ of installation, as described in Fig. 4.5; the ‘Shape’, or
generalised, descriptive morphological category (see Chapter 4, Part 2); the ‘Terrain’,
or lie of the land; ‘FB Guns’, indicating the presence and number of artillery in fire
support bases (firebases), as either ‘pits’ (gun pits) or ‘slots’ (vehicular slots that could
house self-propelled artillery and/or tanks); the ‘Area’ of each installation (in square
metres); ‘Rect’, or the sampling rectangle in which each installation is located (when
an installation is just outside a rectangle, then its position is additionally noted with
the indication of a cardinal point). The last two fields are for decimal longitude
(‘Lon’) and latitude (‘Lat’). When some data has not been noted during the
digitisation process, this is indicated by ‘n/n’, for ‘not noted’.
Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
Low relief
45991
215
-14.29331 26.05893
Polygonal
Flat desert
41296
215
-14.20124 26.12223
comp
Polygonal
Flat desert
5373
215
-14.11954 26.16177
31
comp
Polygonal
Flat desert
2861
182
-14.11936
256
comp
Polygonal
Dissected
1858
157
-11.71488 26.54882
257
comp
Polygonal
Dissected
2207
157
-11.71543 26.54791
124
comp?
Complex
Flat desert
10861
221
-12.77264 26.13621
377
comp?
Polygonal
Dissected
9677
157
-11.64347 26.58682
8
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
4968
215
-14.3331
10
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
3993
215
-14.30327 26.04328
15
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
2904
215
-14.27232 26.06934
17
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
4934
215
-14.24099 26.08431
21
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
3731
215
-14.21316
25
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
3017
215
-14.18465 26.13885
28
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
2455
215
-14.15216 26.15149
128
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
7978
221
-12.71291 26.16424
130
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
6842
187
-12.69757
131
flt
Irregular
Flat desert
1229
187
-12.70167 26.21793
NAME
TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
14
comp
Polygonal
23
comp
30
5
LON
LAT
26.1636
26.01102
26.1067
26.1936
Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
Low relief
8369
157
-11.77374 26.56121
Irregular
Low relief
4901
157
-11.77403 26.53408
flt
Polygonal
Low relief
3572
124
-11.5635
26.84264
388
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
5938
248
-14.481
25.88408
389
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
7401
248
-14.46393 25.88574
393
flt
Polygonal
Flat desert
6026
248
-14.40706
19
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
3 pits
38811
215
-14.22477 26.09598
121
fsb
Circular
Flat desert
4 pits
137091
221
-12.83013 26.15034
134
fsb
Complex
Low relief
5 pits
208701
187
-12.67399 26.27722
237
fsb
Complex
Dissected
11 pits
32305
157
-11.84645 26.54688
239
fsb
Complex
Dissected
6 pits; 3 slots
63275
157
-11.81566 26.55834
241
fsb
Polygonal
Dissected
1 pit; 9 slots
90146
157
-11.72231 26.63239
254
fsb
No perimeter Dissected 5 pits; multiple slots 341137
157
-11.71962 26.57289
266
fsb
Irregular
Dissected
13 slots
79485
157
-11.64012 26.57437
270
fsb
Circular
Dissected
1 pit; 5 slots
95174
157
-11.61101 26.63872
271
fsb
Irregular
Dissected
4 pits
1113383
124
-11.54899
26.7111
375
fsb
Polygonal
Dissected 7 pits; multiple slots 220241
157
-11.65581
26.5989
387
fsb
Polygonal
Flat desert
3 pits
30725
248
-14.50791 25.88343
392
fsb
Irregular
Flat desert
5 pits
91701
248
-14.43629 25.88959
24
fsb?
Irregular
Flat desert
59498
215
-14.20312
9
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
93355
215
-14.32178 26.02247
18
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
25496
215
-14.22364 26.09484
22
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
32170
215
-14.19977 26.12105
29
ft
Irregular
Crest top
37992
215
-14.11765
122
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
14659
221
-12.80712 26.14204
123
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
46912
221
-12.77288 26.13432
129
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
93556
187
-12.69629 26.17937
135
ft
Circular
Low relief
66114
187
-12.65624 26.25802
136
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
111313
187
-12.62361 26.27139
138
ft
Complex
Low relief
318871
187
-12.60957 26.29882
145
ft
Complex
Low relief
34001
187; E -12.53162 26.38712
163
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
75608
187; E -12.55907 26.42548
150
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
14433
221
-12.8289
238
ft
Irregular
Dissected
39727
157
-11.83602 26.53806
240
ft
Irregular
Dissected
322755
157
-11.8034
26.54625
242
ft
Irregular
Dissected
146552
157
-11.7788
26.5531
244
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
250316
157
-11.75599 26.58405
245
ft
Circular
Low relief
16440
157
-11.73838
246
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
56171
157
-11.72447 26.60901
247
ft
Irregular
Dissected
99368
157
-11.71475 26.61621
NAME
TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
243
flt
Polygonal
248
flt
291
6
LON
LAT
25.9152
26.1236
26.1618
26.14659
26.5979
Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
Low relief
124658
157
-11.76774 26.53578
Irregular
Low relief
27193
157
-11.7339
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
66069
157
-11.72612 26.54078
255
ft
Circular
Low relief
24581
157
-11.71528 26.53749
260
ft
Irregular
Dissected
35572
157
-11.69124 26.53761
262
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
10931
157
-11.6778
263
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
47502
157
-11.67228 26.54936
265
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
19905
157
-11.65534 26.55325
267
ft
Irregular
Dissected
152341
157
-11.6413
268
ft
Irregular
Dissected
103812
157
-11.61411 26.57199
278
ft
Irregular
Dissected
156406
124
-11.54177 26.67401
279
ft
Irregular
Dissected
50377
124
-11.53099 26.68495
280
ft
Irregular
Dissected
98079
124
-11.51124 26.69484
281
ft
Irregular
Dissected
79321
124
-11.5012
283
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
20010
124
-11.50114 26.73623
284
ft
Irregular
Dissected
168727
124
-11.49836 26.74352
285
ft
Irregular
Dissected
32939
124
-11.50669 26.75854
286
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
59103
124
-11.51696 26.77134
287
ft
Irregular
Dissected
304428
124
-11.52035 26.78652
288
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
47101
124
-11.52537 26.80126
289
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
41482
124
-11.54044 26.81347
290
ft
Irregular
Dissected
205581
124
-11.55191 26.83417
292
ft
Circular
Low relief
17361
124
-11.58367 26.85007
293
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
271217
124
-11.59792 26.85381
385
ft
Polygonal
Coastal
44158
248
-14.54294 25.87516
386
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
45921
248
-14.50905 25.88054
391
ft
Polygonal
Flat desert
36361
248
-14.43706
133
ftfb
Complex
Low relief
4 pits; 5 slots
311703
187
-12.68915 26.23992
16
ftfba
Polygonal
Flat desert
4 pits
60339
215
-14.25848 26.07632
26
ftfba
Polygonal
Flat desert
5? pits
39749
215
-14.16697 26.14528
120
ftfba
Complex
Flat desert
4 pits; 5 slots
132430
221
-12.85141
127
ftfba
Complex
Flat desert
3 pits
175840
221
-12.72212 26.14892
13
ftfba?
Complex
Flat desert
n/n
94816
215
-14.29301
125
lz
Polygonal
Flat desert
2082
221
-12.77376 26.14025
126
lz
Polygonal
Flat desert
2131
221
-12.82634 26.15094
258
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
3776
157
-11.69483 26.54395
264
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
3645
157
-11.65754 26.55501
376
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
4383
157
-11.66053 26.58289
378
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
4867
124
-11.52781 26.71259
27
lz?
Polygonal
Flat desert
10018
215
-14.16871 26.14768
NAME
TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
249
ft
Irregular
250
ft
253
7
LON
LAT
26.54222
26.54517
26.56025
26.72746
25.8861
26.1494
26.0556
Table: Berm No. 1 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
Flat desert
2436
215
-14.22601 26.09751
Polygonal
Low relief
9673
157
-11.73067 26.54163
mcomp
Polygonal
Low relief
5795
157
-11.72881 26.54115
390
mcomp?
Polygonal
Flat desert
5986
248
-14.45372 25.88626
132
pcomp
Irregular
Flat desert
14176
187
-12.69856 26.22535
137
pcomp
Polygonal
Flat desert
8047
187
-12.61589 26.28423
151
pcomp
Polygonal
Flat desert
3595
187
-12.61924 26.27724
20
rft
Circular
Low relief
13622
215
-14.22883 26.09562
236
rft
Polygonal
Dissected
27465
157
-11.85088 26.53959
259
rft
Polygonal
Dissected
3689
157
-11.69223 26.54813
261
rft
Polygonal
Dissected
3547
157
-11.69231
26.5392
282
rft
Irregular
Dissected
115184
124
-11.5053
26.7306
NAME
TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
148
lz?
Polygonal
251
mcomp
252
LON
LAT
Table: Berm No. 2 – Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME
TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
400
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
4 pits
129172
LR; 221
-12.62743
26.10525
610
fsb
Irregular
Dissected
4 pits
52441
LR; 124
-11.39751
26.87576
397
ft
Polygonal Flat desert
65140
LR; 221
-12.67239
26.11697
398
ft
Polygonal Flat desert
12777
LR; 221
-12.64552
26.11266
399
ft
Irregular
Low relief
150479
LR; 221
-12.63256
26.10285
401
ft
Circular
Low relief
55141
LR; 221
-12.6146
26.09155
402
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
139327
LR; 221
-12.60319
26.07159
608
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
45041
LR; 124
-11.35243
26.81285
609
ft
Irregular
Dissected
119188
LR; 124
-11.35979
26.83995
611
ft
Irregular
Dissected
29290
LR; 124
-11.36102
26.8615
612
ft
Irregular
Dissected
189847
LR; 124
-11.36872
26.87943
613
ft
Irregular
Dissected
197860
LR; 124
-11.3846
26.90089
pcomp? Polygonal Flat desert
27311
HR; 221
-12.69326
26.13432
396
606
rft
Circular
Dissected
18460
LR; 124
-11.36663
26.79427
586
rft?
Complex
Low relief
150261
LR; 124
-11.38836
26.67545
Table: Berm No. 3 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
4,464
126
-10.98637 26.91582
92
-11.02469 26.94995
679
flt
Polygonal
Escarpment
675
fsb
Circular
Dissected
682
fsb
No perimeter
Dissected
3 pits
36,693
92
-10.96404 26.92815
683
fsb
Polygonal
Dissected
multiple slots
154,926
92
-10.94358 26.96133
684
fsb
Circular
Dissected
4 pits
46,253
92
-10.9385
697
fsb
Circular
Dissected
9 pits; multiple slots 250,782
92
-10.91797 26.97574
3 pits; multiple slots 182,645
8
26.92773
Table: Berm No. 3 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
703
fsb
Circular
Dissected
4 slots
47,596
92
-10.89334 27.04147
704
fsb
No perimeter
Dissected
1 pit; 6 slots
35,627
92
-10.91361 26.99591
711
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
2 pits?; 4 slots?
