Peace in Analogue/ Digital International Relations

Global Change, Peace & Security formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpar20 Peace in Analogue/ Digital International Relations Oliver P. Richmond To cite this article: Oliver P. Richmond (2020) Peace in Analogue/ Digital International Relations, Global Change, Peace & Security, 32:3, 317-336, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2020.1825370 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2020.1825370 Published online: 07 Oct 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 204 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cpar20 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 2020, VOL. 32, NO. 3, 317–336 https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2020.1825370 Peace in Analogue/ Digital International Relations Oliver P. Richmond Department of Politics, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY This article outlines a preliminary perspective of peace in IR resting on analogue and digital versions in mainstream and critical forms. It discusses their implications for long standing key debates in the discipline about war and peace. It argues that digital IR/ international relations were initially thought to be a breakthrough for global civil society and rights, which promised a more emancipatory form of peace by allowing individuals and civil society to challenge power structures more effectively, and by curtailing the bounding effects of territorialism, sovereignty and nationalism. This gave critical forms of agency space to network. However, a brewing ‘counter-revolution’ of what might be now called the ‘ancien regime’ once again, points to digital forms of governmentality, which replicates the liberal and neoliberal governmentalities of the last few decades. This may make the analogue ‘liberal peace’ look like a virtuous high-water mark in recent history. Furthermore, a digital version of peace has yet to be developed. Received 23 June 2020 Accepted 11 September 2020 KEYWORDS Peace studies; peacebuilding; international relations theory; digital … an experimental tool in a terrestrial struggle to covert history and politics into information and data.1 Introduction Has there been a substantive change in the nature of peace and international relations under the conditions of contemporary neoliberal and digital globalisation? How is this compared to the recent industrial and geopolitical world of the Twentieth Century (moderated as it was by liberal international institutions and law)? Analogue international relations operated in the territorially sovereign context of twentieth century politics and technology, moderated by the national interest, but digital forms appear to offer the potential of even more global networks, mobility, speed, and transgressive alliances, enabling emancipatory rather than merely state-based forms of peace and security.2 This may mean that the existing methods of peacemaking become no longer viable. Furthermore, digital additions to international relations have had much hope placed in them but they may merely extend the geopolitical international system and the liberal international CONTACT Oliver P. Richmond oliver.richmond@manchester.ac.uk 1 Mark Duffield, Post-Humanitarianism (Cambridge: Polity, 2019), 153–4. 2 See for example, J. Eriksson and G. Giacomello, ‘The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations: (IR)relevant Theory?’, International Political Science Review 27, no. 3 (2006): 221–44. This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 318 O. P. RICHMOND architecture.3 There is concern about these questions at the highest levels of international organisation.4 In order to address this question, this article makes a fairly crude conceptual division in the recent history of IR using the analogy of analogue and digital political governmentality.5 This shift is propelling governmentality from its analogue, industrial and liberal forms into neoliberal and digital forms.6 The changing nature of governmentality has been closely connected to the development of peace in IR, from negative to positive, and onwards to newer iterations such as everyday or hybrid.7 This spans its analogue nineteenth century geopolitical iteration, requiring crude modulations of power moderated by elite face to face diplomacy and conferences designed to support the balance of power,8 the liberal peace in the twentieth century as seen in the Washington Consensus of the early 1990s,9 and more recently the neoliberal peace, which dominated the post-war political process in Iraq.10 The neoliberal peace framework is now connected to new technological and thus governmental innovations, such as the infamous Human Terrain System.11 This has extended the dimensions of power in analogue terms into a digital framework, with as yet indeterminate effects on the social construction of a post-colonial, hybrid political order necessary for human rights and emancipatory forms of peace.12 Analogue systems of international relations are also related to thinking about the Holocene and its boundaries, versus the Anthropocene with its complexity and focus on integrated, interconnected systems, reflected in digital, networked approaches. The latter point to broad questions of global and inter-generational sustainability.13 This might be termed global justice, to which conceptions of peace might be better connected (if they are not framed by geopolitics or neoliberalism). This article proceeds by firstly outlining a preliminary perspective of peace in IR resting on analogue and digital versions in mainstream and critical forms and discusses their 3 ‘Technology and its Discontents’, The Economist, 16 April 2018: C. Aradau and T. Blanke, ‘The (Big) Data-security assemblage: Knowledge and critique’, Big Data & Society 2, no. 2, (October 2015): J.P. Singh, ‘Information Technologies, Metapower, and Transformations in Global Politics’, International Studies Review 15, no. 1 (2013): 5–29. 4 See for example, Confidential Sources, Personal Interviews, UN DPKO, New York, 9–10th March, 2016. 5 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87– 104. 6 Romain Badouard, et al., ‘Beyond “Points of Control”: Logics of Digital Governmentality’, Internet Policy Review 5, no. 3 https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/beyond-points-control-logics-digital(2016). doi:10.14763/2016.3.433. governmentality. 7 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191: Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011). 8 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, Vintage Books, 1987). 9 John Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, ed. Williamson, John (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1989). 10 Oliver P. Richmond, Failed State Building (Yale University Press, 2004). 11 Maximilian C. Forte, ‘The Human Terrain System and Anthropology: A Review of Ongoing Public Debates’, American Anthropologist 113, no. 1 (2001): 149–53. 12 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 519–38:c Nadarajah, Suthaharan and David Rampton, ‘The limits of hybridity and the crisis of liberal peace’, Review of International Studies 41, no. 1 (2015): 49–72: Stuart Hall, ‘When was “the post-colonial”? Thinking at the Limit’, in The Postcolonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, eds. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti (Routledge, 1996), 242–59. See also M. Mayer, et al., ‘A Toolbox for Studying the Global Politics of Science and Technology’, in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, eds. M. Mayer, et al., Vol. 2. (Springer, Berlin, 2014). 13 John S. Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering, The Politics of the Anthropocene (Oxford University Press, 2019), 8. GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 319 implications for long standing debates about war and peace. It then presents the analogue/ digital disjuncture as something of a binary change in two subsequent sections (though the digital framework has been evolving for a long time as an overlay onto the analogue system of the twentieth Century industrial state, itself replacing nineteenth Century imperialism).14 This approach is partly rhetorical, but partly to emphasise the significant shifts now underway. Subsequently, in a section on peace and war in digital international relations, the article argues that digital international relations were initially thought to be a breakthrough for global civil society and expanded human rights in a global and networked framework. Social movements could gain information on best practice and knowledge, form global networks and transversal alliances which could see an obscure social moment say in Kosovo engaging with a UN agency or senior diplomat.15 It has led to the UN’s Sustaining Peace agenda (an outgrowth of the UN Sustainable Development Agenda) as a discursive framing for new practices to emerge.16 However, a brewing counter-revolution of what might be now called a revitalised ‘ancien regime’ instead points to digital forms of governmentality, which supports existing power complexes and reduces the remaining legitimacy of older institutions, the state and international law and organisations. It foregrounds national interests (and national disinterest) over rights as well as humanitarianism, as in Syria since the failure of UN mediation.17 It concludes by proposing that the liberal peace architecture is being replaced by technological rationalities of power that may well reduce rights, the good life, security and legitimacy to a level of depoliticised, virtual peace.18 This may make the analogue ‘liberal peace’ look like a virtuous high-water mark in recent history, despite its defects.19 Peace in analogue international relations A first step is to explain the analogy of analogue and digital forms of international relations, and its relevance for peace.20 Analogue forms of international relations and IR theory pertained to a territorially situated world of international relations involving huge distances, centralised governments, territorial sovereignty, the states-system, and the development of inter-governmental and non-governmental transnational institutions.21 This was a world in which time, space, and technology, interacted with states 14 H.G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reactions of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (Dover: Mineola, 1901), 3. Cited by Duncan Bell, ‘Founding the World State: HG Wells on Empire and the English Speaking Peoples’, International Studies Quarterly, (2018, forthcoming). 