European Journal of Science and Theology,
February 2018, Vol.14, No.1, 115-124
_______________________________________________________________________
THE ISSUE OF PERIODIZATION IN
WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Marián Ambrozy*1 Roman Králik2 and Jordan Poyner3
1
College of International Business ISM Slovakia, Department of Social Sciences,
Duchnovičovo námestie 1, 080 01 Prešov, Slovakia
2
Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Faculty of Arts, Štefánikova 67, Nitra, Slovakia
3
Indiana University, Department of English Language and Literature, Ballantine Hall, Rm 442,
1020 E. Kirkwood Ave., Bloomington, Indiana 47405, U.S.A.
(Received 28 September 2017, revised 17 October 2017)
Abstract
A great number of academic papers dealing with Ludwig Wittgenstein‟s (1889-1951)
philosophy of religion have been published. Analytical philosophers and philosophers of
history have focused on this topic since the 1960‟s. This article, therefore, will not
attempt to add to the multitude of such studies. A study which would map out
Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion would not evidently constitute an addition to the
worldwide or even Central European academic space. Instead, this article will focus on
the periodization of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion. It will attempt to answer the
question: to what extent do the periods that will be dealt with throughout the course of
this article correlate to the general periodization of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy. As
Schilbrack notes, Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion also bears a connection to his
philosophy of mathematics. This article will also try to show that in these changes from
the „Tractatus‟ to the „Philosophical Investigations‟ in the latter, Wittgenstein ultimately
shows a commitment to a philosophical value of openness and willingness to transform
one‟s mind by the discovery of what is given.
Keywords: philosophy, stages, nonsensical, belief, Christianity
1. The early Wittgenstein on religion
The undeniable first phase of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy is his writing and
publishing of the Tractatus. We will not dwell on the notoriously known
propositions of this work; instead, we will concentrate on the claims made in
relation to his philosophy of religion. Wittgenstein‟s postulations, in his treatise
dealing with religion, very closely correlate to the propositions found in the
Tractatus. Even though, in this particular work, Wittgenstein does not pay much
attention to the Philosophy of religion, the analysis of his theorems – coupled
with the notes from his journals as well as his bibliography – is sufficient for a
coherent picture of his philosophy of religion to emerge.
*
E-mail: ambrozy.marian@gmail.com
Ambrozy et al/European Journal of Science and Theology 14 (2018), 1, 115-124
“In certain philosophical streams of thought of the 20th century, an
inclination towards the claim that religion cannot produce substantiated
cognitive claims can be found.“ [1] That which can be stated can be stated in a
clear manner, but some things are left unsaid because it is senseless to speak of
them. However, this does not necessarily mean that such things do not exist, nor
that there is any reason to ignore them – “As it was pointed out by Pasqualle
Frascolla, there are two kinds of subjects mentioned in the Tractatus: the
metaphysical subject – the limit of the world – and the empirical subject“ [2].
First of all, religious questions do not belong among scientific ones, as has been
promoted ever since the dawn of the Age of Enlightenment, which bore with it
“an uncritical faith in the objectivity of human reason - in the capacity of reason
(a metaphysical, transpersonal category) to explain the world and to teach the
human race how to live in it” [3]. Wittgenstein counters: “We feel that even if all
possible scientific questions are answered, the problems of life have still not
been touched at all” [4].
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein accepts that statements can be divided into
several categories. The first category of statements are meaningful ones, which
constitute the statements made by the Natural sciences: “These statements are
sentences that share a common logical form with the world that also makes them
an integral part of the world, and as such, they state something either true or
false about the world” [5]. The second kind of statements are senseless
statements, mainly tautologies and contradictions – the statements inherent to
Mathematics and Logic. They are generally true or false, but they do not touch
upon the world in any way: “In this case, such statements embody a legitimate
and logically coherent chain of signifiers, even though the resultant statement is
without its informatory value“ [6]. The third group of statements are, according
to Wittgenstein, nonsensical ones. It is not possible to subject these to empirical
verification. They either constitute grammatically discomposed statements, or
they contain a term whose semantic meaning is not verifiable or falsifiable
because it transcends the bounds of language. The second case – when the
semantic meaning cannot be grasped – integrates a specific type of situation. If
statements attempt to transcend the bounds of language, it means that they
cannot be verbally communicated, only shown: “What can be said, according to
Wittgenstein, can be said in a transparent manner and which shows us what
cannot be said” [7, p. 10]. Wittgenstein attributes ethical and religious
statements to such statements. He offers an example: “They are of the same kind
as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful” [4,
p. 39] As it is well known, Wittgenstein postulated that statements be analysed
in an intuitive manner because otherwise problems occur when formulating
definitive criteria (in the sense Wittgenstein invoked in the Tractatus) for the
analysis of statements [6].
