Balkan Islam and Malay Islam
as Branches of Islamic Civilisation
An Introductory Discussion of
Their Similarities and Differences
Osman Bakar
Introduction
The main contention of this brief essay is that Balkan Islam and Malay Islam
both deserve to be treated as veritable branches of the global Islamic civilisation
and of the global Muslim ummah in particular. By Balkan Islam we mean Islam
as understood and practiced in the Balkans throughout its historical presence
in the region. We are speaking here of a religious and cultural presence that
is traceable to as far back as the tenth century. Likewise, by Malay Islam we
mean Islam that is understood and practiced in the Malay speaking world in
Southeast Asia over the last ten centuries or so. Rather interestingly, we are
speaking here of two branches of the global Muslim ummah that are more or
less of the same age. The tenth-century scholar, Abu Raihan al-Biruni (9731051), who was also a noted geographer and considered by many historians of
science as the greatest Muslim scientist to have ever lived, made the following
observation about the simultaneous penetration of Islam to the Balkans and
the Malay world in the tenth and eleventh centuries:
Islam has already penetrated from the eastern countries of the earth to
the western; it spreads westward to Spain (Andalusia), eastward to the
borderland of China and to the middle of India, southward to Abyssinia
and the countries of Zanj (i.e. South Africa, the Malay Archipelago and
Java), northward to the countries of the Turks and Slavs. Thus the
different peoples are brought together in mutual understanding, which
only God’s own Art can bring to pass.1
Al-Biruni’s observation on the concurrent expansion of Islam to Southeast
Europe and Southeast Asia suggests an underlying globalising force that needs
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further investigation. Detailed studies of the historical origins of Balkan Islam
and Malay Islam have been carried out by historians and scholars in various
other ields of study, but these have been done for each branch on a separate
basis. Usually, the historical origin and early development of each of these
two branches of Islam has been treated in a regional rather than in a global
context, meaning that it is studied primarily in relation to the immediate
neighbouring presence of Islam. A comparative study of the historical origins
and development of Balkan Islam and Malay Islam could prove to be more
useful in yielding information about the underlying globalising forces and
tendencies that help push and accelerate the expansion of Islam to Southeast
Europe and Southeast Asia.
In several of our works we took up the theme of Islam and the three waves
of globalisation, especially in relation to the Southeast Asian experience.2 We
claim that in human history there have been three major waves of globalisation
if we are to understand the term ‘globalisation’ in a broad sense as in fact
adopted by quite a good number of students of globalisation. We claim it
was Islam that generated the irst major wave of globalisation. On the basis
of historical facts we went to identify the beginning of this Islamic-generated
global wave with the tenth century. On the testimony of al-Biruni, in his
own century this wave originating from the centre of the Islamic world that
appeared then to be gaining momentum had already reached the shores of
the Balkans and the Malay world. We attempted to verify the theory of the
three major waves of globalisation with a study of the historical origin and
development of Islam in Southeast Asia over the centuries until the postcolonial period, particularly in the Malay world. We argue that the irst wave of
globalisation helps explain the global context in which the incoming Islam to
the Malay world took irm roots and evolve into a true branch of the ummatic3
tree possessing a distinctive cultural identity while remaining linked to its trunk
and roots as well as to its other branches. We refer to this identity as the MalayIslamic identity.4
We contend it would be a good idea indeed if a similar study of the impact
of the Islamic wave of globalisation on the world were to be undertaken – if
not yet already done – for the Balkans. One objective of such a study is, of
course, to verify if the theory of the three major waves of globalisation would
also be applicable to the Balkans. We suspect that the initial incoming of Islam
to Southeast Europe and its evolving Islamic presence in the region is primarily
as a result of the impact of the same wave of globalisation. A comparative
study of the impact of the irst wave of globalisation on the Islamic presence
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in the Balkans and the Malay world would be of great relevance not only to
the understanding of the history of the development of the ummah over the
centuries but also to the understanding of the antecedents of contemporary
globalisation.
Intra-Islamic Comparative Cultural Study
In undertaking an intra-Islamic comparative cultural study in general and one
between Balkan Islam and Malay Islam in particular, we are motivated and
guided by several more considerations of a general nature. The Islamic wave
of globalisation perspective has just been discussed. We view this perspective
as of great important to our quest for a deeper understanding of the ummatic
history of Islam, especially its intra-ummatic relations, which unfortunately
has not been given due attention by the Muslim scholars themselves up till
now. Another important perspective is the ummatic and civilisational identity
perspective, which is conceptually related to the theory of the marriage
between religiosity and ethnicity serving as a fundamental explanatory factor
for the formation of these two identities. We have explained in detail the
philosophical basis of this theory in one of our works.5
We argue that, for example, the Malay-Islamic identity, both at the ummatic
and civilisational levels, is productive of the marriage between the dominant
form of Islam that arrived and took irm roots in the Malay world and Malay
ethnicity. Theologically, the dominant form of Islam in the region that we
have in mind was and still is Ash’arism, while the Shari’ah dimension of the
form has been provided by the Shaie school of legal-ethical thought (iqh).
Ethnically, it was the Malay race with its numerous sub-ethnic groups that
provide the human vessels for the reception of the newly arrived religion and
its subsequent indigenous cultivation in the following centuries. In a sense, it
was the marriage between Ash’arism and the Shaie school of thought that
prevailed over the centuries till now that produced and sustained the MalayIslamic identity. This ummatic identity may be understood at various levels, right
from the national to the regional and global levels. Thus we may speak of the
Malay-Islamic identity within the Malaysian or the Bruneian context or within
the context of the whole Malay-speaking world or even within Southeast Asia
as a whole.
We believe the theory of the ummatic identity6 and the philosophical theory
of the marriage between religiosity and ethnicity on which it is based may
serve as a good perspective for the understanding of the various branches
of the ummah and of Islamic civilisation. In particular, we maintain that
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this perspective would help deepen our understanding of similarities and
differences between the different branches of Islam. In this chapter our
discussion of similarities and differences between Balkan Islam and Malay
Islam is based on this perspective. However, in scope our discussion is rather
limited. In this brief discussion we are basically interested only in providing
new perspectives for intra-Islamic comparative cultural studies, particularly
pertaining to issues of identity.
Before proceeding to discuss similarities and differences between Balkan
Islam and Malay Islam, albeit briely, it is a pertinent point to emphasize here
that comparing between them is very much akin to comparing and contrasting
between Islam and the West, a contemporary intellectual concern with which
we are so familiar. In the latter case, critics have pointed out that the comparison
is not entirely appropriate, since Islam is essentially a religious entity whereas
“the West” connotes primarily a geographical entity. We are thus in this case
pursuing a comparison between two entities that are essentially different
from each other. To a certain extent the criticism is justiied. However, from
the civilisational point of view, the comparison is not entirely inappropriate.
In fact, comparing between Islam and the West at the civilisational level
is epistemologically legitimate and quite appropriate in the context of our
times. Moreover, it can also be a rewarding intellectual undertaking. Islam
is not only a religion but also a civilisation. Although the West connotes a
geographical entity, notwithstanding its ethnic and cultural plurality and
diversity, it is meaningful to speak of Western civilisation in the singular. It
is thus meaningful to make a comparison between Islam and the West when
we understand both entities in civilisational terms. For then we would actually
be comparing between Islamic civilisation and Western civilisation, which has
been associated with Christianity for the last two millennia.
Balkan Islam and Malay Islam: Similarities and Differences
We have earlier referred to certain similarities between Balkan Islam and Malay
Islam with respect to the historical circumstances surrounding their origin
and early development. However, the two branches of Islam did not undergo
the same historical process of development and expansion. The expansion
of Balkan Islam was partly due to the Ottoman conquest of the region. In
contrast, military conquest has never been part of the expansion of Islam in
the Malay world. The main factors that explain the expansion of Malay Islam
were Sui missionary work and trade.
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While the same theory of ummatic identity may account for the formation
of the Balkan Islam and Malay Islam identities, we could also observe it as
helping to explain the rationale of the ummah having branches with distinct
identities.7 The two branches differ from each other irst and foremost in
respect of theological persuasion and ethical-legal school of thought or
school of jurisprudence (iqh). Like in Turkey with which it has close historical
and cultural connections the dominant theological school in Balkan Islam is
Maturidism, while the dominant school of iqh is the Hanai. In Malay Islam,
as asserted earlier, the dominant schools in theology and jurisprudence are
Ash’arism and the Shaie respectively. The two branches also differ from each
other with respect to ethnic differentiation and distribution. If we consider
language as the main deining element of ethnicity and the primary factor in
ethnic differentiation as insisted in traditional Islamic anthropology, then we
could make the assertion that Malay Islam is far more monolithic in cultural
terms than Balkan Islam. It has been observed that Balkan Islam is without a
lingua franca. In contrast, Malay Islam has the Malay language (bahasa Melayu)
as its lingua franca. This lingua franca helps in the past to make the Malay-Islam
ummatic identity at the regional level more cohesive.
Balkan Islam is fundamentally more pluralistic in its ethnic make-up than
Malay Islam. In linguistic terms we are speaking of its two main branches,
namely Albanian and Bosnik. We are thus faced with a different challenge in
dealing with the issue of the Balkan Islamic identity from the one we have
when dealing with the Malay-Islamic identity. We are thus called upon to
investigate the nature and characteristics of the Balkan Islamic identity not at
the ethnic but rather at the religious level.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, we wish to assert that viewing Islamic civilisation as a living tree
with many branches could prove quite helpful in explaining the phenomenon
of cultural unity in diversity that is so characteristic of this civilisation. The
branches in view may be characterised as geo-cultural and ummatic in nature.
Considerable beneits may be derived from intellectual undertakings aimed
at comparing and contrasting between two or more branches of Islamic
civilisation. We may arbitrarily select any two geo-cultural branches for this
purpose and yet still producing a beneicial outcome, but it could well be the
case that some of the branches when viewed together for comparison would
prove to be better suited than many other branches for illustrating the idea of
unity in diversity as a characteristic feature of Islamic civilisation.
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Both Balkan Islam and Malay Islam are veritable geo-cultural branches of
Islamic civilisation and more particularly of the global Muslim ummah that
created and sustained it. The kind of intra-Islamic comparative approach
adopted in this essay in the study of the different branches of Islamic
civilisation promises us a more enriching understanding of each particular
branch of it than were we to study it in isolation from other branches.
Notes
1. Quoted from al-Biruni, The Book of the Demarcation of the Limits of Areas, by Nais
Ahmad, Muslim Contributions to Geography (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), p. 35.
2. For a detailed treatment of this theme, see Osman Bakar, “Islam and the three
waves of globalization: The Southeast Asian experience,” Islam and Civilisational
Review, vol. 1, no. 4 (July 2010), pp. 666 – 684. We have included this article in our
recently published book Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World: Thematic Essays
(Gadong, Brunei Darussalam: ubd press, 2014), chapter 11.
3. By ummatic we mean having the quality and characteristics that conform to the
identity of the Muslim ummah.
4. For a detailed discussion of various aspects of Malay-Islamic identity, particularly
its ummatic and civilisational dimension see our Islamic Civilisation and the Modern
World; “Islam and the Malay civilizational identity: tension and harmony between
ethnicity and religiosity,” John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition:
Muslim Perspectives (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 480487; also Osman Bakar, “Islam dalam jati diri tamadun Melayu: konlik dan
keharmonian antara tuntutan keetnikan dan keagamaan,” Kalthum Ibrahim, Farid
Mat Zain, Nasruddin Yunos dan Ezad Azraai Jamsari, eds., Dunia Melayu dan Islam
(Bangi: ATMA, UKM, 2009), pp. 389-398.
5. Osman Bakar, “Islam and the Malay civilizational identity: tension and harmony
between ethnicity and religiosity,” John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., Islam
in Transition.
6. See Osman Bakar, Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World, chapter two.
7. For a study of Balkan Islam that is of relevance to the idea of global ummatic
identity, see Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans Between
Nationalism and Transnationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Turkey’s Cultural Inluence in EU at the
Beginning of the 21st Century
Muhamed Ali
The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century are considered
as a period when the Turkey-EU relations, besides the positive trends, are
also characterized with many challenges caused by numerous factors which
played an important role in the process of development of mutual relations in
the domains of politics and economy. Simultaneously, the cultural aspect of
Turkish multidimensional diplomacy represents one of the most important
segments of Turkey-EU relations in the recent period. Namely, Turkish
cultural inluence is consisted of governmental and nongovernmental sectors
which simultaneously play a vital role in the factorization of Turkey’s position
in the EU and wider. In this paper we will focus on Turkey’s governmental
cultural inluence in the EU which makes the main segment of the above
mentioned.
Short Historic Review of the EU Establishment and their
Relations with Turkey
The dream of united Europe has deep roots in the history of European
populations and the European continent. Although the realization of that
dream began after the end of World War II, however the theoretic roots
of this project can be found few centuries earlier. Namely, the theoretic
foundation for uniication of European populations can be found as early
as the 16th century (Yıldız, 2006, 46; Dura, 2007, 40; Gözen, 2009, 378).
Thinkers and philosophers like La Rochefoucauld, William Penn, Due de
Sully, Emile de Girardin, Victor Hugo and Briand through their creative ideas
and opinions gave enormous efforts for inding true mechanisms and models
related to uniication of European populations and countries, with an aim for
decrease of misunderstandings and establishment of permanent peace on this
continent. In this context, we can simultaneously mention the idea of Kant
(17th century) who was advocating the establishment of United European
Countries. Unlike theories of the above mentioned personalities who
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advocated for the uniication of the European continent through usage of
peaceful methods, there are some moments of European history when usage
of force was a way for uniication of European populations. In this context
we can mention the efforts of Napoleon, who through usage of military
power contributed more for disintegration of the European continent than
for its integration (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 3-4). Besides the newly introduced
ideas and views for uniication of European populations, an intensiication of
steps for integration of the European continent was noticed towards the end
of 17th century, respectively during the period of the Industrial Revolution.
Namely, there was a Trade Agreement signed between England and France
in 1786, which besides other things had an aim to increase the trade of
industrial products through lowering of mutual customs taxes. Besides the
above mentioned, the steps of Prussia following the Vienna Conference
(1815) in the domain of internal customs taxing, the establishment of
German Customs Union (1834) with participation of 18 German states, the
unsuccessful attempts for establishment of customs union between the Italian
states, lowering of customs through the Trade Agreement between England
and France (1860) and between France and Prussia (1862) can be considered
as the most vital steps in the way of the economic integration of the European
continent during the 18th century (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 4). In the period
between the irst half of XX century until World War II, two new projects
appeared which aimed the uniication and integration of European continent
states in one single country. The irst project was the Kont Kalergi project,
who was advocating for the establishment of the Pan-European Union. After
Kalergi’s idea, in 1930, the French minister of foreign affairs Aritide Briand
came to the European political scene with the idea for establishment of the
Federal European Union, which aimed the integration of European countries
along with conservation of their sovereignty (Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 5). This
idea was supported by the German minister of foreign affairs of that time,
Gustav Stresemann (Yılmaz, 2005, 23). Besides the mentioned interpretation
for development of ideas and projects foe European uniication until the
irst half of the 20th century, respectively until World War II, there is another
version about the roots of the European movement. According to this
version, the development of the idea for European integration and uniication
went through three phases. The irst phase began in 1815 and lasted until the
beginning of the 20th century. Globally observed, although this phase was
characterized with harmony of European countries, nevertheless the crisis
of the Ottoman Empire, Central and Eastern Europe, contributed towards
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postponement of the idea for integrated European continent. This phase
was different because the European movement had political origins. As far as
the second phase is concerned, it should be highlighted that it developed in
accordance with the Versailles system. This phase was different because the
ideas for European uniication and European movement mainly originated
from various ideologists and intellectuals. According to the above mentioned
version of the development interpretation of theoretic base for European
uniication, the last phase of the European movement which advocated for
uniication of the European continent began with the appearance of Nazism,
respectively with Adolf Hitler’s activities. This phase was characterized with
application of military force which not only contributed against the integration
of European countries, but on the contrary, it created new enmities between
European countries themselves (Bashkurti, 2006a, 175-176).
After World War II, bearing in mind the negative experiences of
disintegration, the European continent had turned into a scene where ideas
and steps for European population’s uniication of values began to intensify
and apply in real politics. Namely, Winston Churchill in 1946 in his speech
held at Zurich University declared the idea for United Europe through
establishment of the United European Countries. The European Federal
Union was established in Paris in December of the same year. In 1947,
Churchill appeared as the initiator of the Movement for Free Europe. In June
of 1947, Rene Korte formed the French Council for United Europe. In this
context, similarly, as one of the most prominent steps was the forming of
the European movement of united socialistic countries and the application
of customs agreement between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
It should be highlighted that the year 1948 was also considered as vital in
the ield for application of ideas for integration and uniication of European
values and populations. Namely, during this year, the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation was formed which aimed coordination of
Marshall’s Plan and at the same time Churchill lead the European congress
which initiated the establishment of the most vital European institutions like
the European Council, Human Rights Map and the European Court of Justice
(Bashkurti, 2006a, 177; Hacıtahiroğlu, 2006, 5).
Besides the above mentioned ideas and steps taken which had important
contribution in the way for realization of the aim of united Europe, the year
1950 is considered as a turning point in the process of realization of the historic
dream of European populations for their uniication and mutual integration.
The Agreement for establishment of European Coal and Steel Community –
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ECSC was signed in 1951. Along with the forming of the European Economic
Community and European Atomic Energy Community as a result of the
Rome Agreement in 1957 (it came to power in 1958) between the signatory
countries of European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC, a new phase in
the history of European integration and uniication began. One of the most
featured characteristics of this phase was the removal of trade barriers and
the establishment of mutual market of the participating countries. The year
of 1967 also represents a signiicant moment in the long way of European
integration and uniication. Namely, during this year (1st of June 1967) the
three vital European communities: European Coal and Steel Community –
ECSC, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy
Community united into a common community under the name European
Community (See Bashkurti, 2006a, 178-180; Bashkurti, 2006b; www.sobranie.
mk [Accessed 25 December 2011]; www.abgs.gov.tr [Accessed 12 December
2011]). Along with the end of the Cold War, deep changes took place on the
international scene which had important relections on the world order, so that
the process of integration of European countries did not stay immune to these
processes of international relations. As the most important happening that left
a historical mark on the integration of European continent population was
the signing of Maastricht Agreement (1992), which came to power in 1993.
The European Union took over the previous name of European Community
with this agreement. The Summit in Copenhagen (1993), the Agreement of
Amsterdam (1997), introduction of the common European currency EURO
(2002), the Summit in Thessaloniki (2003) and the Agreement in Lisbon (2009)
are some of the most important segments of EU development in the period
after the Cold War (Bashkurti, 2006a, 181-185, 189, 193-197, Yıldız, 2006, 4850). It should be highlighted that the global economic crisis, just like on other
international relations factors, has also made and is still making deep negative
relections on the successful functioning of the EU.