15 Visoka, Gëzim, Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood (London: Palgrave, 2017). 16 Advisory Group of Experts, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace (New York: UN, June 2015), 1–12. See also, High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO), UN Resolutions A/70/95 & S/2015/446, June 2015. 17 Raymond Hinnebusch, et al., UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi (International Peace Institute, 2016). http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09643. 18 Der Derian, James, ‘Virtuous War/Virtual Theory’, International Affairs 766, no. 4(2000): 772–88: Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (London: Palgrave), 202–30. 19 For a comparison of Bosnia, Kosovo, the Middle East, Cambodia, and East Timor, see Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 20 This analogy is partly inspired by the perhaps apocryphal story about how the digital reproduction of music has allowed its mass circulation but has undermined the depth and fidelity of older analogue systems of reproduction. T. Libbey, ‘Digital Versus Analog: Digital Music on CD Reigns as the Industry Standard’, Omni 17, no. 5 (Feb 1995). The Analogue/ Digital analogy also relates to current debates about the Holocene and Anthropocene. See John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Anthropocene (OUP, 2019). 21 See for example, N.J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1944). 320 O. P. RICHMOND and societies in a relatively predictable manner described by theories of political realism and liberalism. The state was seen as a Leviathan, balanced externally by other ‘Great Powers’ and shaped, reformed or resisted by social and revolutionary movements, into an internal social contract. International relations were marked by geopolitical power, which drove state-centric wars, institutional balancing, and social frameworks for engagement and critique which also engaged with civil conflict. Social, cultural, and environmental considerations were secondary to ideological, geopolitical and geo-economic forces.22 Peace spanned a victor’s peace to negative peace as a result. The diplomacy and organisational tasks were complex and vast. This can be seen in the logistics required to coordinate and follow up on the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the scale of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, or the Paris Peace Treaty in 1919. One should also consider the risks of the Atlantic Charter meetings in 1941, and the exponential increase in the scale of the annual UN General Assemblies since 1946, the meetings on UN Treaties and Conventions such as the Decolonisation Convention of 196023 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966:24 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also of 1966;25 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979;26 as well as the GATT and World Trade Organisations meetings. They all attest to the scale and potential of international diplomacy and institutional development in an analogue framework, but also to their limitations. Overall, the resultant global political architecture was formed by war and trade, leaving legacies of violence and inequality, but also drove the creation of multilateral institutions and organisations, law (including attempts at the Law of Peace),27 as well as the expectation of expanded social networks and political frameworks of rights and emancipation, as liberal institutions and social movements expanded their operation within the state and the states-system. All of this was conducted through a physical infrastructure dependent upon complex diplomacy, logistics, the mediation of different political interests, legal and bureaucratic systems, often via enormous conferences and meetings over great distance. The vast scale of logistics to implement and maintain such international tools and institutions also in part explains their difficulty in bringing to fruition and later implementation. These institutions eventually responded, to a limited degree at least, to their own limitations (such as with the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly),28 on rights, injustice and inequalities after the UDHR with legal, political, and military instruments,29 and obstacles to critical agency and expanding claims 22 See for example, George F. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, July 1947. Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell, ‘Power Politics by Economic Means: Geoeconomics as an Analytical Approach and Foreign Policy Practice’, Comparative Strategy 37, no. 1 (2018): 73–84. 23 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, December 14, 1960. 24 ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966. 25 ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI),16 December 1966. 26 ‘The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, UN General Assembly Resolution 34/180, 18 December 1979. 27 ‘Declaration on the Right to Peace’, UN General Assembly Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/28, 1 July 2016. 28 ‘Uniting for Peace’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/377(V), 3 November 1950. 29 ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A, December 10, 1948. GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 321 for rights30 often through their connection with what became known as global civil society.31 Analogue social frameworks for critique engendered a range of early advocacy networks,32 which advocated for social change and rights (abolition of slavery and disarmament being two) as well as of states and capital, but they worked within the context of the technologies of the day, which were more suited to territorial forms of sovereignty and centralised, state-centric political authority. Multi-lateralism and the development of civil society was tenuous in this framework given the logistical challenges. Peacemaking in this analogue world rested upon slow, face-to face, elitist diplomacy and institutions, operating in human time, amplified by twentieth century technologies, in which the industrial West- and elite classes dominated. Positionality within the hierarchy was closely guarded, along with the sources of state and political, economic power and the processes of institutional and social governmentality. This facilitated a mainstream debate based upon the eternal nature of state-units, hierarchies, and interests (and their state-based clashes) or alternatively, in liberal terms, the universal nature of human rights guaranteed by a mixture of state and international law. The analogue system of international relations thus protected long-standing hierarchies, and was based upon geopolitics and territorial sovereignty as ways of organising power and capital. Historical processes of state formation in the long term,33 legitimated a nationalist narrative about the origins and current status of state and international order, despite their many shortcomings.34 Sovereignty, multilateralism, intervention, and law worked within this analogue framework. By necessity, it eventually came to have a liberal overlay of normativity that domesticated the worst attributes of geopolitics by focusing on democracy, rights, and trade, later known as the liberal peace.35 Nevertheless, analogue forms of multilateralism were slow and cumbersome, often unwieldy in the industrial era in comparison to geopolitical and geo-economic rationality, which led to constant cycles and escalations of systemic and regional wars from the nineteenth Century onwards. The endeavour to build peace in this context eventually led to the emergence of liberal international institutions to moderate interests, law, regional organisations and NGOs to mobilise and condition social and political agency. They allowed a more positive versions of peace to emerge,36 which in turn facilitated peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development praxis in the later twentieth Century. However, they established themselves as conservative systems of intervention, producing more negative, liberal or neoliberal forms of peace as a historical response to the long-standing geopolitical dynamics of violence and system collapse, as archaeologists have long argued.37 30 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951): Stephanie DeGooyer, Alastair Hunt, Lida Maxwell, and Samuel Moyn, eds. The Right to Have Rights (London: Verso, 2018), 4; S. Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in and Unequal World (Oxford: Belnapp Harvard University Press, 2018), 153–72. 31 Mary Kaldor, ‘The Idea of Global Civil Society’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 79, no. 3 (2003), 583–93. 32 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998), 10. 33 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990). 34 E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism (2nd ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 35 Doyle, Michael, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 205 (1983): 207–8. 36 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Op. Cit., 167–91. 37 Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (New York & Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 322 O. P. RICHMOND Consequently, it can be argued that peace was determined and constructed in analogue international relations by the most hegemonic but centralised states, territorially conceived and bounded, yet pursuing a sophisticated and well supported foreign policy designed to mitigate war, moderated by global institutions and trade. It operated through face-to face governance extended discursively through policy doctrines (this being the early point of many of the arguments of liberal theorists like Locke and Paine).38 It had a historical presence, and a social order that responded to political authority, according to power, autonomy and self-determination, rights and law, as Rousseau argued.39 Such states represented a ‘home’, but were connected through tenuous human, social, military, political, and economic relations with other states. The natural environment was not seen as an agent within such theorising,40 as politics assumed extractive economic models.41 The individual and society were subservient to states in this framework and their agency was amplified by access to certain ‘heavy’ industrial technologies, heavily regulated by law and by capital which at the same time carries forward old imperial or racial hierarchies (though perhaps not explicitly).42 A hierarchy of states remained in international relations, which represented ‘peace’ in a status quo form, mitigated by international organisations. This hierarchy has been relatively unchanged over the time that it has been measured in the Human Development Index.43 In other words, peace in the analogue international system maintained a natural, eternal, and unchanging framework involving acute lines of division and inequality. It was formed mainly in the eighteenth Century, reshaped in the twentieth Century under conditions of industrial scale war making, and decolonisation, liberal internationalist and capitalist responses, and is shifting again with the advent of new actors and new technologies.44 Peace in analogue IR operates within the parameters and material structures of the Westphalian state system. It was heavily territorialist and geopolitical, tending towards the authoritarian or hegemonic,45 this providing the structural constraints against which the state, humans and society struggle in extractive mode. This struggle has produced a series of normative critiques of power, evil, geopolitics, hierarchy, and capital.46 These 38 John. Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1689]). Paine Thomas, Rights of Man (Dover, 2000 [1791]). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, translated by Judith R Masters, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978 [1762]). 40 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 41 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (University of Chicago Center for International Studies Beyond the Headlines Series, 2005). 42 Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia (New York: Farrar, Straus & Geroux, 2012): Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present (London: Penguin Publishing Group, 2012). 43 Compare the previous UN Human Development Reports against the most recent (2017), hdr.undp.org. See also Oliver P Richmond, Failed Statebuilding (Yale University Press, 2014), Appendix 1. 44 O. Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015): Stefan Fritsch, ‘Conceptualizing the Ambivalent Role of Technology in International Relations: Between Systemic Change and Continuity’, in The Global Politics of Science and Technology Vol. 1, edS. Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes and Ruth Knoblich (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014), 116; Beth Simmons, ‘International Studies in the Global Information Age’, International Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 589–99. 45 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in Millennium 10, no. 2) (1981). 46 Ibid: Hurrell, Andrew, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford University Press, 2008). 39 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 323 structures were eventually modified and mitigated, post- WW2 and post-Cold War, by the liberal international system: namely human rights, democracy, and development, embodied in the capacities of the UN, but strictly limited by the power of dominant states (such as key Security Council members). This whole system is determined by the scale, hierarchy, and time frames denoted by territoriality.47 When Fukuyama offered his twentieth Century revision of Kant’s Perpetual Peace to general acclaim, ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ effectively marked the apogee of analogue international relations. Its logic operated within the constraints of industrialised states and their economic and military power (with the additional caveat of the limits of capitalism and its impact on the natural environment).48 Thus, analogue international relations were marked by several phases of conflict and responses in mainstream thinking: the geopolitical phase, responded to by imperial and state balancing: the liberal international phase, responded to by strengthening multilateralism, global governance and international law; the post-colonial phase, to which the response was self-determination, the limited expansion of rights, and the developmental state; and the neoliberal and geoeconomic phase, to which the post Cold War response was limited forms of statebuilding and globalisation.49 The UN system, international law, human rights and democracy,50 resting on Cold War policies of ‘containment’,51 and augmented by the Helsinki Convention, and the Washington Consensus were perhaps the most well-known elements of the analogue order connected with peace.52 As critical versions of IR have pointed out, drawing on Marx, post-colonialism, philosophy, anthropology, and other sources, territorial sovereignty undermined peace and IR’s normative legitimacy as it moved beyond being determined mainly by military, strategic and economic power to social versions as in constructivism.53 This is amplified in critical theory, especially when understood as an amalgamation of subaltern claims54 about social and global justice.55 This drives the concept of peace in international relations beyond geopolitics or capitalist determinations facilitated by the emergence of new technologies (transport, networks, communications, knowledge infrastructures, military applications, etc).56 Constructivism, critical theory, and post-structuralism heralded these shifts early on,57 as a reaction to the Nineteenth Century foundations of realism and neoliberalism, anarchy and material structures, or Nineteenth Century liberalism and its norms, or 47 Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (The University of Chicago Press, 2011). Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, The National Interest (1988). 49 Julien Barbara, ‘Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building: Building Post-Conflict Development States’, Development in Practice 18, no. 3 (2008) (Jun.): 307–8. 50 Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 1 & 2 (1983): 205–35, 323–353. 51 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (The University of Chicago Press, 1984). 52 M. Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical theory Perspective’, International Journal of Peace Studies 10, No. 2 (2005): 23–42. 53 Martha Finnemore, National Interests In International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 2. 54 Rebecca Hovey, ‘Critical Pedagogy and International Studies: Reconstructing Knowledge Through Dialogue with the Subaltern’, International Relations 18, no. 2 (2004): 241–54. 55 Janet M. Conway, Edges of Global Justice: The World Social Forum and Its ‘Others’ (New York: Routledge, 2012). 56 Stefan Fritsch, Op.Cit (2014): P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Craig Warkentin, Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 57 J. Der Derian, ‘From War 2.0 to Quantum War: The Superpositionality of Global Violence’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 5 (2013): 570–85: J. Der Derian, Critical Practices of International Theory: Selected Essays (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2009). 