12,802
92
-10.84423 27.08017
712
fsb
Irregular
Dissected
5 pits?; multiple slots 278,298
92
-10.85368 27.09428
778
fsb
Complex
Low relief
44,476
62
-9.96653
674
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
98,645
126
-11.03178 26.90965
677
ft
Polygonal
Escarpment
37,043
126
-10.99195 26.91134
681
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
62,564
126
-10.9704
685
ft
Polygonal
Escarpment
22,826
126
-10.93892 26.91665
687
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
60,089
92
-10.91892 26.92149
689
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
28,744
92
-10.91445 26.93011
695
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
22,974
92
-10.9071
698
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
47,273
92
-10.89788 26.98111
700
ft
Irregular
Crest top
41,197
92
-10.89349 27.00669
702
ft
Irregular
Dissected
51,242
92
-10.89277 27.02869
705
ft
Polygonal
Dissected
86,417
92
-10.86639 27.05235
710
ft
Irregular
Crest top
35,790
92
-10.83834 27.07012
775
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
86,707
62
-10.01125 27.36055
776
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
107,474
62
-9.99509
27.38041
777
ft
Circular
Low relief
39,651
62
-9.97857
27.38894
779
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
103,927
62
-9.95615
27.40503
780
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
58,679
28
-9.93468
27.4274
781
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
104,054
28
-9.9214
27.441
784
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
13,110
28
-9.905
27.45694
694
ftfb
Complex
Dissected
54,137
92
-10.90931 26.94909
676
gar
No perimeter
Dissected
92
-10.99215 26.94798
692
gar
No perimeter
Dissected
92
-10.91516 26.95969
699
gar
No perimeter
Dissected
92
-10.90445 26.99891
678
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
3,968
126
-10.99345 26.91275
680
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
4,686
92
-10.97192 26.92278
686
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
3,327
92
-10.93726 26.91915
688
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
6,497
92
-10.91927 26.92343
693
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
5,728
92
-10.91216 26.95443
701
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
11,692
92
-10.8985
27.01956
690
pcomp
Polygonal
Escarpment
7,182
92
-10.9123
26.93765
691
pcomp
Polygonal
Escarpment
4,320
92
-10.91083 26.94354
696
pcomp
Circular
Dissected
19,835
92
-10.90377 26.96903
706
rft
Complex
Low relief
97,070
92
-10.88948 27.07991
707
rft
Circular
Low relief
15,339
92
-10.89243 27.08337
708
rft
Irregular
Low relief
9,260
92
-10.89609 27.08244
709
rft
Polygonal
Low relief
15,440
92
-10.89337 27.07855
4 pits
4 pits
9
27.41491
26.91615
26.96206
Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
855
comp
Polygonal
Escarpment
9,656
126
-10.8716
26.91672
1093
flt
Circular
Escarpment
1,308
100
-9.04033
27.00996
1252
flt
Circular
Flat desert
7,250
952
-8.84457
28.03263
1262
flt
Circular
Flat desert
4,285
952
-8.83152
28.05885
1264
flt
Circular
Flat desert
3,028
952
-8.82256
28.07612
1268
flt
Circular
Flat desert
5,895
952
-8.80913
28.14449
1270
flt
Circular
Low relief
2,812
952
-8.80335
28.16802
1272
flt
Circular
Low relief
9,004
952
-8.78603
28.20481
1273
flt
Circular
Low relief
4,354
952
-8.79176
28.21899
1275
flt
Circular
Low relief
3,000
952
-8.79749
28.23616
2078
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2094
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2099
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2101
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2122
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2123
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2124
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2125
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2128
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2129
flt
n/n
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
1084
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
5 pits; 4 slots
27,863
100
-9.0711
27.02284
1091
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
8 slots
11,440
100
-9.02585
27.02123
1108
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
3 pits
33,416
100
-8.87518
27.02659
1249
fsb
Circular
Flat desert
3 pits; 5 slots
112,286
952
-8.86695
28.01647
1255
fsb
Complex
Flat desert
4 pits
70,008
952
-8.86947
28.10058
1257
fsb
Irregular
Flat desert
5 pits
67,737
952
-8.84991
28.09075
1261
fsb
Polygonal
Flat desert
4 pits
81,118
952
-8.86044
28.06733
1281
fsb
Circular
Low relief
5 pits
34,946
952
-8.82234
28.23105
1282
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
3 pits
77,288
952
-8.86085
28.21948
847
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
69,831
92
-10.91036
26.92082
851
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
18,840
92
-10.89128
26.91702
853
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
43,046
126
-10.87061
26.91268
1080
ft
Irregular
Dissected
14,110
100
-9.08115
26.99912
1081
ft
Irregular
Dissected
23,007
100
-9.08039
27.00814
1089
ft
Polygonal
Escarpment
20,315
100
-9.05137
27.01232
1094
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
33,998
100
-9.02839
27.00702
1095
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
12,976
100
-9.00241
27.00922
1099
ft
Polygonal
Escarpment
41,332
100
-8.97863
27.00884
1102
ft
Irregular
Dissected; wadi
16,351
100
-8.95085
27.00925
1104
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
68,758
100
-8.92663
27.0063
10
Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1106
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
17,097
100
-8.89713
26.99952
1107
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
41,730
100
-8.86691
27.00065
1250
ft
Circular
Flat desert
45,964
952
-8.83421
28.00052
1251
ft
Circular
Flat desert
95,189
952
-8.84761
28.02158
1253
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
351,653
952
-8.83848
28.04382
1263
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
53,916
952
-8.82575
28.06828
1265
ft
Circular
Flat desert
88,446
952
-8.81864
28.08587
1266
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
97,995
952
-8.81051
28.11505
1267
ft
Circular
Flat desert
102,844
952
-8.81402
28.13427
1269
ft
Irregular
Low relief
24,365
952
-8.80161
28.159
1274
ft
Complex
Low relief
50,789
952
-8.79559
28.22865
1271
ftfba
Complex
Low relief
79,689
952
-8.80587
28.17908
1105
gar
No perimeter
Low relief
100
-8.93226
27.02774
1111
gar
Circular
Low relief
100
-8.88588
27.04073
1112
gar
No perimeter
Low relief
100
-8.94308
27.08674
1260
gar
Polygonal
Flat desert
952
-8.86925
28.07467
1085
gar?
No perimeter
Low relief
100
-9.08123
27.02401
1086
gar?
No perimeter
Low relief
100
-9.06983
27.02037
1113
gar?
Complex
Low relief
100
-8.90467
27.07712
1115
gar?
No perimeter
Low relief
100
-8.92198
27.07506
848
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
3,349
92
-10.91032
26.92212
852
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
3,328
92
-10.89149
26.91884
854
lz
Polygonal
Escarpment
3,037
126
-10.87209
26.91488
1083
lz
Polygonal
Dissected
5,922
100
-9.08191
27.01155
1109
lz
Polygonal
Low relief
4,171
100
-8.87673
27.02623
1114
lz
Polygonal
Low relief
8,734
100
-8.92685
27.07573
849
rft
Circular
Dissected
306,675
92
-10.88655
26.93779
850
rft
Irregular
Dissected
151,611
92
-10.87548
26.95075
1110
rft
Complex
Low relief
71,998
100
-8.89053
27.02675
1254
rft
Circular
Flat desert
141,926
952
-8.90596
28.10529
1256
rft
Circular
Flat desert
248,604
952
-8.87155
28.09192
1258
rft
Circular
Flat desert
4,942
952
-8.88548
28.08002
1259
rft
Complex
Flat desert
77,577
952
-8.8759
28.07346
1280
rft
Polygonal
Low relief
65,781
952
-8.8391
28.23359
2068
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2069
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2070
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2071
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2072
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2073
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2074
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
Multiple slots
256,693
74,621
36,675
11
Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
2075
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2076
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2077
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2079
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2080
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2081
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2082
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2083
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2084
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2085
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2086
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2087
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2088
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2089
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2090
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2091
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2092
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2093
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2095
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2096
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2097
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2098
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2100
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2102
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2103
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2104
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2105
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2106
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2107
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2108
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2109
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2110
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2111
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2112
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2113
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2114
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2115
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2116
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2117
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2118
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2119
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
12
Table: Berm No. 4 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
2120
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2121
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2126
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2127
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
2130
sop
Circular
n/n
n/n
952
n/n
n/n
Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1414
flt
Circular
Flat desert
5,979
520 E
-14.34552
23.84089
1416
flt
Circular
Flat desert
9,300
520 E
-14.30974
23.85328
1471
flt
Circular
Low relief
3,191
491
-13.3372
23.94377
1472
flt
Circular
Low relief
1,978
491
-13.3281
23.9437
1473
flt
Circular
Low relief
2,555
491
-13.31355
23.95097
1482
flt
Irregular
Hill top
3,622
491
-13.24629
23.96734
1485
flt
Polygonal
Low relief
7,069
491
-13.1955
23.97604
1486
flt
Polygonal
Low relief
7,187
491
-13.18334
23.9813
1584
flt
Irregular
Hill slope
3,684
359
-12.32561
24.98408
1586
flt
Polygonal
Pediment
9,678
359
-12.26882
24.98786
1593
flt
Polygonal
Pediment
5,324
359
-12.24881
25.04387
1596
flt
Irregular
Hill slope
2,197
359
-12.3272
24.98516
1481
flt?
Polygonal
Dissected
2,413
491
-13.2562
24.02348
1318
fsb
Irregular
Low relief
3 pits; 1 slot
30,050
583
-15.84045
23.27661
1327
fsb
Circular
Low relief
4 pits
26,876
583
-15.65438
23.35037
1385
fsb
Circular
Flat desert
4 pits
84,917
553
-14.71523
23.65004
1386
fsb
Circular
Flat desert
4 pits?
62,891
553
-14.70314
23.63989
1390
fsb
Irregular
Low relief
2 pits
11,776
553
-14.65554
23.65547
1412
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
5 pits
51,805
520 E
-14.38263
23.85222
1465
fsb
Polygonal
n/n
3 pits; 2? slots
129825
491 W -13.39568
23.94036
1470
fsb
Polygonal
n/n
3 pits
103436
491 W -13.39156
23.96637
1484
fsb
Polygonal
Low relief
5 pits?
54,765
491
-13.22533
24.00173
1488
fsb
Irregular
Pediment
4 slots
34,611
491
-13.11467
24.02134
1594
fsb
Polygonal
Pediment
3 pits
51,263
359
-12.2572
25.05312
1595
fsb
Circular
Pediment
3 pits
85,254
359
-12.26527
25.07296
1315
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
51,469
583
-15.83497
23.23885
1316
ft
Circular
Low relief
15,296
583
-15.81671
23.21952
1319
ft
Irregular
Escarpment
30,501
583
-15.79671
23.22439
1320
ft
Circular
Low relief
14,732
583
-15.78337
23.24706
1321
ft
n/n
Low relief
3,870
583
-15.7759
23.25159
1322
ft
Circular
Flat desert
27,326
583
-15.75448
23.26506
1329
ft
Circular
Flat desert
16,403
583
-15.73697
23.27708
1330
ft
Circular
Flat desert
42,409
583
-15.71003
23.29157
13
Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1332
ft
Circular
Low relief
13,811
583
-15.68265
23.29851
1333
ft
Circular
Flat desert
49,056
583
-15.65257
23.31171
1334
ft
Circular
Flat desert
19,622
583
-15.62731
23.31263
1335
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
69,109
583
-15.60954
23.31854
1381
ft
Circular
Flat desert
29,472
553
-14.76704
23.6326
1382
ft
Irregular
Flat desert
16,188
553
-14.73831
23.63049
1387
ft
Circular
Flat desert
45,646
553
-14.70854
23.63017
1388
ft
Circular
Flat desert
13,657
553
-14.68011
23.63149
1391
ft
Irregular
Low relief
122,201
553
-14.6626
23.63751
1392
ft
Irregular
Low relief
12,985
553
-14.63756
23.63479
1393
ft
Irregular
Hill top
45,570
553
-14.61798
23.61841
1409
ft
Irregular
Low relief
25,204
520 E
-14.42594
23.79216
1410
ft
Circular
Low relief
32,907
520 E
-14.41594
23.82331
1411
ft
Circular
Low relief
11,696
520 E
-14.39534
23.83296
1413
ft
Circular
Flat desert
36,314
520 E
-14.37348
23.83558
1415
ft
Irregular
Low relief
22,288
520 E
-14.33513
23.84714
1417
ft
Irregular
Hill top
43,279
520 E
-14.27746
23.86007
1463
ft
Irregular
n/n
14955
491 W -13.44257
23.89267
1464
ft
Irregular
n/n
21492
491 W -13.41367
23.89995
1466
ft
Complex
n/n
17001
491 W -13.40283
23.90934
1467
ft
Irregular
n/n
125498
491 W
-13.3938
23.92746
1468
ft
Circular
n/n
8018
491 W -13.37312
23.92855
1469
ft
Irregular
n/n
41796
491 W -13.35616
23.94064
1475
ft
Irregular
Low relief
40,536
491
-13.31986
23.94734
1476
ft
Circular
Low relief
13,120
491
-13.30323
23.96099
1477
ft
Irregular
Low relief
53,996
491
-13.276
23.96772
1483
ft
Irregular
Low relief
106,670
491
-13.21835
23.96881
1487
ft
Irregular
Pediment
99,980
491
-13.17111
23.99048
1489
ft
Circular
Low relief
15,657
491
-13.13791
24.00298
1490
ft
Complex
Low relief
217,235
491
-13.11162
24.00947
1501
ft
Polygonal
Pediment
167,467
491
-13.11244
24.10976
1585
ft
Irregular
Crest top
12,256
359
-12.31773
24.97733
1590
ft
Irregular
Hill slope
34,451
359
-12.2592
25.0195
1591
ft
Complex
Low relief
29,277
359
-12.25082
25.02617
1597
ft
Circular
Low relief
35,184
359
-12.23349
25.0602
1598
ft
Polygonal
Hill top
19,547
359
-12.19721
25.10328
1389
gar
n/n
Low relief
n/n
553
-14.68144
23.66779
1474
gar
n/n
n/n
n/n
491
-13.32594
23.9628
1480
gar
No perimeter
Dissected
n/n
491
-13.27476
24.1046
1592
gar
No perimeter
Low relief
n/n
359
-12.2591
25.04533
1317
rft
Polygonal
Low relief
10,063
583
-15.81109
23.22926
14
Table: Berm No. 5 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1323
rft
Circular
Flat desert
12,922
583
-15.71907
23.32963
1324
rft
Circular
Flat desert
35,227
583
-15.70769
23.32821
1325
rft
Polygonal
Low relief
25,161
583
-15.66734
23.35831
1326
rft
Polygonal
Low relief
14,761
583
-15.66446
23.3573
1328
rft
Circular
Flat desert
33,954
583
-15.64857
23.35843
1331
rft
Polygonal
Flat desert
9,694
583
-15.71277
23.29602
1383
rft
Circular
Flat desert
3,040
553
-14.73424
23.63412
1384
rft
Circular
Flat desert
2,228
553
-14.72348
23.64237
1478
rft
Circular
Low relief
167,287
491
-13.30018
24.04247
1479
rft
Polygonal
Dissected
29,939
491
-13.32783
23.99091
1588
rft
Irregular
Hill slope
4,494
359
-12.2752
25.00591
1589
rft
Irregular
Hill slope
1,503
359
-12.26869
25.0136
1587
sop
Irregular
Low relief
403
359
-12.26695
25.00357
Table: Berm No. 6 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1635
flt
Irregular
Low relief
4500
850
-17.02515
21.33831
1640
flt
Polygonal
Low relief
2924
850
-16.9792
21.3622
1641
flt
Irregular
Low relief
3182
850
-16.96496
21.36064
1643
flt
Circular
Low relief
2309
850
-16.93116
21.36318
1646
flt
Circular
Low relief
3064
850
-16.89326
21.36097
1679
flt
Circular
Flat desert
3666
853
-16.34059
21.36466
1680
flt
Circular
Flat desert
5308
853
-16.31973
21.35731
1682
flt
Circular
Flat desert
5336
853
-16.27585
21.34694
1683
flt
Circular
Flat desert
6603
853
-16.25038
21.34949
1686
flt
Circular
Flat desert
8275
853
-16.1878
21.34464
1904
flt
Circular
Low relief
4671
850
-16.94387
21.36295
1634
ft
Polygonal
Coastal
9509
850
-17.02845
21.34159
1636
ft
Irregular
Low relief
7939
850
-17.02207
21.33738
1637
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
2845
850
-17.01204
21.34959
1638
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
3458
850
-17.0024
21.35887
1639
ft
Circular
Low relief
6542
850
-16.99186
21.36363
1642
ft
Irregular
Low relief
5401
850
-16.9592
21.36227
1644
ft
Circular
Low relief
9286
850
-16.91408
21.36162
1647
ft
Polygonal
Low relief
3274
850
-16.88841
21.36247
1648
ft
Complex
Low relief
7554
850
-16.87057
21.36327
1681
ft
Circular
Flat desert
12489
853
-16.29495
21.3508
1684
ft
Circular
Flat desert
13251
853
-16.23047
21.35053
1685
ft
Circular
Flat desert
4152
853
-16.20346
21.34856
1687
ft
Circular
Flat desert
15094
853
-16.16153
21.34973
15
Table: Berm No. 6 - Summary data of installations located in sampled rectangles
NAME TYPE
SHAPE
TERRAIN
FB GUNS
AREA
RECT
LON
LAT
1688
ft
Circular
Flat desert
8172
853
-16.13915
21.35125
1689
ft
Circular
Flat desert
8356
853
-16.11997
21.34877
1691
ft
Circular
Flat desert
16465
854
-16.1012
21.34638
1693
ft
Circular
Flat desert
7673
854
-16.08363
21.34356
1694
ft
Circular
Flat desert
7572
854
-16.06439
21.34358
1695
ft
Circular
Flat desert
20676
854
-16.04465
21.34611
1696
ft
Circular
Flat desert
9311
854
-16.02176
21.34378
1697
ft
Circular
Flat desert
10773
854
-16.00362
21.34131
1698
ft
Circular
Flat desert
22652
854
-15.97727
21.33891
1699
ft
n/n
n/n
10159
854
-15.95333
21.34113
1700
ft
Circular
Flat desert
8137
854
-15.93621
21.3424
1701
ft
Circular
Flat desert
15745
854
-15.90493
21.33495
1702
ft
Circular
Flat desert
11394
854
-15.87711
21.33216
1692
gar
n/n
853; N
-16.10452
21.43097
1674
rft
119763 853; N
-16.11091
21.43707
No perimeter Flat desert
Polygonal
Flat desert
16
Appendix 3:
Gazetteer of ARTifariti out-of-door artworks recorded in 2011
The following are brief citations on the different ARTifariti artworks recorded in
2011. They include an alphanumeric descriptor for each artwork, or group of
artworks; the location of each piece, in decimal degrees (north and west); the title of
each, or most, artworks, followed by their creator; The ARTifariti season in which
each piece was created; brief, descriptive notes (though, where an artwork has been
discussed fully in Chapter 7, a reference is made to that chapter instead of providing
an abridged description); and finally, a referral to the appropriate ARTifariti catalogue
with page references (except in those instances where reference is made to Chapter 7).
