OFFICE OF EVALUATION
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in
West Bank
and Gaza Strip
2011-2015
August 2017
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in
West Bank and Gaza Strip
2011-2015
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF EVALUATION
August 2017
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Office of Evaluation (OED)
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Photo credit (cover photos): @FAO/Savina Tessitore.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Contents
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................viii
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................1
1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................11
1.1 Background and purpose ..........................................................................................11
1.2 Scope and Objectives ..................................................................................................12
1.2.1 Scope ......................................................................................................................12
1.2.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................13
1.3 Main evaluation questions ........................................................................................13
1.4 Methodology ................................................................................................................14
1.5 Constraints and challenges ........................................................................................16
2. Context ........................................................................................................................................ 17
2.1 Historical background and humanitarian context: operating at the
intersection of humanitarian and development needs ..............................................17
2.2 Agriculture, natural resources and climate change ........................................... 22
2.3 Poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity ........................................................... 23
2.4 Gender .............................................................................................................................24
2.5 Development frameworks and response plans ...................................................25
2.5.1 Government policies for the agricultural sector ........................................25
2.5.2 International development and response frameworks ...........................25
3. FAO in WBGS ..................................................................................................................... 27
3.1 The WBGS Office ...........................................................................................................27
3.2 FAO’s programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2011-2015 .....................28
3.2.1 The Plan of Action (2011-2013) .......................................................................28
3.2.2 The Programme Framework (2014-2016)....................................................28
3.3 Overview of FAO’s field programme delivery ..................................................... 29
3.4 Regional Projects ......................................................................................................... 34
4. Assessment of FAO’s strategic positioning in WBGS .......................................... 35
4.1 Strategic relevance and effectiveness ....................................................................35
4.1.1 Relevance and appropriateness of FAO WBGS strategic frameworks .35
4.1.2 Relevance and appropriateness of FAO’s analytical approach ............ 38
4.1.3 Linking relief, rehabilitation and development .........................................43
4.1.4 Alignment to FAO’s corporate Strategic Framework ...............................47
4.1.5 Partnership and coordination ........................................................................49
4.1.6 Decentralization ................................................................................................ 54
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
4.2 Positioning in the context of a protracted crisis ................................................. 56
4.2.1 Special status of the FAO WBGS office ....................................................... 56
4.2.2 Technical work in the political context of WBGS ......................................59
5. Assessment of FAO’s contribution to addressing humanitarian and
development needs in WBGS ........................................................................................... 63
5.1 Livelihood Activities .................................................................................................... 63
5.1.1 Targeting ............................................................................................................. 63
5.1.2 Relevance ............................................................................................................ 66
5.1.3 / Effectiveness/Timeliness ...............................................................................69
5.2 Policy support and capacity development ...........................................................74
5.3 Cross-cutting issues......................................................................................................81
5.3.1 Monitoring and lessons learning .................................................................81
5.3.2 Gender ................................................................................................................. 82
5.3.3 Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) ...........................................85
5.3.4 Environmental sustainability ...........................................................................87
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 89
7. Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 92
Appendix 1: List of People met......................................................................................... 98
Appendix 2: List of documents consulted ..................................................................104
Appendix 3: Evaluation Matrix ....................................................................................... 110
Appendix 4: List of Country, Regional and Global Projects ...................................117
Appendix 5: Map of WBGS project sites ..................................................................... 120
Appendix 6: Table of projects visits............................................................................... 121
Appendix 7: Theory of change ....................................................................................... 122
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Boxes, figures and tables
Boxes
Box 1: Livelihoods and protection.....................................................................................21
Box 2: FAO WBGS programme frameworks.................................................................. 29
Box 3: Resilience .................................................................................................................... 36
Box 4: FAO’s Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) ......................... 39
Box 5: Support to Food Security Information Systems ............................................. 40
Box 6: Instances of lack of preliminary analysis affecting project
implementation .....................................................................................................................43
Box 7: FAO WBGS’ work on Disaster Risk Reduction/Management ......................45
Box 8: FAO’s strategic position on partnerships .......................................................... 50
Box 9: FAO WBGS’ contractual arrangements with implementing partners .......52
Box 10: Regional Initiatives for FAO’s Near East and North Africa Region ............55
Box 11: Assistance provided through the country support mechanisms
2015/16 – some figures ....................................................................................................... 56
Box 12: FAO experience in countries with no Representation ..................................57
Box 13: FAO’s Project Support Cost (PSC) mechanism ............................................... 58
Box 14: Principles for action for improving food security and nutrition in
protracted crises ................................................................................................................... 60
Box 15: Beneficiary selection through application forms.......................................... 64
Box 16: Importance of land tenure arrangements to ensure relevance.................65
Box 17: Relevance of some FAO agricultural and livelihood support activities .......67
Box 18: Case study: improved nutrition as a result of home garden
development and sheep distribution in Khan Yunis, Gaza Strip .............................70
Box 19: HVC - hanging strawberry production in Gaza Strip ....................................71
Box 20: A FAO Assessment of the value of water stored in cisterns........................72
Box 21: Capacity Development in FAO ............................................................................75
Box 22: Effectiveness and use of FAO’s normative products: support to PADRRIF........79
Box 23: Monitoring of Cash Assistance .......................................................................... 82
Box 24: Gender aspects in project design and implementation ............................. 84
Box 25: Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment methodology.......85
Box 26: FAO and AAP .......................................................................................................... 86
Figures
Figure 1: West Bank (as of February 2005) .....................................................................19
Figure 2: Funding of FSS projects under the HRP 2015 ...............................................26
Figure 3: Total field programme delivery per year (USD)........................................... 30
Figure 4: Resources mobilized by year (2011-2015)..................................................... 30
Figure 5: Donor contribution to country projects’ portfolio (2011-2015)..............31
Figure 6: Number of projects by budget size (USD) .....................................................32
Figure 7: FAO’s programming focus between 2011 and 2015 ..................................33
Figure 8: Locations of FAO’s projects .............................................................................. 34
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Tables
Table 1: WBGS socio-economic data ................................................................................17
Table 2: West Bank areas following Oslo Accords ........................................................18
Table 3: Summary of land use in the WBGS .................................................................. 23
Table 4: Poverty in WBGS ....................................................................................................24
Table 5: Beneficiary households per main livelihood activity ...................................33
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Acknowledgements
The FAO Office of Evaluation would like to thank all those who contributed to the
evaluation of FAO’s Programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We are grateful
to FAO WBGS management and technical and administrative staff in the three
offices of Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza for their constant and efficient assistance
throughout the evaluation, and in particular the Deputy Programme Managers
and the drivers who accompanied the team on their many field trips. We would
also like to acknowledge the thorough engagement in this exercise of the acting
Head of Office, Ciro Fiorillo, and Azzam Saleh acting Head of Programme, who
have always remained open to exchanges and discussions which have much
enriched the results of this evaluation. Special gratitude goes to our evaluation
focal point, Rana Hannoun, who showed constant support and timely responses
to all our requests.
This evaluation was led by Savina Tessitore and Sara Holst from the FAO Office of
Evaluation. The evaluation was based on the extensive work of a team of experts,
comprising Claudia Martinez Mansell as food security expert, Sara Pavanello as
cash transfer and vulnerable livelihoods expert, Naser Qadous as agronomist and
markets expert and Muhannad Sandouka as value chain expert. Caroline Abu
Sada and Olivia Lazard also contributed their inputs in different phases of this
evaluation. The report benefitted from the insights of three OED Evaluation
Officers, Olivier Cossée, Marta Bruno and Amelie Solal-Celigny, who peer reviewed
the final draft and offered a number of insightful comments. Sarah Jaff in OED
provided constant administrative support.
Some historical information could only be collected through interviews with past
FAO West Bank and Gaza Strip staff to which we are very grateful. The team also
wishes to thank involved officers in RNE and at FAO headquarters who provided
invaluable information and documentation.
Finally, we would like to extend our thanks to all the other stakeholders met
during the whole course of this evaluation including officers of the Palestinian
Authority, donor agency officials, and staff of other UN agencies and nongovernmental organisations as well as members of the communities consulted
by the evaluation team.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Acronyms and Abbreviations
viii
AAP
Accountability to Affected Populations
AECID
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AOS
Administrative and Operational Support
APIS
Agricultural Projects Information System
CBOs
Community-based Organizations
CD
Capacity Development
CFS
Committee on World Food Security
COGAT
Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
CPF
Country Programming Framework
CSO
Civil Society Organization
DaLA
Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment
DPM
Deputy Programme Manager
DRM
Disaster Risk Management
DRR
Disaster Risk Reduction
EU
European Union
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGD
Focus Group Discussion
FSS
Food Security Sector
GAP
Good Agricultural Practices
GCP
Government Cooperative Programme
GDI
Gender Development Index
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
HCT
Humanitarian Country Team
HNO
Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP
Humanitarian Response Plan
HVC
High Value Crops
IFI
International Financial Institution
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IP
Implementing Partner
ISF
Israeli Security Forces
LACS
Local Aid Coordination Secretariat
LbL-i
Livestock Based Livelihoods Support Programme – institutional
component
LoA
Letter of Agreement
LRRD
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation
MoA
Ministry of Agriculture
MoH
Ministry of Health
NAIS
National Animal Identification System
NENA
North East and North Africa
NGO
Non-governmental Organization
OCD
Office of Coordination and Decentralization
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
OCHA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSRO
Office for Special Relief Operations
PA
Palestinian Authority
PADRRIF
Palestinian Agriculture Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Fund
PAPP
Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People
PCBS
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PF
Programme Framework
PNTD
Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development
PoA
Plan of Action
PSC
Project Support Cost
PVCA
Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
RBM
Results-based Management
RI
Regional Initiative
RIMA
Resilience Index Measurement Analysis
RNE
Regional Office for the Near East and North Africa
SEFSec
Socio-economic and Food Security survey
SF
Strategic Framework
SFERA
Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities
SO
Strategic Objective
SPS
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
SWOT
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunity and Threats
TCE
Emergency and Rehabilitation Division
TCP
Technical Cooperation Programme
UNDAF
United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East
UNSCO
United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
WBGS
West Bank and Gaza Strip
WFP
World Food Programme
WHO
World Health Organization
WSI
Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity
YMCA
World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Executive Summary
Introduction
ES1
The purpose of this evaluation was to review the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations’ (FAO’s) programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), and to better
align it with the needs of the Palestinian government as well as affected populations. The
evaluation also aimed to enhance the impact of FAO’s contributions to achieve the Global
Goals of FAO’s members: i) eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; ii)
elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all; and
iii) sustainable management and utilization of natural resources at the country level.
ES2
The overall objective of this evaluation was to assess FAO’s work in WBGS over 2011 to 2015,
identifying lessons learned, good practices, causes of success and failure, gaps in FAO’s
programming and potential areas of future work. The specific objectives of the evaluation
were to assess i) FAO’s strategic relevance in the WBGS, and ii) contributions made by FAO
towards sustainable socio-economic growth and food security as well as the resilience of
small-scale farmers, herders and fisher people in the WBGS.
ES3
The evaluation aimed to provide accountability to governmental and non-governmental
partners, resource partners, communities in WBGS, as well as all member countries. The
evaluation reviewed the design and implementation of FAO’s programme in WBGS in
order to draw lessons and provide advice to FAO and its main partners as they continue to
respond to the crisis in WBGS.
ES4
The evaluation covered the entire programme implemented by FAO in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip between 2011 and 2015, including activities funded through trust funds
and FAO’s own resources. The evaluation’s framework of analysis was based on the goals
of the two programming documents, the Plan of Action 2011-2013 and the Programme
Framework 2014-2016.
ES5
The evaluation was carried out within the scope of FAO’s Strategic Objectives (SOs),
particularly SO2 “Make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable”,
SO4 “Enable inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems” and SO5 “Increase the
resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises”. The evaluation paid particular attention to
strategic alignment with these SOs, endeavouring to draw lessons benefiting the work of
the Organization toward these objectives.
ES6
The Evaluation of FAO’s Contribution to Crisis-related Transition1 was used as a frame
of reference, as the findings and recommendations were relevant to the WBGS context.
In particular, the evaluation’s theoretical framework, theory of change and conceptual
definitions were adopted and referred to in framing this evaluation and developing its
methodology.
Methodology
ES7
The evaluation was managed by the Office of Evaluation and carried out by a team of
seven people comprising a range of sectoral expertise. The majority of the external team
members were Palestinian or of Palestinian origin and Arabic speakers. The team visited
WBGS and Israel between 15 February and 15 April 2016. As well as holding interviews and
reviewing documents in Jerusalem, the team visited ten governorates in the West Bank and
five in the Gaza Strip.
ES8
Project sites were selected in consultation with the WBGS office aiming at relevance and
geographic variety. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were
1
The evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crisis-related transition: linking relief, rehabilitation and development was
carried out over the first three quarters of 2014 and included the West Bank and Gaza Strip as one of the case studies.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
undertaken with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, implementing partners (IPs) and
local authorities to understand their views.
ES9
The following areas of work were identified as particularly relevant during the preparatory
phase of the evaluation: cash transfers and vulnerable livelihoods, access to markets, and
land and water resource management. FAO’s contributions were considered through the
lens of these three areas.
ES10 The evaluation team analysed the WBGS programme based on the following evaluation
questions (and the related sub-questions):
a. Considering FAO’s mandate and Strategic Framework (SF), was the Organization’s
strategy relevant and effective in the WBGS?
b. How did FAO position itself in the context of the protracted crisis in WBGS? What are the
challenges and opportunities for FAO as a technical agency in this context, and to what
extent has it addressed and taken advantage of them?
c. To what extent has the programme addressed the humanitarian and development
needs of Palestinians and their communities through agriculture, and helped them move
toward sustainable socio-economic growth, resilience and food security? What were the
impacts of FAO’s work on livelihoods, institutional capacities and cross-cutting areas of
work?
Context
ES11 WBGS faces a protracted crisis due to the occupation, characterized by access restrictions
to water and land and to domestic and external markets, recurrent conflict, longstanding
economic food access crisis, the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional
capacity to respond. The viability of agricultural livelihoods, furthermore, is constrained
by specific and different vulnerabilities and risks in the West Bank (e.g. settler violence,
land confiscation, restriction of movement and access to land and water, problems tied
to administration of Area C) and the Gaza Strip (e.g. blockade, high dependency on food
imports, access to land in the Seam Zone and to the sea, high dependency on relief aid, high
price volatility, erratic restrictions to entry and export of goods). The evaluation therefore
assessed FAO’s work both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, considering the different
challenges faced by the population in the two areas.
Findings
Assessment of FAO’s strategic positioning in WBGS
Strategic relevance and effectiveness
Findings on FAO WBGS strategic frameworks
• FAO WBGS strategic frameworks increasingly shifted toward a more developmental focus,
bridging the humanitarian/development divide through a resilience approach.
• This was a natural evolution of FAO WBGS’ work and relevant to this context, as is the value chain
approach at the basis of the Programme Framework (PF), though the potential of adopting a
market-centred focus was not fully exploited.
• The longer timeframe and broader aims of some projects indicated an evolution towards a more
programmatic approach, though overall the portfolio continues to be project led, mainly due to
high reliance on voluntary project funding.
• The design of the programme had some weaknesses; for example, the causal chains between
projects, activities and the overall framework were not well defined, and the logframe lacked
clarity on a number of fronts.
• Building national capacity and supporting policy and normative work was aligned with FAO’s
mandate and relevant and appropriate to the United Nations’ support to a two-state solution.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Findings on FAO’s analytical approach
• Both programming documents under review were supported by a situation analysis which
demonstrates attention to the context; FAO’s overarching analysis at national and governorate
level was well-constructed and based on a wide range of exercises.
• FAO developed a framework to work through value chains that was relevant to the context and
appropriate to FAO’s work and resilience-building aim.
• When looking at specific project needs assessments, no context analysis or analyses of risks,
cash injections, markets, protection or natural resources were undertaken at community and
household levels. Though such analyses could all greatly benefit FAO’s programming, neither
FAO headquarters nor donors provided funding to undertake assessments or build baselines
prior to project design.
• As FAO’s portfolio shifts towards development, its future work supporting food security
information systems will also need to shift away from its current annual emergency focus, to
more comprehensive systems, and further research, technical support and financial commitments
in order to cover a wide range of agricultural data and information systems.
• Any future work advocating and supporting improved food security information must wait for
the development of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) new National Policy Agenda 2017-2022 as
well as the final endorsement and adoption of the Socio-economic and Food Security (SEFSec)
methodology by Palestinian authorities.
Finding on linking relief, rehabilitation and development
• FAO’s focus on resilience as a way of linking relief, rehabilitation and development was
constructive and clearly reflected conceptually in its strategies and policy guidance, but not in
the design of activities.
• In practice, there was limited integration of humanitarian and development in FAO’s value chain
approach, whose rationale is grounded in an analysis of the business environment and not
enough on the humanitarian challenges the context presents.
• While projects claimed to be implementing resilience-building activities, these were often
focused on asset building rather than addressing the underlying issues that create, perpetuate or
increase the vulnerability of the targeted population (e.g. progressive erosion of natural resources
or reduction of access to resources and labour, commodity or service markets).
• There was a coordination gap at operational level between FAO’s humanitarian and development
activities, and a lack of harmonization between the Food Security Sector (FSS) and the Agricultural
Working Group’s aims and activities.
• Though crisis modifiers were not systematically integrated into the programme, by scaling up or
modifying interventions at field level, FAO demonstrated an ability to respond to emergencies.
Findings on alignment with FAO’s corporate Strategic Framework
• The Programme Framework has fully incorporated the current reviewed Strategic Framework
2013-2023 in its strategy, and both programming documents in the period under review are
clearly linked to the corporate objective of enhancing resilience, aligning with the previous
Strategic Objective I and current Strategic Objective 5. There were also some links with SO2, 3
and 4.
• FAO’s Strategic Framework was considered a useful tool by staff for thinking strategically about
FAO’s overall mandate, but not necessarily conducive to better programming.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Findings on partnership and coordination
• FAO’s collaboration with the Palestinian Authority intensified over the years through strategic
and operational work with different ministries, and became increasingly focused on institutional
capacity development.
• FAO’s presence and leadership in multiple coordination fora and technical working groups was
widely praised by all stakeholders. The donor community recognized FAO’s technical role and
appreciates its ability to collaborate with the government counterparts.
• Notwithstanding solid partnerships with key actors, FAO displays weaknesses when partnering
with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs),
whose work is mostly limited to service provision regulated through Letters of Agreement (LoAs).
Findings on Decentralization
• As a focus country, WBGS was supported in implementing activities in line with the Regional
Initiatives (RIs), providing otherwise difficulty to access seed funds.
• The country support process seems to have improved over the two years of its implementation,
with a broader range of SOs supporting the office, and a higher number of requests of support
being met.
Positioning in the context of a protracted crisis
Findings on the special status of the office
• Not being a Representation at the diplomatic and administrative level had various consequences
for the office, including not benefitting from FAO’s annual regular budget allocation and being
fully funded through the projects it implements.
• Some efforts were made by the Office of Evaluation in 2014 to clarify key issues, however the
potential for FAO’s work could be seriously affected by the reduction in programme delivery.
• The capacity of retaining qualified core staff and the consistently high level of the Head of Office
has raised the reputation of the office. The need to be efficient and effective in order to survive
seems to have been at least partly the reason behind the office’s high standards over time.
• Presently the office relies on emergency work to cover its running costs, and on a share of project
budget reserved for administrative and operational costs. The sustainability of this model is
questionable.
• The difficulties of access for staff travelling between the WB and the GS are a serious constraint
to joint work, and have the effect of isolating the office in the Gaza Strip.
Findings on technical work in the political context
• FAO WBGS has been involved in development cooperation, humanitarian response and (indirectly)
political engagement in the peace process, using its comparative advantage to reinforce the
state-building agenda.
• FAO has addressed protection mostly by supporting livelihoods and enhancing resilience in
order to help people confront the consequences of the conflict and prepare them for its peaceful
resolution.
• FAO’s credibility and its status give it a leverage to participate in a number of negotiations by
adopting a technical angle.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Assessment of FAO’s contribution to addressing humanitarian and development
needs in WBGS
Findings on targeting
• FAO used SEFSec data and Resilience Index Measurement Analysis (RIMA) to consider the socioeconomic characteristics of its target population; however, it gave insufficient attention to shock
exposure at household level, though this would be a good proxy measure of household resilience.
• Overall efforts were made to improve transparency and enhance FAO’s approach to targeting,
though little community consultation was carried out regarding targeting criteria.
• Inclusion and exclusion errors in targeting limited the involvement of communities in the
identification and definition of targeting criteria.
Findings on relevance
• FAO’s agriculture and livelihood-related activities were found to be relevant or very relevant to
local needs; however, the design of activities usually was not based on context-specific analysis,
but rather on the implicit knowledge of FAO staff.
• Livelihood interventions were predominantly focused on expanding beneficiaries’ asset-base,
with limited attention to supporting intangible processes and resources such as removing market
constraints and protection threats, two key elements to address vulnerability in WBGS.
• Where activities were less relevant, this was linked to some recurrent weaknesses of design.
Findings on effectiveness and timeliness
• By restoring or increasing access to assets and key resources and household-level food production,
most activities had positive effects. The food produced was used predominantly for household
consumption, with important gains on dietary quality and diversity and ability to save.
• Greater access to assets and food production enhanced some beneficiaries’ ability to sell surplus
production.
• FAO’s activities in support of agriculture were also perceived as carrying political significance by
maintaining the presence of Palestinian farmers on their land, reducing the risk of confiscation
and settlers’ attacks, and contributing to resistance to the occupation.
• Trainings provided as part of the interventions received mixed feedback. Implementation was
sometimes slow when several departments and actors were involved, but overall FAO’s response
to shocks was found to be effective and timely.
• Three recurrent factors were found to limit the effectiveness of FAO’s livelihood interventions:
when quantities of inputs were too small to make a difference; when inputs were of a different
and lesser quality than had been promised; and when coverage was too limited to ensure a
positive outcome.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Findings on policy support and capacity development
• FAO’s engagement with the enabling environment dimension of capacity development was
widely appreciated and instrumental in responding to country requests for policy assistance.
FAO’s assistance to policies and regulatory frameworks on plant protection and food safety was
very relevant and helped to develop the ability to export products, protect agriculture and adapt
to the increasing sophistication of consumer demands.
• FAO also fostered coordination in defining cross-disciplinary policies and programmes (SPS), and
government’s involvement in the management of transboundary resources, for example on pest
and animal diseases.
• Less evident was the development of local capacity for policy analysis, formulation and
implementation, affecting the sustainability and impact of developed capacities. Efforts to
develop the capacity of national NGOs, CBOs and public institutions is limited, though their
involvement could enhance sustainability and create multiplier effects at the community level.
• The physical and institutional constraints of the Palestinian Authority, together with the lack
of preliminary beneficiary consultations and assessment of their needs by FAO, have limited
ownership and undermined sustainability of some capacity development activities; sometimes
this led FAO to emphasize achieving outputs rather than intervening on processes that would
instead ensure local ownership and sustainability.
• Most technical trainings designed to transfer technologies and promote good agricultural
practices (GAPs) were relevant and effectively delivered.
Cross-cutting issues
Findings on monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
• Overall, the assessment of project and programme contributions to impact was hindered by lack
of monitoring of progress toward outcomes and of availability of disaggregated data. This was
also a consequence of limited resources and dedicated staff capacities within the office.
• No reference to earlier recommendations was found in project proposals and action plans,
and there seem to be no systems in place to ensure that lessons are learned and mistakes are
capitalized upon. However FAO is presently developing a system to monitor its activities.
Findings on gender
• While the evaluation found that FAO staff made efforts to incorporate gender aspects in
FAO’s operations, gender issues received little attention in project development and strategic
documents.
• The current method of targeting women as beneficiaries is not adequate, and does not equate to
gender programming. Instead programme designs need to be informed by an understanding of
women’s specific vulnerabilities and coping strategies in the WBGS.
Findings on accountability to affected populations (AAP)
• The WBGS office did not fulfil FAO’s corporate commitments on accountability to affected
populations, though there has been progress on the transparency of selection processes, and
some lessons arising after community consultations have been incorporated in programming.
• Recently the office has made a series of commitments to mainstream AAP throughout the project
cycle. These have not been implemented yet, but the new AAP framework appears to have some
conceptual weaknesses.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Findings on environmental sustainability
• FAO’s work presents several examples of efforts to use resources sustainably, especially through
knowledge sharing and training at household level, training on Good Agricultural Practices and
in some instances by reducing the use of chemicals and overuse of freshwater. Most of the High
Value Crops (HVC) farming, though, involves conventional fertilizer and pesticide use.
• Considering that the major challenge to environmental sustainability is the over-exploitation,
depletion and salinization of water sources, recycled wastewater is key to resilience, and FAO
should continue its work in this area. This includes at the more strategic and systemic institutional
and policy level to regulate resource use and ensure efficiency of production and sustainability.
Conclusions
In answering the evaluation questions these conclusions consider what worked well in the WBGS
programme, what the gaps were and what was innovative for FAO.
Conclusion 1. On FAO’s strategic positioning and reputation
• FAO was effective despite the difficult operating context and highly sensitive political
situation.
• An innovative emerging trait of the WBGS programme and a lesson for FAO corporate is
to address resilience by working through value chains on accessing markets.
• FAO’s strategy to adopt a technical approach to advocacy was appreciated by resource
partners and elevated FAO’s standing among United Nations agencies. FAO’s role in
coordination fora and as a leader in the sector was widely acknowledged and valued.
• NGOs and IPs would like to play a greater role when working with FAO, and to be
engaged in a more equal partnership.
Conclusion 2. On translating FAO’s position programmatically
• Though much work has been done to strengthen continuity and coherence at the
programmatic level, the programme’s overall structure was not reflected when translated
into projects and activities. The resilience approach at the core of the programme needs
to translate into projects addressing livelihoods and asset distribution. Moreover, there is
a coordination gap between FAO’s developmental and humanitarian activities.
• The use of value chains as the basis for programming offers an opportunity to bridge the
gap between humanitarian and development activities.
• Analyses remain generic and this undermines the resilience aim and effective integration
of humanitarian and development activities and goals. For example, the differences
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were not always accounted for in the design
of projects that target both areas.
• The weak link between programming documents and project activities was partly
related to the unclear corporate definition (until now) of the primary goals of FAO’s
programming documents; this issue should be partially solved by the new Country
Programming Framework (CPF) format that WBGS is about to adopt.
Conclusion 3. On policy support:
• Supporting Palestinian Authority institutions to develop policies is a small but important
and growing area of FAO’s portfolio in the WBGS. Considering the context, FAO’s
assistance was found to be effective and greatly appreciated by national authorities.
The implications of this work are: i) improved policies and normative frameworks have
the potential to immediately ease access or open outlets for the constrained Palestinian
economy; ii) a better policy environment builds the PA’s credibility in negotiations
with local and international partners, as well as with the Israeli authorities; and iii) it
strengthens the Palestinian position and its authority with regard to future advancement
and the peace process.
7
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
• The current status of the office as a non-Representation affects FAO’s capacity to
perform its core functions, including normative work, policy development and support
to information systems, as these very often fall outside the scope of project activities.
Conclusion 4. On community level assistance:
• At the community level, FAO’s work is focused mainly on asset building and land and water
rehabilitation, as opposed to other more nuanced interventions to enhance household
resilience by targeting specific needs and vulnerabilities. This has provided households
and communities with critical assets to enhance their agricultural production. However,
more attention should be paid to the implications of the activities on beneficiaries (e.g.
risks or trade-offs for beneficiaries and the indirect effects of distributed assets.
• More could be done to factor in risk and protection at the community level, and to
protect and support livelihoods.
• FAO’s programming documents should consider how the activities will affect women’s
inclusion and empowerment, particularly in relation to women’s ownership and access
to natural resources, and their position in the agricultural sector.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1. On strategic positioning in WBGS
a. General
FAO should build on its successful and well recognized strategic positioning in the WBGS,
while trying to improve in the areas suggested below.
b. Strategic Framework
Considering FAO’s mandate and technical expertise, market access and value chains were
appropriate strategic frameworks to address resilience. In developing related strategies,
however, more clarity is needed regarding livelihood promotion and protection objectives,
which should be suited to the context and target group.
Strategic alignment with Strategic Objectives should be reviewed in light of the local
context, national priorities and available funding resources.
c. Doing technical work in a crisis context
FAO should endeavour to better understand the causes of livelihood vulnerability, and the
multiple links between livelihoods and protection. One way for FAO to strengthen its focus
on protection is to coordinate with other organizations working on protection issues.
d. Coordination and consistency between humanitarian and development work
FAO should continue to play a role in coordinating and bridging development and
humanitarian work. The link between humanitarian and development work should be
mainstreamed in all activities and coordination efforts, including programme formulation,
implementation, and food security sector and working group coordination.
Recommendation 2. On programming
a. General
Though the office is to be commended for its ongoing efforts to adopt an increasingly
programmatic and harmonized approach, more systematic integration is recommended
among analysis, programming and M&E. In a context of declining resources, it is vital to
increase efficiency by promoting synergies between projects and activities. However, this
requires dedicated resources, and donors need to be more open to supporting activities
whose benefits extend beyond the projects they fund directly.
8
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
b. Analysis
More attention is needed to ensure that the design and implementation of project
activities i) are logically and technically sound; ii) are based on a solid analysis of the context
(social, economic, political); and iii) includes access to the necessary technical and financial
resources for preliminary assessments and studies.
c. Policy support
FAO should support and advocate for the institutional capacities needed to translate policy
into action. These capacities include enhanced coordination among institutions and with
external actors, and improved abilities to generate, manage and use information.
d. Access to markets
FAO should address the imbalance between producers and traders. Local markets should
be supported in order to reduce farmers’ post-harvest losses and encourage the marketing
of higher quality Palestinian produce. Working at the consumer end of the value chain
through sensitization and awareness campaigns would enhance the competitiveness of
local high quality production.
e. Community level assistance and cash transfers
FAO should better clarify and communicate the rationale for its choice of assistance
modalities (cash or in-kind) and make explicit the alignment with the overall objective of
resilience building. The relevance and appropriateness of conditional cash transfers should
be better analysed and communicated, and FAO should optimize its partnerships with
other agencies involved in cash-based activities.
f. M&E
The lack of project and programme baselines and endlines has limited FAO’s ability
to measure the effectiveness of interventions at household level. Moreover, improved
monitoring and gender-sensitive analyses of interventions would help to improve women’s
inclusion and empowerment.
Recommendation 3. On support to the office in view of its special status
a. General
FAO corporate should consider how best to support the WBGS office by facilitating the
necessary financial and technical resources. Resources should be made available in
support of functions that are not project-specific, particularly M&E, accountability, needs
assessments, programme formulation, project development and communication.
b. Financial support
As long as FAO WBGS is expected to bear the duties and responsibilities of a Representation,
headquarters should provide the resources needed to carry out the office’s duties. The
general principle should be full cost recovery for any action that the office is required to
undertake.
c. Technical support
A strong case can be made for headquarters (rather than the Regional Office for the Near
East and North Africa - RNE) to provide technical support to FAO WBGS: only headquarters
possesses the technical skills necessary to assist in drafting legislative frameworks, as
well as for general strategic actions (assessments, evaluations, capacity building, M&E,
communications, assessments and studies). Furthermore, the nationality of many officers
in RNE does not allow them to travel through Israel.
Recommendation 4. On partnerships
a. General
FAO corporate should create simpler and more actionable legal instruments for establishing
9
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
partnerships. This would also respond to donors’ (and NGOs’) frequent demands for more
equal partnerships.
More systematic guidance from headquarters is recommended to improve capacity to
negotiate with governments and build trusting partnerships with resource partners.
b. Palestinian Government
Governmental entities need to be fully committed and involved in order for their partnership
with FAO to be effective. FAO should ensure that the CPF is a fully nationally owned process
to guarantee its uptake.
To ensure the sustainability of its technical assistance, FAO should improve the Palestinian
Government’s capacities in technical innovations, rural finance, nutrition sensitive agrofood systems and safe agriculture. FAO should also enhance the Ministry of Agriculture’s
(MoA’s) capacity to support the preparedness of farmers in responding to seasonal
challenges.
c. United Nations agencies
Better and more complementary collaboration with United Nations agencies should be
sought i) by partnering with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) on cashbased interventions; ii) where FAO could add value by facilitating a better match between
supply and demand (e.g. by intensifying efforts to link farmers’ cooperatives and retailers
accepting food vouchers); iii) with the International Labour Organization on activities
involving labour force and the labour market; iv) with the World Health Organization
(WHO) on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (human/animal health interfaces) and
coordinating on activities undertaken with the Ministry of Health (MoH) (see above); v)
with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization on facilitating synergies on
activities involving the food industry and in regard to laboratory development; and vi) with
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on its livelihood portfolio.
d. NGOs/IPs/CBOs
In partnering with NGOs and CSOs, FAO should clarify the respective roles and
responsibilities of each organization, and use the appropriate contractual instruments.
FAO should strive to create synergies based on value added skills and capabilities, rather
than working in competition, and to build partners’ capacities rather than consider them
only as implementers.
e. Private sector
Considering FAO’s market-focused strategy and its work on value chains, FAO should clarify
different actors it engages with, and find ways to regulate the conditions of partnership.
10
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
1. Introduction
1.1
Background and purpose
1
The decision to undertake an independent evaluation of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nation’s (FAO’s) Programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(WBGS)2 over 2011 to 2015 was taken, in cooperation with the Strategic Objective (SO)
5 management team, on the basis of the following considerations: i) the relative size of
the programme; ii) the WBGS office’s commitment to improve integration of monitoring
and evaluation (M&E) into its activities, in order to provide accountability to national
stakeholders and member countries; iii) donors’ requests for evidence of results; iv) the fact
that the programme has been a precursor in working at the edge between humanitarian
and development programming, and that resilience has been a long-standing focus of
FAO’s interventions in the country, and can therefore provide important lessons for FAO’s
future corporate approach to building resilience and for the operationalization of FAO’s
Strategic Objective 5, “Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises”.
2
The purpose of the evaluation is to provide inputs to better orient FAO’s programme in the
WBGS, and specifically to improve its relevance to the needs of the Palestinian Government
and affected populations. The evaluation also aims to enhance the impact of FAO’s
contributions to achieve the Global Goals of FAO’s Members: i) eradication of hunger, food
insecurity and malnutrition; ii) elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic
and social progress for all; and iii) sustainable management and utilization of natural
resources at the country level.3
3
The evaluation aims to provide accountability to governmental and non-governmental
partners, resource partners, communities in WBGS, as well as all member countries. The
evaluation reviewed the design and implementation of FAO’s programme in WBGS in
order to draw lessons and provide advice to FAO and its main partners as they continue to
respond to the crisis in WBGS.
4
Besides drawing lessons on FAO’s work in the WBGS, the evaluation seeks to contribute
to a better overall understanding of FAO’s modalities and capacity to respond in complex
emergencies. In particular, the question of whether FAO was able to respond effectively to
needs through an emergency programme with a strong development component aims to
inform FAO’s strategic choices regarding its engagement in protracted crises.
5
The main audience for the evaluation are FAO WBGS office management, its staff, and
the support teams at all levels of the Organization who will benefit from the evaluation’s
findings and recommendations. Other important users of the evaluation are the Regional
Office for the Near East and North Africa (RNE) and FAO as a whole, including the SP5
management team, divisions at headquarters, and other country offices and programmes
in contexts of protracted and complex crises that will benefit and build on lessons learned
and good practices. Further users of the evaluation will be FAO’s partners within the
broader development community, including the Palestinian Authority (PA), resource
partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), implementing partners (IPs) and other
UN agencies, in particular those with whom strategic interventions were identified in the
context of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the State of
Palestine and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). Although not a target group for the
evaluation report itself, the evaluation also aspires to provide accountability with respect
to communities and in particular vulnerable groups in WBGS that FAO has sought to assist.
2
While acknowledging that FAO officially uses West Bank and Gaza Strip to refer to its work in this area, this report
will also occasionally use the alternative occupied Palestinian territories, especially when referring to the political
and institutional entity.
3
See Annex 1 for FAO’s vision and Global Goals of Members.
11
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
1.2 Scope and Objectives
1.2.1 Scope
12
6
The evaluation covered the entire programme implemented by FAO in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip between 2011 and 2015, including activities funded through trust funds and
FAO’s own resources such as the Regional Initiatives (RIs) and backstopped by headquarters
and RNE.
7
The framework of analysis was based on the goals and purposes of the two programming
documents, the Plan of Action (PoA) 2011-2013 and the Programme Framework (PF) 20142016. It focused on one side on continuity and overlapping activities between the two, and
on the other on establishing whether the evolution of the strategy in terms of a) analysis
b) response frameworks and activities, and c) targeting criteria, had a significant (positive
or negative) effect on relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of the programme
over time. Given the short timeframe over which the PF had been in place at the time of
the evaluation, all initiatives implemented over the past five years were assessed. However,
a greater emphasis was placed on assessing preliminary progress towards the objectives
defined in the PF, given that it corresponds to FAO’s present strategy.
8
The evaluation was carried out within the scope of FAO’s Strategic Objectives (SO). In
particular, the objectives and activities carried out by FAO in WBGS are relevant to SO2
“Make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable”, SO4 “Enable
inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems”, and SO5 “Increase the resilience of
livelihoods to threats and crises”, and the evaluation payed particular attention to strategic
alignment with these SOs, endeavouring to draw lessons benefiting the work of the
Organization towards these objectives.
9
Contributions provided by FAO as part of its core functions (see Annex 1 for FAO’s core
functions), often by their nature not necessarily delivered as part of specific projects, were
also covered by this evaluation. Specifically, the evaluation focused on the core functions
of policy dialogue; developing capacity for information and monitoring systems;
coordination and partnership; and advocacy.4 These are particularly relevant to the
context and FAO in the WBGS has been historically committed to these areas of work. On
the other hand, the assessment of this aspect of FAO’s work in WBGS was driven by the
particular status of the office as a “non-Representation” with no core funding for this kind
of activities, and the need to understand how this gap reflects on the functioning of the
office.
10
The Evaluation of FAO’s Contribution to Crisis-related Transition5 was used as a frame of
reference, seeing the relevance of its findings and recommendations to the context of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. In particular, the evaluation’s theoretical framework, theory of
change and conceptual definitions were adopted and referred to in framing this evaluation
and developing its methodology.
11
Furthermore, in formulating the evaluation questions a purposeful effort was made to
consider the three main recommendations of the Transition Evaluation and markedly the
need for FAO:
1
To respond first and foremost to the needs of the poor, the food insecure and the
vulnerable, measuring its effectiveness in crisis contexts in terms of impact on these
affected populations;
2
While advocating for recognition of its comparative advantage in overcoming the
humanitarian-development divide, to also press resource partners to overcome such
divide;
4
FAO’s work in this area is particularly interesting to assess in relation to its capacity to intervene in protracted
political crises.
5
The evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crisis-related transition: linking relief, rehabilitation and development was
carried out over the first three quarters of 2014 and included the West Bank and Gaza Strip as one of the case
studies.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
3
12
To adopt as a paramount concern in working in conflict or conflict-prone situations,
the relationship of food security and agriculture (including tenure, employment and
income) to conflict and potential conflict management/resolution.6
The whole WBGS faces a protracted crisis due to the occupation, characterized by access
restrictions to water and land and to domestic and external markets, recurrent conflict, a
long-standing economic food-access crisis, the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient
institutional capacity to respond. The viability of agricultural livelihoods, furthermore, is
constrained by specific and different vulnerabilities and risks in the West Bank (e.g. settler
violence, land confiscation, restriction of movement and access to land and water, problems
tied to administration of Area C) and the Gaza Strip (e.g. blockade, high dependency on
food imports, access to land in the Seam Zone and to the sea, high dependency on relief
aid, high price volatility, erratic restrictions to entry and export of goods). The evaluation
therefore assessed FAO’s work both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, considering the
different challenges faced by the population in the two areas.
1.2.2 Objectives
13
The overall objective of this evaluation was to assess FAO’s work in WBGS over 2011 to
2015, identifying lessons learned, including good practices as well as causes of success and
failure, gaps in FAO’s programming and potential areas of future work. The evaluation is
geared towards providing strategic recommendations to improve FAO’s programme in
WBGS, and any lessons that can be extended to other situations of protracted political
crisis and to the Strategic Objective of building resilience.
14
The specific objectives of the evaluation of FAO’s programme in WBGS are twofold: on
one hand FAO’s strategic relevance in the WBGS. In particular, the evaluation assessed the
relevance and effectiveness of FAO’s strategy in terms of its programming documents, its
analytical approach, the relevance and connectedness of its emergency and development
projects, its alignment to the corporate Strategic Framework (SF), its effectiveness in
partnering and coordination, and in the way it is affected by FAO’s decentralization process.
15
The programme in WBGS has been gradually shifting from a purely humanitarian focus to
an increasingly developmental one. In view of this shift and of the specificity of the context
in which FAO operates, strategic relevance was also assessed in terms of FAO’s capacity to
position itself in the context of a protracted political crisis such as this one. This included
analysing how contextual factors are reflected on FAO’s office structure and ways of
working, whether FAO’s technical work has an impact on the political context, and what
FAO’s role and its comparative advantage are, as well as its capacity to deliver vis-à-vis the
operating environment.
16
On the other hand, the evaluation assessed contributions made by FAO towards sustainable
socio-economic growth and food security as well as the resilience of small-scale farmers,
herders and fisher people in the WBGS. Resilience building has been a long-standing focus
of the programme, and in fact, in some ways the WBGS office has been piloting FAO’s
approach to resilience since the beginning of the 2000s. The evaluation will base its analysis
of resilience building in WBGS on FAO’s own definition, while adopting a slightly broader
view (see Box 3 in section 4.1.1). The evaluation aimed to assess progress in addressing both
development and humanitarian needs of Palestinian communities and individuals and the
impact of FAO’s work on livelihoods and institutional capacity, and on cross-cutting areas
such as gender and environmental sustainability.
1.3 Main evaluation questions
17
6
On the basis of the above scope and objectives, the Terms of References identified three
overarching questions with a set of sub-questions to guide the evaluation.
FAO 2014, Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crisis-related transition. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.
Final Report.
13
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
a. Considering its mandate and its Strategic Framework, is FAO’s strategy relevant and
effective in the WBGS?
b. How does FAO position itself in the context of the protracted crisis in WBGS? What are
the challenges and opportunities for FAO as a technical agency in this context, and to
what extent has it addressed and taken advantage of them?
c. To what extent has the programme made progress in addressing the humanitarian and
developmental needs of Palestinians and their communities through agriculture, going
towards sustainable socio-economic growth, resilience and food security? What have
been the impacts of FAO’s work on livelihoods, institutional capacities, and cross-cutting
areas of work?
18
These questions were further refined by the team at different stages of the in-country
investigation phase, considering new issues and angles emerging during the inquiry
and specific questions arising from each of the three research areas at the centre of the
evaluation. The full evaluation matrix is provided in Appendix 3.
1.4 Methodology
19
The evaluation was managed by the Office of Evaluation and carried out by a team of
seven people comprising a range of sectoral expertise and divided into three sub-teams,
as detailed below. The majority of the external team members were Palestinian or of
Palestinian origin and speakers of Arabic. The team visited WBGS and Israel between 15
February and 15 April 2016. As well as holding interviews and reviewing documents in
Jerusalem, they visited ten Governorates in the West Bank and five in the Gaza Strip (see
Table of project visits in Appendix 6).