On the other hand, along with the beginning of implementation of the
historical dream of European populations for their uniication and integration
into United Europe, Turkish foreign politics had made the irst steps for
integration of the Turkish state into united Europe. Turkey had made an
application in 1959 for membership in the EEC (European Economic
Community), a date which simultaneously symbolizes the beginning of
the long path of the process of Turkey’s integration in the community of
European populations. The Turkish request for membership in the EEC was
denied, an act that was justiied with the fact that Turkey was not developed
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enough yet in order to take over responsibilities which derived from the act of
joining to this community. However, as an alternative to the membership, the
EEC made an offer for partnership Agreement, which according to European
authorities should have had a temporary character until the fulilment of
conditions for acceptance as a full member of the community. An Agreement
between Turkey and EEC was signed in Ankara in 1963, better known as the
Ankara Agreement, with the aim of opening the road for Turkey towards
full membership into this community (Yiğit, 2006, 90; Ergin, 2006, 4-5).
According to this agreement, the process of developing relations between
Turkey and EEC should have gone through three periods: preparatory period,
transitional period and inal period (Ergin, 2006, 6-7; Yiğit, 2006, 91-92; www.
abgs.com.tr [Accessed 12 December 2011]; Kramer, 1996, 203-233). However,
besides the steps taken for intensifying relations between Turkey and EU, the
1970’s and the irst half of the 1980’s are considered as a period of mutual
relations demotion. Besides political and economic factors, at the same time
the Turkish army military coup (1980) against the democratically elected
government can be considered as the main factor that gave an additional pulse
for deterioration of the mentioned relations. Along with the establishment
of civil and democratic government, Turkey decided (1987) to apply for full
membership in this community. The European Community declined Turkey’s
application by justifying that act with the fact that there is a need for further
development of Turkey in the economic, political and social ields. The
Customs Union came to power in 1996, by which Turkey-EU relations entered
a phase which can be considered as one of the most important moments in
the history of Turkish integration in the European family (www.abgs.com.tr
[Accessed 10 November 2011]; Ergin, 2006, 10-13; www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed
10 November 2011]; Dura, 2007, 500).
Turkey-EU Relations at the beginning of 21st Century: Political,
Integration and Economic Aspects
The end of the 1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s are considered as a
period when Turkey-EU relations, besides positive trends – like gaining the
candidate status for joining into the EU (1999) and the recommendation
for start of the negotiation process between both sides (2005) – is also
characterized with numerous challenges caused by internal and external
factors that played an important role in the process of development of mutual
relations. In this context, we can mention the Cyprus issue, a litigation which
besides it determined relations between Turkey and Greece for decades,
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through Cyprus’ entering into the EU, it also turned into a new challenge for
the process of Turkey’s integration into the EU. Along with Erdogan’s party
coming to power, for the irst time in its history Turkey oficially accepted the
existence of the Cyprus issue and expressed political and diplomatic readiness
for solving of the issue within Anan’s Plan. Although the Cyprus issue is not
solved yet, it can be concluded that the new proactive politics of AKP towards
this issue had great avails for growth of sympathies towards Turkey between
European political elites and the beginning of admission negotiations (Gözen,
2009, 487; Nas, 2008, 139-173). Besides the Cyprus issue, the beginning of the
2000’s witnessed other numerous happenings that had important relections
on the euro integration process of the Republic of Turkey. Namely, as one of
the most important challenges that determined relations between Turkey and
EU in this period was the Iraqi War (2003). In this context, we should point
out that Turkey’s attitude towards this war, which was in harmony with the
attitudes of European leading countries, France and Germany, and opposed
to the American policies and strategies, contributed towards strengthening of
mutual relations between Turkey and the EU, having in mind the fact that
the complete integration of Turkey in this institution, besides the fulilment
of political and economic criteria, it also depended on harmonization of its
attitudes with the ones of EU in the domain of international politics (Gözen,
2009, 359-360, 486- 487). However, it is a surprising fact that exactly the above
mentioned two supporting countries (Germany and France), in the last period
have turned into leaders and a symbol of European resistance against Turkish
euro integration.
Namely, just before the beginning of the new century, at the Helsinki
Summit in 1999, besides the decision for oficial acceptance of Turkey’s
candidature, the decision for preparation of a Document for assessment
partnership with Turkey also took place, just like the case of all other member
candidate countries for entrance into the EU (www.abgs.com.tr [Accessed
5 May 2012]; www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 10 November 2012]). It should be
highlighted that following the Helsinki Summit, as a result of the newly
created climate of Turkey-EU relations, the Turkish state began with vital
reforms with the aim of speeding up its integration into the EU, so in 2001 the
changes and reforms of the country Constitution had started and in January
of 2002 the new civil Code came to power through which Turkish authorities
made huge steps on the road of intensifying and democratizing of the country
and society and their approach towards western standards (Dura, 2007, 560566, www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15 Mаy 2012]). Besides these steps, Turkish
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authorities through the eight reform packages in the period between 2002 and
2004 took further steps for adjustment of Turkish regulations with European
ones. The Recommendation for beginning of assessment negotiations (2005)
represented a vital moment in the history of Turkey-EU relations. It should
also be highlighted that in the context of Turkish regulations adjustment
with the European legislative, the ninth reform package came to force on the
12th of April 2006, by which Turkey made another step on the road for its
integration into the EU. Simultaneously, we can conclude that deepening of
democratic and economic reforms by Erdogan’s government is an additional
impulse for intensifying of Turkish integration in the EU. Opening of TV
channels for other nationalities of Turkish society (like the opening of state
television channel into Kurdish and Arabic language), strengthening of the
function of General Secretariat for euro integrations and the positive trend of
Turkish economy in global scale are some examples for the above-mentioned.
Also, changing 20 articles of the Turkish Constitution, as a result of the
positive attitude of Turkish population towards the Constitution Reform
Packages, voted on the referendum in 2010 (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 7 May
2012]), uncompromising ight of Erdogan’s government against underground
structures (like Ergenekon) which through various segments and methods
have traditionally played a vital role in the demotion process of democratic
processes in Turkey and the new preparations of Turkish government for a
new constitution in accordance with democratic principles of the developed
countries are some of the most vital steps in the road of Turkey’s integration
towards the EU.
Relations between Turkey and EU countries, besides the political plan, are
different in some signiicant economic relations. Along with Customs Union
coming to power, the volume of trade exchange between the two countries
was only 36.2 billion US dollars and only few years after the implementation in
2010 it increased up to 125 billion US dollars. There are some different critics
in relation with Turkey’s entrance into the Customs Union. One of the most
important critics for this integration is the fact that Turkey, although obliged
for implementation of Customs Union legislation, is not involved in the
deciding mechanisms of the EU, which many times had damaged the economic
interests of the Turkish state (www.ab.org.tr [Accessed 15 June 2012]). The
EU in the last period represents the greatest trade partner of Turkey. Turkey
is considered as the 7th greatest exporter in the EU and the Turkish market
is the ifth greatest market towards which EU export is directed. From 2008
until 2010, Turkish direct investments in EU countries were 2.1 billion US
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dollars. During the same period, direct investments of EU countries in Turkey
reached 14.7 billion US dollars. In 2010, the greatest percentage of Turkish
export was directed towards the EU (46,3 %) and on the other hand, during
the same year Turkey imported mostly from the EU (39,3 %) (ec.europa.eu/
index_en.htm/ [Accessed 15 June 2012]).
Turkish Cultural Inluence in EU at the beginning of the 21st
Century as a Part of the New Concept of Turkish Foreign Policy
Along with implementation of Ahmet Davutoglu’s vision in Turkish foreign
politics, a vision better known as the strategic depth doctrine, the factorization
of Turkish diplomacy began in the region and on international scene as well.
Before all, this new concept of Turkish diplomacy caused a chain of reactions
within the expert public, which was advocating for interpreting and deining
the new deinition of Turkish foreign politics. This new concept of Turkish
diplomacy, according to Graham Fuller, was deined as the most detailed and
the most systemized vision about the Turkish strategic location. According
to other experts, Davutoglu’s strategy over exceeded the boundaries of
the former Ottoman Empire. According to Davutoglu, Turkey possesses a
vital historical and geographical depth and just like we can’t imagine a state
like Germany separated from Central Europe, at the same time we can’t
imagine a country like Turkey separated from the Balkan, Caucasian and
Middle Eastern regions, regions with whom it shares common history. He
adds, Turkey also possesses geographical depth which is an inseparable part
of the historical depth, exactly because of the fact that this country belongs
to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Balkan, the Caucasian and the
Middle Eastern region at the same time. In this context, we also mustn’t forget
Turkey’s civilization depth. The geo strategic position of this country, which
is situated in the centre of ancient civilizations, like the Greek, Egyptian,
Mediterranean, Persian and Mesopotamian, is an additional value that
strengthens this country’s vitality in the international scene. All these three
mentioned components (historical, geographical and civilization depths) are
depicturing Turkey’s strategic depth which should create regional and also
global strategies and politics. Simultaneously, the historical, geographical and
civilization depths are playing a vital role in the determination of Turkey’s
centrality in its hinterland and international scene, by which this country can
turn into a regional factor and after a longer period into a global power (www.
radikal.com.tr [Accessed 26 February 2011]; www.2023.gen.tr [Accessed 25
December 2011]; Davutogllu, 2005, 205-206; Ali, 2010, 140-142; Atasoy,
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2005, 182). In this context, it should be highlighted that this new concept of
Turkish foreign politics, besides other things, is also based on few principles.
The principles of the new Turkish foreign politics based on the strategic depth
doctrine besides other things id the principle of zero problems with neighbours
and multidimensional diplomacy. Globally observed, prior Erdogan’s rule, Turkish
relations with neighbours were not on the desired level. This fact inluenced
the deterioration of Turkish credibility and prestige on international scene.
Along with the beginning of strategic depth doctrine implementation, a new
era of Turkey’s relation with their neighbours began. According to this new
vision, the slogan that Turkey is surrounded with enemies from all sides was
changed with the slogan zero problems with neighbours. However, along with
the beginning of Arab Spring, which signiicantly changed the strategic-politic
balances in the Middle East region, it brought huge damages to the principle
of zero problems with neighbouring countries. Namely, Syrian authorities
attempt for repression of Syrian population protests as a result from the
Arab Spring in the recent period (2011-2012), the Iranian position towards
the Syrian crisis – an attitude which has a negative inluence on the TurkishIranian relations – can be considered as an additional reason for the partial
failure of the functionality of the principle mentioned.
Simultaneously, it should be highlighted that Turkish foreign politics through
its history has many times been characterized by creation of single-dimensional
politics. Mainly, these politics had in mind the lack of absence of Turkish
state from its pro-Western orientation. However, the single-dimensionality of
Turkish diplomacy on many occasions had brought huge damages to the state
interests. Although it was rarely, there were some periods where we witnessed
implementation of multidimensional diplomacy. As an example of Turkish
multidimensional foreign strategies we can take the period of Turgut Ozal
who initially was a Prime Minister and then the President of Turkey (19831993). He managed through his long term vision to develop democracy and
economy which turned Turkey into an important factor in the region. Through
implementation of the strategic depth doctrine, the multidimensionality of
Turkish foreign strategy was reborn. Although Turkish state in 2005, under
Erdogan’s party leadership, had begun negotiations with the EU for full euro
integration, according to the strategic depth doctrine, EU doesn’t represent the
only alternative for the country. The traditional Turkish foreign politics names
this doctrine as politics of isolation and suggests closeness with Russia and
Iran (Walker, 2007, 6; Cagaptay, 2007). As a result of the implementation of
this new politics, the Turkish state developed its relations with Russia. Mutual
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visits of Erdogan and Putin/Medvedev are best arguments for the mentioned.
Multidimensionality of Turkish foreign politics is also applied through Turkish
investments widespread all over the world, through intellectuals who can be
met at most reputable educational institutions and through nongovernmental
economical organizations like TUSIAD and TOBB, which play a historical
role for the success of Turkish diplomacy (Sözen, 2008).
The cultural aspect of Turkish multidimensional diplomacy represents
one of the most important segments of Turkey-EU relations of the recent
period. Namely, Turkish cultural inluence is consisted of a governmental and
a nongovernmental sector which simultaneously are playing a vital role in the
factorization of Turkish position in EU and wider. In this work we will focus
on Turkish governmental cultural inluence in the EU that makes the main
segment of the above mentioned. As the main carriers of cultural activities of
the Turkish state, we will mention:
• Ministry of Culture and Tourism
One of the most important institutions of the Republic of Turkey during
AKP rule which contributes towards widening of Turkish cultural inluence
and introduction of EU countries with Turkish culture and tradition is the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This ministry, besides it aims the coordination
of the cultural activities of various institutions, it simultaneously contributes
towards afirmation of Turkish culture on global scale, especially in the EU
countries. For achievement of its aims, in the recent period this ministry has
opened cultural consultancies and attachés in numerous European cities.
There consultancy ofices play a vital role through numerous activities for
afirmation of Turkish culture within the European public opinion as well
(www.kultur.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]).
Table 1: Turkish cultural consultancy and attaché ofices in EU states and their cities
England
Denmark
Bulgaria
Spain
Finland
Italy
Belgium
London
Copenhagen
Soia
Madrid
Helsinki
Roma
Brussels
Sweden
France
Holland
Poland
Switzerland
Germany
Austria
Stockholm
Paris
Hague
Warsaw
Zurich
Berlin & Frankfurt
Vienna
Source: www.kultur.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]
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• Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In the last period we are witnessing intensifying of cultural activities of the
Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs inside EU countries. Signing protocols for
cultural cooperation and programs for cultural exchange represent a foundation
for bilateral cultural cooperation. Organization of various historical artefacts
exhibitions in European metropolises (like the Istanbul exhibition: City and
Sultan in 2006, Amsterdam, Turkey: 7000 Years of History, organized in
2007 at the presidential palace in Italy for the occasion of 150 anniversary
of bilateral relations and the Hadrian Exhibition: Empire and Conlict;
organized in 2008 at the British Museum etc.), participation in the prestigious
European festivals (like participation at the Festival Culturespaces in 2008
in Switzerland, participation at the Le Merce festival in 2009 in Spain etc.),
anniversaries celebration of establishment of bilateral relations with some
EU countries (like the celebration of 600 years anniversary of diplomatic
relations between Turkey and Poland, celebration of 400 years anniversary of
diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Netherlands etc.), submission of
offers towards prestigious European universities for opening Turkish Studies
cathedras (like the example of LSE etc.) are only few examples of the cultural
activities of republic of Turkey with the aim of Turkish culture promotion in
the countries of EU. (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]).
• TIKA (Тurkish International Cooperation and Development Agency)
In conditions of falling apart of the Soviet Union and the establishment of
new Turkish republics in Middle Asia, Turkey decided in 1992 to establish the
state agency TIKA, which during that period before all had the aim to offer
technical assistance to the above mentioned countries in their development
process. However, along with the application of the new concept of Turkish
foreign politics after 2002 and the signiicant development of Turkish economy,
a new situation was created where TIKA grew from an agency that was active
only in one area into a Turkish state agency active in many areas and on global
scale. Besides the social, educational and infrastructural activities, this agency
is also active in the cultural area as well. Namely, the Turkish state through this
agency is also active in few EU countries. Restoration of cultural monuments
(like the restoration of the Kanuni Sultan Suleyman mosque in the Hungarian
town of Zigetvar (Szigetvár) , restoration of cultural monuments in Romania
etc.) which date from the Ottoman period, Turkish cultural activities in various
cities of the EU (like the organization of cultural manifestations in Romania
etc.) and technical, academic assistance of Turkology cathedras within many
universities of EU countries (like the ones in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
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Slovakia etc.) are some of the many examples that depicture Turkish state
cultural activities in EU countries at the beginning of the 21st century (www.
tika.gov.tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]).
• Coordinatorship for Public Diplomacy
This public institution is established in 2010 through the decision of the
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and it aims coordination of all activities of
the public and non governmental institutions and organizations in the area
of public diplomacy. One of the main aims of this institution is successful
promotion of the developing potential of the Turkish state through the
activities of public diplomacy in the domain of culture, education, economy
etc. The most important activities of this institutions are organization of
summer schools where students from the EU are also participating, inancing
various documentaries which promote Turkish culture in Eu countries,
organization of various forums and conferences etc. (www.kdk.gov.tr
[Accessed 15 November 2013]).
• Prime Ministers Foundation for Promotion
It represents an institution led by the Turkish Government vice president,
where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the
National Turkish Radio and Television are also taking part. This institution is
inancing projects which are aiming promotion of Turkish culture and history
throughout the world, including EU countries (www.mfa.gov.tr [Accessed 15
November 2013]).
• TRT (Turkish Radio and Television)
The National Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) in the last period is
considered as one of the most prominent public institutions which contribute
for the afirmation of Turkish culture in the world and the EU countries. As
one of this institution’s foremost successes is the success of this television’s
representative Sertap Erener, who won the Eurovision song contest with
the song “Every Way That I Can” and contributed towards afirmation and
promotion of Turkish culture within European public opinion. The opening
of TRT documentary channel through which Turkey is being promoted
in English, German, French, Russian and Turkish languages, as well as the
signing of agreement with one of the most inluential world television stations
Euronews, are some of the numerous projects through which Turkey pretends
to promote its cultural values on the European continent as well (www.trt.net.
tr [Accessed 15 November 2013]).
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• Turkish Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs)
The General Directorate (Bureau) of Turkish Diyanet for Foreign Relations
is the main sector which besides other things aims development of relations
with other religious representatives from overseas, including EU, monitoring
and analysis of numerous activities outside Turkey which are focused on Islam
and other religions, establishment and development of relations with various
religious and cultural institutions within EU countries, creating solutions
for problems and litigations of cultural and social nature for EU citizens
of Turkish origin (www2.diyanet.gov.tr. [Accessed 1 September 2013]). For
reaching the above mentioned aims, the Turkish Diyanet has established the
following consultancies/counselling and attachés in the EU:
Table 2: Turkish Diyanet Consultancy Ofices in EU States
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Germany
Belgium
England
Holland
France
6.
7.
8.
9.
Sweden
Denmark
Austria
Bulgaria
Source: www2.diyanet.gov.tr. [Accessed 1 September 2013]
Table 3: Turkish attaché ofices in EU states and their cities
Germany
Cologne (Köln)
Stuttgart
Frankfurt
Münster
Hannover
Nuremberg
Mainz
Berlin
Munich
Karlsruhe
Essen
Hamburg
Düsseldorf
France
Lyon
Strasbourg
Austria
Salzburg
Holland
Deventer
Rotterdam
Romania
Constanta
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• Yunus Emre Cultural Centre
Yunus Emre cultural centres which are active in few European centres that
function under the Yunus Emre Institute based in Ankara represent one of
the most vital segments of the cultural inluence of Turkish country in EU
countries. Namely, the above mentioned cultural centres play a vital role in the
cultural relations development between Turkey and the EU at the beginning
of 21st century. The activities of Yunus Emre Institute in European centres
are focused in introduction to European population and institutions with the
Turkish language, culture, history and arts. For realization of this aim, the
institute organizes various courses for Turkish language learning, initiates
cultural activities, scientiic conferences and publishes different editions
that are focused on promotion of Turkish language, culture and history. It
should be pointed out that the coordinative body for Turkology functions
within the Yunus Emre Institute. Namely, through this Institute project for
Turkology, in 35 different countries and 49 cathedras of Turkish language and
literature/Turkology, recruitment of academic capacities from Turkey is being
coordinated and simultaneously the educational and technical development
of the mentioned capacities is being assisted. This project’s activities are
focused on the cathedras of Turkish language and literature/Turkology in
the following EU countries: Bulgaria, Italy, Belgium, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia (www.yee.org.tr [Accessed 10 September 2013]).