AR1
26.15960 N / 10.56304 W
Flor en el Desierto or Flower in the Desert (Panémona) by Roberto Pajares (with
Cruz Echagoyen)
ARTifariti 2009
Constructed in 2009, this installation is an all-metal sculpture made up of vertical rods
supporting a ring of cut out, and open, metal oil drums suspended at the very top of
the piece. The installation stands around 8.5 m high, and it is supported at its base by
three arcing metal braces of differing heights. They cover a base area of around 5 m x
5 m x 5 m. According to the artist, this ‘wind-mill’ sculpture was supposed to be a
practical installation, able to rotate and extract water from a well for the garden
nearby. Looking at it in 2011, however, it seemed to have never been put to practical
use.
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 26-27 & 89.
AR2
26.15934 N / 10.56230 W
Mujer Saharaui or Saharawi Woman by Rosamar Corcuera
ARTifariti 2008
This sculpture of a Saharawi woman, is apparently made of thick cloth, wound and
draped over an armitage of wood and wires, and standing approximately 1.6 m high.
17
Unfortunately, it has lost its head and some of its sculpted mud (possibly mixed with
cement) render. The piece includes inlaid, coloured, broken glass; and a base of the
same, with quartz fragments and decorative roundels that look as if they are glazed.
The piece stands on a circular, mud brick and cement plinth close to the model farm at
Tifariti. On the wall of the garden, in Spanish, and on the rear of the sculpture, in
Arabic, the artist has inscribed a fragment of a poem written by her father, Arturo:
I write peace when the sun shows up,
I travel around lands and sands of life
Sowing a dove in each furrow.
Ref: ARTifariti 2008: 66-67 & 120
AR3
26.15946 N / 10.55992 W
No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards by Bessaï Zineddine
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR3a
26.15946 N / 10.55989 W
El Grupo or The Group by Lalidji Walid
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR4
26.15946 N / 10.55989 W
Portrait of Nayem El Garhi by Federico Guzman
ARTifariti 2010
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR5 & AR6
26.15946 N / 10.55992 W
Untitled: fragmentary designs and stone alignments, by members of the 2008 Algerian
delegation of artists. These appear to be ad hoc artworks.
18
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7.
AR7
26.16053 N / 10.56020 W
Al Paso de la Puerta or At [the] Door Step by Nabila Kalache
ARTifariti 2009
This is a low level, rectilinear alignment of stones painted white, representing the
outline (or foundations) of a house and its rooms. The outlines are a single stone
thickness, and height, and they cover an area around 6.3 m x 7 m.
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 67 & 93.
AR8
26.15943 N / 10.56033 W
Víctimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims by Karim Sergoua
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR8a
26.15943 N / 10.56033 W
Ficción o Realidad or Fiction or Reality by Kenza Mebarak
ARTifariti 2009
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR9
26.16007 N / 10.55795
Unattributed, spray can painted patterns in red and green, with some black and white,
on a low level rocky outcrop behind the infirmary in Tifariti. They extend for
approximately 5 metres. These appear to be ad hoc designs. The outcrop is probably
no higher than 1.7 m.
No ARTifariti reference.
19
AR10
26.15918 N / 10.55782 W
El Muro de la Vergüenza or The Wall of Shame by Federico Guzman
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR11
26.15872 N / 10.55766 W
Viajando al Paraíso or Travelling Paradise by Maria Ortega Estepa
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR12
26.15857 N / 10.55708 W
El Tikit de la Baraka or The Tikit of Baraka by Federico Guzman
ARTifariti 2009
This artwork is essentially a circular hut-like installation made up of steel reinforcing
rods arcing inwards, and joining up to create a dome. The rods are welded together
and the top of the dome is covered with palm fronds. Helping to support the dome is a
central upright metal rod set in mud bricks, and radiating rods at the base.
The artist was inspired by the traditional Mauritanian hut, known as a tikit,
representing a shelter that gives both light and shade. The artist placed within the
structure, items which he made out of the waste of war. For instance, there is a teapot
with a soldier’s helmet for a lid, and with a spout made from a motor vehicle exhaust.
Accompanying tea cups are made from car/truck oil filters and placed within a panel
(perhaps from a truck) representing a tray. The piece looked forlorn in 2011, and it
was surrounded by wire fencing material, presumably to protect it.
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: 22-23 & 89
AR13
26.15811 N / 10.55573 W
Caballo de Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse by Rolando de la Rosa
(with Susana Cato)
20
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
Additional: In 2011, however, with the sculpture (AR13) already moved to the berm
north of Tifariti, all that could be recorded was its base. This consisted of an
approximately 10 m wide circle of stones with a centrally placed plinth of large stone
slabs and rubble, on which the ‘Trojan Horse’ was originally placed, facing east. The
remains of the ring consisted, in places, of alternating cobble sized, red and black
stones, interspersed with small boulders. There was also, for about two thirds of its
inner circumference, a narrow spread of quartz fragments. The ring was no more than
a single stone or small boulder in height and about 25 cm thick. Four small, free
standing boulders were placed within the ring, while along its easternmost arc there
were five short orthostats. On these were painted, either in red or blue the names of
four of the refugee camps at Tindouf: Ausserd, Ayoun, Dakhla and 27th of February.
The words, ‘faith’ and ‘resistance’ were also painted onto two of the stones. These
were in Arabic, but translated for me by the Saharawi accompanying me at the time.
AR14
26.15747 N / 10.55524 W
Tear Down the Wall by Alexis Amador.
ARTifariti 2010
This artwork fell down sometime within a year after its creation. It was a single
thickness, breeze block wall, with a jagged opening in it. It was painted to look like
the wall from the Pink Floyd animated film, ‘The Wall’. To the artist, this installation
was an effigy of the Moroccan berm, which was, in his words, a ‘…wall that is not
seen, that no one wants to see, which is not allowed to be seen, and that we must see.’
Ref: ARTifariti 2010: 100-101 & 155
AR15
26.16124 N / 10.55678 W
Unattributed ‘daubings’ of white paint on a boulder outcrop, about 18 m long and with
Moroccan army shelters built up against it. The paint was relatively bright in 2011, so
21
the boulders were probably painted in the 2010 ARTifariti festival. They have been
recorded since they represent a kind of land art, as does AR9.
ARTifariti ?
AR16
26.15765 N / 10.55562 W
A Standing Stone re-erected on a concrete plinth at the eastern entrance to Tifariti.
This has not been raised as an ARTifariti artwork, therefore, it has probably been put
in place by the Tifariti Town Council. Nevertheless, it has been included here as a
piece of ‘public art’. It is a tall, slender orthostat, approximately 3.5 m tall (not
including the 0.8 m height of its plinth). It is broken nearly in half, and it has been
repaired with metal plates held in place with bolts, and with reinforcing rods welded
together. It is of apparent antiquity, but its provenance is not known.
AR17
26.15983 N / 10.55607 W
Diario Enterrado: 27th de Febrero or Buried Journal: February 27th by Miluca Sanz
This installation is a placard, in essence, a sign. It is a montage of metal panels, and
items, with February 27th cut out of it (and also written in Arabic). The piece is up to 4
m high, but the panel, on supports, is up to 3 m high x 1.8 m wide. The artist wanted
to celebrate the date of the founding of the SADR, on the 27th of February, by
embedding it in the ground. By making a link between the very land of Western
Sahara and the proclamation of the Saharawi Republic.
Ref: ARTifariti 2010: 80-81 & 160.
AR18
26.15994 N / 10.55497 W
U’m Dreiga or Oum Dreiga by Mohamed Moulud Yeslam
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR19
26.15896 N / 10.55656 W
22
This is a generic designation for a number of freestanding, and mural artworks
(including AR20) by a number of different artists, that are disposed out-of-doors
within the building compound which was the base for ARTifariti in 2007-2010, and
where the Tifariti Museum is located. Within the context of this research, they are not
pieces of land art (nor have they been seen as art on the land), but they were briefly
noted and photographed in 2011. Amongst them were, upright, single plane,
geometric constructions of wood shaped as either rectangles or triangles. There was a
mechanical man-like construction made out of war detritus, and very similar to the
artworks created by Mozambique artists through the ‘Transforming Arms into Tools’
project. There was also a small tee-pee with an associated, well made, wire outline of
a man and a camel.
Ref: ARTifariti 2009 and ARTifariti 2010.
AR20
26.15905 N / 10.55715 W
Egoismo or Selfisness by Djamel Agagnia
This mural is part of AR19, but it was noted separately in 2011. It is located at the end
of the south colonnade of the building complex in which ARTifariti was based. The
piece fills an arched niche, around 2.5 m high x 1.5 m wide. This is a compelling
painting in which it shows Saharawis, with blacked out eyes, situated behind a barbed
wire fence, staring out. The fence extends outwards, along the walls on either side of
the niche in which the piece has been painted, and along it there are splatters of red
paint representing blood. There was also similar red paint on the floor surface in front
of the piece. There is a townscape behind the figures looking through and over the
fence, and the sky is painted black. Lines of verse, by the Tunisian Poet Abulkasim
Ashafi, were inscribed across the black sky:
If one day the people aspire to life
the dark night will disappear
and the chains will inevitably be broken
ARTifariti 2010: 157)
Ref: ARTifariti 2009: pp. 62-63 & 93
23
(as quoted by Bahia Awah in
AR21
26.16136 N / 10.56543 W to 26.16261 N / 10.56731 W
Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return by all of the ARTifariti participants in 2007
and 2008.
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR22
26.16038 N / 10.56583 W
Breakfast at Tifariti by Fernando Pinteño
ARTifariti 2007
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR23
26.15950 N / 10.55998 W
This is a group of artworks, all painted on the walls and collapsed sections of the old
Spanish fort at Tifariti. Their individual descriptors are AR23, AR23a, AR23b, Ar23c
and AR23d.
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where all these artworks are fully discussed.
AR24
26.16355 N / 10.56732 W
Proyecto de Eliminacón - 2 or Removal Project - 2, by Carlos de Gredos
ARTifariti 2007
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
AR25
26.15366 N / 10.56166 W
La sombra del gnomon or The shadow of the gnomon by Guillermo Roiz
ARTifariti 2008
See Chapter 7 where this artwork is fully discussed.
24
Figures:
Accompanying text of Vol. 1
Fig. 3.1: General map of Western Sahara.
25
Fig. 3.2: Extent of traditional tribal ranges in Western (Spanish) Sahara in the third
quarter of the 20th century. Image source: map from Damis 1983, p. 7, with additions
from Mercer 1976, p. 128.
26
Fig. 3.3: The position of Villa Cisneros on the Dakhla peninsular along the inlet
(Bahia) of Rio de Oro. The line of defensive blockhouses north of Villa Cisneros is
also shown, circled in red. Image source: portion of 1951 Spanish Military (SGE)
Map, from Blanco Vázquez 2012.
27
Fig. 3.4: An early view of the fort at Villa Cisneros showing the northern 'defensive
tower' and the low, un-rendered curtain wall. Image source: www.saharamili.net/images/fuerte/bens20.jpg accessed 11 April 2011.
Fig. 3.5: A post card dated 1910 illustrating the monumentalising of the fort at Villa
Cisneros, with nomads' tents in the foreground. Image source: www.saharamili.net/images/fuerte/bens25.jpg accessed 11 April 2011.
28
Fig. 3.6: Ruins of the probable French fort at Zug. Image source: Western Sahara
Project.