48 324 O. P. RICHMOND indeed, Marxist understandings of class relations under conditions of capitalism and imperialism. Peace in digital international relations Though the potential of the digital shift is as great as the industrial shift earlier, it carries all the attendant risks of war, as experienced after the ‘long peace’ between the Congress of Vienna (of dubious provenance) and the breakdown of domestic and international order from the beginning of the Twentieth Century, when industrialised, imperial power escaped the peace systems that had constrained Nineteenth Century states and power relations.58 The ‘long peace’ was replaced by another, rough, long peace (marred by northern hegemony, wars in the global south as well as the structural conflict of the Cold War) under US hegemony from 1945,59 and this analogue order is now in the process of breaking down. Unlike the last breakdown from around 1914–1945, the question is how might we prevent war as we shift into the digital era after neo/liberal hegemony?60 Critical debates have long pointed to the contradictory and cumbersome nature of mainstream IR in analogue mode.61 Post-structuralism pointed to identity, fluidity, mobility, difference and critical agency over cumbersome systems of sovereignty;62 critical theory pointed to the limits of territorialism and the need for global systems of legitimate authority, and justice;63 constructivism pointed to the social construction of political frameworks, institutions, the state, and the international; post-colonialism pointed to political and social hybridity and a more radical process of decolonisation; gender debates and environmental discussions opened up new dimensions of inequality in a range of ways, from the ontological to the methodological.64 Critical work on security and post-colonialism has also pointed in this direction,65 raising questions about new forms of emancipation particularly those driven by subaltern perspectives on peace.66 The ‘digital’ is a term that appears to capture the contemporary zeitgeist. It signifies leaderless, dextrous, and decentralised, networks, nodes, and associations between varied political, social, and economic groups, both human and technological. It depends on new technology aimed at disrupting existing political modes of organisation and 58 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987). 59 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, International Security 10, no. 4 (Spring) (1986): 99–142: Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). 60 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown Pub, 1977). 61 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Introduction to International Relations (Lynne Rienner Publishers, US, 1994). 62 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 63 David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (Cambridge, UK Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2004):; Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory. A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Taylor & Francis, 2004). 64 Christine Sylvester, Feminist International Relations: An unfinished Journey (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002): William Connolly, Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). 65 Paul Williams, ‘Critical Security Studies’, in International Society and Its Critics, ed. Bellamy, A (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 135. 66 Oliver P Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011), conclusion. GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 325 entrenched power-relations within analogue IR. However, it may also extend existing and historical centres of legitimate authority or power-relations, that are ambivalent about rights and everyday political claims.67 Digital rationalities are ontologically different in scale because the key dimensions of the analogue- space/ distance, time, power/ knowledge- are now fundamentally changed.68 Space, distance, and time have been altered by new technologies and transactions take place at much greater distances and speeds (as with information, capital or missiles).69 Law, rights, and political institutions still operate in analogue scales, however. Network theory and work on global assemblages have made this clear, but the extent to which this undermines socio-political ethics essential for peace, is only now becoming clearer.70 The rational-actor model is being taken to an extreme, removing the social and the political from the equations of IR. Knowledge is now democratised in digital form, but power has shifted from its control to the control of networks and access to them. Power is thus re-centralised rather than democratised under the emerging conditions of digital governmentality.71 Thus, IR, peace, security and order, are no longer centred on the territorial state, but on an amorphous, complex, and unstable set of networks, with constantly changing personal, fluid goals, all dependent upon the next technological enhancement, which shifts their capacities again. Knowledge is no longer universal as in liberalism but must be disruptive of established consensus and patterns, meaning that any peace framework would attempt to stabilise systems designed to be unstable (contradicting the liberal peace framework that prospered when states and institutions were stable).72 Digital frameworks fundamentally aim to undermine the checks and balances that maintained existing power relations at social, state, and international levels of analysis, partly by bypassing them with new technologies and frameworks, partly through disruption, and partly through collapsing analogue, material conceptions of time, space, distance, and power. Scale jumping ensues, unsettling old political hierarchies, which nevertheless will respond. Networks have always been the historical backbone of social order, often hidden and extremely resilient; they have been a significant feature of archaeological and anthropological data and theory on the collapse or survival of societies of minor and major scale throughout history.73 Nevertheless, their digitisation allows for a fundamental amplification of their significance.74 Digital time is not linear or constrained by material factors: progress or backsliding- features of liberal thought- are too simplistic to understand the dimensions, fluctuations and incredible speeds, and potentially intergenerational nature- of digital time. All of this has augmented humanity, changed society, altered the nature of the state (and its relevance), influenced global governance, and created new forms of global collaboration and conflict. Thus, it has implications for war and 67 Martin Coward, ‘Against Network Thinking: A critique of Pathological Sovereignty’, European Journal of International Relations 24, no. 2 (2017): 443–4. See for example, Hannah Knox, and Antonia Walford, ‘Is There an Ontology to the Digital?’ Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology website, (March 24, 2016). https://culanth.org/fieldsights/818-is-there-an-ontology-to-the-digital 69 Owen, Op. Cit., 30. 70 Martin Coward, Op. Cit., 452–6. 71 Contra Owen, Op. Cit., 30. 72 Ibid., 38. 73 Joseph A. Tainter, (1988), Op. Cit. 74 Manual Castells, Communication Power (OUP, 2009), 21. 68 326 O. P. RICHMOND peace, for law and institutions, for their intersections with the environment, markets and capital, and further technological advances. The digital shift represents a major change for the international system from being based upon Euro-centric notions of territorial sovereignty, to the development and control of networks relating to key states, capital, technology, knowledge/ information, as well as more traditional class, diplomatic, and military networks. Coward has described its elevation of networks as a ‘pathological sovereignty’ by way of a replacement for rights, identity, and territoriality, which seems more likely to merely extend the pathologies of earlier forms of sovereignty through fantasies of the precise application of force, governance, and the ability to bypass ethics and culture.75 This is part of a century (and more) long development at least, relating to an increasingly precise political praxis for social and international intervention, selective de-territorialisation, and the increasing speed of transactions, partially moderated by global governance. Communications and transport advances have changed the structural impediments of nature, geography, shifting the speeds and distance through and over which civil society, the state, and international actors can operate significantly (as Virilio also pointed out in the context of the Gulf War for the military).76 Access to knowledge, and its production, has significantly improved and widened. Positionalities across time and space have become much more discernible, even for the subalterns of IR/ international relations.77 This has enormous implications for rights and justice claims, in local and global scales, whether related to violence or inequality, war, gender, or the natural environment.78 Digital technologies amplify the power of people and networks, as well as the state, capital and the ‘international’, but not in the same ways or at the same levels. Significant inequalities remain and are amplified, and contradictions are becoming even more politicised. A digital struggle is forming between individuals and society, the state, the international and capital, with shifting networks and alliances forming, to push forward rights claims or to reject them. They contest the nature of the state, the extent of the political community (local to global), the priorities of politics and IR particularly relating to access to new rights.79 In this struggle analogue concepts like territory, borders and institutions are little more than obstacles to digital political agendas: whether expanded rights or expanded geo-economic power. These dynamics have been useful for ‘global civil society’ and its ‘norm cascades’ in the last few decades,80 as well as for populist nationalism, and the disruption of political organisations (such as Russian campaigns aimed at NATO, the EU, Ukraine and other states in the region, as well as possible interventions through social media and right-wing capital in the US election in 2017 and the Brexit referendum in the UK in 2016).81 While the early literature indicated that cascades of liberal civil society activism 75 Ibid., 444 & 452–6. P. Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light (London: Continuum, 2002). 77 See the collection edited by Robbie Shilliam, International Relations and Non-Western Thought (London: Routledge, 2010). 78 See for example, Christine Sylvester, ‘The Forum: Emotion and the Feminist IR Researcher’, International Studies Review 13, no. 4, 1 (2011): 687–708: R. Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013): 763–83. 79 Taylor Owen, Op. Cit., 35. Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004): 283. 80 Kaldor, Op. Cit. Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52 (autumn) (1998): 887–917. 76 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 327 would take over the state and reshape the international system, authoritarian power, and the markets, offering expanded rights, a more mature view points to how long entrenched power relations are now reinforcing themselves through digital strategies which enable power to shift into atmospheric modes, transcending the state and ‘legacy’ international architecture of the twentieth Century.82 While digital international relations are heavily networked, this means that control of networks and their nodes is vital for hegemony, and though digital IR might seem to promise to devolve power because networks are relational, they are utilitarian, transactional, and reflect established power-relations too. Networks also maintain hierarchies, meaning that interests may proliferate even faster across these widening networks. Thus, this may offer a form of digital governmentality, designed to counter the expansion of social movements and global rights frameworks and their related connection of peace, security, and development with emancipatory claims. Mainstream digital international relations thus extends realism and liberalism into digital governmentality connected to surveillance capital,83 designed for corporate profit, scientific innovation, and more importantly to manage or quell the political claims of the world’s populations for global justice. Yet, this damages attempts to reconstruct political authority after war, as can be seen with the reversion to authoritarian power in Cambodia,84 or the regression of the peace process in Colombia.85 Digital international relations tends to be virtual rather than face to face, perhaps even more based upon interests because it lacks the potential for empathy or interest in society and culture than its analogue version was.86 Its virtual, networked, accelerated mode is merely a precursor to the next stages in the development of war, power, diplomacy, and trade.87 These next stages build on data, access, and networks to bypass the established mitigating systems of international relations, including the shift to future remote operations (utilising drones for warfare, peacekeeping or intelligence, connected to power and hegemony etc), and the automation of international relations more extensively. Under the emerging digital framework, power may shift from access and control of the key institutions of the territorial state and economy under the analogue mode (eg security services, the military, political institutions, infrastructure, the UN, IFIs, and donor system etc). It may shift to the control of networks between them, nodes around the network, their modes of operation, their speed and access in digital international relations.88 The emergence of an enhanced capacity to network through technology speeds up the application of power and interests, the coordination of policy goals, and the ability to extend governmentality. This is the basis of Latour’s conception of the actor-network.89 It 81 Tony Barber, ‘A Renewed Nationalism is Stalking Europe’, Financial Times: The Economist (11 July 2016), (19 November 2016). ‘Trump’s World: The New Nationalism’, The Economist. Owen, Op. Cit., 172–81. 83 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (London: Profile, 2019), 9. 84 Lee Morgenbesser, ‘Cambodia’s Transition to Hegemonic Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1(2019): 158– 71. 85 Jasmin Hristov, Paramilitarism and Neoliberalism: Violent Systems of Capital Accumulation in Colombia and Beyond (London: Pluto Press, 2016). 86 For example, see R. Badouard, C. Mabi, and G. Sire, ‘Beyond “Points of Control”: Logics of Digital Governmentality’, Internet Policy Review 5, no. 3 (2016): B. Latour, Reassembling the social. An introduction to the Actor-Network Theory (Oxford University Press, 1999): M. Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777–95. 87 Virilio, Op. Cit.: Der Derian, “From War 2.0 to quantum war”, Op. Cit. 88 M. Castells, Communication Power (OUP, 2009), 44 & 419. 89 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social (OUP, 2005). 82 328 O. P. RICHMOND connects technology to the state and international, as well as to research, capital, the military and industry (but omits to engage with the problem of the limits of the natural world itself).90 Simultaneously, it facilitates activities and networks of advocacy and resistance pertaining to rights, equality, and justice. Time and distance collapse under its conditions, as has long been argued,91 provoking heavily modified social claims for justice,92 in the changing context of the Anthropocene.93 These developments may well facilitate mobility, communication, expanded rights and social mobilisation; equality under decentralised power-systems and democratised forms of knowledge; new and more relevant forms of legitimate political authority, perhaps through peace formation;94 as well as a greater understanding of the cultural, aesthetic/ visual, and normative dimensions of difference and cooperation.95 Critical thinking about the Anthropocene and the risks of human impact on the ecosystem provides early hints about the tensions between it, and the limits of digital international relations. However, digital international relations are also dominated by power, along networks connecting new actors, with new interests with analogue sites of power such as classes, the state, military capacity, and capital. It represents a form of digital governmentality that displaces its former liberal and neo-liberal versions, very much akin to ‘surveillance capitalism’.96 Zubov argues that the latter, … runs contrary to the early digital dream … it strips away the illusion that the networked form has some kind of indigenous moral content, that being ‘connected’ is somehow intrinsically pro-social, innately inclusive, or naturally tending towards the democratisation of knowledge … . At its core surveillance capitalism is parasitic and self-referential.97 Thus, digital international relations creates a context for rethinking the concept of peace that is partly characterised by a tendency towards disruption after the failure of various types of liberal governance in the analogue mode.98 Whether it offers progress for global civil society, rights, democracy, and sustainability, or is regressive and enforces neoliberal power or geopolitical inequality, is open for debate. More critical versions of digital IR raise even deeper questions of sustainability, equality, and representation (perhaps following the logic of critical debates about the Anthropocene), expanding the mobilisation of social actors across its networks, utilising its flexibility and speed, but always in opposition to digital governmentality to engage with long term questions of sustainability. 90 David Chandler, Ontopolitics in the Anthropocene (London: Routledge, 2017), 21. Stephen Graham, ‘The End of Geography or the Explosion of Place? Conceptualizing Space, Place and Information Technology’, Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 165–85. 92 Taylor Owen, Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age (OUP, 2015). 93 P. Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind: The Anthropocene’, Nature 415 (2002): 23. G. Durbeck, et al., ‘Human and Non-Human Agencies in the Anthropocene’, Ecozon 6, no. 1 (2016): 118–36. 94 Oliver P. Richmond, Peace Formation and Political Order (OUP, 2016). 95 The UN’s Global Pulse project is one example of a response, through which UN agencies, private organisations, offers the capacity through ‘big data’ and global social networks to engage in humanitarianism. UNGP, ‘Harnessing Innovation to Protect the Vulnerable’, www.globalpulse.org, 2009, p.13. See also Mark Duffield, Post-Humanitarianism (Cambridge: Polity, 2019) 153. 96 See Shoshana Zuboff, Op.Cit., 9: R. Badouard, et al., ‘Beyond “Points of Control”: Logics of Digital Governmentality’, Internet Policy Review 5, no. 3: 3 & 9: C. Aradau and T. Blanke, ‘Politics of Prediction: Security and the Time/Space of Governmentality in the Age of Big Data’, European Journal of Social Theory 20, no. 3 (2017: 373–91. 97 Shoshana Zuboff, Op.Cit., p.9. 98 David Chandler, Ontopolitics in the Anthropocene (London: Routledge, 2018), 159. 