From the EU countries, Yunus Emre cultural centres can be found in the
following centres:
Table 4: Yunus Emre Cultural Centres in EU Countries
Belgium
Brussels
England
London
Romania
Bucharest
Constanta
Poland
Warsaw
Hungary
Budapest
Source: www.yee.org.tr [Accessed 10 September 2013]
• YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities)
One of the most important tools of Turkish cultural inluence in EU
countries is the newly established public institution Presidency for Turks
Abroad and Related Communities (established in 2010) YTB. This institution,
besides other things, aims to motivate, support and assist cultural and social
activities of Turkish citizens, foreign citizens of Turkish origin or kin and
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related communities of Turks outside the country. The above mentioned
institution through these activities afirms Turkish traditional and cultural
values outside the country, including EU countries and also protects Turks
from eventual cultural assimilation outside the Turkish borders. For realization
of the aims, this institution supports various NGO’s outside the country and
awards scholarships to international students for studying at some Turkish
universities (www.ytb.gov.tr [Accessed 12 September 2013]).
Conclusion
Along with the beginning of the 21st century and the new concept of Turkish
foreign politics, the factorization of Turkish diplomacy in the region and
the international stage began. According to this new vision, the historical,
geographical and civilization depths are depicturing Turkey’s strategic depth,
which should create regional and global strategies. Simultaneously, the above
mentioned components are playing a vital role in the determination of
Turkey’s centrality in its hinterland and on international stage, through which
this country can turn into a regional factor and after a longer period into a
global power. It should be highlighted that the Arab Spring, which changed
the strategic and political balances of the Middle East to a great extent, made a
great damage to the principle of zero problems with the neighbours. However,
the cultural aspect of Turkish multidimensional politics still represents one
of the most important segments of Turkish diplomacy at the beginning of
21st century, which has deep effects on the Turkey-EU relations in the recent
period. Turkish state institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious
Affairs) – which besides other things, have for an aim relations development
with various religious and cultural institutions within the EU countries -, the
Yunus Emre cultural institution – which is active in few European centres –
and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, represent
few of the most vital segments of the Turkish state cultural inluence in EU
countries and play a vital role in the development of cultural relations between
Turkey and EU at the beginning of 21st century. The increase of Turkish
cultural inluence in the EU is a very signiicant process in a time when the
Islamic world image/reputation suffered numerous damages. For further
factorization of the Turkish state on international stage and development
of Turkey-EU relations we can recommend increase of investments in the
domain of Turkish culture afirmation outside the country, especially the EU
countries. Bearing in mind the fact that Turkey with its successful democratic
and secular system and the Muslim identity of its population, represents a
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model for many countries of the Islamic world and on the other hand is
being considered as a vital ally of the West, I consider that through increase
of cultural activities it can play a vital role for passivity of increasing active
theories for the clash of civilizations.
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Islam in Austria
More than a Century of Oficial Recognition
Christoph Marcinkowski
Introduction
When one thinks of Austria and its relations with Islam and Muslims, what
comes irst to the mind of most people will perhaps be the famous Ottoman
Siege of Vienna in 1683 (although many tend to forget that the Turks had
“visited” the Danube metropolis already in 1529, with a similar negative
outcome for them). For Europeans, or at least for those among them who are
still aware of their own history and culture, the year 1683 means something
of a watershed: from that time onward “the Turk” was relentlessly driven
back from Central and Southeast Europe (Marcinkowski, 1997). Also, to some
more conservative-minded Europeans this event might also mean something
like a revenge for the “lost” Crusades of the Middle Ages. At least it signiied
triumph over a centuries-old foe.
Austria, or what was left of it after the First World War, features today a
comparatively large immigrant community of Muslims with various ethnic
backgrounds – among them Turks, Albanians of various nationality, and
Bosnians, in short from countries that once were part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire of the Habsburgs (Hauptmann, 1995, 2nd ed.). The circumstance of
the presence of a large Muslim immigrant community in the country does
not set apart the alpine republic from other industrialized societies in Western
Europe. Especially Germany with its millions of Turks might come to mind.
What does set Austria apart, however, is the manner in which it deals with
“its” Muslims – and this already since 1912, the year when the Islamgesetze
(lit. “Islamlegislation”) (Potz, 2010) came into force – i.e. at a time when the
Balkan Wars created havoc and chaos in Southeast Europe, serving as a text
case for the Great War of 1914-18. Here we see a country– although rather
multi-religious but with a staunchly Catholic monarchy at the top – granting
the Muslim minority within its borders clearly deined rights, rather than
seeing in them something like a “ifth column” that cannot be trusted. In
consequence, the Great War saw the Empire’s Muslims ighting loyally side by
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side with their Christian comrades-in-arms for the Monarchy.
Even Austria’s various post-WWI political republican settings did not
touch upon the 1912 legislation, and recently Austria could commemorate
the irst century of its coming into force. Today, Austria is unique among
Western European countries insofar as it has granted Muslims the status of a
recognized religious community.
In the following, we shall have a glance at the presence of Islam in presentday Austria by providing some basic information as to historical background,
structures and legal arrangements.
More than 100 Years of Oficial Recognition of Islam
In the beginning were the Islamgesetze, already several weeks before the
annexation in 1908 of formerly Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bauer
1971; Balic1995), representatives of the Muslims living in Vienna tried to ind
out from the Austrian authorities whether there would be any intention from
their part to grant oficial recognition for the Muslim faith throughout the
Habsburg Empire. Soon after, the building of a irst mosque in Vienna was
asked for, an idea which was also supported by the then mayor of Vienna
– perhaps also after taking into consideration the economic advantages
of such a move in the light of the capital city’s trade with visiting Muslim
entrepreneurs and the foreign relations with the Ottoman Empire. Eventually,
together with Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans would be allies
during the Great War.
As mentioned earlier, the Islamgesetze survived the Great War and were
carried over into the First Republic. During the post-WWI period, several
prominent Austrians even converted to Islam, and in 1932 some of them
founded the Islamischer Kulturbund (Islamic Cultural Federation). The most
famous among those converts was Leopold Weiss (1900-92), perhaps better
known to some under his Muslim name Muhammad Asad of The Road to Mecca
literary fame (Asad, 2002; Windhager, 2008, 3rd ed.). In 2008, the square in
front of the main entrance to UNO City in Vienna was named “Muhammad
Asad Square” in his memory.
Here we shall not dwell much on historical details; sufice it to say that
the Islamischer Kulturbund was ultimately dissolved in 1938 by the German
Nazis when they occupied Austria to annex it to their “Third Reich” (Heine,
Lohlker, and Potz, 2012:53). It should be added, however, that the Nazis
tried to instrumentalize Muslims from the Balkans and elsewhere where the
German held sway or had “strategic interests.”
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The year 1945 meant also for Austria’s surviving Muslims a new beginning.
Conversions still happened from time to time, but it was the mass arrival
of Muslim immigrant workers from then-Yugoslavia and Turkey which let
to dramatic numerical, social and cultural changes, especially form the 1960s
onward – with another inlux as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
the following wars on the Balkans.
Issues and Challenges
Today, the “Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich” (IGGiÖ, Islamic
Religious Community in Austria) enjoys the oficial status of a statutory
corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) as an acknowledged religious
community (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012:55). With this, the organization
belongs now irmly to the group of 14 communities which include religious
communities and churches – from the large ones, like the Roman Catholic
Church, to the smaller ones, among them the Evangelical-Methodist Church
or Jehova’s Witnesses.
However, there were ups and downs in terms of the application for oficial
recognition – especially when considering the scope of recognition (Heine,
Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 55-56). In Austria, oficial legal recognition requires
from the respective religious community that it accepts the democratic and
constitutional order of the Republic. This includes, of course, also conformity
with the basic social consensus and human rights. With regard to Islam, this
seems to amount to the challenge to accept the role as a statutory corporation
within a western pluralistic political order that is based on constitutional law.
Therefore the often raised question as to the compatibility of Islam with such
a state can be considered as answered afirmatively.
Such a legal arrangement includes the offer by the Austrian state for a
cooperation, which, however, also means that the religious communities must
be ready to fulil the constitutional expectations of the Republic. The state
can therefore expect from those communities certain contributions toward
the solution of ethical issues that might arise in society. This would include
cooperation in the educational and charity sectors or in terms of pastoral
work to the sick and imprisoned, as well as assistance to the handicapped and
similar alike.
The massive inlux of international Muslim students, refugees, diplomats
and workers, especially the national capital Vienna, from the middle of the
1960s onward led to increased efforts to achieve the longed for institutional
recognition, a special characteristic of the Austrian legislation vis-à-vis religious
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communities. In January 1971 irst application was made by a Muslim welfare
organization in Vienna (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56).
After extensive negotiations an oficial application was inally made in 1979.
During the eight years that led to the oficial application, several technical and
legal problems had to be overcome. In the end, the settings that were used in
Bosnia were taken over by Austria. Finally, in April 1979, the aforementioned
IGGiÖ was founded and acknowledged by the Austrian state (Heine, Lohlker,
and Potz, 2012: 56 and 270 n. 22).
Quite surprisingly, in the course of the negotiations leading to the
recognition the issue of polygamy was raised again as “bigamy” is punishable
by law in Austria. The Austrian authorities even referred to Cairo’s Al-Azhar
University, then the highest authority in the world of Sunni Islam. They also
contacted Diyanet, the state-run ofice for religious affairs in Turkey. Those
two authorities replied by stating that a Muslim would have no right to claim
the “right” to polygamy in a non-Muslim state (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz,
2012: 56).
Another issue which had to be solved was that the old Islamgesetz of the
Austrian-Hungarian period acknowledged only the Sunni Hanai rite (madhhab)
which would cause problems with regard to Islam’s other “legal schools”.
Again, Diyanet was asked what could be done. From Turkey came the reply
that all “legal schools” of Islam should be acceptable, explicitly mentioning
the remaining three Sunni ones, i.e. the Shai’is, Malikis and Hanbalis, but
not referring the Shi’ites. The Austrian authorities accepted this interpretation
from Turkey. The applicants, however, had also asked to include Twelver
Shi’ites, Zaydis and Ibadhis (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 56-57).
In 1987, Austria’s Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) declared the
previous focus on things Hanai in the 1912 Islamgesetze as not conform to the
Constitution of the Republic. The Court did so not only in order to preserve
freedom of worship and religious confession, but also since the secular
Austrian state should maintain neutrality in matters of religion, be it Christian,
Muslim or otherwise. Since then IGGiÖ has changed its own constitution and
recognizes now all Muslims living within the borders of the Republic.
The IGGiÖ serves now as the umbrella organization of many Islamic
associations in Austria, but not all Muslims in the country are members of
those organizations. This is similar to the situation in neighbouring Germany
and other European countries. Thus even if IGGiÖ acknowledges Austria’s
constitutional order, his say nothing about the approaches of those who are
not members.
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IGGiÖ is entitled to provide lessons of religious education in state schools
(Khorchide, 2009; Potz, 2003; Kalb, Potz, and Schinkele, 2003). It is also
allowed to collect “church tax” but so far it has not exercised this privilege
and does not build, inance or administer mosques in Austria. In 2013, Austria
has granted the status of a recognized religious community also to Alevism.
Another issue is the somewhat restricted reach of the IGGiÖ as Muslims in
Austria are not required to be members. As a matter of fact, among religions
in Austria, Roman Catholic Christianity is predominant. According to the
2001 census, 73.6% of the country’s population adhered to this denomination.
As of 2012, the most recent year for which igures are available, the number
of Catholics has dropped to about 63.5% of the population. There is a much
smaller group of Lutherans, totalling about 4.7% of the population in 2001,
3.8% in 2012. Since the 2001 census these two historically dominant religious
groups in Austria recorded losses in the number of adherents. The Roman
Catholic Church reported a drop of ~10%, the Lutheran Church of ~1%. In
contrast, the number of Muslims in Austria has increased in recent years, and
with 4.2% of the population calling themselves Muslim in 2001, up to around
5% to 6.2% in 2010. In 2010, it was estimated to be around 400,000 to 500,000
Muslims in Austria, or up to about 6% of the total population (Euro-Islam.
Info 2013). However, the IGGiÖ has direct access only to 40-50,000 Muslims,
as not all of Austria’s Muslims are members, as just mentioned (Heine,
Lohlker, and Potz, 2012). There is also the issue of “identity and religion. It
is a matter of fact that for many migrants – not only Muslims – religion and
ethnic identity are often intermingled or even confused with each other. The
same can be said about “traditions”, many of those, are actually in blatant
contrast to the original teachings of Islam.
Within this complicated context, one cannot estimate high enough the
contributions made by the IGGiÖ in terms of integration of Muslims into
Austrian majority society, whereby “integration” wouldn’t necessarily mean
“assimilation”. Time will tell whether the Austrian model of participation will
be crowned by success as the Austrian authorities would have to continue their
support for this promising project also in the future.
Recent Developments
The IGGiÖ did make some efforts to improve this situation, even on the
European level. Upon the initiative of the IGGiÖ and with the support of
the Austrian state, so-called “conferences of imams” (Imamkonferenzen) had
been organized, the irst one in 2003 with international participation in Graz
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(Austria), and the following ones in Vienna in 2006 and 2010. In between
there had been an Austrian Imamkonferenz in Vienna in 2005. During those
meetings a host of religiously and politically relevant topics had been discussed
and several remarkable statements were published (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz,
2012).
The 2003 conference in Graz addressed the situation of the Muslims in
Europe and advocated an individual European identity. Other topics discussed
had been democracy human rights and pluralism, all with recourse to classical
Islamic theology and contemporary interpretations. Moreover, the issue of
Islam’s relations with other religious communities was discussed.
Very interesting was the debate on a special interpretation of Islamic law
for Muslims living in a minority situation (iqh al-aqalliyat) (Albrecht, 2010)
as well as moderation and the “middle path” in Islamic religious practice (alwasatiyyah) (Kamali, 2008; 2010) and a distancing from any form of extremism
and fanaticism.
The 2006 Vienna meeting addressed issues regarding putting things into
practice in order to increase the public acceptance by majority non-Muslims of
Muslims living in Europe. Muslims had been asked to understand themselves
as integral part of European societies, a very encouraging step forward to the
mind of this writer. Even issues concerning the ecological environment had
been discussed at the conference.
Up to the 2006 meeting Shi’ites had not been invited. This changed in 2010
when Shiites were explicitly welcomed. On this meeting imams had been asked
to engage also in social work for the wider good of society. They should also
acquaint themselves with the cultures of their host countries. In the centre was
a call for more active participation for the sake of the further development of
European societies at large.
In Austria, there exists now a variety of Islamic organizations, most of
them members of the IGGiÖ, but some of them not. Common to all of
them is, that most of them has somewhat lost contact to the second and
third generations of immigrants. The decreased interest in religion as such
seems to be a general feature especially of the third generation. Therefore, it is
increasingly dificult to describe the present situation of Islam in Austria as we
notice an increasing trend toward “individualized religiosity” among Muslims
in Austria.
The Turkish mosque associations in Austria are organized under the
umbrella of ATIB, which in turn is a branch of the already mentioned oficial
Turkish Ofice for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in Ankara. Its President is the
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attaché for religious affairs at the Turkish embassy in Vienna. Current around
60 associations are member in ATIB, whose main task consists in facilitating
networking. ATIB is basically culturally and religiously oriented rather than
politically. Within the IGGiÖ, ATIB has a leading position.
Less organized are Austria’s Bosnian Muslims, who are already a long-time
feature of the country, due to its Austrian-Hungarian past, as mentioned
initially. All of them are inanced by private donations and most of them are in
line with the religious administration (Rijaset) of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its
head then Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric, who is often in Austria for visiting the
Bosniak communities. The Bosnian Muslims understand themselves as truly
European Muslims – rightly so – due to the location of their home country
and their recent history. After the end of the Bosnian civil war, however, many
of them emphasize now the importance of religious identity over the cultural
background.
Of special interest is the “Islamic Federation of Vienna” (IFW, Millî Görüş,
lit. “National Vision”) (Schiffauer, 2004 and 2010; Amir-Moazami, 2010),
one of the leading Turkish diaspora organizations in Europe, since the new
IGGiÖ-president comes from their ranks. They differ from ATIB as they
consider Islam as something which doesn’t end at the doors of the mosques
but as a lifestyle to be observed in society. They have a strong focus on social
work with the youth and women. Other Muslims, however, consider IFW as
quite ethnocentrically closed up organization catering for the needs of ethnic
Turks only. Within IGGiÖ, the IFW will surely continue to play an important
role as the majority of Muslims living in Austria happen to be Turks and
as Turkey itself is ruled by the religiously oriented AKP-government under
Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdoğan.
There are also several other Muslim associations in Austria which have a
background Suism (al-tasawwuf) or Islamic mysticism. Here shall be mentioned
only the Süleymanci Movement (Wunn, 2007: 54 ff.), named after its founder
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). They too are involved in social work
with the youth and women. A special characteristic of the Süleymancis is
their origins in the Naqshbandi movement of Sunni Suism, the founder of
which was Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389 in Central Asia) (Kabbani, 2012).
Like the Naqshbandi Sui order (tariqah), the Süleymancis too practice in the
religious assemblies the dhikr, literally “remembrance”, an Islamic devotional
act, typically involving the recitation—mostly silently - of the Names of God,
and of supplications taken from hadith texts and Qur’anic verses.
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Leaving for while Sunni Islam, Austria is also home to Twelver Shi’ites
(Marcinkowski, 2010: 19-47), mostly from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and, to a lesser
extent, from Azerbaijan and the Indian subcontinent. The “Imam Ali Centre”
in Vienna, headed by the Austrian convert Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad
Waldmann, caters mostly for Iranians and can be considered close to the
Islamic Republic of Iran and its political direction. Shi’ite immigration to
Austria increased especially after the 1979 revolution in Iran, the fall of the
Saddam regime in Iraq and the various conlicts in Lebanon. As mentioned
earlier, there had been certain tensions with the Sunni dominated IGGiÖ in
terms of a lack of Shiite representation, but now both are involved in dialogue
in order to clear the way of closer cooperation.
It is quite remarkable with regard to the current state of integration the
Shiites into Austrian society, that the oficial opening of Vienna Airport’s
Terminal 3 Check-In on 21 June 2012, was not only attended by Vienna’s mayor
and Christian and Jewish religious dignitaries, such as the Rabbi, and leading
Catholic and Protestant personnel, but also by Mr. Waldmann, representing
Vienna’s Muslims at large. All of them recited blessings according to their
particular fashion. Around 200 invited guests had been present at the ceremony
(Flughafen Wien 2012). Aside from those rather well integrated Sunni and
Shi’ite organizations, however, there are also rather shadowy movements,
some of them to be considered quite extremist in their ideology and political
outlook. Here mentioned shall be only the Hizb al-Tahrir (lit. “Liberation
Party”) (Taji-Farouki, 1996) and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egyptian as well
as increasingly also Syrian “fame” (Rubin, 2010; Mitchell, 1993). Vienna is
actually the main seat of Hizb al-Tahrir in the German-speaking countries.
Their aim is the revival and re-establishing of a supra-national caliphate in the
Islamic lands which is seen as the sole solution of the current problems faced
by the Muslims worldwide. Most of the members are well-educated and many
of them appear in mosques in order to recruit members to their organization.
Austria’s security establishment is currently watching them closely.