Fig. 3.7: 1926 aerial view of the expanded fort at Villa Cisneros, clearly surrounded
by barbed wire. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/images/aero1926.jpg
accessed 11 April 2011.
29
Fig. 3.8: By 1934 Western Sahara was enclosed by French and Spanish forts. The
Spanish forts or positions, along the coast, north to south are (red squares): Cape Juby
(Tarfaya), Villa Cisneros, and La Guera. Occupied Smara is also shown in the
northern panhandle. The French forts along the Piste Imperiale, from northeast to
south, are (blue squares): Tindouf, Ain Ben Tilli, Agmar (not labelled), Bir Moghrein,
Idjil (F’Derick) and Atar. The western, French coastal fort at Cape Blanc is Port
Etienne (Nouadhibou). Image source: base map from Mercer 1976.
30
Fig. 3.9: Spanish expansion in the 1930s and 1940s. Key (in red): No. 1, Smara; No.
2, El Ayoun; No. 3, Guelta Zemmour; No. 4, Bir Gandus; No. 5, Tichla, and No. 6,
Zug. Image source: base map from Mercer 1976.
31
Fig. 3.10: A very early view of the fort at Tichla. The barbed wire entanglement
around the fort can just be made out. Image source: http://www.saharamili.net/images/anoni/antc001.jpg accessed 9 April 2011.
Fig. 3.11: The fort at Tifariti garrisoned by the Spanish Foreign Legion. Image source:
http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm and http://www.saharamili.net/images/amigost/tf001.jpg accessed 9 April 2011.
32
Fig. 3.12: The green squares show the new desert forts built by the Spanish in the
1960s. Key: No. 7, Mahbes; No. 8 Echdeiria; No. 9, Hausa; No. 10, Tifariti, No. 11,
Guelta Zemmour; No. 12, Bir Enzaren, and No. 13, Aargub (the numbers do not
reflect any sequence of construction). Image source: base map from Mercer 1976.
33
Fig. 3.13: Outline of ‘Greater Morocco’, taking in parts of Algeria and Mali, and the
whole of Mauritania. Image source: map from Damis 1983, p. 16.
34
Fig. 3.14: The partition of Western Sahara. The Moroccan occupied zone is north of
the partition line, while the Mauritanian zone is south of it. El-Ayoun, Bou-Craa and
Smara are shown as being in the so-called ‘useful triangle’. Image source: base map
from Damis 1983, p. 77.
35
Fig. 3.15: Map of the Moroccan ‘berms’ partitioning Western Sahara and built
between 1980-1987. The territory north and west of berms 4, 2, 5 and 6 is presently
occupied by Morocco, while the territory to the east, including Tifariti and Zug, is
held by Polisario/SADR.
36
Fig. 4.1: This Google Earth image of Western Sahara shows the extent of Google
Earth (Digital Globe and Geo-Eye) high-resolution imagery (outlined in white) dated
to 20 August 2008. This was the range of imagery available for the studying of the
Moroccan berms as of 9 November 2010.
37
Fig. 4.2: Google Earth imagery showing the digitised delineations, or traces, of the
Moroccan berms across Western Sahara. They have been drawn in different colours to
differentiate them, and for their sequence of building see Fig. 3.15. The scale bar in
the lower left indicates 200 kilometres.
38
Fig. 4.3: Spanish military map (Servicio Geográfico del Ejército de España – ‘SGE’)
dated to 1960, with the digitised traces of the Moroccan berms across Western Sahara.
39
Bank type
Description
Single
Berm is mainly a single embankment along its trace.
Double
Berm is mainly a double embankment along its trace.
Multiple
Berm has more than two embankments along its trace.
Multiple
configurations
This can be a qualifier to the above types of berms. It indicates that
there are a variety of additional configurations of embankments
associated with a given defensive trace.
Fig. 4.4: Table of descriptive terminology applied to berm embankments during
digitisation from Google Earth.
Installation
type (code)
Description
ft
Mural fort; a fort along a berm. But this type of installation can be free
standing in those few regions where there are no berms, and the ‘barrier’ is
made up of natural features.
rft
A fort behind the berm; a fort in the rear.
ftfb
Fort with a firebase apparently built as an integral part; a composite fort.
Almost always mural.
ftfba
Fort with a firebase added or attached. Almost always mural.
fsb
Fire support base; always in the rear behind a given berm.
flt
Fortlet; up to 100 metres along its longest length or under 10,000 sqr
metres in area. Almost always mural.
comp
Non-mural compound with no, or very minimal, internal features, and with
no signs of obvious fortifications.
mcomp
Mural compound with no, or very minimal, internal features. With no signs
of obvious fortifications.
pcomp
Long & thin mural compound, laid out parallel to a given berm.
sop
Small occupation position; essentially a small fortlet (flt) and apparently
specific to Berm No. 4. Up to ca. 50 metres along their greatest length.
These are densely spaced and very numerous along the berm facing the
Algerian border, and because of this, only a sample of these installations
have been recorded - within square 952 (see Fig. 4.6 and the reference in
Fig. 4.19). There are other small, similar sized features associated with the
berms, but these have no internal features and they have not been
included in the tabulations in this chapter.
gar
Garrison or camp, usually with no enclosure and behind the berms.
Fig. 4.5: Table of the basic descriptive types of military installations recorded along
the berms.
40
Fig. 4.6: Map of Western Sahara showing selected (sampled) rectangles for ‘snapshots’ of the berms. These are shown in red overlying
areas covered by Google Earth high-resolution imagery – outlined in broken lines.
41
Fig. 4.7: Map of Berm No. 1. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia
el Hamra; thin black line = earlier Bou-Craa and Smara defences; thicker black line (east of Bou-Craa and Smara) = later defensive
berms/barriers.
42
Berm No. 1: (Part 1) Barrier lengths for berm from Jebel Zini to Bou Craa
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (there are no natural barriers)
299*
Length (kms) of single banked barriers
235
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with additional
64
multiple configurations of banks
Berm No. 1: All military installations from Jebel Zini to Bou Craa
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
182**
Number of mural forts (ft)
100
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
18
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb)
1
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba)
1
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
23
Number of fortlets (flt)
8
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
11
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
6
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp)
14
NB: *299 kms/**182 = 1 type of installation for every 1.6 kms
Fig. 4.8: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up Part
1 of Berm No. 1. The different types of installations along the berm have also been
tabulated. To compare Part 1 with Part 2 of Berm No. 1, see Fig. 4.10.
43
Berm No. 1: (Part 2) Barrier lengths for berm from Bou Craa to the Atlantic
Count
coast
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers)
335*
Total Length (kms) of all barriers (excluding 101 kms of natural barriers)
234
Length (kms) of single banked barriers
234
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with additional
<1
multiple configurations of banks
Berm No. 1: All military installations from Bou Craa to the Atlantic coast
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
143**
Number of mural forts (ft)
63
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
2
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb)
3
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba)
8
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
17
Number of fortlets (flt)
36
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
9
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
2
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp)
3
NB: *335 kms/**143 = 1 type of installation for every 2.3 kms
Fig. 4.9: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up Part
2 of Berm No. 1. The different types of installations along the berm have also been
tabulated. To compare Part 2 with Part 1 of Berm No. 1, see Fig. 4.10.
44
Berm 1
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
All
Total length (inc natural barriers)
299
47%
335
53%
634**
Single banks
235
79%
234
70%
469
74%
Double and multiple banks
64
21%
0.5
<1%
65
10%
101
30%
101
16%
Natural barriers
Associated installations
Count
Count
Count
ft
100
55%
63
44%
163
50%
rft
18
10%
2
1%
20
6%
ftfb
1
<1%
3
2%
4
1%
ftfba
1
<1%
8
6%
9
3%
fsb
23
13%
17
12%
40
14%
flt
8
4%
36
25%
44
12%
comp
11
6%
9
6%
20
6%
mcomp
6
3%
2
1%
8
2%
pcomp
14
8%
3
2%
17
5%
Total
182
143
325
Fig. 4.10: Comparative table showing the differences and similarities between parts 1
and 2 of Berm No. 1.
45
Fig. 4.11: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 1) and Berm No. 2, at the Smara salient, within and
adjacent to rectangles 124 and 157. Note: ‘High resolution Google Earth imagery’ denotes (on all GIS ‘snapshots’) those areas
covered by the best quality imagery available on Google Earth in 2010.
46
Fig. 4.12: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 1 (Part 2) in Rectangle
215.
47
Fig. 4.13: Map of Berm No. 2. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple
configurations of banks; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier and later barrier/berm defences.
48
Berm No. 2: Barrier lengths
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (there are no natural barriers)
357*
Length (kms) of single banked barriers
234
66%
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with
123
34%
202**
100%
Number of mural forts (ft)
130
64%
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
16
8%
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
24
12%
Number of fortlets (flt)
2
1%
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
11
5%
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
2
1%
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp)
6
3%
Number of rear garrisons (gar)
11
5%
additional multiple configurations of banks
Berm No. 2 All military installations
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
NB: *357 kms/**202 = 1 type of installation for every 1.8 kms
Fig. 4.14: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up
Berm No. 2. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.
49
Fig. 4.15: Map of Berm No. 3. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier and later barrier/berm
defences.
50
Berm No. 3: Barrier lengths
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers)
338*
Length (kms) of single banked barriers
145
43%
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with
141
42%
52
15%
181**
100%
Number of mural forts (ft)
111
61%
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
11
6%
Number of mural forts with an integral firebase (ftfb)
1
<1%
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
41
23%
Number of fortlets (flt)
1
<1
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
5
3%
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp)
5
3%
Number of rear garrisons (gar)
6
3%
additional multiple configurations of banks
Length (kms) of natural barriers
Berm No. 3 All military installations
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
NB: *338 kms/**181 = 1 type of installation for every 1.9 kms
Fig. 4.16: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up
Berm No. 3. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.
51
Fig. 4.17: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 3, in rectangles 92 and
126. This mapping sample shows the barrier running west to east, and then turning
northwards. Berm No. 4 extends to the east, into rectangle 126 and beyond.
52
Fig. 4.18: Map of Berm No. 4. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; broken blue line = Saguia el Hamra; Black line = earlier barrier/berm defences.
53
Berm No. 4: Barrier lengths
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers and the rear,
624*
subsidiary berm)
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the rear, subsidiary berm)
43
7%
Length (kms) of single banked, rear, subsidiary berm
138
22%
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with
432
69%
11
2%
additional multiple configurations of banks
Length (kms) of natural barriers
Berm No. 4: All military installations
Total of all recorded defensive installations on and behind the berm
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm (excluding 53
427
374**
100%
Number of mural forts (ft)
153
41%
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
45
12%
Number of mural forts with a firebase added (ftfba)
2
<1%
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
53
14%
Number of fortlets (flt)
31
8%
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
26
7%
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
1
<1%
Number of linear (parallel) mural compounds (pcomp)
10
3%
Number of rear garrisons (gar)
53
14%
Number of small occupation positions (sop): only in sampling rectangle 952
53
sops from sampling rectangle 952)
NB: *624 kms/**374 = 1 type of installation for every 1.7 kms
Fig. 4.19: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up
Berm No. 4. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.
54
Fig. 4.20: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle 100.
The rear, subsidiary barrier behind the berm (to the north) is also shown.
55
Fig. 4.21: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 4, in rectangle 952.
This sampled mapping clearly illustrates the density of installations in this length of
the barrier, which directly faces the frontier with Algeria to the east.
56
Fig. 4.22: Map of Berm No. 5. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations
of banks; broken purple line = natural defensive features; black line = earlier and later barrier/berm defences.
57
Berm No. 5: Barrier lengths
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including natural barriers, and the matrix
1002*
of rear, subsidiary berms at 354 kms)
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the matrix of rear,
264
26%
327
33%
Length (kms) of the matrix of rear, subsidiary berms
354
35%
Length (kms) of natural barriers
57
6%
321**
100%
Number of mural forts (ft)
203
63%
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
33
10%
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
46
14%
Number of fortlets (flt)
19
6%
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
5
2%
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
1
<1%
Number of rear garrisons (gar)
14
4%
subsidiary berms)
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with
additional multiple configurations of banks (excluding the matrix of rear,
subsidiary berms)
Berm No. 5: All military installations
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
NB: *1002 kms/**321 = 1 type of installation for every 3.1 kms
Fig. 4.23: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up
Berm No. 5. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.
58
Fig. 4.24: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle 359.
59
Fig. 4.25: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 5, in rectangle 583.
60
Fig. 4.26: Map of Berm No. 6. Colour Key: red line = single embankment; blue line = double embankment; green line = double
embankment with additional, multiple configurations of banks; brown line = single embankment with additional, multiple configurations
of banks; black line = earlier barrier/berm defences.
61
Berm No. 6: Barrier lengths
Count
Total length (kms) of all barriers (including the rear, subsidiary berms)
1168*
Length (kms) of single banked barriers (excluding the rear, subsidiary
361
31%
196
17%
611
52%
364**
100%
Number of mural forts (ft)
207
57%
Number of forts in the rear (rft)
11
3%
Number of non-mural fire support bases (fsb)
25
7%
Number of fortlets (flt)
99
27%
Number of non-mural compounds (comp)
7
2%
Number of mural compounds (mcomp)
3
1%
Number of rear garrisons (gar)
12
3%
berms)
Length (kms) of double and multiple banked barriers, and all barriers with
additional multiple configurations of banks (excluding the rear, subsidiary
berms)
Length (kms) of rear, subsidiary berms
Berm No. 6: All military installations
Total of all defensive installations on and behind the berm
NB: *1168 kms/**364 = 1 type of installation for every 3.2 kms
Fig. 4.27: Table listing the different types of barriers, and their lengths, making up
Berm No. 6. The different types of installations along the berm are also tabulated.
62
Fig. 4.28: GIS ‘snapshot’ showing the disposition of Berm No. 6, in rectangle 853,
along the border with Mauritania.