“What is especially interesting for the further examination of
Wittgenstein‟s opinions concerning ethics is the claim made by McGuiness that
Wittgenstein puts the mystical experience on the same level as ethics, aesthetics,
and metaphysics.” [8, p. 175] Wittgenstein‟s thoughts on ethics, present towards
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The issue of periodization in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion
the end of the Tractatus, may be used when trying to ascertain his opinions on
religion. The Austrian philosopher allocates values outside of the world: “The
sense of the world must lie outside the world” [4, p. 87]. He assumes ethics (as
well as aesthetics) to be of a transcendental character. Values do not belong in
the world, and that which would appear as a value – during the description of the
empirical state of things – cannot be so. “Wittgenstein does not use the word
„God‟ very often, but he uses it in a consistent way.” [9, p. 316] Wittgenstein
explicitly addresses God only once in the Tractatus when he claims: “God does
not reveal himself in the world” [4, p. 89].
The aforementioned statements concerning religion were thus seen by
Wittgenstein as senseless – nothing can be said about them. In spite of that, in
his Notebooks, he formulates statements such as: “The meaning of life, i.e. the
meaning of the world, we can call God” and “What do I know about God and the
purpose of life? I know that this world exists” [10]. His claims can be expanded
by another postulation: “In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the
same thing: The world - which is independent of our will” [10]. “His private
opinions presented in written form (which in stricto sensu should constitute
senseless statements) also correspond to the bibliographical realia. It is known
that in the trenches of World War I Wittgenstein often read Tolstoy‟s
interpretation of the Gospel [11]. He had lived the life of a soldier who had faced
religion head on. He was not only a believer, but a Christian declaimer that
recommended Tolstoy‟s book to those who had fallen into despair.” [12]
In his zeal to serve as an example for others, Wittgenstein voluntarily took
on the most dangerous combat missions and he became a war hero. His combat
missions paradoxically strengthened his religious belief. He had lived the
unwritten part of his Tractatus – the life of a volunteer who, in his effort to
defend his country, managed to mobilize all of his strength and courage, in order
to carry out the mission at hand to the best of his abilities. His later donation of
his estate and his volunteer work as a gardener and teacher are also reflections of
that which he had written in the Tractatus about religion. His telling of the
unfinished part of the Tractatus – on the subject of religion – through his actions
was indeed exemplary. He never spoke of it: “his students did not recall him
mentioning the Gospel during his teachings” [13].
2. Middle Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein‟s concept of religion can truly be regarded as significant and
consistent with his general notions. He advocated a similar position in his
Lecture on Ethics. This text, as Ondřej Beran aptly notes, was an afterthought to
the Tractatus. Wittgenstein does not add anything new to the understanding of
ethics and religion, he merely explains these issues from a different perspective:
“Wittgenstein makes yet another attempt [...] to show that his position is
radically different from the one maintained by the anti-metaphysical positivists.”
[14, p. 438] That he had managed to do so does not change the fact that the text
is ideologically similar to the Tractatus. He offers a well-known example
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according to which a human being, familiar with all the motions and all of the
internal states of the Universe, could not possibly know a single ethical
statement because values are of a transcendental nature. He mentions two
experiences, the first of which is based on wonder. Wittgenstein states: “I
believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the
existence of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as „how
extraordinary that anything should exist‟ or „how extraordinary that the world
should exist‟.” [15, p. 8] In a similar manner, he mentions an experience during
which he has a feeling of absolute safety. It is a mystical experience which is
typologically very close to a religious mystical experience. In the
aforementioned lecture, he once again emphasizes his conviction that such
experience is senseless to verbalize; he states that the claim – I wonder at the
existence of the world – is as senseless to express as is the claim that God is the
creator of the Universe.
A certain development of his notions can be seen in connection to his
discussions with the members of the Vienna Circle. It is here where his general
opinions about verification, physicalism, logical analysis, and his concept of
language begin to further develop. In the discussions which he held with
Waismann, Schlick, and Carnap, he gradually began to assume different
ideological positions than those found in the Tractatus.