From among the non-extremist and rather reformist movements the Gülenis
also active in Austria movement (Ebaugh, 2012; Heine, Lohlker, and Potz,
2012: 78-79). Their focus is on a certain rapprochement between tradition
Islam and Modernity and on a synthesis between Islam and Turkish-Ottoman
heritage. In Austria they publish a German-language edition of their organ,
the Zaman newspaper. Through the “Friede-Institute” (Peace Institutes) in
Vienna and Innsbruck they are also involved in interreligious dialogue, which
includes also contacts to Hinduism and Buddhism.
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Turning now our attention from “institutionalized Islam” in Austria and
proceeding toward currents of faith and ideology, three phenomena should be
considered that can be considered somewhat at the fringes (Suism) or even
outside mainstream Islam (Salaism and Jihadism) as practiced by the majority
of Muslims in Austria.
Salaism is a movement among Sunni Muslims named after the Salaf (lit.:
“predecessors” or “ancestors”), the earliest Muslims, whom they consider the
examples of Islamic practice. Salaism has become associated with literalist,
strict and puritanical approaches to Islam. In neighbouring Germany, Salaism
has been described as the fastest growing Islamic movement in a 2010 German
domestic intelligence service annual report (Al Arabiya News, 12 April 2012).
Although not all Salais are prone to violence or even terrorism, at times the
borders are often somewhat blurred. In Austria, some of them have tried
to undermine the other Islamic organizations with their followers (Heine,
Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 95).
Contrary to Salaism, however, Jihadism (from jihad, commonly translated
as “Holy War”, but actually meaning “to struggle in the way of Allah”) refers
to the renewed focus on armed jihad in Muslim fundamentalism since the later
period of 20th century, but with a continuous history reaching back to the
early 1800s. “Jihadism” in this sense covers both guerrilla warfare and Islamic
terrorism with an international scope as it arose from the 1980s, since the 1990s
substantially represented by the al-Qaeda network. It has its roots in the late
19th and early 20th century ideological developments of Islamic revivalism.
Generally the term jihadism denotes Sunni Islamist armed struggle.
In Austria, in 2007, the so-called “Globale Islamische Medienfront” (GIMF)
published video messages against German and Austrian military participation
in Afghanistan (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 98). Several activists, such as
Mohamed Mahmoud, the former head of the “Islamische Jugend Österreich”
(Austrian Muslim Youth), were arrested by Austrian authorities and later on
sentenced to imprisonment (Heine, Lohlker, and Potz, 2012: 98).
The problem of increasing jihadi tendencies among Muslims in Austria
but also in the rest of Europe should perhaps seen not so much through the
religious lens. Equally important is the social marginalization of Muslim youths
in Western Europe, who often encounters prejudice from the part of the
majority population. Many of them didn’t inish their education which causes
problems for them to ind a job, which in turn, serves as a further obstacle on
the way toward full integration into European society. Identity problems add
to the severity of the issue. That jihadism in Austria seems to a real problem
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and not an imagined one became obvious toward the end of 2010/beginning
of 2011, when attacks by jihadists on Coptic churches in Egypt caused also
preventive security measures from the part of the authorities in Austria as
names of Austrian Copts had appeared on jihadi websites (Heine, Lohlker,
and Potz, 2012: 100).
Finally, Suism, the peaceful and mystical branch of Islam. Classical Sui
scholars have deined it as a science whose objective is the reparation of the
heart and turning it away from all else but God. Muslims and mainstream
scholars of Islam deine Suism as simply the name for the inner or esoteric
dimension of Islam (excellent coverage in Schimmel, 1975) which is supported
and complemented by outward or exoteric practices of Islam, such as Islamic
law. Of course, Islamic mysticism belongs now also to mainstream Islam
in the sense that its intellectual spiritual tradition is certain part of Islamic
tradition at large. What puts it at the fringes of contemporary mainstream
Islam in contemporary Austria, as perhaps elsewhere in western Europe, is
that the number of its followers today is comparatively smaller than that of,
say, the ordinary visitor of a ATIB mosque, many of the latter being employed
in “blue collar jobs”.
There are currently no studies on Suism in Austria, but apparently the
Naqshbandi tradition seems to be the fasted growing branch (Heine, Lohlker,
and Potz, 2012: 96-97). The membership in such a tradition, a tariqah or “order”
offers to the members a coherent social network and a spiritual basis in an
otherwise completely secularized society like Europe. This writer would even
argue that such an “organized Suism” would even further identity-inding
or integration in western society as it focuses on social wellbeing, charity and
support of the “Other” – non-Muslims included.
Conclusion: Austria as a Model for Europe?
After this brief overview of a century of oficial recognition of Islam in
Austria, the question arises whether we can speak of an “Austrian model” that
should be emulated in other parts of Europe.
This question is dificult to answer as it refers to a variety of levels. As a
matter of fact, the Austrian approach has found several supporters, especially
in neighbouring Germany, where there exist now even imam-training courses
at university-level (in Münster and Osnabrück), and even oficial recognitions
of the level of German federal states, such as Hamburg. It is certainly laudable
that, for the irst time, there exist now such training programs inside Europe,
programs the curricula of which are oficially approved by the state. This
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ensures that the syllabi of such courses are in line with Islamic tradition on
the one hand and contemporary European society and its foundations on the
other.
However, as far as we can see, Muslims in Austria, the youth in particular,
face still the issue of how to preserve religious but especially ethnic identity
vis-à-vis the majority non-Muslim European majority population. Legal
approaches toward integration are in order but they seem not to reach the
grassroots, the ones that are supposed to be integrated. Moreover, the real
meaning of “integration” has so far not been transmitted to the Muslims,
perhaps since this meaning had not yet been clear to Austria and other western
European nations for that matter themselves. Often it seems that “integration”
is confused with “assimilation” where one has to give up his or her identity in
order to be accepted by a host society. It appears to this writer that both sides
have to make a step toward the “Other” in order to be credible.
A problem for host populations in Europe when talking about “integration”
is that many if not most Muslim countries do not grant full religious freedom
– a human right after all – to their citizens, so the issue of a lack of reciprocity
seems to be a main condition in heads of many in Europe.
In addition, many in Europe do not consider their respective countries as
immigrant society. International political issues, such as the various conlicts
throughout the Middle East and the therewith connected worldview of
“principally violent Muslims” or the indeed threatened status of Christians
throughout the Muslim world do their part in insuring that Muslims are often
not considered welcome in Europe.
On the other hand, however, the steps taken by Austria, especially Islamic
religious instruction in schools and the opportunity to study Islamic theology
and practice at University level are surely steps into the right direction, steps
that are perhaps one day leading toward a truly “European Islam” that is
accepted – and accepts itself – as an integral part of this continent.
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Islam in Slovenia
The History of the Muslim Presence and Characteristics of
the Muslim Population of Slovenia
Anja Zalta
The History of the Muslim Presence
Islam in Slovenia cannot be studied separately from the events that occurred
in the Balkans, as it is from the Balkan Peninsula that the Islamic population in
Slovenia primarily originated, and is the region through which Islam penetrated
furthest, and where Islamic peoples remained.
Many believe that the Balkans irst encountered Islam during the Turkish
incursions, in the third quarter of the 14th century. In the period between
that time and especially the end of the 15th century the Balkans met with
the predecessors of today’s Turks, Muslim Albanians and Muslim Bosnians,
(Bosniaks from here on); but the Balkan peoples and southern Slavs had come
in contact with the Islamic world and Muslim peoples much earlier via Arab
tradesmen.
These earliest inluences of the Arabs as well as the Turkmen peoples
via war, trade and culture left a religious imprint on the territory of former
Yugoslavia; there should be no doubt that a population of Islamic faith existed
here even before the beginning of the Ottoman invasions of the Balkans.
However, our main interest in the following section is the way Slovenia
irst met with Islam. According to available sources, the irst encounter of
the Islamic world with Slovene territory indeed occurred in the period of
Turkish incursions. The irst took place in 1409 in the southernmost part of
our territory, in the town of Metlika, and was soon followed by many others.
Historians, among them the most prominent expert on Turkish incursions
in Slovenia, Ignacij Voje, divide them into three time periods: the Turkish
incursions dating between 1408 and 1483, those occurring between 1491 and
1499, and the incursions taking place between 1511 and 1559 (Voje, 1996).
These incursions deinitely mark one of the darkest periods in Slovene
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history. Through folk poetry and prose the Slovene collective memory
preserves the recollection of the horror upon the incursions of Ottoman
mounted units that plundered, killed and hunted men for slavery. Though
these invasions were of dubious representation of the Islamic faith, they still
bear an inluence on public opinion and the attitude towards Islam in Slovenia.
The Turks and their religion have survived through the entire Slovene history
as something completely “different,” alien and dangerous. The Slovene word
for a Turk (“Turek”) became an expletive. Even in the 15th century, the word
Turks was being replaced with epithets such as ‘hereditary enemies,’ ‘dreadful
tyrants,’ ‘blood-thirsty and rabid dogs,’ ‘birds of prey,’ ‘bandits’ and ‘arsonists.’
Interestingly, the peasants at that time also used the expression ‘Christian
Turks’ for aristocrats and gentlemen living in courts (Pašić, 2002, 97).
In the middle of the 16th century, the Slovene Protestants paid the problem
of Turks much attention. Jurij Dalmatin (1547-1589), author of the irst
Slovene translation of the Bible, referred to the Turks as “impious dogs,” while
Primož Trubar (1508-1586), founder of the Slovene written language and
author of the irst two Slovene books (“Cathecismus” and “Abecedarium”),
taking it upon himself to convert the Turks to Christianity and thus put a stop
to the incursions, regularly visited Turkish prisoners incarcerated at Ljubljana
Castle (Rajhman, 1986).
The greatest Slovene poet, France Prešeren (1800-1849), was the irst
poet to touch on the topic of Islam. At that time there was little literature
available on Islam and the majority of the population was unfamiliar with
this religion. In his work “A Wreath of Sonnets” Prešeren refers to Muslims
as ‘Muhammadans,’ while in the poem entitled “Turjaška Rozamunda,” he
speaks of a Bosnian named Lejla, who abandoned the faith of ‘Mahoma’
and converted to Christianity. ‘Mahoma’ is actually Muhammad (in Slovene
‘Mohamed’), and this can be taken as some proof of how little the Muslim
tradition was known during that period. However, among the Slovene poets
we can also ind a few men of letters who were better acquainted with the
topic of Islam and were even well disposed towards it. One of these was
Anton Aškerc (1856-1912), who after inishing his theology studies began
exploring Islam and Buddhism. Of course, in his literary work he could not
avoid the Turkish incursions and atrocities, but many of his poems were
written as he travelled the Islamic countries and these consequently manifest
a more positive attitude towards the Muslims. Aškerc spoke of the latter as of
brothers (Slavs) of different religion, and one of the poems (“The Goblet of
Immortality”) even begins with a surah from the Qur’an.
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One of the rather inluential tales that really settled into the hearts of
Slovene readers is the novel by Josip Jurčič (1844-1881) entitled “Jurij Kozjak,
slovenski janičar” (“Jurij Kozjak, a Slovene Janissary”).
Jurčič wrote very disapprovingly about Islam. In this book, a Slovene
boy named Jurij is taken away to become a Janissary. The Muhammadans
deracinate his Christianity, which teaches us to love our neighbours, and
inculcate Muhammadanism in him, which preaches hate and elimination
of the Christians and their religion. Jurčič’s novel is part of the Slovene
compulsory primary school reading material and we can just imagine what
kind of impression it makes on a young reader.
Even today the Slovenes usually associate Turkish incursions with the
“stealing” of Slovene boys who were raised by the Turks to become Janissaries
and who returned several years afterwards to Slovene soil, amnesiac and
oblivious of their origins, to rob and kill their own people. This is the reason
why many Slovenes associate the word Islam irst, in a very stereotypical
way, with this stigma of the past and do not allow themselves to widen their
knowledge towards more positive aspects of Islam.
Characteristics of the Muslim Population of Slovenia
One of the irst great inluxes of Muslims into Slovene territory occurred
during the First World War, when Bosniaks fought on the Soča Front on the
side of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.1
At that time there was a mosque in the village Log pod Mangartom, the irst
and only mosque in Slovenia, offering religious service to Bosniak ighters.
After the war the mosque was allegedly a thorn in the side of the Italian
administration, as the Italians feared the Bosniaks more than the devil himself.2
Most probably it was the Italians who tore the mosque down, although it
is not impossible that the locals themselves destroyed it, as the mosque was
made of wood and they needed wood for heating.
The author who wrote most extensively about the Bosniaks on the Soča
Front was Vasja Klavora in his work titled “Plavikriž” (“The Blue Cross,”
1993), which includes the only extant photograph of the Log pod Mangartom
mosque. Migrations of larger Muslim populations to Slovene territory took
place in the time of former Yugoslavia, in the 1960s, mostly due to the
expansion of industry. It was during these years, on September 12, 1967, that
the Islamic Community in Slovenia was founded. Since 1981 a masjid, a house
of prayer, has been operative in Ljubljana, and there are similar places of
worship in Koper, Celje, Maribor and Jesenice.
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According to the censuses presented by Mojca Piko in her dissertation
entitled “Political-Geographical Problems of the Islamic Religious Community
in Slovenia” (“Politično geografska problematika Islamske verske skupnosti v
Sloveniji”), the share of Muslims in the population and territory of Slovenia
in 1921 was 0.1%. Most of them lived in Ljubljana, Maribor and the environs
of Murska Sobota. The 1931 Population Census showed no major changes,
but it is interesting to observe the considerable differences between shares of
male and female members of the Islamic community in both censuses, which
was most probably due to a greater immigration of males from the Muslim
areas of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, especially in the age group 20-24. Many
years passed between the 1931 and the next population census (carried out in
1953) and many socio-political changes affecting the increase of population
occurred in the interim. Among other things, the Slovene territory expanded
with the incorporation of the Primorska region, Yugoslavia transformed
from a kingdom into a federative people’s republic that separated church and
state so that faith became a private matter. Despite the latter fact, the 1953
census recorded 1,617 people declaring themselves as followers of the Islamic
religion in Slovenia, which represented 0.1% of the total Slovene population.
Between the 1953 and the 1991 censuses the population in Slovenia increased
by almost 30% (Piko, 2004, 44). In 1991, the census registered 29,361 Muslims
representing 1.6% of the entire population. In the 1991 Population Census the
question of national afiliation was answered by 87.5% of the 29,361 Muslims
polled. As many as 20,435 (69.6%) declared themselves to be Muslims mainly
from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2,481 (8.1%) as Albanian-nationality Muslims
from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, 1,196 (4.1%) stated regional afiliation,
1,121 (3.8%) declared themselves as Yugoslavs, and 818 (2.7%) as Slovenes.
A total of 1,265 Muslims polled indicated Slovenian as their mother tongue
(Piko, 2004, 51).
According to the population data of the 2002 census there were 47,488
members of the Islamic Religious Community living in Slovenia (2.4% of the
entire population), which means that the Islamic community is the second
most numerous religious community, following the Catholic.
The difference in the number of Muslims is considered to be a result of
the fact that many believers had not declared themselves to be followers of
the Muslim faith in the 1991 census. According to the estimates of the Islamic
community there are Muslims who even in the 2002 census did not declare
themselves to be Muslims; therefore an increase in the number of declared
Muslims is to be expected in the next census as well. This means that the
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latter censuses did not actually record an increase in the share of Muslim
population, but rather the movement towards the real number of Muslims
in Slovenia. The Islamic community estimates that there are approximately
60,000 Muslims living in Slovenia at present. In their opinion the increase in the
number of declared Muslims resulted from the more democratic atmosphere
in which the 2002 census was conducted in comparison to that of 1991. This
explanation is convincing, for the number of refugees in the interim would
not account for such an increase.
The category ‘Muslim’ in census results
The category ‘Muslim’ was introduced in the 1961 Population Census and was
at irst intended primarily for those inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina
who did not want to describe themselves either as Croats or Serbs and whose
national identity was based on their religion; but it was soon adopted by the
Muslims from Sandžak as well. The category ‘Muslim’ was abolished with
the passing of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as this states that its
constituent peoples are Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.
Despite the introduction of the term Bosniak, the category ‘Muslim’ still
appears in census results, but in an analysis the two categories should not be
merged as the Muslims originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina now declare
themselves as Bosniaks, while those from Sandžak still declare themselves as
‘Muslims.’ Their national identity is based primarily on religion, Islam, as they
consider themselves neither Serbs nor Montenegrins. With the emergence
of independent states in the territory of former Yugoslavia the classiication
of national afiliation of the population came to include the answer Bosniak,
a term that was introduced in the constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Federation in 1994.
The options regarding national afiliation still include the category ‘Muslim,’
but since the latter is used to denote ethnic and not religious afiliation, we
should be very careful with this category when studying the national structure
of Muslims in Slovenia.
The Legal situation of Muslims in Slovenia
The Islamic community in Slovenia has been active since 1967, when
in Ljubljana the irst local community (jama‘ah) was established. It was
administratively connected with Zagreb, with its centre located in Sarajevo.
Since 1991, when Slovenia attained its independence, these communities are
no longer administratively connected with Zagreb and Sarajevo; instead, the
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whole community functions independently of the latter, according to the
Slovene law. At present there are fourteen such communities operative in
Slovenia.
Agreement on the legal status of the Islamic community in the Republic
of Slovenia was signed on 9th of July 2007 by Dr. Nedžad Grabus, Grand
Mufti and President of the Meshihat of the Islamic community in the
Republic of Slovenia, and Dr. Lovro Šturm, Chairman of the Committee of
the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Solving Open Issues of
Religious Communities on the basis of Article 21 of Religious Freedom Act.3
The Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Islamic community have
agreed on freedom of operation of the Islamic community, legal personality
of the Islamic community, freedom of organisation and conduct of religious
and educational activity, and jurisdiction, freedom of forming structures of
the Islamic community and appointing persons in charge of them, freedom
of establishing and maintaining contacts, freedom of access to public media
and establishment of own media, freedom of creating associations, freedom
of establishing educational institutions, preserving historical and cultural
heritage; general rights and religious activities in hospitals, nursing homes, the
armed forces, the police and special institutions; education of Islamic charity
organisations with other charity organisations.
Conclusions
It is the fact that Muslims in Slovenia are Slovene citizens with all related
rights and duties, yet the Slovene notions of Islam are more or less the
same as the general “western” ones. The positive presentation of Slovene
society as democratic, developed, free, and even tolerant, together with the
negative presentation of Islamic society as the opposite (i.e., undemocratic,
discriminatory against women, undeveloped, violent and intolerant) was
distinctly evident in the Slovene public debate on the question of the
construction of a mosque.
As early as 1969, the Muslims living in Slovenia made a request for a mosque
to be built in Ljubljana. The discussion on the mosque was extraordinarily
burdened with contradictory views and principles on one side as well as very
material and symbolic interests, prejudice and ignorance on the other side.
In 2006, Ljubljana’s Islamic community gained a new mufti, Dr. Nedžad
Grabus, who has worked with public intellectuals and activists to promote
roundtable discussions, cultural events and other educational activities to
replace stereotypically negative notions of Islam. The community has changed
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the streams of intolerance and after 45 years of petition from the Islamic
community to build a mosque in Slovenia, the opening of the Slovenia’s irst
mosque is announced for 2016.