63
Fig. 4.29: Google Earth image along Berm No.1 (in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). The
bulldozer tracks are clearly visible only on the west side of the barrier. The sharply
defined shadow on the west of the barrier indicates that the embankment is triangular
in section. Scale bar at lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 23/12/12,
DigitalGlobe.
64
Fig. 4.30: A Google Earth image showing a section of Berm No.1 (in rectangle 215 of
Fig. 4.6). When looked at closely, the top of the embankment appears to be flat or
slightly indented, perhaps with two ridges. North is to the left of the image. Scale bar
at lower left indicates 40 metres. Image date 31/1/06, DigitalGlobe.
65
Fig. 4.31: Part of Berm No.1 shown on Google Earth (in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). It
is a single embankment with clear evidence of being created by bulldozing from both
sides. The top, in places, appears slightly flat, or with a slight depression. Scale bar at
lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 31/12/04, DigitalGlobe.
66
Fig. 4.32: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.5 (in rectangle 583 of Fig.
4.6). A single embankment is clearly visible with short sections of secondary banks.
North is to the upper left. Scale bar at lower left indicates 200 metres. Image date
26/1/04, DigitalGlobe.
67
Fig. 4.33: A Google Earth image showing part of Berm No.1 (between rectangles 124
and 157 of Fig. 4.6). It shows the direction of bulldozing in the construction of the
barriers (only from one side), and illustrates how the secondary, western barrier more
or less follows natural contours, with the primary frontal barrier cutting across natural
drainage. A mural track is visible to the west. Scale bar at lower left indicates 200
metres. Image date 12/6/10, DigitalGlobe.
68
Fig. 4.34: A low resolution Google Earth image showing parallel banks along Berm
No.2 at the Smara salient (located around nine kilometres southeast of rectangle 157
of Fig. 4.6). Multiple tracks behind the barrier are also visible. Scale bar at lower left
indicates 200 metres. Image date 2004, CNES/Spot.
69
Fig. 4.35: At just to the west of rectangle 491 in Fig. 4.6, this Google Earth image of
Berm No.5 clearly shows a frontal defensive bank with subsidiary, intermediate
banks. The tracks of the bulldozers which created the embankments are also clearly
visible. The second, rear bank is not parallel with the frontal bank, but it also has a
ditch on its south side (north is to the top left of the image). A causeway through the
second bank and ditch is clearly visible, and water has backed up behind the second
barrier, illustrating how the construction of the berms can affect natural drainage.
Scale bar at lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 3/3/06, DigitalGlobe.
70
Fig. 4.36: A Google Earth image from rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6. North is to the upper
left. It shows a multiple embanked section of Berm No.5, with three banks, though
with the north most, rear bank, having a ditch in front of it (as in Fig. 4.35). A mural
bunker is incorporated in the frontal bank (near the bottom of the image) and there are
at least two vehicular slots behind the barrier, near the top of the image. The scale bar
at lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 25/10/04, DigitalGlobe.
71
Fig. 4.37: A very good Google Earth image of a short section of Berm No. 4, located
in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6. It shows a triple embanked barrier, facing south (north is
to the left), and positioned on a watershed. A light line in front of the barrier probably
represents barbed wire. There are bunker type structures associated with the front
embankment. The bank making up the rear of the barrier includes a ditch along its
southern side. The earthworks to the north (the left) are probably gun emplacements.
The scale bar at lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 23/11/07, DigitalGlobe.
72
Fig. 4.38: A low level aerial photo of the location indicated in Fig. 4.39, showing a Paris-Dakar rally car passing through the Moroccan
Berm. It clearly gives a sense of scale, and illustrates the components making up the barrier. North is to the right of the photo. Image
source: http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20091109-nem-csak-a-berlini-fal-nepeket-elvalaszto-falak-es.html accessed 14 September 2012.
73
Fig. 4.39: A low resolution image from Google Earth showing a stretch of Berm No. 2
in Mauritania, and located due south of rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6. North is to the right.
The black circle indicates the approximate location of the crossing point though the
Berm shown in Fig. 4.38. The scale bar at lower left indicates 400 metres. Image date
2006, CNES/Spot.
74
Fig. 4.40: View of Berm No. 4 taken near the border with Algeria. It shows multiple
embankments and even the rooflines of buildings or bunkers. Image source: ©
‘wixtroem’, from http://www.panoramio.com/photo/40069297 accessed 3 september
2012.1
1
Photograph taken and posted on Panoramio and Google Earth by ‘wixtroem’. There is no guarantee
that the ‘geotagged’ location of the photograph on Google Earth is correct.
75
Figure 4.41: A view of the Moroccan barrier at ground level, photographed near
Tifariti. The barrier has three elements: the stone wall at the rear, an earthen bank in
the centre, followed by a frontal embankment with two ridges,just visible at the left of
the photograph. The Saharawi soldier on the barrier gives a sense of scale. Image
source: © Bruno Zanzottera, from http://stock.parallelozero.com and
http://www.parallelozero.com/images/stock/mid/c72e465d7af3494aa14600a8956d98b
b5fa097fc.jpg accessed 12 April 2014.
76
Fig. 4.42: One of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets clearly visible on
Google Earth. This is a redundant fortlet (flt 10) on Berm No.1 (located in rectangle
215 of Fig. 4.6). Its internal buildings and bunkers are visible (now roofless) and the
routeways in and out of the installation can just be made out. The scale bar in the
lower left indicates 30 metres. Image date 26/5/12, DigitalGlobe.
77
Fig. 4.43: Second of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets, clearly visible on
Google Earth. North is to the left of the image. This is a redundant fort (ft 163) on
Berm No. 1. It is located just outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6.
It is clearly concentric with two perimeter banks and it is subdivided longitudinally.
There are clear fighting positions along its southern face (they look like nicks, or
indents, in the embankment). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres.
Image date 4/8/05, DigitalGlobe.
78
Fig. 4.44: Third of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets. A concentric,
polygonal fort (ft 685) with rounded corners on Berm No.3 (located in rectangle 126
of Fig. 4.6). This fort is not redundant since it faces the Poliosario held zone of
Western Sahara. It has fighting/observation positions along its southern and eastern
flanks - facing the upper right, and right of the image (north is to the upper left), and
its internal buildings and bunkers are roofed and visible. Its northwest side is very
slightly bent (concave) while its south and southeast trace follows the contours of the
slight rise on which it is situated. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres.
Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.
79
Fig. 4.45: Fourth of four examples of polygonal forts and fortlets. This mural fort (ft
1335) is located on a redundant part of Berm No.5, located in rectangle 583 of Fig.
4.6. North is to the left. Though partly obscured by drift sand, the fort’s internal
buildings are clear (and now roofless), and its concentric trace and multiple
subdivisions are also clearly visible. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100
metres. Image date 3/1/04, DigitalGlobe.
80
Fig. 4.46: Google Earth image of a semi-circular fortlet (flt 1252) on Berm No.4
(located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). There are obvious bunkers along the front of the
installation facing east. It is also sub-divided with embanked partitions. There is a
cordon of barbed wire just in front of the fortlet, which is just barely visible. The scale
bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 3/3/08, DigitalGlobe.
81
Fig. 4.47: Google Earth image (in monochrome to highlight features) of a semicircular fort (ft 1250) from Berm No.4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This fort
has a concentric trace along its rear, with a frontage (facing the northeast) filled with
bunkers and fighting positions. The installation is obviously compartmentalised and
its entrance is clear This fort faces Algeria from Morocco, north of Western Sahara.
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe.
82
Fig. 4.48: Google Earth image showing a sub-circular fort (ft 1597) on Berm No. 5
(located in rectangle 359 of Fig. 4.6). This fort is still occupied and it clearly shows
fighting positions along its east facing front. It is also sub-divided with blast
partitions. The fort has a rectilinear landing zone to the immediate northwest, while
internally, there are gun pits and obvious bunkers. The concentric earthen banks
outlining the installation have sharp outlines suggesting that they are revetted with
stones. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 25/10/04,
DigitalGlobe.
83
Fig. 4.49: Google Earth image of a kidney shaped fort (ft 1387) along a redundant
part of Berm No.5 (located in rectangle 553 of Fig. 4.6). The fort is
compartmentalised with internal internal blast barriers and there are fighting positions,
and some bunkers, along its frontage, facing south (north is to the left). The remains of
bulldozing tracks indicate that the fort was constructed from the north. The scale bar
in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 20/10/05, DigitalGlobe.
84
Fig. 4.50: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 1391) on Berm No.5
(located in rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6), in an area of desert with low relief. It is mainly
surrounded by a double embankment, and it is compartmentalised by numerous blast
barriers. There are bunkers and fighting positions along its southern, curvilinear
frontage (north is to the left). There are other buildings or bunkers, and even some gun
pits within the installation. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image
date 20/10/05, DigitalGlobe.
85
Fig. 4.51: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 681) on Berm No.3
(located in rectangle 126 of Fig. 4.6). Its defensive banks are concentric and follow
the natural contours of three spurs of high ground. There are multiple sub-divisions
with blast barriers. Buildings and bunkers are spread through out the fort, and there
are bunkers and fighting positions at the salients facing south (north is to the left). The
scale bar in the lower left indicates 90 metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.
86
Fig. 4.52: Low level aerial view of fort ft 681 in Fig. 4.51. The view is to the east, so north is to the left. This image clearly illustrates the
disposition of this sizable fort on high ground, overlooking Polisario controlled territory to the right (the south). Image source:
unattributed image from http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-163.htm accessed 15 January 2014.
87
Fig. 4.53: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fort (ft 687) situated at the
junction of Berms No. 3 and No. 4 (located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It follows the
contours of an escarpment over lower ground to the west and south (north is to the
left). Its defences are more or less concentric and there is multiple
compartmentalisation. There are numerous buildings and bunkers with fighting
positions visible along the fort’s southern flanks. There are two rectangular landing
zones to the immediate north. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres.
Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.
88
Fig. 4.54: Google Earth image (in monochrome to highlight features) of an irregular
shaped fort (ft 1269) on Berm No. 4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). It used to
be a concentric semi-circle but its frontage has been removed and it is now an
irregular arc shaped installation. It is sub-divided and there are bunkers. Fighting
positions are visible along the east facing front. A cordon of barbed wire is also just
visible, about 100 metres in front of the fort, to the east. The scale bar in the lower left
indicates 80 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe.
89
Fig. 4.55: Google Earth image of a straightforward, though partly complex, fort (ft
1648) on Berm No. 6 (located in rectangle 850 of Fig. 4.6). It is situated on a knoll. It
has an external enclosure to the east, which also incorporates high ground with the
remains of fighting or observation positions. The south and east facing ramparts of the
fort, with observation and fighting positions, are sharply outlined, indicating retaining
walls along the internal faces. There are bunkers and buildings, and two gun pits, also
well defined. A ramp leads into the fort from the north. The scale bar in the lower left
indicates 50 metres. Image date 21/2/13, DigitalGlobe.
90
Fig. 4.56: Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft 145) on Berm No.1 (located close
to, but outside the northeast corner of rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). It has observation and
fighting positions along its angled east side overlooking a wadi. It has secondary
embankments that give the impression that it has concentric defences, but this is not
the case. Instead, the fort simply consists of multiple enclosures. There are annexes to
the north and south, and besides the buildings and bunkers internally, there are also
two possible gun pits. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date
4/8/05, DigitalGlobe.
91
Fig. 4.57: Monochrome (for better clarity) Google Earth image of a complex fort (ft
1274) on Berm No.4 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). The installation consists of
an initial concentric sub-circular fort, with a multiple embanked rectilinear addition to
the north. Both parts of the fort are compartmentalised and there are bunkers and
observation and fighting positions on their eastern flanks, facing Algeria. It is possible
that there are two small gun or mortar pits in the southern, circular part of the
installation. There are five gun pits to the west of the fort, and there is a cordon of
barbed wire, just barely visible, in an arc in front of the initial, circular fortification.
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 16/3/08, DigitalGlobe.
92
Fig. 4.58: A complex fort (ft 290) on Berm No.1, in the Smara salient (located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). This is a very large group of
enclosures utilising a spur and at least four knolls overlooking a wadi to the east. The core enclosure at the lower, left centre of the image,
has concentric defences with observation and fighting positions facing east. The contoured extension to the east also has fighting and
observation positions facing eastwards, and the knolls just behind the single embanked outer enceinte, are all individually fortified. This
is indeed, a multi-part, complex fort. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 300 metres. Image date 23/12/12, DigitalGlobe.
93
Fig. 4.59: This is a very good example of a concentrically embanked fort on one of the Moroccan berms, illustrating the complexity of
internal compartmentalization with sand embanked blast barriers. Image source: unattributed image from
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-163.htm accessed 15 January 2014.
94
Fig. 4.60: View of a mural fort along one of the Moroccan berms. The image shows the construction of internal buildings quite well, and
a parapet walkway with niches: fighting and observation positions. Image source: attributed to ‘MINURSO Database’ and available at
http://www.tindoufexpress.org/tep/?page_id=183&lang=en and http://www.tindoufexpress.org/tep/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Muro_ONU_2007.06.07_-1_028.jpg accessed 17 January 2014.
95
Fig. 4.61: This is an aerial photograph of an Israeli fort or strong point (Maozim) from
the Bar Lev Line, reputedly taken by an Egyptian spy plane some time before the
1973 Arab- Israeli War. It is included here to illustrate what small fighting positions,
or niches, along a defensive line can look like. Here they are revetted with sand bags,
but stones could just as easily be used. There are metal hoops over the trenches, and
these were for canvas shades. Image source:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/41809355@N00/877414678/ accessed 4 October 2012.2
2
Aerial photograph uploaded on to Flickr on 23 July 2007 by ‘Amr Saleh’, with the caption: ‘Egyptian
military intelligence photo of a Bar Lev Line strong point, taken from a spy plane. Typical Bar Lev
Line fortification, surrounded with 5 lines of barbed wire with land mines and traps in between. Under
ground bunker is 15m deep into the ground made of railway reinforced concrete. With exception of one
post, all Bar Lev Line points were stormed by Egyptian infantry in 1973.’