20
Teamwork was organized under three sub-teams working in relative autonomy to carry
out in-depth studies around the three areas detailed above. These studies provided
evidence and complemented the strategic analysis of FAO’s overall programme. Fieldwork
was conducted by the sub-team members to meet direct beneficiaries and assess the
relevance and effectiveness of interventions in these areas, as well as any positive and
negative intended and unintended results at individual and community level. Project sites
were selected in consultation with the WBGS office aiming at relevance and geographic
variety. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries, implementing partners and local authorities were undertaken to collect
their views.
21
The following areas of work were identified as particularly relevant during the preparatory
phase on the basis of: a) their strategic relevance vis-à-vis the context and FAO’s mandate
and Strategic Framework; b) the number of projects in the WBGS portfolio and the volume
of dedicated funding; c) indications from FAO staff managing or supporting the office; and
d) their potential for expansion:
• Cash transfers and vulnerable livelihoods
• Access to markets
• Land and water resource management
FAO’s contributions were considered through the lens of these three areas. Their strategic
relevance to the context and the programme is detailed below.
22
7
14
Over the period covered by the evaluation, FAO implemented different interventions
through cash assistance for livelihood support, a modality of conditional cash transfers
piloted by FAO in the WBGS which implies a vertically integrated approach, where
beneficiaries are responsible for constructing their own household or community asset and
then using it and maintaining it after the completion of the project.7 Furthermore, during
the inception mission cash transfers were mentioned by FAO management as a key area
in which FAO could invest more in the future. Another related area of FAO’s work identified
as a focus for the evaluation is assistance targeting vulnerable small-scale farmers,
herders and fisher people. Such focus is in line with FAO’s overall mandate and with SO5,
FAO (2015) Conditional cash assistance to build resilience against water scarcity in the West Bank.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
and is particularly relevant seeing the general conditions of the Palestinian population and
the vulnerability of specific groups in WBGS, such as herders in Area C, farmers with plots
in the Seam Zone and fisher people who cannot access the sea. The evaluation sought to
understand each of these two areas separately, as well as the intersections between them.
23
Another priority area for FAO involves enhancing access to markets. The evaluation chose
to focus on this area on the basis of the conceptual frame of the PF, built following a value
chain model in order to address exposure to shocks as well as the decline in agricultural
productivity that characterizes the Palestinian context. Such a model aims to assist
beneficiaries targeted by FAO’s humanitarian and development interventions to preserve
their productive assets and access to inputs while regaining their productive capacity,
boosting their competitiveness and adding value to their production. This area of work is
tied to FAO’s SO4.
24
Land and water resource management are central concerns in the WBGS, seeing the
frequency of land confiscation and evictions by the Israeli authorities, and considering
that access to and control of land and water is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As
shown by the analysis of the country portfolio these areas, central to FAO’s mandate both
in terms of sustainable natural resource management and of ensuring land and water for
sustainable agriculture, have partially been covered by FAO’s work in the past, but there is
much scope for further engagement. This area of work is linked to FAO’s SO2. Primary and
secondary data were collected as evidence to assess strategic relevance and contribution:
• A desk review of the literature, including project documents, past evaluations and
reviews, and other relevant literature from FAO and other organizations. In particular,
the two programming documents for the period under evaluation, the Plan of Action
2011-2013 and the Programme Framework 2014-2016 were reviewed to assess whether
the analytical framework and design of the FAO programme were based on a preliminary
analysis of the context and of the gaps and needs of the population and other relevant
actors.
• Stakeholders were mapped with the support of the WBGS office to provide information
in relation to the evaluation questions. Protocols for interviews were developed by the
team and refined over the course of the missions. Key informant and group interviews
were carried out in different locations including:
- FAO staff in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza Strip
- Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) (central and decentralized, both in the West Bank
and in the Gaza Strip), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Ag sector WG,
Palestinian Water Authority, Ministry of Social Affairs
- Israeli technical counterparts, including the Director of Veterinary Services of the Israeli
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the former head of administration
in the Gaza Strip
- Staff of donor agencies (13), Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS), Food Security
Sector (FSS)
- Staff of UN agencies and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (17)
- 13 implementing partners both in Ramallah and in the Gaza Strip
- 89 focus group discussion (FGD) with beneficiaries in 15 governorates.
• Field visits to 55 FAO and four non-FAO project sites.
25
Two team workshops were organized at the beginning and towards the end of the main
mission. Initially to brainstorm on the evaluation framework, discuss the evaluation matrix,
and coordinate overlaps between the areas of sub teams’ work both in theoretical and
operational terms; at the end to discuss initial findings and emerging conclusions and review
the matrix together in light of sub-team fieldwork and of a preliminary analysis. At the
end of the second workshop, a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
analysis session was conducted with national FAO staff to engage them in a discussion on
emerging topics of relevance to the evaluation, and triangulate initial findings.
26
In consultation with managers in the WBGS, and on the basis of team discussions and
document reviews, the team developed a Theory of Change for the WBGS programme
15
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
2011-2015 for a better and consolidated understanding of both programming documents
being evaluated (see Appendix 7).
27
The Office of Evaluation management team visited the Regional Office in Cairo between
9 and 11 May to gain an in-depth understanding of the support provided to the WBGS
office and of any issues related to the regional perspective, including the WBGS office’s
participation in Regional Initiatives and the impact of being a “non-Representation” office
for the Regional Office.
28
The final evaluation of the institutional level component of the European Union (EU)
project: “Support livestock-based livelihoods of the vulnerable populations in the occupied
Palestinian territory” (OSRO/GAZ/201/EC), carried out between July and October 2016
under the same Office of Evaluation management team as the WBGS programme
evaluation, was framed to partly incorporate some of the questions related to the overall
evaluation, and some of its findings fed into this report.
29
A workshop was held in Jerusalem with the FAO WBGS team in March 2017 to discuss some
main issues emerging from the report, and jointly develop draft recommendations.8
1.5 Constraints and challenges
30
Geographically, the area under evaluation constitutes a fragmented territory for which
access is under strict control by the Israeli Security Forces (ISF) and subject to unpredictable
closures and heightened restrictions, making the logistics of the visits to FAO project sites
quite complex. Furthermore, access to and movement between the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank and East Jerusalem for Palestinians depends on what kind of ID and permit they are
given by the Israeli authorities, and this constrained mobility and access to some project
sites for the Palestinian team members.
31
The low-intensity but continuous conflict and the general regime of insecurity affected
the planning of the evaluation in a number of ways, such as having to forgo any visits to
Hebron or Bethlehem and in general meet the paramount security concerns and comply
with security regulations. It had a bearing on fieldwork, for example when a focus group
was held in a community in Southern West Bank where the ISF had just demolished some
houses, an event which clearly was reflected in the interviewees’ state of mind and coloured
their responses.
32
The sensitivities incurred in carrying out an evaluation in such a frayed political context
cannot be understated. When a conflict has been so emotionally charged for so many
people and for such a long time, and so much is at stake politically and symbolically, language
becomes charged with meaning and the very choice of which words to use becomes highly
sensitive. This invites more than the usual caution, and inevitably affected the framing of
this evaluation and the way this report is written. This evaluation acknowledges these
complex political issues, and while hoping to contribute to the debate, it will not address
them upfront.
33
Seeing that the evaluation period was covered by two different programming documents,
and that the evaluation had to assess what were ultimately two frameworks which only
partly overlapped, the team could not rely on a single logframe with clear outcome and
impact indicators for its assessment. Furthermore, no baseline data existed for either
framework against which to measure progress, also due to the absence of regularly
produced agricultural statistics, a prerequisite to establish baselines.
34
For logistical and financial reasons the evaluation team relied on purely qualitative
data, so though the fieldwork findings of this evaluation have been validated through
triangulation and can be considered robust, they will shed more light on causal chains than
on generalizable and replicable findings, usually the outcome of more qualitative research.
8
16
See Annex 6 with list of participants.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
2. Context
2.1 Historical background and humanitarian context: operating at the
intersection of humanitarian and development needs
Table 1: WBGS socio-economic data9
Population (in 2016)
Total WBGS and EJ
4.7 million10
West Bank
2.9 million
East Jerusalem
0.4 million
Gaza Strip
1.8 million
Refugees in Palestine (2015)
42%11
Refugees in WB
26.3% of WB pop.
Refugees in GS
67.7% of GS pop.
Population 0-19 years old (WBGS)
50%
Rural population
16.6%
Unemployment rate
25.9%
Unemployment rate in WB
17.3%
Unemployment rate in GS
41.0
39.2%
Female unemployment rate
Female Labour Force Participation rate
19.1%
Agricultural employment rate
(% of total employment)
7.3%
Wage Employees in Agriculture (2014)
(% of total agricultural employment)
Males: 39.1%
Females: 4.0%
Unpaid Family Members in Agriculture (2014)
(% of total agricultural employment)
Males: 18.8%
Females: 63.5%
12
Source: PCBS 2015
101112
35
The current situation in the Palestinian territories is grounded in the failure to come to an
agreement over sovereignty and the political government of the area after 1948, at the end
of the British mandate in Palestine. The Arab States’ rejection in 1947 of the UN proposed
Partition Plan to create two independent States with economic union, shortly followed by
the proclamation of the State of Israel and the occupation by the Arab States of the Arab
portion of the partition plan, led to a full scale war between the newly formed Israeli entity
and the Arab countries.
36
What came to be known as the first Arab-Israeli war resulted in the destruction of hundreds
of Palestinian villages and the displacement of an estimated 700 000 Palestinians from their
homes and lands. It created a Palestinian diaspora and refugee community in surrounding
countries amounting to around 4.9 million people in 2010, more than the total Palestinian
population living in WBGS at the time.13 Israel later occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem
9
All data refer to 2015 unless otherwise stated.
10 Palestinian population worldwide is calculated as 12.4 million.
11 UNRWA records indicate that 5.59 million Palestinian refugees registered at the beginning of 2015, 42,8% of
Palestinians worldwide (UNRWA). Around 28.7% refugees live in 58 refugee camps: 10 in Jordan, 9 in Syria, 12 in
Lebanon, 19 in the West Bank, and 8 in the Gaza Strip. These estimates represent a minimum number, given the
presence of non- registered refugees, the non-inclusion of the refugees who were displaced between 1949 and
the 1967 wars and the non-refugees who left or were forced to leave as a result of the 1967 war.
12 The labour force participation rate is defined as the percentage of the population that is either employed or
unemployed (that is, either working or actively seeking work).
13 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics portal http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/PalDisPOPUL-2010E.htm
17
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
and the Gaza Strip in 1967. The UN position in response to the war was articulated
under Resolution 242 affirming the need for withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces and
acknowledging the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace. These two tenets, known as “land for peace”, were at the basis of
subsequent bilateral peace agreements between Israel and neighbouring countries.
37
The First Palestinian Intifada began in 1987 and ended with the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords
establishing the Palestinian Authority as an interim body to run the Gaza Strip and parts
of the West Bank (but not East Jerusalem) pending an agreed permanent solution to the
conflict, foreseen in 1998. As part of the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided in three
areas designated as A, B and C. The large majority of the population lives in Areas A and B,
and is severely constrained in its movements and restricted in its economic potential and
livelihoods, while Area C, fully under Israeli control, constitutes two thirds of the agricultural
land in the West Bank,14 hence its crucial importance for food security and livelihoods of
all Palestinians.
Table 2: West Bank areas following Oslo Accords
% population % land
Israeli/PA control
Area A
53%
18.3%
Full civil and security control by the PA
Area B
41%
18.8%
Full civil control by the PA and joint PA-Israeli security control
Area C
5.8%
62.9%
Full Israeli control over security, planning and construction
15
Source: EU (2011)
38
The initial negotiations on a final status agreement were interrupted, which resulted in
the Israeli Civil Administration16 not handing over its authority over Areas B and C.17 The
lack of a final peaceful solution and tensions around holy sites in Jerusalem triggered the
Second Intifada (2000-2006), at the end of which Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, while
maintaining control over sea, land and air borders, and continuing to build the West Bank
separation barrier and new settlements within the West Bank. An agreement between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to regulate economic and trade relations,
the Protocol on Economic Relations, also called Paris Protocol, was signed in April 1994.18
39
The victory in the Palestinian 2006 legislative elections by Hamas, led the United States
of America to suspend aid to the Palestinian Authority, followed by the European Union.
After significant infighting between Fatah and Hamas, in June 2007 the latter took control
of the Gaza Strip forming a de facto government, while the former declared an emergency
government in the West Bank. Israel reacted by imposing an air sea and land blockade
on Gaza and temporarily suspend transfer of taxes to the PA on one side,19 while opening
formal contacts with the emergency government on the other, while the Quartet, formed
by representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America
and the Russian Federation,20 called for reviewing all financial commitments against the
principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements
and obligations. The political division between Fatah and Hamas has not yet been resolved,
though different attempts to form a unity government have been ongoing.
40
2014 again witnessed a sharp increase in the severity of humanitarian needs in the Gaza
Strip, as well as heightened tension and intensified clashes across the West Bank. The Israeli
14 UNCTAD (2015), The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector, New York and Geneva
15 EU (2011), EU Heads of Missions report: Area C and Palestinian State-Building.
16 The Civil Administration is part of a larger entity known as Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories
(COGAT), which is a unit of the Ministry of Defense of Israel.
17 The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee, supposedly an interim organ to manage water and sewage, though
not regularly functional throughout the period, is also still in existence. Its work was interrupted mainly due to
Israeli rejection of water projects in Area C and to the Palestinian refusal to agree on connecting settlements
to water projects in the West Bank. Recently the PA announced it has reached an agreement to reactivate the
committee.
18 http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Gaza-Jericho%20Agreement%20Annex%20IV%20
-%20Economic%20Protoco.aspx
19 Transfer of tax revenue has presently been resumed.
20 http://www.quartetrep.org/page.php?id=4e3e7y320487Y4e3e7
18
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
military operation “Protective Edge” affected the agricultural livelihoods of 32 000 farming
households and 8 000 agricultural wage labourers in Gaza Strip, with heavy damage to
assets causing shortages and high food prices, which in turn increased the severity of
food insecurity. In the West Bank, restrictions on trade and access to land and water led
to a lack of economic access to food, lower purchasing power and unemployment, and
overall erosion of livelihoods and potential for economic development, all of which had
a particularly heavy toll on the more vulnerable segments of the population. To this date,
reconstruction efforts are falling short and recovery in the Gaza Strip is still awaiting the
support that had been pledged.
Figure 1: West Bank (as of February 2005)
Source: FAO 2016
41
The post-Oslo peace process has stalled up to the present, notwithstanding various recent
attempts to reanimate it, including towards the end of 2016, a conference in Paris and calls
to resume negotiations in speeches by the UN Secretary-General and the US Secretary of
State. In the meantime, the blockade persists in Gaza, its effects worsened by the closure
of illegal tunnels which allowed for the smuggling of goods from Egypt. There is presently
widespread international consensus that the continuous expansion of Israeli settlements
In the WB and East Jerusalem21 greatly undermines the prospects of the peace process
and of a two-state solution.22 Not only do settlements occupy land in the West Bank
which according to the Oslo Accords should eventually be part of a Palestinian state: a
further, more indirect, consequence is that t he fear of settler attacks prevents farmers
from cultivating their plots, leaving space for further land requisition in favour of settlers,
allegedly on the basis of the Ottoman Land Code.23
21 At the end of 2014 the population in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was approximately
570 700, and had been growing at a steady rate, with an average growth rate of 14 600 people per year between
2002 and 2014. Secretary-General’s 2016 report Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including
East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/HRC/31/43. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2017 the Knesset
passed a controversial “regularisation bill” providing justification for constructions of settlements in the WBGS,
and de facto legitimizing their existence.
22 As exemplified by UN Security Council Resolution 2334 adopted on 23 December 2016, and the subsequent
speeches by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, and US Secretary of State John Kerry.
23 Since 1967 Israel has adopted a policy of declaring big tracts of territory in the West Bank state land and assigning it
to settlements on the basis of its interpretation of the Ottoman Code inherited as occupying power from the previous
administration. To turn previously otherwise designated land into state land, the Israeli Civil Administration referred
to several rules: the farmer must prove cultivation of at least one half of the total area of a parcel in order to acquire
rights on the land; cessation of cultivation for several years nullified people’s right on the land, even if it had been
cultivated by the family for decades; and public land assigned for specific community use could be converted to state
ownership. This interpretation of the rules contradicted the Ottoman Code as interpreted and applied by previous
administrations, and as such has been contested as inconsistent with international law, B’Tselem 2012.
19
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
42
Ultimately, the protracted protection crisis suffered in the WBGS is determined by Israeli
economic and political measures imposing severe restrictions on movement and access to
land and other resources, a situation with humanitarian consequences driven by insufficient
respect for international law on all sides. Agricultural productivity has declined as a result
of restricted access to land and water resources among other factors (World Bank 2013,
UNCTAD 2015). In Gaza Strip, the now seven-year-old blockade crippled economic activity
sending poverty rates soaring, and 35 percent of agricultural land cannot be accessed
safely and is largely uncultivated, at an opportunity cost of an estimated USD 50.2 million
annually.24 The No-Go and High Risk Access Restricted Areas amount to 17 percent of the
Gaza Strip directly affecting the livelihood of an estimated 178 000 people, or 12 percent
of the population in Gaza Strip.25 It is estimated that the total potential value added from
lifting Israel’s restrictions on Palestinian production in Area C would amount to USD 3.4
billion, or 35 percent of Palestinian gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011 (Niksic, Nasser
Eddin and Cali, 2014:5). Major infrastructure passing through Area C cannot be constructed
without Israeli authorization, and gas and oil reserves in the Gaza Strip and in the West
Bank are not accessible due to a lack of legal access.
43
The presence of international actors and the UN architecture itself are marked by the ArabIsraeli question and the effort to oversee and advance the Middle East peace process,
including supporting Palestinian state-building. To this end, the Local Aid Coordination
Secretariat26, established under the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,27 supports the local aid
coordination structure to ensure development effectiveness through donor cooperation
and coordination, in line with the Palestinian Authority’s priorities and the Paris
Declaration. The Quartet was established in 2001 after the outbreak of the Second Intifada
in recognition of the need of a mediation structure in the face of escalating conflict, while
the Office of the Quartet Representative is dedicated to promote projects and policy
issues to realize economic growth.
44
The UN’s mission in Palestine is to support development cooperation, humanitarian response
and political engagement in the peace process (see Annex 2). While all UN structures
cooperate to achieve these goals, two agencies were created to meet specific challenges:
the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) was
established in the wake of the Oslo conference to enhance the UN’s involvement in the
peace process by strengthening UN cooperation and boosting development assistance;
and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), created in 1949, carries out direct relief and works programmes for Palestinian
refugees,28 a mandate continuously renewed in the absence of a solution to the refugee
problem. Furthermore, since 2001 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been present to support international efforts to address
the humanitarian situation through a coordinated and effective response.
45
This crowded arena, which also includes a large number of local and international
NGOs, together with the complex political scenario in which aid agencies operate, has
a bearing on the peculiarities of the political economy of aid in WBGS: some critics, for
instance, consider development projects to distract from claiming redress of infringed
Palestinian rights, while on the other hand humanitarian interventions are denounced for
not tackling underlying causes and perpetuating a short-term emergency approach to a
decade-long crisis,29 while a concrete risk exists of donors over-emphasising protection by
humanitarian agencies to substitute for their own state level political action to address and
stop human rights violations.30 On the other hand, growing concerns about the reliance
of vulnerable populations on emergency assistance drive the wish on behalf of donors
24 OCHA and WFP. Aug 2010. “Between the Fence and a Hard Place,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs Affairs / World Food Program occupied Palestinian territory. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/betweenfence-and-hard-place
25 OCHA and WHO, 2010.
26 http://www.lacs.ps/article.aspx?id=1
27 http://www.lacs.ps/article.aspx?id=6
28 UN (2007), The Question of Palestine and the United Nations.
29 Al-Shabaka (2014), Donor Complicity in Israel’s violation of Palestinian Rights.
30 This has been recognized as one of eight operational dilemmas for humanitarian programmes operating
protectively in highly contested, dangerous and deeply politicized conditions, see Slim, H., Bonwick, A. (2005)
Protection: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, ODI.
20
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
to offer Palestinians more sustainable solutions.31 Advances in technical cooperation may
sometimes be hindered by the political stance of some Palestinian actors who refuse
technical collaboration with Israelis, seen as a normalization of relations and therefore
acceptance of the status quo. In general, aid is perceived by some as depoliticizing the
conflict, as well as detracting from Israel’s obligations as an occupying power responsible to
protect Palestinian civilians and meet their basic needs under International Humanitarian
and Human Rights Law.32
46
It is hard not to acknowledge that the stalled peace process, the continued occupation, the
limited sovereignty of the State of Palestine, and its reliance on funding from donors, who
on their side are also driven by their own national interest, represent a concrete obstacle
to the State’s ability to exercise its full functions as a national government, depriving it of
most policy tools and curtailing the drive towards a more developmental approach. This
is particularly true in Area C, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and in respect to the refugee
population, where it is difficult to envisage a greater involvement of the Palestinian
Authority since its authority has not increased over the years. Though efforts are underway
to support the PA in its state building efforts, including developing its economy and
assuming its full role as a duty bearer towards the Palestinian population, unless advances
are made in the peace process a substantial reduction in the presence of external actors
seem unlikely in the short term.
Box 1: Livelihoods and protection
Section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel is party, establishes obligations
on occupying powers and provisions protecting civilians in territories under occupation.
Though primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with States as signatories to
international human rights, humanitarian and refugee legal frameworks, agencies
operating in a context of repeated rights and human rights violation, and where the crisis
itself is first and foremost a protection crisis, should develop programming that alongside
providing assistance, protects people from such violations and ensures that assistance
does not inadvertently expose them to these threats. This involves a twofold protection
challenge: the strategic political task to get the responsible authorities to ensure respect
for human rights, and the tactical task of working with people at risk to meet their
practical protection needs amidst continuing abuses. In practical terms it means working
according to a principle of complementarity among agencies to stop, prevent or alleviate
the worst effects of abuses (responsive action), to assist and support people who are
recovering from abuses (remedial action), and to consolidate political, social, cultural
and institutional norms conducive to protection (environment-building action).
Multiple protection threats faced by communities force them to balance the risks they face
and to make difficult choices, exacerbating those factors that make people increasingly
unable to deal with shocks without compromising their long-term prospects. Incorporating
a protection lens within livelihood analysis allows a better understanding of the causes
of vulnerability and the multiple links between them. Furthermore, a more up front
engagement with protection threats enables a more appropriate response to tackle
vulnerability. Present efforts by different agencies to incorporate protection activities in
livelihoods interventions in WBGS include research and advocacy on the impact of the
barrier, ‘buy local’ campaigns to stimulate markets, fair trade programmes, and advocacy
to ensure that products from settlements in the West Bank are clearly labelled. Such efforts
are regarded as critical by farmers to maintain their livelihoods and stay on their land (O’
Callaghan et al).
Sources: Slim, H., Bonwick, A. (2005) Protection: An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies, ODI and O’
Callaghan, S. et al (2009), Losing ground: Protection and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ODI.
Bank Gaza WBG
31 The United Nations Medium-Term Response Plan and the Palestinian National Development Plan in 2011 have
been important steps to address this, and have urged humanitarian organizations to become more strategic in
their provision of relief assistance, drawing a clearer line between emergency programmes and recovery and
development interventions and removing the latter projects from the CAP.
32 Dittli, R. (2011) International assistance in Gaza: aiding fragmentation or unity? A view from inside Gaza, Swiss Peace.
Wildeman, J, Marshall, S., “By misdiagnosing Israel-Palestine, donor aid harms Palestinians”, Open Democracy, 21
May 2014.
21
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
2.2 Agriculture, natural resources and climate change
47
In the Gaza Strip and the sub-humid parts of the West Bank land is prevailingly used for
agriculture and horticulture, while rangeland for small ruminants dominates the semi-arid
parts of the WB. Olive production occupies an important cultural place within the rural
economy, and the olive oil sector is still one of the strongest in the West Bank. In Gaza Strip,
horticulture used to be dominated by citrus production, but due to difficult access to land,
decreasing quality and increasing salinity of groundwater, citrus is now often replaced by
sturdier olive and palm trees, more resistant to brackish water. In the eastern and southern
parts of the WB potentially high value livestock production is another backbone of the rural
economy. 1.2 million dunums,33 or 21 percent of the total area of the WBGS, 90 percent of
which is in the West Bank, is estimated to be cultivated. Only 19 percent of the cultivated land
is irrigated, while the rest is rain fed. Rangeland amounts to 2 million dunums, though the
area available for grazing is only 621 000 dunums.34
48
Though agriculture is a key pillar of the economy, its contribution to GDP in the West Bank
is declining, from 14 percent in the mid-1990s, to 4.5 percent by 2014. In the meanwhile,
the number of Palestinians employed in the sector more than doubled between 1995 and
2006 (World Bank 2013). Agriculture supports food security, provides employment for
7.3 percent of the labour force and accounts for around 20 percent of exports, with olives,
olive oil, vegetables and cut flowers as the main products exported.35 Agriculture is also a
major contributor to the protection of land from confiscation and settlement. Moreover, it
contributes directly to the improvement and preservation of the environment, and it plays
an important role as a supplier of inputs to various industries and as a consumer of inputs
and services from other sectors (MoA, 2014).
49
The occupation has multiple and profound consequences on rural livelihoods. In the West
Bank the fragmentation of land due to the division in areas A, B and C and the barrier,
as well as movement restrictions including those regulated by the permit regime and
closure policies all combine to limit the population’s access to land and water, with clear
impact on farming and livestock rearing. Mobility restrictions are calculated to render
an estimated 50 percent of agricultural land inaccessible, hindering household and
commercial production and decreasing jobs in this sector. Barrier zones surrounding the
external boundaries of some settlements cover approximately 5 000 dunums, half of
which encompass agricultural land privately owned by Palestinians who, when seeking to
access their land, need to have permits and coordinate their time of entry with the Israeli
authorities.36 Israel’s closure policies also harm farmers in more subtle ways: for example,
Israelis open gates close to the wall letting landowners, but no other family member, in
to harvest olive trees. However, olive harvesting is a long and heavy work and sometimes
the landowner is an old man who cannot manage on his own, so the bulk of the harvest
is lost. In Gaza Strip, besides the effects of the recurrent conflicts and the land-restricted
areas detailed above, other obstacles to a viable agriculture include the fact that certain
fertilizers are part of a list of “dual use items” and their import in Gaza Strip is severely
restricted. The imposed fishing limit, which fluctuates between three and nine nautical
miles,37 means that more than 3 000 fishermen do not have access to 85 percent of the
maritime areas agreed in the Oslo Accords, with the result that fish catch has decreased
dramatically over the years also as a consequence of depletion of stocks. In 2012, overall
land and sea restrictions affected 178 000 people, 12 percent of Gazans, and resulted in
annual estimated losses of USD 76.7 million from agricultural production and fishing.38
50
Israel utilizes discriminatory policies such as planning and zoning policies39 and has been in
control of all aquifers in the Palestinian mountains since 1967. Though aquifers ought to be
33 10 dunum = one hectare.
34 MoA, 2014. National Agricultural Sector Strategy 2014-2016: “Resilience and Development”, Ministry of Agriculture,
Ramallah.
35 UNCTAD 2015.
36 Note by the Secretary-General on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation,
A/70/82-E/2015/13, 8 May 2015.
37 The Oslo Accords established a limit of around 20 nautical miles.
38 UN (2012) Gaza in 2020. A liveable place? A report by the UNCT in the occupied Palestinian territory.
39 Note by the Secretary-General on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation,
A/70/82-E/2015/13, 8 May 2015.
22
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
a shared resource according to international law,40 Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company,
uses at least 80 percent of these groundwater resources and sells back the remaining 20 to
15 percent to the Palestinian Water Authority.41 The Oslo Accords (1995, Annex 3, Article
40) giving Israel control of approximately 80 percent of the water reserves in the West
Bank was intended as an interim arrangement, however the allocation largely still stands
despite the demographic, socio-economic and natural changes affecting the supply and
demand for water since its signature. In the West Bank, the 520 000 Israeli settlers use
approximately six times the amount of water than the 2.6 million Palestinians.42 In Gaza
Strip, the yearly sustainable yield from the only freshwater source available is about two
times less than required, and the population has resorted to over-extraction, resulting in
marked progressive deterioration in the quality of the water supply, already contaminated
by decades of sewage infiltration.43
51
The southern and eastern countries of the Mediterranean Basin form one of the world’s
most water-scarce regions, highly vulnerable to climate change: climate models predict
a hotter, drier and less predictable climate and significant rainfall decline in winter,
and more frequent extreme rainfall events.44 Water resources are already under severe
pressure and food insecurity risks further increasing as a consequence of climate change.
Mounting rural-urban migration flows to the main cities in the West Bank, Ramallah,
Hebron and Nablus are likely to create additional pressure on the urban environment and
service sector while increasing social tensions. )
Table 3: Summary of land use in the WBGS
Type of Land Cover
West Bank
Gaza Strip
WBGS
Area
(km2)
Percent
Area
(km2)
Percent
Area
(km2)
Percent
Total area
5 661
100
363
100
6 024
100
Cultivated and arable land
2 361
41.7
197.9
54.5
2 559
42.5
Pastures
753.7
13.3
0
0
753.3
13.3
Forest and wooded land
78.9
1.4
78.9
1.4
Land with special vegetation
cover
213.8
3.8
7.6
2.1
221.4
3.7
Open land without or with
insignificant vegetation cover
1 693.6
29.9
71.4
19.7
1 765
29.3
Palestinian built-up land
314.2
5.6
82.3
22.7
396.5
6.6
Built-up land in Israeli occupation
sites including wall
244.3
4.3
0
244.3
4.3
Source: PCBS, 2008/FAO 2016
2.3 Poverty, vulnerability and food insecurity
52
Overall poverty remains high, with marginal improvements over the last ten years (see
Table 4), the main cause of livelihood vulnerability being the highly volatile and insecure
environment due to the many consequences of the occupation. While the Palestinian
population has been collectively exposed to the effects of the prolonged crisis, a range
of interconnected drivers including physical (related to age, disabilities, chronic illnesses),
40 Amnesty International. 2009. “Troubled Waters: Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water,” Amnesty International,
Israel- Occupied Palestinian Territories.
41 Ma’an Development Centre, 2014. Farming the Forbidden Land: Israeli Land and Resource Annexation in Area C.
Ma’an Development Centre, Ramallah.
42 Oxfam International, 2013. “20 Facts: 20 Years Since the Oslo Accords,” https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.
org/files/oxfam-oslo-20-factsheet.pdf ; Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene group (EWASH) and Al-Haq.
Sep 2011. “Joint Parallel Report submitted by the Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene group (EWASH) and
Al-Haq to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the occasion of the consideration of the
Third Periodic Report of Israel.”; Amnesty International. 2009. “Troubled Waters: Palestinians Denied Fair Access to
Water,” Amnesty International, Israel- Occupied Palestinian Territories.
43 Amnesty International, 2009.
44 Brown and Crawford, 2009.
23
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
socio-cultural (related to gender and family size), economic and livelihood-related (such
as employment status, livelihood basis), spatial or geographical (e.g. residence in refugee
camps, H2 in Hebron,45 Area C, Seam Zone) underpin risk exposure and vulnerability in
this context.
Table 4: Poverty in WBGS
Population below national poverty line
2006
2007
2009
2010
2011
30.8%
31.2%
26.2%
25.7%
25.8%
Source: World Bank
53
In Gaza Strip, unemployment rates have soared from less than 10 percent in the early
1990s to over 40 percent in 2015.46 Overall, industry generates 14 percent of the gross
domestic product and employs 12.3 percent of the workforce, while nearly 23 percent
of the workforce is employed in the public sector, including public administration and
security forces, which generate 13.5 percent of the GDP (UNCTAD 2009); the International
Monetary Fund estimates that the Palestinian Authority’s wage bill alone is equivalent to
over 27 percent of the GDP. It is estimated that one million new jobs will be needed to bring
unemployment figures down to 10 percent by 2030.47
54
Unemployment and food insecurity in the WBGS are closely related. Moreover, since 1994
the cost of living and consumption has risen, while the average income has barely increased.
The compounded effect of unemployment and decreasing purchasing power means that
food insecurity usually results from inaccessibility to food i.e. the inability to purchase it,
rather than the lack of food availability. This is especially true for poorer families, who are
most affected by high unemployment and low economic performance. According to the
annual food security survey,48 in 2013 food insecurity rates in Gaza Strip were 57 percent,
and in the whole of the territory one third of the households were estimated to be food
insecure. Almost 870 000 Palestine refugees depend on food aid from the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.49 In Gaza Strip too, food
insecurity is due to a lack of economic access, further exacerbated during the 2014 conflict,
when up to 71 percent of the population in Gaza Strip became food insecure as prices of
basic foodstuffs soared, people were unable to meet their basic needs, and UNRWA ended
up having to support the entire population of refugees in the Gaza Strip.50
2.4 Gender
55
In addition to the consequences of continued Israeli occupation, women are disadvantaged
by limited employment opportunities, the socio-cultural norms prevailing in Palestinian
society, and the inadequate provision of social protection. The 2016 Humanitarian Needs
Overview (HNO) identified these as key determinants of access to resources, opportunities
and resilience, their absence resulting in a range of gender-based vulnerabilities (OCHA,
2016). Female-headed households represent 10 percent of the total households, one third
of which are food insecure, as compared to one fourth of male-headed ones (SEFSec 2013-
45 In 1997, the Hebron Protocol divided the city into two administrative areas: H1, which came under full control
of the PA, and H2, under Israeli control. H2 includes the Old City, once a vibrant commercial centre and several
settlements located both within and outside the city centre (e.g. Kiryat Arba). There are around 40 000 Palestinians
living in H2 in close proximity to several hundred settlements. A harsh combination of violence and confrontation
between Israeli and Palestinians living in H2, and systematic restrictions on freedom of movement imposed on
Palestinians have drastically reduced livelihood opportunities for the thousands of Palestinians living in the area.
(see https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_hebron_h2_factsheet_november_2013_english.pdf
and O’Callaghan et al., 2009)
46 World Bank 2016 and PCBS 2015.
47 The Portland Trust, 2013.
48 The survey was carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, FAO, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and WFP and published in June 2014.
49 UN General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Note by the Secretary-General on “Economic and Social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories”, 8 May 2015.
50 ibidem
24
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
14), a starker difference in the WB.51 In 2013, 68.7 percent of the male labour force was
active, while women’s labour force participation rate was 16 percent - less than a quarter
of men’s - and women’s median daily wage was only 84 percent of men’s.52
56
The Gender Development Index (GDI)53 for women living in the WBGS is of 0.607 in contrast
with 0.706 for males, resulting in a GDI value of 0.860, which places the State of Palestine
113th out of 188 nations.54 The data concerning command over economic resources reveal
that women fare considerably worse than men - with a gross national income per capita
amounting to USD 1 580 for women and USD 7 726 for men.55
2.5 Development frameworks and response plans
2.5.1 Government policies for the agricultural sector
57
After decades, the agricultural sector has recently come back as a priority among
decision makers in the WBGS: the National Development Plan 2014-2016 saw a 7 percent
increase in the agriculture budget, while over 2011 to 13 donors allocated approximately
USD 100 million per year to agriculture.56
58
The latest Agricultural Sector Strategy 2014-2016 identified the following main challenges
to agricultural resources: the Israeli occupation; deterioration and ineffective use of
agricultural resources, including land and water; a weak institutional framework, an
incomplete legal framework, and weak enforcement of existing laws and regulations;
deterioration of rangelands and biodiversity; and inadequate response capacity to
disasters, climate change and desertification.
59
Accordingly, the Ministry of Agriculture developed the following strategic objectives
for the agricultural sector: 1) Ensure farmers’ resilience and attachment to their land,
while fulfilling the contribution of the agriculture sector in providing requirements for
development of the State of Palestine; 2) Efficient and sustainable management of natural
resources; 3) Enhanced agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness, as
well as enhanced contribution of agriculture to food security; 4) The agriculture sector
has effective and efficient capacities, institutional frameworks, legal environment,
infrastructure and agricultural services.
2.5.2 International development and response frameworks
60
Following UN resolution 67/19 of November 2012 recognizing Palestine as a non-member
State with observer status, UN Agencies in Palestine developed the first-ever United Nations
Development Assistance Framework. Finalized and approved in 2013, FAO’s mandate
focuses primarily on the first, fifth and sixth priority areas: economic empowerment,
livelihoods, food security and decent work; social protection; urban development,
natural resource management and infrastructure (with an emphasis on natural resource
management).
51 25% as compared to 15% of male-headed households. PCBS & FSS, Summary of Preliminary Results of SEFSec 2013-14.
52 ILO website (www.ilo.org/beirut/projects/WCMS_224205/lang--en/index.htm) Accessed on 12.05.2016.
53 In 2014 the office responsible for the Human Development Report introduced the GDI, as a new measure is based
on the sex-disaggregated Human Development Index and is defined as a ratio of the female to the male HDI. It is
to be noted that the Gender Inequality Index by UNDP or the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap measures
the inequalities in WBGS. The GDI measures three basic dimensions of human development: health (measured by
female and male life expectancy at birth), education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling
for children and mean years for adults aged 25 years and older), and command over economic resources (measured
by female and male estimated GNI per capita).
54 UNDP, State of Palestine Briefing note for countries on the 2015 Human Development Report (http://hdr.undp.org/
sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PSE.pdf) last accessed on 12 May 2016.
55 http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GDI
56 However, it should be acknowledged that, as also observed in the UNCTAD report of 2015, “the various resource
and access constraints have prevented the Palestinian National Authority from providing adequate support to the
besieged agricultural sector.”
25
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
61
The Strategic Response Plan for Palestine for 2015 required USD 705 million, targeted
4.5 million people, and comprised six strategic objectives. Food security is one of six
clusters57 within the Humanitarian Response Plan. In 2016 the food security sector58
aimed to address food security by (i) restoring and enhancing the productive capacity
of households to protect their livelihoods and increase their resilience; (ii) meeting basic
food needs of food insecure households while sourcing food locally thereby reinforcing
Palestine’s economy and food production; (iii) improving coordination and information
sharing for preparedness, advocacy and synergies in implementation (OCHA, 2016).
Figure 2: Funding of FSS projects under the HRP 2015
Funds per type reported as received
in 2015 Q4
FSS funds
received
% on tot FSS funds
received
% of funds on
target request
Food Assistance
USD 161 511 711
83%
88%
Livelihood Support
USD 12 706 991
6%
22%
CfW
USD 21 515 144
11%
27%
Total
USD 195 733 846
62
60%
A yearly analysis by the FSS of the status of projects under HRP 2015 showed that the level
of funding for the sector had only reached 60 percent of the total amount requested, and
support to livelihoods particularly underfunded, with a considerable 78 percent of unmet
funds. These figures are interesting when set against the widespread consensus among
international actors that assistance should increasingly move towards resilience building,
and therefore be characterized by longer-term forms of support, and seem to be revealing
of a gap between intentions and hard facts.
57 The wording sector rather than cluster was preferred to indicate the inclusion of more developmental activities
and actors besides the humanitarian ones traditionally associated with the Cluster system.
58 These are: 1) Enhanced protection by promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL); 2) Respond to immediate needs following shocks and enhance resilience
of those at risk of forcible displacement; 3) Respond to food insecurity and promote resilient livelihoods; 4) Ensure
access to essential services for people in areas with restricted access; 5) Enhance national capacity to provide
coordination and preparedness for coordinated response to emergencies; 6) Ensure transitional solutions for IDPs
and those vulnerable to displacement in Gaza, towards a durable solution.
26
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
3. FAO in WBGS
3.1
The WBGS Office
63
The FAO office was established in 2002 under the umbrella of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP).59 At the time it was an Emergency and Rehabilitation
Coordination Unit and functioned as a central provider of food security information
and technical agricultural advice for the humanitarian community, with a primary focus
on food and agricultural threats and livelihoods emergencies. FAO’s collaboration with
the Palestinian Government was formalized in May 2009 through a Memorandum of
Understanding and later, in 2014, through a Letter of Intent with the Palestinian Ministry
of Agriculture. Given that Palestine is not an FAO member country, the office is not a full
representation, and does not receive any core funding, but rather runs its operations
entirely on the basis of extra-budgetary resources.60
64
In 2014, the current Head of Office and Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator,
Mr Ciro Fiorillo, succeeded Mr Cyril Ferrand, who had been covering the position since
2010. FAO operates out of a main office situated in Jerusalem, and two sub-offices
respectively in Ramallah (West Bank), and in Gaza City (Gaza Strip). As of 31 December
2015, FAO employees, mainly Non Staff Human Resources, comprised 35 nationals and 10
internationals, 24 based in Jerusalem, 13 in Ramallah and 8 in Gaza City.
65
Over the past years the WBGS Coordination Office has been assuming increasing
responsibility in local (UN and Palestinian Government related) as well as global (mainly
FAO related) processes in terms of liaising, planning and reporting. The decentralization
of budget-holder responsibility, completed in 2013, was accompanied by the ability to tap
into up to 40 percent or more Administrative and Operational Support (AOS) resources.61
This enabled funding of the Head of Office/Senior Emergency Coordinator position mainly
from AOS earnings, which in turn reduced the pressure on project budgets to finance
human resources from direct project costs, and improved the office’s position when
negotiating budgets with resource partners and government.
66
Meanwhile, the number of non-project specific activities the office is asked to perform
to comply with corporate procedures has grown, with increasing time absorbed by the
strategic planning, monitoring and reporting process over the course of 2015. For the
coming biennium the office is also expected to adopt the standard Country Programming
Framework (CPF) approach. As noted in the 2015 Annual Report,62 this calls for due
consideration to the financial sources to cover the time required for activities involving
costs not directly attributable to any specific project (e.g. strategic planning, monitoring
and reporting), to allow a significant reallocation of project staff time toward non projectspecific tasks.
67
Until 2013, globally the budget holder for all emergency operations was the Emergency and
Rehabilitation Division (TCE) at FAO headquarters which, in the case of WBGS, meant TCE
was the budget holder for the whole programme. Since then FAO decentralized budget
holder responsibility, and emergency and development programmes have been integrated
at the country level under the purview of the FAO Head of Office, while the Regional Office
has become the first port of call for technical assistance to country offices in the region.
59 FAO conducts its activities in the WBGS under the umbrella of the UNDP Programme of Assistance to the
Palestinian People established by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/147 of 20 December 1978.
UNDP/PAPP serves as an umbrella organization for most of the UN agencies in the WBGS with the exception of
UNRWA, UNSCO and UNESCO. The relationship is regulated by a Memorandum of Understanding between FAO
and UNDP with regards to the cost recovery of Services at the Programme Country Level dated 27 June 2003. FAO’s
relationship with UNDP is confirmed by UNDP’s Certification Letter dated 14 November 2012 and FAO’s Legal
Counsel’s Certification Letter dated 8 October 2010.
60 Extra-budgetary resources are provided by member countries to fund specific FAO projects.
61 These constitute charges for administrative and operational services which are a necessary and inherent part of
any project the Organization agrees to execute, but which, because of their nature, cannot be readily or directly
identified and therefore charged to the project itself.