In his conversations with Schlick and Waismann, Wittgenstein dwelled on
religious argumentation. He thought that what is good is thus because God wills
it. Here, it seems, Wittgenstein got into a dispute with Schlick, because he
relinquished his original stance on the inability to verbally express the nature of
religion and ethics. The justification of religious morality and ethics resides
within God. The claim that what is good is what God wills is a justification, not
something mystical or inexpressible [16]. Here we are confronted with the limits
of language and (as Wittgenstein could very well imagine) religion without
verbal expression.
The purpose of religion lies in practicing it: “For it is true of expectation,
belief, hope, etc., that each of these words is used not for a specific process, but
for different though mutually related processes. In all these cases we can speak
in fact of articulated and unarticulated process (for action).” [17] Religion is
open to verbal expression, however, not in the sense of theological theories, but
in the sense of its practice. Which is why it is no longer necessary to stay silent
when it comes to religion. There is a kind of power that either punishes or
rewards, which resides behind duty – otherwise nothing would make sense.
Towards the end of his discussions, Wittgenstein aptly paraphrases
Schopenhauer, whose influence is significant especially in Wittgenstein‟s earlier
philosophy [18].
The Tractatus markedly differs from earlier Wittgenstein when it comes to
his religious convictions. In connection with this, it should be stated that in the
aforementioned discussions Wittgenstein even shows sympathy towards the
propositions put forward by Heidegger in Being and Time, as well as What Is
Metaphysics? He shows understanding for those problems expressed by
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Heidegger that are related to the limits of language. The anxiety deriving from
nothingness, and his quest to find the purpose of being, correlates with
Wittgenstein‟s amazement and wonder arising from pure existence (compare
with [19-21]).
In 1937, Wittgenstein mentioned that religion should be linguistically
tended in such a way that each level of religiousness would possess expressions
which would be senseless on another level. In this way the meaning of
expressions that have a purpose in one level of religious consciousness would
not get entangled with the communication of other levels of religiousness.
Otherwise they would not only lack meaning, but they could also be
misunderstood: “Thus, we can understand the word God if, following
Wittgenstein‟s indications, we start to use it inside a specific linguistic
[community], where the practice gives sense to the word, in prayer or
confession” [22, p. 21].
3. Late Wittgenstein
Let us pay attention, for a while, to the arguments on the subject of
religion presented by later Wittgenstein. The later philosophy of Wittgenstein
could be summarized by the following: “Wittgensteinian philosophy claims to
leave everything as it is” [23, p. 106]. It seems that Wittgenstein‟s attitude
towards religion had subsequently changed in several aspects: “The later
Wittgenstein foreshadowed an understanding of theology as grammar” [24].
During the beginning of what could be called his later philosophical period
(1938), he gave his Lectures on Religious Belief. While reading them, it becomes
obvious that Wittgenstein shifted to different topics than those recorded in the
writings from his middle period. Questions of the certainty of belief, its roots,
and the last judgement dominate in this later period. The three pivotal issues in
the Lectures could be outlined as “the nature of religious belief, the
incommensurability of religious and nonreligious belief and the
unreasonableness of religious belief” [25].
The first of these three topics Wittgenstein addresses in the initial
paragraphs of the Lectures. He realized that even Christian belief is made up of
its constituents. Belief itself is not a certainty, Wittgenstein emphasizes. To
believe in different things, even when it comes to the predefined position of
believers, does not mean to have differences only in the explanations of the
meaning of individual religious terms. “Suppose someone were a believer and
said: “I believe in a Last Judgement,” and I said: “Well, I‟m not so sure.
Possibly.” You would say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he said
“There is a German aeroplane overhead,” and I said “Possibly I am not so sure,”
you‟d say we were fairly near to agreement. However, it isn‟t a question of our
being anywhere near to agreement with Wittgenstein, but rather we are on an
entirely different plane. Wittgenstein replies to his imaginary interlocutor, “The
difference might not show up at all in any explanation of the meaning” [26]. The
nature of religious belief is by no means a certainty, it is belief.
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Even Wittgenstein writes about his doubts, about various levels of
religious consciousness. He acknowledges the differences which exist among
different beliefs, and he knows that various religious convictions do not share a
common belief in the last judgement. There is no content that would be typical
for belief. “According to Wittgenstein, the notion that one religion can be truer
than another, or that science refutes and surpasses magic and religion, is based
on the wrongful understanding of magic and religion.” [27, p. 86] One of the
typical signs of religious belief is its incommensurability with nonreligious
belief (nota bene, the incommensurability of religious systems is addressed in a
new book by Rudolf Dupkala [28]).