96
Figure 4.62: This image, taken as a still from a YouTube video, shows Moroccan
soldiers in a bunker on the berm manning a recoilless rifle. It clearly shows the
aperture size, and type of view available, from what is possibly a relatively standard
bunker along the perimeter of a fortified Moroccan position along the berms. Image
source:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=5KxzZQGpIHc&NR=1
accessed 1 October 2012.3
3
This is a still image taken from a video entitled (in English) Hassan II inspects [the] army in the
Algerian-Moroccan border Moroccan Sahara. The video is undated and unattributed, but it has been
uploaded onto YouTube by ‘Lineamarocco’ on 7 January 2010.
97
Fig. 4.63: Berm No. 1. Google Earth image of two mural compounds (to the west, in the left portion of the image) and a mural fort (to the
east of centre), with vehicular slots (‘tank’ slots) behind the berm at the eastern (right) edge of the image. The compounds, from the west
(left to right) are mcomp 251 and mcomp 252, and the fort is ft 253 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left
indicates 180 metres. Image date 12/6/10, DigitalGlobe.
98
Fig. 4.64: Google image of pcomp 132 on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 187 of
Fig. 4.6). It shows a parallel enclosure, longitudinally subdivided, with
fighting/observation positions along its front, to the east. The entry to the compound is
from the west, near the north end of the compound. The scale bar in the lower left
indicates 80 metres. Image date 2/5/10, DigitalGlobe.
99
Fig. 4.65: Examples of small occupation positions on Berm No. 4 (located in
rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). At the top (to the north) is sop 2097, while to the south is
sop 2098. Between them are vehicular slots, probably for tanks (or perhaps even
smaller vehicles that can mount guns), with a slightly larger slot, on its own and to the
west, that could probably accommodate a self-propelled piece of artillery. The scale
bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 16/3/08 (in monochrome for
clarity), DigitalGlobe.
100
Fig. 4.66: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of ftfb 133 on Berm No. 1
(located in rectangle 187 of Fig. 4.6). This multipart installation has four gun pits
located more-or-less in its centre. Probably for self propelled artillery. North is to the
upper left. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 200 metres. Image date 2/5/10,
DigitalGlobe.
101
Fig. 4.67: Google Earth image of ftfba 16 on Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 215 of
Fig. 4.6). A large, redundant, mural fort with a firebase attached to its northwest side
(north is to the upper left). The firebase includes four artillery gun pits very spread
out. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 80 metres. Image date 2/4/04,
DigitalGlobe.
102
Fig. 4.68: Google Earth image of fsb 1470 on Berm No. 5 (located to the west of
rectangle 491 of Fig. 4.6). A polygonal fire support base, though originally subrectangular, with three large gun pits for self propelled artillery. The guns can be seen
in the image. The base is behind Berm No. 5 by more than four kilometres. The scale
bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/06, DigitalGlobe.
103
Fig. 4.69: Google Earth image of fsb 1255 (located in rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). A
rectilinear, though complex, fire support base with four gun positions situated behind
Berm No. 4. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/08,
DigitalGlobe.
104
Fig. 4.70: Google Earth image of sub-circular fsb 1327 behind Berm No. 5 (located in
rectangle 583 of Fig. 4.6). Though redundant, this is a fine example of a fire support
base with five gun pits, perimeter fighting or observation positions, and clearly visible
internal buildings. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date
3/1/04, DigitalGlobe.
105
Fig. 4.71: Google Earth image of an irregular shaped fire support base (fsb 1257)
behind Berm No. 4 (located within rectangle 952 of Fig. 4.6). This firebase is
redundant, probably replaced by fsb 1255 (see Fig. 4.69). The scale bar in the lower
left indicates 100 metres. Image date 3/3/08, DigitalGlobe.
106
Fig. 4.72: Google Earth image of a redundant, complex firebase (fsb 237) behind
Berm No. 1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). This installation has numerous gun
pits and vehicular slots. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date
14/9/12, DigitalGlobe.
107
Fig. 4.73: Google Earth image of a firebase (fsb 703) for self propelled artillery,
behind a redundant part of Berm No. 3 (located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). This
firebase has been built behind a knoll along its east side. North is to the upper right.
The scale bar in the lower left indicates 60 metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.
108
Fig. 4.74: Google Earth image of an unenclosed firebase (fsb 682) behind Berm No. 3
(located in rectangle 92 of Fig. 4.6). It is situated between two knolls, one to the south
and the other to the northwest. There are three clear gun pits, and additionally,
fortifications on the southern knoll. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100
metres. Image date 8/2/06, DigitalGlobe.
109
Fig. 4.75: This is a sketch of United States Army Fire Support Base Kramer in
Vietnam. It shows the base perimeter; five artillery pieces in gun pits left of centre; the
command centre, in its own protective berm (and labelled ‘TOC’); tent positions; and
howitzer positions. Image source: United States Army Heritage and Education Centre,
from: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec/AHM/AHT/Vietnam/Firebase.cfm accessed
19 February 2013.
110
Fig. 4.76: Low level aerial photo of Fire Support Base Roy in Vietnam (dated
February 1969). Image source: http://www.alphaavengers.com/PICS/fb-roy2.jpg and
http://www.alphaavengers.com/firebases.htm accessed 19 February 2013.
Fig. 4.77: Unattributed and undated photograph of a Moroccan fire support base
behind one of the berms. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-165.htm
accessed 19 February 2013.
111
Fig. 4.78: A Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of two compounds
behind Berm No. 1. To the north is comp 256 with a possible gun) pit within it, while
comp 257 is to the south, and made up of two parts (both are located in rectangle 157
of Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 30 metres. Image date 12/6/10,
DigitalGlobe.
112
Fig. 4.79: A fort in the rear (rft 1674), behind Berm No. 6 (located to the north of
rectangle 853 in Fig. 4.6). This is essentially a garrison position surrounded by a
single earth embankment. There are no obvious defensive positions along the
perimeter bank. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date
26/1/04, DigitalGlobe.
113
Fig. 4.80: A highly developed rear support fort (rft 282) on Berm No. 1, east of Smara
(located in rectangle 124 of Fig. 4.6). This large base has a great variety of facilities
including a sports field. It follows the contours of the high ground on which it is
situated, with lower ground sloping downwards to the east. The scale bar in the lower
left indicates 100 metres. Image date 14/8/09, DigitalGlobe.
114
Fig. 4.81: This rear support fort (rft 236) is around half a kilometre behind Berm No.
1 (located in rectangle 157 of Fig. 4.6). It is very similar to other polygonal forts
situated on, and integral to the territorial berms. Although this installation is
apparently redundant, it has still been maintained, as shown by the clear bulldozer
tracks. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date 14/9/12,
DigitalGlobe.
115
Fig. 4.82: Google Earth image of a fort in the rear behind Berm No. 3 (rft 706). It is
irregular in shape, though also complex, and in its southern part there are three
possible positions for self-propelled artillery. This installation is located in rectangle
92 of Fig. 4.6. The scale bar in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Image date 8/2/06,
DigitalGlobe.
116
Fig. 4.83: Rear support forts are commonly found on hill top ridges in the Guelta
Zemmour region of Western Sahara. This Google Earth image shows rft 1588, strung
out on a ridge at around one kilometre behind Berm No. 5 (located in rectangle 359 of
Fig. 4.6). The scale bar in the lower left indicates 40 metres. Image date 25/10/04,
DigitalGlobe.
117
Fig. 4.84: Unattributed and undated photograph of a Moroccan installation,
presumably located behind one of the berms and situated on a hill top ridge. A
defensive trench or parapet is just visible along the far edge of the closely placed
buildings and bunkers making up the post. Image source:
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-164.htm accessed 19 February 2013.
118
Fig. 4.85: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of garrison gar 1112
behind Berm No. 4 (located in rectangle 100 of Fig. 4.6). North is to the bottom of the
image, and the marked out rectangle represents the approximate coverage of view in
Fig. 4.86. Image date 4/9/07, DigitalGlobe.
119
Fig. 4.86: Unattributed photograph of an unfortified army camp (or garrison) behind
the Moroccan berms. Upon examination, it turns out that this is part of gar 1112
behind Berm No. 4. The coverage of this view (south is to the top of the photo) is
outlined in the rectangle in the lower left of Fig. 4.85. Image source:
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-165.htm, accessed 19 February 2013.
120
Fig. 6.1: This map shows the location of the TF1 study area of the Western Sahara
Project (WSP), north of the larger Tifariti Study Area (2011), which is the subject of
Chapters 6 and 7.
121
Tifariti
Fig. 6.2: Distribution map of funerary archaeology from the WSP TF1 Study Area
(shown in the upper left) to Tifariti. The density of blue dots in the TF1 area indicates
that it has been intensely surveyed on the ground. Further ground based survey has
also taken place just south of the study area, while the blue dots to the south and east
have mainly been plotted from Google Earth. The dots within the larger Tifariti Study
Area have been plotted from limited ground survey (in 2011) and Google Earth. The
dark grey line represents the approximate boundary between rocky, undulating ground
to the north, and flat, hamada desert to the south.
122
Fig. 6.3: Photograph showing the vegetation in the Wadi Tifariti. This image was
taken in the TF1 Study Area of the WSP.
123
Fig. 6.4: Distribution of prehistoric remains in the Tifariti Study Area. Key: red
triangles = burial monuments; blue = wadi drainage; grey-green = land at 480 metres
and over; brown lines = igneous rock intrusions. The distribution of monuments has
been based on fieldwork in 2011 and plottings from Google Earth. Background
mapping is 1/200,000 Soviet era Russian mapping (available from
http://mapstor.com/map-sets/country-maps/western-sahara.html ).
124
Fig. 6.5: The TF1 study area - showing the disposition of late, probably Islamic period
burials, amidst earlier prehistoric funerary monuments. Key: red crosses = kerb
(Islamic) burials; grey circles = prehistoric funerary remains; cross hatched areas =
rocky outcrops.
125
Fig. 6.6: View of the impressive standing stones site, WS001 in the TF1 study area
(looking north). The insert shows some of the eight Islamic period burials disposed
along, and within, the western side of this prehistoric monument (looking northwest).
126
Fig. 6.7: Map of caravan routes from 1700 to 1900 in the western Sahara. Though
highly schematic, this map shows a corridor of routes passing through the greater
Tifariti region. It is also possible that these routes reflect trails that antedate the 18th
century by many centuries. Image source: map from Lydon 2009, p. xxvii, and
georeferenced over Google Earth.
127
Fig. 6.8: Map showing the route taken by Lt. Col. Mouret, from Atar in the Adrar, in
his raid on Smara in 1913. The outward journey is shown in blue with the return
journey (though progressing all the way to Atar) shown in red. Tagliat is shown,
representing the approximate location of the battle with a tribal force under
Mohammed Laghdaf (along the Wadi Tagliat). As the map shows, the French troops
would have passed within the Tifariti area on their return journey to Idjil, and then
Atar. Source: based on Berthomé 1996, map on p. 144, but revised, taking the place
name Tagliat into consideration.
128
Fig. 6.9: Plan of Spanish colonial Tifariti, 1964 to 1975. Key: 1 = fort; 2 = infirmary; 3 = external buildings near the fort; 4 =
commandant’s quarters; 5 = bake house; 6 = main water cistern; 7 = subsidiary cistern; 8 = rubbish dump; 9 = well site; 10 = ‘colonia’;
11 = Islamic cemetery. Scale at lower left indicates 150 metres, image date 21/2/06, Digital Globe.
129
Fig. 6.10: Low level aerial image of colonial Tifariti, looking south. The numbers
refer to the key in Fig. 6.8. Image source:
http://www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/displayimage.php?pos=-270 accessed 9
March 2013.
Fig. 6.11: Photograph of the fort at Tifariti taken in 2007. The view is similar to that
in Fig. 3.11, but it clearly shows the damage sustained from the 1991 Moroccan air
attacks.
130
Fig. 6.12: Plan of the Spanish fort at Tifariti. Key: the black and white outline
represents Phase 1 of the fort (dashed lines represent reconstructed wall outlines); 2
(yellow) = Phase 2; 3 (grey) = Phase 3; 4 (green) = Phase 4; 5(brown) = Phase 5; A =
SW corner blockhouse; B = NW corner blockhouse; C = NE corner blockhouse; D =
SE corner blockhouse; E = right angled entranceway; F = courtyard; G = location of
menagerie; and H = location of dovecote on roof.
131
Fig. 6.13: Composite image of the east facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti (recorded in 2011). The southern dogleg in the fort’s plan
(see Fig. 6.12) was destroyed in the 1991 air attack, nevertheless, compare this elevation with the view of the contemporary fort at Hausa
in Fig. 6.14.
132
Fig. 6.14: This photograph of the Spanish fort at Hausa was taken in January-February 1969. It shows what the east elevation of the fort
at Tifariti (Fig. 6.13) would have looked like soon after its construction. Image source: http://www.saharamili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
133
Fig. 6.15: Composite image of the west facing elevation of the fort at Tifariti (recorded in 2011), showing the damage sustained in the
Moroccan air strikes of 1991. To see what this elevation must have looked like in an undamaged state, see Fig. 6.16, an image of the
contemporary fort at Echdeiria.
134
Fig. 6.16: The fort at Echdeiria. As at Hausa, this fort was identical to the one at Tifariti, and this view shows the matching elevation to
that shown in Fig. 6.15, before it was substantially damaged in the air attacks of 1991. The blockhouses at either end are clearly shown,
as is the entrance to the right, where there is also a bar across it, as is similarly visible in Fig. 6.10. Image source: photograph taken in
July 1974 by Adolfo Peña Herrero, available at: http://www.sahara-mili.net/person/albumPersonalMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
135
Fig. 6.17: View of the rear, north facing wall of the fort at Tifariti taken in 2007. For a view of what this side of the fort looked like in its
original condition, compare it with Fig. 6.18.