62 Annual Report January-December 2015 WBGS.
27
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
3.2 FAO’s programme in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2011-2015
68
Before 2010, FAO’s activities in WBGS were delivered through single projects, rather than
based on a programme or a strategy. Over time the need to be more effective and increase
donor confidence in the programme, however, led FAO to shift from predominantly reliefdriven intervention to a programmatic/strategic approach, and eventually to the design
of the first FAO programme for WBGS, the Plan of Action 2011-2013. The aim of such an
approach was on one hand to be clear and transparent about the overall intention of the
programme, and on the other to focus beyond the output level on impacts and outcomes,
considering also that donors were more interested in effectiveness in the longer-term and
at a more structural level.
69
The two WBGS programming documents developed in the period under evaluation were
designed to be in alignment with FAO’s corporate Strategic Frameworks63 as well as with
the national policies. FAO’s interventions in both humanitarian and development sectors
are all framed in coordination and alignment with the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Humanitarian Response Plan and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework
respectively. The first UNDAF for the State of Palestine was initially envisaged to cover 20142016, and then extended to 2017.
3.2.1 The Plan of Action (2011-2013)
70
The Plan of Action represented a first shift in strategy from predominantly reliefdriven project interventions to a more programmatic approach centred on disaster
risk management (DRM), balancing emergency response (36% of the portfolio), with
enhancing local capacity for preparedness (27%) and transition to development (37%).
The PoA was based on an in-depth contextual analysis, which was itself the outcome of
a literature review and a comprehensive consultative process with actors engaged in the
agricultural sector. The 36-month programme was meant to go beyond the conventional
short-term response interventions, and it cross-referenced fundamental sectoral and
development-oriented strategic documents, including the National Development Plan
2010/13; the Palestinian Agriculture Sector Strategy “A Shared Vision” 2011/13; and the
FAO Regional Priority Framework for the Near East 2009/12.
71
The PoA was designed under an overarching food security conceptual framework, with
its overall goal of “Improved food security” articulated into two outcomes: 1) “Higher
economic access to food” and 2) “Improved food utilization”. The work plan to implement
the PoA was divided into six programme components, two for each outcome, centred on
household food production, purchasing power, domestic food quality and nutrition and
food safety, plus two stand-alone components corresponding to FAO’s core functions of
capacity development and coordination.
3.2.2 The Programme Framework (2014-2016)
72
The programme moved further toward developmental activities and goals with the
Programme Framework 2014-2016, which adopted a dual track approach and aimed to
address both humanitarian and developmental needs of the Palestinians by facilitating
a greater economic access to food and assisting the development of a viable agriculture
sector.
73
The overall goal of the PF, “sustainable socio-economic growth, resilience and food security
for the Palestinian people” is based on a broader framework than the strictly food security
framework at the basis of the PoA, reflecting the aim to move to a more developmental
approach, as also illustrated by the inclusion of “growth” and “resilience” as part of the
goal.
63 The PoA was aligned to FAO’s SF for 2010-2019 and the PF to the Reviewed SF 2013-2023.
28
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 2: FAO WBGS programme frameworks
Plan of Action Response Plan
Overall goal: Improved food security
Outcome 1: Higher economic access to food
Output 1. Improved household-level food production
Output 2. Higher incomes and strengthened purchasing power
Outcome 2: Improved food utilization
Output 3. Higher domestic food quality and nutrition
Output 4. More adequate food safety
Stand-alone programme components
Output 5. Institutional capacity development
Output 6. Operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management
Programme Framework Response Framework64
Overall goal: sustainable socio-economic growth, resilience and food security for
the Palestinian people
RESTORE, STRENGTHEN, PROTECT
Component 1. Provide time-critical assistance to protect and restore agricultural livelihoods
Result 1.1. Access to livelihood assets and resources restored or increased
Result 1.2 Improved food access and nutrition in urban and peri-urban settings
Result 1.3 Livelihood assets and resources protected
DEVELOP, ENABLE, ENHANCE
Component 2. Increased productivity, competitiveness and employment in the agricultural sector
Result 2.1 Capacity of local/national organizations and institutions and community-level initiatives
developed
Result 2.2 Sectoral strategies, frameworks and policies more enabled
Result 2.3 Agricultural productivity, quality, market potential and income enhanced
COORDINATE, INFORM
Cross-cutting components
a) Coordination. Ensure response in the Food Security Sector is more efficient, effective, targeted
and partnership-based
b) Information collection, analysis, monitoring and sharing. Ensure response in the Food Security
Sector is evidence based.
64
3.3 Overview of FAO’s field programme delivery
74
64
Over 2011-2015, FAO’s portfolio with the WBGS as a recipient country65 amounted to 44
country-dedicated, 4 interregional/global, and 1 regional projects,66 for a Total Budget of
USD 89 million and Total Actual Expenditure of about USD 71 million. The figure below
A list of specific activities is identified for each result in the Programme Framework (see FAO 2014, Programme
Framework for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, pp.46-48). The results matrix was revised in the Programme
Framework 2014-17 addendum, where the result chain is more adapted to FAO standard terminology (impact,
outcome, outputs). However, this revision did not fall under the evaluation period, and will therefore not be
considered in the present report.
65 Palestine is not universally recognized as a country/state, and is not an FAO Member State. However, the
classification used by FAO to differentiate projects’ geographic coverage (Country, Regional, Interregional and
Global) does not allow an exception for the specific case of WBGS, therefore the term country will be used in this
analysis (as it is in FAO’s information system) to indicate projects located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The
evaluation only considered global and regional projects that were rated as important by the Regional Office.
66 Projects with Entry On Duty date (EOD) prior to 2011 and Not To Exceed date (NTE) from 2011 onwards, were
included to capture relevant activities. The count includes two projects that were not implemented. The
interregional project GCPA/INT/028/SWE is used to fund an Associate Professional Officer (APO), who provides
support to the FAO Coordination Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, examining and analysing different
agricultural cropping systems and patterns in terms of water use and management, and define gaps and good
practices. This project was not considered by the evaluation.
29
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
illustrates FAO WBGS field programme delivery from 2011 to 2015, based on FAO’s internal
classification of projects as emergency or non-emergency.67 Interventions have primarily
been classified as emergency and are equivalent to the total delivery throughout the
evaluated period (2011-2015), while overall technical (non-emergency) delivery is almost
none, and equivalent to zero in 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Figure 3: Total field programme delivery per year (USD)
Source: FPMIS – Feb 2017
75
Overall delivery increased between 2012 and 2013, reaching more than USD 16 million.
After a slight decrease between 2011 and 2012, the spike in delivery in 2013 was due to the
launch of three of the ten biggest projects of the 2011-2015 portfolio. Despite a decrease
of about USD 3 million, the total delivery in the WBGS for 2014 is still high compared to
the average delivery within the considered timeframe. A USD 3.5 million decrease in the
total delivery between 2014 and 2015 could be related to the closure of nine emergency
projects. The same period saw the beginning of six new longer-term projects, four of
which classified as technical cooperation. Although the evaluation covers the 2011-2015
timeframe, figures regarding 2016 are included in the Table as evidence of the significant
shift towards more developmental projects in parallel with the emergency work at the
heart of the Programme (see section 4.1.1).
76
Overall only five country projects were categorized as technical cooperation, and part of
the field programme in 2011 and 2015 only. However, two observations should be made:
first, in the context of WBGS, there is a dearth of funding available for development as such
for all agencies, and therefore all agencies draw overwhelmingly on emergency funds.
Second, most FAO projects funded with emergency funds are in fact developmental in
their activities and objectives (something that will be analysed further on in this report).
Figure 4: Resources mobilized by year (2011-2015)68
Source: FPMIS – Feb 2017
67 The source of all information provided and analysed here is FAO’s Field Programme Management Information
System (FPMIS), an information system used to track, store, update, and access information on projects FAO
undertakes in various countries. The total field programme delivery only refers to country projects.
68 Figure 2 depicts the total budget by year (from 2011 to 2015), in terms of projects launched each year of
the evaluated period. Project budgets are grouped according to the year in which the project was declared
‘Operationally Active’ to identify the concentration of projects launched in a specific year. Projects that started
before 2011 are not reflected in the graph. A more detailed table is available in Appendix 4.
30
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
77
2013 and 2014 figure as the most successful years in terms of resources mobilized due
to the launch of the two biggest projects of the portfolio,69 amounting to more than
USD 9 million each: a project on High Value Crops (HVC) funded by the Netherlands
(OSRO/GAZ/207/NET), initiated in January 2013, and a Canada-funded project
supporting farming and herding livelihoods through inputs provision and enhanced
water availability (OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN), which started in April 2014. On the other hand,
in 2015, only seven projects were launched, and the funds mobilized during the year
dropped to about USD 6.1 million.
Figure 5: Donor contribution to country projects’ portfolio (2011-2015)
Source: FPMIS – Feb 2017
78
As shown in Figure 4, Canada (six projects) and the Netherlands (five projects) represent
the most important donors for this portfolio. Though the number of projects they fund is
almost equal, Canada’s contributions, above USD 26 million, is almost double the almost
USD 14 million provided by the Dutch. The European Union is the third donor, with two
projects, followed by Italy and Spain, each contributing 8 percent of the overall budget
analysed.
79
The Figure below provides an indication of the number of small budget activities versus
more substantial projects, corresponding to longer term and more structural interventions.
The portfolio presents a certain balance between small projects (16 projects of less than
USD 500 000) and bigger projects (12 projects of USD 3 to 9 million) with eight projects
in the middle range, (USD 1 to 2 million). The five largest projects amount to a total of
USD 32 700 266, 45 percent of the budget throughout the evaluation period. Among these
large projects, one is funded by the Netherlands,70 two by Canada,71 one by the European
Union72 and one by Japan.73
69 Based on data downloaded from FAO Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS) in November
2015.
70 OSRO/GAZ/207/NET “Market oriented and sustainable high value crops sector development in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip”.
71 OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN “Prepare and respond to shocks affecting low resilience farmers and herders in West Bank
and Gaza Strip” and OSRO/GAZ/202/CAN “Protection of farmer livelihoods (West Bank)”.
72 OSRO/GAZ/201/EC “Support to livestock based livelihoods of vulnerable population in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (The institutional level component of the Food Security Thematic Programme [FSTP])”.
73 OSRO/GAZ/301/JPN “Emergency protection of Palestinian-owned assets and contribution to building resilient
livelihoods”.
31
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Figure 6: Number of projects by budget size (USD)
Source: FPMIS – Feb 2017
80
Given the challenge of harmonizing and combining data and information according to
the two strategies and their relative logframes and structures, the evaluation analysed the
portfolio by clustering activities according to the key areas of work covered by FAO during
the considered timeframe as follows:
a. Input distribution: emergency activities involving in-kind input distribution, e.g
drought tolerant seeds, shed rehabilitation and winterization, fodder distribution,
traps against red palm weevil, water tanks and organic fertilizer.
b. Land and water access: cistern rehabilitation for livestock and farming uses and land
rehabilitation (including through conditional cash assistance modality).
c. Home-based farming units: activities pertaining to urban and peri-urban backyard
vegetables and animal units.
d. Irrigation systems: irrigation systems rehabilitation, including wells rehabilitation and
conveyance systems rehabilitation.
e. Value chain development: any activity to improve production quality and post-harvest
capacities.
f. Institutional support and capacity development: improving capacity to formulate,
implement, coordinate, monitor and evaluate policies and frameworks.
81
Although it is not always possible to disaggregate and identify the specific budget
dedicated to each of these areas of work, it is still interesting to see how and whether the
focus of projects activities have evolved throughout the years. The Figure below provides
an overview of the frequency of FAO’s activities in these areas in projects implemented at
country level during each programming period covered by this evaluation: projects started
before the Plan of Action and still ongoing in 2011, projects under the PoA and those under
the Programme Framework.74
74 All data presented and analysed in this report refer to the first half of the PF cycle (2014-2015) exclusively.
32
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Figure 7: FAO’s programming focus75 between 2011 and 2015
Source: Project documents and final reports
82
It is evident that input distribution and land and water rehabilitation have been and still are
at the heart of FAO’s programme, while the focus on capacity development and institutional
support is growing (the same is true for value chain development through a very important
project just started in 2016 and not included in our analysis). The concentration of PF
projects activities in these areas is directly related to the two emergency-oriented and
developmental outcomes of the programme itself. On a side note, the appearance of an
overall reduced occurrence of activities under the PF compared to the PoA is also linked to
the fact that projects are now fewer in numbers but longer in terms of years.
Table 5: Beneficiary households per main livelihood activity
GAZA STRIP
WEST BANK
Tot. beneficiary
HH (approx.)
Activity
ARTIFICIAL
cows
INSEMINATION
200
ARTIFICIAL
sheep
INSEMINATION
1690
red palm weevil
1150
red palm weevil
450
Vet service
1123
Vet service
1976
OUTCOME 1
CISTERNS
OUTCOME 2
Tot. beneficiary
HH (approx.)
Activity
rehab
1053
built
1091
home gardens
1950
home gardens
1207
agri inputs
1015
agri inputs
3640
fodder
1992
fodder
4285
881
drought tolerant
seeds
8245
1323
sheep
665
goat
100
beehive
1131
rabbits
1175
milking
721
sheep
544
DEMO FARMS
26
LAND REHAB
1593
LAND REHAB
7361
WWT unit
289
WWT unit
GROUNDWELLS and irrigation
networks
529
GROUNDWELLS and irrigation
networks
Water reservoir
375
Water reservoir
rooftop gardens
DISTRIBUTION and aquaculture
chicken
DISTRIBUTION
17
85
HYDROPONIC
JFFLS
facilitators
16
students
240
Global GAP
16
JFFLS
Global GAP
1891
1150
facilitators
students
69
960
400
Source Project documents and final reports
75 Projects have been classified according to their main activities, however no project exclusively focuses on a single
activity, and a measure of capacity development is included in all projects.
33
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
83
A desk review of project documents and final reports yielded a list of the most important
activities implemented in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip together with an estimate of
the number of households that have reportedly benefitted. The table above represents an
attempt to link the activities that have been and keep being at the heart of FAO’s work to
the present outcomes of the Programme Framework. Together with the map in Appendix
5 and the figure below it can provide a more in-depth overview of FAO’s coverage and
focus of work at field level.
Figure 8: Locations of FAO’s projects
Source: Project documents and final reports
3.4 Regional Projects
84
WBGS is a recipient country for one regional, two inter-regional76 and two global projects.
The ten-year Regional Integrated Pest Management Programme in the Near East GTFS/
REM/070/ITA had a consistent budget of USD 8.6 million in total. Each of the ten countries
targeted by the project, including WBGS, received about 10 percent of the overall budget.
With a budget just under USD 400 000, the one-year inter-regional project GCP/INT/041/
EC was funded by the European Union and implemented between 2012 and 2013 to
establish scientific and institutional cooperation to Support Responsible Fisheries in the
Eastern Mediterranean. SFER/GLO/101/MUL BABY24 is classified as global, due to its
funding under the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA),77 but
is actually entirely dedicated to the WBGS. With a budget of USD 70 000, it was used to
develop aquaculture, water reuse in agriculture and to support the development of the
Palestinian Agriculture Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Fund (PADRRIF). The budget
holder is not in the WBGS, and it resembles a TCP facility78 more than an actual project.
The second global project, GCP /INT/229/NET, “Monitoring water productivity by Remote
Sensing as a tool to assess possibilities to reduce water productivity gap” is ongoing (20152019) and USD 2 7 million out of an almost 10 million total budget have been already
released. It is strictly related to the Regional Initiative on water scarcity, and since activities
have just begun it is too early to assess any impact at this stage.
76 One of the two inter-regional projects is in fact not relevant for this analysis: GCPA/INT/028/SWE is used to fund an
Associate Professional Officer (APO), who provides support to the FAO Office.
77 FAO Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities provides FAO with a means of taking rapid action
in emergency situations. It enables FAO to participate in inter-UN agency needs assessments missions following a
crisis, to establish rapidly an emergency coordination unit for agricultural assistance and to prepare a programme
framework. Essential, SFERA enables FAO to quickly and efficiently: initiate operations; establish surge capacity and
reinforce existing operational capacity at field level; deploy assessment and programme formulation missions; and
develop and implement a programmatic response in specific large-scale emergencies.
78 See section 4.2.1 and note 116.
34
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
4. Assessment of FAO’s strategic positioning
in WBGS
4.1
Strategic relevance and effectiveness
4.1.1 Relevance and appropriateness of FAO WBGS strategic frameworks
Findings on FAO WBGS strategic frameworks
• FAO WBGS strategic frameworks increasingly shifted towards a more developmental focus,
bridging the humanitarian/development divide through a resilience approach.
• This is a natural evolution of FAO WBGS’ work and relevant to this context, as is the value chain
approach at the basis of the Programme Framework, though the potential of adopting a marketcentred focus is not fully exploited.
• The longer timeframe and broader aims of some projects indicate the evolution towards a more
programmatic approach, though overall the portfolio continues to be project led, mainly due to
high reliance on voluntary project funding.
• The design of the programme has some weaknesses, for example the causal chains between
projects, activities and the overall framework are not well defined, and the logframe lacks clarity
on a number of fronts.
• Building national capacity and supporting policy and normative work is aligned with FAO’s
mandate and relevant and appropriate to the UN’s support to a two-state solution.
85
In assessing the relevance and appropriateness of FAO’s strategic frameworks it is important
first of all to retrace their evolution and to highlight some of their defining characteristics.
The first programming document, the Plan of Action, was developed in 2011 under the
aegis of the Emergency Division , Plans of Actions being the standard tool used by TCE
to draw up country plans for Strategic Objective 1, TCE’s main strategic and operational
framework at the time79 and for activities framed around Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).
86
The blueprint for the 2014/16 PF is the Country Programming Framework, FAO’s tool for
country-level strategic prioritization and overall medium-term country-level programming.
Though the CPF format was not a requirement for the WBGS office, and indeed the word
“Country” was dropped from the document’s name, the format was consistent with the
adoption of FAO’s corporate Strategic Framework in the Regional Office for the Near East
and North Africa, and aligned with FAO’s corporate programming and budgeting cycles
and formats. The PF has resilience and development growth “at the heart of FAO’s strategy”,
and is based on a value chain model to achieve the goal of “sustainable socio-economic
growth, resilience and food security for the Palestinian people through agriculture”. When
compared to the PoA, the PF is more clearly aligned to the two UN guiding frameworks, as
its first component reflects the HPC, and the second component the UNDAF.
87
The shift in strategic focus, from a more emergency-oriented programme centred on
adaptation to shocks and DRR, to a greater role of the development and market-based
component was intended to bridge the humanitarian/development divide by envisaging
two parallel streams within one single programme, while at the same time clarifying
to donors whether they were contributing to UNDAF or to the humanitarian appeal, in
order to avoid duplication and provide clarity, transparency and accountability of funding
streams. A further driver for this evolution is linked to a changing donor environment and
the effort to find more sustainable responses to needs in the WBGS. Furthermore, at the
time of drafting the PF, the Office of the Quartet Representative was developing a huge
economic plan for Palestine that included an economic growth stream for agriculture
and building the PF around a value chain approach was also functional to accessing this
potential funding, though, as will be argued further on, there are intrinsic reasons for FAO
to adopt this lens in the WBGS context.
79 See FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019 http://www.fao.org/uploads/media/C2009K5864EnglishStrategicFr_1.pdf
35
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
88
There are strong arguments for bridging humanitarian and development actions through
what may be described as a resilience approach. Such an approach not only corresponds to
a global effort to find more sustainable solutions particularly in situation of protracted crisis,
also reflected in FAO’s adoption of resilience as one of its corporate strategic objectives.
According to the evaluation’s definition (see box 3 below), in many ways resilience as an
overall framework is a relevant lens in a stalling political crisis such as this one, exposing
households to a high risk environment, and where there is a wide consensus on the need to
curb reliance on external aid delivered mostly through in-kind assistance and to reinforce
national and individual capacities and agency.
89
In this sense it is remarkable that FAO WBGS adopted a resilience outlook through a value
chain approach not just in compliance with the new corporate framework and its Strategic
Objective 5, but rather as a natural evolution of the way the office had been working for
a long time: with close attention to the context and the capacity to coordinate with both
development and humanitarian actors and to act on both fronts, not to mention its longstanding engagement with FAO’s corporate work on resilience measurement. Furthermore,
for FAO to be working towards development implies supporting national institutions
linked to the agricultural and food security sectors. Strengthening governmental capacity
in view of assisting the government gain an increasingly central and independent role is
in line with the UN’s support of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
therefore appropriate for FAO’s role as an agency working under the UN umbrella.
Box 3: Resilience
The concept of resilience has become increasingly popular in international development and
humanitarian debates. Calls for resilience building have at their core the idea of enhancing capacity
at different levels - systems, nations, communities, households, and individuals - to cope with risks
and shocks arising from climate, food prices, macroeconomic shocks, protracted violence and so on,
without compromising future options. Resilience - and the key concepts associated with it including
vulnerability, risk, shocks and adaptive capacity - is also increasingly seen as a useful paradigm
for bridging the long-standing divide between emergency response and development assistance,
while addressing the root causes, rather than only the consequences, of recurrent crises.
FAO defines resilience as “the ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to
anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and
sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods
systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and
food safety.” While the evaluation has based its analysis of resilience building in the WBGS on
such definition, it adopted a broader view by also considering the interplay between the different
and interconnected forces and levels (institutional, community, household, individual). In assessing
FAO’s work on resilience, the evaluation looked at whether FAO’s strategy and actions also focused
on the underlying processes that drive a lack of resilience rather than only addressing its proximate
causes. If lack of resilience may be viewed as the risk not to be able to withstand both present
and potential future shocks and stresses, this risk should be minimized not just by building “an
immediate set of assets, but rather a long-term capacity, a future ability to cope
with future possible problems”. 80
This concept of resilience emphasizes a focus on reducing people’s vulnerability and enhancing
peoples’ agency, their ability to make and follow through on their own plans in relation to socioeconomic security. The actual capacity to reach the aims of “reducing vulnerability” and “enhancing
agency” when programming for resilience depends on the specific programme components and
actions, and whether they are based on a contextual analysis and on how they interact with the
context and with each other.
80
90
80
36
Several factors limit the sustainability of agencies’ activities in this context, including
limited sovereignty, isolation, restricted access to natural resources and markets and low
negotiating power of Palestinians. FAO addresses these factors through a programme
designed to enhance access to markets and increase competitiveness through products’
value addition, partnership building with the private sector and farmer cooperatives,
according to a model more geared towards resilience, while working for the rehabilitation
of the supply side of the value chain during the frequent crisis spikes.
A. Pain and Levine, S. (2012) A conceptual analysis of livelihoods and resilience: addressing the ‘insecurity of
agency, HPG Working Paper, London: ODI.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
91
However, there is a limit in a programme grounded in “the ideal value chain, integrated
and able to perform even if the political situation remains unchanged”:81 functioning value
chains are inextricably linked in many ways to the occupation and the uncertain and uneven
control on markets resulting from it. FAO’s market approach, on the other hand, does
not seem to consider the effects of crises on markets in general while aiming to enhance
market access, and it is unclear whether and how the programme is also preoccupied with
their inclusiveness. In other words, whether enhancing market access is explicitly aimed at
supporting different livelihood systems and marginalized households within them.
92
Examples of more developmental-oriented steps taken over the two programming periods
to add value to agricultural products, increase food safety and improve Palestinian farmers’
access to international markets through a value chain approach82 include enhancing the
capacities of the Palestinian Authority to create a master document for Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)83 and to establish a law on a National Animal Identification
System (NAIS),84 while strengthening farmers’ capacities to be more productive and
competitive.85 The timeframe of these projects (three years) and the increased importance
of capacity development activities indicate an effort to achieve a unified programmatic
objective by tackling different levels and issues through individual projects. Until now,
there has been limited capacity to translate such effort into a consistent programmatic
approach throughout FAO’s portfolio, which has continued to be project-led, mainly due
to the office’s high reliance on project funding.
93
Overall the conceptual frameworks used and the stated goals, outcomes and outputs
are coherent and relevant. However, the causal chain between projects and activities
and the overall framework is not so clear. Greater clarity on causality would help frame
a detailed response option analysis bridging these different levels and helping guide the
choice of response. To a certain extent when nearly identical projects are being proposed
and implemented under different guiding frameworks targeting different beneficiaries,
as was sometimes found to be the case,86 the exercise seems more about retrofitting
activities to a framework than the result of a well thought out process for achieving the
desired results.
94
The design of the logframe in the Programme Framework87 is problematic on a number
of counts: the logframe does not specify to what level the baseline data for outcome and
impact refer to, though if, as it seems, the data are aggregated at national level, it is unclear
how they relate to FAO’s beneficiaries, which are located in specific geographical areas.
Furthermore, the indicators for Pprogramme Ccomponent A: “assistance provided to
protect and restore agricultural livelihoods threatened or affected by shocks” are all at the
policy level, while the main indicators for this component should refer to the household
level considering the livelihood focus.88.
81 FAO PF page 18
82 The global value chain is regulated by a number of formal and informal institutions operating at various scales.
Formal regulation typically occurs through a number of state policies and legislation which, in some cases, have
been influenced by international food standards or pressures. In a broad sense, formal regulations such as sanitary
and phytosanitary measures have been introduced to prevent the transmission of potentially harmful pests,
diseases and biomaterials to crops across national boundaries and to protect national agricultural industries and
the environment, sometimes by restricting trade. Food regulations, particularly phytosanitary regulations, have
contributed to trade barriers.
83 OSRO/GAZ/402/NET.
84 OSRO/GAZ/201/EC.
85 OSRO/GAZ/207/NET.
86 This was the case for example of projects rehabilitating cisterns which were carried out under the two different
frameworks under the evaluation, with no changes in rationale, implementation modality or complementary
activities to reflect a change from a focus on DRM to one on value chains.
87 PF pp.38-39.
88 This was noted during the midterm review of the PF and was addressed by a revision of the result matrix, with
SMART indicators and qualifiers as well as baseline data. A new logframe was being developed and approved
while the present report was being drafted.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
4.1.2 Relevance and appropriateness of FAO’s analytical approach
Findings on FAO’s analytical approach
• Both programming documents under review are supported by a situation analysis which
demonstrates attention to the context, and FAO’s overarching analysis at national and
governorate level is well-constructed and based on a wide range of exercises.
• FAO developed a framework to work through value chains that is relevant to the context and
appropriate to FAO’s work and resilience-building aim.
• When looking at specific projects needs assessments, no context analysis or analyses of risks,
cash injections, markets, protection and natural resources were undertaken at community and
household levels. Though such analyses could all greatly benefit FAO’s programming, neither
FAO headquarters nor donors provide funding to undertake assessments or build baselines prior
to project design.
• As FAO’s portfolio shifts towards development, its future work supporting food security
information systems will also need to shift away from its current annual emergency focus, to
more comprehensive systems, and further research, technical support and financial commitments
in order to cover a wide range of agricultural data and information systems.
• Any future work advocating and supporting improved food security information must wait for
the development of the Palestinian Authority’s new National Policy Agenda 2017-2022 as well
as the final endorsement and adoption of the Socio-economic and Food Security (SEFSec) survey
methodology by Palestinian authorities.
38
95
It is commendable that a concrete attempt was made to base both the food security
and the market based strategies of the Plan of Action and Programme Framework
respectively on a situation analysis, seeing that context-specificity is often a weakness
in FAO’s programming. The food security framework guiding the analysis in the Plan of
Action proved to be a strong tool to frame the whole FAO programme through a clear
definition of objectives and the relations between them. Furthermore, the three pillars
of access, production and utilization of food are good entry points to capture the issues
to be addressed through FAO’s actions. This is unsurprising, seeing that the food security
framework as an analytical tool provides both an explanation for causality and clarifies
means and entry points to response. By contrast, the development and humanitarian
situation analyses underlying the strategy in the PF are less well articulated and the links
between the two are not developed.
96
In view of organizing the 2014/16 PF along a value chain model, a framework was
developed (see annex 5) to map FAO’s activities against the main value chain steps of
supply, processing, aggregation and distribution, and market demand. An interesting
effort was made to frame these steps as a link between emergency response and
development interventions. This framework captures activities in the agriculture and
food security sectors under a single umbrella from emergency to development and,
most importantly, in doing so it clarifies the processes and mechanisms that FAO aims
to modify. As pointed out by the former Head of Office, conceptualizing interventions
along the agricultural value chain is an appropriate way for FAO to work towards building
resilience. If, as mentioned, resilience is considered a future capacity to cope with
adversity, and building it implies influencing processes rather than just increasing the
asset base of beneficiaries, a comprehensive way for FAO to do so is precisely by improving
the single steps of the value chain to enhance access to markets as illustrated in the Value
Chain Analysis framework. However, while this framework has proved to be a very useful
analytical tool, no evidence has been found by the evaluation team that it incorporates
dynamic changes and specifically those which arise due to the fragile environment of the
WBGS. Without looking at power relations or undertaking vulnerability and risk analysis,
value chain modelling is not enough to bridge the humanitarian-development gap,
particularly in a protracted crisis such as this one.
97
FAO uses a wide range of analyses at national and governorate level to guide its work.
On the humanitarian side, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) coordinated by
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) uses
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
joint analyses to promote “a shared understanding of the impact and evolution of a
crisis with the humanitarian country team”89 and details strategic objectives and priority
areas by sector. On the development side, a Common Country Assessment coordinated
by UNSCO has been initiated since 2016, defining development needs and forming the
foundation for drafting the UNDAF. Both form the backbone of FAO’s humanitarian and
development programme analysis.
Box 4: FAO’s Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA)
FAO has since 2008 been working on measuring the resilience capacity of people to food insecurity
and the effectiveness of resilience strengthening interventions. RIMA is “an innovative quantitative
approach that allows explaining why and how some households cope with shocks and stressors
better than others do”. RIMA –II is the revised methodology developed in 2015. RIMA-II measures
resilience both directly and indirectly, and should ultimately translate into a more comprehensive
estimation of resilience and sounder policy recommendations. It estimates household resilience
to food insecurity with a comprehensive pack, which includes both direct and indirect measures:
direct measure suits descriptive purposes; indirect measure provides causal inference; shocks are
considered exogenous and included into a regression model for estimating their impact on food
security and resilience; food security indicators are the outcome of resilience and are not included
in the resilience estimation model.
FAO RIMA-II Brochure, 2015
98
Concerning food security analysis, the SEFSec surveys collect data on the living
conditions of Palestinian households by periodically monitoring key socio-economic and
food security indicators. A preliminary report analysing this data is produced, and this
data and analysis are quoted in FAO’s programme frameworks and project documents
to ground interventions and activities, though as mentioned above, they are not directly
useful to build baselines for livelihood activities, as they only refer to governorate level
and above.
99
In addition, in 2011/12 FAO developed Livelihood Baseline Profiles for WBGS using SEFSec
data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and FAO’s own data sources. The
profiles provide details about the characteristics of (i) urban and peri-urban; (ii) mixed
farming and herding; (iii) farming; and (iv) herding livelihoods, the differences between
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the main risks they are subject to, their seasonal calendars,
and their coping strategies. This analysis guides FAO’s programme frameworks, though
FAO staff admitted that as a costly and time-consuming exercise it is only undertaken
every four/five years. Furthermore, its use has been erratic, and since livelihood profiles
have not been updated, project documents now more simply refer to low, medium and
high resilient groups.
100
It is important to note that documents and staff often quoted RIMA as an analytical
tool, but this evaluation was unable to see what RIMA analysis actually involves, since
documents were elusive, reference to it erratic and interviews and the SWOT analysis
indicate that there is scarce knowledge of RIMA among FAO staff. The Programme
Framework claims to have “created a comprehensive analytical tool from which to
construct its programming”, however the evaluation found no evidence of RIMA having
been used as an analytical tool at field level. It is too early to gauge the effects of RIMA-II,
tested in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2015 and whose findings supposedly will widen
and enrich the scope of analysis that feeds FAO future programing.
89 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hno2015_factsheet_final_november_2014.pdf
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 5: Support to Food Security Information Systems
9091
The scope of a common and harmonized framework of information for food and nutrition security is
outlined under FAO’s SO1.90 Activities under this framework (see box 2) fall within the Organization’s
core competencies. For FAO WBGS this type of work has concentrated under Programme Component
6 “Operational coordination and evidence-based, food security-related information management”
of the 2011-2013 Plan of Action, and under the cross-cutting components of the 2014-2016 PF,
even though many of the activities are part of Component 2 “Develop the capacity and enable the
environment of the agriculture sector for increased productivity, competitiveness and employment.”
During the evaluation period, the main activities carried out were FAO’s contribution to the SEFSec
surveys through work on the RIMA, and the Agricultural Projects Information System (APIS).
Through its support to the SEFSec surveys, FAO has been supporting the Food Security Sector in
its ability to collect and analyse relevant food security data, statistics and information. The SEFSec
survey is an annual joint effort between PCBS and UNRWA, the World Food Programme (WFP) and
FAO, since 2014 working under the umbrella of the FSS. Prior to that, FAO, jointly with WFP and later
UNRWA, directly supported implementation of SEFSec including technical assistance to put in place
measurement methodology in consultation with other partners. The survey identifies changes in
the living conditions of Palestinian households by periodically monitoring key socio-economic and
food security indicators. Since 2009, SEFSec has consistently been utilizsed by the FSS as a tool for
assessing trends on food security and providing data on vulnerable areas and groups.
At first, the SEFSec methodology was based on a two-pronged analysis that measured consumption
and income poverty on one hand, and socio-economic clustering on the other. When a private
consultancy firm was commissioned to study a revision of the methodology, this was not deemed
satisfactory, and FAO’s Economic and Social Development Department (ESA) department was asked
to step in on the basis of their work on the RIMA (see Bobox 4). The aim of the revised SEFSec
methodology, resulting from a dialogue among all local partners and a HCT working group colead by FAO and involving all stakeholders, was to reflect the multi-dimensional drivers of food
insecurity in Palestine: poverty, food deprivation, and lack of resilience. Different partners gave
positive feedback on FAO’s technical contributions to the SEFSec, and FAO’s strategic role in raising
the profile of the resilience agenda in WBGS by including the resilience pillar was praised. However,
there was some discussion with WFP, the other sector- lead agency, on the opportunity of adding
this pillar.
Currently PCBS’role in the SEFSec is mainly to collect data for the surveys and coordinate with
different line ministries, while in measurements of food insecurity FAO’s contribution is essential in
providing technical assistance. The SEFSec reports remain very much an exercise led by UN agencies
working under the FSS with data collected by PCBS, and with external partners contracted for the
analysis. PCBS is supposed to eventually take the lead in the actual analysis of the food security
data, though it remained unclear when this will actually happen. Efforts are underway to ensure
the new methodology is adopted nationally, as a first step towards PCBS playing a leading role in
both collection and analysis of food security. It is not proving to be an easy process, however, and
some have argued that the new methodology does not fully apply to the context of the WBGS, a
criticism that is summarized in the comment, repeatedly heard, “we are not Somalia”. This response
seems tied to awareness that the methodology was initially tested in African countries,91 and is
not necessarily based on a full understanding of its complexity and how it has been adapted to
Palestine. FAO’s role in supporting the revision of the SEFSec methodology was considered very
positive and an important milestone, introducing indicators tied to access to services, and moving
away from measuring food insecurity through food availability exclusively.
40
90
‘Help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition’.
91
RIMA has been tested in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Malawi and Nigeria. Apart from WBGS, the other 11 countries are in Africa.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
The Agricultural Projects Information System (APIS) was established by the Applied Research Institute
-Jerusalem (ARIJ) in 2004, with funding from the Spanish Agency for International Development
Cooperation (AECID), and it was taken over by FAO in 2009 based on request from AECID and the
Ministry of Agriculture. In 2011, it was fully transferred to the MoA, and intended to be used as a
coordination tool by the FSS. Its aim was to compile information concerning agriculture, including
relevant information on organizations involved in agricultural activities in the WGBS. Data on the
APIS website stop at 2011, though the pages also state that they are currently being revitalized, and
that “FAO considers APIS an integral part of its ongoing mission in the WBGS and will exert every
effort in order to have it sustainably active and continuously updated and used”.92 According to FAO
staff, the MoA did not do the job of promoting APIS well among the members, and at the same time,
APIS members - mostly NGOs - considered APIS a control tool in the hands of the MoA. There was
a general agreement that work in this area should be followed up, together with the strengthening
of agricultural statistics within PCBS. The MoA has established a new Sector M&E system, and FAO
(through FSS) plans to support integrating APIS into that system. The need for FAO to continue its
support to the Palestinian Authority to administer the APIS database is detailed in both the Plan of
Action and the Programme Framework; the limited results achieved since 2012, however, highlight
FAO’s dependency on donor funding in an area that actually falls under FAO’s core mandate, as well
as the need for national counterparts to be fully committed in order to move forwards.
FAO has been working closely with national institutions on a number of initiatives to enhance the
MoA’s capacities in establishing early warning mechanisms to monitor and prevent natural hazards,
such as streamlining data collection systems for rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment (DaLA)
for the agriculture sector, establishing the Palestinian Agriculture Disaster Risk Reduction and
Insurance Fund (PADRRIF) to deal with agricultural risk management, and the animal identification
system set up in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see note on DRR., section 4.1.3). A market monitoring
system was also developed for the MoA General Directorate of Marketing, to act as an early warning
tool for market related crises.
92
101
Implicit sources of knowledge also indirectly inform programming: these include the
knowledge accessed through FAO’s strong links with the Ministry of Agriculture, and
the implicit analysis of the political context undertaken by FAO staff, as emerged during
discussions with the evaluation team and during the SWOT analysis. While use of staff’s
experience and knowledge is in principle desirable, in practice it should be incorporated in
FAO’s whole way of working and be less ad hoc than it is at present.
102
Though FAO’s overarching analysis at national and governorate level is well-constructed
and grounded, at the community level and when looking at specific projects, limited
evidence appeared to back FAO’s choice of activities and locations. Ultimately, projects
were not designed on the basis of preliminary assessments of needs or risks, and at none of
the field sites visited by the evaluation team was a more detailed analysis at community level
carried out. Undertaking a macro level analysis exclusively is particularly inadequate when
interventions are implemented at household level, and this shortcoming often resulted in
the provision of the same kind and quantity of inputs for all beneficiaries, regardless of
their situation.
103
It should however be recognized that usually neither FAO nor donors provide funding to
undertake assessments or build baselines prior to project design. Though recently some
funds have been invested for assessments,93 none of these address the lack of tools and
resources to gain a better understanding of the situation at community level.
104
In particular, FAO’s decision to frame its strategy along a value chain model is sustained
by a developmental context analysis describing the unfavourable business environment
and its consequences on the agricultural sector, and a humanitarian analysis describing
the shocks the sector is subject to. The rationale for this strategic choice would have been
clearer if the link between the two analyses had been explicated in terms of identification
of needs across the value chain, and if the Programme Framework had articulated how the
response framework addresses those needs.
92
http://www.apis.ps/about.php?menu_name=about
93 Some examples are an assessment of trade bans and trade relations funded by EST, a study commissioned under
the Regional Initiative on Small Scale Family Farming on public service delivery capacity to cooperatives, and a
study on the capacity of small and medium sized enterprises (SME) to engage in agribusiness.
41
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
105
Similarly, a system analysis of the Palestinian market backs the adoption of a value chain
approach. No preliminary assessments of specific markets were conducted, nor were
pre-existing analyses used, though understanding how markets normally operate is a
precondition to support them to function better and to allow a more equitable, effective
and sustainable access to markets and resources, particularly for marginalized farmers.
Understanding the functionality of market systems before crisis peaks, such as the war
in the Gaza Strip or winter storms, would also contribute to enhance the design and
implementation of FAO’s response to crises through a market-based approach, making it
more rapid and appropriate. In sum, listing projects across a value chain does not create a
value chain model by default, and a more detailed understanding of how markets work is
needed to fully take advantage of the adoption of this approach.
106
A more articulated understanding of risks for all components of an agricultural value
chain at different levels would be more aligned with the aim of developing a resiliencebuilding strategy explicitly focusing on market-oriented approaches, rather than focused
on business as usual supply-led livelihoods activities. Value chains, elements of these, and
the actors that operate within them are vulnerable in different ways according to the
intensity of exposure and the kind of risks they are exposed to. Therefore, analyses should
be broken down to understand the vulnerabilities for each value chain. Furthermore, a
value chain analysis should include an understanding of the position of different actors
along the value chain and of the quality of their interactions in exchanging information or
resources, whether they are bound by a formal or informal contractual relationship and
ultimately of the power relations between them. For example, several fieldwork discussions
indicated the significant constraints to marketing faced by producers, and an imbalance
in the bargaining power of traders and producers, with the latter having very little or no
ability to negotiate prices was a commonly reported problem for beneficiaries of FAO’s
humanitarian interventions.
107
Adequate analysis explaining the appropriateness of cash-based responses in the local
contexts where FAO is operating was also missing, notwithstanding the recent focus on
cash transfers as a modality of assistance, a shift, which seemed to have been based on
technical considerations rather than on context-specific assessments. Importantly, market
assessments, critical to understanding whether food insecurity hinged on problems of
accessibility or availability, had not informed the choice of conditional cash as a transfer
modality.
108
A lens to help contextualize the various protection threats that people experience is vital
for a detailed livelihood analysis and in particular to understand the interwoven nature of
protection and livelihoods (see box 1). Nonetheless, analysis appeared weak in its attention
to risks that beneficiaries are exposed to at community level. FAO project activities would
greatly benefit from the incorporation of a protection analysis aimed at gaining a more
holistic understanding of the underlying causes of vulnerability for livelihood systems and
households, and of how these vulnerabilities in WBGS are gendered. In assessing protection
needs as well as other issues highlighted above, not all analysis needs to be carried out
directly by FAO. It could depend instead on FAO’s capacity to liaise with and tap into
other actors’ strengths and markedly non-governmental organizations and communitybased organizations (CBOs) with which it could establish a more constructive partnership
to this end, as also discussed later in the section on partnership. Instead, relations with
protection partners appeared to be badly organized, and interviewed organizations that
FAO considered focal points on protection issues on its own projects were surprised to
learn FAO regarded them as such.
109
The team found that FAO WBGS does not always make use of global natural resource
assessment tools or methodologies to inform its understanding of land and water issues,
and its other tools or methodologies do not include a natural resource element. The
impacts of water-related projects (e.g. cisterns) are assessed solely on the basis of the value
or price of water. For example, the only assessment related to cistern construction made
available to the evaluation team was a one-off exercise carried out to estimate the value
of water stored in cisterns94 (see box 18, section 5.1.3). Though this was a useful exercise
to understand the economic impact of the interventions on households, it should be
complemented with a broader assessment to understand other relevant factors related
94 FAO Water Value in the Cisterns, no date.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
to water issues, such as impacts on agricultural practice and productivity, environmental
sustainability and the non-economic value of water.
110
A recent FAO report on land tenure, planning and management in the WBGS (FAO, 2015)
provides an accurate snapshot of current land tenure practices and policies, and of land
use, planning and management. In providing a wide range of information, and in-depth
analyses, as well as recommendations for action, it has great potential as a tool to improve
policy and planning in the WBGS. On the other hand, the lack of disaggregated analysis of
land tenure arrangements between land/water owners and sharecroppers weakens its use
for programme development or operations, e.g. beneficiary selection. A practical example
of a useful tool in this regard is the Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development
(PNTD) approach. Developed by FAO and used in Mozambique and more recently planned
for Somalia, the PNTD consists of on an open process of diagnosis at the community level
to understand existing relationships, institutions and mechanisms governing access to and
use of land and resources, production and tenure systems in a given context (FAO, 2005).