91 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 329 However, since the 1990s the pace and scale of the expansion of rights frameworks and inclusion (particularly of social and civil actors) has increased very substantially. For example, the numbers of NGOs registered globally with ECOSOC have increased from some 40 in 1948 to 3382.99 There are an estimated 10 million NGOs now in existence around the world, many of them globally networked around liberal democratic, human rights, justice, humanitarian, development and equality issues, connected to key international institutions and donors.100 This aspect of digital international relations promises an international emancipatory project, by connecting peace, development, and the international system to newer thinking about global justice (defined as historical, distributive, gender, and environmental).101 This has been supported by the possibilities raised by digital ‘global listening projects’, a broad, interdisciplinary and practical engagement, and their interpretation of subaltern claims for international reform. The UN’s recent Sustaining Peace agenda (2016) is an example of this process, which has created enormous demands for progress from the state and the international architecture without giving either more resources.102 Similarly, the MDGs (2000) and the SDGs (2015) were based on a broadening and deepening epistemological framework, made possible by new technologies.103 Under analogue conditions, previous consultations on peace or rights at the international level had tended to be limited to narrow constituted and extremely slow elite and diplomatic, institutional meetings, as with the promulgation of Wilson’s Fourteen Points at the end of WW1 or the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights leading up to its announcement.104 While such improvements have become clear, there is also significant opposition to digital global civil society, as can be seen in the growing marginalisation (even by core actors such as the US and the UK) of the role of IGOs, of human rights agendas and cosmopolitan thought, and through defunding the NGO sector.105 Clearly, digital international relations are much more complex than analogue international relations and potentially more unstable. Firstly, it appears to be disruptive of existing power relations that support inequality and injustice (an enhanced critical agency and ‘ungovernmentality’106), but also to enhance some of them (particularly, the alliance between the state, military, capital, and technology). Secondly, it may be leaderless and uncoordinated, with complex networks as a constituency rather than a territorially bounded or identity-defined group of people. Thus, it may also signal a shift in the location of power, from the state to social movements, or more likely towards centres of capital and technology. Initially its uncoordinated and decentralised nature was 99 ‘Changes in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with consultative status with ECOSOC 1948 to 2010, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268357/changes-in-the-number-of-ngos-worldwide-since-1948/ 100 See for example, ‘The Top 100 NGOs 2013’, The Global Journal. http://www.theglobaljournal.net/group/15-top-100ngos-2013/article/585/. 101 Margaret Kohn, ‘Postcolonialism and Global Justice’, Journal of Global Ethics 9, no. 2 (2013): 187–200. 102 Advisory Group of Experts, Op. Cit., 1–12. 103 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2012 (New York: UN, 2012). 104 See for example, Colonel House’s discussions of the planning behind institution of the liberal peace framework, or post-WWII discussions on the UNHCR. Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1996): Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 105 Amnesty International, ‘Laws Designed to Silence: The Global Crackdown on Civil Society Organisations’, https://www. amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/9647/2019/en/, 21 February, 2019. 106 Sandra Pogodda,, and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Palestinian Unity and Everyday State Formation: Subaltern ‘ungovernmentality’ Versus Elite Interests’, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 5 (2015). 330 O. P. RICHMOND significant for rights-based movements but later on more established forms of governmentality have moved into digital spaces. Thirdly, digital international relations projects power, shapes systems and practices, whether for hegemony or progress,107 and thus points to two paths for rethinking peace. One is a reflection of the enhanced rights claims made by conflict-affected populations more able to build a political agenda in the context of the transversality, speed, and mobility that digital international relations enables. This path points to the connection of peace with global justice. The other path rests on geopolitics and neoliberalism under digital governmentality, and maintains a much more conservative international system. Assessing ‘Digital peace’ Peace in digital international relations appears to be affected by six main dynamics: i digitisation of power/ knowledge (information), speed, networks, and virtuality: ii the formation of transnational, transversal, and trans-scalar networks separate to and challenging, or connected to and maintaining, older sites of power; iii the opening of access to and control of networks; iv acutely heightened speed and mobility both in terms of social agency and of existing power structures (eg of people, knowledge, expansion of subaltern rights claims, and the counter-expansion relations between elites, states, capital, and hegemony); v increasingly remote operation; vi finally, in the very long term, shifts towards automation.108 Digital international relations implies that intervention, diplomacy, and peace oriented transactions may thus be virtual, extremely fast, operate remotely and might be automated so access to networks and their control is absolutely crucial. This signifies the potential, and the limits of ‘digital peace’, which wavers between a connection with global justice and a status quo oriented character. Thus, its negative–positive- hybrid character remains unaffected at its base, as both its conservative and emancipatory characteristics are augmented. Its activities may be coordinated by the traditional centres of power, including the UN Security Council Members, key states and donors, or it may be devolved to digital, transitional civil society networks from ‘enlightened’ members of the UN Secretariat and donors. It connects humans, states, institutions, companies, NGOs, and others, to networks and its technologies and represents a significant shift in terms of peace, legitimacy, order, and power, away from territorial sovereignty and state authority structures. It has an impact on traditional approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding, statebuilding, as well as international organisation and the donor system. Broken infrastructures and blockages can also be avoided though digital and technological advances, and local to international scales can be jumped (as with the use of new technologies in disaster relief, or for peacekeeping).109 107 Taylor Owen, Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age (OUP, 2015). For glimpses see: Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007): Alexander D. Barder, Empire Within: International Hierarchy and Its Laboratories of Governance (New York: Routledge, 2015); Afred McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 108 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 331 In practice, the positive potential of peace in digital international relations has been limited by the inertia produced by analogue forms of international politics, including: formal, official, state-backed face to face diplomacy in complex multilateral public institutions like the UN, EU, OECD-Dac, or in national Parliaments. Military support or intervention, state, economic, and social programming by the UN, World Bank, donors and NGOs have been similarly unresponsive, as the tortured process of intervention and peacemaking in the Balkans from 1992 illustrates.110 Much of the analogue international peace architecture depends on static citizenship in territorialised sovereign states in order to enable rights, law, representation, and common international standards. This architecture is being heavily disrupted by digital dynamics now emerging, but rather than pushing the concept of peace towards a global justice framework,111 it appears to be status quo oriented, leading to a re-emergence of quasi-authoritarian regimes around the world. For interlocuters or participants in a broad range of activities aimed at peacemaking, this inevitably means the form of peace will follow suit. Some of these dynamics may appear to some degree to facilitate both social power and state capacity, and yet also to marginalise the social and political, substituting neoliberalism, technology, capital and technocracy as the basis for peace settlements. In its early days many thinkers saw possibilities for progress, through social networks, communications and transport, global civil society, and technological advances which would bring to an end poverty, injustice, and instability.112 However, older power structures and hierarchies have proven to be resilient despite the advent of expanded human rights, global epistemic networks, and their reform-oriented political consequences (as might be seen after the recent ‘revolutions’ across the MENA region).113 This can be seen in the breakdown of many extended peace processes recently (the Middle East, Syria, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Cyprus to name a few) and the pressure on others (such as in Northern Ireland), the resurgence of authoritarian governments, and the wavering of the spread of democracy (according to Freedom House’s data).114 The frameworks that countered war and violence in the analogue world, namely the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and international law and organisation are now themselves being easily countered. No peace solutions have yet been found to the shift of power from the state constitution and international institutions to the market and global network defined by capital and technology. Digital (atmospheric)115 rather than liberal industrial power has not (yet) been reconciled with liberal peace or its as yet unknown successor. As for the industrial-military states of the early twentieth century, peace in a digital context would have to stabilise the existing system and also deal with its new dynamics.116 109 Statement of the UN Secretary General, SG/SM/15929-SC/11435-PKO/411, UN, New York, 11 June 2014 http://www.un. org/press/en/2014/sgsm15929.doc.htm. 110 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998). 