136
Fig. 6.18: November 1974 view of the rear wall of the fort at Echdeiria, showing what the rear, northern wall of the fort at Tifariti would
have looked like before it was damaged in 1991. Image source: photograph taken by Adolfo Peńa Herrero, available at:
http://www.sahara-mili.net/person/albumPersonalMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
137
Fig. 6.19: South facing elevation along the north side of the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti. Composite photograph taken in 2011.
Fig. 6.20: West facing elevation along the east side of the central courtyard of the fort at Tifariti. Composite photograph taken in 2011.
The graffiti-like painting on both elevations was applied during one of the ARTifariti festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter
7.
138
Fig. 6.21: East facing elevation along the west side of the central courtyard of the fort
at Tifariti, photographed in 2011. This view almost matches that in Fig. 6.22. The
graffiti-like painting on the building remains was applied during one of the ARTifariti
festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter 7.
139
Fig. 6.22: This westward looking view is similar to that in Fig. 6.21. It shows the
interior of the fort at Tifariti while it was garrisoned by Spanish troops. It also shows
what can best be described as a ‘managerie’ in the courtyard of the fort. There is also a
dovecote on the roof of the fort in the upper centre of the photograph. Image source:
http://www.hermandadtropasnomadas.com/fotos/displayimage.php?pid=280&fullsize
=1 accessed 9 April 2011.
140
Fig. 6.23: View of the gateway into the 1940s fort at Tichla. Its construction is
apparently of stone with a rough render. This is in contrast to the smooth, cast
concrete construction of the fort at Tifariti. Image source: photograph taken in 1971
by Juan Piqueras, available at: http://www.saharamili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
141
Fig. 6.24: A 1970 photograph showing the central courtyard of the Spanish fort at
Hausa, which was identical to the fort at Tifariti. A permanent awning with seating is
visible in the background, and the soldier is standing in a courtyard with irregular
paving slabs (‘crazy paving’). Image source: photograph taken in 1970 by Manuel
Cordero, available at http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm
accessed 9 March 2013.
142
Fig. 6.25: This photograph shows how the interior courtyard of the fort at Bir Enzaren
was filled with trees, undoubtedly giving the fort a cooler environment. Image source:
photograph taken in 1975 by Luis Ángel Martinez Pérez, available at
http://www.sahara-mili.net/lugar/albumLugarMarcos.htm accessed 9 March 2013.
Fig. 6.26: Low level aerial view of the Spanish post and fort at Bir Enzaren. The fort,
which matches the fort at Tifariti is to the left, while to the right is the infirmary.
Image source: http://www.amigosdeltercertercio.com/ifni/html/images/79.jpg
accessed 11 March 2013.
143
Fig. 6.27: View of the Spanish post at Hausa, captioned ‘View of the school, medical
clinic and Territorial Police Headquarters in the northern town of Hausa’.4 The
medical clinic, or infirmary, is in the centre of the image. Image source:
http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-40.htm accessed 11 March 2013.
Fig. 6.28: View of the remains of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti (2011),
looking southwest.
4
The original Spanish is: ‘Vista de la escuela, el dispensario médico y la sede de la Policía Territorial
de la localidad norteña de Hausa’.
144
Fig. 6.29: View of the Spanish period infirmary in Tifariti (2011), looking northwest.
The graffiti-like painting on the building was applied during one of the ARTifariti
festivals held in Tifariti (2007-2010). See Chapter 7.
Fig. 6.30: View (looking northeast) of Spanish post commander’s
accommodation/office at Tifariti. There is the trailer from an articulated lorry to the
left of the building.
145
Fig. 6.31: View (looking west) of the bake house behind the fort at Tifariti. The oven
is to the left. A doorway has been blocked, and the impressions of wall tiles can be
seen on the internal wall, visible to the right.
146
Fig. 6.32: View, to the south, showing the concrete posts that supported the gravity fed pipe that provided water to the Tifariti Fort. The
Bake House is also visible in front of the fort. Its northwest, channelled extension (possibly a flue) is visible with ashy ground adjacent.
147
Fig. 6.33: View, looking south, of the posts that carried a water pipe to the subsidiary cistern that served the Commander’s quarters. The
area of ground reflecting sun light in the right of the photograph is a part of the Spanish garrison rubbish dump.
148
Fig. 6.34: Looking west over a part of the Spanish garrison’s rubbish dump.
149
Fig. 6.35: This might be the site of the earliest well in Tifariti. It is the site of the
water source used during the Spanish occupation of the settlement, and it has
obviously been dug and re-dug a number of times. It has probably been a main source
of water until quite recently, but it appears to have been out of use by 2011.
150
Fig. 6.36: Google Earth view (in monochrome for clarity) of the remains of the
colonia at Tifariti. There are six housing blocks north of the road, and four at the east
end, south of the road. They are all neatly aligned. The remaining area to the west, and
south of the track, consists mainly of the remains of mud brick buildings. The scale in
the lower left indicates 50 metres. Image date, 11/7/13, CNES/Astrium.
151
Fig. 6.37: View of low cost housing in El Ayoun in the 1960s. These are examples of
what the pre-fabricated housing in the colonia at Tifariti might have looked like.
Image source: Norris 1964.
Fig. 6.38: View (looking to the south) of Moroccan soldier’s graves in the Tifariti
cemetery.
152
Fig. 6.39: A view looking southwest of local Saharawi graves in the Tifariti cemetary.
They are surrounded by stone kerbs. Their head and footstones are large, and
decorative quartz stones can be seen on graves in the centre of the photograph.
153
Fig. 6.40: A panorama of Mahbes, showing a large Bedouin encampment in the left half of the photograph; an identical fort to the one at
Tifariti off centre to the right; ancillary post buildings beyond the fort; and an infirmary type building at the right hand edge of the photo,
similar to the infirmary at Hausa. This image clearly shows the relationship between the different elements, Saharawi and Spanish,
making up a Spanish period desert settlement. Image source: photograph taken by José Rodrigues Sosa in 1974, available at
http://www.sahara-mili.net/images/jrdgzs/jrs001.jpg accessed 17 March 2013.
154
Fig. 6.41: View of a shallow ‘skirmisher trench’ or ‘scrape’. This is a posed Polisario
photograph with supposed woman combatants, but it illustrates the nature of quickly
excavated, or scraped, single soldier fighting positions. Image source: SADR Military
Museum, Rabuni, Algeria.
155
Fig. 6.42: Moroccan defences at Tifariti.View of single man foxhole, or slit trench.
Fig. 6.43: Moroccan defences at Tifariti.View of a large, or two-man foxhole, or slit
trench. It has an additional, rubble stone divider between the two positions.
156
Fig. 6.44: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Possible machine gun or heavy portable gun
position fronted with boulder parapet.
157
Fig. 6.45: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A stone parapetted, presumed, special
purpose dug out. Perhaps a command or observation position.
Fig. 6.46: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A probable mortar pit, with a smaller dugout
fighting position to the left.
158
Fig. 6.47: A recent image of a mortar pit, freshly dug by U.S. soldiers. This was
probably taken during a training exercise, nevertheless, this pit is not that different
from the one shown in Fig. 6.46. Image source:
http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1545742__ARCHIVED_THREAD____Paratroop
ers.html&page=6 and http://imageshack.us/a/img401/334/l4d0.jpg accessed 4
February 2014.
159
Fig. 6.48: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of Moroccan defensive
positions along the western perimeter of the Tifariti box. Their aspect is to the
northwest, and there are clear approach trenches, presumably to observation positions
looking over the lower ground in the upper left of the image. Behind the trenches,
there are further defensive dug out, and built up, positions. The scale in the lower left
indicates 50 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
160
Fig. 6.49: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of dug out Moroccan
fighting positions linked by trenches, located along the southern perimeter of the
Tifariti box. The scale in the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13,
DigitalGlobe.
161
Fig. 6.50: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a group of dug out fighting
positions linked by a trench.
162
Fig. 6.51: View of Moroccan field housing at Tifariti. To the left and right of the metre scale, there are even stone mastabas, or benches:
places where soldiers could sit outside and congregate.
163
Fig. 6.52: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti. Just visible to the right of the metre scale is a window made out of a wooden box.
164
Fig. 6.53: Moroccan Army field shelter at Tifariti, with a tin can for a window just left of the metre scale.
165
Fig. 6.54: Moroccan Army field structure in the Wadi Tifariti at the TF1 study area. It
is built mainly of mud bricks with, in this example, an internal cement render. The
structure is surrounded by embanked earth, with an entry passage revetted with stones.
166
Fig. 6.55: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular, or ‘tank’, slot in the Tifariti redoubt. Other similar slots are behind this one,
and further behind are soldiers’ bunker-like shelters.
167
Fig. 6.56: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. View of a vehicular slot in the Tifariti redoubt. This excavated and embanked feature is clearly
revetted internally with boulders. Beyond it, going up the slope, are other dug out defensive structures.
168
Fig. 6.57: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. A Google Earth view of gun pits in a wadi
within the Tifariti box. The pit in the centre, and the two smaller ones in the lower left,
have nib-like extensions that represent crew or ammunition bunkers, or protective
embankments. There are other dug out features clearly visible as well. The scale in the
lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
169
Fig. 6.58: Moroccan defences at Tifariti. Another Google Earth view of gun pits in a
wadi within the Tifariti box. In these examples, which might be large mortar pits,
there are long approach trenches with protective dugouts linked to them. The scale in
the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
170
Fig. 6.59: Google Earth image showing the Spanish airstrip south-southwest of the old
Tifariti Fort and colonial period buildings. The scale in the lower left indicates 300
metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
171
Fig. 6.60: Distribution of defensive features (red dots) around Tifariti. Also showing
natural drainage and ground at 480 metres and above. In total, 7170 Moroccan
defensive features have been plotted from Google Earth.
172
Fig. 6.61: Distribution of defensive features located over key terrain (highlighted and
cross-hatched) around Tifariti (shown by a black circle). The map also shows the
spread of ridges formed by igneous intrusions (light brown lines, mainly in the upper
part of the map).
173
Fig. 6.62: This map indicates the disposition of the inner defensive box (highlighted
with criss-crosed hatching) around Tifariti (shown by a black circle), set within the
outer defences - the ‘outer’ defensive box.
174
Fig. 6.63: This map shows the viewshed (in red) around the inner Tifariti defensive
box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key terrain, while the criss-cross hatched
area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box. The yellow triangles are the locations
from which the viewshed has been created. The white, background areas of the map
are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen from the inner defensive box. The area of
central Tifariti is shown by the black circle.
175
Fig. 6.64: This map shows the viewshed (in red) from the outer, Tifariti defensive
box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key terrain, while the criss-cross hatched
area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box. The blue triangles are the locations
from which the viewshed has been created. The white, background areas of the map
are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen from the outer defensive box. The area of
central Tifariti is shown by the black circle.
176
Fig. 6.65: This map shows the combined inner and outer viewsheds (in pink to red) in
and around the entirety of the Tifariti box. The cross hatched areas are areas of key
terrain, while the criss-cross hatched area indicates the inner Tifariti defensive box.
The white, background areas of the map are dead ground – areas that cannot be seen
from any of the defences. The area of central Tifariti is shown by the black circle.
177
Fig. 6.66: Distribution of entrenched defences within and around the Tifariti box. Key
terrain is shown cross-hatched. All defensive positions are represented by red dots.
Yellow triangles represent defensive positions with approach trenches, while those
shown as light blue dots represent groups of fighting positions linked by trenches. The
red criss-crossed areas are minefields (MF).
178
Fig. 6.67: Distribution of built up structures in and around the Tifariti box: shown by
yellow diamonds. Built up structures include sangars and shelters, and/or soldiers’
accommodation. All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key terrain
is shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields.
179
Fig. 6.68: Distribution of artillery gun pits in and around the Tifariti box. Blue dots
represent gun pits up to 4 metres in diameter. Yellow squares are gun pits larger than
4 metres in diameter. Criss-crossed yellow squares represent gun pits with associated
dug outs. All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key terrain is
shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields.
180
Fig. 6.69: Distribution of vehicular slots in and around the Tifariti box. Blue triangles
represent small defensive slots that could have accommodated jeeps and/or trucks.
Yellow squares are larger slots that could have accommodated tanks and/or selfpropelled artillery. All other defensive positions are represented by red dots. Key
terrain is shown cross-hatched. The red criss-crossed areas are minefields.
181
Fig. 6.70: An illustrative density plot of all the defensive features making up the
Tifariti box. The darker the colour, from grey to black, represents a greater density of
features: there is obviously a greater density in the northern half of the box compared
to the southern half.
182
Fig. 6.71: This map indicates avenues of approach into Tifariti, shown by the grey
arrows. A ‘plain of mobility’ existed in the open hamada desert to the immediate
south and southeast of Tifariti. The area of central Tifariti is shown by the black
circle.
183
Fig. 6.72: View of a disused Polisario/SPLA shelter in the Akhchach area northeast of
Tifariti. Note how mud bricks and mortared rubble has been used to enhance the
original, naturally hollowed out rock of the shelter, turning it into useable
accommodation.
184
Fig. 6.73: The location of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ extends within the black rectangle.
The red rectangle is the extent of the detailed Google Earth view in Fig. 6.74.
185
Fig. 6.74: The approximate centre of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ (for location, see Fig. 6.73), as seen in Google Earth (shown in monochrome
for clarity). The scale in the lower left indicates 100 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
186
Fig. 6.75: A captured, American made, Moroccan jeep with a 105mm recoilless rifle
mounted on the rear. Photo taken at the SADR Military Museum, Rabuni.
Fig. 6.76: A vehicular slot on high ground in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’ with a view over
the surrounding terrain to the north. This is a well built feature, just large enough for a
jeep type vehicle. To the right of the metre scale are the ruins of a stone shelter:
presumably for accommodation or ammunition storage. A further built up structure is
in the background.