Talks were underway with FAO’s Land and Water Division to find new entry points to work
on land use and governance, and a preliminary mission was carried out, but so far it has
been difficult to identify ownership on these issues within the Palestinian Authority and
this initiative was not followed up on.
Box 6: Instances of lack of preliminary analysis affecting project implementation
• Some beneficiaries of project OSRO/GAZ/807/ITA in the Gaza Strip complained the packages of
inputs they received contained plastic sheets whose characteristics and quality were unsuitable
to protect their crops from adverse weather conditions. In such cases, the distributed inputs
proved useless to achieve the expected outcome of rehabilitating production base and small
infrastructures.
• Some beneficiaries complained that drought tolerant seeds were distributed without preliminary
analysis to understand which groups were most affected by droughts, and a finding emerging
from many FGDs was that drought tolerant seeds were distributed to farms practicing protected
irrigation and intensive animal rearing rather than those practicing open field rain-fed agriculture
and grazing, which were the most affected by droughts.
• Dripping pipes whose characteristics according to some interviewees did not fit their farming
needs were distributed to avocado farmers participating in the Dutch funded high value crops
project.
4.1.3 Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
Findings on LRRD
• FAO’s focus on resilience as a way of linking relief, rehabilitation and development is constructive
and clearly reflected conceptually in its strategies and policy guidance, but not in the design of
activities.
• In practice, there is limited integration of humanitarian and development in FAO’s value chain
approach, whose rationale is grounded in an analysis of the business environment and not enough
on the humanitarian challenges the context presents.
• Risk reduction being the objective of some projects in their own right, and more developmental
objectives included in some humanitarian interventions, indicate an attention to LRRD. However,
while projects claim to be implementing resilience-building activities, these were too frequently
focused on asset building rather than on tackling key processes that create/perpetuate/increase
the vulnerability of the targeted population, such as progressive erosion of natural resources or
reduction of access to resources and (labour, commodity, service) markets. On the other hand,
elements of capacity development as part of humanitarian interventions denote an attention to
longer-term, resilience-building aims in a complex environment.
• A coordination gap at operational level between FAO’s humanitarian and development activities
is also mirrored in the lack of harmonization between the Food Security Sector and the Agriculture
Working Group’s aims and activities.
• Though crisis modifiers were not systematically integrated in the programme, by scaling up or
modifying interventions at field level, FAO demonstrated an ability to respond to emergencies.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
111
Making the two-way link between immediate humanitarian objectives and medium and
long-term development objectives corresponds to the capacity to respond to crises with a
“good transition approach”95 as defined in the report of the evaluation of FAO’s contribution
to crisis-related transition. According to the Theory of Change developed by the transition
evaluation, a transition approach would allow FAO to better respond to chronic, protracted
and complex crises such as the one in the WBGS by addressing the underlying causes of
vulnerability, while still responding to new shocks and maintaining response capacity.
On the basis of the recommendations of the transition evaluation, this evaluation looked
into FAO’s ability to include humanitarian principles, concerns and activities when doing
development work in WBGS,96 while at the same time planning for a longer timeframe
when responding to crises, in which conditions this may be done and if any trade-offs are
involved.97 If a “good transition approach” seems particularly relevant in the context of the
WBGS to find sustainable solutions through developmental actions, all actors also need to
be cognizant of the volatility of the situation due to the political context and how it reflects
from the national level, to communities and households, calling for protection measures as
well as preparedness to sudden surges in humanitarian needs.
112
The evaluation found that the strategic objective of addressing humanitarian and
development needs was constrained by the limited integration of these two streams, both
conceptually and practically. In particular, FAO’s value chain approach focused exclusively
on addressing the unfavourable business environment, delinking it from the humanitarian
situation, which was not explicitly addressed, and this led to a fragmented approach and
ultimately resulted in vacuums in programming. For example, many projects enhancing
farmers’ access to markets are based on agribusiness, but fail to incorporate in their design
the limitations and levels of risk farmers are subjected to in this context.
113
As mentioned in section 4.1.1 the shift to integrate a more developmental approach
in FAO’s programme was evident with the adoption of the Programme Framework.
Although there is a clear rationale for this, some caution should be exercised, as shifting
too far or too rapidly away from humanitarian preoccupations and failing to adequately
fund humanitarian activities may involve some risks when the conditions under which
Palestinians live and markedly the lack of the rule of law expose them to arbitrary attacks
and other unpredictable events negatively affecting their livelihoods, as also emerged
during the fieldwork for this evaluation. As mentioned, in this context protection is
paramount to guarantee the effectiveness of any intervention to build sustainable
livelihoods. A programme based on a developmental framework exclusively would come
at the expense of the recognition of protection needs, weakening the appropriateness
of the approach. More in general, until the political conditions change, the effects of the
occupation and particularly the volatility it creates will always inevitably impact on any
development intervention. However, this can be mitigated by a strong analysis of the risk
environment and of needs, and with contingency planning factored into the programme
at different levels.
114
Taking into account the context of great insecurity, uncertainty and volatility, the evaluation
assessed how risk mitigation and reduction were integrated in the programme, and
whether measures were taken to minimize potential risks incurred during implementation.
A matrix for risk monitoring and response flowing from the risk analysis is very similar in
both the Plan of Action and the Programme Framework, and remains quite generic, not
being grounded in either framework. Nonetheless, the risk analysis matrices are useful to
go through programmatic and contextual risks that may affect the situation in the region
and therefore the FAO programme in WBGS. Furthermore, the risk analysis in the PF refers
to FAO’s delivery, not to potential risks affecting beneficiaries, an understanding which is
also missing in project design; there is little consideration of the risks beneficiaries incur by
95 FAO 2014, Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crisis-related transition. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.
Final Report.
96 As also pointed out in a recent review of humanitarian principles in evaluation commissioned by UNEG (2016),
evaluations can play a significant role in understanding how humanitarian principles are currently applied,
supporting their application and analysis and assessing the results of doing so. This evaluation adopts a broad
definition, and while not referring to them directly, has considered the principles of humanity, neutrality and
independence in assessing FAO’s work in WBGS.
97 FAO 2014.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
default, and if and how FAO’s intervention may mitigate or on the contrary inadvertently
heighten risks. One project proposal that factors in risk in order to calculate the financial
burden of losses is the support to the PADRRIF and the insurance and compensation scheme.
115
On the other hand, in some instances risk mitigation and reduction were objectives of
the projects in their own right. Such examples include construction of animal sheds and
distribution of drought resistant seeds for preparedness to adverse climatic conditions, the
distribution of quality emergency fodder in the aftermath of the 2014 conflict in the Gaza
Strip, critical for the rapid recovery of herds, and some complementary activities to assist
setting up of the national insurance and compensation fund (PADRRIF). The tagging of all
the livestock, set up to comply with international standards and build a national animal
identification system, potentially also has the positive effect of facilitating systematic
outreach to herders in case of emergency distribution of fodder and provision of other
veterinary services during a humanitarian crisis (see box 7 below). Such system is also
important in the monitoring and prevention of transboundary animal and plant pests and
diseases. The SPS programme, improving plant protection, food safety and animal health,
is another example of an initiative aiming to address and mitigate risks.
Box 7: FAO WBGS’ work on Disaster Risk Reduction/Management
9899100
Recognizing the WBGS context as “a chronic emergency with recurring crises”,98 the
Plan of Action highlighted the importance of understanding the relationship between
preparedness, response and transition phases as circular rather than linear. In turn,
the PoA and related interventions were articulated along a Disaster Risk Management
model to bring the focus beyond conventional short-term emergency responses to include
attention on enhancing local capacity for preparedness and transition to development.
A 2013 policy brief on DRR noted that at the operational level, FAO WBGS’ work, which
at the time was guided by the PoA and its related DRM approach, sought to address the
main drivers of risk for herders and farmers, including water scarcity (through rainwater
harvesting cisterns, reservoirs, grey waste water treatment units) and fluctuations in
input prices (through rangeland rehabilitation activities, establishment of model farms,
promotion of crop diversification higher value crops, emergency vaccination campaigns).99
The Programme Framework highlights a number of activities that draw on DRM approaches
and are designed “to mitigate environmental and naturally occurring risks”.100 These include
integrating environmental conservation and good practices in natural resource management,
addressing animal and plant pests and diseases such as red palm weevil, foot and mouth
disease, development of a sector-wide mapping and response tool to better understand the
patterns of climatic shocks and address their impact on farmers and herders.
FAO WBGS staff interviewed for this evaluation was of the view that, while DRR is not
systematically mainstreamed in project design and implementation, attention to and
implementation of activities such as water conservation (e.g. through the construction or
rehabilitation of cisterns) are an indication that elements of DRR such as preparedness and
risk mitigation nonetheless regularly feature in project activities. That said, programme
and project documents reviewed do not elaborate on the role that such interventions may
have in the different phases of the DRM model (e.g. preparedness, response, transition
phases) and, critically, how and why those specific interventions are best placed to mitigate
the risks that targeted beneficiaries are exposed to in the different phases.
98 FAO (2011) Plan of Action. West Bank and Gaza Strip 2011-2013, p. 26.
99 FAO (2013) FAO Disaster Risk Reduction Brief. West Bank and Gaza Strip http://www.preventionweb.net/
files/33680_fao.pdf
100 FAO (2014) 2014-2016 Programme Framework. West Bank and Gaza Strip, p. 40.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Some of the findings of the fieldwork also point to the recognition by staff and FAO
implementing partners (IPs) of a gap in the area of preparedness. Following the
emergency fodder distribution in Gaza101 targeting livestock-holders through blanket
coverage in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Gaza Strip war, it turned out that there
were less heads of livestock in the Gaza Strip than initially thought. This pointed to the
importance of having an animal tagging system in place, such as the one which has been
implemented through the LbL-i project as part of broader preparedness measures in the
quite likely event of escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip. Referring to the importance
of developing an animal tagging system also to improve effectiveness and timeliness of
response, both FAO staff and beneficiaries concurred that “if a conflict [in GS] erupts again
then FAO and other actors know how many animals are out there and this allows us to
plan better”. While this finding is pertinent to livestock related emergency response in the
Gaza Strip, it may be indicative of the need to take preliminary stock of the situation in
some areas both in the WB and the GS, and for other livelihood groups (e.g. communities
affected by settlers violence, demolitions etc.) that are constantly under threat, to see how
preparedness activities can best be strengthened making response more effective.
101
116
The population in Area C suffers from Israeli imposed limitations to movement and
access to land and natural resources that affect the preservation of their agricultural
livelihoods and their productive capacity, as well as raising protection issues. FAO,
like many other agencies in Area C, responds through emergency projects, which are
part of the Humanitarian Response Plan. While granting immediate access to food as
well as protection (see section 4.2.2), some of these initiatives in Area C also ensure
that Palestinians are able to continue raising their animals and cultivating their land,
counteracting the erosion of their livelihoods due to the occupation with a longerterm developmental goal. FAO also supports vulnerable herders in Area C and Eastern
Slopes by developing their capacity and assisting them to establish cooperatives.102 The
introduction of longer-term capacity building components as part of a humanitarian
activity delivering assets and rehabilitating agricultural infrastructures indicate the will
to adopt a resilience-building approach in a complex context, which is under Israeli
authority and where settler and ISF violence is rampant.
117
Until 2014 the person who was in charge of the agriculture stream of humanitarian
coordination also gave an important contribution in designing the humanitarian
components of FAO’s projects and programme, as well as ensuring technical advisory
contributions for emergencies in agriculture to both FAO management and other
UN agencies and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The fact itself of having a
“middleman of emergencies in agriculture” allowed FAO to bridge its technical work in
emergencies with other less technical, and more advocacy-oriented work carried out in
the food security area. Furthermore, investing in the function of liaising with the HCT
meant that there was constant and fruitful coordination and exchange of information,
which allowed concrete integration of FAO’s development and emergency approaches.
When the person covering this role departed, she was not replaced, partly because
some of her functions were taken over by the newly established Food Security Sector
coordinator. However, strategic communication of information with humanitarian
actors had ensured a stronger link with FAO’s development work in agriculture than
is currently the case, indirectly weakening FAO’s role in LRRD. A gap continues to exist
between humanitarian FSS activities and coordination of development stakeholders
through the Agriculture Sector Working Group. As also pointed out by the present FSS
coordinator, addressing this gap would better harmonize emergency and development
interventions and, incidentally, would also respond to one of the recommendations of
the transition evaluation. Remarkably, the livelihood stream of the FSS for 2015 is the
most underfunded by donors, who ostensibly widely support a shift towards more
developmental programming in the WBGS, but do not seem to follow through at least in
the way they allot their resources to the FSS (see 2.6.2).
101 OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN.
102 OSRO/GAZ/807/ITA.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
118
According to Mosel and Levine, flexibility is one of the principles that are the basis of good
LRRD programmes.103 An example of how flexibility can be incorporated into a programme
is by introducing “crisis modifiers” – i.e. components in a programme that are already preagreed with the donor and that stipulate that if conditions in implementation change, the
programme can quickly change accordingly.104 From what the team observed, FAO WBGS
programme does not incorporate any crisis modifiers or programmatic contingency plans.
During the evaluation period, the only contingency plan that FAO had adopted was that
of the FSS - and this was considered “not very developed” by partner stakeholders due to
weak funding for it. The evaluation however notes that a new FSS sector contingency plan
was being developed while the evaluation was underway.
119
Despite the lack of a contingency plan at the field level, this evaluation has observed an
ability to respond to emergencies, by either scaling up or modifying interventions. Positive
feedback was provided when discussing the blanket distribution of fodder under project
OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN. This was not originally planned under this project, but in the
aftermath of the 2014 Gaza war the FAO team was able to adjust activities to reallocate
funds between the WB and the GS - in agreement with the donors. Land rehabilitation
activities were also newly introduced after the war in Gaza under the Dutch-funded HVC
project. Less positive was the feedback from Susia, where FAO distributed plastic sheeting
in response to the Alexa winter storm which were too small for the sheds they were destined
for. Donors interviewed thought FAO was capable of expanding capacity and responding
to shock if needed - FAO was described as “quite nimble on the ground”. Similarly, FAO staff
considered their relations with specific donors constructive, especially with regard to donor
responsiveness, flexibility and speed in budgeting resources when they were needed, and
in response to sudden peaks in humanitarian need.
4.1.4 Alignment to FAO’s corporate Strategic Framework
Findings on alignment with FAO’s corporate Strategic Framework
• The Programme Framework has fully incorporated the current reviewed Strategic Framework
2013-2023 in its strategy, and both programming documents in the period under review are
clearly linked to the corporate objective of enhancing resilience, aligning with the previous
Strategic Objective I and current Strategic Objective 5. There are also some links with SO2, 3
and 4.
• FAO’s Strategic Framework is considered a useful tool by staff for thinking strategically about
FAO’s overall mandate, but not necessarily conducive to better programming.
120
In its logical framework, FAO’s PF refers to two of FAO’s current Strategic Objectives, SO2
and SO5, and two Organizational Outcomes. The PF also broadly outlines the synergies
of the programme with all five SOs. The Plan of Action, by contrast, does not clearly align
to the first version of the SOs of FAO’s Strategic Framework 2010-2019, making a general
reference to FAO’s new vision and framework.105 In the PoA’s rationale, however, there
is a clear linkage with SO5, which is not surprising seeing that the office started as an
emanation of FAO’s Emergency division and that the PoA was closely linked to SOI the
predecessor of SO5.
121
The evaluation team found that the Programme Framework closely correlated with SO5,106
as indicated in the logframe, with resilience at the core of FAO WBGS’ work, resulting in
activities and projects contributing to the resilience-building objective. Much of what is
103 The other four principles are: (i) risk taking and openness to learning; (ii) working with local institutions; (iii) joint
analysis/ planning and learning at country level; and (iv) realistic programming. These are covered in different parts
of the report. Irina Mosel and Simone Levine, Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development,
HPG Commissioned Report, ODI, March 2014.
104 For different mechanisms to institutionalise and operationalise resilience see for example the working document
prepared by Mercy Corps “Summary of existing donor activities around institutionalising resilience” https://www.
mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Ann_Vaughan_IFPRI_Resilience.pdf
105 Alignment between country programmes and corporate framework was not mandatory at the time the PoA was
drafted.
106 Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
classified under SO5 within the programme corresponds in fact to delivery of inputs,107,
however, as argued elsewhere in this report, this kind of activity can at best be considered
resilience building if coupled with other components. Other important outcomes related
to SO5 include the results of a number of institutional support activities. Perhaps the most
remarkable among the institutional activities correlated with SO5 is the long-standing
effort to produce resilience measurements in close collaboration with the Agricultural and
Development Economics Division (ESA) in Rome. This translated in development of the
RIMA and the resilience marker, a strand of work that was integrated into the new SEFSEC
methodology for measuring national food security and furthered FAO’s collaboration with
PCBS. Other activities related to SO5 include FAO’s support to the National Agriculture
Sector Strategy 2014-16 “Resilience and Development” and to the PADDRIF.
122
FAO WBGS’ work on markets, also at the core of the Programme Framework and mainly
focused on developing the agriculture sector’s capacity and increasing productivity, is
directly aligned to SO2.108 Less explicitly, by targeting low resilient farmers and herders and
therefore facilitating the inclusiveness of the economically vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups, the PF also aligns with SO3109 and, by improving access to markets, with SO4.110
123
However, the team found that the second part of SO2, which states that agricultural
development is to be developed “in a sustainable manner” does not seem to be pursued
consistently by FAO, in particular regarding water resources for agriculture. This was
poignantly illustrated by a water expert interviewed in the Gaza Strip who referred to the
findings of a recent report issued by the PWA111 according to which in 2013-2014, agricultural
activities in the Gaza Strip used 95 MCM, with an increase of 9.5 percent in water use for
agriculture since 2012. The sustainability of such extraction levels in the context of the wellknown fragility of aquifers in the Strip coupled with the prohibition to drill new wells by the
Ministry of Agriculture was indicated by the same expert as questionable. FAO considers
the problem mainly in terms of water demand management (making more efficient use of
water extracted and promoting a shift to more salinity tolerant and less water consuming
production) and is planning to promote the reuse of treated wastewater. However more
could be done to mitigate these problems: to avoid the risk of worsening the situation
attention to issues of water sustainability should be central to any FAO intervention
supporting agricultural development in the Gaza Strip, while this is not always true (for
example in some activities related to the high value crops projects).
124
A comment repeatedly heard among staff, and that this evaluation concurs with, is that
FAO’s Strategic Framework is a useful tool for thinking strategically about the FAO mandate
overall but it is not necessarily conducive to better programming, as Strategic Objectives in
practice overlap and projects often fell under more than one strategic objective making
the job of assigning their various components to single SOs requested by headquarters to
respond to the corporate Results-based Management (RBM) framework quite difficult and
time consuming. Staff felt at times that the office was just catching up with the changes
in the SF without much thought and with little time to plan. The top-down process of
developing the Strategic Framework, they felt, did not involve staff, and requests to fall
in line with it and to produce other information updates arrived with extremely tight
deadlines and left the team little time to digest the large structural and conceptual changes
taking place at FAO headquarters. As a result, the need to follow the SF sometimes meant
retrofitting current projects to the new framework, rather than the framework being a
useful tool for staff to carry out a thorough exercise in thinking things through. The topdown process is also reflected in the fact that the SF does not mention direct delivery and
operations, which makes matching the expected results in the RBM framework with all the
activities implemented in the WBGS very difficult.
107 Seeing that asset distribution is often done as part of broader projects, its share of the programme is difficult to
quantify, however it could be estimated approximately as of 25% of the total budget.
108 Increase and improve provision of goods and services in a sustainable manner.
109 Reduce rural poverty.
110 Enable more inclusive and efficient agricultural systems.
111 The interviewee did not however mention exactly which report they were talking about.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
4.1.5 Partnership and coordination
Findings on partnership and coordination
• FAO’s collaboration with the Palestinian Authority intensified over the years through strategic and
operational work with different ministries, increasingly on institutional capacity development.
• FAO’s presence and leadership in multiple coordination fora and technical working groups is
widely praised by all stakeholders. Over the years FAO has undertaken many actions to foster a
true partnership relation with donors. The donor community recognizes FAO’s technical role and
appreciates its ability to collaborate with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip as well as with the Israeli authorities and the Coordinator of the Israeli Coordination of
Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).
• Notwithstanding solid partnerships with key actors, FAO displays weaknesses when partnering
with local NGOs and CBOs, whose work is mostly limited to service provision regulated through
Letters of Agreement (LoAs).
• On the other hand, under the HVC project, FAO WBGS created a consortium based on an equal
footing with a national organization. This unprecedented arrangement was seminal to the
establishment of the new manual section “Operational Partners Implementation Modality”
(OPIM) defining corporate rules and procedures for this type of partnership.
125
Through its presence in multiple coordination fora112 and participation in dialogue with
various ministries – including agriculture, women’s affairs, labour and health – donors,
NGOs, the private sector and other UN agencies, FAO maintains strong channels of
communication113 with all relevant stakeholders.
126
Though Palestine is not a member country, FAO’s main interlocutors remain national
institutions, and principally the Palestinian Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture.
The relationship has intensified over the years, especially since the Programme Framework,
increasingly dedicated to institutional support (around USD 11 million over 2013 to 16),
where previous interaction had been a narrower and based on project implementation.
This helps explain statements by government officials, who described FAO occasionally as
a competitor for funds and at other times as a key partner in strengthening the capacity of
the agricultural sector, according to the period of their engagement with the FAO office.
FAO maintains multiple linkages at the operational and strategic level with the MoA,
collaborating with ministry directors and field offices throughout the project cycle. For
example, all new MoA proposals for donors involve joint planning with FAO, and FAO is
closely involved in drafting the agricultural strategy.
127
This strong collaboration was seen as providing critical capacity to the MoA by a wide
range of stakeholders and considered in a very positive light by the Ministry itself. It was
suggested that it went some way towards explaining FAO’s technical expertise and its value
added when working at field level. At the same time some concerns were raised by partners
over potential conflict of interest seeing FAO is simultaneously adviser on national policies,
programme adviser and implementer of agricultural projects. A different opinion was
expressed by a UN officer who thought FAO’s relationship with the MoA was remarkable
in its freedom and for not being “highjacked or antagonized”. By contrast, it emerged from
interviews that FAO’s relations with other Palestinian ministries and agencies are limited to
specific activities.114
112 These include: OCHA and HCT meetings, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee with donors, the Association of
International Development Agencies, the Local Development Forum, as well as the various Sectors and Working
Groups.
113 Through the above coordination fora, as well as with Palestinian stakeholders and institutional representatives,
and COGAT and other Israeli entities.
114 These include EQA (climate change), PSI (quality standards, SPS), MoH (SPS), MoNE (SPS) and MoL (agricultural
cooperatives).
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 8: FAO’s strategic position on partnerships
FAO’s corporate strategy defines partnerships as the cooperation and collaboration between FAO
units and external parties in joint or coordinated action for a common purpose. A partnership
therefore involves a relationship where all parties contribute to the output and the achievement
of the objectives rather than a purely financial relationship. The existence of mutual will among
the partners to pursue a common goal is considered a necessary condition for the success of a
partnership.
This strategic importance placed on partnerships at corporate level is reflected programmatically
in the Programme Framework for 2014-2016, where partnerships with governmental officials,
development partners, civil society and the private sector are said to be “at the heart of FAO’s
strategic approach in the WBGS,” and to be developed through a “true partnership model”
– an approach based “on the premise that organizations could accomplish more by focusing on
the quality of their relationships. Though seemingly obvious in principle, the popular paradigm
regarding partnerships is still driven by a financial relationship (entailing power and control) and a
binary (either/or, right/wrong) mentality.” This focus on partnerships was also important under the
Plan of Action 2011-2013.
128
At field level, the Ministry of Agriculture is often part of the administration of local
committees and FAO typically relies on the capacities of local MoA staff to coordinate
and implement its projects. This makes the quality of the relationship quite variable and
contingent on personal relations and on the specific individuals involved. The uneven
perception of the quality of the MoA’s work tends to reflect on FAO itself, at times in a
negative way.
129
Relations with the MoA in the Gaza Strip are more limited to issues of technical coordination,
also due to the ban on working with the de facto government at political level, however
technical relations do exist and have been described as constructive. FAO has certainly
been catalytic in working on projects, which required intense involvement of the ministerial
counterpart both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and Government representatives
have expressed great appreciation of this. In any case, FAO’s capacity as a UN agency to
negotiate and interact to a variable degree with three governmental entities, the Palestinian
Authority, technical staff from the de facto government and Israeli authorities, and COGAT
in particular, was widely perceived by donors as a strong comparative advantage of FAO
vis-à-vis for example NGOs, something that this evaluation concurs with, as explained in
more detail in other sections of this report.
130
Though many donors115 expressed their preference to work with and through FAO rather
than local NGOs for its more reliable and solid administrative, financial and reporting
capacities, the effectiveness of its systems as well as, crucially, the above mentioned ability
to liaise with governmental entities, they also remarked on its higher overheads and staff
costs, which make it less competitive at least financially when it comes to implementation
of projects with a strong field presence. In general, donors consulted were positive
concerning their relationship with FAO, and very favourable in their judgement and
supportive of the FAO team whose high standards they considered crucial to the good work
of the office. FAO’s clout influenced donors’ willingness to be involved in negotiations with
COGAT, ensured that Area C was kept on the agenda, and in the Gaza Strip its standing as a
multilateral neutral broker made it easier to engage in negotiations with Israeli authorities
on crucial issues such as the fishing limits or farming in the buffer zone (see section 4.4.2).
In addition, donors corroborated the view that FAO has a strong focus on accountability,
both through regular updates and briefs prepared for individual donors, and through more
informal but regular sharing of information, and were positive regarding its responsiveness.
Similarly, FAO staff considered their relations with specific donors constructive, especially
with regard to donor responsiveness, flexibility and speed in budgeting resources when
they were needed, and in response to sudden peaks in humanitarian need such as those
mentioned in section 4.1.3. Overall, donors were actively and willingly involved in FAO’s
programming through different means, thus fostering a relationship that was more geared
towards a true partnership rather than one based only on financial engagement.
115 “Under the “true partnership” framework established in 2011, FAO’s relationship with its donors extends beyond
funding to one that is based on mutual understanding and knowledge sharing. FAO’s approach to donor relations
emphasizes the power of long-term partnerships, maintains a focus on results measurement and efficiency, and
provides appropriate visibility to donor partners” Programme Framework 2014-2016, p.34.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
131
FAO is praised by local implementing partners for its professionalism and the good and
regular communication it establishes, but they also often complain of its overheads, and
especially larger Palestinian NGOs crucially view FAO as competing with them for donor
funds and Ministry of Agriculture support. The evaluation team found that the quality of
the relationship with NGOs was mixed and, as in the case of relationships with the MoA,
often dependent on personal interactions, and that FAO generally invests very little time
and resources in developing the capacity of its partners and other local NGOs. This is also
acknowledged by staff, despite the claims made in FAO’s corporate strategy and in the
Programme Framework. It is worth noting that the PF does not refer to local and international
NGOs, aside from a generic mention of civil society,116 which is particularly worrying when,
on the other hand, the PF estimates a dramatic reduction in access to be highly probable,117
making “cooperating with local partners who are already based in the targeted areas”
necessary,118 presumably based on pre-established and long-standing relations with local
partners. An important exception to this general trend is the consortium created under the
HVC project, an interesting and commendable example of donor pressure pushing FAO to
find a solution and ultimately change its corporate rules “from the bottom up”, in other
words being driven by the needs and experience of a decentralized office. Unfortunately,
FAO’s manual sections for partnerships and service providers, contrary to FAO’s corporate
stance, are not conducive to the establishment of partnerships on an equal footing with
local NGOs. Paradoxically, Manual Section 701, which was triggered by the need to establish
the above mentioned consortium (see also box 9), has made it more difficult to articulate
relationships such as the one experimented under the HVC project.
116 Programme Framework 2014-2016, p.34.
117 The Programme Framework 2014-2016, Annex III, p.43 explains that “despite statistics showing a lower number
of security checkpoints in the West Bank, continued settlement expansion, demolitions of agricultural assets and
infrastructure, settler violence, restrictions on movement and the separation barrier continue to further restrict
access to land”, while “the blockade of Gaza and ongoing incursions continue to limit access to land and sea for
livelihood activities”.
118 Programme Framework 2014-2016, p.42.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 9: FAO WBGS’ contractual arrangements with implementing partners
In working with civil society (CSOs) and other actors, FAO WBGS limited its partnerships to one out
of the six areas of collaboration identified by its strategy for partnerships with civil society i.e. joint
use of resources in emergency situations.119 To that effect, the most prevailing administrative tool
is the Letter of Agreement, which in fact reflects a service provision function on behalf of the CSO/
NGO, rather than a partnership relationship, as defined by FAO itself.120
In the Gaza Strip LoAs for smaller NGOs and CBOs were seen as both a hindrance and a deterrent.
FAO staff in the Gaza Strip admitted that due to slow and bureaucratic procedural constraints, local
organizations and especially small CBOs sometimes ended up working pro bono and without a LoA,
with the hope of establishing a more formal partnership in the future. LoAs are not very friendly for
small NGOs, as they demand a great amount of detail however small the sum involved, and a lot of
legalistic information which, while important, is intimidating and requires experience and time to
be collected and entered.
FAO staff acknowledged that this affected implementation too: at times local CBOs and NGOs possess
the best local knowledge, and in an ideal arrangement staff would have preferred working with
them. However, in some cases this would mean developing separate LoAs with each organization,
so time and logistical constraints sometimes led staff to seek a single blanket LoA with a larger
partner covering numerous geographical areas, even if that partner had less developed local ties
and understanding.
FAO’s modus operandi of having one standard LoA template thus has a seriously detrimental effect
on its ability to establish formal partnerships at field level. In building its partnerships with local
NGOs and CBOs, FAO seems more affected by its own internal procedures than by identified needs
at field level. This in turn raises questions concerning the extent to which FAO undertakes a proper
selection process of the implementing partners, develops their capacities, and strengthens its
accountability to affected populations
One case where FAO created a consortium with a CSO in Palestine taking the form of a proper
partnership was with the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, Mount of Olives company and
the Palestinian Businesswomen’s Association under the HVC project. FAO did not contemplate this
kind of partnership agreement before the Dutch donor requested it as a conditio sine qua non
to obtain funding for the project. Thanks to a strong effort and collaboration between FAO WBGS
and relevant divisions at headquarters, a new manual section named “Operational Partners
Implementation Modality (OPIM)” (FAO Manual, Section 701) was introduced defining all
rules and procedures applying to this type of partnership agreement/modality. Though in theory
this new instrument was poised to constitute an important step for the organization as a whole, in
practice it involves high transaction costs and has ended up making the process more bureaucratic
still.
119120
132
FAO generally has good relations and collaborates to various degrees with the other UN
agencies. The UN Country Team worked together to prepare Palestine’s first UNDAF, but
otherwise interagency working groups organized under the development coordination
umbrella are underperforming, and opportunities for joint work are mostly under the
humanitarian coordination system. Different interviewees have commented favourably
on FAO’s work in resilience, and consider FAO a leader on the issue of resilience analysis
and measurements among UN agencies.
133
In the past relations with UNDP were not easy as there was little acknowledgement of
FAO’s specific role and mandate. Though there is still no joint planning or fundraising,
presently FAO can count on a very good reputation, its normative standards and
guidelines are employed, and it is considered a potential partner on UNDP’s big livelihood
portfolio. On the other hand, with another UN technical agency such as the World Health
Organisation there has been some collaboration with good synergies on common areas
119 The six areas of collaboration are: field level programs; knowledge sharing and capacity development; policy
dialogue; joint use of resources in emergency situations; FAO normative activities; advocacy and communication.
(FAO strategy for partnerships with civil society organizations. ISBN 978-92-5-107932-4 FAO, 2013FAO).
120 The scope of LoAs is generally limited to contracting services from non-commercial entities. LoAs entail a transfer
of resources from FAO to a registered non-profit organization in exchange for pre-defined services and are
governed by Section 507 of FAO Administrative Manual under the overall responsibility of the Procurement Service
(CSAP) and technical units.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
of work, such as transboundary animal diseases and food safety with the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary measures project (see also 5.2). FAO’s capacity to tactfully engage with
OCHA and UNSCO on humanitarian and political agendas respectively, as mentioned in
4.2.2, was highly appreciated too. As also mentioned in section 4.2.2, FAO made technical
contributions to World Bank reports, and markedly on the study on Area C and the future
of the Palestinian economy.
134
According to former staff, past FAO and WFP collaboration was excellent, based on
mutual respect, with much willingness to engage and some joint work including
monitoring and analyses. However present staff point out that there are no areas of
joint work between the two agencies apart from the work on the SEFSec, nor is there
a clear vision or discussions regarding possible collaboration in the future. The recent
evaluation of WFP’s country portfolio 2011-2015 also remarked that “there was much
shared thematic work, but little practical collaboration at the operational level and still
less real synergy or multiplier effects.” There is however good potential for joint work in
the area of market based interventions, seeing FAO’s adoption of a value chain approach
and WFP’s use of vouchers, where FAO could fill in a gap in farmers’ capacities to market
their products, by providing technical support to farmers to improve agribusiness and
different value chains.
135
At the end of 2012, following the recommendations of a joint FAO/WFP mission the Food
Security Sector was created by merging three humanitarian clusters, namely Agriculture,
Food Assistance and Cash Assistance, led respectively by FAO, WFP and UNRWA, which
successively became working groups under the food security umbrella. The food security
coordination mechanism, co-led by FAO and WFP, was defined as a sector rather than
a cluster to keep it open to working in a more developmental sense, though up to
now there has been no coordination with the LACS Agriculture Sector Working Group
coordinating donors, as would be expected to ensure greater integration of emergency
and development oriented work and, as pointed out by the present FSS coordinator, to
be more coherent with the resilience building approach which should imply links at every
level, including coordination.
136
Though formally no FSS coordinator was appointed until May 2014, this role was
covered by an FAO staff member who was already working on coordinating the former
Agriculture cluster as well as taking care of FAO’s more emergency related work (see also
4.2.2). Efforts were made by FAO at the time to play a neutral brokering role, and this
involved at times staying out of the fray and not competing for funds from emergency
appeals in order to gain agencies’ trust. All the same, the FSS was associated with FAO,
and more so than with WFP, mainly because FAO’s interventions are more diverse, as are
its partners, and due to its stronger ties with the Ministry of Agriculture and effective
engagement in different coordination fora, as well as its investment in policy support and
dialogue at national level. Information shared by the FSS is considered vital by partners,
and FAO’s technical contribution to the SEFSec is valued and respected. In general FAO’s
role is seen as constructive and leading, and the MoA in the Gaza Strip, seeing its weak
capacity, particularly appreciates its coordinating function.
137
FAO contributes to aid effectiveness through LACS, which brings together development
partners to support the Palestinian Authority to achieve its development goals and
priorities. In particular, as co-chair and technical adviser to the Agriculture Sector
Working Group, FAO worked to promote complementarity between development actors’
interventions and alignment to the Government’s Agricultural Development Strategy. It
also helped align donor interests with agricultural sector strategic priorities. FAO is also a
member of the Social Protection Sector Working Group, the Private Sector Development
Working Group and the Environment Sector Working Group. This coordination role is an
important part of FAO’s assistance to the government and widely appreciated both by
the MoA and by donors.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
4.1.6 Decentralization
Findings on Decentralization
• As a focus country, WBGS has been supported in implementing activities in line with the Regional
Initiatives, providing otherwise difficult to access seed funds.
• On one hand, the country support process seems to have improved over the two years of its
implementation, with a broader range of SOs supporting the office, and a higher number of
requests of support being met.
• On the other hand, procedures are heavy and not always clear, reporting requirements weigh on
staff, and ultimately being a focus country seems to entail many duties and few advantages to
the office in Jerusalem.
• A good example of direct support was the SPS programme, which involved different technical
divisions, was rolled out without support from the Regional Office or headquarters, and was
considered an extremely satisfactory experience by all parties. On this basis and also in view of
the difficulties for nationals from the region to travel to the WBGS, a case could be made for more
technical support being provided directly from the technical divisions.
138
Until 2014, before FAO’s integration of emergency and development activities and the
decentralizsation of its operations to regional and country offices, backstopping to what
at the time was an Emergency Coordination Office was provided by technical officers from
FAO headquarters via TCE focal points. The Regional Office at the time provided ad hoc
assistance in response to specific requests, as it did for example to develop national treated
wastewater standards in response to a request from the Ministry of Agriculture, or with a
mission to support the Gaza Strip appeal during the conflict in 2014.
139
A new country support process, in place since the adoption of the reviewed Strategic
Framework, aims to better and more systematically assist countries within the renewed
decentralized organizational structure. Regional Initiatives have been developed as
delivery mechanisms to enhance the focus and impact of work on specific SOs, particularly
at country level. The status of focus country121 within the RI delivery system should be
particularly relevant for WBGS, as RIs can provide seed funds to develop concept notes and
proposals, which are otherwise difficult to access for this office.
140
The West Bank and Gaza Strip has been a focus of the RI on resilience since 2014, and in the
biennium 2016-2017 it also became one for the Regional Initiatives on Water Scarcity (WSI)
and small-scale agriculture. Though the WBGS office has not yet received any resources
through the WSI, if it were to prioritize water sustainability issues, this Regional Initiative
could become an important resource, providing ready access to experience and expertise
from other North East and North Africa (NENA) countries. Due to the concentration of FAO
strategic activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the country is presently considered a
country under close observation by the organization, and this should entail more targeted
and consistent support, though it is not clear what form this would take, and it risks
increasing reporting requirements.
141
A number of requests were formulated through the country support process, and at the
time of writing, towards the end of 2016, requests for activities contributing to eleven
SO outputs had been advanced by the office in Jerusalem. Activities related to three of
these outputs have been completed, including support to project proposal on capacity
development of PADRRIF, stakeholder consultations to define programming areas/
interventions for DRR/M and climate change adaptation, and development and piloting of
the resilience marker. Activities are ongoing for five further outputs, including supporting
121 A focus country is the selected country for active observation and coordination support within a certain
Regional Initiative. Focus countries were selected on the basis that they: present a challenge related to an SP
and demonstrate political will to address it so that FAO can be engaged to make a meaningful difference in the
biennium; have a significant portfolio of ongoing FAO work with validated expected results for the biennium;
require close coordination of FAO’s work including timely and continued technical support and monitoring
at country level from concerned SO teams; provide the opportunity for cross-SP collaboration with important
opportunities for synergies.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
the Ministry of Agriculture in developing the next Agriculture Sector Strategy, formulation
of capacity development for agricultural cooperatives, support to develop full assessment
of trade bans and trade relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, formulation
of a project document on the use of treated wastewater for agriculture, formulation of
innovative humanitarian programming in protracted crises. The three remaining requests
have not yet been responded to. This amounts to a remarkable improvement compared to
the response to the twelve requests of 2015 when six did not materialize, and only one was
partially completed that year, while the remaining six were carried over to 2016.
Box 10: Regional Initiatives for FAO’s Near East and North Africa Region
i. “Near East and North Africa’s Water Scarcity Initiative” (SO2); came into effect in 2014,
with the objective of supporting NENA countries to address problems of water for agriculture.
ii. “Small-scale Agriculture for Inclusive Development in the Near East and North
Africa” (SO3);
iii. “Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition in the Near East and North
Africa” (SO5).
142
Interviewed FAO staff and Palestinian Government officers were not clear regarding the
benefits deriving from the status of focus country, while on the other hand complaining of
the costs it entailed in terms of reporting which, as also recognized by staff in the Regional
Office, are considerable. On one hand this contrasts with the perception of staff in RNE who
feel they are offering substantial support, something that seems to be confirmed by the
data (box 11). This mismatch may be at least in part explained by the fact that the support
provided by RNE was at more strategic level, while WBGS staff perceive the relationship
with Cairo as offering few opportunities for personal development and capacity building.
It is true that due to its non-member country status there are no regular programme
resources for staff to travel for trainings and other workshops, and when opportunities
do arise the benefits are not widely shared among staff. It is also worth mentioning that
funds for SO5 have greatly decreased in the second part of the biennium, reducing the
WBGS staff participation in regional activities that had been partly funded through SO5.
More importantly, what was supposed to be an agile mechanism to respond to emerging
country needs has been transformed into a procedural demanding process, affecting its
timelines and effectiveness.
143
A good example of direct support was the SPS programme in all its components. This
involved many different technical divisions at headquarters (Food Safety and Quality, the
Legal and Ethics Office, the Animal Production and Health Division, and the International
Plant Protection Convention secretariat) contributing to the drafting of the legislation on
SPS and later to its implementation. A contact with the technical divisions was established
directly by the office in Jerusalem, and the collaboration was extremely fruitful and
mutually satisfactory according to all parties involved. Officers felt they were dealing with
a very efficient office, working to high technical standards, and this made them confident
that their contributions were effectively addressing the needs of the Palestinian Authority.
As one interviewed officer put it, “their quality standards are so high, that you also want
to be on the same level”. This direct collaboration should be flagged as a model of how
country teams and headquarters can work together on projects.
144
On the basis of the SPS experience, a strong case can be made for more technical support
to FAO WBGS being provided from headquarters rather than the Regional Office, the
main reason being that strong and specialized technical skills are necessary for the kind of
support to assist in drafting legislative frameworks, and these are not presently available
in the Regional Office. Furthermore, the nationality of many officers in RNE does not allow
them to travel through Israel. At the same time, finding Arabic speakers as needed in WBGS
who are not nationals of Arabic countries and therefore able to travel freely, is something of
a challenge. An alternative would be to rely more on staff in the WBGS office and develop
their capacity.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 11: Assistance provided through the country support mechanisms 2015/16 – some figures
• Eighteen requests of assistance to headquarters or the Regional Office were formulated by FAO
WBGS and channelled through the country support mechanism
• As a consequence, ten activities have been completed or are ongoing
• As part of these activities, nine supporting staff members from headquarters or RNE were
mobilized, undertaking a total of 11 missions to WBGS
• Overall USD 411 000 were disbursed through the country support mechanism for activities in
WBGS over 2015/16
• Over the entire period, 66 percent of the funds disbursed were channelled through SP5, 17 percent
through SP3, 17 percent through SFERA
• In 2015 all support came from SP5, while in 2016 SP1, SP3 and SP4 also provided support
4.2 Positioning in the context of a protracted crisis
4.2.1 Special status of the FAO WBGS office
Findings on the special status of the office
• Not being a Representation at diplomatic and administrative level has various consequences for
the office, including not benefitting from FAO’s annual regular budget allocation and being fully
funded through the projects it implements.
• Some efforts were made by the Office of Coordination and Decentralization (OCD) in 2014
to clarify key issues, however the potential for FAO’s work could be seriously affected by the
reduction in programme delivery.
• The capacity of retaining qualified core staff and the consistently high level of the Head of Office
has raised the reputation of the office. The need to be efficient and effective in order to survive
seems to have been at least partly the reason behind the office’s high standards over time.
• Presently the office relies on emergency work to cover its running costs, and on a share of
project budget reserved to Administrative and Operational Costs which has been shrinking over
recent years. The sustainability of this model is questionable, and in shifting towards a more
programmatic approach in an increasingly competitive environment for donor resources, other
options need to be explored to avoid affecting the office’s ability to contribute effectively in this
complex environment.
• The difficulties of access for staff travelling between the WB and the GS are a serious constraint
to joint work, and have the effect of isolating the office in the Gaza Strip.