According to Wittgenstein, belief is not based on proof: “[the religious
person] will probably say he has proof. But he has what you might call an
unshakeable belief.” [28, p. 54] True religious belief cannot be synonymous with
superstition, it has to be differentiated from it. Religion is also not based on
proving miracles. Wittgenstein maintains a fideistic position, similar to that
maintained by Kierkegaard. Wittgenstein “disapproves those who see religious
belief as hypothetical, reasonable, or dependent on empirical evidence” [29, p.
280].
Religious and nonreligious ideological convictions are different from each
other: “And then I give an explanation: ‟I don‟t believe in ....‟, but then the
religious person never believes what I describe.” [26, p. 55] The principles of
convictions are radically ulterior, and, in a given context, even the same terms –
used in the speech of a believer and a nonbeliever – can mean something entirely
different because, as Martin [25] notes, the use of the term is different. The
language employed by a believer and a nonbeliever are incommensurable.
However, Wittgenstein emphasizes that this discrepancy has nothing to do with
the disagreements present in other areas of life [30]. In some hypothetical and
specific situations, a sceptic and a believer may understand each other,
Wittgenstein says. A religious person, however, takes into account belief that is
not based on evidence.
In his Lectures, Wittgenstein also deals with the relationship between
belief, reason, and meaning. He sees religious proofs as fragile. In the last part,
he entertains the question of the adequacy of our belief. He sees the evidence of
belief as irrational because it is not subject to rational argumentation. Some
interpreters of Wittgenstein claim that here he alludes to the Letter to the
Corinthians, wherein Paul of Tarsus states: to some people, the word of the cross
is foolishness. He seems to be saying that to some people, Christianity is absurd.
Nota bene, Wittgenstein‟s notes – wherein he alludes to the Bible – have been,
with regard to the relative eccentricity of these remarks, rarely explored [31].
Religious claims to proof have very little support. Some religious
convictions are unproven and, in light of evidence, even seem improbable.
Wittgenstein views evidence as simply insufficient for belief. Thus he admired
Kierkegaard, who said that people believe in Christianity despite the absurdity of
its doctrines [32, 33]. The influence of Kierkegaard on Wittgenstein‟s
philosophy is, for example, addressed by Boix [34]. On the other hand,
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Wittgenstein was far from being a religious fundamentalist or fanatic: “That
Wittgenstein is a stumbling block to philosophical theists and atheists alike is
itself a testimony to the originality of his way of approaching such traditional
questions in the Philosophy of religion as whether it is rational to believe in
God” [35].
Several claims regarding religion and belief can be also found in
Wittgenstein‟s Philosophical Investigations. In this book Wittgenstein talks
about religion only sporadically. He considers prayer to be an example of a
language game: “Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying” [36]. In the
Investigations he discusses various forms of life, and this is what religion is to
him: a form of life, as opposed to a form of knowing. For Wittgenstein, religion
expresses a certain historical and metaphysical truth that is outside the
capabilities of an ordinary human spirit [37, 38]. He repeats the question of the
certainty of belief. He ponders the historicity of Moses. He perceives the various
possibilities of the use of the term „Moses‟. It could be the child saved by the
Egyptian princess of the Nile, the leader of the Israelites, the man named Moses
who lived at a certain time in a certain place, etc. He asks what needs to be
falsified in order for us to not believe in the existence of the man who is bound
by everything that is written in the Holy Scripture. He arrives at the conclusion
that such a measure does not exist. Wittgenstein concludes that the basis for
defending the authenticity of Moses in a biblical sense lies in one‟s own
decision, as opposed to a verification in biblical history: “Is it not the case that I
have, so to speak, a whole series of props in readiness, and am ready to lean on
one if another should be taken from under me and vice versa?” [36, p. 37] The
basis is belief alone – here Wittgenstein maintains his fideistic position.
People form other religious positions for the fundament of belief. In the
second part of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein asks how the use of
the expression „believe‟ came into existence: “So it looks as if the assertion „I
believe‟ were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis „I
believe!‟” [36, p. 190]. Wittgenstein understands the expression „I believe‟ as
one‟s use of something, of which one claims that it is as it is. Even though he
claims that it is possible not to believe one‟s own senses, the same is not
possible when it comes to religious belief.