Notes
1. The War Ofice issued an order granting all Muslims a free day on Friday and three
or four days off for Bayram. The Bosniak regiments had their own imams and the
swearing in was even adapted to religious ceremonies (Pašić, 2002, 80).
2. Since the Italians were in such great fear of the Bosniaks, fezzes were distributed
among numerous other units during the last, 12th battle, and even after the departure
of these units the muezzins remained behind in order to remind the Italians ive
times a day that they were still there (Ovčak, 2002).
3. Ofic.Gaz.Of the RS, no. 14/2007.
Bibliography
Dragoš, Srečo (2003): Islam in suicidalno podalpsko pleme. Ljubljana, Skupina za
spremljanje nestrpnosti, Mirovni inštitut.
Grabus, Nedžad, Stiković. Denis (ed.) (2012): Z dialogom do medsebojnega spoštovanja,
Ljubljana, Zavod Averroes: Sožitje I.
Hukić, A., (ed.) (1977): Islam i muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo, Starješinstvo
islamske zajednice u SR Bosni i Hercegovini.
Kerševan, Marko (2005): Svoboda za cerkev, svoboda od cerkve. Ljubljana, Založba Sophia.
Klavora, Vasja (1993): Plavi križ: Soška fronta: Bovec 1915-1917. Ljubljana, Mladinska
knjiga.
Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera (1996): Bosanska identiteta med preteklostjo in prihodnostjo. Ljubljana,
Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.
Norris, H. T. (1993): Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab
World. Columbia, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press.
Ovčak, Tomaž (2002): Džamija v Logu pod Mangartom, www.soskafronta.com.
Pašić, Ahmed (2002): Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji, Sarajevo, Emanet.
Pašić, Ahmed (2006): Islam in moderni zahod: integracija islamskih skupnosti v moderne
zahodne družbe, Kranj, Gorenjski glas.
Piko, Mojca (2004):Politično geografska problematika Islamske verske skupnosti v Sloveniji,
diplomska naloga. Ljubljana, Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta.
Rajhman, Jože (1986): Pisma Primoža Trubarja. Ljubljana, SAZU.
Urh, Polona (2003): Podobe islama v časniku Delo, diplomska naloga. Ljubljana, Univerza
v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede.
Verske skupnosti v Sloveniji (1994). Ljubljana, Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije za
verske skupnosti.
Voje, Ignacij (1996): Slovenci pod pritiskom turške ganasilja. Ljubljana, Znanstveni inštitut
Filozofske fakultete.
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Muslims of Croatia:
Social Recognition and Challenges
Senad Nanić
Basic Statistical Facts
According to censuses conducted in years of 1991, 2001 and 2011, Republic
of Croatia records signiicant demographic losses continuously, both in
total population number and in majority of census categories. Causes of
demographic loss in 2001, when 4.437.460 inhabitants in total were recorded,
making 7.27 percent decrease in relation to 1991 census when 4.785.265 of
them were recorded, may well be attributed to immediate and long term effects
of the war from the irst half of the nineties. However, in conditions of stabile
peace in the following decade, in years of political stability that may well be
characterized in major part as period of economic growth, demographic
loss in 2011, when 4.284.889 inhabitants in total were recorded, that is, 3.44
percent less than in 2001, points to a deep cultural and civilization problem of
Croatian society in terms of so called transition. Particularly alarming is the
fact that the biggest demographic “losers” are children, population category
of age between 0 and 19 years, counting in 2011 decrease of 14.9 percent in
relation to 2001 census. Consideration of prospects of any social community
in Croatia is conditioned by these negative demographic indicators.
Though small in number, Muslims are one of the rare categories that
records continuous growth in the three censuses. According to the 2011
census, there are 62.977 Muslims in Croatia what makes only 1.47 percent
of total population. However, this igure makes a growth of even 10.92
percent in relation to the 2001 census when their number was 56.777 what
constituted then 1.28 percent of total Croatian population. Similarly, the
1991 census records 54.814 Muslims and that is 1.15 percent of the then
total population of the Republic of Croatia. Muslims record intensive growth
throughout the whole 20th century. In the 1919 census, 3.145 Muslims with
continuous residence were recorded, while in the 1931 census, 4.750 of them
were recorded.
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In terms of ethnicity, nearly 60 percent of Croatian Muslims are Bošniaks,
the second largest national minority, i.e., ethnic group, in Croatia. The
percentage includes those Bošniaks who declare themselves as ethnical
Muslims or Bosnians. Somewhat more than 15 percent of Muslims declare
themselves as Croat in terms of ethnicity. Only a bit less is the percentage of
Albanian Muslims. The forth group in number are Roma, making 8 percent,
while the other ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Turks, Iranians and others,
participate insigniicantly.
Published results of the census prior to the last census did not relate ethnical
to religious declaration. It is thus impossible to determine the cause of this
signiicant increase of Muslim population in Croatia. One cannot attribute
it to higher natural increase of Muslims since age distribution of Bošniak
population essentially does not differ from general age distribution, as seen
in Population distribution chart according to ethnicity and age from 2011.
Signiicantly higher share of child age population is registered in Roma and
Albanian ethnic groups, whose share in Muslim population, on the other hand,
is less than a quarter. It is possible that number of Bosnia and Herzegovina
citizens and those of other ex-Yugoslav countries who gained Croatian
citizenship or residence permit within the last decade was in reality higher
than generally expected. The fact is that the last Croatian census recorded even
6.733 Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens having no Croatian citizenship. Special
attention is to be addressed to assimilation trends though, in two directions,
irstly, Croatian majority assimilating Bošniak ethnical declaration by Muslims
of Bosnia and Herzegovina origin in third generation or in ethnically mixed
marriages and secondly, Muslim community gradually assimilating by analogy
with Muslim communities in the West. Muslims today inhabit almost all cities
of Croatia. The highest number of them is found in industrial and cultural
centers such as Zagreb, Rijeka, Sisak, Dubrovnik, and Pula.
Causes of Social Recognition
Islam was recognized as a state religion in Croatia in 1916 by parliamentary
conirmation of decision decreed by Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1912.
Since then, Islamic Community in Croatia enjoys institutionalized continuous
activity. Its oneness and identity has never been threatened by a parallel or
an alternative Islamic institution. Islam in Croatia was recognized due to
historic fact of Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1878 and later annexing in 1908 whereby Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina became irst Islamic entity in modern Europe. Having state
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tradition of mono-confessional citizenship on one side and political decision
of preserving administrative unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other,
Austro-Hungarian state, Croatia then included, has institutionalized Islam
making Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina its citizens. Newly established
community continued to practice Hanai religious law tradition of Ottoman
Empire. Thereupon Bošniaks started to inhabit Croatia more intensively in
pursue of university education and better business opportunities having thus
renewed medieval multi-centennial presence of Muslims in Croatia, abruptly
ended in 18th century. No other place in Western Europe, until second half
of 20th century in Spain and Belgium, had institutionalized Islam as religion.
Modern presence of Muslims in Croatia lasts much longer than the presence
of Muslims in countries of Western Europe so that grade of social integration
and institutionalization is much higher. Muslims of Croatia do not fall in
category of work and education immigration for a long time now.
Fact that Bošniaks are signiicantly more socially recognized than Albanians
and particularly Romas is evident once having professional registers and
encyclopaedic reference books scanned. Unlike other Muslim minority and
majority peoples and communities in Europe, Bošniaks share exceptional
cultural proximity with neighbouring peoples. The language is practically
the same, the origin is mutual southern Slavic and historic multi-centennial
experience of living together under foreign imperial rule of different cultural
spheres, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, is shared. Cultural phenomena
of the two cultural spheres live more or less in both Bošniak and Croatian
people. 18th and 19th century represent merely a violent break of Bošniak and
Muslim presence in Croatia. Larger parts of present day eastern and southern
Croatia were part of autonomous Bosnian governance, namely “pashaluk”,
under Ottoman administration in 16th and 17th century. Eastern and western
Christians had their religious rights and institutions protected. This has
inluenced signiicantly development of respective national institutions and
their attachment to religious institutions in modern age. In terms of the stated
cultural proximity, Islam becomes the most important component of Bošniak
national identity, unlike other European Muslim nations, namely Turks and
Albanians, since their languages and cultures differ signiicantly from the
neighbouring.
City of Zagreb, being industrial and university centre of Yugoslavia
throughout 20th century, has continuously attracting large number of Bošniaks
in pursue of high education and professional and social recognition until late
after the Second World War when Sarajevo has deinitely developed as a strong
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university and industrial centre. Therefore, urban, university educated and
industrial population share in Bošniak minority in Croatia surpasses Croatian
average population share. Muslims, though few, today inhabit all cities of Croatia.
Interval between the two world wars is marked politically by struggle of
southern Slavic peoples for the recognition in centralist Kingdom of Yugoslavia
ruled by Serb dynasty. Bošniaks, especially those living in Croatia, supported
Croatian struggle for national recognition and preferred Zagreb over Belgrade
as a welcoming environment recognizing Bošniaks as cooperates in struggle
for national recognition. Negation of separate nation of Bosnian Muslims and
territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Croatian political faction
caused political ight against Muslims, that is, Bošniaks, reaching climax by
establishment of Ustashi fascist regime in 1941 and the war conlict in 1993.
Nevertheless, Bošniaks stayed for ever perceived by majority of Croatian
people as a friendly separate national entity. This perception was enhanced by
renewal of national states in form of federal republics in socialist Yugoslavia
even though Bošniak nationality was not recognized before seventies of the
20th century under a compromise name “Muslim”.
Intensive industrial development of socialism after the Second World
War attracting a large number of Bošniaks into industrial centres of Croatia
was enhanced by particular international position of socialist Yugoslavia in
relation to eastern and western blocks. International policy of non-alignment
movement headed by Yugoslavia intensiied political, cultural and economic
ties with numerous Muslim countries. Large number of Croats worked in
Muslim countries. Large number of students from Muslim countries studied
and continued to live their lives in Croatia. This has inluenced in a positive
way the perception of Islam and Muslims in Croatia and Yugoslavia.
Muslims of Croatia were never a signiicant part of Croatian political elite
in spite of their common ability in individual achievements. Not in one regime
Muslims had a lobby to help them pass the ilters of high rank political decision
making. So they turn to what can provide for living; that is quality of individual
work as the only guarantee of social survival. Even today employment rate in
state administration of Muslims, especially of those who do not ethnically
declare Croatianhood is far beneath respective population share.
Far beyond average, Muslims of Croatia contributed defence of Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina against aggression that lasted from 1991 till 1995.
They perceived the aggression as an attack on both of their two homelands
meant to physically exterminate their people. They participated over average
in establishment of national institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those
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of Bošniak people. During and after the war, they direct activities to further
establishment of Islamic community and establishment of national minority
Bošniak institutions. They struggle for complete recognition of Bošniak
minority rights in Croatia and full integration in Croatian society.
Institutions
Islamic Community and Croatian Government have signed agreement whereby
state inancial support is determined as well. The agreement is drafted in line
with the agreement which Croatian Government signed with majority Roman
Catholic Church. The agreement deines state support for religious primary
education, as having been executed successfully in numerous public schools
and Islamic Community at local levels since Croatian independence. Number
of pupils is counted in thousands. Religious service in army, police, hospitals
and prisons is determined by the agreement, as well.
Islamic Community has founded public Islamic High School. There are
four mixed classes with some hundred students. Islamic Community founded
Halal Certiication Agency, Football Club “Nur”, Muslim Youth Club, Female
Choir “Arabesque”, Council of Muslim Women and other organizations.
Islamic Community hosts international competition of the Qur’an readers
annually, traditional public presentations of Islamic topics weekly since 1962,
occasional scientiic symposiums, round tables, exhibitions, publishing etc.
Apart of education, basic aims of Islamic Community today are construction
of mosques and waqf centre. Establishment of Faculty of Islamic Sciences is in
preparatory phase now. Locally, Islamic Community is organized in 15 majlises.
Struggle for political recognition of Bošniaks in Croatia was started by Party
of Democratic Action in Croatia, tied to Party of Democratic Action in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The party was founded in 1990 and has 19 branches now.
At the beginning, political activities were directed at the beginning to criticism
of Croatian state policy to Bosnia and Herzegovina and later to struggle
for recognition of Bošniak nation and Bošniak minority rights. Mr. Šemso
Tanković, then president of the party, was member of Croatian Parliament
in two terms representing Albanian, Bošniak, Montenegrin, Macedonian and
Slovene minorities.
Bošniak Democratic Party in Croatia, founded in 2008, claims its political
position as centre left. At the last parliamentary elections in 2011, Mr.
Nedžad Hodžić, president of the party, becomes member of the Parliament
representing ive “ex-Yugoslav” minorities and president of Club of Minority
Parliamentary Members. The party now counts 15 branches in Croatia.
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Founded in 1991, Cultural Society of Croatian Bošniaks “Preporod”
promotes cultural creativity of Croatian Bošniaks as a separate and original
phenomenon in Croatian and Bošniak culture. Renown by rewarded magazine
for culture and social issues “Behar” and numerous publishing endeavours
winning highest state and professional awards in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “Preporod” gathers best Bošniak writers in Croatia and opens
the door to numerous associates from Croatia and the region. “Preporod” also
publishes magazines “Preporod›s Journal” and “Jasmin” and hosts female choir
“Bulbul” and drama group “Orient Espresso” with children group “Zvrk”.
Bošniak National Community in Croatia was founded in 1993 aiming to
protect and promote Bošniak individual and collective rights in Croatia. 11
branches were founded. The community publishes books and magazines
“Bošnjačka pismohrana” and “Bošnjački glas” and hosts choir “Bosana”.
Croatian Homeland War Bošniak Association was founded in 2000 as the
only minority veteran association. In memory of Bošniak soldiers who died
in Homeland War, a war memorial was erected in 2012 next to Islamic Center
in Zagreb.
Assembly of Bošniak Associations in Croatia gathers 23 Bošniak associations
and publishes monthly “Sabah” and hosts annual folklore reviews. Lot of
independent Bošniak cultural amateurism associations are founded across
Croatia. The most prominent is “Sevdah”.
National minority councils advise local authorities. Bošniak Minority
Councils are founded in most of Croatian regions and in many cities and
municipalities. The most recognized is Bošniak Minority Council of Zagreb
City through its popular programs of Srebrenica Convoy and Bosnia and
Herzegovina Movies Review. The Council carried out noticeable sociological
research on social and cultural status of Bosniaks in Zagreb City.
Challenges
Protection of historic unity and high level autonomy of Islamic Community in
Croatia as a part of Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is challenged
now. It is best illustrated by political struggles on new constitution of Islamic
Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, few new interest realities have
formed during last two decades. In the process of dissolution of Yugoslav
republics, recognition and strengthening of their independence, different
state policies on Muslims formed, varying from genocide to full recognition.
Islamic Community in Yugoslavia, now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reduced
in war to territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Sanjak and
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Bošniak diaspora excluding Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, by
decision that was understandable in war but proved disadvantages in the long
term, perceives these various state policies as potential threat to its unity. It
was to be expected then to hear voices of centralism from Sarajevo. On the
other hand, Islamic Community in Croatia, being minor, continues to struggle
to preserve existing level of autonomy aiming the best possible cooperation
with the state and will keep trying to meet requirements of particularity of
state policies. Consensus that has been reached on new constitution proves
momentary capacity of political wisdom and patience by not having forced
Islamic Community in Croatia in direction of full independence. This would
prove fatal. Real strength range of Islamic Community in Croatia having
no ties with Bosnian parent community would enable fast establishment of
parallel Islamic communities. They would be formed by interests of state
policies of ex Yugoslav countries following ethnic and other differences
among Croatian Muslims. State policies of other countries would follow in
line with interest for their citizens or export of their “own” Islam. Instead
of exemplary regulation of Muslim question, Croatia would experience
proverbial European dissolution of Muslim organizations. Already, in that
sense, one could have heard among Zagreb diplomats a criticism of too loud
public support of Islamic Community to realization of Croatian participation
in NATO projects.
On the other hand, one is glad to see ability of Islamic Community to renew
and extend its regional institutional presence. Recent joining of Hungarian
Muslims at their own request in Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was done by their formal joining in Islamic Community in Croatia. So if
other communities of Muslims in central and southeastern Europe recognize
Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their cardinal institution of
Islam, it is practical goal to promote new constitutional changes ordered to
establish regional transnational Islamic Community which will in accordance
with historic, cultural and civilizational realities meet multifold requirements
and needs of Muslim communities in central and southeastern Europe. This
is to be done by making structure of the Community both complex and open
in order to assure ever expanding space for autonomy of communities acting
in different states.
Croatian Muslims will hopefully play inevitable role in sure attempt of
Croatian business capacities return on markets of Muslim countries. This is
corroborated by great interest of Croatian companies shown for program
of halal certiication carried out by Islamic Community. This is area of real
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political and economic struggle where proportionate employment of Muslims
in state administration and respective institutions needs to be assured having
in mind this employment rate was far beneath average by now, particularly for
Muslims who did not declare ethnic Croatianhood. It is necessary to intensify
activities on establishment of Faculty of Islamic Sciences and Arabic Language
in Zagreb where education will be provided for successful activities of Islamic
Community and special aspects of Croatian diplomacy and economy.
Having respect for historic and social identity of Croatian Muslims in
mind, institutionalization of basic Bošniak organizations in Croatia, that is,
emancipation from level of civil associations to realm of continuously assured
institutional activity, is prerequisite of survival and growth of comprehensive
cultural and social identity of Muslims in Croatia. This is not possible without
bilateral agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia which
keeps away like any other continuous support of Sarajevo to cultural and
social activities of Croatian Bošniaks. This is to be observed in context of
ethnic and structural complexity of Bosnian state and lack of deinition of
diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to its ethnic declaration.
The consequences, hopefully not for good, are being endured by Bošniaks in
Croatia, who are, together with Roma, the only national minority in Croatia
with no institutional support by parent state.
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Socio-Cultural Diversity
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Muhidin Mulalič
Historical and Socio-Cultural Background
The historical experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that states, cultures,
civilizations and religions respectively clash, meet and coexist; a process that
is inevitable for historical progress and dynamism. As in the case of BosniaHerzegovina, whenever an exclusive socio-cultural model was presented as an
alternative, requesting transformation and assimilation of existing socio-cultural
models, the country experienced conlicts and wars. The historical continuity
of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state has been characterized by an inclusive sociocultural model, a model that embraces diversity. Actually Mahmutčehajić (2000)
in his work Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition used the Tradition as a basis
of tolerance, understanding and coexistence (pp. 183-190).
The Latin sources indicate that the state of Bosnia was established as early
as in the mid-tenth century. Then, according to documents from 1137, the irst
ruler, Ban Borić, is referred to as the irst Ban or Viceroy of Bosnia from 1154
to 1164. After his reign Bosnia as an independent state continued to exist, this
was also conirmed by Kulin Ban’s Charter, written in 1189. In 1376, after
crowning of King Tvrtko I, Bosnia became a kingdom and kept such status
until the conquest by the Ottoman Empire. During the medieval times Bosnia
reached signiicant economic and socio-cultural development. Therefore, it is
signiicant to mention that before the Ottoman arrival in 1463, Bosnia as an
independent and sovereign state had historical and socio-cultural continuity
(Imamovic, 2006, 44-48).