145
The FAO Coordination Office in the WBGS is not an official FAO Representation at diplomatic
and administrative level seeing that, as mentioned, Palestine is not an FAO member
country. As a result, the office does not benefit from FAO’s annual allocation from FAO’S
regular budget to fully-fledged FAO Representations, usually in the form of the salary of
the FAO Representative and one or two National Professional Officers and, depending on
the volume and complexity of the work carried out, sometimes covering other support
staff and office running costs as well.
146
The FAO WBGS office is therefore fully funded from the projects it implements including,
from 2013, a share of the AOS generated by those same projects. This lack of Regular
Programme funding affects the office and its status, in several ways:
i. FAO’s normative work in WBGS very often falls outside the scope of project activities and
burdens staff with additional responsibilities that are not budgeted, even though they
are part of FAO’s core mandate. This includes support provided to national authorities
through technical and policy guidance, for example in developing and rolling out the
National Strategy for the Agriculture Sector 2014-2016, or supporting the annual Socioeconomic and Food Security surveys.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
ii. The office is not eligible for Technical Cooperation Programme funding, a source of
internal FAO funding at the disposal only of member countries often used for project
formulation at the inception stage.122 The lack of access to TCP funds hampers and affects
the potential development of the FAO WBGS programme in key areas of FAO’s mandate.
At the same time, the office is requested to provide support for the implementation of
regional and global TCP or trust fund projects that operate in the WBGS.
iii.As Palestine is not a member country, WBGS does not appear under FAO’s corporate
country website page123 that details key information on member and associate countries
and the corresponding FAO offices. This lack of visibility is further compounded by the lack
of funds to cover the salary of the communications officer who is supposed to develop
the country programme website124 and to improve overall online presence in addition to
supporting a number of other FAO corporate communications activities. Nor does FAO
WBGS currently appear under FAO’s webpage on worldwide offices under “Who We
Are” that details FAO’s different offices around the world.125 Furthermore, the webpage
dedicated to the Regional Office for Near East and North Africa does not include WBGS
under its programmes and projects.126 This lack of visibility affects FAO’s positioning at a
programmatic level, as most activities currently highlighted online refer to the emergency
programme and do not reflect the gradual shift to a more developmental focus.
147
Within RNE, FAO WBGS suffers from limited visibility not least because Palestine in practice
is not considered a full member of the region, as a regional officer pointed out. While the
office is referenced as a good case to learn from and is often invited to participate at RNE
events, as mentioned this requires an extra effort as travel costs for staff from this office are
not covered by the RP.
Box 12: FAO experience in countries with no Representation
Within FAO, the WBGS office is not unique, and there have previously been similar cases of countries
in protracted crisis where FAO began operating without a Representation: in Timor-Leste, FAO
operated an office from 1999, and only in 2012, when it had become a sovereign country and as
a response to Government request to focus more on development activities, did FAO establish its
Representation Office; South Sudan is another similar case: it became an independent state in 2011,
and by 2014 FAO had set up a proper FAO Representation, but in the interim FAO ran an Emergency
and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit office based in Juba for years, while the FAO Representation
was in Khartoum. Both Timor-Leste and South Sudan began as ERCU offices reporting to TCE. Once
they became a Representation, roles and responsibilities changed and they began reporting to the
Office of Coordination and Decentralization127 (OSD). The challenges for FAO in WBGS are therefore
not unique, and have been faced by other countries before. But unlike the cases of Timor- Leste
and South Sudan, the recent FAO decentralization process means the FAO WBGS office no longer
reports to TCE but to OSD, and is expected to work to implement FAO’s mandate and its Strategic
Framework, like any other FAO Representation.
127
148
In addition, as previously mentioned, FAO WBGS is currently operating under the UNDP
Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP) umbrella so personnel contracts
and administration procedures need to go through UNDP. These are services for which FAO
pays a fee based on a UNDP table of costs that adds an additional layer of expenses to all
field operations.
149
In 2014, efforts were made by OSD to clarify a number of key issues, “considering the very
special nature of the office and of the FAO activities in WBGS,”, including revising reporting
lines with headquarters and the Regional Office, in line with FAO’s decentralization process
and following reporting lines of Representations, and the use of AOS resources generated
from projects operated by the office to cover the cost of the Head of Office (see 3.1).
122 The TCP Facility “aims to provide urgent, local programming support activities and to strengthen field programme
development processes”.
123 http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/en/ (last accessed on 19 November 2016).
124 Expected to be online in 2017.
125 http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/worldwide-offices/en/ (last accessed on 19 November 2016).
126 http://www.fao.org/neareast/programmes-and-projects/en/ (last accessed on 20 November 2016).
127 OCD is responsible for all FAO Representations around the world.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
150
The FAO programme delivery in WBGS increased in 2011 and 2012 when FAO WBGS was
still linked to TCE. Having reached its zenith in 2013 and with a decline over the last couple
of years, the potential for FAO to work in WBGS could be seriously affected. FAO’s field
programme delivery has gone from 16.6 million in 2013, to 13.8 million in 2014, to 10.1
million in 2015. This has repercussions for the potential AOS earned by the FAO office and
therefore its ability to cover its most basic personnel costs, that of its Head of Office: for
2014 the AOS earned was USD 446 141, while in 2015 it went down to USD 361 000.
151
FAO as a knowledge organization depends on its capacity to attract, retain and develop
staff. When the FAO WBGS office was set up in 2002, a favourable funding environment
allowed for the competitive recruitment of a team of national and international staff
with the right skill mix. In the competitive hiring environment of WBGS, the possibility of
retaining qualified core staff as well as the consistently high level of the Heads of Office is not
a given, and it raised the reputation of the office both with donors and at in headquarters.
A testament to the quality of the team is how departments at headquarters, such as TCI
and EST, anticipated funds for preliminary missions of technical staff to prepare project
proposals trusting that the WBGS team would be able to follow through and fundraise to
cover these investment costs.
Box 13: FAO’s Project Support Cost (PSC) mechanism
The standard PSC is 13 percent of the budget of a Government Cooperative Programme (GCP), and
10 percent of a project funded under the Emergency and Rehabilitation Trust Fund (OSRO). Under
this arrangement, the country office usually receives 6 percent as Administrative and Operational
Support resources of the GCP budget and 4 percent of the budget of OSRO projects.
In WBGS over 2011 to 2017, 28 percent of projects have been affected by a reduced PSC (-10 percent
for GCP projects and -7 percent for OSRO projects), a growing trend, considering that only one
project was affected by this reduction in 2011, three in 2012, five in 2013, six in 2014 and seven in
2015.
Non-standard PSCs rates therefore have important implications for field offices’ resources and their
capacity to carry out activities, which are not funded directly by projects. Such non-standard rates
can be as low as 7 percent of the project’s overall budget, in which case only 1 percent goes to the
field office as AOS, even though it is the main implementer.
58
152
The need to be efficient and prove effective in order to survive has been flagged as a
reason for the consistently high standards of the office over time. As the office is currently
structured, there is a reliance on emergency work to cover its running costs, as these act as
FAO’s ‘bread and butter’. The worrying trend of donors increasingly requesting an exception
to the standard percentage of a project’s budget allocated to the Project Support Cost and
the increasing competition for scarce donor resources result in a shrinking share of PSC
being allotted as AOS to FAO country offices, and this is proving to be unsustainable (see
box 13). For FAO WBGS, a key implication of these new arrangements is that it is unable to
offer competitive packages to all staff. The unstable contractual arrangements and limited
career paths, while understandable in FAO WBGS’ current financial situation, affect staff
morale as well as its capacity to undertake more technical work. FAO is presently effective
in implementing projects, but as it moves to a more programmatic and developmental
approach and lower PSCs are accepted, the current arrangement runs the risk of adversely
affecting its ability to contribute effectively in this complex environment.
153
The evaluation team is aware that any change in the status of the office is an extremely
delicate political decision that is well beyond the remit of an evaluation such as this one.
Nevertheless, efforts are needed to find alternative ways to support the office. A positive
example is the way in which, in order to comply with UN Minimum Operating Security
Standards and Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards of the FAO WBGS
office and international team, the Security Office at headquarters has supported securityrelated costs. Other efforts will be needed as FAO’s role in WBGS continues to move away
from emergency response towards a role that increasingly aims to assist the Palestinian
Authority in developing policies and programmes, as per FAO’s mandate.
154
FAO staff highlighted the office set up and travel restrictions as a key issue that affected
the efficiency and effectiveness of the office, notwithstanding the attempt to reduce these
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
limitations through regular videoconferences. For example, current travel limits imposed
by Israeli authorities, especially with the Gaza Strip, hamper team movement between
offices and the possibility for the team to all meet together. Travel records show that in
2014/16 nine staff members from the Jerusalem office spent in all 124 days in Gaza Strip
over 20 months, often clustered around a few months with big gaps in between, with
project managers and technical advisers spending more time and longer periods, while
management totalled less than one visit every two months on average. Even though travel
from Gaza to Jerusalem over the same period was more frequent and visits lasted longer,
overall this has meant that FAO staff in Gaza has at times felt excluded from key operational
and programmatic discussions.
4.2.2 Technical work in the political context of WBGS
Findings on technical work in the political context
• FAO WBGS has been involved in development cooperation, humanitarian response and, indirectly,
political engagement in the peace process, using its comparative advantage to play a key role by
reinforcing the state-building agenda and interacting with different sides to assist the Palestinian
people.
• FAO has addressed protection mostly by supporting livelihoods and enhancing resilience in order
to help people confront the consequences of the conflict and preparing them for its peaceful
resolution.
• FAO’s credibility and its status give it a leverage to participate in a number of negotiations
adopting a technical angle. The capacity and attitude of the Officer in Charge were pivotal to
FAO’s indirect engagement with political issues.
• Though FAO has been exceptionally brave and cautious in understanding the context and
working within the given limits, there is still space for improvement, incorporating protection
more explicitly and more strategically in its programme in order to reduce the effects of risks and
protection threats in its areas of work and according to its mandate.
155
In May 2016, FAO convened Nobel Peace Laureates for an alliance for food security and
peace, acknowledging that through strong political commitment and deepened technical
understanding it is possible to address food insecurity, reducing the potential for conflict
and instability. As stated in the Committee on World Food Security’s (CFS’s) Framework for
Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises, these “require special attention,
and (…) appropriate responses for these contexts differ from those required in short-term
crises or in non-crisis development contexts”.128 While each one of these settings has its own
specificity, some learning is possible by looking at successes and failures across cases, even if
the underlying causes of the crisis in WBGS, briefly outlined in section 2.1, are longstanding
and complex, and might seem hardly comparable with other situations. On the other hand,
FAO has been engaging more or less directly with all three objectives of the UN’s mission
in Palestine: development cooperation, humanitarian response and political engagement
in the peace process (see annex 2). This capacity to be involved across what are usually
different and separate areas of work and to relate to a range of actors and communities of
practice is quite unusual for an FAO office, and worth examining. This section of this report
is therefore dedicated to such analysis, in view of any learning opportunities for FAO as an
organization working in protracted crisis contexts.
156
In alignment with the Humanitarian Country Team and its advocacy strategy of reducing
humanitarian needs and enhancing respect for international law, FAO addresses protection
from breaches of rights and human rights mainly through the tactical task of working with
people at risk to meet their practical protection needs, while it only indirectly engages
with the strategic political task to get the responsible authorities to ensure respect for
human rights (see box 1 on protection frameworks). While the inherently political nature
of the occupation means that it will only be overcome through political negotiations, its
consequences are inextricably entwined with the livelihoods of the Palestinians living
in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. So though most of FAO’s work will not directly
address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis, supporting livelihoods and enhancing
resilience has the potential to help people better confront its consequences while possibly
128 CFS 2015.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
preparing them for the day when a solution will be found through other means. Lastly, the
fact that FAO’s areas of work are at the very heart of the conflict has twofold and to some
extent contradictory consequences: while on one hand this may limit its effectiveness, on
the other hand, under certain circumstances, it constitutes an entry point to better assist
the Palestinian people, provided FAO works in synergy with other actors with a political
mandate or who are directly engaged in advocacy work. This places FAO in a unique
position to contribute indirectly to advocacy work on issues such as water, demolition of
agricultural infrastructures, access to land or livestock based livelihoods.
Box 14: Principles for action for improving food security and nutrition in protracted crises
CFS Framework for action for food security and nutrition in protracted crises
Addressing critical manifestations and building resilience
1. Meet immediate humanitarian needs and build resilient livelihoods
2.Focus on nutritional needs
Adapting to specific challenges
3. Reach affected populations
4. Protect those affected by or at risk of protracted crises
5. Empower women and girls, promote gender equality and encourage gender sensitivity
6. Ensure and support comprehensive evidence-based analysis
7. Strengthen country ownership, participation, coordination and stakeholder buy-in, and
accountability
8. Promote effective financing
Contributing to resolving underlying causes of food security and undernutrition in protracted crises
9.Contribute to peacebuilding through food security and nutrition
10. Manage natural resources sustainably and reduce disaster risks
157
According to interviewed staff from UNSCO and OCHA, two UN agencies with a political
and/or humanitarian mandate in Palestine, FAO has been savvy and strategic in using its
comparative advantage to play a key role in this complex environment by supporting work
towards the Palestinian state-building agenda and interacting with different sides to assist
the Palestinian people. FAO is well respected thanks to the competency and engagement
of its staff and management, and the fact of being considered efficient and effective by
donors further amplifies its standing and credibility with government counterparts. It has
an edge in difficult negotiations where its status as an intergovernmental organization
gives it leverage with all parties and its technical entry point is considered in some ways
more acceptable than a rights-based approach, while its long-standing commitment with
communities has helped ensure that they would respect their part of any deal. Examples
of instances where technical arguments were functional to push the political agenda are
the negotiations FAO was involved in to extend the fishing limits in the Gaza Strip on the
basis of arguments relating to food security, employment and sustainability,129 but also on
other complex issues such as the demolition of productive assets, obtaining permission for
reclaiming farming of agricultural land in the buffer zone in the Gaza Strip and constructing
a cage farms in the sea of Gaza.
158
A frequent comment was that both Heads of Office have been very pragmatic and
realistic, “doing their homework” and using hard facts to keep delicate and controversial
but crucial conflict-induced challenges on the agenda. This has been critical for the
successful engagement in negotiations and indirect engagement with political issues,
though it emerged that work of this kind was done more in the past, and apparently more
strategically. This seems due to a combination of factors, including an overall reduction of
the humanitarian space and decreasing international attention towards the Middle East
peace process in favour of other conflict areas of global concern. A reason specific to FAO
is the more explicit choice in the past to engage with humanitarian and political aspects of
the crisis, as also demonstrated by greater investment in human resources, with a person
dedicated to liaising the humanitarian and the development sides of FAO’s work (see 4.1.3),
and explicit mention of FAO’s protection role in the political context in the Plan of Action.
129 The arguments made by FAO to lift the fishing limits in Gaza are also summarized in FAO’s contribution to the 2012
UNCT report Gaza in 2020: A liveable place?
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
On the other hand, engaging in advocacy activities may also be financially problematic
for FAO: as with other activities tied to core functions, such as contribution to national
agricultural statistics (see annex 1), advocacy is not covered by regular programme funding
and most donors are unwilling to fund activities of this kind, somewhat paradoxically
seeing that these activities play a particularly important role in WBGS, and that FAO is still
accountable overall to member countries in performing them.
159
It is by now a widely shared opinion based on documented evidence130 that the occupation
and the expansion of settlements are currently undermining the feasibility of the two- state
solution and putting the prospect of a peaceful solution of the conflict at risk.131 Working in
Area C of the West Bank, an area that is indispensable for the future of a Palestinian State, is
politically significant in itself, as it affirms the Palestinian’s presence in the face of expanding
settlements as well as addressing real needs. FAO’s standing enables it to interact with the
Palestinian Authority and with COGAT and implement some agricultural activities in Area C.
FAO also contributed to the WB report on economic development in Area C,132 which while
not adopting an explicitly political stance, made a strong case regarding economic losses
incurred because of Israeli restrictions, and how lifting these restrictions could contribute
significantly towards a viable and peaceful solution to the present conflict.
160
In many ways Israeli authorities’ decisions overrule demand and supply in determining
the functioning of markets and Palestinians’ access to them, and in some instances Israeli
producers (e.g. of strawberries) unduly influence markets. When possible, FAO attempts
to reduce the impact of this interference by facilitating meetings with the Ministry of
Agriculture and COGAT in Israel. FAO used its technical expertise to address the problem
through a situation assessment in the first half of 2016 on the legal grounds of trade bans for
meat and dairy products with inputs from the Trade and Market Division and missions from
headquarters which garnered much donor interest, though no follow-up has been decided
as of now. Notwithstanding the Oslo Accords, the movement of goods and commodities
between the West Bank and East Jerusalem is subjected to many restrictions by the Israeli
Government on the grounds of presumed insufficient safety standards. Assisting the
Palestinian Authority to reinforce its regulatory frameworks and other systems for food
traceability as FAO is doing with its SPS programme and NAIS (see also 5.2.1.), is also a
way to strengthen the Palestinian position vis-à-vis this argument, besides contributing
to develop institutional capacity in view of the independence of the Palestinian State, as
envisaged by the Oslo roadmap.
161
In its Plan of Action 2011-2013 FAO committed, as part of the UN Humanitarian Country
Team, to continue monitoring the political situation and periodically review developments
in line with programme objectives.133. By participating in the Advocacy Working Group of
the HCT and liaising with OCHA, FAO engages in “soft advocacy”, providing information on
technical issues to other actors whose role is direct advocacy. Examples of this kind of work
are the estimates of income lost through settlements and limited use of water sources
for a coming OCHA publication on the humanitarian impact of settlement expansion,134,
a technical assessment of losses in the olive industry135, and, following a request from
ECHO, costing the effects of the ban on fertilizers in the Gaza Strip. FAO has an absolute
comparative advantage over other actors in putting together figures on the economic
value of occupation-related issues, and in the past at least the office maintained a relevant
capacity to do so. Another example of this kind of work is the cost benefit analysis on water
130 See for example the Secretary-General’s 2016 report Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
including East Jerusalem and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/HRC/31/43, OCHA’s forthcoming publication The
humanitarian impact of informal settlement expansion, B’Tselem’s two reports Land grab: Israel’s settlement
policy in the West Bank (2002) and Under the guise of legality: Israel’s declaration of state land in the West Bank
(2012), as well as the already mentioned statements to the Security Council in December 2016 by COGAT.
131 By 2013 only, Israel had officially confiscated more than 1 000 km2 of Palestinian owned land comprising 20
percent of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), mostly for the use of settlements. Economic and social
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, Note by the SecretaryGeneral, A/70/82-E72015/13, § 44.
132 World Bank (2013).
133 “Although FAO has limited mandate to conduct political advocacy, it contributes to policy level initiatives to protect
Palestinians from further reduction in access to land, sea and livelihood resources (e.g. water and agricultural inputs)
owing to the political situation, through its participation in the HCT Advocacy Working Group” (FAO 2014, p.28).
134 OCHA (2017) The humanitarian impact of informal settlement expansion.
135 Food Security Sector (2013) The olive industry in the occupied Palestinian territory.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
use and restrictions to its access, which had various outcomes.136 Through UNSCO and FAO
headquarters, the office also provides technical information for a number of UN reports
to the Secretary-General, various UN bodies and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee on the
situation in Palestine.
162
This way of working in which FAO contributes technical inputs to make arguments for
advocacy actors reinforces good relationships with partners because it fulfils FAO’s
mandate, provides a useful and much needed service, and is not in competition with others
since it responds specifically to the Organization’s role. In this constrained environment,
many interviewed stakeholders considered that the office in WBGS has been exceptionally
brave and cautious at the same time. It has exercised a capacity to understand the situation
by taking into account political, social and economic factors while working within the
given limits and assessing them, conscious of the degree of risks that could be taken on
a case to case basis. There is however still space for improvement, and while continuing
to work according to its mandate and a principle of complementarity with other
agencies and within the limits of its capacities, FAO could incorporate protection more
explicitly and more strategically in its programme in order to reduce the effects of risks
and protection threats especially in its livelihood supporting activities at household and
community level. This would be a further means to support the UN’s position on Palestine.
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, this would include ensuring that activities do not
expose beneficiaries by being more aware of protection threats, and more systematically
undertaking risk analyses in collaboration with other protection actors (see also 5.1 and
box 1).
136 One of these was the publication by FAO in 2013 of the brochure Improving water availability and management for
Agriculture. See also section 5.2 on the outcomes triggered by FAO’s work on water in agriculture during that period.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
5. Assessment of FAO’s contribution to addressing
humanitarian and development needs in WBGS
5.1
Livelihood Activities
5.1.1 Targeting
Findings on targeting
• In programmatic terms, FAO uses SEFSec data and RIMA to consider the socio-economic
characteristics of its target population, but on the other hand gives insufficient attention to shock
exposure at household level, though this would be a good proxy measure of household resilience.
• Overall efforts were made to improve transparency and enhance FAO’s approach to targeting,
though little community consultation was carried out regarding targeting criteria. Candidates’
eligibility is rated according to scored application forms, denoting an effort to reach the most
vulnerable, but little use is made of RIMA analysis at community level.
• Inclusion and exclusion errors found in a number of projects that were the focus of this evaluation
are linked to dissonance between the overarching objective and the population groups that
interventions claim to be targeting, and limited involvement of communities in the identification
and definition of targeting criteria.
163
In programmatic terms, there was a shift during the evaluation period from targeting
according to food security and socio-economic status to resilience ranking. The Plan
of Action aimed to target small-scale and medium-scale farmers, herders and fishers
whose food insecurity or vulnerability were defined on the basis of SEFSec data using
the classification criteria developed for the RIMA which gives weighted values to six
components.137 FAO used this methodology to determine the total number of food insecure
or vulnerable farmer and herder households in the WBGS, and then derive an estimate
of the number of households it aimed to target for each group,138 as well as their socioeconomic profiles. The same methodology was used to highlight gendered vulnerabilities
and thus the importance of targeting female-headed households. The analysis in the Plan
of Action, however, provided no geographical indications to guide FAO’s actual targeting
on the ground.
164
The Programme Framework’s targeting strategy is based on households’ resilience status
(low, medium, high), defined according to the Livelihood Baseline Profiling, which again
relies on SEFSec data and RIMA profiles. The PF provides a description of the salient socioeconomic characteristics of targeted groups as well as the estimated number of beneficiary
households to be reached by FAO for each group.139 Livelihood Baseline Profiling was used
to rank governorates according to high, medium and low resilience levels but, since the
data was not disaggregated, this methodology was not reflected in project documents
or in the way communities and beneficiary households were actually selected by FAO.
Ultimately, both documents reflect a thorough effort on the part of FAO to consider the
socio-economic composition of its target groups and, for the PF, how these groups are
distributed throughout the governorates in WBGS. On the other hand, though the number
of shocks households are exposed to contribute to the aggregate resilience ranking of
livelihood types, insufficient attention is given to the intensity and nature of the shocks
faced by individual households and to their consequences, though this would provide a
relevant proxy measure for targeting according to household resilience.
137 The RIMA components of resilience are (i) productive assets, (ii) income and access to food, (iii) access to social
safety nets, (iv) access to basic services, (v) adaptive capacity, and (vi) levels of stability in the household.
138 FAO’s target groups are therefore divided into farming, herding or mixed livelihoods households who are either
food insecure or vulnerable for a total of 12 potential target groups. It should be noted that the two categories in
fact refer to the same indicators, while varying in terms of scale, with food insecurity considered a more severe and
vulnerability a less severe form of poverty according to compounded economic and socio economic variables.
139 The targeted population is identified as low resilience farmers and herders and urban poor for component 1 of the
PF and medium and high resilience farmers and herders for component 2.
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165
Operationally, geographical selection of targeted sites is based on a combination of
the HNO/HRP definition of vulnerable localities within Area C, East Jerusalem and Gaza
Strip,140 a set of priorities identified by the UNDAF, and SEFSec data on community
characteristics. The inclusion of HNO and UNDAF criteria reflects an effort to harmonize
community targeting among the various actors, and avoid duplication. To this end, FAO
also coordinates with the MoA to agree on its project sites. Nonetheless, cases emerged
of communities that appeared to be inherited from previous project phases rather than
newly selected on the basis of lessons learned and actual needs. Some communities
involved in project 207/NET, for instance were targeted in a precursor project also funded
by the Netherlands, and implemented by PARC. While this may have been appropriate,
no preliminary analysis seems to have been undertaken to understand the links between
impact of the previous project and targeted cooperatives, to understand which of them
actually merited further support.
166
In some cases, the rationale behind targeting is to maximize risk reduction, rather than
agricultural development. For example, in selecting locations for cistern rehabilitation
FAO seems at least in some cases to have prioritized villages under specific threats,
such as proximity to the separation barrier or settlements, rather than on the basis of
the potential to develop agricultural production. This is appropriate, especially for more
vulnerable communities in Area C, but it also underscores the need to clearly distinguish
between the more productive and protective aims of FAO WBGS’ work, according to the
circumstances.
167
In order to select beneficiary households, candidates’ application forms providing both
technical (e.g. size of land) and socio-economic information are rated according to a
scoring system to determine eligibility.141 This system was also introduced to ensure that
households with socio-economic vulnerabilities who do not necessarily meet technical
criteria are included too. This is a positive development, which clearly denotes an effort to
reach the most vulnerable. Throughout its selection process, FAO collaborates with other
actors such as the Ministy of Agriculture, local authorities and sometimes implementing
partners and communities. Though the extent of such collaboration and the form it takes
vary according to the project, together with the aforementioned systematization of the
application forms, it improves transparency and enhances FAO’s approach to targeting.
On the other hand, staff possess a subtle understanding of vulnerability and local
contexts that is not fully exploited to design projects. This is a missed opportunity, and
in the end livelihood groups and drivers of vulnerability are described in a generic and
formulaic way in project documents, without reflecting local characteristics. Ultimately,
this translates in beneficiary selection criteria not always being consistent or tailored to
the project’s scope.
Box 15: Beneficiary selection through application forms
The WBGS programme adopts an approach to targeting that is quite innovative for FAO. Existing
local committees or committees formed jointly by the FAO project manager, implementing
partners, MoA representatives and representatives of the community undertake initial beneficiary
selection at the locality or community level. These targeting bodies advertise the programmes
in their communities, screen applications and shortlist applicants believed to be eligible for
support according to pre-established eligibility criteria. Implementing partners then verify these
nominations by auditing applications for completeness and eligibility against intervention-specific
selection criteria on the basis of applicants’ self-reported data. Both FAO and IP staff further verify
eligibility through individual visits to nominated households.
168
For example, a recurrent finding from interviews and focus group discussions is that
in many projects beneficiaries are selected according to the amount of land farmed,
irrespective of whether it is owned or rented. Yet land ownership can be a significant
140 These are based in part on Vulnerability Profile Project (VPP), a tool managed by OCHA in WBGS including
information on a range of humanitarian indicators for Palestinian communities living in Area C, including physical
protection, access to land and livelihoods, water and sanitation, education and health. See http://data.ochaopt.
org/vpp.aspx
141 Socio-economic indicators such as number of family members, female headed households, number of children
with disabilities, etc. are assigned different weighs which add up to the overall scoring.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
factor in project effectiveness, especially when local investment is required to realize
project benefits, as when a well or water reservoir is constructed, but farmers are
expected to provide pipelines, as in the ITA/807 project. Land and water resource projects
appear to be most effective when farmers own the land, or at least where good relations
between landowner and farmer create an interest for the latter to invest in such ancillary
support, though these considerations were not found to be paramount in the selection
of beneficiaries for FAO projects related to land and water.
Box 16: Importance of land tenure arrangements to ensure relevance
In Zubeidat, landownership follows well-established and long-standing sharecropping
arrangements, more so than in other communities in the Jordan Valley. The 207/NET project’s
interventions (irrigation pipes) were well received by sharecropping farmers and used to expand
cultivation of the land, also through agreements that beneficiaries reached with landowners, with
whom they typically enjoyed a good, collaborative relationship. Interventions appear less successful
where relations with land or well-owners were more strained: in al-Jiftlik, Jericho Governorate, for
example, the provision of irrigation pipes to sharecropping farmers to rehabilitate agricultural lands
as part of project 207/NET was deemed not useful or appropriate by a number of beneficiaries. One
male beneficiary for example explained that he was not consulted before project implementation
and that he would have preferred to receive fertilizer rather than irrigation pipes as agricultural
support from FAO. He viewed irrigation pipes as a long-term investment in the land, something that
he was not interested in as a sharecropper, and felt that such investment would ultimately benefit
the landowner, not himself. He indicated that he had sold the irrigation pipes shortly after receiving
them through the project.
169
Especially in relation to the humanitarian or vulnerability reducing component of FAO’s
activities, some inclusion errors - of middle class, less vulnerable households - and
exclusion errors - of eligible vulnerable households - were found during the fieldwork
carried out for this evaluation. The two main reasons for this seem to be a mismatch
between the objective of enhancing agricultural productivity and the population group
that interventions claim to be targeting, and limited involvement of communities in
the definition of targeting criteria. In different cases households who were landless,
land-poor, who did not own livestock, and/or whose members were unemployed and
under-employed, were widely considered to be the most vulnerable and in dire need
of assistance, but by not meeting a targeting criteria, typically tied to asset ownership,
they did not qualify for participation in FAO projects. Except in the village of Jayyous,
where targeting criteria were amended following discussions with the community, there
were also frequent mentions by a wide range of respondents that activities and targeting
criteria “were decided by the project” and “came ready-made”. Limited or no community
consultation was already evidenced by the midterm review of the Plan of Action (FAO
2012) where surveyed participants pointed to the need for more involvement with
communities to understand their needs. In terms of targeting vulnerable members of
the community hired under the cash transfer interventions, the lack of monitoring of
the recruitment of these casual labourers and of the benefits they reaped somewhat
weakened the rationale for the adoption by FAO WBGS of CT as a modality.
170
A manual for beneficiary selection in WBGS is currently under development, but besides
this, the evaluation acknowledges that the problem of accurate and well defined
targeting at community level in FAO projects is not unique to FAO WBGS, and has been
found to be problematic by other evaluations in a wide range of settings, such as Somalia,
Lao PDR and Burkina Faso. This indicates that the issue of clarifying targeting criteria
and their implications needs to be confronted at corporate level too. For example, a key
question for FAO, not specific to this setting, is whether landless households should and
can be targeted, and if they were, what kind of specific assistance they would require.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
5.1.2 Relevance
Findings on relevance
• On the whole, FAO’s agriculture and livelihood-related activities were found to be relevant or
very relevant to local needs, though their design was mostly not based on explicit context-specific
analysis, but rather on the implicit knowledge of FAO staff.
• Livelihood interventions were predominantly focused on expanding beneficiaries’ asset-base,
with limited attention to supporting intangible processes and resources such as removing market
constraints and protection threats, two key elements to tackle vulnerability in WBGS.
• Where activities were less relevant, this was linked to some recurrent weaknesses of design,
such as lack of community involvement, short project life, lack of complementary activities and of
investments after the end of the project, and not enough learning from past experiences.
171
Project activities were aligned and relevant to both strategies though, as already pointed
out, the relevance of activities seems to have been based on the implicit knowledge and
experience of FAO staff rather than on an explicit context-specific analysis grounded in
evidence. The question remains of whether the adoption of “resilience and economic
growth” at the “heart of FAO’s [current] strategy”, as stated in the Programme Framework,
has actually resulted in a paradigm shift in terms of how projects and related activities are
selected, planned and implemented. In particular, a business as usual approach centred on
asset building has dominated the choice of interventions at the cost of a more innovative
focus on intangible processes and resources. Such focus might have led, for example,
to a greater attention to existing marketing constraints and protection threats in the
design and implementation of FAO’s projects, two important obstacles for Palestinians, as
emerged during interviews with beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and key elements of
the enabling environment to tackle vulnerabilities in this context.
172
On the other hand, many of FAO’s agriculture and livelihoods-related activities were
found to be overall relevant or very relevant to beneficiaries’ needs (see box 15). Previous
experience and knowledge of the context were critical to correctly identify people’s shortterm needs. At the same time relying solely on staff’s knowledge detracted from gaining
a more in-depth understanding of the context through other means to address a wider
variety of issues and design more holistic, sustainable and appropriate interventions with
the potential to reduce vulnerability on the long term.
173
In some cases FAO activities were less relevant to context and needs, and this seemed to
be linked to recurrent weaknesses identified in design: lack of community involvement in
planning, affecting ownership and appropriateness of the activity; a limited time frame
to achieve what were sometimes complex aims, for example addressing social cohesion;
failure to plan complementary activities to reach the full potential of interventions;142 the
inability or unwillingness on behalf of beneficiaries to invest after the end of the project;
little learning from previous experiences incorporated in design of projects.
174
Two questions stand out as not having been directly considered in designing projects,
lessening the relevance of FAO’s actions. In the first place, in many locations visited by
the evaluation team, households and communities were exposed to different protection
threats that significantly undermined people’s livelihoods and resilience. These included,
for example, being subjected to settler violence in Qusra, or restrictions to freedom of
movement and to access to land for households in the village of Susia, due to the proximity
to a military training area. While a number of FAO’s interventions supporting livelihoods
and agriculture (e.g. cistern construction, irrigation systems) carry important protection
benefits for households and communities by virtue of retaining and expanding their access
to land through cultivation, more engagement up front with protection threats, possibly in
collaboration with other actors, would have increased the relevance of FAO’s interventions
to the context and its capacity to tackle vulnerabilities.
142 Failure to include other complementary activities was found to reduce relevance of various kinds of interventions
for different reasons, including distribution of veterinary kits, land rehabilitation, rehabilitation of water
infrastructures, enhancing market access through the Global GAP.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
175
In the second place, the relevance of some interventions in the area of enhancing access to
markets is weakened by some structural constraints which go unaddressed in the design
of projects. An example is the HVC project, which aimed to improve competitiveness on
national and export markets by enhancing capacities of small and medium producers to
raise the quality of their products. Some activities of this project, such as compliance with
international standards and the introduction of cash crops are clearly more geared towards
the export market, at least on the short term, while some other activities target the internal
market (e.g. establishing of local chain of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) selling points,
capacity development of extension services), and others still are aimed at both (e.g.
promotional campaigns, farmer capacity development and cooperatives’ business plans).
176
Though the export-oriented component has proven to have important benefits (see
section 5.1.3 on effectiveness), it also faces several structural obstacles, such as difficulties
in reducing production costs affecting competitiveness on external markets, or the
consequences of the political environment and of Israeli control on borders and access and
the high risks they involve. On the other hand, creating competitiveness of high quality
produce in the local market is a longer-term process, subordinate to an expanded volume of
the offer which will lower prices and widen the demand base. As such, presently the sale of
high quality products remains a niche market for medium-high income Palestinian families,
and farmers selling safe and quality food and non-food agricultural products through
Global GAP might need to apply a higher price to amortize the expenses encountered
to get the certification. The fact that these crops are currently more marketable on the
international scene is reflected in interviewed farmers’ perception that the HVC is mainly
export-oriented. The project design does not reflect this complexity, and its relevance
is therefore diminished by the lack of clarity on the differentiation of (internal/external;
producer/consumer) market characteristics. FAO’s engagement in internal and external
markets should be based on a thorough analysis of the benefits and costs of expanding
business on either market, and be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and
adopt different strategies on the short, medium and long term.
Box 17: Relevance of some FAO agricultural and livelihood support activities
• Cisterns address a pressing need due to limited or no access to water and water infrastructures,
and are viewed by the majority of interviewed beneficiaries as highly relevant in two ways: they
enable local rainwater harvesting to capture a small (and variable) volume of water, while also
increasing storage capacity, reducing the costs of tank water supply. Judged on economic grounds
a standard household cistern costing around USD 3 000 is economically profitable, since besides
storing harvested rainfall, it allows substantial savings from the water that would otherwise be
bought from tanks, and this over many years. Furthermore, considering the context of the Israeli
occupation, where other sources of water are not available, and/or where costs are prohibitive
because of Israeli restrictions, cisterns appear as an appropriate and highly relevant intervention.
• In some instances, projects involving discrete water infrastructure components were
found to be implemented with limited attention to existing institutional arrangements, or to the
requirements needed to ensure their use. This was found to be the case in one location visited
for project 403/NET-305/UK where construction of a storage reservoir required main pipes and
distribution lines to be purchased by farmers, who were unable or unwilling to do so mainly
because of land ownership issues as described above. Similarly, in one of the two locations visited
for project 807/ITA, activities were delivered without complementary and necessary parts to
connect the pipes to the water well or reservoir, and the water they provided was insufficient to
expand agricultural production.
• The HVC project (207/NET) is a good example of the relevance of FAO activities to achieve
better food quality and safety and contribute to value chain improvement. In general, this project
is consistently viewed as positive and relevant by most beneficiaries in both the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, praised for the inputs it distributes –packaging houses, irrigation networks, shoes,
masks, gloves – and the associated training and Global GAP certification scheme it provided.
MoA staff on the other hand, while appreciating it, considered it less important than investing in
a plant health lab and other SPS component. Not enough attention is paid to terms of trade and
marketing problems, which beneficiaries report to be major constraints to farming. Relevance
would therefore be further improved by incorporating ways to overcome limits to market access,
especially in view of competition from settler farmers and Palestinian agribusiness companies.
According to interviewed women and in particular to cooperative members, a greater focus on
business management capacity would maximize the relevance of interventions.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
• Land rehabilitation activities conducted under 401/CAN were overwhelmingly recognized
as very relevant in the village of Jayyous. Having laid in a state of abandonment since the building
of the barrier in 2002, land parcels reclaimed after the changed route of the barrier following the
decision of the High Court of Israel were widely described as covered in rocks and shrubs, and
in much need of clearance before any agricultural activity could take place. FGD participants
mentioned beneficiaries who contributed their own money in order to complete rehabilitation
activities to illustrate the relevance of the intervention. In the words of one committee member,
“the fact that beneficiaries paid [additional amounts] is an indication that the project succeeded
in fulfilling a need”. That said, a widespread complaint related to the exclusive focus on land
rehabilitation, without complementary attention to improving access to water for irrigation,
considered a prerequisite for enabling cultivation on rehabilitated lands. This was found to have
played a key role in the self-exclusion of a number of eligible beneficiaries. As explained by
local committee members, several households decided not to apply for the project, knowing that
once their lands were rehabilitated they would have had little means to irrigate them and start
cultivation
• Sheep distribution, under project 405/SPA in the Gaza Strip, was widely considered relevant,
given the importance attached to small stock as a key productive household asset. Being
relatively easy to market, sheep also represented a critical liquid asset in the event of sudden
shocks. Referring to losses of livestock and other asset during the 2014 conflict in the Gaza Strip,
one non-beneficiary in Khan Yunis stated that sheep distribution had “helped beneficiaries get
back on their feet”. However, though largely effective, (see section 5.1.3), sheep distribution also
suffered from a number of hindering factors that to some extent limited positive results.
• Emergency interventions in response to shocks were perceived as very relevant as
highlighted by respondents during fieldwork discussions in Susia (plastic sheets for animal
shelters), and in the Gaza Strip (emergency fodder distribution). In particular, beneficiaries in
the Gaza Strip overwhelmingly reported fodder being a pressing need, both during and in the
immediate aftermath of the 2014 war. Some respondents recalled fleeing their homes together
with their livestock (donkeys, horses, sheep and goats) and needing fodder to sustain them at
that time.
• A number of respondents, including representatives of FAO’s implementing partners, explained
that historically there has been little interaction between farmers and fishers. Training before
the establishment of fish ponds in Gaza Strip through project 301/JAP did include a session
on the management of the farmer-fisher partnership. However, by their nature the foundations
of partnerships require considerable efforts and time in order to build mutual trust, understand
each other’s strengths and weaknesses, develop problem-solving skills etc., something that
a one-off training session could hardly have achieved. The project was finally not considered
relevant with regards to the partnership between these two groups
• Cash Transfers tied to construction and rehabilitation of cisterns were first implemented
in 2011. The shift from procurement arrangements to conditional cash transfers for cistern
construction/rehabilitation was based on three main assumptions. First, the realization that
excavations could be carried out by beneficiaries who, under the supervision of FAO technical
staff or IPs, could replace private contractors either by undertaking the work themselves, or, if
the household was labour-less or scarce, hire someone to do it for them. Second, the recognition
of the advantages of cash-based assistance, including possible multiplier effects on the local
economy thanks to direct injection of cash and, a point that was repeatedly stressed by a number
of staff, encouragement and support of micro-entrepreneurship rather than perpetuating
dependence on aid. Third, the cost effectiveness of decentralized, informal procurement carried
out by beneficiaries compared to FAO’s formal procurement procedures. As such, the shift to
cash transfers and the conditionality are a case of FAO’s actions being predominantly driven by
assumptions and past experiences, and while it is positive to capitalize on the past, this cannot
be a replacement for context-specific assessments and evidence, such as a market assessment
to inform the appropriateness of cash-based responses and therefore their actual (rather than
potential) relevance to the situation and needs.
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5.1.3 / Effectiveness/Timeliness
Findings on effectiveness/timeliness
• By restoring or increasing access to assets and key resources, and household-level food production
most activities had positive effects. The food produced was used predominantly for household
consumption, with important gains on dietary quality and diversity and ability to save.
• Greater access to assets and food production enhanced a few beneficiaries’ ability to sell. Some
positive spill over effects accrued to non-beneficiaries, and for beneficiaries a number of positive
gains were recorded on intangible aspects of wellbeing.
• FAO’s activities in support to agriculture were also perceived as carrying political significance
by virtue of their role in maintaining presence of Palestinian farmers on land, reducing the risk
of confiscation and settlers’ attacks, and contributing to resistance to the occupation Trainings
provided as part of the interventions received mixed feedback. Implementation was sometimes
slow when several departments and actors were involved, but overall FAO’s response to shocks
was found to be effective and timely.
• Three recurrent factors were found to limit effectiveness of FAO’s livelihood interventions: when
quantities of inputs were too small to make a difference; when inputs were of a different and
lesser quality than had been promised; when coverage was too limited to ensure a positive
outcome.
177
Overall, the team found that the great majority of FAO’s activities aimed at improving
households’ livelihoods contributed to restoring or increasing access to livelihoods assets
and key resources, and household-level food production. Such short-term success is
unsurprising when the focus of the intervention is distribution of assets, and yet the value
of this achievement is not to be underestimated when implementing this kind of activity
in a challenging operating environment, and considering the high and pressing needs in
most of the locations reached by FAO’s interventions.
178
Establishing whether interventions are effective in reducing households’ vulnerability in
the long-term is always a difficult objective when distributing assets, and particularly in
view of the greatly volatile and insecure environment faced by many of the most vulnerable
households targeted by FAO’s interventions. In this instance, reaching such firm conclusions
would have required longer, more in-depth fieldwork, and in many cases a longer time lapse
since the end of the project. Furthermore, an intrinsic limit to measuring the effectiveness
of FAO’s interventions at household level was the lack of project and programme baselines
and endlines. Equally, better monitoring data than currently available would allow greater
precision in assessing increases in agricultural productivity, for example by using the farm
records, which are a requirement for the Global GAP.
