© 2024 IAI
Climate Security at NATO:
Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
ISSN 2532-6570
by Louise van Schaik
IAI COMMENTARIES 24 | 46 - JULY 2024
The celebration of 75 years of NATO
existence in Washington DC confirmed
a remaining strong support to Ukraine
and singled out China as enabler of
Russia’s war activities, and hence a
security risk. Some time was devoted
at the Summit and its Public Forum
to other issues, such as the need
to innovate and address imminent
concerns like climate-related security
risks. This showcases NATO’s continued
ability to keep a strategic focus. But
what has NATO done so far to prepare
for climate change, why is this relevant
for a military-focused organisation,
and what could be done more in this
area?
Climate security on NATO’s agenda
Addressing climate change in a military
environment is not a given. This enemy
does not have a face and cannot be
1
fought with weapons. However, climate
change has long been recognised
as a threat multiplier by the military
establishment. On top of this came the
recognition of climate change directly
affecting military activities at home
and abroad, as well as the implications
of emission reduction policies and the
energy transition.
Indeed, climate impacts can hit hard
and climate change increases societal
tensions, conflict risk and migration
flows. Extreme weather events lead
to more calls for military assistance
at home and abroad, adjustments to
preparations for and implementation
of operations, and more vulnerable
installations
and
bases.
Military
dependency on fossil fuels is another
vulnerability related to both securing
supply lines in the field and them
being oftentimes purchased from
Louise van Schaik is Head of Unit EU & Global Affairs at the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael. This commentary was prepared within the framework
of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author’s alone.
Climate Security at NATO: Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
© 2024 IAI
questionable, sometimes even hostile
regimes. Energy transition is generally
seen as an opportunity to enhance
operational effectiveness, but one that
requires innovation and entails costs.
ISSN 2532-6570
For all of these reasons, NATO
recognised the security dimension
of climate change, for the first time
in its strategic concept of 2010.1 This
recognition built upon previous
efforts on the relationship between the
environment and security that resulted
in
many
NATO
Standardisation
Agreements (STANAGs), which in this
context set standards for environmental
protection
measures
across
the
Alliance. In 2011 NATO started with
a smart energy initiative to consider
less noise linked to fuelling operations,
reducing energy-related heat that
can be traced on radars and enhance
operational effectiveness of alternative
energy sources and energy efficiency
measures.
IAI COMMENTARIES 24 | 46 - JULY 2024
Under the leadership of SecretaryGeneral Jens Stoltenberg, NATO then
started to consider an actual policy
framework for the issue. In 2021 it
adopted an Action Plan for Climate
Change and Security.2 The plan sets
out activities to raise awareness, adapt
military capabilities and societal
resilience, reduce military emissions
and
integrate
climate
change
considerations in outreach to partners.
In 2022 the organisation committed
to become net-zero in 2050 for its
activities as an enterprise.
The strategic concept of 2022
highlights climate change as a
defining challenge of our time,3 with a
profound impact on NATO’s security.
It states that NATO should become
the leading international organisation
when it comes to understanding and
adapting to the impact of climate
change on security. At the 2023 NATO
Summit in Vilnius, Allies welcomed
the establishment of a NATO Centre
of Excellence for Climate Change
and Security (CCASCOE) in Montreal,
Canada.4 This Centre was officially
launched and accredited in 2024 at
the Summit in DC and should be at full
capacity by the end of this year.
The official 2024 Summit communiqué
indicates that NATO allies “will
continue integrating climate change
considerations into all core tasks”,
committing to “ensuring secure,
resilient, and sustainable energy
supplies, including fuel”, to military
forces.5 The DC Summit also saw the
publication of NATO’s third climatesecurity risk assessment. It considers
how climate change impacts the
military capabilities of potential
adversaries such as Russia and China,
and discusses how they use extreme
weather and climate initiatives against
NATO allies in targeted disinformation
3
1
NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence.
NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, 19 November
2010, para. 15, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_82705.htm.
2
NATO, NATO Climate Change and Security
Action Plan, 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm.
2
NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept, July 2022, para.
19, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.
4
NATO, Vilnius Summit Communiqué, 11 July
2023, para. 69, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.
5
NATO, Washington Summit Declaration, 10
July 2024, para. 34, https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.
Climate Security at NATO: Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
ISSN 2532-6570
© 2024 IAI
campaigns.6 Examples are included
of how climate change places an
additional burden on each of NATO’s
operating domains – sea, land, air,
space and cyber – as well as on NATO’s
missions and operations, and resilience
and civil preparedness. It moreover
addresses the climate impact of
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
notably in terms of extra greenhouse
gas emissions.
The Public Forum included climatesecurity in specific sessions and side
events. The International Military
Council on Climate and Security
(IMCCS) presented the World Climate
Security Report of 2024, focusing
on military innovation in relation to
climate change.7 Newly developed
technologies offer an opportunity
to combine environmental goals
and the improvement of operational
effectiveness, which is fundamental for
a military alliance.
Is NATO really prepared for a
changing climate?
IAI COMMENTARIES 24 | 46 - JULY 2024
Scratching
beyond
the
surface
of policy intentions, security risk
assessments and the new centre that
is being operationalised, it seems that
NATO is indeed taking the issue of
climate-security seriously. It sees the
implications for strategic regions such
as the Arctic, and the need to reduce
vulnerabilities related to fossil energy.
The strong personal leadership of
the Secretary-General on the societal
need to address climate change helped
to promote the agenda within the
organisation and towards the military
forces of its allies.
What helped furthermore is that several
countries acted as climate champions,
including the US, France and the UK.8
They first came up with initiatives to
include climate change in security
strategies and (future) threat analysis.