Socio-cultural features of medieval Bosnia were especially characterized by
the Bosnian Church, which formulated religious make-up independently from
the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christianity. Indeed, the Bosnian Church
represented the state of Bosnia and shaped common religious and cultural
identity of the citizens who were not identifying themselves with neighbouring
states. Thus, Bosnian national identity and sovereignty were derived from the
Bosnian church (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 31-33; Velikonja, 2003, 19; Malcom,
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1994, 27-42). According to Lovrenovic (2001) Medieval Bosnia was also
characterized by unique heritage especially expressed in original Bosnian
language [bosančica] and in the tombs [stećci] (pp. 65-69).
In 1463 Bosnia was under Ottoman rule. Since the reign of Sultan Mehmet
II, the Conqueror, the territories of Bosnia had been expanding, reaching its
climax in the 16th century, a time during which Bosnia included parts of Croatia,
Dalmatia and Serbia. Throughout the Ottoman period (1463-1878), territorial
integrity of Bosnia had been preserved and—due to the Ottoman millet
system—its distinctive socio-cultural values (Jelavich, 1983, 1:49-50; Vucinich,
1962, 605-606). For the sake of a more effective administrative structure of
the state, Bosnia was established as ayalet in 1580 and was divided in sanjaks.
The irst Bosnian ayalet or socio-political, territorial and administrative unit
was furthermore divided into sanjaks or provinces. Such socio-political and
administrative organization indicates historical continuity of Bosnia and her
signiicance within the Ottoman Empire (Ibrahimagic, 1998, 77-81).
The socio-cultural mosaic of medieval Bosnia was furthermore enriched
between the 15th and 19th century due to the interaction and the presence
of the Ottomans. Such presence left a mark on the monuments, literature
and poetry. Besides, Bosnia’s administrative, socio-cultural and economic
structures were directly shaped by the Ottoman presence. For instance
religious monuments built during the Ottoman period left great mark on
Bosnia (Algar, 1971, 168-203). However, it is signiicant to mention that new
economic, political, social, cultural and religious models were not imposed by
the Ottomans (Kirmizialtin, 2007, 646–657). Rather, such new models were
furthermore enriched by the medieval socio-cultural models as they continued
to lourish under new empire.
Socio-cultural values of Bosnia cannot be properly addressed without
mentioning cultural and religious transformations as a result of Ottoman rule.
Ottomans brought the religion of Islam to Bosnia and with it new cultural
and spiritual opportunities. New civilization brought along a higher living
standard and urban, architectural, administrative, economic and commercial
development. The people of Bosnia, considering beneits provided by the
new worldview, had integrated themselves without rejecting their past heritage
of Western civilization. It is interesting to mention that during the reign of
the Ottomans the term Bosniak was used to denote people of the region
regardless of religious afiliation (Imamovic, 1998, 376). Mostly those afiliated
with the Bosnian Church converted to new religion and took an active role
in the political, religious, economic, administrative and cultural life of the
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Ottoman Empire (Enver Imamovic, 1995, 133-135). As Ottoman sources and
archives indicate, the process of the conversion to the religion of Islam in
Bosnia lasted for more than two centuries. This signiies a rather peaceful
conversion to the religion of Islam (Zheliazkova, 1994, 187-208). Political,
cultural and economic developments and circumstances during the Ottoman
rule contributed tremendously towards gradual conversion to the religion of
Islam. Tolerance and understanding, and not forced conversion, on behalf of
the Ottoman Empire can be also inferred from Sultan Mehmed II’s pledge in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463, which granted freedom, safety and security to
the Bosnian Franciscans (Donia and Fine, 1994, 64-65; Gavran, 2001, 63-69).
Due to gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and power succession,
Bosnia became an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (18781918). Historically, Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule is divided into two
periods: the irst, from 1878, known as the interim rule; the second, from
1908, known as annexation or direct colonial rule. Both periods represent
shifts from belonging to the Ottoman or Islamic cultural orbit to AustroHungarian or Western cultural orbit. During this time rapid political and
socio-cultural transformation and modernization of the country began in
terms of governance, law, economy, social structure, urbanization and cultural
transformations (Karčić, 1999). Then the rise of nationalism gave birth to
various Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian national organizations, each fostering
different national projects. During this period Muslim, Serbian and Croatian
national movements and organizations were established that would later be
transformed into nationalist political parties (Banac, 1984, 340-368). Such
diverse groups of people or nations developed from the religious communities
that were deined previously according to the Ottoman millet system. Thus,
Bosnia as a state began to be questioned and its future sovereignty would
be very much a cause of various political and military disputes, the last
culminating in the 1990s.
According to Glenny’s work The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers,
(1804-1999) (pp. 256-266) the Serbian and Croatian nationalistic aspirations
towards Bosnia were very disruptive and affected the balance of power in the
Balkans. Such nationalistic aspirations would eventually lead the Balkan region
and the whole world towards World War I. Since the Middle Ages, Bosnia had
been preserving its distinctive national identity that was built upon diverse and
inclusive historical, cultural, ethnic, religious and linguistic features. As such, the
state was envisioned distinctive from the neighbouring states such as that of
Serbia and Croatia. Even during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods,
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Bosnia exercised such distinctive features. However, as a result of the birth of
Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the people of Bosnia were affected too.
During the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods, Bosnia was prevented
from articulating its distinctive socio-cultural features at the state level.
Therefore, the need for such articulation emerged with the rise of Serbian and
Croatian nationalism and as a result of the decline of multinational empires,
especially that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Judah, 1997, 73-89). By
1890s Bosnian national identity was expressed in newspapers, magazines and
by national movements that were emphasizing Bosnian national identity as
distinctive from that of Serbia and Croatia. For instance, in 1891, the irst
newspaper Bosniak was published to foster national identity and national
aspirations. An idea that the people of Bosnia were not Turks as perceived
by Serbs and Croats, but the people of the soil who had converted to a new
religion had to be explained and clariied (Bringa, 1995, 24-26). This was also
the time of cultural upheavals and an attempt of the Bosniak community to
position itself within the region and within the Western civilization. Political
autonomy was sought by the Muslim National Organization to preserve
Bosnian national identity and its unique cultural heritage (Banac, 1984, 368).
Indeed, the task was dificult because it was a challenge to encompass Slavic
ethnic identity, Western and Christian values, common national identity and
the Islamic spiritual orientation of the Bosniak people who were stretched inbetween Serbian and Croatian nationalism.
With the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918
and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, socio-cultural and political features of
Bosnia were furthermore affected. As the name of newly established state
suggests, Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks were entirely erased as constituent
people of the state. Bosniaks were not considered as national group but as
distinctive cultural-religious group. During this time in Bosnia the Muslim
community and its leadership under Mehmet Spaho (1883-1939) was reduced
to insigniicant minority by Serbian and Croatian nationalists (Purivatra, 1974,
58-104). Lack of national aspirations and strong leadership had continued to
affect socio-cultural and political position of Bosnia during World War II. The
people of the country had failed to preserve their own sovereignty as they fell
under heavy inluence of Serbian, Croatian and Communist national ideologies.
In this regard it is signiicant to mention that the Muslim community during
this very critical period of time was sharply divided. Such selective siding
of the Muslim community with at one time Serbian nationalists, Croatian
nationalists and Communists suggest how little of national consciousness
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and independence was present in the Muslim community. On the other hand,
Serbian and Croatian national consciousness was very strong and as such was
articulated by the political and intellectual elites (Filandra, 1998, 49-50). For
instance, Serbian national identity and aspirations were clearly envisioned by
Ilija Garašanin in his “Načertanije” of 1844, Stevan Moljevic’s “Homogenous
Serbia” from 1941 and the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts (SANU) from 1986. Croatian national aspirations, on the other
hand, were envisioned in well-known Cvetković-Maček agreement in 1939
(Judah, 1997, 56-61). Such widely-known historical documents positioned
the Serbian and Croatian communities respectively as the successor powers.
However, considering ethnic complexity and religious diversity, Bosnia could
hardly belong to any regional power and as such could not be administered or
organized according to ethnocentric principles.
Bosnia as a state of different ethnic groups, cultures and religions was
recognized by the communists as a country of ‘the peoples’ by the exclusion
of speciic national, ethnic or religious afiliations. Bosnia was reafirmed as a
federal republic as a result of the creation of Yugoslavia (1945-1991). In 1943,
the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of BiH (ZAVNOBiH) reafirmed
the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina in small town of Mrkonjić Grad. Thus,
state’s sovereignty was reafirmed and creation of Yugoslavian national identity
strengthened the bond between Bosnia-Herzegovina’s peoples such as Serbs,
Croats and Muslims. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the most diverse
federal republic within former Yugoslavia. Positioning itself as a clear example
of coexistence of the people who had accepted common Yugoslavian identity
in a country that was equally Muslim, Serbian and Croatian, sometimes referred
to as a miniature of Yugoslavia (Ibrahimagic, 1998, 95). Yet it is signiicant to
mention that in former Yugoslavia Muslim national and religious identities
were constitutionally subdued. Only by 1974, due to constitutional reform the
Muslims became recognized as a nationality in their own right (Malcom, 1994,
197). Thus such misrepresentations prevented Bosniaks from articulating
their own political, cultural, ethnic, linguistic and historical identities. On the
contrary, Serbian and Croatian nationalists, especially since the 1980s, were
working very hard to assimilate Bosniak community and to develop conditions
as to join part of the country to Serbia and Croatia, respectively (Ramet, 1996,
7-49; Meier, 1999, 35-60). Nevertheless, Bosniak cultural and national identity
was revived and articulated by intellectuals, as for instance, Adil Zulikarpašić,
Smail Balić, Selim Ćerić, Alija Isaković, Midhat Begić and Muhamed Hadžijahić
(Imamovic, 1997, 562-569).
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The ethno-religious nationalism, revived from the past, led to the traumatic
war of 1992-1995 and as such even in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina has
been colouring every aspect of everyday life. There emerged a signiicant fusion
of national and religious identity based on the distant and past historical and
socio-cultural heritage of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, distinctively. National
identity of Bosnia Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Bosniaks was based
on ethnicity and religion (Bringa, 1995, 108). Therefore, the dissolution of
former Yugoslavia has articulated again the question of national identity or
the relationship between ethnicity, religion and the state. The right to selfdetermination, demand for national uniication and the consequent redrawing
of borders affected socio-cultural features of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
particular, Bosnia-Herzegovina posed the greatest challenge as Serbia and
Croatia had historic and territorial pretensions due to great majorities of Serbs
and Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, all national groups felt
threatened, so the fear and resentment were used to develop imaginary fear
of extinction felt across the ethnic and national groups. This had contributed
towards tremendous co-ethnic mobilization by Serbia and Croatia in BosniaHerzegovina (Almond, 1994, 3-30).
The above short historical and socio-cultural survey indicates that the
period from 1992 to 1995 represents cyclic patterns of historical processes.
In 1992, due to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
declared its independence. However, conlicting socio-cultural features of the
state and troubled complex, historical processes again challenged multicultural,
multi-ethnic and multi-national diversity. The outcomes of the war in BosniaHerzegovina are obvious and need no further elaboration (Ramet, 1996,
243-268). However, the pre-war period and post-war periods had instigated
questions that have been hunting this country since its emergence, particularly
the question of national, religious and cultural identity. Ever since in postDayton Bosnia-Herzegovina there have been attempts to afirm and strengthen
the state’s sovereignty and to envision a political and socio-cultural model
acceptable to all people of Bosnia. As history has already indicated, exclusive
hegemonic nationalism, as fostered in the past centuries and decades, has
been destroying very foundations of multiethnic and multicultural BosniaHerzegovina (Imamovic, 1997, 489-532).
National, Religious and Cultural Diversity
Past and present ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of Bosnia-Herzegovina
should be discussed in the wider historical and socio-cultural contexts. The
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author shall not focus on producing basic information about ethnic, national
and religious groups but, on the contrary, an attempt shall be made at providing
the readers with the interpretation of socio-cultural concepts by putting
them in the historical, geopolitical and cultural frame of understanding. The
statistical data from 1991 indicates that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population is
4.2 million, a population consisting of Bosniaks, (42%), Serbs (33%) and
Croats (18%) and about 8% of others. There is no doubt that culture is the
way of life experienced and practiced distinctively by the people in one society
and as such represents shared social norms and values. Thus, culture is often
perceived as a social generator that leads the society towards social, political,
economic, artistic and cultural creativity and dynamism (Newton, 2001, 201214; Said, 1993, xii).
Like culture, history is also related to the socio-cultural features of one state
as it affects its moulding and shaping. Therefore, from such a historical and
socio-cultural perspective, Bosnia-Herzegovina encompasses both oriental and
occidental cultures, thus relecting true multiculturalism. As already discussed
above, the heritage and culture of Bosnia-Herzegovina are interwoven with
ancient medieval, modern and contemporary cultures. Therefore, from a sociocultural perspective, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been very unique throughout
the history and, as its heritage indicates, it belongs neither to the West nor
to the East but contains elements of both (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 54-64). In
today’s global world where questions of culture, religion and identity have
been revisited and discussed, the cultural values of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if
properly used, could have become a hallmark of this small European country.
The socio-cultural values of Bosnia-Herzegovina should also be looked at
from a geopolitical perspective. Bosnia-Herzegovina bridges and separates
different civilizations, states and cultures and as such its integrity and
sovereignty is vital for civilizational, cultural and security balance. Historically
speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the ‘front line’ between Byzantine
Orthodoxy and Western European Catholicism, a ‘front’ which run partly
along the river Drina. Unique Bosnia-Herzegovina’s position was secured by
the establishment of independent ‘Bosnian Church’ by the Bogomils, who
cherished religious tolerance and coexistence of different faiths.
With the coming of the Ottomans, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the front line
between the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Western Christendom. Such front
line had consequently created a perennial struggle between Christianity and
Islam that had not affected the country’s diversity because a mixed population
of Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians has been preserved. Thus,
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Bosnia-Herzegovina has to serve as a bridge between the Muslim and the
Western worlds. In today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina, three major world religions—
Islam, Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity—lourish side-by-side. These
three religions should continue to formulate distinctive physical and spiritual
features of the state, which guarantee the state’s continuity in the form of a
necessary religious balance (Mulalic, 2009, 119).
In the Balkan region Bosnia-Herzegovina has been representing the balance
of power since the World War I until today. Whenever Serbian and Croatian
nationalist pretensions on Bosnia-Herzegovina were exercised, the region as
a whole had been engulfed in the bloody wars as in the case of recent Balkan
Wars from 1991-1995 (Slack and Doyon, 2001, 140-141). Therefore, BosniaHerzegovina must be preserved as a multicultural and multinational state as
it encompasses shared Bosniak, Croat and Serb socio-cultural values. As a
consequence of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing a challenge of how
to bridge various national and cultural identities. However, in order to avoid
the tragic events of the early 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina should function as a
bridge between Serbia and Croatia. The people of Bosnia-Herzegovina should
be committed to diversity as to check and balance the two exclusively ethnostates of Serbia and Croatia.
Apart from three constituent peoples of Serb, Croat and Bosniak, BosniaHerzegovina is a home to seventeen different minorities that afirm the
multicultural diversity of a state and articulate the necessity of intercultural
dialogue. The socio-cultural values of Bosniak, Serb, Croat, Jewish and
other minorities are represented through different cultural and educational
organizations. Such socio-cultural values are also a guarantee of the multicultural
sustainability of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is historically impressed in the
foundations of a state. Therefore, multicultural diversity within BosniaHerzegovina has multiple faces and as such doesn’t generate isolation.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s old towns and cities represent the greatest examples
of multicultural inclusiveness. Throughout the country, such old towns are
usually the places where one can ind a Serbian Orthodox church, a Roman
Catholic cathedral, a Jewish synagogue and a mosque. Then, the most
important characteristic of the old towns are their markets which are the places
where all groups freely come together to buy and sell (Karahasan, 1994, 3-16).
Such coexistence contributed to signiicant oriental and occidental inluence
on local Bosniak, Croat and Serb culture, language, literature, customs and
practices. Today Bosnia-Herzegovina characterizes a rich native culture and
tradition which includes folk and oral literature, music, dances, art, clothing,
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folk life, architecture, being a result of various cultural inluences of the Slavic,
Mediterranean, Balkan, Oriental and Middle-European cultural circles.
Socio-Cultural Transformations, Challenges and Prospects
In the recent war multiethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were greatly
affected and the state’s socio-cultural features in the form of shared cultural
values and artistic monuments were destroyed. After the war institutional
preservation and reconstruction of monuments that represent socio-cultural
values of the country have been neglected due to the lack of institutional
approach, budget and expertise. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina can boast
only a very small number of museums, libraries, cultural centres and artistic
institutions. Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to invest in the development
of positive climate so that common socio-cultural values subscribe to by all
her citizens can lourish again, forming a future common identity too (Mulalic,
2008, 19-29). Shaping such socio-cultural models is indeed a very challenging
responsibility that should be instigated by policy-makers, civil society, cultural
and artistic organizations and associations, state educational institutions and
international organizations.
National identity is derived from the notion of a ‘nation’ representing
ethnicity, race, culture, language, religion and historical experience (Duncan,
Jancar-Webster and Switky, 2008, 264-270). In post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina
distinctive ‘peoples’ such as Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have attempted to
create their own exclusive and hegemonic national identities based on different
histories, cultures, ethnicities, religions and languages. Therefore, as a result
of the war, many citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not share a common
national identity although their distant past and present indicate common
historical, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious traits. It is unfortunate that
such exclusive confrontational national identities have been constructed due to
recent historical and social contexts (Eriksen and Hylland, 2002, 1-16). Such
attempts have been made in spite of the fact that world history clearly indicates
that there has never existed single socio-cultural model.
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina as elsewhere, national identity should be
derived from shared socio-cultural values while ethnic bonds, should be upheld
and broadly respected. The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that ethnic
distinctive bonds have been lourishing throughout the centuries while common
national identiication and a sense of interconnected relationship between
diverse groups of people had always been strongly felt. Actually history of
Bosnia-Herzegovina points to cultural inclusion and cross-culture, not exclusive
cultural isolation. That is why nowadays as throughout the past, although
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belonging to different groups of people, many distinguished Serbs, Croats and
Bosniaks have accepted a common and shared Bosnian national identity.
In the age of globalization and in the world of diversity it has become an
imperative to foster and preserve tolerance, understanding and co-existence
in multicultural and multi-ethnic societies as an alternative to Huntington’s
civilizational clash (Mahmutčehajić, 2000, 88-90). In this regard, the inclusive
socio-cultural model of Bosnia-Herzegovina could position a country as very
unique socio-cultural state-model, which other multicultural and multiethnic
countries could follow worldwide. This is in particular true for the EU
member-states that presently cope with the challenges related to minorities,
religion, culture, language and ethnicity.
Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout history has been united through its sociocultural diversity based on shared tradition. Therefore an alternative to the
divisive ethno-nationalist socio-cultural model are commonly accepted and
shared traditional values. Any denial of socio-cultural unity in diversity of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and hegemony of one socio-cultural model over another
is against the true, historically afirmed nature of a country. Therefore, shared
tradition as widely represented in Bosnia-Herzegovina could serve as a model
for global inter-religious dialogue and coexistence.