179
The food produced through FAO’s interventions supporting household level production
was used predominantly for household consumption, with important gains in the quality
and diversity of beneficiaries’ diet and their ability to save, since it reduced purchase of
food. Greater access to assets and food production was also found to have enhanced
the ability of a minority of male and female beneficiaries to sell their own produce. Some
positive spill over effects accrued to non-beneficiaries, as beneficiaries reported sharing
with extended family members and/or neighbours. In addition, positive gains on intangible
aspects of wellbeing included the confidence and satisfaction arising from making longterm investments and, specifically for women in the Gaza Strip, positive feelings tied to
becoming economically active household members.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 18: Case study: improved nutrition as a result of home garden development and
sheep distribution in Khan Yunis, Gaza Strip
143
Hind is a 40 years old female beneficiary of OSRO/GAZ/405/SPA, she is married with four children
and her husband is addicted to Tramadol143 and unemployed. Hind described him as emotionally
detached, so the responsibility of their children falls completely on her shoulders. Before the home
garden project one of her children was very thin and “his face was yellow”. She felt this was linked
to a poor and scarce diet since their dire financial condition meant that it was not uncommon for
her children to go hungry or for their meals to consist of tea and bread only. When this child came
back from school and did not find food he would sit outside in the street and cry, or start fighting
with his siblings. She in turn would start crying inside the house, or beat him and his siblings out of
desperation. They never used to eat fruit and very rarely vegetables and meat, while now she can
afford to buy more vegetables and meat thanks to sales of produce and occasionally slaughtered
lambs. In turn, her children’s health, well-being and school performance has greatly improved.
180
FAO’s activities in support to agriculture in the West Bank were also perceived as carrying
political significance by virtue of their role in maintaining presence of Palestinian farmers on
the land, and contributing to resistance to the occupation. The Arabic term frequently used
during fieldwork discussions to illustrate this was al sumud, which means steadfastness,
rootedness and indeed, has a connotation of resistance. As one UN representative
remarked, FAO not only – as in other contexts - supports agricultural livelihoods, but also
helps farmers hold on to their land, thus preventing land losses and confiscation. Indeed,
the importance of retaining access to land through cultivation was often discussed by
community respondents in relation to the ubiquitous risk of confiscation due to Israel’s
interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858.144
181
On the other hand, sometimes FAO’s interventions also carried some risks: in particular,
cistern construction was perceived as potentially increasing the risk of confiscation of the
lands of non-beneficiaries that remained uncultivated and stood out even more when
the adjacent parcel was cultivated. One suggestion was to encourage beneficiaries to
share the harvested water in the cistern between one or more households. On the other
hand, a positive benefit on non-beneficiaries was that, as cultivation activities intensified,
the physical presence of a greater number of farmers acted as a collective protection
mechanism and as deterrent for settler attacks. Furthermore, increased presence of people
on the land meant that attacks could be spotted more rapidly and by a larger number of
people, and the response mechanisms145 that villagers had put in place could be deployed
faster.
182
As mentioned in the sections on analysis and relevance, this evaluation found that overall
FAO’s protection measures were unsystematic and ad hoc, despite the nature of the
political, economic and social risks involved in FAO projects including, for beneficiaries
constructing in Area C, the threat of demolition of property, arrest and detention, as well
as increased risk of physical violence from settlers. These different risks affect people’s
livelihoods as they hinder access to land and property and the movement of goods.
Interviews with protection actors suggested that FAO was not at all systematic in referring
protection cases.
183
The most tangible outcomes of the High Value Crops and other interventions on households
were related to the introduction of new technologies or crop varieties, or animal breeds.
Examples are avocado crops, the introduction of hydroponic planting for strawberry farmers
and of artificial insemination of sheep. For example, the evaluation team found that many
of the herders in Tubas whose sheep were artificially inseminated through an FAO project146
experienced breed improvement, increased percentage of twins (70 percent) and economic
143 Tramadol is a synthetic opioid painkiller similar to morphine that has seen a growing number of Gazans addicted to
it since the start of the blockade imposed by Israel on the Strip in 2007.
144 See note 16 for an explanation of the consequences of such interpretation.
145 One widely reported mechanism consisted of farmers (or anyone who spotted the attack) alerting the village
council and imams by placing a call on their mobiles. Imams would then place a call through the loudspeakers of
village mosques for adult and young males to rush to the attack site.
146 The evaluation team was not able to identify the specific project that was implemented by FAO benefitting the
interviewed herders, due to lack of information from both herders and implementing partner also considering the
long time passed since the activity was carried out. Through the project documents’ review, the possible relevant
projects are OSRO/GAZ/008/ITA, OSRO/GAZ/105/CAN or OSRO/GAZ/202/CAN.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
return from milk.147 Overall, interviewed beneficiaries were very happy with the quality of
the support received. In a small number of cases some complaints were raised regarding
the quality of inputs provided. Introducing new systems such as drought resistant seeds,
the NAIS and SPS was also promising. The two marketing liaison units established by the
HVC project provided marketing support, conducting meetings with marketing companies
and traders in Israel and Jordan to maximize the quantities of HVCs marketed on Israeli and
Jordanian markets. The Gaza Strip marketing company is working to facilitate the export of
Gaza Strip HVCs to the West Bank, Israeli and external markets.
Box 19: HVC - hanging strawberry production in Gaza Strip
Hanging strawberries are an example of the effectiveness of a new technology introduced by FAO to
ameliorate the use of natural resources for agriculture through the HVC project. One implementing
partner reported that even the Ministry of Agriculture, initially reluctant to accept this innovative
technique, changed its attitude towards strawberry farmers. He claimed that all the farmers
became interested in these new planting techniques provoking up to 60 percent reduction of water
consumption and a threefold increase in productivity.
184
Despite the fact that the Global GAP did not immediately improve access to export markets,
the Global GAP training enhanced farmers’ practices and awareness about food safety and
decreased costs of production. The adoption of such improved practices resulted in fewer
rejections at the checkpoints, a potential incentive for more widespread adoption. Positive
outcomes of improved practices should presumably also encourage farmers to adhere to
Palestinian standards once they are in place.
185
Conditional cash transfers were perceived as having acted as catalyst for two benefits.
First, their use for cistern and land rehabilitation/construction enabled hiring a limited
number of local male casual labourers for plastering or terracing. Interviews revealed that
often casual labourers hailed from among the poorest and most vulnerable segments
of the community, and were described as typically landless or owning small parcels of
land which they struggled to cultivate, and living a hand to mouth existence. This finding
confirms FAO’s assumption that cash-based assistance can be a means to effectively target
the most needy. Secondly, according to beneficiaries, contractors typically prioritize their
own interests and profit-making objectives, for example by using low quality materials
that compromise the durability of the infrastructure in the long-term, while cash allowed
beneficiaries to manage construction or rehabilitation activities to their own best interests,
ensuring good and robust quality of construction tailored to households’ needs and
making use of the household’s labour force when available. Indeed, this finding supports
the rationale underpinning the shift to a cash delivery modality tied to beneficiaries’ direct
involvement in project activities.
186
No evidence, however, was found of cash transfers per se acting as catalyst for enhanced
entrepreneurship. Rather, the small-scale economic activities that only a handful of
beneficiaries had started to engage in were found to be linked to increased ability to
cultivate and sell. Beyond the provision of material assets - whether through cash or in-kind
assistance - building and strengthening micro-entrepreneurship requires the adoption of a
holistic approach to accrue the necessary capacity and skills over time, including technical
(e.g. vocational skills and training) and financial (e.g. access to microcredit) support and
business-management skills (e.g. record-keeping, marketing, loan administration).148 One
of the challenges faced by FAO WBGS in project implementation was related to unexpected
costs, for example when excavation activities were conducted in rocky terrains, or when
price fluctuations devalued the FAO cash transfer, forcing beneficiaries of the ongoing
BEL/501 project to add around USD 100 each on top of what they had received to make
develop their home gardens. Clearly, by shifting to cash-based response, the problems
of higher costs of implementation or the risk of price fluctuations in the Gaza Strip have
not fundamentally changed. What seems to have changed, however, is that, by involving
beneficiaries directly in the implementation of activities, additional costs are now borne by
beneficiaries.
147 Interviewed herders also reported the advantages deriving from artificial insemination, such as the reduced size of
the tail which increases the value of the sheep, the fact that they have started producing their own rams and the
fact that with artificial insemination births can be every 8 months, instead of once a year.
148 See for example http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/entrepreneurship-and-enterprise-development/lang--en/
index.htm for a wide-range of resources on this topic.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
187
Cistern construction and rehabilitation in the West Bank,149 and the provision of irrigation
systems as part of home garden kits in both the WB and the GS,150 were perceived by
the great majority of respondents as having enabled greater access to water and water
infrastructure. Most of these interventions were implemented in Area C, where it is virtually
impossible to obtain construction permits from the Israeli authorities, making it extremely
difficult for FAO and indeed any other humanitarian and development actor operating in
this context to plan and implement more robust and permanent water infrastructures to
better support household agricultural productivity. Limited access to water had pushed
small farmers to adopt coping strategies and incur other costs including practicing rain fed
cultivation during winter only, increasing reliance on low maintenance crops, transporting
water from the village to the land or purchasing water from private vendors, and in the
most extreme cases, leaving the land fallow. Harvested rainwater increased the ability of
beneficiaries to irrigate their land while reducing reliance on purchased water for irrigation.
In some villages water from rehabilitated cisterns was also used for small stock or domestic
consumption. Women who used to fetch water from nearby wells concurred that easy
access to water stored in a cistern constructed next to their home was a welcome relief
and reduced their daily workload. A further widespread positive effect of cisterns was that
they improved household-level food production and access. In the village of Al Qusra, for
example, the majority of beneficiaries of cisterns reported having resumed or increased
cultivation of trees such as olive, almond and lemon; herbs such as thyme, parsley and sage
(often planted in between olive trees); and a wide range of vegetables, including zucchini,
onions, garlic, tomatoes, ful (fava beans), lettuce, cucumbers, cauliflower, eggplants, and
fruits such as watermelon (depending on the season).151
Box 20: A FAO Assessment of the value of water stored in cisterns
An assessment was carried out by FAO WBGS over February/March 2011 in selected locations in
Bethlehem and Dura to estimate the value of water stored in the cisterns which were the object
of FAO’s interventions. In most locations, the price of water purchased from private vendors was
found to be NIS 50 per cubic metre, which is in line with the findings of this evaluation. The value
of water stored in the cisterns was calculated by multiplying the price of water in a given location
with the amount of water stored in the cistern at the time of the assessment (the latter was also
clearly dependent on the capacity of the cistern itself). The value of stored water, in other words
the savings on purchased water accruing to cistern beneficiaries at the time of the assessment, was
significant, ranging between NIS 1 500 to a staggering NIS 50 400 per cistern.
188
The distribution of two pregnant female sheep per beneficiary household in Gaza Strip
was widely considered by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Khan Yunis as having
succeeded, to a certain degree, in restoring and strengthening beneficiaries’ livestock
asset base. The value attached to small stock, the fact that sheep distributed were female
and pregnant, and their rapid reproduction rates, were all seen as important factors
contributing to this objective as well as, to a certain extent, to the ability to maintain and
sustain those livestock assets in the future. Two years after the intervention interviewees
all stated that they still had between two and eight sheep, and would have been keen to
further expand production if it were not for high costs. In particular, a key driver of the
sales of lambs was the need to buy high priced fodder to sustain the rest of the flock. FAO
staff and beneficiaries agreed that two sheep were too few to lead to sustainable herd
growth, considering the risk that animals might die or need to be slaughtered for Ramadan.
Selecting less beneficiaries with more heads per capita would have been more likely to
induce sustainable growth of stock, with a greater positive impact overall. Furthermore,
some problems in implementation were reported to have limited the potential of this
intervention, including the distribution of a lesser quality and less productive breed of
sheep than had initially been promised.
189
The general perception of aquaculture ponds152 emerging from interviews was that project
design and implementation had suffered from a number of shortcomings that limited
effectiveness, timeliness and, for some, the sustainability of the intervention. Beneficiaries,
non-beneficiaries, FAO and implementing partner staff, all concurred that late distribution
149 Implemented under OSRO/GAZ/108/EC, OSRO/GAZ/202/CAN and OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN from November 2011.
150 Implemented under OSRO/GAZ/202/CAN between March 2012 and April 2014.
151 Not all beneficiaries in Qusra planted all of the above mentioned trees, herbs and vegetables. In some cases,
beneficiaries had only planted olive trees and herbs.
152 Implemented under OSRO/GAZ/301/JAP between March 2013 and February 2014.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
of fingerlings linked to a delay in procurement was a problem, and the combination of the
cold winter season of 2013 and the absence of plastic sheets to protect the pond resulted in
the death of fingerlings for several beneficiaries. An estimated 80 percent of beneficiaries,
according to IPs, decided to purchase fingerlings from the market and continued to engage
in aquaculture until today, albeit not necessarily with fisher partners. However, fishers
and farmers interviewed for this evaluation, admittedly not a representative sample,
considered that the project’s costs exceeded the benefits. There were reports that the
quality of fingerlings and fodder provided was poor and that ponds lacked much-needed
oxygenation facilities.
190
Across all locations visited by the team, increased ability to cultivate was reported in the
aftermath of land rehabilitation activities, which had also enabled sales of produce for a
minority of beneficiaries. Most reported selling small quantities locally and to other village
residents, while a handful of beneficiaries were found to have started more reliable and
possibly lucrative small-scale economic activities. The critical importance of access to water
in order to reap the benefits of enhanced cultivation was particularly evident in the village
of Jayyous in the aftermath of land rehabilitation activities in 2015, where beneficiaries
with land parcels close to communal wells reported planting olive and lemon trees, thyme
and vegetables, predominantly for household consumption. By contrast, beneficiaries
who owned lands far from wells were either not cultivating or struggling to do so because
irrigation was inefficient and costly: the irrigation network was old and inadequate,
comprising a mix of plastic and metal pipes which were either broken or in dire need of
repair. As such, the farther lands were located from wells, the higher the volume of water
needed to irrigate - due to leakages - the higher the costs of irrigation, which for many
constituted a barrier to cultivation. Positive impacts on more intangible aspects of wellbeing were found, and in particular satisfaction of being able to produce and sometimes sell
more. For women interviewed in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, the enhanced ability to support
their families through vegetable and sheep production generated positive feelings of
having become economically active members of the family and thus more “confident and
strong”, as one beneficiary put it. In the villages of Jayyous and Al Qusra, beneficiaries who
had planted olive trees in the aftermath of land rehabilitation or cistern construction were
not yet reaping benefits, but were nonetheless confident about what they considered a
vital long-term investment for future generations. As someone said during a FGD: “They
[our ancestors] planted, we eat. We plant, they [our children and future generations] will
eat”. Such a long-term outlook is a fundamental characteristic of what should constitute
a “resilience-building” outcome, though to be sustainable it should be complemented
with other risk-reducing measures and markedly protection mechanisms, considering the
exposure of land and olive trees to settler attacks and other threats.
191
Trainings provided as part of the interventions received mixed feedback. The capacitybuilding component of aquaculture ponds, providing training on fish farming techniques,
was considered by some to be useful to gain new knowledge, but also very complex and
time consuming by others. Trainings on value chain development in the Gaza Strip were
rated very positively, with beneficiaries reporting increases in output and varieties produced
and sold, and number and types of markets reached. In the West Bank, on the other hand,
such trainings were of no use to farmers who were already well connected to markets
and familiar with high value crop varieties. Global GAP capacity support, which included
training and certification, was considered timely, and trainings were often highlighted as
very efficient in delivering the development of needed capacities.
192
Regarding timeliness, FGDs highlighted that implementation was sometimes slow when
several departments and actors were involved. Sometimes long procurement processes
affect the predictability of delivery, with negative consequences especially when support
is sensitive to seasonality. Furthermore, FAO staff pointed out that clearance from the
Regional Office could take a variable amount of time, and this added to unpredictability
of FAO’s projects schedule. It is critical that input distribution be timely, especially in
response to disaster: if the crop has been planted already, sheets need to be distributed
immediately to be of any use to farmers. But overall, FAO’s responses to shocks were found
for the most part to be effective and timely as detailed above, and as in the case of fodder
distribution during and immediately after the 2014 Gaza war. 207/NET was also successfully
adapted following the war to support the rehabilitation of land, water infrastructure and
packinghouses. Beneficiaries praised the speed of FAO’s response. FAO’s activity under
401/CAN was also shifted following Storm Alexa in the West Bank and following the 2014
Gaza war with at least some success.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
193
In sum, the following recurrent factors were found to limit effectiveness of FAO’s livelihood
interventions: 1) At times the quantities of distributed inputs were too small to make a difference
in the long run, as in the case of the sheep distribution mentioned above and sometimes even
in the short run. For example, a common complaint of beneficiaries of drought resistant seeds
(barley and vetch) for fodder production under CAN/401 in Dura, Hebron was that quantities
received were too little to grow what they estimated to be a sufficient quantity of fodder.
Similar complaints were found among beneficiaries of ITA/807 in Tamoun, Tubas who deemed
the irrigation kits for greenhouses to be insufficient. 2) In other cases inputs were of different
and lesser quality than what had been promised, again in the case of sheep distribution, or of
fish for the aquaculture ponds in the Gaza Strip. 3) In some instances more extensive coverage
would have been necessary to ensure a positive outcome. For example, in 2011, the 401/CAN
project was adapted to support FAO’s response to a red palm weevil infestation, but weevil
trap buckets were not distributed comprehensively throughout the Gaza Strip, so though
the intervention proved effective for those farmers who did receive the buckets, palm quality
and yields have not recovered to pre-infestation levels and the infestation problems remain
as this is a generalized threat requiring a comprehensive palm weevil pest control process
including follow-up treatment. As we have seen, a further problem related to coverage was
the unintended effect of greater exposure to risk for non-beneficiaries of land rehabilitation.
194
It is worth reiterating how the volatility of the context and the risks beneficiaries are exposed
to can hinder effectiveness. The capacity of the High Value Crops project to increase
competitiveness on the export market, for example, depends largely on the political will
of Israeli authorities, and as such remains a challenging endeavour. Sustainability is equally
dependent on certain factors unrelated to the intervention itself, and FAO’s projects run
the risk of destruction whether during wars, most lately in 2014 in the Gaza Strip, with
a large-scale destruction of productive assets and water infrastructures, or during more
localized military actions (demolitions of cisterns in Area C). International donors have
no guarantees from Israel that their investment will not be destroyed or compensated
if destroyed, and as mentioned FAO does not have its own contingency plan153 or crisis
modifiers inbuilt in projects to minimize losses to beneficiaries in case of crises.
5.2 Policy support and capacity development
Findings on policy support and capacity development
• FAO’s engagement with the enabling environment dimension of Capacity Development (CD) was
widely appreciated and instrumental in responding to country requests for policy assistance.
FAO’s assistance to policies and regulatory frameworks on plant protection and food safety was
very relevant and contributed to develop the ability to export products, protect agriculture and
adapt to the increasing sophistication of consumer demands.
• FAO also fostered coordination in defining cross-disciplinary policies and programmes (SPS), and
government’s involvement in the management of transboundary resources, for example on pest
and animal diseases.
• In line with growing attention to DRR/DRM in the WBGS, FAO supported MoA’s capacity in DRR/M
by streamlining the Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment data collection processes and providing
technical support to the Palestinian Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Fund, which was also
based on FAO’s corporate normative work.
• Less evident was the development of local capacity for policy analysis, formulation and
implementation, affecting the sustainability and impact of developed capacities. Efforts to develop
the capacity of national NGOs, CBOs and public institutions is limited, though their involvement
could enhance sustainability and create multiplier effects at the community level.
• The physical and institutional constraints of the Palestinian Authority together with the lack
of preliminary beneficiary consultations and assessment of their needs by FAO have limited
ownership and undermined sustainability of some CD activities, and sometimes this leads FAO to
emphasize achieving outputs rather than intervening on processes that would instead ensure such
local ownership and sustainability.
• Regarding CD at the individual level, most technical trainings designed to transfer technologies and
promote good agricultural practices were relevant and effectively delivered. Participative approaches
enhancing individual soft skills were more effective than sole formal training with technical assistance,
yet FAO has paid little attention to developing the “soft skills” that are likely to significantly influence
performance in the organizational and policy/enabling environment dimensions.
74
153 However FAO does participate in the FSS contingency planning (see section 4.1.3).
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
195
A further objective of the evaluation was to assess technical assistance to policy and
capacity development. While the area might not be particularly large in terms of funding
given its nature (prevalently software), it is a main qualifier of FAO presence in the country,
building on its comparative advantage as knowledge organization and qualifying its
contribution to the UN undertaking in support of the Palestinian state building process.
FAO’s work on capacity development was assessed against the degree to which the
strategy, programmes and projects with this aim are aligned with national priorities and
with the FAO Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development (see box 21).
196
At least since 2009, FAO has been increasingly involved in policy support and institutional
capacity development, engaging several governmental bodies, civil society, private
sector and academia. It is worth mentioning that often policy assistance and especially
developing policy capacities was only marginally funded and had to be delivered as side
or complementary activities to others. FAO’s work in this area resulted in different types
of activities, such as the formulation and monitoring of national agricultural strategies;
the support to the definition of regulatory frameworks and development of technical
and institutional capacities in public services in areas like food safety, SPS regulations,
capacity of veterinary (through the NAIS) and plant protection; support to disaster risk
management capacities and information management; formulation of quality standards
and many others.
197
To begin with, the Plan of Action’s focus on institutional capacity development (Programme
Component 5) was limited to supporting the Ministry of Agriculture in realizing two actions
of the Agriculture Sector Strategy 2011–2013: (i) upscale the competence and effectiveness
of agricultural institutions (section 5.3.1); and (ii) train and rehabilitate human resources
(section 5.3.3). Later on, FAO’s work in CD was expanded through Outcome 2 of the
Programme Framework, with three outputs targeting community-level organizations (2.1),
public institutions (2.2) and the agriculture sector (2.3).
Box 21: Capacity Development in FAO
The definition of Capacity Development adopted in the FAO Corporate Strategy on Capacity
Development is “the process whereby individuals, organizations and society as a whole unleash,
strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time”. In this definition, CD is explicitly
directed at empowering beneficiaries to address food security, improve livelihoods and ensure that
systems of resource use are sustainable. In other words, national capacity development is seen
as an evolutionary process in which the strengthening of individual and organizational capacities
influence one another and the enabling environment in a self-reinforcing loop. According to its
mandate, FAO assists countries both to enhance the enabling environment for agriculture and to
become more effective in formulating and implementing policies.
FAO considers three dimensions of CD:
i. The enabling environment relates to political commitment and vision; norms, values and
institutions; policy, legal and economic frameworks; institutional relations; sector strategies
and overall resources; the general development level (health, literacy, etc.), and financial
resources.
ii. The organizational dimension relates to political and administrative bodies (government
agencies, political parties, international and regional bodies), technical bodies (inspectorates,
laboratories, research, extension), economic and social bodies (enterprises, commerce chambers,
consumer groups, producer associations, ,CBOs, universities). Interventions designed for the
organizational dimension are usually associated with improving the organizational system
rather than individual competencies. This can involve the setting-up of veterinary laboratories,
information systems, development of restructuring plans, etc.
iii. The individual dimension relates to improving the ability of individuals of all ages and providing
them with knowledge and a skill set (both technical and soft) that improves their ability to
contribute and that enhances the effectiveness of any group or organization they are associated
with.
Each dimension relates closely to the other in an embedded system where the whole is the sum of
the parts. It is possible to take one of the parts and change it but for success and sustainability, the
changes need to be linked to, supported and reinforced through all dimensions.
FAO’s Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development, FAO, 2010
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
198
The evaluation found that FAO WBGS’ work on institutional policy support and capacity
development at the three different levels is aligned with the national priorities as expressed
in the national agricultural strategies as well as with the other ministries’ needs. However,
seeing that the shift towards more developmental projects and institutional capacity
development activities only started in 2013, and that their impacts need longer time frames
to emerge, it is unsurprisingly very hard to find evidence of direct or tangible impact at this
stage.
Enabling environment dimension
199
At the policy level, FAO was closely involved with the Ministry of Agriculture and other
institutions on a number of fronts, including supporting the development of the two latest
agricultural strategies and the detailed framework for a comprehensive assessment of
land tenure, land planning and land management mentioned in section 4.1.2. Support to
national and local institutions developing legal frameworks or with a normative function is
of paramount importance to the effectiveness and sustainability of CD initiatives.
200
Many interlocutors perceive FAO as particularly well placed to facilitate decision-making
groups related to agriculture and food security, by utilizing its recognized comparative
advantage as honest broker, facilitator and expert adviser to development and
humanitarian national working groups, donors and UN clusters. For example, with regard
to the Food Security Sector and the Agriculture Sector Working Group, FAO is considered
to be playing this role successfully, raising FAO’s profile and respect amongst a wide range
of stakeholders.
201
FAO’s presence in multiple coordination fora (see section 4.1.4) also raised awareness
about national sectoral priorities such as working to meet sanitary and phytosanitary
capacity development needs. The “Capacity building programme in support of the
Palestinian National Authority – Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures”154 was felt by
various stakeholders as a fundamental step for WBGS to safeguarding the health and wellbeing of people living in the WBGS, as well as increasing access to domestic, regional and
international markets (see also section 4.2.2). The programme, in fact, was designed to
respond to the need of effectively managing food safety and quality in Palestine, expressed
by the Palestinian Authority as well as by many international organizations, including the
World Organisation for Animal Health, the European Union, and the WHO. Furthermore,
developing SPS-related capacities is a prerequisite for the WBGS to join the World Trade
Organization and, in itself, this makes the project extremely relevant for the WBGS. FAO
has been particularly effective in developing the capacities of government officials to
understand and in some cases apply international regulatory frameworks such as the
International Plant Protection Convention and the Codex Alimentarius. However, the fact
that Palestine is not an FAO member country limits its international exposure and precludes
it from participating in regional exchanges, thus depriving it of an opportunity to legitimize
international instruments and provide fertile grounds for advocacy and support.
202
Stakeholders recognized this kind of assistance to be FAO’s comparative advantage on the
basis of its global experience and mandate, and appreciated the focus on facilitating interministerial coordination of food safety and defining the division of roles between various
line ministries.155 FAO has played an important role in fostering coordination to define
cross-disciplinary policies and programmes (SPS), and involvement in the management of
transboundary resources, for example on pest and animal diseases. FAO’s contribution was
critical to define the role in the development of the Food Safety Strategy of the various
stakeholders and provide a roadmap for future interventions.
203
FAO has also been instrumental in responding to the request for policy assistance through
the “Institutional level component of the project: Support livestock-based livelihoods (LbL)
of the vulnerable populations in the occupied Palestinian territory”,156 which established
the first National Animal Identification System in the WBGS, a registration system of all
small ruminants and cattle. The NAIS represented an effort to develop capacities pertaining
154 OSRO/GAZ/402/NET.
155 Ministry of National Economy (MoNE), MoA, MoH, Palestinian Standards Institute (PSI) and key municipalities.
156 OSRO/GAZ/201/EC.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
to the ‘Sanitary Pillar’ of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and is considered relevant to
improve food safety for the Palestinian people and enable local animal products to meet
international trade standards. The establishment of the NAIS was identified as a priority
in the Agriculture Strategy, as also recognized by an international technical assessment
mission.157 Feedback from FAO and MoA officers confirmed the relevance of interventions
delivered under this project and its importance for the livestock sector and to strengthen
the Ministry of Agriculture’s capacity in service delivery. On the other hand, many herders,
MoA extension officers and NGOs had conflicting views regarding the NAIS, partly due to
a limited understanding of its regulatory aims.
204
In 2013, a joint EU-PA-FAO workshop on improving water availability and the ensuing
discussions with donors and the Ministry of Agriculture through the Agriculture Sector
Working Group, triggered an innovative effort to develop common guidelines for land and
water interventions. These guidelines, adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and donors,
embraced a new approach in the way land and water interventions were identified,
designed, implemented and coordinated, moving away from ad hoc interventions
targeting individuals to more holistic ones aimed at farming communities, responding to
their needs and building their ownership, in coordination with the government. Currently,
FAO is engaged with the donors and the Ministry of Agriculture for the establishment of an
“Interest Group on Land and Water Development” under the Agriculture Sector Working
Group where FAO should play a technical advisory role.
205
FAO provided support in developing the national standards for wastewater treatment (see
also section 4.1.6) and directly produced a number of useful policy documents building on
previous ones (e.g. the formulation of the Livestock Sub-Sector Strategy; an assessment of
the current land tenure and management situation recommending the adoption of the
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure; a feasibility study on the
potential of mariculture in the Gaza Strip). However, less evident to the evaluation team
was the development of local capacity for policy analysis, formulation and implementation,
affecting the sustainability of the developed capacities and their impact, notwithstanding
the widely acknowledged fact, including in FAO corporate Strategy on Capacity
Development that policy support should always be provided in parallel with capacity
development for policy makers.
Organizational Dimension of Capacity Development
206
Both the LbL-i and SPS projects are directed towards enabling the environment by
improving incentives, policies, legislation, regulations and accountability, while also
addressing the organizational dimension of Capacity Development. In particular, through
these projects, FAO helped the Palestinian Authority strengthen its organizational
capacities and government institutions supporting plant protection and transboundary
animal diseases (including by setting up and strengthening laboratories), food safety,
statistics and information management.158
207
Much of FAO’s work on the organizational dimension concentrates on data and
information management across the range of its technical areas, from food safety to animal
health and agriculture statistics, all recognized as important by partners and donors. FAO’s
assistance in this area responds to crucial information needs. Interlocutors appreciated
FAO’s effort in facilitating communication among ministries and departments, however,
the information-sharing mechanisms across sectors still requires some improvements.
FAO has also provided a consultant to help the Ministry of Agriculture to work on M&E
157 Carried out by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the European Union Technical Assistance and
Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX).
158 More in general and in programmatic terms, the two dimensions fall under Outcome 2 of the PF. The first area
of intervention under Outcome 2 is institutional capacity development, which mainly resulted in developing
1) Sanitary and phytoanitary) related capacities including an enabling environment for improved animal, plant
health and food safety, and 2) Livestock Based Livelihoods – institutional component, focusing on strengthened
capacity of the MoA to fulfil its mandate in service delivery. The second one is community level capacity
development, which works in two tracks, one indirect and one direct. Indirectly it works through institutional
capacity development of the public sector, aiming at improving quality of extension services; and directly through
interventions aiming at improving farmers’, and particularly women’s, effective engagement in high-value
agricultural value chains in local and global markets, by promoting capacity development in the field of quality
assurance and standards.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
systems and develop national indicators for the sector that are linked with a software on a
MoA server. This system is expected to help FAO and other stakeholders to better monitor
interventions and develop consistent monitoring matrices, centred on national indicators.
208
At the same time, FAO’s work on strengthening management and business capacities of
cooperatives, through the HVC and One Stop Shop projects, was mostly appreciated by
farmers and donors. However, there is limited evidence that FAO helps these groups gain
more voice in the policy making context and be better networked and linked to markets,
services and the policy and advocacy initiatives of established producer organizations, and
to do so in a sustainable way. For example, the HVC project established two marketing
companies, one in the WB and one in the GS, to facilitate marketing of HVCs produced
by cooperative members. However, farmers do not acknowledge these companies nor
do they perceive the advantages of such intermediary in their business. The evaluation
team also found that in its HVC project FAO tends to emphasize achieving outputs rather
than intervening on processes that ensure local ownership and sustainable capacity
development. This is largely a consequence of project design failing to adequately consider
specific needs and priorities as well as other contextual factors, and failing to involve
beneficiaries at different stages of planning.
209
The area of Disaster Risk Reduction/Management159 is another example of FAO’s CD work
that is relevant to both local priorities and FAO’s corporate CD Framework, particularly to
the organizational dimension. Following a number of assessments undertaken by national
and international actors in 2014, including FAO, which indicated the need for a PA-led
DRM framework to guide existing humanitarian and development strategies,160 FAO
facilitated the integration of DRR concepts within the Ministry of Agriculture, provided
training on preparedness to MoA staff and harmonized food security information.161 More
recently and in light of the gaps identified above, in spring 2015, FAO WBGS organized two
workshops with representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture in Ramallah and Gaza City
to assess capacity needs for the development of a DRM system for the agricultural sector.
Further individual consultation meetings were conducted in May 2016 with the focus on
DRR/M capacities and tools in the Ministry of Agriculture and with high relevance for the
operationalization of the PADRRIF as well as linkages with other work streams such as
climate change adaptation (see paragraph 212).
210
The above-mentioned SPS programme, the LbL-i, HVC and One Stop Shop projects and
the work on DRR are also examples of effective institutionalization. Institutions that would
go on to become service providers were involved from the design stage and throughout
implementation. Institutions were also strengthened as part of the interventions (the Ministry
of Agriculture; the National Agricultural Research Centre; farmers’ cooperatives; PADRRIF162).
211
A number of weaknesses are recognized as potentially undermining the role and activities
of PADRRIF, including the fact that a public body with virtually no experience on insurance
159 The definitions of DRR and DRM adopted in this document draw on the definitions provided in the “FAO DRM
Workshop Summary Report” according to which DRR aims at strengthening the capacities and resilience of
households, communities and institutions to protect lives and livelihoods, through measures to avoid (prevention)
or limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse effects of hazards and provide timely and reliable hazard
forecasts. The DRM approach integrates these DRR elements (prevention, mitigation, preparedness) with postdisaster response and rehabilitation and with transition to development (FAO, 2015).
160 In February 2014, a Rapid Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment (DaLA) conducted by the PA with funding
from the World Bank in the aftermath of the Alexa storm (World Bank (2014) Rapid Damage, Loss and
Needs Assessment of Winter Storm Alexa West Bank and Gaza December 2013. http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/02/000469252_20140702112718/Rendered/
INDEX/889710WP0P1499270Box385254B00PUBLIC00ACS.txt); the aftermath of the 2014 war in the GS pointed to
the need to streamline the DaLA’s data collection system (FAO (2015) Summary report: Disaster Risk Management
in the Agriculture Sector in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Training & Workshop 17 & 18 March 2015, City Inn,
Ramallah; 26 & 27 May, ArcMed Hotel, Gaza City; FAO (no date) Informal note: Support in Disaster Risk Reduction for
Agriculture and Food Security. Unpublished); stocktaking exercise of existing national DRM capacities conducted by
the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team -led mission in collaboration with the PA and the
RC/HC (UNDAC (2014) Disaster Response Preparedness Mission to the State of Palestine. Mission dates: 22 March to
05 April 2014 Draft, 26 June 2014 United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team); the MoA Agriculture
Strategy 2014-2016 identified a number of DRM measures as sectorial priorities to strengthen mechanisms to deal
with disasters, climate change and desertification (FAO, 2015).
161 FAO (2013) FAO Disaster Risk Reduction Brief. West Bank and Gaza Strip http://www.preventionweb.net/
files/33680_fao.pdf
162 See box below.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
and risk management has been tasked with leading the sector, and the lack of a clear
reference to the establishment of a public-private partnership to facilitate the inclusion
of insurance companies in the development of the agricultural insurance scheme. FAO is
currently planning to address these weaknesses and support the overall function and role
of PADRRIF, specifically by providing technical assistance to the development of a publicprivate agricultural insurance scheme and a risk management system for the agricultural
sector. A project proposal in this regard was drafted and presented to donors in May
2016.163
Box 22: Effectiveness and use of FAO’s normative products: support to PADRRIF
In 2013 the Ministry of Agriculture established the Palestinian Agriculture Disaster Risk Reduction
and Insurance Fund to deal with all that relates to agricultural risk management.164 PADRRIF, which
became operational in 2014, brings under the same umbrella two main functions: i) insurance and
risk management for the agricultural sector; and ii) direct compensation for damages to agricultural
activities.165 PADRRIF recognizes risks to the agricultural sector in the WBGS as arising from natural
and environmental hazards, such as snow, frost, earthquakes and desertification, water scarcity,
as well as political factors linked to the occupation including the barrier, land confiscation, tree
uprooting etc.166. As noted by an FAO staff member interviewed for this evaluation, besides the
Sendai Framework for DRR,167 the FAO Resilient Livelihoods Framework168 and its four integrated
thematic pillars were also employed to draft the PADRRIF, and particularly to identify and cluster the
risk focus and the main areas of its work. This happened without being prompted by the technical
support unit at FAO headquarters and is a good example of the use of FAO normative
frameworks to develop a new instrument at national level. FAO WBGS is also a member
of the PADRRIF Board of Directors and the establishment of PADRRIF is recognized in a recent
FAO project document as a step forward in the development of much needed insurance and risk
management systems for agriculture.169
164 165 166 167 168 169
212
As part of FAO’s support to DRR/M in the agriculture sector, in August 2015 FAO’s
assisted the Palestinian Authority in standardizing and speeding up the Damage, and
Loss Assessment (DaLA) data collection processes170 through a USD 200 ,000 USD project
funded by FAO Regional Ooffice under FAO’s Strategic Objective 5 and as part of the
regional country support process. Before FAO’s work on DaLA, data entry was done
centrally at MoA level. The lack of staff capacity to perform this time-consuming task was
a key reason underpinning the slow DaLA process (as outlined above) and in turn delays
in the management of farmers’ requests for compensation, especially after large-scale
disasters. Shifting data entry activities to field staff as part of this intervention is expected
to reduce this delay.
213
The preliminary work, led by a technical officer at FAO headquarters, to investigate the
linkages between DRR and climate change adaptation in the WBGS context is in line with
the Ministry of Agriculture’s willingness to engage in these areas of work in a structured
and systematic way. As explained by a number of FAO staff, the Ministry of Agriculture
is indeed stepping up work in other areas that have linkages with DRR and has been
recently working, with support from relevant UN agencies, including FAO, on cross-sectoral
national strategies: in collaboration with UNDP, the MoA has drafted a Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy; drafting of a Drought Management Strategy with support from
163 FAO (2016) Agricultural Insurance and Risk Management Technical Assistance Programme in West Bank and Gaza
Strip. March 2016.
164 Agricultural Risks: PAADRIF as Part of the Solution. Palestinian Agricultural Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance
Fund Presentation given to the Agricultural Sector Working Group, Ministry of Agriculture, February, 2016.
165 Agricultural Insurance and Risk Management Technical Assistance Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Draft
to be shared with PAADRIF. FAO, March 2016.
166 State of Palestine Palestinian Agricultural Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance Fund System. PA, October 2015.
167 http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework
168 http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3270e.pdf
169 FAO (2016) Agricultural Insurance and Risk Management Technical Assistance Programme in West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Draft to be shared with PAADRIF. March 2016.
170 FAO 2 (no date) Informal note: Support in Disaster Risk Reduction for Agriculture and Food Security. 160324 DRR
support. End of Project Report Unpublished. This included, starting from September 2015 and for approximately
five months, supporting a) the development of a mobile application for data collection and of an intermediary
application to connect the mobile application to the Damage Assessment Database (DAD); b) the provision of IT
infrastructure (tablets) to enable field staff to perform data collection and entry of field survey questionnaires and;
c) the provision of training related to functions covered in a) and b).
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
UN-DESA is currently ongoing, and the Desertification Strategy was recently finalized.
Furthermore, FAO has also supported the Ministry of Agriculture in formulating the priority
agriculture sector adaptation measures for the National Adaptation Plan (NAP, 2016) as
well as mitigation measures for the Nationally Determined Contribution (forthcoming) as
part of the communications that the Palestinian Authority needs to provide since the State
of Palestine’s joined the UNFCCC in March 2016.
214
Furthermore, FAO is currently working with a number of NGOs, CBOs and public institutions
to implement projects. However, interlocutors reported that FAO’s effort in developing
their capacity is limited. As previously mentioned, the evaluation found that closer liaison
and mentoring and a move towards greater collaborating would help to further strengthen
endogenous capacity. This may require large initial investment (especially on capacity
development), but such involvement has the potential for greater sustainability and could
create multiplier effects at the community level. Furthermore, engaging in partnerships
with international NGOs provides opportunities for FAO to reach out more widely and to
engage in mutual learning and exchange.
Individual Capacity Development Dimension
215
Interviewed stakeholders consider it important for FAO to continue engaging in field
activities, both to provide practical experience to its normative work and, more importantly,
to develop the capacity of countries to test the appropriateness of new approaches and
technologies to meet their needs. Exchange visits between West Bank and Gaza Strip
farmers were conducted and appreciated by participants as a knowledge-sharing method.
216
A large majority of FAO projects’ activities aim at developing the capacities of individuals,
mainly government staff and/or farmers and farmers’ groups, but the effectiveness of
these varies according to the approach adopted. This seems to be related to the little
attention FAO has paid to developing the “soft skills” that are likely to significantly
influence performance in the organizational and policy/enabling environment dimensions.
For example, though women’s cooperatives and MoA extension staff working on the
NAIS showed sincere appreciation for the training undergone on business management
capacity and animal tagging respectively, they were concerned that they might lack the
organizational capabilities and practical skills to conduct their work in an effective manner.
217
The evaluation team found that facilitation and participative approaches enhancing
individuals’ soft skills were more effective than sole formal training on technical aspects.
In particular, the proved effectiveness of the training provided through the HVC project
demonstrates the importance of practical training for the immediate application of
knowledge and skills (Global GAP and demonstration farming), as well as the frequent need
to accompany such training with initiatives to strengthen management and organizational
capacities (marketing). The trainings provided on Global GAP are one such example, and
translated into reduced use of fertilizers, pesticides and water, saving that reflected on the
profitability and competitiveness of the farming process and therefore on households’
livelihood.
218
Furthermore, capacity development projects aiming at more transformative goals have
a greater chance of success when the participation and ownership of the end results is
ensured. Instances of this kind of transformative projects are the introduction of new crops
and technologies enabling farmers to reduce the use of resources and the establishment
of demonstration farms through HVC and 807/ITA projects,171 which were felt to be very
important, relevant and effective as an encouragement to adopt new crops. Less positive
are the outcomes of some individual CD activities carried out under the often-mentioned
171 Pineapples, for example, were tested in Tulkaram and allowed farmers to save one third of the water they were
previously using for the production of tomatoes; or the introduction of new agriculture technologies, such as
strawberry farming in Gaza saving up to 90 percent of water through the introduction of the hanging technique.
Prior to the HVC project, 807/ITA had introduced new crops and technologies such as avocados. Since they were
planted in 2012 and need 5-7 years for tangible results, early production is expected in 2018-2020. When the
evaluation team visited Qalqilia, avocados were found growing well and farmers were happy with the intensive
planting, and envisaged making good business in the future if all went well. The same project assisted herders by
supplying milking machines and butter churns which, according to beneficiaries, reduced drudgery and improved
product quality.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
LbL-i project. So, while the LbL-i trainees highlighted their satisfaction in terms of trainer’s
expertise and relevance of the topic, on the other hand scarce knowledge of the tagging
technique on the part of trainers172 as well as a lack of ownership of the intervention
overall and the insufficient awareness raising carried out prior implementation (see also
the findings of the LbL-i project evaluation) affected the quality and final impact of the
activities.
219
On the other hand, one-off trainings targeting individuals (government officials in the case
of LbL-i, some farmers in the HVC project, or women in other marketing projects) were
found to be of limited impact, even when FAO included the application of knowledge to
policy planning and implementation in the training package. In some cases, though there
were some good results, the very short timelines were not enough to achieve sustainable
capacity and consolidate gains (see projects on LbL-i, aquaculture ponds in the Gaza Strip,
etc.).
5.3 Cross-cutting issues
5.3.1 Monitoring and lessons learning
Findings on M&E
• Overall, the assessment of project and programme contributions to impact is hindered by lack of
monitoring of progress towards outcomes and of availability of disaggregated data. This is also a
consequence of limited resources and dedicated staff capacities within the office.
• No reference to earlier recommendations was found in project proposals and action plans,
and there seem to be no systems in place to ensure that lessons are learned and mistakes are
capitalized upon. However FAO is at present developing a system to monitor its activities.