111 Advisory Group of Experts, ‘The Challenge of Sustaining Peace’, (New York: UN, June 2015), 1–12. 112 Mary Kaldor, ‘The Idea of Global Civil Society’, International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): 583–93: J. Aart Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance’, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation, Working Paper No.65/ 01, (2001. ): 1–23. 113 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Globalization, Democratization, and the Arab Uprising: The International Factor in MENA’s Failed Democratization’, Democratization 22, no.2 (2015): 335–57. 114 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 115 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Paradox of Peace and Power: Contamination or Enablement?’ International Politics 54, no. 5 (2017): 637–58. 332 O. P. RICHMOND Under the conditions of digital international relations, peace is not between political units leading to legal or diplomatic agreements about the nature of a state and constitution, the sharing of power, the reorganisation of boundaries, and the extension of rights and democracy as was claimed early on in the development of this literature.117 Instead it may often be about trying to find a way to accept a diminished place for humans in the world dominated by technology, speed, military applications, capital, and their related networks. It may mean reduced human rights and democracy, reduced states and their safety nets, along with territorialism and borders which replicate elite interests (eg geopolitics and capital rather than cooperation and rights), and overall a reduced place for the material world and natural environment as international relations shifts into the techno-capitalist, geo-economic sphere, even over realist notions of geopolitics. Elements of these dynamics can be seen in the post-Cold War list of peace agreements that have gone awry, including in Cambodia where authoritarian rule favours extractive capital, in Colombia where a peace dividend was undermined by a refusal to negotiate over structural matters, or in Bosnia and Kosovo where ethno-nationalism is manipulated by elites to maintain geopolitical and economic interests. Under the conditions of digital international relations, rights, sustainability, and democracy are being replaced by a struggle over access to networks and technology, as well as the crucial sources of energy needed to maintain these in the interests of elite.118 Enormous levels of complexity heighten the risk of system collapse, but also endorse the apparent need to develop ways of remotely operating and automating this system (nudging, intervention, etc).119 The space for global civil society that once appeared to be opening up in order to support the growth of liberal internationalism, the UN system, rights, law, and a free media,120 is curtailed. As it shifts onto digital platforms and networks a ‘firewall’ is created around political debate by the new powerholders who control access to networks and key nodes.121 This means that politics, protest, and the expansion of rights is confined to virtual spaces, so it has little or no material impact on power-relations and power-sharing maintains the very stratifications that caused war in the first place. Clearly, questions of emancipatory agency are crucial in deciding the path that digital peace takes in the future, being perhaps one of the longest standing dynamics that has been noticed, particularly in constructivist work on human rights, post-structural work on identity and resistance, and interdisciplinary work on social movements and mobilisation.122 Understanding ‘digital interventions’ would be necessary, including remote peacekeeping, and the use drones in a variety of applications (from disaster relief to humanitarianism, via remote surveillance). The potential for monitoring and conflict prevention, anticipating causes and trends of conflict, humanitarian crises, and natural 116 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest no. 16 (1989): 3–18: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992). See for example, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997). 118 Tainter, Ibid. 119 R. Thaler and C. Sunstein, Nudge (London: Penguin Books, 2008). 120 Kaldor, Op. Cit. 121 Castells, Op. Cit. 122 Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 117 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 333 disasters using so-called big data is also crucial.123 Digital diplomacy also offers potential, encompassing digital embassies, ambassadors, the use of social media, virtual summits and other related forms of multilateralism.124 Further dynamics include the digital recognition of states (and their potential exclusion). Hybrid forms of warfare are also connected to digital international relations (as in the Russian involvement in Crimea and Ukraine). Many other dimensions are opening up: humanitarianism and the use of e-payment for refugees; virtual terrorism and counter-terrorism conducted as ‘marketing campaigns on the internet (often using, as with ISIS, violent images and videos); digital civil society, including digital protests, and internet-based resistance movements; digital forms of democracy such as the digital citizenship system in Estonia; questions about the right to the internet; the digital economy for services and exchange; and digital environmentalism.125 Any progressive vision in digital international relations relating to peace, security, or development also has important methodological dimensions, which challenge older quantitative and qualitative approaches. Digital discourse analysis has become possible, as with large-scale databases of peace-agreements, peace processes, diplomatic and official statements, and a related effort to quantify conflict, development and peace indicators.126 This is connected to the potential of digital ethnography and post-field research methods from digital humanities and social sciences, perhaps creating online databases of interviews and other qualitative data. On the other hand, so far, ‘big data’ and the requantification of research and policy methods appears to undermine the ethical premise of peace theories, replacing textured notions of emancipation with mass-produced conceptions of self-help that are rarely plausible in war apart from at a very basic level, as in Syria. Peace, war, and legitimate authority in digital IR Critical versions of Digital IR perform a similar role to the critique that was mounted against realism and liberalism in the so-called third debate.127 Indeed, it seems that the mainstream versus critical theory binary of analogue forms of IR may well be transferred onto this emerging platform, either expanding realist dynamics or offering new emancipatory modes of analysis or responses. The epistemological tensions of analogue IR are being transferred, effectively, from one historical epoch to the next, whilst also expanding the terrain of the debates into newer areas (eg networks, the Anthropocene, technology, etc). Historical power and hegemony is reinventing itself whilst rights claims also advance discursively but often not materially. The next ‘debate’ on peace in IR, if it is digital, may well be multi-scalar, transversal, mobile, and global justice oriented, perhaps proceeding 123 Very preliminary discussions have been taking place in UN institutions like PBSO, PBC, DPKO, UNDP. Some reference has been made in UN SG briefings, as well as by various under- Secretaries-General. Eg, Statement of the UN Secretary General, Op. Cit. 124 Tom Fletcher, Naked Diplomacy (London: Collins, 2016). 125 Thanks to Gezim Visoka for pointing to the examples. 126 See for example, S. Roberts, H. Snee, C. Hine, Y. Morey, and H. Watson, eds., Digital Methods for Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Research Innovation (London: Palgrave, 2016). 127 Y. Lapid ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 235–54. 