Apart from inherent traditional socio-cultural values commonly accepted
by the people of the country, cosmopolitan multiculturalism that has exploited
liberal values could be another source of strengthening common national
identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Drawing from the British, the Dutch and
Malaysian experiences in establishing institutional conditions for lourishing
of true multiculturalism would be an additional complementary in BosniaHerzegovina. Such approaches are especially inevitable due to the processes
of Europeanization and globalization. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina is in
essence a multiethnic and multicultural country, multicultural diversity as
state policy has yet to be advocated. Therefore, there is a need of developing
multicultural policy aimed at civil society and education institutions that could
nourish and foster multicultural cosmopolitanism.
Socio-cultural aspects of Bosnia-Herzegovina should again be approached
from occidental and oriental, i.e., global perspectives. Socio-cultural diversity
within Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reinforced by contemporary trends that
value such diversity. In the era of globalization, coexistence of various sociocultural aspects of life has become fundamental. Therefore, Bosnia’s very
path towards joining the EU and the fulilment of set requirements guarantee
upholding of both traditional and liberal socio-cultural values.
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Concluding Remarks
In spite of recent past and present predicaments, Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
microcosmic socio-cultural model represents an increasingly interconnected
and diverse world. A principle counter the perspective of Huntington’s clash
of civilizations as articulated at international meetings, conferences, seminars
and scholarly writing worldwide will be manifested in the survival of BosniaHerzegovina. Therefore, diverse socio-cultural models are not only central to
the rebuilding and transition of Bosnia-Herzegovina but of the global world
as a whole (Karić, 1999, 90-92). Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout history
has managed to incorporate ethnic, religious and cultural diversities and had
projected a distinctive multicultural state identity. Instances of disputes and
conlicts, as clearly elaborated in the paper, have often been sparked by outside
inluences. Such inluences have been in particular politically and economically
motivated by regional states such as Serbia and Croatia (Malcom, 1994, 234).
Being a multicultural state, Bosnia-Herzegovina has always lourished as a part
of a greater whole, i.e., the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire and
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the future of this small country lies in joining the EU, a
family of nations that uphold diversity. Upholding liberal values, cosmopolitan
multiculturalism, the Tradition and diverse socio-cultural values derived from
Bosnia’s past and present would in turn uphold and strengthen the EU road
towards achieving the goal of creating a family of nations.
References
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Almond M. (1994). Europe’s Backyard War. London: Heinemann.
Banac I. (1984). The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Bringa T. (1995). Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Princeton: Princeton New Jersey.
Donia R. and Fine J. (1994). Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Tradition Betrayed. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Duncan R., Jancar-Webster B., and Switky B. (2008). World Politics in the 21st Century.
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Eriksen T. and Hylland T. (2002). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives.
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Filandra S. (1998). Bošnjačka politika u XX stoljeću. Sarajevo: Sejtarija.
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Ibrahimagic O. (1998). Constitutional Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo:
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Karčić F. (1999). The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity. Sarajevo: El-Kalem.
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Mahmutćehajić R. (2000). Sarajevski eseji: Politika, ideologija i tradicija. Zagreb: Durieux.
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Some Relections on
Islamic Calligraphic Heritage
in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Meliha Teparič
Introduction
Historically, the period of active presence of Islamic calligraphy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina dates back to the second half of the 15th century. That is the
period of presence of Ottoman Empire in Bosnia and Herzegovina (14631878), which brought with themselves what they have already developed, by
setting high artistic standards, actively beginning artistic activities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and the wider area of the Balkans.
Islamic calligraphy from Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by its
manifestations relected the diversity, although today largely destroyed. Thus,
the art of Islamic calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be divided into
several categories, namely; (1) manuscripts calligraphy; (2) calligraphy on stone
(chronogram-tarih) and tombstones (nišani); (3) calligraphy on removable
panels (levh); (5) wall calligraphy and (6) calligraphy on objects for everyday
use (ceramic, metal, wood, embroidery, etc.).1
Manuscript calligraphy of Arabic script is actually calligraphy written
manuscripts, with all the basic principles and requirements of Islamic calligraphy.
Here, in the irst place is the holy book of Muslims - Holy Qur’an, then the
other books in the domain of literature, poetry, etc. Manuscript calligraphy,
we could say, is a limited form of calligraphic art in a formal sense, primarily
because of the primary role of letters - to transmit information, in particular
manuscript expediency - to be read. Calligraphic segment, artistic skills, which
manuscript may or may not necessarily possess, is only a secondary element of
aesthetically shaped letters with all the necessary legalities and artistic criteria
established by Islamic calligraphy.2 Skilled calligraphic manuscripts and books
are most often richly furnished and decorated with illuminations.
The manuscript calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is noticeable in
number, compared to the other forms of calligraphy. The level of attained
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calligraphic skills are also notable because calligraphy, no matter on which
material or medium it is performed, always requires respect of the basic rules
of calligraphy, that makes it exactly as it should be. Meaningful could be the
pages of manuscripts that, in addition to usual written text, bring miniature
“calligraphic composition,” which quite resemble calligraphic panels called
Lawh.3 These specimens can be usually found in the individual religious books
(such as Dalailu’l Hayrat), which represent a symbolic illustration of the themes
in the book, and in the artistic, stylistic sense is similar to calligraphic panels
– lawh.
Manuscript calligraphy has one more form that occurs, and it is within
miniature painting where calligraphy is an integral part of the picture, and
as such does not violate the concept of miniature, as well as the integrity of
the image itself, but becomes one of its elements. This could be interpreted
as an adaptability character of Arabic calligraphy to other art forms; it also
represents another phenomenon of Islamic calligraphy, which requires special
study of Arabic letters.
Arabic script, as well as its artistic value in Bosnia and Herzegovina can
be found in large numbers, engraved in stone, as chronograms (tarih) on the
portals of sacred and profane monuments. These signs inform us about the
year of construction, but most often, about other data as well, such as builders,
for example, or benefactor – those who endowed money for construction.
Another aspect of calligraphic examples engraved in stones can be found on
tombstones (nišani). Both these types are formally and stylistically creative
aspect of calligraphic expression in relation to the manuscripts, but still quite
limited due to its essentials functions, namely transmission of information,
and after that the artistic design comes into perspective.4 These monuments
have been preserved in large numbers; however, those who are holding high
calligraphic art values are rare.
Calligraphic panels (lawhs) in comparison with the previous types of the
Islamic calligraphic art, represent the most creative visual art phenomenon
in Islamic art, art that did not develop an interest for the picture in terms of
European Christian art. This avoidance of igural religious themes compensate
to a great extent, repertoires of calligraphic panel (lawh), the most often Holy
messages, names of God, God’s Prophet and other holy persons. These
calligraphic works can be written and made with more freedom and imagination
in the form of various compositions, where the letter itself constitute the main
elements, which sometimes can include decorative elements such as ornaments,
illuminations or ebru paper - painting on water. This kind of calligraphic art
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were decorating the walls of the sacred to the profane space, both in the
interior and exterior. Over time, in addition to developing different styles of
letters, different types of calligraphic panels (lawhs), composition and thematic
repertoire and artists - calligraphers have developed their own style of artwork
and calligraphy, calligraphy that tends to unify written values, and attain levels
of more sophisticated writing. Thus, the primary role of the calligraphic
panels is aesthetic and creative effect: decorating the walls with their sacred
messages,5 create a visual impression, and after that, as a secondary meaning,
read written text.6 The highest number of calligraphic panels (lawhas) in Bosnia
and Herzegovina found so far dates back from the 17th to the irst half of the
20th century. We should also mention calligraphic activity on the glass, which
seems to have been developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the
fragility of the material, many pieces were destroyed, but there are, fortunately,
some examples still preserved. Unfortunately, many of them are without the
signature of the author, and their origin is dificult to ascertain.
Wall calligraphy, according to its formal and stylistic characteristics, does not
deviate from calligraphic panels. Mainly, they have the same stylistic features,
with the only difference in the material and the manner of performance.7 Wall
calligraphy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unfortunately, has been preserved in
the smallest percentage in relation to all other forms of calligraphic media.
Thus, there is no authentic example of artistic activities from the early
Ottoman period. Mainly it was destroy by Eugene Savojski, who, in the 17th
century, burned down Sarajevo, which was the centre of culture, and most
of the original Ottoman heritage was destroyed.8 In subsequent periods, the
Austro-Hungarian occupation in the 19th century, “it is assumed that the
provincial government has made in that time some kind of action painting of
Islamic sacred places throughout Bosnia.9” Therefore, in that way interiors got
new oriental decor that has brought about a new aesthetic, a surrogate oriental
‘trick’. In rare cases, a relatively older wall decoration, with the calligraphic
art, preserved beneath this layer, as is the case with several of Sarajevo sacred
buildings10 where, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there was found and
restored almost complete painting decoration from 19th century. These objects
represent the treasures that reveal a bit of the past, while other facilities11 await
restoration research. Unfortunately, devastating is the fate of other religious
monuments such as the Central Mosque, Gazi Husrev-bey Mosque, whose
interior decorations are from Austro-Hungarian period. The Commission
of the Federal Bureau of cultural and historical heritage of Yugoslavia along
with the Republican Institute for Cultural Heritage of the Federal Republic
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of 20th century, “unanimously rated
worthless,”12 all these monuments. Consequently, at the beginning of the last
decade of the 20th century restoration started, with removing all layers of
plaster - to the heart of stone. In this process of “restoration” they removed
the entire interior of the mosque calligraphic repertoire of one of the most
important 19th-century calligrapher, Rakim Islamović. It consisted of a large
ensemble of calligraphic compositions.13
Why is it now so dificult to reconstruct a picture of calligraphic art in
Bosnia and Herzegovina? One of the reasons is the man himself, beside the
time. The men was, in fact, deliberately destroying calligraphic art works, once
so developed and live artistic activity, destroying and throwing even to the
garbage valuable calligraphic works and replacing them with the new ones, at
that time the modern prints. However, now those old prints, eventually gain
the signiicance because of the age, in part, while on the other hand, they
represent a valuable backup copies of calligraphic works that are experiencing
the same fate as former Bosnian calligraphic originals, they are replaced
with new patterns of computer graphics so “decorating “walls of religious
buildings from the last period.
Although, it is known that the activity of Islamic art of calligraphy in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was practiced since the second half of the 15th century,
however it preserved peaces dating only from the 17th until the irst half of
the 20th century and it is less known about their fate during the earlier periods.
Not much has been done, regarding the past-published contributions to
the calligraphic art. The most of the research are about biographies, but not
about the calligraphic works within its stylistic and formal characteristics.
Most of these contributions have brought more confusion with regard to the
calligraphers and copyists or amateurs, who were placed under the authors of
calligraphy. It is very signiicant to make this distinction about calligraphic art
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Art historians in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not thoroughly deal with this
artistic discipline; they cited only the basic historical and stylistic characteristics
of Islamic calligraphy in general, or, only mentioned individuals who practiced
calligraphy, and almost certainly did not deal with its manifestations. For
some calligraphers we know just because they are mentioned in biographies
as writers, poets but calligraphy was only as secondary activity for them. It
appears that it was general opinion that the art of calligraphic was a minor,
secondary manifestation of Islamic art. This is certainly completely wrong
approach to Islamic calligraphy, on the contrary, not only that it is an integral
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part of the art, but also it is already a leading artistic discipline.14 Even in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, its manifestations were no less signiicant.15
The reason for this attitude lies in a fact that in the past of Bosnia and
Herzegovina there were few art historians, none of these had in their focus
Islamic calligraphy. In most cases, they were specialized in architecture. The
reason for this can be found in the fact that until the 20th century calligraphic
works were mostly destroyed or that there are few surviving copies buried
under the ceilings of private homes and religious buildings, while monumental
calligraphic works on the walls of the sacred buildings generally were not
preserved. We can ind it in the rare data today evidence on how this artistic
branch was represented. How it is possible today, to reconstruct the image
of the achieved level of calligraphic art, and whether a suficient number of
surviving works, which seem to be equally rare as written data, represents pale
relection of the former state of the art, its representation in the society and
the level reached?
Negligence and carelessness about cultural art heritage contributed to
the rapid deterioration and destruction of calligraphic works, and it will
permanently remain unknown to what degree was this developed. With
regard to the development of the discipline of art at the time of its greatest
prosperity, i.e. from the 16th to the 18th century, one would expect a lot of
information, but unfortunately in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no much
written or documented information. For this reason, and because of the
lack of professional treatment and research of artistic disciplines, research
on calligraphic art of Islam in Bosnia is more dificult, and more so as the
information about artists - calligraphers in most cases is impossible to verify
because their work for the most part have not been preserved. Although the
number of artists’ calligraphic art, based on the data collected so far, is large,
and mainly based on poor lists that do not provide enough information about
the type of work. However, there are only few basic biographical information
about calligraphic art.
Another aggravating factor for calligraphic art in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is not only past ravages of war (1992 to 1995) but I and II World War, in
which a huge part of this heritage was destroyed. In addition, migration
and population movement that occurred during the aggression in 1992 to
1995 also inluenced the movement of goods, including calligraphic works.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the recent war many examples of Islamic art
and crafts were sold very cheap, for “bare survival.” Because of these and
similar events present state of Islamic religious buildings lost their authentic
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wall paintings and calligraphy.
Islamic calligraphy has remained very active in the second half of the 19th
century, period of government change and Austro-Hungarian Empire (18781908) taking control of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which brings
with them a completely different, not only aesthetics and taste, but also artistic
activities. Sudden changes that have occurred in society16 inevitably inluenced
the artistic activities and calligraphic art, that is how it appears, based on the
information about calligraphy, was in slight decline. More signiicant decline
in interest in Islamic calligraphy is felt in the second half of the 20th century,
during the period of communism, when there was almost complete extinction
of these and similar traditional Islamic arts. It is very important to mention that
in the 21st century interest in the artistic discipline concerns increased sharply,
and that there comes the interests not only in the professional academic, but
also generally at a scientiic level.
Some Illustrations
Fig. 1: Manuscript Calligraphy, Calligrapher Ahmed Sarayi, 1891,
R. 6509, Gazi Husrev-bey Library, (photo Damir Tatlic)
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Fig. 2: Calligraphy Compositions, En’am, R. 8679,
Gazi Husrev-bey Library
Fig. 3: Calligraphy and Miniature Painting, Divan-i Haiz,
16th Century, R 1366., Gazi Husrev-bey Library
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Fig. 4 and 5: Calligraphy Compositions in Stone, Oglavak, Bosnia
(Photo Sara Kuhen)
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Fig. 6: Calligraphic Panel (Lawha), Calligrapher Ali Faginovic, 1902,
Private Collection Sheikh Musa-Kazim Hadzimejlic, Vukeljici, Bosnia
(Photo Reik Omerovic)
Fig. 7: Calligraphic Panel (Lawha), Calligrapher Hadziosmanovic, 1811, (Mehmed
Mujezinović, Islamska epigraika Bosne i Hercegovine I, 1998., 85.)
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Fig. 8: Wall Calligraphy, Calligrapher Rakim Islamovic, 19th Century, Gazi
Husrev-bez Mosque, Sarajevo, (Photo Damir Tatlic)
Fig. 9: Wall Calligraphy, Hajji Sinan Tekke, Sarajevo, (Photo Sara Kuhen)
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
Muslim artisans seem to have covered every conceivable object with writing,
often with verses or rhyming sentences. See Annamarie Schimmel, Calligraphy and
Islamic Culture, (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 25.
“Writing or copying the Qur’an requires strict compliance to established and
generally accepted rules, irst to those dictated by the Holy Quranic Text and then
rules that have developed over the centuries.” See Ćazim Hdžimejlić, Umjetnosti
islamske kaligraije, (Sarajevo, Sedam Publishing, 2009), p. 116.
First, levha is an Arabic word lawh and indicates a lat surface: ‘panel’, ‘tabla’, in this
sense can indicate drawings or pictures, and calligraphic print.
“Artistic and calligraphic value is relected through the use of various forms of
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Arabic scripts, inding a speciic visual variation that only allows this script, often
enriched with elements of pure vegetable-ornamental decorations.” See Mehmed
Mujezinović, Islamska epigraika Bosne i Hercegovine, Vol. 1, (Sarajevo: Sarajevo
Publishing, 1998), p. 6.
But more than that, their function and religious character that constantly reminds
the faithful to God. Here you have particular function forms of the letters that
are so typical and abstract, where he developed a whole science of letters and
their symbolic-spiritual sense, which extends to the interpretation of these letters,
and they are attributed amulets signiicance.
Some calligraphic composition due to its complexity is sometimes dificult to
read even for the greatest experts of Arabic script, and if it is related to some
Quranic sentences, knowing the text helps in the interpretation.
While manuscript calligraphy and calligraphic panels (lawhs) are performed with
pen, calligraphy mural is depicted with brush, as well as calligraphy on glass.
“During the invasion of Prince Eugene of Savoy (1697), Sarajevo was ravaged
by a ire that turned the city into a heap of ashes. Of the 104 mosques, which
were then in Sarajevo, just 12 were spared by the ire. Hamdija Kreševljaković,
“Džamija i vakufnama Muslihuddina Čekrekčije,” in Glasnik Islamske vjerske
zajednice Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Year VI (1938.), No.: 1, Sarajevo, pp. 17-38.
Sabira Husedžinović, Dokumenti opstanka, (Zenica: Muzej Grada, 2005), p. 290.
Hadži Sinan tekke, Čekrekči Muslihudin mosque, Careva mosque.
Džamija Havadže Duraka (Čaršija mosque).
Nihad Čengić, Likovni fenomen hadži Sinanove tekije i njegova konzervacija, (Sarajevo:
Sarajevo Publishing, 2009), p. 56.
From complete calligraphic repertoire that counted over twenty calligraphic
compositions there were only two copies preserved of circular calligraphic
composition of this great calligrapher at the entrance of portal in Gazi Bey
Mosque.
“Arabic calligraphy has given to Islamic art the strongest and most original seal.”
“The expansion of Islam is updated to the written word, which contributes to
the development of Arabic script to the point of becoming” a central, leading
branches of Islamic art.” Ćazim Hadzimejlic, Umjetnosti islamske kaligraije, p. 14.
“ Islam has taken and still holds a place with special privileges so that it can
say without hesitation that it is the order of the traditional Islamic visual art,
and that is the most characteristic manifestation of the visual aspect of Islamic
civilization.” “Calligraphy is still a fundamental central visual art that has many
forms and very huge range of applications from architecture to poetry.” Seyyed
Hossein Nasr, Islamic art and spirituality, (Sarajevo: Lingua Patria, 2005), p. 31. “/
... / Persians, / ... / Where was the art of calligraphy is not of central importance
as it became after they embraced Islam.” (Nasr, p. 36)
“/ ... / Calligraphy / ... / Became the most important among the Islamic Arts
on the Balkans.” Hilal Kazan, “The Art of Calligraphy on the Balkans,” in
The Proceedings of the 3rd International Congress of Islamic Civilization in
the Balkans, Bucharest Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture
(IRCICA), (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006).
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16. “The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina survived sudden
changes of additional social relations that are manifested in the conversion and
harmonization of patriarchal way of life and civilization orientation towards
the countries of capitalism, this is to say, one Western European country.” See
Hajrudin Ćurić, Muslimansko školstvo u bosni i Hercegovini do 1918, (Sarajevo: Veselin
Masleša , 1983), p. 189.