220
Formally the M&E system for WBGS consists of three levels: first, monitoring of postdistribution, second, monitoring of outputs to assess progress of programme results
including midterm and final reviews of the programme, and lastly, external project
evaluations carried out by independent external evaluation teams. Strategically there is an
attention to M&E reflected in both programming documents, resulting in heavy reporting
burden. As explained by staff during the SWOT analysis, in recent years, the volume of
projects handled by the office has increased exponentially, and as a consequence the lack
of a proper M&E system to provide sound foundations for decision-making, learning and
evaluation is increasingly felt.
221
One person is in charge of M&E among other tasks, partially supported by two assistants.
This small unit relies on field staff whose primary task as Deputy Programme Managers
(DPMs) is to supervise implementation, and who are therefore overburdened. DPMs report
on an ad hoc basis according to donor and corporate requirements, and there is ultimately
no evidence that in practice the M&E carried out follows established procedures.
222
Though great quantities of post-distribution monitoring data are available, lack of
capacity and resources to process them hinders more outcome level analysis. Baselines in
programming documents are generally not disaggregated below the national level, making
attribution of any changes to FAO difficult, considering that the country has many players in
the sector. Moreover, as mentioned, the sources of information for baseline data in the Plan
of Action and Programme Framework are not clear. Though the PF baseline should depend
in theory on the endline of the PoA, no evident link emerges, making effectiveness hard
to measure. The midterm and final reviews of the programmes are presented as outcome
evaluations, but in fact they mostly concentrate, again, on output level results, weakening
their function as learning tools.
172 Although FAO provided the same technical trainings on the tagging system to appointed MoA officers in both
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the outcome of the tagging process was different in the two areas. While in the
Gaza Strip there were no obstacles in implementing the activity, in some areas of the West Bank the tagging was
undertaken by unskilled technicians who were unable to correctly tag the animals’ ears, sometimes hitting veins
and provoking inflammation and swelling. This led herders to remove tags from all their animals, perceiving the
tags as a risk for their animals’ health.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
223
The limits of the current monitoring system emerged from the analysis of various
interventions. For example, for the long list of marketing activities of the HVC project
reporting was carried out at output level,173 while outcomes were not reported. Weak
monitoring made it difficult to assess how productivity was affected, something that
could be overcome by using farm records, as mentioned in section 5.1.3. The APIS is a case
of a good monitoring practice that was not followed-up systematically (see box 5). This
weakness is particularly evident in the case of capacity development, where measuring
outputs does not provide any indication of effectiveness.
Box 23: Monitoring of Cash Assistance
The adoption of conditional cash transfers in a context of increased volume of projects but without
a parallel increase in M&E staff capacity has made monitoring activities particularly burdensome.
Specifically, monitoring of conditional cash transfers were found to be more onerous precisely
because of the need to ensure that cash expenditures are in line with the conditions defined by
the project. Referring to 501/BEL, staff interviewed in the Gaza Strip for example stressed the
difficulties faced in monitoring cash expenditures of beneficiaries towards purchases of the many
inputs required for home garden development (irrigation pipes, pumps, seedlings etc.). This is not
surprising however: by their nature conditional cash transfers, including vouchers, are notoriously
administratively burdensome, much more so than unconditional cash transfers for instance (Harvey
and Bailey, 2011).
224
Following a thorough desk review of all available documentation, the evaluation team
found that despite the programme reviews, midterm evaluations and final project reports,
no reference was made to earlier recommendations in programme proposals or action
plans. This does not mean that lessons from earlier experiences are not incorporated into
the design of new projects, and though there seems to be no systematization of success
stories, historic memory of FAO staff is considered fundamental in developing new
projects. For instance, when projects were found not to have reached the intended target
beneficiaries, enhanced efforts were made to advertise the launch of activities, a positive
case of incorporating lessons learned.
225
No resources are available to better systematize documentation and manage knowledge,
M&E, and learning process, nor is support for M&E provided by the Regional Office for
the Near East and North Africa or headquarters. On the other hand, the WBGS office
is presently working to develop its M&E system, as well as a new package on process
flows for programme implementation. The monitoring process is partially improving, as
indicated by FAO staff, and there is a new programme monitoring system which aligns
the project, Programme and Strategic Framework logframes, so everything is evolving
into something more systematic, and PF indicators are being developed to fulfil CREAM
criteria.174 Information about beneficiaries and interventions are now being centralized,175
yet information management and archiving needs to be strengthened to ensure quality
of the follow-up process with beneficiaries, and to improve the effectiveness of delivery of
future activities
5.3.2 Gender
Findings on Gender
• While the evaluation found that FAO staff made positive efforts to incorporate gender aspects in
FAO’s operations, overall there was some evidence of gender issues being weakly mainstreamed
in projects and of a decreased attention to the issue in strategic documents.
• Targeting women as beneficiaries of projects as is presently done is not enough and does
not equate to gender programming. Instead programme designs need to be informed by an
understanding of women’s specific vulnerabilities and coping strategies in the WBGS.
173 Report of 2014.
174 Clear, Relevant, Economic, Adequate, Monitorable.
175 A beneficiary database system is currently being developed with support from CIO.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
226
FAO’s Programme Framework makes no reference in its needs analysis to the situation of
women, and only in the overview of the current Palestinian value chain is there a reference
to the fact that “women face unequal access to assets”. The suggested response is to
increase levels of women’s participation in the processing aspects of the value chain, but
the document offers no details on how to do so. The rationale behind the percentage of
women FAO aims to target, why so few women are included and how programming will
be tailored for those who are, all remain unclear. In addition, the PF provides no gendered
baseline, indicators or targets, even if the logframe states that data sources will be “gendersensitive monitoring, evaluation and assessment of relevant programmes to enhance
accountability and feedback”.176 The previous programming document, the Plan of Action,
on the contrary, does state that the focus must lie “in actively empowering women as agents
of development in their homes and communities”,177 and seems overall more sensitive to
gender. It uses SEFSEC data and RIMA categories to highlight gendered vulnerabilities and
thus the importance of targeting female-headed households. Besides, while references
to “gender” and “women” does not equate to gender-sensitive programming, it is
nevertheless noteworthy that the words “gender” and “woman” are used three and nine
times respectively in the Programme Framework, while in the Plan of Action, they appear
a total of 8 and 37 times. A further indication of a greater focus on gender in the past is
the request by FAO to UN Women in 2010, prior to the period under evaluation, to carry
out an assessment of its work on gender, a very positive and uncommon exercise for FAO
in general, which still contains valid and relevant lessons and recommendations for FAO
WBGS’ work on gender.
227
In a context where women are disadvantaged and discriminated on a number of fronts
(see section 2.5), and also considering that women earn 17 percent less than their male
counterparts and 97 percent of the women working in agriculture are unpaid family
members,178 it is critical for FAO to develop projects that are gender sensitive. Despite
this, FAO reveals a weakness in involving women in its projects, and only 11.5 percent
of FAO’s beneficiaries in 2015 were women-headed households and female members
of cooperatives, while in 2014 this figure was 18 percent of the total.179 Reviewing the
available lists of beneficiaries of the projects assessed under the access to market focus
of this evaluation revealed that the number of women who directly benefited is minimal.
For example, the 207/NET project targeted 23 cooperatives and farmer groups for a total
2 735 participants, of which only six were formed exclusively of women, for a total of 283
members.
228
Some of FAO’s criteria in selecting beneficiaries exclude women by default: for example,
women constitute less than 4 percent of cooperatives and own only 8 percent of total
agricultural holdings,180 so projects working with cooperatives or landowners are very
unlikely to include women. In general, though women take an active part in agricultural
production, they often do not own assets, and projects aimed at rehabilitating assets, such
as cisterns for example, end up targeting men who typically are the asset-owners. Women
confirmed that announcements regarding new projects had been placed in public places
usually visited by them such as schools and health centres where they could see them,
redressing a gap that had been found by the midterm review of the Plan of Action, though
this is insufficient to ensuring women’s inclusion, which would require a more thorough
understanding of underlying issues that affect women in the WBGS, presently absent from
many projects.
176 FAO Programme Framework 2014-16, p.38.
177 Plan of Action for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2011-2013, p.8.
178 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015. Women and Men in Palestine: Issues and Statistics, 2015. Ramallah Palestine.
179 FAO Annual Report 2015 and FAO Annual Report 2014.
180 ESDC. 2012. Social and Economic Role of Cooperatives in West Bank.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Box 24: Gender aspects in project design and implementation
• Fieldwork discussions in Khan Yunis highlighted the benefits of projects designed to be more
gender focused. 504/SPA aimed to support poor and vulnerable families with vegetable
production units and backyard animal production units. In this case lack of ownership of property
by beneficiaries did not appear to affect project results: the men in the family, who had found
out about this opportunity, had encouraged women, even though they did not own land, to
apply. Despite the conservative society, these women’s involvement in the project had allowed
them to participate in training and information sessions outside their homes, and then take
responsibility of their home gardens. During a FGD women explained that they are normally
not encouraged to leave their homes, so they don’t work outside, and depend largely on their
husbands. The trainings were described as short holidays and trips on which they made friends
and felt mabsuta (happy). Growing vegetables and animals was a source of joy, in part because
it allowed these women to be productive members in their families, and enabled them to have a
greater voice in household decisions.
• Some female beneficiaries specifically highlighted that cisterns provided relief from the burden
of water collection - a task that typically falls on women and girls. Female Bedouin beneficiaries
interviewed indicated that since the rehabilitation of a 100 cubic metre communal cistern in the
hamlet they are no longer forced to walk for long distances to fetch water.
• In the case of the Kafr Laqif Women’s Association involved in the One Stop Shop project,
members rely on buying tomatoes and Za’atar for processing at relatively high prices and were
not supported either to plant themselves or to connect with producers who benefit from HVC
Consequently, these women depend on purchased raw material from the wholesale market of
Qalqilya paying a higher cost, resulting in lower competitiveness.
229
Interviewed FAO staff admitted being unsure on how to ensure gender-sensitivity within
the project cycle, and the issue of limited ownership of assets was used as an example
of the constraints faced when targeting women. Field discussions corroborated the
need for more in-depth understanding of the vulnerabilities women suffer and the local
mechanisms for coping with them. At times what is important to ensure gender issues
are mainstreamed is not ownership, but a range of complementary services, such as safe
spaces to interact. As mentioned in section 5.1.2. FAO projects are not based on a thorough
analysis, including a gender analysis, and partly as a consequence they do not appropriately
address a wide variety of key issues affecting women such as workload, unpaid labour and
the role of women in the informal sector, and how these affect women’s ability to earn an
income; or access to and ownership of key land and water resources and the implication of
targeting female beneficiaries with land and water interventions when they do not own
these resources. Furthermore, though a number of FAO projects as the HVC and One Stop
Shop aim to empower women by increasing their market participation, growth of women’s
productive work and income does not necessarily imply a reduction of their engagement
in reproductive work, and this double burden could jeopardize the aim of increased wellbeing and empowerment. The effect of productive work on women’s lives should therefore
be monitored with appropriate indicators throughout the project life cycle in order to
assess whether the overall project aim of empowering women is in fact being achieved.
230
Despite this strategic weakness, the office appears to be making some efforts to mainstream
gender in its operations, as evidenced during several interviews with FAO staff. Towards
the end of the period under evaluation the Gender Marker was systematically used for
all project documents that are part of HNO/HRP, as this is part of project approvals in
the FSS vetting process. The creation of a gender committee is another example of the
efforts to pay increasing attention to gender issues in all aspects of the team’s work. The
committee reviews project documents, ensures women’s involvement and checks the
wording of reports for gender-sensitivity. In addition, a gender focal point has recently
been appointed181 and according to interviews with staff, this has contributed to a more
systematic approach to integrating gender aspects in FAO’s programme. Currently the
focal person ensures that projects target the stated percentage of women indicated at
planning stage through a Gender Workplan as well as being responsible to ensure that
gender is monitored in all projects, and with this workload her ability to concentrate on
other gender aspects is limited.
181 The FAO Gender Focal Point for a part of the mission was on maternity leave, and nobody from the Programme
Support Unit was replacing her. It is also to be noted that she is responsible for all beneficiary identification and
verification of FAO projects.
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231
During focus group discussions, women from farming and herding communities repeatedly
expressed the view that they had never been consulted on FAO projects. Some FAO staff
described the positive impacts or outcomes of projects on male beneficiaries, with little
consideration of the potential positive or negative effects on women too. For example,
short-term employment opportunities generated by cistern rehabilitation was mentioned
by staff in terms of opportunities that this intervention provided for men only, while no
mention or consideration appeared to have been given to the potential opportunities for
women too.
232
Both the gender dimensions and the broader relevance and effectiveness of FAO’s livelihood
activity could be improved through the fuller use of participatory and community-building
methods in project preparation, design and implementation. This applies especially to
FAO’s work with vulnerable communities in Area C, but also in other situations. Such an
approach would have the additional benefit of reducing FAO’s current focus on input
delivery. The Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (PVCA) methodology
adopted by the World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations (YMCA), one of
FAO’s implementing partners, could be a model for FAO. It’s a case where FAO could rely
on the knowledge and expertise of its implementing partners in relation to community
targeting and context analysis, which could also include a broader use of IP’s capacities and
resources to complement FAO’s own.
Box 25: Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment methodology
The PVCA methodology was developed by Christian Aid and is widely used in Area C by YMCA
(with DFID funding). It is an approach to resilience in conflict settings focused on empowering local
communities to understand the vulnerabilities they face and their capacities and needs, and to take
an active role in achieving change. YMCA staff spends an extensive amount of time in selecting
communities, based on their assessment of environmental and political hazards plus community
willingness, and go on to create village committees, comprising women, youth and others whose
voices are usually ignored. The village committee and community then discuss vulnerabilities,
capacities and needs – which may relate to either inputs or skills development, and to land and
water or other issues. Discussions are intense: in one Bedouin community, YMCA was involved in
29 meetings, lasting a month, and ended up talking with everyone in the community (around 100
people). Through this, the communities prepare, design, vote on and implement community action
plans, with YMCA’s support. The approach often results in unusual outcomes. In another Bedouin
community it was decided that house gardens for community vegetable consumption was the
priority – in support of which YMCA provided both inputs and training. The same community also
requested access to expertise and networks on how to take complaints to the Israeli authorities.
YMCA staff report that this approach can have transformative effects on community social
structures, especially gender relations, as well as community resilience.
5.3.3 Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)
Findings on AAP
• Assessed against FAO’s corporate commitments on AAP, the office falls short on most of them,
though there has been some progress on the transparency of selection processes, and some
lessons arising after community consultations have been incorporated in programming.
• Recently the office has made a series of commitments to mainstream AAP throughout the project
cycle. These have not been implemented yet, but the new AAP framework appears to have some
conceptual weaknesses.
233
The evaluation assessed FAO WBGS’ work on AAP against FAO’s seven corporate
commitments (see box 26). In relation to strengthening leadership, governance and staff
competencies (1) and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (6), interviews indicated
that some staff were not aware of means and ways to be more accountable to affected
populations, nor was training ever provided to assist them to clarify the issue or address
issues of sexual exploitation and abuse. Apart from one presentation by the AAP focal
point to familiarize office staff with the concept, in general until now no guidance has been
provided nor policy established to ensure consistent and effective AAP. FAO WBGS is aware
of its present weakness, and is commendable for having made a series of commitments
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
on AAP throughout the project cycle. At the time of the evaluation, these were still to be
implemented and there were few tangible results to report on. The new AAP framework
(see Annex 3), however, denotes a certain mix-up in the way means for AAP are classified,
displaying a confusion between opportunities, entry points, actions and tools that could
limit the framework’s potential usefulness in practice. Rather than mostly referring to
generic FAO actions and tools for assessment, monitoring and evaluation, it would have
been more useful if the framework had relied on AAP-specific resources such as the IASC
Tools to assist in implementing the IASC AAP commitments (2012), or the Guidance on AAP
and Gender Consideration included in FAO’s recent Phased agricultural livelihood needs
assessment framework and tools (2016).
Box 26: FAO and AAP
In a 2013 corporate guidance note on AAP, FAO defines accountability to affected populations from
a human rights perspective, as “an active commitment by actors and organizations to use power
responsibly by taking account of, giving account to and being held to account by the people they
seek to assist.”
FAO’s goal to improve policy and practice in AAP is underpinned by seven core commitments that
provide the framework for focused improvement:
1. Strengthen leadership and governance to embed good practices and to ensure that FAO’s
staff and implementing partners deliver on its commitments;
2. Provide greater and more routine transparency, two-way communication, and
information for affected communities;
3. Offer means to provide feedback, submit complaints, and to ensure a timely response;
4. Enable participation of all sections of affected populations, including the most vulnerable and
marginalized;
5. Mainstream AAP into needs assessment, design, monitoring, and evaluation
activities, ensuring continuous learning;
6. Prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by FAO personnel and implementing partners and
put in place adequate response mechanisms;
7. Collaborate with peers and partners to deliver on AAP commitments.
234
Regarding transparency, communication and information provision (2), some interviews
with beneficiaries signalled a lack of shared understanding of the rationale of the selection
process or of agreement regarding targeting criteria (see 5.1.1). Nonetheless there was
a marked improvement in informing on the selection process which has become more
inclusive, transparent and standardized.
235
Notwithstanding some reporting including information gathering from beneficiaries,182
until now FAO WBGS has not had an established feedback mechanisms (3) in place, and
this in part results in FAO’s weak understanding of local contexts and of vulnerabilities
experienced by communities, as well as undermining effectiveness and efficiency of
delivery. In one case, interviewed non-beneficiary farmers who applied to be part of
a HVC project but were not selected, claimed that while aware of their rejection, they
did not know the reason for it, nor had they received any feedback or advice on how to
improve their farm to eventually benefit from future interventions. This is an issue that is
covered in different parts of this report, as the implications affect programming at various
points of the programme cycle. For example, this has an effect on how gender aspects are
streamlined, or how monitoring and lessons learning are incorporated in FAO’s projects
and overall programme. To respond to this gap, a grievance redressal mechanism is being
developed and will start being implemented in 2017.
236
Considering FAO’s weak community analysis, participation to determine what is needed
and how it can be provided, and meaningful and fair representation of communities during
182 This may include post-distribution monitoring, field visits, project evaluation, midterm and final evaluation of
programme framework, MoA channelled feedback, consultations with CBOs.
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consultations (4) become even more important for FAO activities. As FAO staff commented,
“It is important to listen more to people on the ground. We are responding to a need but
we don’t talk to people. It [project development and eventually implementation] is always
what we or the MoA think they want”. In particular, though FAO generally relies on contact
with communities and beneficiaries through its staff, no direct effort or mechanism is in
place to consult the most vulnerable and marginalized, in order to understand their needs
but also ensure that even when not targeted by FAO interventions, they are not indirectly
negatively affected by them.
237
Though WBGS is flagged as a good example in AAP in the 2013 corporate guidance note
on AAP, this refers exclusively to the inclusion of beneficiaries as an information source for
the midterm review. While commendable, this is quite a narrow approach compared to the
potential of involving affected populations in the overall design, monitoring, evaluating
and learning of programmes (5). As mentioned, until now there has been little to show
in terms, for example, of participation or complaints and redress mechanisms in project
design as a result of the commitments made on paper. However, some lessons following
community consultations have been incorporated in project implementation, for example
improving previously weak communication to women regarding new projects (see 5.3.2).
238
The extent and nature of FAO’s commitment to working with partners and other
stakeholders (7) is discussed extensively in the section on partnerships (4.1.5) Specifically,
FAO does not usually train its partners on AAP or discuss with them on how commitments
to AAP can be met. It is also worth highlighting that no mention is made of CSOs in
programming documents, a significant omission considering that they often constitute
an important link in the chain of accountability to affected populations. Furthermore, as
mentioned elsewhere in this report, there are important functions, which would enhance
the programme, that FAO does not have the resources to carry out, and in particular
analyses to inform FAO’s programming could depend on FAO’s capacity to establish
constructive partnerships with small NGOs and CBOs.
5.3.4 Environmental sustainability
Findings on environmental sustainability
• FAO’s work presents several examples of efforts to use resources sustainably, especially through
knowledge sharing and training at household level, training on Good Agricultural Practices and
in some instances by reducing the use of chemicals and overuse of freshwater. Most of the high
value crops farming, though, involves conventional fertilizer and pesticide use.
• Seeing that the major challenge to environmental sustainability is the over-exploitation,
depletion and salinization of water sources, recycled wastewater is key to resilience, and FAO
should continue its work in this area, including at the more strategic and systemic institutional
and policy level to regulate resource use and ensure efficiency of production and sustainability.
239
If not planned and implemented with a sustainable perspective, the development of the
agricultural sector risks an extensive utilization of and an adverse impact on natural resources.
Therefore, it is fundamental that environment-related issues are considered throughout the
value chain. FAO WBGS’ work presents several examples of efforts in ensuring an efficient
utilization of resources, especially through knowledge sharing and trainings on the efficient
and sustainable utilization of land and water resources at household level.
240
In general, efforts have been made by FAO to reduce the use of chemicals and overuse of
fresh water, for instance by introducing aquaponics and hydroponic technologies to reduce
water consumption, or by enhancing rainwater harvesting storage facilities. All Netherlandfunded projects are working towards reduced water use through the introduction of new
crops such as cherry tomatoes, hanging strawberries for which water is recycled or reused.
Still, most of the HVC farming involves conventional techniques that include the use of
fertilizer and pesticides (an interesting exception is pineapple cultivation).
241
The training on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) resulted in a number of benefits towards
environmental sustainability. All interviewed stakeholders, from donors to farmers and
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
government officials, agreed that the Global GAP promoted the rational use of (scarce)
resources, reduced the use of chemicals, and encouraged environmentally friendly
methods, such as the pollination of tomatoes by bumblebees and pest control through the
use of pheromones. The rational use and selection of chemicals is expected to reduce the
impact on the environment.
242
FAO is already working on recycled waste water reuse both in terms of standards and
formulation for future investments/projects, including: assistance to the Palestinian Water
Authority and Ministry of Agriculture in defining water pricing tools, bylaws and policies;
technical support to development of standards for reuse and ongoing consultative
process to develop a comprehensive project document to promote reuse; support to the
government through the Regional Initiative on Water Scarcity on water accounting and to
enable increased water productivity; support to the development of the bylaw on water
user committees. Seeing that the major challenge to environmental sustainability in the
oPt is the over-exploitation, depletion and salinization of water resources due primarily to
Israeli restrictions, FAO’s work on reclaimed water use is a key area for development and
resilience, requiring FAO to also intervene at the more strategic and systemic institutional
and policy level to continue assisting in the implementation of macro-interventions and
support the development of strong regulations on resource use to ensure that increased
efficiency of production will not lead to unsustainable use of resources.183
183 Increased production efficiency in the absence of regulations is typically associated not with decreased overall
resource use, but rather its increase because of rising rate of resource consumption due to increasing demand (the
Jevons paradox).
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6. Conclusions
In answering the evaluation questions these conclusions consider what worked well in the WBGS
programme, what the gaps were, and what is innovative for FAO. Beyond this, they also touch upon
the broader issue of FAO’s role as a knowledge organization in contexts of protracted crises, in
territories under occupation and where the state is fragile or its status uncertain, as in the present case.
Conclusion 1. On FAO’s strategic positioning and reputation
• FAO has been exceptionally capable in this highly sensitive political context to engage
on different fronts, covering the three aims of the UN in WBGS of responding to
humanitarian needs, supporting institutions through development cooperation and
affecting the peace process (albeit mostly indirectly). It does so by exploiting its own
comparative advantage and working as a broker between institutions, something that
has been appreciated by resource partners and national authorities.
• An innovative emerging trait of the WBGS programme and a lesson for FAO corporate is
to address resilience by working through value chains on accessing markets. Building a
strategy along the value chain is quite innovative for FAO and relevant to its mandate and
role, as well as to needs, all the more so in a middle-income context such as the WBGS,
where the potential to develop value chains and increase market access is considerable,
and improving food security and agricultural systems is more a matter of access to
markets than of increased production.
• FAO’s strategy to adopt a technical approach to advocacy has been much appreciated
by resource partners and elevates FAO’s standing among UN agencies. For FAO it is
an unusual way to be proactive and position itself as a technical development agency
in a protracted/complex political crisis environment, exploiting its own comparative
advantage including by working with different, and sometimes conflicting, institutions.
FAO’s role in coordination fora and as a leader in the sector as well as in resilience analysis
is widely acknowledged and valued.
• NGOs and implementing partners would like to play a greater role when working with
FAO and be engaged in a more equal partnership than has been the case up to now.
FAO has tried to strengthen its partnership capacity, and an experimental partnership
agreement to engage on a more equal basis was designed in the WBGS, and has since
been translated by FAO at a corporate level into a new manual section named OPIM.
However, this ultimately resulted in a tool that proved to be too costly and rigid for
widespread utilization.
Conclusion 2. On translating FAO’s position programmatically
• Though much work has been done to strengthen continuity and coherence at
programmatic level, and there are cases of successful normative activities, in particular
through the establishment of regulatory frameworks (SPS, LBL-i), the programme’s
overall clear structure is not reflected when translated into projects and activities. The
“resilience” approach at the core of the programme needs to translate into projects
addressing livelihoods more holistically and ensuring that asset distribution is more
consistently integrated with activities aimed at tackling processes and provoking
sustainable change. There is a coordination gap between FAO’s more developmental
and humanitarian activities. In practical terms the specific constrains due to the context
affect the structure of the office and the way it works. On one side as an outlier the WBGS
provides interesting learning points for FAO corporate on working in difficult and volatile
environments. On the other hand, the special condition of the office and the important
role it plays require careful consideration on ways to ensure that it is appropriately
supported.
• The use of value chain as a basis for programming is to be commended, as it offers an
opportunity to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development activities. An
important effect of programming through VCA should be to allow distribution of risks
along the value chain, which requires carrying out a preliminary market and risk analysis
and setting up a contingency plan for emergencies that is structured around the value
chain, something that is lacking at present. Analyses remain generic and this undermines
the resilience aim and effective integration of humanitarian and development activities
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and goals in practice. For example, the differences between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip are sometimes not accounted for in design of projects which target both. And while
the office has shown a capacity to programme and operate flexibly, modifying project
activities when necessary in the face of unexpected events, at present this remains too
ad hoc, and there is no contingency planning specific to FAO. This impacts on FAO’s
capacity to address risks.
• The weak link between programming documents and project activities is partly related to
the unclear corporate definition (until now) of the primary goals of FAO’s programming
documents, and whether they are analytical, programmatic or resource mobilization
tools, something that should be partially solved by the new Country Programming
Framework format that the WBGS is also about to adopt.
• In order to achieve greater and longer term impact there is the need to make a further
step towards integrated programming, as also recommended by the evaluation of SO5,
considering that linking different areas of work, levels and objectives is key to building
resilience and ensuring access to markets. In this sense FAO WBGS is to be congratulated
for already going in this direction, having recently reunited multiple donors under one
single programme and funding stream for the next CPF.
• The context and constraints due to the political situation affect how the office is
structured and the way it works. Full reliance on project funding has a number of
implications. While on one side the need to fundraise for survival has had a positive
impact on efficiency, on the competitive hiring process, and on the selection of the
Officer in Charge, on the other hand the lack of access to the TCP funds at the design
stage, the dependence on UNDP contracts and short-term consultancy contracts for staff
and, critically, the fact that no fund is available to finance the fulfilment of FAO’s core
functions all heavily affect the office. This situation clearly also constitutes a challenge
in shifting towards a more development oriented portfolio, as FAO is presently doing.
This move supports the UN goal of a two-state solution and building Palestinian
institutions, in the direction of greater sustainability as per the Paris Declaration, and
supporting economic development and capacity to enhance value addition on domestic
and international markets. On the other hand, care should be taken to avoid the risk of
dedicating less attention and resources to humanitarian needs and protection and to the
link between humanitarian and development areas of work.
• In general support from headquarters and the Regional Office is functioning, though the
procedures at the basis of the country support process are found by the evaluation to be
cumbersome and vague. Moreover, in this context it is necessary to reflect carefully on
ways to support and fund the office, considering its particular status and the critical role
it covers.
Conclusion 3. On policy support:
• Support to Palestinian Authority institutions to develop policies is a small but important
and growing area of FAO’s portfolio in the WBGS. Considering the constrained space
and the many difficulties and setbacks due to the occupation, FAO’s assistance has been
found not only to be greatly appreciated by national authorities, but overall effective.
In this context this kind of support has a particular relevance at different levels. In the
first instance, better policies and normative and standard-setting frameworks have the
potential to immediately ease or open outlets for the constrained Palestinian economy in
all directions, i.e. between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with Israel
and towards regional and global markets. Second, a better policy environment builds the
Palestinian Authority’s credibility in its negotiations with local and international partners
and with the Israeli authorities. Lastly, it strengthens the Palestinian position and its
authority, in the perspective of a future advancement in the peace process.
• Weak government capacity to implement policies could severely hamper the achievement
of sustainable results in the policy/enabling environment dimension. Therefore, it is
important for FAO to keep focusing on enhancing capacities at the national level to
translate policies into action while also working on inter-departmental linkages and
assisting the government to engage with other actors.
• For trainings to trigger change and in turn increase national capacities to influence the
global agenda, they need to be provided in conjunction with other capacity development
modalities further supporting the gradual uptake of changes across the three dimensions
of CD. Instead, in WBGS complementary activities to CD such as advocacy measures in
some cases affected and weakened the design and therefore the effectiveness of FAO’s
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work across all three dimensions. A better understanding of needs would have thus led
to more strategic targeting of CD, effective project implementation and sustainable
results.
• The current status of the office as a non-Representation affects FAO’s capacity to
perform its core functions, including normative work, policy development and support
to information systems, as these very often fall outside the scope of project activities.
• The question for FAO of whether and how to support institutions and at times re-build
them from scratch applies to many other protracted crisis or post-disaster or conflict
settings where gains are volatile. In view of the findings of this evaluation, the case can be
made that even in contexts where institutions are fragile, risks are rampant and success
elusive, there is an “imperative” for FAO to support institutions, not just by default,
because it is in the nature of the Organization and part of its comparative advantage,
but because there are concrete potential gains in terms of peace dividends, even when
there can be no guarantees that these will be long-lasting.
Conclusion 4. On community level assistance:
• At the community level work is still mostly focused on asset building and land and water
rehabilitation, as opposed to other more nuanced interventions to enhance household
resilience, targeting specific needs and vulnerabilities. This has provided households and
communities with often critical assets to enhance their agricultural production, at times
with important secondary effects on non-economic factors. At the same time more
attention is to be paid to the implications of the way activities are designed, if they entail
risks or trade-offs for beneficiaries, and the way in which the quality and quantity of
assets distributed concretely affects outcomes.
• More could be done to factor in risk and protection at the community level, and to protect,
support and, to the extent possible, promote livelihoods, as is the case and according to
circumstances. In this sense there needs to be a greater effort to put in place mechanisms
to reduce the many and diverse risks and uncertainties faced by households in the WBGS,
and spread the costs they entail, for example when infrastructures are demolished.
• Though there is some acknowledgement of gender in FAO’s programming documents,
when it comes to design of activities there is still space for better consideration of how
these really affect women’s inclusion and empowerment, seeing the latter’s specific
conditions in relation to ownership and access to natural resources, and to their position
in the agricultural sector.
• RIMA and SEFSEC analyse and collect data at an aggregated level, which makes them
appropriate to orient the general direction of the country programme, as they provide
a wide analysis of the context and outline needs broadly. However, other tools and
mechanisms need to be in place to capture different and possibly more subtle and
context-specific information, to feed into a livelihood analysis conducive to better
understanding and better targeting of specific interventions.
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7. Recommendations
While the conclusions broadly follow the structure of the report and the evaluation questions,
the recommendations have a slightly different order: Recommendation 1 addresses issues
related to FAO’s strategic positioning in WBGS (Conclusion 1) and Recommendation 2 is related to
programming, including policy support and community level assistance (Conclusions 2, 3, and 4).
The remaining two, Recommendation 3 (on partnerships) and 4 (on support to the office in view
of its special status) address two specific topics which are dealt with throughout the report and
considered by the evaluation team as two areas requiring particular attention and deserving of
self-standing recommendations.
Recommendation 1. On strategic positioning in WBGS
a. General
Building on its successful and well-recognized strategic positioning in the WBGS, FAO
should continue in the same direction, while trying to improve some areas of weakness, as
detailed below:
b. Strategic framework
Market access and value chains are appropriate strategic frameworks to address resilience
considering FAO’s mandate and technical expertise, and the WBGS office’s adoption of
such an approach should provide learning for FAO as a whole.
In developing the strategy, however, in general more clarity should be reached between
livelihood promotion and protection objectives, which need to be suited to the context
and target group, both to inform programme activities and to refine targeting.
Strategic alignment with Strategic Objectives needs to be reviewed in light of the local
context that defines national priorities and funding resources available.
c. Doing technical work in a crisis context
FAO’s ability to engage with different aspects of the UN’s mission in Palestine
(developmental, humanitarian and political) by using its knowledge and its focus on
food security, natural resources, rural livelihoods and agricultural value chains constitutes
a positive example which can shed light on FAO’s potential to perform in difficult and
constrained environments.
This stance is also consistent with FAO’s commitments to use its technical entry point
towards peace building, as encouraged by Kofi Annan at the meeting of Elders convened at
FAO headquarters, and outlined in the corporate guidelines on food security in protracted
crises.
Attention to protection threats should be made more explicit to better understand the
causes of livelihood vulnerability, and the multiple links between livelihoods and protection.
One way for FAO to strengthen its focus on protection is to link up and coordinate more
with protection actors: much work and analyses exist on the links between protection and
agricultural activities and livelihoods which may be tapped into. Not tapping into this existing
wealth of work, efforts, resources and capacities would mean missing an opportunity, and
risks reducing effectiveness and appropriateness of FAO WBGS interventions.
d. Coordination and consistency between humanitarian and development work
FAO should continue to play a role in coordinating and bridging development
and humanitarian work. The link between humanitarian and development should
be mainstreamed in all activities and coordination efforts, including programme
formulation, implementation, Food Security Sector and Working Group coordination.
Ensuring the link between the two sides of FAO’s work includes investing resources
directly, for example by dedicating at least part of a staff member’s time to this. Greater
efforts to plan for contingencies and systematically put in place crisis modifiers would
also contribute to this end, as would mitigation activities towards recurrent weather-
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related events affecting farmers. Preliminary stocktaking of situations under threat could
be carried out as part of preparedness activities.
A caveat to all this is that resource partners would need to secure funds to this aim, aligning
with ‘bridging interventions’ without an exclusive humanitarian or development focus, aware
that this would result in greater effectiveness and sustainability of their investments in WBGS.
Recommendation 2. On programming
a. General
Though the office is to be commended for its ongoing efforts to adopt an increasingly
programmatic and harmonized approach, more systematic integration between analysis,
programming and M&E is recommended.
In a context of declining resources, it is vital to increase efficiency by promoting synergies
between projects and activities. However, this requires dedicated resources, and donors
need to be more open to support activities whose benefits go beyond the projects they
fund directly to allow, among other things, greater focus on strategic activities and policy.
b. Analysis
To improve the effectiveness and sustainability of interventions, but also their
ongoing relevance and timeliness, more attention is needed to ensure that design and
implementation of project activities is robust and technically sound, based on a solid
analysis of the context (social, economic, political) and making sure that technical and
financial resources are available for preliminary assessments and studies. The following are
some more specific suggestions:
• An investment in more rigorous community level analysis to underpin FAO WBGS
programming is strongly recommended. This would entail better and consistent
communication directly with beneficiaries at the early stages of engagement to inform
the analysis and gain a better understanding of the characteristics of vulnerable groups,
which in turn would result in more accurate targeting. More use should be made of FAO’s
staff knowledge of the context to inform these analyses.
• Consider including a needs analysis complemented by a more robust problem analysis
and related detailed response options in key programme strategies and documents, to
outline the choices open to FAO and the rationale for targeting, delivery modalities and
activities selected.
• Consider carrying out an in-depth study, ideally using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative research methods, to gain a better understanding of the impacts of the
different interventions implemented at the household and community levels. Further
development of the M&E system and related indicators would provide a useful basis for
identifying areas of investigation for such study.
• Undertake a gender analysis to understand the conditions of women in relation to the
areas of FAO’s work. This could be used to inform all interventions and maximize their
relevance in terms of women’s inclusion, empowerment and access to natural resources.
• A thorough analysis of the business model promoted by FAO should be carried out,
including a comparison between different models such as marketing cooperatives’
products through private companies or trade channels or directly through cooperatives.
• In-depth ex ante and ex post market analyses need to be carried out, including
systematically collecting baseline data to ensure relevance and effectiveness of FAO
interventions in this domain. Such assessments need to factor in needs of different
producer and livelihoods groups, including marginal groups and individuals, their position
in the market and the risks they are exposed to, and the power relations between actors
through a political economy lens. At the same time, undertaking a proper value chain
analysis would be extremely useful. Tracking production costs along the value chain from
field to fork would help identify the crops to be selected for farmers’ production.
c. Policy support
The positive role of FAO WBGS support to policies and institutions in this context has
already been mentioned, and constitutes an encouragement to continue this kind of
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
assistance. However, seeing that constrained government capacity risks affecting the
sustainability of results in the policy dimension, FAO should support - and advocate for the necessary institutional capacities to be in place for policies to be translated into action.
This would include enhanced coordination among institutions and with external actors,
and strengthening capacities to generate, manage and use information of the line ministry,
beyond the production of statistics. Furthermore, in perspective FAO should promote the
functions of policy development to be increasingly embedded within Palestinian institutions
and owned by them. To this end, FAO should pay more attention to complementary activities
to its capacity development work such as awareness raising and training on soft skills for
individuals, together with initiatives to strengthen their organizational capacities and create
more systematic and better links between technical assistance and capacity development.
Considering the importance of this area of work, resource partners should reverse the
decline in funding for this sector, invest more in policy and capacity development and, by
supporting FAO to fulfil its mandate, contribute to Palestinian State-building efforts.
Furthermore, this area of WBGS’ work provides the lesson for FAO corporate that
supporting institutions in difficult contexts may produce concrete gains towards peace
building. Future work supporting food security information systems will also need to shift
to more comprehensive systems and include more research, technical support and financial
commitments in order to cover a wide range of agricultural data.
d. Access to markets
Finding ways to enhance access to markets should be a preoccupation of all FAO activities
involving farmers, including those targeting more vulnerable households, focusing more
on Terms of Trade and marketing problems, especially in view of competition from settler
farmers and Palestinian agribusiness companies. In particular, FAO needs to address the
imbalance between producers and traders to empower the former to negotiate favourable
prices, possibly continuing to encourage farmers to organize in cooperatives, when
appropriate, and engage in addressing gaps over rural financing services. Local markets
should be supported in order to reduce farmers’ post-harvest losses and encourage the
marketing of Palestinian higher quality produce. To this end, working at the consumer end
of the value chain through sensitization and awareness campaigns would enhance the
competitiveness of local high quality production.
e. Community level assistance and cash transfers
While relating to the global debate on cash, including donor preference for cash or inkind assistance, FAO should better clarify and communicate the rationale for its choice of
assistance modalities - cash or in kind -, and make explicit the alignment with the overall
objective of resilience-building. Some guidance can be sought from the cash transfer team at
headquarters, which provides trainings to this end. Market assessments could be carried out
to this end, complemented by a study aimed at understanding what kind of risk mitigation
measures are needed to reduce the potential costs borne by beneficiaries of cash responses.
The relevance and appropriateness of conditional cash transfers in this context need to be
better analysed and communicated: FAO should consider its own positioning in WBGS in
relation to cash assistance, and while finding its own niche, also optimize its partnerships
with other agencies more engaged in cash, all the time ensuring that administrative/
financial tools are available at corporate level to implement cash-based activities.
The relevance and effectiveness of livelihood activities as well as the gender dimension of
FAO’s work could be improved through fuller use of participatory and community-building
methods in project preparation, design and implementation. FAO WBGS should continue
to adhere to FAO’s commitment to Accountability to Affected Populations principles,
including reinforcing the possibility for beneficiaries to provide feedback, and having
mechanisms in place to redress complaints.
f. M&E
An intrinsic limit to measuring the effectiveness of FAO’s interventions at household level
has been the lack of project and programme baselines and endlines. Better monitoring data
than currently available would allow greater precision in assessing increases in agricultural
productivity, for example by using the farm records which are a requirement for the Global
Gap. Likewise, improved monitoring of gender progress based on gender-sensitive analysis
of interventions would contribute to improve women’s inclusion and empowerment. In
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
line with the positive effort so far to streamline M&E processes among various projects
and implementation processes, the WBGS office should continue to review its current tools
and continue building the stand-alone unit established in 2015, enhancing capacity for
long term impact analysis, dedicating technical and financial support to this. At the same
time M&E resources from projects should also be used to build local capacity. Updating the
livelihood profiles that underpin FAO’s programming is expensive and time consuming. A
possible solution to maximize the benefits of such high costs is for FAO to turn this into an
FSS exercise considering that livelihood profiling could be a useful tool for everyone in the
food security and agriculture sectors.
Recommendation 3. On support to the office in view of its special status
a. General
Seeing the important role played by the office and its overall excellent performance over
time, the growth of the programme and the impossibility to access regular programme
funds for exogenous reasons independent of its performance, FAO corporate needs to
attentively think through how to ensure that the office can continue to play such role by
finding ways to channel the necessary financial and technical resources. Resources should
be made available in support of functions that are not project-specific, and in particular
M&E, accountability, needs assessments, programme formulation, and in order to address
some present weaknesses, particularly in project development and communication.
b. Financial support
As long as FAO WBGS is expected to bear the duties/responsibilities of a Representation, it
is recommended that headquarters endow the office with the resources required to carry
out said duties. The general principle should be full cost recovery for any action that the
office is required to undertake, in so far as possible leaving the office the flexibility to decide
how to use the funds accrued from delivering any service. To achieve greater efficiency,
ideally FAO should follow the concept of hard budget constraint for each cost centre in the
way it allocates and manages funds for country offices, including the special case of WBGS.
Suggestions to increase financial support include:
• Seconding staff from the Regular Programme according to demand from WBGS in order
to help it with its core functions and the policy and normative dimension of work.
• Pay as you go (model applied over the course of this evaluation, where the office is
reimbursed for services or hours spent on specific non-project tasks).
• FAO headquarters should look into the possibility of allotting a different share of Project
Support Cost to the field offices that do not benefit from an annual allocation of staff
and resources from the Regular Programme. This is especially the case when projects
with non-standard PSC are accepted, as the reduced rate is detrimental for FAO’s ability
to successfully implement projects at field level.
c. Technical support:
FAO WBGS has demonstrated it is possible to engage in positive and fruitful relationships
with technical officers at headquarters, providing a good example of how relationships can
work between country offices and headquarters which should be replicated. A strong case
can be made for more technical support to FAO WBGS being provided from headquarters
rather than the Regional Office, the main reason being that strong and specialized technical
skills are necessary to assist in drafting legislative frameworks and in general for strategic
action (assessments, evaluations, capacity building, M&E, communications, assessments
and studies) and these are not presently available in the Regional Office. Furthermore, the
nationality of many officers in RNE does not allow them to travel through Israel, making the
support process from the Regional Office more complicated.