187
Fig. 6.77: View of a vehicular slot situated in a low-lying position. This is in a solely
protective position behind the crest of a ridge. This slot probably accommodated a
jeep type vehicle.
188
Fig. 6.78: Composite panorama of buidings in the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. Just left of the metre scale is a vehicular slot; behind it, to the right
and left, are the remains of shelters/accommodation for Moroccan soldiers. These features are protected behind the ridge (to the
northwest) in the rear of the image.
189
Fig. 6.79: A large prehistoric tumulus with the remains of Moroccan soldiers’ shelters built into its flank, just behind and to the right of
the scale bar. There is an area cleared of stones to the right as well. The ridge in the background runs southwest to northeast.
190
Fig. 6.80: Google Earth image (in monochrome for clarity) of a Moroccan
proclamation laid out in stone, proclaiming: ‘God, The Nation, The King’. This
feature is located about one kilometre east of the Spanish fort at Tifariti, near the
southern limit of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. North is in the upper right corner. The scale in
the lower left indicates 30 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
191
Fig. 6.81: Google Earth image of central Tifariti today. Key: 1 = site of early well; 2 = site of recent well diggings; 3 = school; 4 = school
and museum; 5 = infirmary (with water cistern to the north); 6 = model farm; 7 = new housing (the ‘Solidarity District’); 8 = foundations
for SADR government building; 9 = LMA/AOAV offices (landmine clearance); 10 = cemetery; 11 = Mayor’s office (the old Spanish
infirmary); 12 = Spanish fort; 13 = Spanish commandant’s quarters; and 14 = site of the Spanish colonia. The UN’s MINURSO base is
located around 2.75 kilometres to the southeast. The scale in the lower left indicates 200 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
192
Fig. 6.82: Comparison of Bedouin pastoral ranges before (in blue cross hatching) and
after the war with Morocco (in red cross hatching). Based on the testimony of
Kalthoum Salma at Tifariti, 2011.
193
Wadi
Tifariti
Wadi
Legtaf
Fig. 6.83: Distribution of the imprints of tent encampments in the Tifariti Study Area
(shown as red dots) visible on Google Earth imagery dated 21 February 2006:
presumably representing Bedouin encampments from 1991 to early 2006. Moroccan
laid minefields are also shown in red criss-crossed hatching.
194
Wadi
Tifariti
Wadi
Legtaf
Fig. 6.84: Distribution of Bedouin tent sites in the Tifariti Study Area (shown by red
diamonds) occupied and visible on Google Earth imagery dated 21 February 2006.
Pre-February 2006 deserted tent sites (from Fig. 6.83) are shown as grey dots.
195
Wadi
Tifariti
Wadi
Legtaf
Fig. 6.85: The imprints of tent sites visible on Google Earth that were set up after 21
February 2006 but were deserted by 14 May 2008. Tent sites that were visible on 21
February 2006 (from Fig. 6.84) are shown as grey dots.
196
Wadi
Tifariti
Wadi
Legtaf
Fig. 6.86: Tent sites, occupied and visible on Google Earth as of 14 May 2008.
Deserted tent sites that were set up after 21 February 2006 but were deserted by 14
May 2008 (from Fig. 6.85) are shown as grey dots.
197
Fig. 6.87: Examples of the traditional (top) and modern (bottom) Saharawi tents.
Source of upper image: http://www.aliceinwonderlands.com/Africa/sahara.htm and
http://www.aliceinwonderlands.com/Africa/saharaimages/1nomad_family_s_tent-2300.jpg. Bottom image by Martin Dewhurst, available at
http://www.flickr.com/photos/gsr/428297944/in/photostream/ both accessed 12
February 2014.
198
Fig. 6.88: Google Earth view (in monochrome for clarity), in the Tifariti area, of the
impressions (footprints) left from modern tents after a tent site has been abandoned.
There is an unroofed building to the immediate left of the tent impressions. The scale
in the lower left indicates 25 metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
199
Wadi
Tifariti
Wadi
Legtaf
Fig. 6.89: Distribution of tent sites as of 14 May 2008 overlying tent sites of 21
February 2006 - showing overall shift towards the northeast. Yellow dots = 2008 tent
sites. Red diamonds = 2006 tent sites. Grey dots = tent sites prior to 2006, and tent
sites set up after 2006, but not occupied in May 2008.
200
Fig. 6.90: Google Earth image of impressions of tent emplacements set up for
Polisario National Congresses held at Tifariti. The scale in the lower left indicates 30
metres. Date of image: 18/3/13, DigitalGlobe.
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Fig. 6.91: View of Tifariti with tents from one of the Polisario Congresses. Image
source: http://blogdebanderas.com/2012/01/21/coleccion-de-banderas-del-saharaoccidental/ accessed 13 February 2014.
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Fig. 6.92: Plot of tent locations for Polisario/SADR National Congresses held at
Tifariti in 2003 and 2007. Also showing the old Spanish airstrip that is used for SPLA
displays and marches.
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Fig. 6.93: View looking north along the old Spanish airstrip. Now the parade ground
for the Polisario/SADR National Congresses held at Tifariti every four years.
Spectator stands are to the right.
Fig. 6.94: Map of Western Sahara in front of the stands at the Tifariti parade ground.
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Fig. 6.95: Stone representation of the Saharawi flag on a northeast facing hillside just
west of central Tifariti. Image source: http://www.lasonet.com/sahara/sh-247.htm
accessed 13 February 2014.
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Fig. 7.1: Distribution of sites of all visible out-of-door ARTifariti artworks, recorded
in 2011.
206
Fig. 7.2: Distribution of artworks from ARTifariti 2007 recorded in 2011: AR21,
AR22, and AR24. (Note: AR21 is a linear artwork shown only by the positions of its
NW and SE ends.)
207
Fig. 7.3: Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22) by Fernando Pinteño (ARTifariti 2007), looking
southeast. Image source: ARTifariti.
208
Fig. 7.4: Google Earth image of Breakfast at Tifariti (AR22). North is to the lower
left. Some dug out positions from the Moroccan military occupation are visible, as is
the SADR flag, laid out in painted stones on the northern flank of the high ground in
the centre of the image. Scale bar at lower left indicates 80 metres. Date of image
14/5/08, Digital Globe.
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Fig. 7.5: Camino del Retorno or The Way to Return, also known as Camino del Aaiún
or The Way to El-Ayoun (AR21) created by the contributors to ARTifariti 2007 and
2008. This view is westerly, while the linear artwork extends to the northwest.
Photographed in 2011. Photographed in 2011.
Fig. 7.6: View to the northwest along The Way to El-Ayoun (AR21). Photographed in
2011.
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Fig. 7.7: Proyecto de Eliminacón 1 or Removal Project 1 by Carlos de Gredos (March
2007) on the Cerro Gallinaro headland, Avila, Spain. Image source: photo by Carlos
de Gredos, available at http://cerrogallinero.com/la-coleccion/obra-efimera/proyectode-eliminacion-1/ accessed 1 May 2013.
Fig. 7.8: Proyecto de Eliminacón 2 or Removal Project 2 (AR24) by Carlos de Gredos
(ARTifariti 2007). This artwork is situated amidst Moroccan fortified positions at the
eastern end of the Tifariti ‘redoubt’. Image source: ARTifariti.
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Fig. 7.9: Distribution of ARTifariti 2008 artworks recorded in 2011: AR2, AR3-5-6,5
AR8, AR10, AR11, AR13, AR21, AR23and AR25. (AR21, which was created in
2007 is also shown since it was worked on in 2008 as well.)
5
AR3-5-6 is a single, location only, designation for some of the artwork carried out at the old Spanish
fort. It includes AR3 and AR3a, AR5 and AR6. AR23 is also a single locational designation, including
AR23, and AR23a to AR23d.
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Fig. 7.10: Caballo de Troya Saharaui or the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13) by
Rolando de la Rosa (ARTifariti 2008). The sculpture is facing eastwards. Image
sources; main photo: Nick Brooks; insert, detail of right front leg of the piece:
ARTifariti.
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Fig. 7.11: The head of the sculpture, the Saharawi Trojan Horse (AR13). The head
has been made from shrapnel and its mane is made up of spent gun cartridges. Image
source: photo by Nick Brooks.
Fig. 7.12: El Muro de la Vergüenza, or The Wall of Shame (AR10) by Federico
Guzman (ARTifariti 2008). This piece is situated outside the LMA/AOAV offices in
Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti.
214
Fig. 7.13: Victimas Inocentes or Innocent Victims (AR8) by Karim Sergoua
(ARTifariti 2008). An artwork painted onto the ruined, east facing, sloping roof of the
colonial period Spanish Infirmary. Photographed in 2011.
215
Fig. 7.14: Gritos bajo los escombros de Tifariti or Cries under the ruins of Tifariti
(AR23) by Abd el Kader Belhorissat (ARTifariti 2008), painted onto the ruined roof
of the southwest corner of the old Spanish Fort at Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti.
216
Fig. 7.15: El renacimiento de un pueblo or The Rebirth of a Nation (AR23a) by
Djeddal Adlane (ARTifariti 2008). This piece has been painted onto the east facing
wall of the western range of the old Spanish fort at Tifariti, and facing into the central
courtyard. Image source: ARTifariti.
217
Fig. 7.16: Un orden estblecido or An established order (AR23b) by Barris Syphax
(ARTifariti 2008). This piece is located just to the north of The Rebirth of a Nation, in
the northwest courtyard corner of the old Spanish fort. Image source: ARTifariti.
218
Fig. 7.17: Wall painting simply entitled S/T (AR23c) by Azzouz Seïf El Islem
(ARTifariti 2008), located on the south facing external wall of the southeast corner of
the old Spanish fort at Tifariti. Image source: ARTifariti.
Fig. 7.18: View, looking east, of a wall painting on the south facing side of the old
Spanish fort, entitled, No me muevo hacia atrás or I do not move backwards (AR3) by
Bessaï Zineddine (ARTifariti 2008). Image source: ARTifariti.
219
Fig. 7.19: Silhouette portraits of the Algerian delegation of artists at ARTifariti 2008.
The piece is simply entitled, El Grupo or The Group (AR3a). Images source:
ARTifariti.
220
Fig. 7.20: Graffiti like paintwork on the south facing wall of the north range of the
Spanish fort (AR23d); carried out by members of the Algerian group of artists
attending ARTifariti in 2008. Image source: ARTifariti.
221
Fig. 7.21: Viajando al Paraíso or Travelling Paradise (AR11) by Maria Ortega
Estepa (ARTifariti 2008). This mural was painted onto the façade of a building
constructed on the foundation platform of a Spanish period colonia pre-fabricated
house. It faces southeast. Image source: ARTifariti.
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Fig. 7.22: La sombra del gnomon or The shadow of the gnomon (AR25) by Guillermo
Roiz (ARTifariti 2008). Upper image: the hand is ‘the gnomon’, able to cast a shadow
over the two stone circles. The circle in the foreground was made from quartz while
the other circle was made from red stones. The lower, Google Earth image shows the
two circles of this artwork clearly. North, for both images, is in the lower left. The
scale bar in the lower left of the Google Earth image indicates 30 metres. It is a
DigitalGlobe image, dated 18/3/13. Source of upper image: ARTifariti.
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Fig. 7.23: Distribution of ARTifariti 2009 artworks recorded in 2011: AR1, AR7,
AR8, AR12, AR19, and AR20.
224
Fig. 7.24: Muro de la Vergüenza ‘F Word’ Tour 2010 or Wall of Shame ‘F Word’
Tour (ARTifariti 2009) by Francis Gomila. Plotted on Google Earth and posted on
vimeo. Image source: from http://vimeo.com/9645169, accessed 16 May 2003.
225
Fig. 7.25: Fósforo: Piss for peace or PHOSPHOR: Piss for peace (ARTifariti 2009)
by Francis Gomila and Bettina Semmer. A GPS track plotted at Tifariti and uploaded
onto Google Maps, showing the ancient alchemy symbol for phosphorous. Image
source: from http://piss4peace.digitalshrines.com/#home, accessed 16 May 2013.
226
Fig. 7.26: Ficción o realidad or Fiction or Reality (AR8a) by Kenza Mebarak
(ARTifariti 2009). Wall painting and accompanying installation applied to the old
Spanish period infirmary, now the office of the mayor of Tifariti. Image source:
ARTifariti.
227
Fig. 7.27: Distribution of ARTifariti 2010 artworks recorded in 2011: AR3-5-6, AR4,
AR14, AR17, AR18, and AR19.
228
Fig. 7.28: Portrait of Nayem El Garhi (AR4) by Federico Guzman (ARTifariti 2010),
killed by Moroccan security forces at the Saharawi Gdeim Izik protest camp in
Moroccan occupied El-Ayoun in 2010.
229
Fig. 7.29: U’m Dreiga, or Oum Dreiga (AR18) by Mohamed Moulud Yeslam (ARTifariti 2010). Referred to as a Saharawi ‘Guernica’,
dedicated to the Saharawi civilians killed at Oum Dreiga and Tifariti during the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara. Image source:
ARTifariti.
230
Fig. 7.30: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures squatting outside
traditional Bedouin tents carrying out ‘daily chores’. Image source: ARTifariti.
231
Fig. 7.31: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing figures in agony, with the purple
colouring above them representing a Moroccan napalm attack. Image source:
ARTifariti.
232
Fig. 7.32: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing the artist next to one of the two
large faces that are on either side of the artwork. Image source: ARTifariti.
233
Fig. 7.33: Detail from Oum Dreiga (AR18) showing a crow or raven clasping a
Saharawi baby. Image source: ARTifariti.
234
Fig. 7.34: ‘The Massacre of Gdaeim Izik’ - with crows or ravens eating Saharawi
children. Image source: http://mouludyeslem.blogspot.co.uk/search?updatedmin=2012-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2013-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&maxresults=2 accessed 18 May 2013.
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