334 O. P. RICHMOND far away from the institutions of epistemic power (parliaments, international organisations, states, leading universities, key associations etc). Or it may be contained in a digital and virtual terrain of politics where it can have little material impact on the updated, geopolitical workings of international relations in practice.128 The relationship between new technologies and the conduct of war, its remote and automated technologies, offers a different road towards peace than that offered by critical IR and its focus on rights, norms, and institutions: more an automated and remote version of realism.129 This provides a glimpse of what digital IR means for the construction of legitimate political authority after war. It may imply rights and access to networks (such as donor networks, social movements or global civil society) would be set by digital hegemons connected to regional and geopolitical powers (probably at a very basic level), hegemony would shift toward the control of access to networks, from civil society, to the state, to international institutions, and the global economy. Constitutional orders would be subservient to surveillance capital. The engagement of peacemakers, the donor community, the international institutions involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding would similarly be determined by digital geopolitics in which digitally enhanced economic powers have displaced political centres of legitimate authority (governments and international actors). This would occur through traditional geopolitical means aimed at preserving the digital status quo, but also through networked encumbrances designed to prevent the further expansion of rights claims by conflict-affected subjects. This could be described as a counter-peace framework aimed at stopping the conceptual development of peace towards global justice. None of the practices, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and formation, that developed in analogue modernity to prevent or stop war, have made the transition to combat the dangers of digital IR. Some energy has been put into beginning the thinking required, but mostly it has followed an analogue strategic and military rationality.130 However, in contrast to inertia in the evolution of peace the very notion of war has shifted from interstate confrontations using military forms, to sub-state or regional ethnic conflicts, to territorial conflicts over land and resources, to liberal interventionism, and far beyond. More recently, it has shifted towards structural war aimed at inflicting structural (and cultural violence) in erecting or enforcing unjustifiable global inequalities through digital governmentalities, in addition to the various forms of inequality long patrolled by liberal and neoliberal governmentality. This is aimed more broadly at disabling the critical shifts that have been occurring towards a system of peace as global justice (incorporating historical, distributive, gender, security, and environmental dynamics, amongst others), as might be glimpsed in the recent UN Sustainable Development Goals.131 Structural war, and its more subtle system of order maintenance- digital governmentality- enforces and maintains opposition to global justice, hybridity, and sustainability, whilst enabling analogue power-structures and hierarchies to recover, reform, and make the transition into the digital era intact. It is effectively a counter-revolutionary 128 James Der Derien, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2001). Der Derian, Op. Cit. 130 Eg see Confidential Sources, Personal Interviews, UNDPKO, May, 2018. Der Derien, Op. Cit. 131 UNDP 2015. 129 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 335 framework designed to oppose, retard, and neutralise the development of a rights based international peace architecture since the mid-twentieth century.132 How might such forms of war be dealt with under these conditions of digital international relations? What will legitimate political authority, peacebuilding or statebuilding look like? A starting point would be to begin to update the international peace architecture (comprising liberal constitutional order, international law, institutions and human rights; regional organisation; diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and development) for digital conditions. They must be updated to be able to work against structural wars, the shift of power to atmospheric networks, speed and the reframing of time and space, as well enhanced technological methods of violence. They must combat the undermining of human rights and democracy, as well as the legitimacy of global peace, security and order, but also must be able to address the expanded claims being made by global civil society through the concurrent emergence of critical digital forms of agency. This must especially encompass two key deficits of the old liberal analogue peace: material inequality and all forms of discrimination across the international system133 exposed by global civil and social networks, and environmental sustainability under the epistemologies of the Anthropocene.134 Such arguments may be unfashionable among those calling for communitarian and parsimonious ‘pragmatism’135 but such inconsistency across time and space, not mention societies, is undermining the current international peace architecture.136 Digital legitimacy and authority rests in its critical version on meeting expanded claims for everyday rights, as opposed to the reconstitution of neo-feudal or elite power in the twenty-first Century. Conclusion Digital IR represents the latest layer of international relations, built upon a series of other historical frameworks, consisting of war and conflict dynamics and their related management and settlement systems. Elements of it predate the current technologies available but the digital element has also proved new impetus, speed and reach to networks in international relations of old. It is driving change, perhaps making the territorial ‘international’ less significant in the face of global networks. It may propagate expanded rights and strengthen the international peace architecture or it may foreground neoliberal137 or disruptive technological and governmental power.138 It is a major shift beyond the older geopolitical, industrial and liberal-international version of IR (the analogue version of the Holocene, in other words). Networks amplify power and resistance, 132 See my forthcoming book, Peace in the 21st Century (OUP, 2020) for more on the development of the international and counter-peace architectures. David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004): Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014). 134 Manuel Arias-Maldonado, ‘Rethinking Sustainability in the Anthropocene’, Environmental Politics (2013). doi:10.1080/ 09644016.2013.765161 W. Steffen, et al., ‘The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369 (2011): 842–67. 135 For a recent iteration of this sort of argumentation, see Richard Bellamy, World Peace (OUP, 2019), 16. 136 For examples of how peace processes are subverted, see Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 145–59: Roberto Belloni, The Rise and Fall of Peacebuilding in the Balkans (London: Palgrave, 2020), 81–204. 137 Shoshana Zuboff, Op.Cit., 9. 138 Chandler, David, Op. Cit, 159: 133 336 O. P. RICHMOND and open up alternative dimensions of international relations, but they also enforce existing power relations and hierarchies through digital governmentality and new forms of atmospheric power (variously termed surveillance capital or digital governmentality). It contributes to the international peace architecture, which is a palimpsest where these often contradictory past and legacy sediments are all visible at once. It represents a contradictory struggle to both break free of moribund peace systems and to extend them to combat new forms of violence. As the latest layer, the digital framework for peace is weak given the tools for conflict that are present and enormously amplified, but those for mitigating their clashes and contradictions are far from commensurate. The forces that created the existing state system and international order are simultaneously being transferred into the digital terrain to counteract- through new forms of digital governmentality- the emancipatory potential it promised (especially in critical thinking on reflexivity and the Anthropocene).139 This is a race between several dynamics to shape the world order to come, whether ‘international’ and driven by digital governmentality or modified by critical, digital contributions to peace based upon global justice, in the next epoch of IR. Acknowledgements Thanks to several helpful reviewers, and to Sandra Pogodda, Annika Björkdahl, Gezim Visoka, and Roland Bleiker, for their comments on an earlier draft. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Notes on contributor Oliver Richmond is a Research Professor in IR, Peace and Conflict Studies in the Department of Politics, University of Manchester, UK. He is International Professor at Dublin City University, Ireland, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Tubingen, Germany, and a Visiting Professor at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. His publications include Peace Formation and Political Order in Conflict Affected Societies (Oxford University Press, 2016) and Failed Statebuilding (Yale University Press, 2014). He is editor of the Palgrave book series, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, and co-editor of the Journal, Peacebuilding. ORCID Oliver P. Richmond 139 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8938-2209 Dryzek and Pickering, Op.Cit., 18.