Recommendation 4. On partnerships
a. General
The office in practice enters into different partnerships, and partners participate in FAO
activities to different degrees (e.g. projects and Country Programming Framework
formulation, country analysis, workshops, etc.). However, this is not reflected in formal
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
terms due to the complexity of the legal aspects of contractual arrangements, and even
informally there is space for FAO to work more and better with its partners. In order to
maximize the use of partners’ capacities through more flexible partnership mechanisms
and more direct and equal involvement of partners throughout its work, FAO corporate
should create simpler and more actionable legal instruments to put true partnerships in
place, beyond the two presently existing modalities (OPIM and MoU). This would also
respond to donors’ frequent demand for more equal partnerships, which echo the same
kind of request from many NGOs.
More systematic headquarters guidance, which could take the form of training, is
recommended to improve capacity to negotiate with governments and build trusting
partnerships with resource partners.
b. Palestinian Government
Governmental entities need to be fully committed and involved for their partnership with
FAO to be effective, and on the other hand FAO should make sure that the CPF is a fully
nationally owned process to guarantee its uptake.
To ensure long term effects of its technical assistance, FAO should aim to equip the
Government with the capacity to undertake tasks autonomously and include the
development of an exit strategy as part of its capacity development strategy in the WBGS.
Important areas on which FAO should focus its support to the Palestinian Government
include technical innovations, rural finance, nutrition sensitive agro-food systems and
safe agriculture, as well as enhancing MoA capacity to support preparedness of farmers
to respond to seasonal challenges, and in general involving the government more in
community level assistance. Ensuring coordination and synergies with the Ministry of
Health could be important in areas such as food safety, zoonoses and antimicrobial
resistance.
c. United Nations Agencies
Better and more complementary collaboration with UN agencies can be sought, for
example in partnering with UNRWA and WFP on cash-based interventions, where FAO
could potentially add value by facilitating a better match between supply and demand
for example by intensifying efforts to link farmers’ cooperatives and retailers accepting
food vouchers, with ILO on activities involving labour force and the labour market, on SPS
(human/animal health interfaces) and coordinating on activities undertaken with the MoH
(see above) with WHO facilitating synergies on activities involving the food industry and
in regard to laboratory development with UNIDO, and liaising with UNDP on its livelihood
portfolio.
d. NGOs/IPs/CSOs
To comply with FAO’s corporate stance on partnerships, and to tailor partnership
agreements and modalities to specific circumstances that arise, in partnering with NGOs/
CBOs, FAO should clarify the respective roles and responsibilities, and whether the
relationship is one of true partnership or of service provision, and use different contractual
instruments accordingly. FAO could, for example, simplify the process of establishing a
Memorandum of Understanding with national NGOs, and at the same time find ways to
accelerate it when partnering with international NGOs. These steps would also be a means
to establish a full partnership rather than confining NGOs to service provision. At the same
time, the recently established OPIM instrument is already in need of simplification in order
to be easily utilized. An in-depth assessment and analysis of the NGO sector in Palestine
would be useful and conducive to define compatibility of existing potential partners with
the use of a LoA or OPA mechanisms.
The added value each partner brings should be considered, especially seeing that partners
are often in the position to fill gaps in knowledge and capacity. In this sense, FAO should
strive to create synergies rather than working in competition, and build their capacities
rather than consider them as implementers exclusively.
e. Private sector
Considering FAO’s market-focused strategy and its work on value chains, FAO should
clarify who the different actors it engages with are, and find ways to regulate conditions of
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
partnership with them. While these partners are often grouped under the label of private
sector, in reality they constitute a very varied group whose different characteristics should
be taken into account in programming more than FAO has done up to now, since this
would make the partnerships far more effective and satisfactory for all. For example, in
exploring partnership opportunities, FAO should consider enhancing inclusiveness of the
developmental process of small and vulnerable holders, an area of work that is not yet fully
valorized. This would involve carrying out the kind of market assessment recommended
above (see Recommendation 2), to understand the position in the market of different
producer and livelihoods groups, the risks they are exposed to, and the power relations
between them. To guide action it is recommended that a research surveying the potential
of Public/Private Partnerships in the context of WBGS is undertaken.
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 1: List of People met
FAO WBGS Office
Name
Role/Organization
Ciro Fiorillo
Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator, Head
of Office, FAO WBGS Office
Azzam Saleh Ayasa
Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator, Head of
Programme, FAO WBGS Office
Rana Hannoun
Economist, FAO WBGS Office
Amjad Abu Jalboush
Deputy Project Manager, Ramallah, FAO WBGS Office
Amro Kalouti
Deputy Project Manager, Ramallah, FAO WBGS Office
Husam Al Hudhud
Deputy Project Manager, Ramallah, FAO WBGS Office
Nasser Samara
Deputy Project Manager, Ramallah, FAO WBGS Office
Cornelis Hendrikusvan Kessel
Deputy Project Manager, FAO WBGS Office
Ruben Baert
Disaster Risk Reduction Advisor Consultant, FAO WBGS
Office
Mira Ansari
Programme Support Assistant, FAO WBGS Office
Intissar Eshtayah
Programme Support Associate, FAO WBGS Office
Priya Gujadhur
Operations Officer, FAO WBGS Office
Masae Sumikoshi
Programme Coordinator, Gaza, FAO WBGS Office
Masoud Keshta
Project Coordinator, Gaza, FAO WBGS Office
Adham Elkhateeb
Deputy Project Manager, Gaza, FAO WBGS Office
FAO HQs
98
Name
Role/Organization
Rodrigo De La Puerta
Director, Office of Support to Decentralized Offices (OSD),
FAO
Dario Gilmozzi
Senior Programme Officer, OSD, FAO
Daniel Gustafson
Deputy Director General Programmes, FAO
Patrick Jacqueson
Senior Programme Officer, SP5, FAO
Jimmy Owani
Emergency and Rehabilitation Programme Officer,
Emergency Rehabilitation Division (TCE), FAO
Luca Russo
Programme Coordinator, SO5, FAO
Rodrigue Vinet
Senior Programme Officer, Officer in Charge, Liaison
Office with the United Nations in Geneva (LOG), FAO
Carmen Bullon
Legal Officer, Development Law Branch (LEGN), FAO
Ahmed El Idrissi
Senior Animal Health Officer, SP5, FAO
Markus Lipp
Senior Food Safety Officer, Food Safety and Quality
(AGFF), FAO
Hilde Kruse
Food Safety and Quality Officer, AGFF, FAO
Martin Heilmann
Food Safety and Quality Consultant, AGFF, FAO
Mischa Tripoli
Economist, Trade and Markets Division (EST), FAO
May Hani
Policy Officer, Social Protection Division (ESP), FAO
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Turi Fileccia
Senior Agronomist, Investment Centre (TCI), FAO
Andre Ariazza
Office for Partnerships, Advocacy and Capacity
Development – Advocacy Unit, FAO (former Operations
officer in FAO WBGS Office)
Cyril Ferrand
Food Security Cluster Global Coordinator, FAO (former
Officer in Charge of FAO WBGS Office)
David Calef
Cash Transfer Programming Coordinator, TCE, FAO
Julius Jackson
Technical Officer, Agricultural Development Economics
Division (ESA), FAO
Sylvie Wabbes Candotti
Liaison and Operations Officer, TCE, FAO
Nina Koeksalan
Climate Change Officer, Climate and Environment
Division (CBC), FAO
FAO RNE Office
Name
Role/Organization
Francesco Del Re
Senior Adviser, SP5, FAO
Alfredo Impiglia
Project Coordinator (Small Scale Agriculture in the Near
East Regional Initiative), RNE, FAO
Fawzi Karajeh
Senior Water Resources Officer, RNE, FAO
Tatjana PopovicManenti
Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, RNE, FAO
Pasquale Steduto
Deputy Regional Representative, Sub Regional
Coordinator, RNE, FAO
National Institutions (central and decentralised level)
Name
Role/Organization
Abdel-Karim Qassem
Mayor of the Municipality of Tamoon
Amjad Elayat
Head of land development division, Ministry of
Agriculture - Directorate of Agriculture of Tubas
Jamal Mohammed Abu Arra
Mayor of the Municipality of Aqaba
Yousuf Ghanam
Director of the municipality of Aqqaba
Kamel Abu Kaida
Um Al Nasser Municipality
Adel Attala
Head of Planning and Policies department, Ministry of
Agriculture, Gaza
Samer Titi
Head of Planning, MoA, Ramallah
Abdallah Q. Lahllouh
Deputy Minister, MoA
Dr Zakareia Salawdeh
Assistant Deputy Minister at Ministry of Agriculture, Gaza
Dr Ibrahim al-Qudra
Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Gaza
Safa Bsiso
Rural Development Officer, Ministry of Agriculture
Issam Nofal
D.G. of Agricultural Water & Irrigation at Ministry of
Agriculture, Palestine
Ibtisam Abu Al Hayja
Ministry of Agriculture
Khaled Barghouti
Deputy General Director, Combating Poverty Directorate,
Minister of Social Affairs
Dr. Rami Al Nakhal
Head of Veterinary Laboratory, Ministry of Agriculture,
Gaza
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Majed Aswed
Forest & Pastures division manager, MoA, Hebron
Amjad Salah
General Director of Plant Protection, MoA
Shadi Darweesh
Director of Plant quarantine and Phytosanitary
Measurements, MoA
Tareq Abu Laban
Director of Marketing, MoA
Izzidin Abu Arqub
Chief, International Relations Unit, National Agricultural
Research Centre, MoA
Hadeel Abushalbak
International Relations Advisor, Palestinian Central
Bureau for Statistics (PCBS)
Haleema Saeed
International Relations Director, PCBS
Mustafa Khawaja
SEFSec Survey, PCBS
Reham Mualla
International Relations Directorate, PCBS
Aseel Zidan
Head of Consumer Price Index Division, PCBS
Shadia Abu Alzain
Director of Agriculture Statistics Department, PCBS
Ahmad Mardawi
Natural Resources Statistics and Land Use Division, PCBS
Ashraf Samara
Price Statistics, PCBS
Nibal Ismael
Cartography and GIS department, PCBS
Adel Yasin
Palestinian Water Authority
NGOs and CBOs
100
Name
Role/Organization
Fuad Abu Seif
Acting General Director, Director, Operations and
Development Department Union of Agricultural Work
Committees (UAWC)
Islam Nairoukh
Project Manager, Union of Agricultural Work Committees
(UAWC)
Basheet Al Ankah
Projects Manager, Union of Agricultural work committees
(UWAC)
Mohamed Motaweh
Project Coordinator, UWAC
Baha’a Abu Baker
Area coordinator, Union of Agricultural work committees
(UWAC)
Saleh Al Ahmed
Project coordinator (High Value Crops), Union of
Agricultural work committees (UWAC)
Mohammad Al Bakri
Executive Director, UAWC, Gaza
Manager for Rafah branch
UAWC, Gaza
Khalil Shila
General Director, Palestinian Agriculture Relief
Committee (PARC)
Izzat Zeidan
Programs and Projects Director, Palestinian Agriculture
Relief Committee (PARC)
Abdelrahman Tamimi
Palestinian Hydrology Group - PHG
Mohammad Musa
Project Coordinator, ESDC
Akram Al-Taher
General Director, Economic & Social Development Centre
of Palestine - ESDC
Jamal Burnat
Monitoring & Evaluation Manager, Economic & Social
Development Centre of Palestine - ESDC
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Imad Ghanmeh
Soil and land development expert, House of Water and
Environment
Hanan Taha
CEO, Palestine Trade Centre (PalTrade)
Mai Jarrar
Young Men’s Christian Association - YMCA
Mohammed Khaled
Country Director, We Effect
Eman Beseiso
Project Manager, International Trade Centre
Mohamed Sawafta
Food Security and Livelihood Country Coordinator,
Oxfam GB
Lidia Hernandez
Humanitarian Programme Coordinator, Oxfam Italia
Elena Qleibo
Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator, Oxfam GB
Ingrid Beauquis
Project Development Officer, ACTED
Asia Khalil
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ACTED, ex Project Manager
David Makin-Taylor
Technical Coordinator, Action Against Hunger/ACF-Spain
Marina Djernaes
Executive Operations Officer, EcoPeace/FOEME
Mir’i Shawahneh
Palestinian Livestock Development Centre - PLDC
Maha Al Masri
Rural Women Development Society (RWDS)
Mr. Khaled A. Abu Sharekh
General Manager, ALNajd Developmental Forum, Gaza
Ms. Refqa Al Hammalawi
Head of Board, ALNajd Developmental Forum, Gaza
Mr. Mohammed Al Jaja
Project Manager, ALNajd Developmental Forum, Gaza
Raed Jalal
Marketing Supervisor of the Agricultural National
Company for Investment & Marketing
Jumana Salous
Programs Manager, Business Women Forum - Palestine
Doa Waddi
Executive Director, Business Women Forum - Palestine
Mohamed Abu S’aied
Head of Burgin agricultural cooperative, Packing house in
Burqin
Sawsan Sawafta
Responsible for the One Shop Stop in Jenin, Managing
partner of
Al Thimar company (Women Cooperative)
Iyad Malouh
Chair, Thinnabeh Agricultural Services Cooperative
(TASC)
Amal Nasser
Chair, Kafr Laqef society (KLS)
Several members
Burqa Women Club
Several members
Rozana Cooperative
Several members
Dura women Cooperative
Several members
Kafr Laqef society (KLS)
Other stakeholders
Name
Role/Organization
Amer Madi
Managing Partner, Al-Sahel Company for Institutional
Development and Communication
Hilel Adiri
Economist, former Advisor to the Israeli Min. of
Agriculture (acted as FAO Senior Technical Marketing
Advisor)
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Nadav Galon
Director of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development, Israel
Boaz Karni
Managing Director &Treasurer, Economic Cooperation
Foundation (ECF), Israel
Tamar Tsamir Tandler
Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation,
Israel
Raymond Ellard
Consultant on SPS project, Director, Food Safety
Authority of Ireland
Camilla Corradin
Advocacy Task Force (ATF) coordinator, EWASH
Resource Partners
Name
Role/Organization
Carlo Marsico
Task Manager for FAO Projects, European Union
Jochen Peters
Aid Coordination Officer (Economic Sector), Local Aid
Coordination Secretariat (LACS)
Wijnand Marchal
Senior Advisor, Representative of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority
Thameen Hijawi
Senior Advisor, First Secretary Economic Affairs,
Netherlands to the Palestinian Authority
Jesús Tomé
Senior Programme Manager, Rural and Economic
Development, Agencia española de Cooperacion
Internacional para el Desarrollo - AECID
Buraq Nuseibeh
UK Department for International Development - DFID,
Senior Policy and Programme Officer, Palestinian
Programme
Karine Tardif
First Secretary (Humanitarian Assistance), Representative
Office of Canada
Naela Shawar
Development Officer, Representative Office of Canada
Tania Abdullah
National Officer, Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC)
Ayman Daraghmeh
Senior Programme Manager, Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC)
Yuki Igarashi
Second secretary, Embassy of Japan in Israel
Jochen Peters
Aid Coordination Officer (Economic Sector), Local Aid
Coordination Secretariat (LACS)
Task Manager for FAO
Projects
Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
AG sector meeting
UN Agencies
102
Name
Role/Organization
Michael Neuwirth
Coordination Officer, UN Special Coordinator Office
(UNSCO)
Sabine Michel
Head of UN Women
Reine Van Holsbeek
Associate Programme Support Officer, United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA)
Dima Abu-Alsaud
Field Emergency Officer West Bank (acting), UNRWA
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Salah Al Lahham
Programme Officer (VAM)/Deputy Head of PSU Unit,
WFP
Marco Ferloni
Food Security Sector Coordinator
Samira Hiliss
Senior Operations Officer and Project Team Leader World Bank
Rima Abumiddain
UNDP, Team Leader, Environment and Natural Resources
PAP
Matthew Ryder
OCHA, Inter-cluster coordinator (WB coordinator)
Rasha ElShurafa
Senior Programme Officer and Acting Deputy
Representative, ILO
Mounir Kleibo
Representative, ILO
Nasser Al-Faqih
Team Leader for Poverty Reduction & Productive Capital,
UNDP
Mohammed Sinokrot
National Officer, UNWOMEN
Nur Nasser Eddin
Economist, World Bank Group
Mattia Polvanesi
Programme Support Officer, UNRWA, Gaza
Gerald Rockenschaub
Head of Office, WHO Occupied Palestinian Territory
Roberto Valent
Special representative of the Administrator, Programme
of assistance to the Palestinian People (PAPP), UNDP
Palestinian Territory
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Appendix 2: List of documents consulted
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Amnesty International. 2009. Troubled Waters: Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water.
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B’teselem. 2002. Land Grab. Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank (also available at https://
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Brown, O. and Crawford, A., 2009. Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions. Climate change and
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Committee on World Food Security (CFS). 2015. Framework for Action for Food Security and
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Committee on world food security. 2015. Strengthening resilience for food security and
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Dittli, R. 2011. International assistance in Gaza: aiding fragmentation or unity? A view
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Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene group (EWASH) and Al-Haq. 2011. Israel’s
violations of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with regard
to the human rights to water and sanitation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Joint Parallel
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to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the occasion of the consideration
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cescr/docs/ngos/EWASH-Al-Haq_Israel_CESCR47.pdf)
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FAO. 2008. Junior Farmer Field and Life Schools come to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO
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FAO. 2009. West Bank and Gaza Strip. Bridging Emergency and Development. Proposed
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Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 3: Evaluation Matrix
Issues / Questions
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
Data collection
methods and
sources
Q1: Is FAO’s strategy, considering its mandate and its Strategic Framework, relevant and
effective in WBGS?
o Literature review
1. Analysis of internal coherence of the
1.1 Design of
and analysis
conceptual frameworks used and of their
programmes
of programme
relevance to the stated goals/objectives.
(POA to PF)
and project
– is the TOC /
2. Comparative analysis of how the
Logframe well
resilience-building objective translates into documents.
designed to
o Literature on
programme design. Is resilience framed
reach its goals?
resilience and
in terms of target groups, kind of assets
How do the
analysis of
delivered or by addressing processes?
two strategic
evolution from
3. Consistency of theoretical framework and
frameworks
PoA to PF
appropriateness to the goal of building
compare?
o Comparative
resilience.
analysis of
4. Assessment of inclusion of changing
programme
context in the evolution from the PoA to
documents
the PF.
o
Interviews with
5. Assessment of the outcomes (positive and
FAO WBGS Staff
negative) resulting from the addressing
(Previous and
contextual factors, or failing to do so, in
present)
the design of the programme
6.
1.2
Analysis – is the 1.
strategy based
on an adequate
analysis? Does
2.
the analysis take
into account
all the relevant
3.
factors?
4.
5.
6.
110
Evidence of inclusion of DRR in programme
design, and eventually of relevance and
appropriateness to context
Evidence of appropriateness of analysis
conducted and of relevance to context and
to goals.
Evidence of needs and situation analysis
having been carried out and eventually
integrated into the programme’s design.
Evidence of integration of different levels
(household, community, livelihood group,
political) in the analysis
Evidence of inclusion of crosscutting
issues such as gender and environmental
sustainability in the analysis.
Assessment of whether the value chain
model is an appropriate outcome of the
analysis through evidence of regained
and boosted productive capacities and/or
preservation of assets (resilience).
Assessment of how FAO bridges the gap
between humanitarian and development
through a value chain approach, and
whether risks are distributed along the
value chain.
o Review of the
UNDAF and HPC
documents
o Interview with
FAO staff
o SWOT Analysis
o Interview with
government
officials from
MoA
o Interview
with the Food
Security Sector
Coordinator
o Analysis of data
collected by the
FSS
o Fieldwork
o Review of
FAO WBGS
programming
documents
(including
livelihood
profiles, gender
work plan, etc.)
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Issues / Questions
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
1.3
1.
To what extent
are the FAO
emergency and
development
projects in the
protracted
crisis of WBGS
relevant and
connected?
2.
3.
1.4
1.
To what extent
does the strategy
incorporate
2.
and integrate
the corporate
Strategic
3.
Framework?
4.
5.
6.
Data collection
methods and
sources
o Interviews with
Ability to “transition” or two way LRRD
Gaza Households
a. Ability to respond in emergency, to
o Fieldwork,
scale up and/or modify interventions
interviews with
and effectiveness and impact thereof
beneficiaries
i. Evidence of FAO’s preparedness for
crisis and deteriorating food security o Interviews with
implementing
ii. Evidence of the relevance and
partners
timeliness of FAO’s response
o
Review of project
iii. Evidence of the effectiveness
documents and
of FAO’s response including
progress/final
project delivery, quality and
reports
appropriateness of provided
o Interviews with
inputs, and quality of technical
FAO staff
information and support provided
to beneficiaries.
o Interview with
stakeholders and
iv. Evidence of coverage, analysis
humanitarian
of FAO’s approach to targeting,
actors, including
against available information and
UN agencies
knowledge on the most affected
areas and population groups
o interview with
resource partners
a. Evidence of having incorporated
developmental elements in
o Review of
humanitarian action and effectiveness
FAO 2016 HPC
and impact thereof.
profiles
a. Evidence of having incorporated
o Desk review of
humanitarian elements in
prodocs and
developmental interventions, and
against transition
effectiveness and impact thereof
evaluation report
Evidence of how well FAO WBGS
management structure and systems
adapted to scaling up and responding
to emergencies and crisis peaks, and
identification of enabling and constraining
factors
Review of programme objectives and
outcomes in view of the recommendations
of the Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to
transition.
o Interviews with
Evidence of alignment of the PoA and PF
FAO WBGS Staff
strategies with the SOs.
o Interviews with
Evidence that the SOs have positively
FAO staff in RNE
influenced programme and project design
and implementation in the WBGS.
o Interviews with
MoA officials
Analysis of synergies and integration
(MoA, Mosa,
between SOs.
others);
Evidence of the programme’s alignment
with FAO’s global goals and core functions o Review of
MoA Strategic
Assessment of the outcomes of being
documents
involved in Regional Initiatives for the
WBGS programme, including evidence of o Review of
FAO WBGS
relevance of Regional Initiatives for the
programming
programme.
documents and
Evidence of any influence of SO5 on
evaluations
programme design, implementation, and
o SWOT Analysis
on the functioning of the WBGS office.
o Analysis
of project
documents and
progress reports
111
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Issues / Questions
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
1.5
1.
How effective
was FAO in
partnering with
other actors?
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1.6
1.
How does the
decentralisation
process affect
FAO’s work in
WBGS?
2.
3.
112
Data collection
methods and
sources
Assessment among partners of effectiveness o SWOT Analysis
of FAO’s role in coordination, including
o Interviews with
assessment of FAO’s capacity to maximise
UN and non UN
synergies and minimise duplication between
coordination
FAO’s and other actors’ interventions within
groups (FFS,
the food security sector.
AG Sector WG,
Advocacy and
Analysis of feedback from FAO’s IPs on the
Humanitarian
nature and quality of their relationship with
Working Groups)
FAO, triangulated with FAO staff feedback,
including:
o Interviews with
resource partners
a. Whether it was a relationship of service
provider or genuine partnership
o Interviews with
UN agencies
b. Accessibility and responsiveness of FAO to
IPs
o Analysis of
LoAs between
c. Whether partners received appropriate
FAO WBGS and
technical support
partners
Analysis of feedback from donors and FAO
o Review of FAO
staff on the nature and quality of their
WBGS donor
relationship, including:
brochures
a. Donor perceptions of FAO’s ability to
(background)
combine development and humanitarian
work and to scale up and respond rapidly o Interviews with
FAO WBGS Staff
and appropriately to the crisis
o Interviews with
b. FAO staff perceptions of the
government
responsiveness, flexibility and speed
officials (MoA,
of donors in providing resources when
Mosa, others);
needed and in response to sudden peaks
in humanitarian needs
o Review of other
UN Agencies’
c. Extent to which donors engage with FAO
evaluation
as a partner, or as a sub-contractor
reports
Analysis of feedback from government
departments and with FAO staff on the nature o Review of
Documents of
and quality of their relationship, including:
SRP HNO HPC
a. The provision of technical advice,
UNDAF
information and support to enable
o Review of
government to respond to the needs of
MoA Strategic
the Palestinian population
documents
b. Quality of the FAO longer-term
o Desk review
relationship with government
and analysis
Analysis of feedback from UN agencies and
of activities’
programmes on the nature of quality of their
portfolio
relationship, including:
a. The quality of the collaboration between o interviews with
NGOs, CBOs
the Rome-based agencies
(including
b. The modalities and quality of the
cooperatives)
collaboration with the agencies with a
humanitarian and political coordination
mandate (UNSCO, OCHA, UNDPR)
Evidence of alignment with UN strategies
Evidence of alignment with PA strategy
Assessment of the relevance and effectiveness
of the collaboration between the Rome-based
agencies on the resilience agenda.
Assessment of FAO’s relationship with civil
society, including whether it met civil society’s
needs and provided fora for exchange.
o Interviews with
Assess the effectiveness of the
FAO Staff in RNE
backstopping functions in RNE, and of the
and HQ
decentralisation of this function from HQ
to RNE.
o Interviews with
WBGS FAO staff
Evidence that FAO programme staff felt
technically adequately supported.
o SWOT Analysis
Identification of gaps in technical support.
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Issues / Questions
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
Data collection
methods and
sources
Q2: How does FAO position itself in the context of the protracted crisis in oPt? What are
the challenges and opportunities for FAO as a technical agency in this context, and to
what extent has it addressed and taken advantage of them?
o SWOT Analysis
2.1 Seeing that the 1. Perception of FAO’s staff regarding
effectiveness and efficiency of FAO’s office o Interviews with
office is not a
structure
representation,
FAO WBGS Staff;
how does the
2. Donors’ perception regarding effectiveness o Interviews with
office structure and efficiency of FAO’s office structure
resource partners
staffing, funding, 3. NGO perception regarding effectiveness
o
Interviews with
procedures
and efficiency of FAO’s office structure
NGOs, CBOs and
– affect FAO’s
implementing
4.
Assessment
of
negative
and
positive
work in WBGS?
partners
impacts, if any, of FAO’s office structure
What are the
on
capacity
to
work,
including
assessment
o
Interviews with
constraints and
of funding modalities, organigram and
FAO Staff in HQ
opportunities
reporting lines.
this creates?
How does FAO’s
modus operandi
affect its capacity
to work in
WBGS?
o Interviews with
1. Analysis of direct and indirect impact
2.2 What is the
UN Humanitarian
of FAO’s technical work on conflict and
impact of FAO’s
potential conflict management/resolution. and political
technical work
agencies Minutes
(in particular
2. Assessment of the relationship between
OCHA UNSCO
Land and Water,
FAO’s technical areas of work (e.g.
Cash Transfers
o Interviews with
agriculture, food security, land tenure,
and Vulnerable
HCT
NRM) and peace-building efforts.
Livelihoods,
o Interviews with
3. Analysis of feedback from concerned
Access to
FAO WBGS Staff
parties of FAO’s capacity to play a role
Markets) on the
as broker and in political advocacy, and
political context?
relevance thereof.
o Interviews with
1. Evidence of FAO working according to
2.3 Considering
actors in the FSS
its comparative advantage and accessing
the political
resources based on a leadership role in the o Review of
economy of the
technical areas of its expertise.
aid environment
FAO WBGS
in the context
programming
2. Evidence of FAO’s capacity to confront
of WBGS what
and project
contextual issues and incorporate them in
are FAO’s role
documents and
its programme and strategy.
and comparative 3. Evidence of FAO’s capacity to play a
progress/final
advantage,
reports
role in negotiating with the GoI and the
and what is
Palestinian Authority over technical issues o Interview with
its capacity to
resource partners
4. Assessment of how the volatile and
deliver?
o interviews with
insecure context and the multiple risks
FAO Staff
affect FAO’s capacity to deliver
5. Evidence of FAO’s capacity to differentiate
its interventions in WB and GS according
to different levels and kinds of risks.
6. Comparative analysis of FAO’s
engagement in other comparable
protracted crisis contexts.
113
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Issues / Questions
Data collection
methods and
sources
Q3: To what extent has the programme made progress in addressing the humanitarian
and developmental needs of Palestinians and their communities through agriculture,
going towards sustainable socio-economic growth, resilience and food security? What
have been the impacts of FAO’s work on livelihoods, on institutional capacity and on
crosscutting areas of work?
o Fieldwork,
1. Evidence of the coverage of FAO’s
3.1 According
interviews with
programme and analysis of its approach
to which
beneficiaries
to targeting, against available information
methodology
and knowledge on the most vulnerable
and criteria has
o Interviews with
populations and affected areas.
FAO targeted,
implementing
and were they
partners
2. Assessment of targeting according to
appropriate and
vulnerability and according to resilience
o Review of project
relevant in the
documents and
3. Assessment of the advantages and
context? Have
progress/final
trade-offs of adopting specific targeting
any exclusion
reports
modalities (i.e. targeting individuals,
and inclusion
cooperatives, communities)?
errors occurred
in the selection
of beneficiaries,
and if so,
what were the
consequences?
1. Analysis of the relevance of FAO’s activities o Review of
3.2 To what extent
FAO WBGS
(in different areas) considering the needs
and how were
programming
and the stated outcomes.
FAO’s activities
documents and
relevant to
2. Evidence of links between activities and
evaluations
the goal of
overarching goal of achieving economic
addressing
o Analysis
growth, greater resilience and food
humanitarian
of project
security.
and
documents and
3. Evidence of coherence between activities
development
progress/final
and stated goals, and of the link being
needs, towards
reports
based on appropriate analysis.
socio-economic
o ST reports
4.
Evidence
of
projects
designed
according
to
growth,
o Review of
context and needs
resilience and
5. Evidence of inclusion of DRR in programme UNDAF, HRP, PA
food security?
documents
and project design, and eventually of
relevance and appropriateness to context
6. Assessment of how the risk analysis
in the PoA translated into design and
implementation
7. Assessment of FAO’s capacity to
differentiate the design of its interventions
in WB and GS according to different levels
and kinds of risks
8. Evidence of inclusion of beneficiaries’
perspectives into project cycle.
114
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Issues / Questions
3.3
3.4
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
Data collection
methods and
sources
o Fieldwork
1. Evidence of the effect of participation of
Are HH more
beneficiaries on outcome of projects. (e.g. o Analysis of the
able to cope,
cash assistance)
anticipate,
Mid-term review
accommodate,
of PF and mid2. Analysis of the wider positive and
absorb, recover
negative, intended and unintended impact term and final
from crises and
review of PoA
of interventions on the life of beneficiaries
shocks in an
(equity, dignity)
o Interviews
efficient and
with MoA and
3. Assessment of household capacity to
sustainable
other national
cope, absorb and recover from shocks and
manner? How
institutions
crises because of FAO’s interventions, and
have FAO
eventually of the sustainability of such
interventions
enhanced capacity.
affected specific
4.
Assessment of FAO’s capacity to work at
population
different levels (household, livelihood
groups (e.g.
group, community, political) to build
women, herders,
resilience, considering the interactions
fisher people,
between these levels.
IDPs)?
5. Analysis of the effectiveness of FAO’s
strategy to build resilience of households.
How were
6.
Evidence of improved resilience through
institutions
the comparison of current situation of
supported to
households with baseline data.
enhance their
7. Evidence of MoA’s and other institutional
capacity and
actors’ increased capacity at the individual,
develop their
organisational and enabling environment
policies?
level.
8. Evidence of increased ownership of the
development process following FAO’s
capacity development activities.
9. Evidence of new and more effective
strategies and normative products being
developed in the areas of FAO’s mandate
following FAO’s support.
10. Evidence that FAO is supporting
government to implement food security
and agriculture policies that address
resilience.
11. Evidence that FAO is building national
and local capacity to reduce and manage
agriculture and food security risks.
12. Evidence of support to information
systems and capacity development of the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in
line with SO6.
1. Assessment of the use of the RIMA and of o SWOT;
How is the
the impact of its use on the programme
monitoring
o interviews with
cycle (design, implementation, M&E)
function
FAO WBGS Staff
incorporated in 2. Analysis of feedback from stakeholders
o Interviews with
programme and
on FAO’s measurement tools (donors, UN
Uother UN
implemented,
partners, PCBS, PA, IPs)
Agencies
and which
3. Assessment of whether lessons arising
o
Ananysis of
relevant lessons
from past activities were incorporated into
programme
were learned in
present ones, and whether this has been
reviews and final
the process?
done in a systematic fashion.
reports
4. Assessment of the office’s monitoring
capacity.
115
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
116
Issues / Questions
Criteria of judgement/ indicators
3.5
1.
Were the crosscutting areas
of work such
as appropriate
gender
focus and
environmental
sustainability
sufficiently
addressed in the
implementation
of the
programme?
2.
3.
4.
5.
Evidence of integration of gender
components in FAO projects.
Analysis of FAO’s performance against
FAO’s corporate commitments on AAP and
gender
Assessment of the relevance and
usefulness of the AAP and gender markers
against project results.
Evidence of any unintended negative
impacts of FAO’s activities on the
environment.
Assessment of environmental sustainability
of FAO’s activities.
Data collection
methods and
sources
o Analysis of
factsheets and
case studies
produced by FAO
WBGS on gender
o SWOT
o Analysis of
activities’
portfolio
and project
documents
o Review of the
analysis of the
mid-term review
of PoA
o interviews with
FAO staff in
WBGS and RNE
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 4: List of Country, Regional and Global
Projects
Project Symbol
Country Projects
MTF /GAZ/008/OSF
OSRO/GAZ/001/BEL
OSRO/GAZ/002/UNO
OSRO/GAZ/003/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/005/SPA
OSRO/GAZ/007/BEL
OSRO/GAZ/008/ITA
OSRO/GAZ/009/AED
OSRO/GAZ/010/NOR
OSRO/GAZ/102/UK
OSRO/GAZ/103/CHA
OSRO/GAZ/104/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/105/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/106/BEL
OSRO/GAZ/108/EC
Project Title
Actual EOD Actual NTE
Total Budget
(DWH)
Pilot aquaponics use for improved food
availability in the Gaza Strip
Mitigation of household food insecurity
through backyard production and
women and youth socio-economic
empowerment in the West Bank
Livelihood Protection and Sustainable
Empowerment of Vulnerable Rural and
Refugee Families in the Jordan Valley
Through Integrated Income Generating
Interventions
Protection of livelihoods of small
ruminant herders and promotion of
better herd management in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip
Emergency assistance to protect the
livelihoods of vulnerable farming
families and rural women through
restoration of horticultural production
and household food production in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip
Emergency food production support to
poor families in the Gaza Strip
Emergency support to protect
agriculture-based livelihoods in the
pastoral areas of the West Bank
Project to Calculate Food Acquisition
to Estimate the Daily Adult Equivalent
Food Intake at Governorate level in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip
Support to reduce the impact of food
insecurity for Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip
Beneficiary Impact Assessment Survey
Using Resilience Analysis for DFIDfunded Project ?Immediate Support
for Endangered Livelihoods of Food
Insecure Farmers, Herders and Fisher
Folk in the Gaza Strip
Emergency support to livestock herders
in the southern part of the West Bank
Mitigation of household food insecurity
through backyard food production
activities targeting vulnerable women
and youth in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip
Emergency support to endangered
livelihoods dependent on livestock in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Emergency food production support to
poor families in the Gaza Strip (Phase
2)
Supporting the food security and
sustainable livelihoods, of poor rural
families through improving rain
water harvesting and water demand
management for agricultural purposes
01/01/2015
31/03/2016
$33.000
01/06/2010
31/08/2011
$863.132
01/07/2010
31/12/2013
$2.027.650
01/04/2010
30/09/2011
$1.590.931
21/07/2010
20/07/2012
$1.526.252
05/07/2010
05/03/2011
$400.000
01/10/2010
28/03/2012
$2.196.160
13/10/2010
31/01/2011
$19.575
17/12/2010
16/12/2011
$776.502
01/02/2011
31/03/2011
$86.942
01/03/2011
31/12/2011
$800.003
30/03/2011
30/09/2012 $3.012.613
30/03/2011
31/03/2012
$3.127.280
01/08/2011
31/07/2012
$400.000
01/11/2011
28/02/2013 $2.012.414
117
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Project Symbol
Project Title
Actual EOD Actual NTE
OSRO/GAZ/109/BEL
Rapid mitigation of the livelihood crises
in the Gaza Strip
Support to livestock based livelihoods
of vulnerable population in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (The institutional
level component of the Food Security
Thematic Programme [FSTP])
Protection of farmer livelihoods (West
Bank)
Food security through backyard food
production
Improving food security in North Gaza
through land rehabilitation and openfield vegetable production
Emergency backyard food production
activities in vulnerable and
marginalized areas of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip
Institutional capacity building
programme formulation mission
Market oriented and sustainable high
value crops sector development in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip
Emergency protection of Palestinianowned assets and contribution to
building resilient livelihoods
Quick impact emergency interventions
to protect the endangered livelihoods
of poor and small scale farmers in
Area C, the Seam Zone and Gaza Strip
against external shocks (CAP project
OPT-13/A/52233/123)
Enhancing the resilience of farmers’
livelihoods in Area C of Qalqilya,
Jericho and Tulkarem Governorates
through improved water availability
and management
Prepare and respond to shocks
affecting low resilience farmers and
herders in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Capacity building programme in
support of the Palestinian National
Authority Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
(SPS) measures
PART I
Enhancing the resilience of farmers’
livelihoods in Area C of Jenin, Nablus,
Tubas and Jericho Governorates
through improved water availability
and management
Emergency support to low resilience
urban and peri-urban livelihoods in
the Gaza Strip through small scale
domestic food production (HPC project
OPT-14/F/60976)
Emergency support to Avian Influenza
outbreaks and to low resilience and
food insecure urban and peri-urban
livelihoods in the Gaza Strip (HPC
project OPT-15/F/73149).
Agriculture Revitalization Project Phase II
11/11/2011
10/11/2012
Total Budget
(DWH)
$645.995
01/02/2013
31/01/2016
$4.163.615
29/03/2012
30/04/2014 $5.983.844
29/03/2012
30/04/2014 $3.989.229
07/12/2012
31/03/2014
23/01/2013
22/02/2014 $649.351
10/09/2012
10/11/2012
$20.000
01/01/2013
31/12/2016
$9.368.974
01/03/2013
28/02/2014 $4.000.000
01/09/2013
31/01/2015
$260.756
01/02/2014
31/03/2016
$1.978.974
01/04/2014
31/05/2016
$9.183.833
01/04/2014
31/03/2017
$1.367.658
01/06/2014
31/05/2016
$2.463.957
08/07/2014
07/07/2015
$267.379
01/06/2015
31/05/2016
$475.000
01/02/2011
30/09/2013 $2.678.535
OSRO/GAZ/201/EC
OSRO/GAZ/202/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/203/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/204/NET
OSRO/GAZ/205/BEL
OSRO/GAZ/206/NET
OSRO/GAZ/207/NET
OSRO/GAZ/301/JPN
OSRO/GAZ/304/SPA
OSRO/GAZ/305/UK
OSRO/GAZ/401/CAN
OSRO/GAZ/402/NET
OSRO/GAZ/403/NET
OSRO/GAZ/405/SPA
OSRO/GAZ/501/BEL
OSRO/GAZ/807/ITA
118
$497.200
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Project Symbol
Project Title
Actual EOD Actual NTE
OSRO/GAZ/901/QAC
Immediate interventions to Assist
the General Early Recovery of the
Agricultural Sector in the GAZA STRIP
and to Restore the Livelihoods and
Food Production of Vulnerable and
Conflict Affected Rural Households
Emergency support to poor families
in the Gaza Strip to restart open field
vegetable production.
Emergency support to small ruminant
herders and vulnerable farming
households in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (WBGS)
Emergency support to vulnerable
farmers in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to maintain and protect their
livelihoods through horticulture
production
Support to reduce the impact of food
insecurity for Palestinians in the West
Bank
Support to FAO Programme
Coordination, Jerusalem
Support to FAO Programme
Coordination, Jerusalem
Culture and Development - (MDGF1841)
Creating one-stop-shop for sustainable
businesses.
Upgrade of the Central Veterinary
Laboratory of the Ministry of
Agriculture of the Palestinian Authority
for animal disease control and human
health protection.
Capacity building programme in
support of the Palestinian National
Authority - SPS measures.
Capacity building programme in
support of the Palestinian National
Authority SPS measures
01/06/2009 31/05/2011
Total Budget
(DWH)
$2.137.500
01/08/2009 31/12/2011
$415.163
12/10/2009 11/04/2011
$1.085.810
12/11/2009
11/11/2011
$1.722.455
05/11/2010
04/09/2011 $43.715
01/12/2007
15/10/2011
$1.298.855
01/02/2012
31/01/2013
$363.372
01/04/2009 30/11/2012
$391.683
01/01/2015
31/12/2016
$426.700
30/12/2014
31/12/2015
$232.107
2015-09-15
2018-12-31
$381.876
2015-12-01
2018-11-30
$1.980.000
01/12/2003
2014-06-30
$8.609.372
07/01/2015
06/01/2017
$265.092
26/10/2012
31/03/2013
$390.595
09/03/2015
28/02/2019 $2.779.800
01/01/2015
31/12/2025
$1.631.570
23/06/2015
31/12/2015
$70.000
OSRO/GAZ/904/AUS
OSRO/GAZ/906/ITA
OSRO/GAZ/908/SPA
UTF /GAZ/005/GAZ
GCP /GAZ/002/SPA
GCP /GAZ/006/SPA
UNJP/GAZ/003/SPA
UNJP/GAZ/011/UNJ
UTF /GAZ/007/GAZ
GCP /GAZ/012/SPA
GCP /GAZ/013/SWI
Regional Project
GTFS/REM/070/ITA
Regional Integrated Pest Management
(IPM) Programme in the Near East
Inter-Regional projects
GCPA/INT/028/SWE
Ms. HEDTJARN SWALING, Julia,
Associate Professional Officer,
Productive water use, water
management and adaptation to
climate change
GCP /INT/041/EC
Scientific and Institutional Cooperation
to Support Responsible Fisheries in
the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed
Year 3)
Global projects
GCP /INT/229/NET
Monitoring water productivity
by Remote Sensing as a tool to
assess possibilities to reduce water
productivity gaps
SFER/GLO/101/MUL
SFERA Revolving Fund Component Needs Assessment and Programme
Development window
SFER/GLO/101/MUL
WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP
BABY24
119
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 5: Map of WBGS project sites
120
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 6: Table of projects visits
The table below summarises the number of project sites visited and of Focus Group discussions
held by the evaluation team in the different governorates of the West Bank and of the Gaza Strip.
The table also includes the four non-FAO project sites visited by the evaluation team as mentioned
in the evaluation report.
West Bank
Locations/Governorates
L&W
CT&VL
n. FGD
n.
project
sites
Bethlehem
2
3
Hebron
3
1
Jenin
4
Jericho
Jerusalem
n. FGD
n.
project
sites
n. FGD
n.
project
sites
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
8
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1*
4
2
1
4
1
5
2
Nablus
Qalqiliya
1*
Ramallah
Gaza Strip
A2M
Tubas
7
3
2
2
Tulkarm
1
3
1
2
Deir Al Balah (Middle Area)
2
3
Gaza City
1*
Khan Younis
2
4 +1*
4
North Gaza
3
6
1
Rafah
4
6
38
35
Total
4
2
4
6
1
2
1
2
1
1
28
9
23
11
* non FAO project sites
121
Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip
Appendix 7: Theory of change
The Theory of Change (TOC) of FAO programme in WBGS 2011-2015 was developed by the
evaluation team in consultation with FAO WBGS managers and is based on the discussions with
the FAO WBGS team and the review of project and programming documents produced by the
FAO WBGS Office.
122
OFFICE OF EVALUATION
www.fao.org/evaluation