Wittgenstein‟s last work (called On Certainty) is quite sparse on the topic
of religion. There are also different propositions connected to religious belief in
the aforementioned work. In it, Wittgenstein maintains the position that certainty
is more about action than knowledge. If we were to question every proposition
in its entirety, we would always have to ask: “how do you know it is so?” We
would arrive in the realm of complete scepticism. Which is why there exist
certain statements that cannot be contested: “A doubt that doubted everything
would not be a doubt” [39]. In the attempt to bypass complete scepticism, a
human being chooses facts that he or she views as the most fundamental, and
does not contest them. As the most fundamental, those facts thus present
themselves as self-evident.
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It is on this basis that we can perceive the context of belief in
Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion towards the end of the philosopher‟s life.
The dying Wittgenstein effectively did not change the opinions of religion which
he held in his later period. The truths of religious belief are those that we believe
and for which we do not need any proof. In Wittgenstein‟s understanding, belief
is not subject to proof, but rather to one‟s decision.
4. Conclusions
So how could we answer the questions posed at the beginning of this
article? The general periodization of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy is not, as modern
interpreters suggest [16, 40, 41], binary. Though in accordance with the majority
of Wittgenstein‟s interpreters in recognizing that there are notable elements (e.g.
phenomenological themes), this paper maintains the position that it is possible to
divide Wittgenstein‟s philosophy into its earlier, middle, and later periods.
The original position of the Tractatus is clear. Wittgenstein sees religion
as something that cannot be verbally expressed and is transcendent, belonging to
mysticism: “Even in the Tractatus did he find an inexplicable experience in
connection with the world as a whole, which is designated from the outside
(from the point of view of nowhere) as opposed to the effective perspective of
the real and absolute states of things” [42, p. 1051]. In this sense, this article
refutes the absurd interpretation of the so-called „New Wittgensteinians‟ who
consider the whole Tractatus to be self-destructive [43]. Although from a
different point of view, this interpretation is also refuted by Došek [44].
The middle period of his philosophy of religion greatly differs from that
of the Tractatus and excludes the Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein clearly
abandons his convictions about the transcendental nature of religion. He also
moves the possibility of religious accounts to a new level. The value of a
religiously meaningful act is no longer positioned within a human being (as it
was in the Tractatus), rather it has to be guaranteed by some higher power. The
distinctions between this and the religious position of later Wittgenstein are
noticeable here.
The last period of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion shows clear signs
of consistency. These topics are related to defining the nature of religious belief,
the justification of belief, the rationality behind belief, and the
incommensurability of religious and nonreligious belief. Wittgenstein also
assumes a fideistic position on the subject of the evidence of belief, which he
perceives as being exceedingly fragile. This is reminiscent of some medieval
mystics‟ and Protestant reformers‟ positions, including Luther‟s claim that only
God “evokes faith and a good conscience in the inner man” [45, p. 185], that is,
beyond the power of reasonable arguments. Some of his convictions are also
consistent with those of Kierkegaard [46-49]. He considers religion to be a form
of life and prayer to be a language game: “A truly Wittgensteinian philosophy of
religion can only be a personal process, and there can be no part in it for
generalized hypotheses or conclusions about religion in general” [50, p. 161].
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The issue of periodization in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion
Wittgenstein views belief as a matter of decision, which he supports in
Philosophical Investigations, as well as in On Certainty – where he claims that
some ideological propositions cannot be subjected to relativization. These topics
and opinions can be understood as significantly different than those which
Wittgenstein presented in the middle period of his philosophy. While in his
middle period, religion and its values have God as their explanation. In
Wittgenstein‟s later period (in On Certainty), however, as Beran [16, p. 105]
notes, he talks about the human choice not to contest certain statements. In this
sense, it becomes possible to address the third stage of his philosophy of
religion.
This article demonstrates a coherent connection between the individual
periods of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy in the sense of its triadistic division into
earlier, middle, and later periods. The discrepancy present in his opinions native
to the first period, presented in his Lecture on Ethics, resides in the fact that here
Wittgenstein basically expands on the notions he advanced in the Tractatus.
Also, as Burley [51] shows, there are no cardinal contradictions among the
individual periods of Wittgenstein‟s philosophy of religion. In this sense, there is
full concordance between the evolution of Wittgenstein‟s general opinions and
their periodization, and the individual stages of his philosophy of religion.
Acknowledgement
This paper was supported with the grant IG-KSV-ET-06/2016-2.1.5
„Current philosophy XX. Century‟, and International Scientific Research Project
ZML-2017/1-508:191006: „Kierkegaard‟s ethics and its meaning for society‟.
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