Then they started to consider how to
adapt to climate change and ways to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Canada supported the effort by
becoming the host-nation of the newly
NATO-accredited CCASCOE.
However, most NATO allies have shied
away from specific emission reduction
commitments for all their military
activities. A key omission is that of
emissions outside of the national
territory, which is typically where
wars are fought and military exercises
take place. Defence Ministries have
successfully managed to keep these
emissions outside of the emission
reduction commitments under the
Paris Agreement. On the one hand, this
can be understood as not be willing to
give information to the enemy about
where you operate and on what scale.
On the other hand, militaries have also
justified the exemption on the basis of
the importance of their role as security
providers, which supersedes all other
6
NATO, NATO Releases 2024 Climate Change
and Security Impact Assessment Report, 9 July
2024,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_227571.htm.
7
John Conger et al., World Climate Security
Report 2024. Military Innovation and the Climate
Challenge, July 2024, https://wp.me/p8RhMM-4oZ.
3
8
For an overview of climate-security activities
of the NATO allies, see NATO Climate Change
and Security Action Plan. Compendium of Best
Practice, July 2023, https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/7/pdf/230710climate-change-best-practices.pdf.
Climate Security at NATO: Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
objectives,
including
combatting
climate change. They do not accept any
questioning of military action on the
basis of emission reduction targets.
IAI COMMENTARIES 24 | 46 - JULY 2024
ISSN 2532-6570
© 2024 IAI
In general, it is considered a challenge
to adapt to climate change and pursue
an energy transition agenda in a
deteriorating security environment.
Defence industries currently have
difficulties in scaling up because all
Allies are purchasing new materials,
which diminished their incentives to
innovate. In order to develop further,
the climate-security agenda also needs
to sync in well with other issues high
on NATO’s agenda, such as the need
to reconsider inter-operationability
of weapon systems, to strengthen the
Eastern flank and to respond to new
forms of (hybrid) warfare. The appetite
for missions abroad, for instance as first
responders to extreme weather events,
is currently limited because the focus is
on deterrence of Russia and, to a lesser
degree, China. Moreover, not all NATO
allies have the market power to request
innovations; they simply buy what is
currently available.
As a result, militaries of NATO allies have
started to consider climate security, but
they are far from being truly prepared
for more extreme weather events.
Their installations and bases are part
of the energy transition efforts their
societies go through, but costs and
lack of skilled labour are an impeding
factor. In specific programmes, like
Defence Innovation Accelerator for
the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the
NATO Innovation Fund, low-carbon
innovations receive much attention,
but in most purchases, other factors
are more important. Fuelling military
4
fighter jets, tanks and navy ships with
fossil kerosene, diesel and bunker fuels
is still the standard, and electrification,
the use of small nuclear reactors or
alternative fuels are seen as options for
a distant future.9
What could NATO consider to do
more in this field?
NATO’s effort to manage to keep
climate security high on its agenda is
to be applauded. The most important
thing is for the organisation to keep a
focus on the issue and implement its
Action Plan, utilise the establishment
of CCASCOE and continue its efforts
to link green energy transition to
innovation, procurement and standardsetting. NATO leadership and its allies
need to keep thinking beyond today’s
wars. Incoming NATO SecretaryGeneral Mark Rutte needs to continue
the leadership on the climate-security
nexus initiated by Jens Stoltenberg.
More specifically, NATO could still
consider a number of possible initiatives
to deepen its climate action. First, it
could reconsider the environment as
a broader category with different links
to climate change to showcase that this
agenda is more all-encompassing than
preparing for extreme weather and
reducing emissions. Several strategic
agendas can be combined, such as
enhancing circularity (of for instance
a military base or operations), dealing
with water scarcity and reconsidering
the use of critical raw materials needed
for the defence industry.
9
Xander Zwemstra and Emil Havstrup, “Can
Europe Green Its Militaries?”, in PSI/Clingendael
Alerts, June 2024, https://www.clingendael.org/
node/17672.
ISSN 2532-6570
© 2024 IAI
Climate Security at NATO: Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
Second, even though more climatesecurity risk assessments are available,
NATO could still do more to anticipate
future risks. These risks may be different
and even more challenging than the
impacts already witnessed today,
including radically different weather
systems and conditions, for instance an
ice-free Arctic, Atlantic Ocean without
Gulf stream, an expansion of overheated
and therefore uninhabitable regions in
places currently highly populated.
Finally, NATO could leverage CCASCOE
so that is can develop into the expertise
centre for climate-security and the
military and contribute in full to the
implementation of NATO’s Climate
and Security Action Plan, as well as
expanding the integration of the nexus
into the curriculum of security officers
and military personnel of the NATO
allies, for instance at the NATO School
Oberammergau and NATO Defense
College in Rome.
Third,
it
should
reiterate
the
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Emission reduction targets
could be coupled with a classified
monitoring system to avoid handing
out strategic data to (potential) enemies.
29 July 2024
IAI COMMENTARIES 24 | 46 - JULY 2024
Fourth,
NATO
could
deepen
cooperation with the EU and its clean
industrial policies as well as the US
Inflation Reduction Act. Many defence
industries are in fact companies that
also produce dual-use and consumer
products. Here the green energy
transition
is
rapidly
unfolding,
supported by EU and US subsidies and
other support programmes. These
could be linked more directly to their
production for the military.
Fifth, it could include low-carbon
innovation
and
contributing
to
the clean energy transition into all
innovation and standard setting
measures, and in parallel calculate
the costs of fossil fuel purchases for
the military and offer transparency
on their origin, to enhance awareness
on unwarranted dependencies on
petrostates.
5
Climate Security at NATO: Looking Beyond Today’s Wars
ISSN 2532-6570
© 2024 IAI
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