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The Role of the Islamic Community in the
Reconciliation Process in the post-War Bosnia
Case Study of Banja Luka
Mirsad Karič
Introduction
One of the most dificult challenges that nations which have gone through
the war face and try to overcome afterwards is the issue of the past. When
conlict between groups is brought to an end the building of constructive
and nonviolent relations between groups becomes possible. However, enmity,
antagonism and mistrust often resume for a long time. The psychological
wounds that resulted from the conlict might be the main obstacle in building
better relations or even lead to a crisis and consequently to a new conlict.
Violence between groups may resume even if the conlict was stopped by
negotiations and agreement signed by groups’ representatives such as the
case with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) that stopped three and a half
year long Bosnian war. Agreements are often not satisfying to all segments of
the groups being in conlict because they might be signed under the strong
pressure from the International Community, or not implemented in a proper
way. It is a greater danger that the conlict and violence would resume after
those conlicts that were ended by one side being defeated by another.1 Hence,
there is a less danger that those conlicts that were inished without a ‘winner’such as the recent Bosnian conlict 1992-1995- would renew into violence.
Furthermore, huge presence of the international security forces makes an
escalation of conlict even less feasible.
Scholars of international relations have long been concerned with the
possible sources of conlict, preventive diplomacy, conlict resolution and
post-conlict peace building. However, they have not yet seriously studied,
examined and analyzed the role of religion, religious communities and
religious leaders in the post-conlict reconciliation process. Due to a secular
paradigm that exists among the scholars of social sciences in general and
international relations in particular religion has always been considered a
source of disagreement, irreconcilable differences and conlict and never a
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factor capable to reconcile those differences and promote common universal
values that exist among all nations over the world. Hence, the role of religion
as possible facilitator in conlict prevention and post-conlict reconciliation
process and promoter of justice and peace has been very much downplayed
and neglected by the scholars. However, collaborative work for justice and
peace is a fundamental commitment of virtually all religious communities.
Moreover, religious communities generally have well articulated and
differentiated structures that provide a basis for collaboration. Furthermore,
they have social assets and traditions to address conlict transformation that
have been frequently underutilized.2
The future of truth and reconciliation among the three main ethnic groups
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely Bosniaks (Bosnians Muslims), Croats
(Bosnian Catholics) and Serbs (Bosnian Orthodoxies) necessitates constructive
and fact-based debates at both, the state and societal levels, because by almost
all accounts the process is incomplete. If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be a
model for other countries whether and how has contributed to reconciliation
must be examined. This is problematic, because the meaning of reconciliation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been ambiguous and contested. Projections as
to what would constitute a successful project of reconciliation, what are the
goals of this project i.e. what reconciled people or persons should look like
are generally unclear. Basic questions who should be involved in the process
of reconciliation and how remain unanswered. Without basic agreement on its
meaning, undertaking and objectives reconciliation remains at best an obscure
goal and at worst it is an empty rhetoric subject to political and ideological
manipulation.
The main goal of this paper is to argue that in a conlict-divided multiethnic
and multi-religious society such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, with special focus
on the city of Banja Luka and its surrounding areas, one must not ignore
the important role religious communities and religious leaders might play in
an attempt to bring about peace, reconciliation and coexistence among the
people. Process of reconciliation has special importance and urgency for
preventing new violence and promoting coexistence in situations, like Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where groups in the post-war period in many parts of the
country still leave next to each other.
Reconciliation
In its most basic sense, the concept of reconciliation might be deined in terms
of building solidarity: building and creating a collective identity, shared values
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or common commitment in an effort to overcome and prevent repetition of
the past. While this requires a certain amount of moral transformation, it
has to be done without placing an excessive and unreasonable burden upon
individual victims to reconcile with former oppressors.3 Reconciliation may
be deined as mutual acceptance by members of formerly hostile groups of
each other. Such acceptance includes positive attitudes and positive actions
which express them. This process needs to result in a changed psychological
orientation towards the other which is the essence of reconciliation. In such
constellation of events reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators
or members of ‘till-yesterday’ ighting and hostile groups do not take past
as a predominant factor in deining their future. They have to be able to
ind a common ground and universal values for a constructive relationship,
interaction, acceptance, coexistence and humanity of one another. Thus,
the process of reconciliation focuses on restoring damaged and deteriorated
relationships between the groups taking into consideration both, the used and
applied procedure and possible outcomes.4 Reconciliation has also been deined
as “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared
future”5. The need for reconciliation is especially emphasized in societies that
went through ethnic conlicts that resulted in the lost trust, strong grievance,
hatred and polarization.
According to Kriesberg, shared truth, justice, regard and security are
four dimensions of reconciliation essential for conlict transformation and
peace-building in post-war societies. Truth is important as societies divided
after the war, ethnic cleansing and genocide tend to deny what members of
the other side have experienced and thus need to openly recognize that they
have different views of reality. Justice is needed as those who have suffered
oppression or atrocities seek redress, which may take the form of restitution
or compensation, but also punishment of those who committed injustices.
Justice may further be exhibited in politics that offer protection against
future harm and discrimination. Expression of regards by members of each
community towards the other entails recognizing the humanity of the others
and their human rights. Security implies that the group that were part of the
conlict feel a minimum of trust and have a reason to believe they can look
forward to living together without one side threatening the other.6
Psychological change of the people and the role of institutions in such
process are of equal importance in promoting reconciliation. The nature of
leadership, role of governmental and non-governmental institutions such as
religious communities, role of media, functioning of the justice system and
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educational system are of crucial importance in promoting and impeding
reconciliation.7 Reconciliation is also a phase in the prevention of violence
and peacemaking and can be eased by processes such as frequent contacts,
dialogue, interaction and peace education.8
Religion, Public Life and Reconciliation
Since the Treaty of Westphalia the contemporary international system has
functioned on the premises of secularism which implies total exclusion of
religion form the state institutions and reducing the role of religion in the
society to the minimum possible level. According to the proponents of
secularism when religion is brought into international public life, it has a
tendency to cause intolerance, war, devastation, political upheaval and even the
collapse of international order. Following this stream they claim that the more
religious people are, the more violent they tend to be. The solution therefore
lies in secularizing the world. Religions-some more than others- need to be
diminished and modernized and rid themselves of their violent essences and
legacies.9 Therefore, the secularization of politics was necessary in order to
limit religion’s domestic inluence through its privatization, minimization of
the effect of religious disagreement and ending the bloody and destructive
role of religion in international relations.10 At the other end of spectrum are
believers who condemn any type of violence done in the name of religion. For
them religious teachings are peaceful at their base, meant to re-establish the
primordial harmony between heaven and earth, creator and creatures and do
not call for violence by any means. Violence might be committed in the name
of religion but not approved and condoned by it as religions per se cannot be
seen as source of violence; only some bad practitioners of them can be held
accountable.11
Since the 1960s the world has witnessed a global resurgence of religion
and religious practices. Although that in some instances there might be a
correspondence between religious and secular paradigms, however, it is
assumed that they are very often in collision. As a result of this, Western
approach to the ield of international relations studies and the role of religion
played in it has been challenged. Consequently, one of the most debated
issues and challenges facing the realms of domestic and international politics
today is the role that faith and religion should play in the society and hence
understanding of actions with religious justiication. Bosnia and Herzegovina
as a multi-religious community has not been an exception to this. In the
Bosnian pre-war, during the war and post-war context religion has played quite
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important role in the life of its citizens. It goes to the extent that division
of the population into the three main ethnic and religious identities namely
Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Bosnian Catholics) and Serbs (Bosnian
Orthodoxies) largely overlaps. Therefore, religion, either consciously or
unconsciously, has been one of the most important factors for deining a
national identity of all ethnic communities in Bosnia.
Since Islam is deined as a complete way of life leaving no sphere of our
worldly affairs undeined it goes without saying that following the principles
of Islamic teaching the Islamic Community, which has gone through the
transition form a pre-war irrelevant to a post-war quite important factor in the
Bosnian social context, has had a great contribution in the process of postwar reconciliation, building the bridges of peace, justice, tolerance, inter-faith
understanding and coexistence among Bosnians of all origins. As a religion
whose name stems from the word peace Salam, issues of justice, rule of law,
peace, religious diversity, tolerance, reconciliation, forgiveness and coexistence
are interwoven into the fabric of the faith. In order to achieve this, primary
sources of Islam, the Quran and the tradition of prophet reveal and promote
the pattern of dialogue and seeking understanding with the followers of other
religions and worldviews. By this Qur’an not only promotes religious diversity
but considers it to be one of the signs of God, which is second in importance
to the creation of the heavens and earth.
“And among His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth,
and the variations in your languages and your colours: verily in that are
Signs for those who know” (30:22)
Similarly, Qur’an promotes, supports and encourages diversity, pluralism,
cooperation and mutual understanding and respect as mentioned in the
following verse:
“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each
other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honoured
of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you.
And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)”
(49:13)
For Nyang the process of mutual understanding elaborated in this verse is the
sine qua non for human solidarity and as such Islam’s interest and receptivity to
reconciliation which comes from Arabic islah, meaning to make good, proper,
right, to reconcile, to settle, is deemed a normal moral value in Islamic law.12
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Furthermore, the main message of this verse is its non-national nature whereby
God tells us that there are no good or bad nations. All religions, irrespective of
how different they are, try to promote peace, coexistence, tolerance.
A careful study and analysis of certain Qur’anic verses discloses a fact for
a struggle towards conlict resolution, peace-building and reconciliation under
the condition that the other party reciprocates in the same manner.
“But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards
peace, and trust in Allah: for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all
things)” (8:61)
“It may be that Allah will grant love (and friendship) between you and
those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all
things); And Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (60:7)
“But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (2:192)
As a result of Islam’s peaceful orientation, the tradition of the Prophet
as well as the period of the rightly guided caliphs provide us with a lot of
examples of reconciliation with various factions and tribes of that time. For
example, the Medina Constitution commands peaceful resolution to Muslim/
non-Muslim disputes. Thus, if we carefully examine and analyze the biography
of the Prophet and with whom he was reconciling (mainly pagan polytheists),
this sets a great example for Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) to be fully engaged in
the process of reconciliation with Orthodoxies (Bosnian Serbs) and Catholics
(Bosnian Croats) and approach our differences in a rational way through
process of peace-building and dialogue rather than conlict and violence.
Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina
As it is mentioned before the main purpose of this study is to examine the
role of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the special
focus on Banja Luka region in the process of reconciliation. Therefore, some
information are needed about the institution of the Islamic Community in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in general and Banja Luka in particular.
The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH) is the sole
and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks
outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own.13 It
is considered as one of the most organized Islamic administration in Europe
by being independent form the state apparatus, self-inanced, led by an elected
leader Reis-ul Ulema and elected assembly.
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The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of
Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia and as
such is inseparable part of the Ummah. The organization of the ICBH and its
activities are derived from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah, Islamic traditions
of Bosniaks and the requirements of the time. The ICBH is independent
in regulating its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic
endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property.
The aim of the ICBH is that all of its members should live in conformity
with Islamic norms. The ICBH protects the authenticity of the Islamic
norms and assures their interpretation and application. The ICBH is taking
care of the religious rights of Muslims and provides necessary conditions
for its members so that they may perform their Islamic religious obligations.
The ICBH establishes and maintains contact and cooperation with Islamic
communities, institutions and organizations worldwide and cooperates with
other religious communities and organizations promoting peace, justice and
good will among all people.14 Following these principles ICBH has undertaken
many steps in facilitating the process of conlict resolution, peace-building,
reconciliation, tolerance and coexistence on the whole territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the post-war period. ICBH advocates that the right to the
freedom of religion and its manifestation be equally respected throughout the
country. It is open for religious dialogue especially with the representatives
of traditional monotheistic religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICBH
considers that every religious community and church, in order to promote
interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should condemn and
sanction individuals and groups in their midst who propagate religious hate,
speak negatively and defame others and incite tolerance towards the followers
of other religions and faiths. The ICBH rejects, condemns and refuses all sorts
of violence and considers it punishable by divine and human laws.15
In its relation with others the ICBH is guided by the Qur’anic teaching on
life in peace, justice and kindness with good willing people:
“Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war
against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you
froth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with
them justly; surely Allah loves doers of justice” (60:8)
Driven by this Qur’anic message ICBH is ready and open for any kind of
dialogue and cooperation that will in any way facilitate the process of
reconciliation among the followers of different religious communities in
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Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to produce positive results truth and justice
have to be acknowledged for an enduring peace to be established although
fragile peace might exist even before justice is served and truth is fully
accepted by all sides. War crime perpetrators must be punished accordingly. If
criminals are not sentenced and if crime consequences are not neutralized, the
future generations of potential criminals might conclude that crime pays and
be tempted and encouraged to use the same methods and means again in the
future. For reconciliation and coexistence- which have no alternative in multiethnic and multi-religious Bosnia and Herzegovina- to take place refuges have
to return to their places of origin as it is their right and society’s and state’s
obligation to help them in returning to their pre-war homes.16
ICBH is composed of eight muftiluks: Bihac, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Travnik,
Zenica, Gorazde, Sarajevo and Mostar. Muftiluks are further divided into
Majlis which are composed of small units called dzemat.
Banja Luka’s Islamic Community and Reconciliation Process
Banja Luka is located in the north-western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and is its second largest city. Throughout the history Banja Luka was a city
known for its multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic co-habitation.
Various religions were tolerated and big number of cultural and religious
buildings such as churches, mosques and cathedrals existed in harmony.
People of different religious backgrounds used to live next to each other
without any dificulties and with full understanding, tolerance and mutual help.
Muslims have always tried to promote mutual understanding and coexistence
irrespective of the one’s religious conviction. In this context Banja Luka’s
Muslim Resolution from 1941 is a very famous document that expressed
concern of the most distinguished local Muslims such as city’s mayor, muftis,
imams, teachers, doctors, engineers, religious teachers, businessmen etc., vis-àvis their neighbours Serbs who were exposed to various types of tortures and
killings from Croats who dominated the state authorities at that time.17
According to the last census held in 1991 the total population of the city
was 195.071; Bosnian Serbs made 54.79% or 106.881, Bosnian Croats made
14.84% or 28.957, Bosniaks (then Bosnian Muslims) made 14.64% or 28.561,
Yugoslavs made 12% or 23.419 and others made 3.72% or 7.253 of the
total population.18 However, the demographic situation drastically changed
during and after the war. Although there is a lack of oficial statistics on
ethnic distribution of population in Banja Luka today, there is an unoficial
estimation that Serbs make an overwhelming majority in the city with 94% of
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the total population while Bosniaks, Croats and others make the rest 6% of
the population.
Banja Luka was taken over by nationalist Serbs on the eve of the war
without any ighting and there was no any ighting in the city during the war.
Through the process of “ethnic cleansing” almost all Bosniaks were expelled
from Banja Luka with only few remaining in the city and its suburbs upon
the end of the war. Beside the expulsion, all buildings of cultural, religious
and architectural Muslim heritage were totally destroyed with the intention of
wiping out all Islamic symbols in the city and surrounding areas and sending
the message to Bosniaks as representatives of the Islamic heritage such as
mosques, endowments, cemeteries, mausoleums, clock-tower, shadrvans, etc.,
that they are not welcome to the city anymore. Serbs did not let any foreign
human rights activists to enter the city and examine the condition of nonSerbs.
Until the end of the First World War Banja Luka had 38 mosques, some of
them built back in the 16th century. First destruction of mosques started in the
period between the two World Wars i.e. during the peaceful period.
Prior to the 1992-95 Bosnian war, Banja Luka had 16 mosques. In a ninemonth period, between April and December 1993 all 16 of Banja Luka’s
mosques were systematically destroyed by the Serbs including the Ferhat pasha
Mosque (Ferhadija), a United Nations Educational, Scientiic and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) listed monument built in 1579 and Arnaudija
mosque, built in 1594, which was also on the UNESCO list of protected
monuments. The Ferhadija stood for exactly 414 years. It survived, during
those four centuries, numerous alternations of war and peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Balkans and even a major earthquake that leveled much
of Banja Luka in 1969. Destruction of mosques in Banja Luka is speciic
for certain reasons. First, destruction occurred while the city was under the
full control of Serb authorities and under curfew; second, there was no any
ighting in the city as almost all Muslim population was expelled from the city;
third, the rubble and ruins of the historic mosques were taken away by trucks
to the city damp and buried under tonnes of garbage in order to prevent
any possibility of the stones ever being reused for any future reconstruction;
fourth, all this was planned, ordered and executed by the authorities and
political establishment of the city in order to conceal any sign of Islamic
heritage and Muslims ever living there. However, the municipal authorities
in Banja Luka not only removed the rubble of the Ferhadija and the other
demolished mosques, they also deleted mosques from the city’s master plan.19
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Only after the strong pressure from international oficials the urban planning
department of Banja Luka municipality inally, on March 19, 2001, issued the
necessary construction permit authorizing the building of Ferhadija mosque.
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) that put a formal end to the Bosnian
war stopped the war in 1995. Annex seven of the DPA states that:
“All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to
their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to
them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities
since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be
restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons
is an important objective of the settlement of the conlict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Refugees and displaced persons are ensured a
permission to return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation,
persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic
origin, religious belief, or political opinion...
In order to achieve this following conidence building measures had to be
undertaken:
a. the repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices with
discriminatory intent or effect;
b. the prevention and prompt suppression of any written or verbal incitement,
through media or otherwise, of ethnic or religious hostility or hatred;
c. the dissemination, through the media, of warnings against, and the prompt
suppression of, acts of retribution by military, paramilitary, and police
services, and by other public oficials or private individuals;
d. the protection of ethnic and/or minority populations wherever they are
found and the provision of immediate access to these populations by
international humanitarian organizations and monitors;
e. the prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appropriate, of persons in military,
paramilitary, and police forces, and other public servants, responsible for
serious violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or
minority groups.20
First return of refugees to Banja Luka started soon after the war. However,
irst wave of a bigger number Muslims going back to their homes of origin
begin in 2000. That was the time when Islamic community started to take an
active role in the process of return.
According to Tarik Sadovic that was possible only after Bosniak political
elites in the Assembly of Republic of Srpska (RS) after long and patient
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work faced with so many political and administrative obstacles created an
environment conducive for somehow normal return of war expelled Bosniaks
from Banja Luka and its surrounding areas.21 For Sadovic, Islamic community
of Banja Luka has played very constructive role in the process of return,
peace-building, promoting reconciliation and coexistence among people in
spite of the fact that its representatives had to overcome so many barriers
such as the very passive role played by the police in collecting information on
certain crimes and the prosecutor and the court in processing various crimes
directed against Bosniaks in promoting reconciliation.
On the 7th of May 2001, on eighth anniversary of the demolition of the
Ferhadija, a peaceful cornerstone laying ceremony for a new structure at the
site of the destroyed mosque was arranged. The city authorities had given
permission for reconstruction to begin only after years of sustained pressure
from international oficials and organizations working in Bosnia. However,
the event was disrupted and stopped by a serious riot of Serb demonstrators
who gesticulated threateningly and chanted Serb nationalist slogans and antiMuslim insult, setting on ire prayer carpets, tearing down the green lag of the
Islamic community centre and putting there the lag of RS and brutally beating
several of them.22 Murat Badic, Bosniak from north-western part of Bosnia
died few days later due to the injuries suffered during the demonstrations.
Sadovic urges authorities of RS to identify and bring to justice, with
maximum sentences, the perpetrators of the violence including the organizers
behind the scenes as well as those who are politically responsible for such
an act. He had noticed that Bosniaks saw an only hope in Bosniak elected
political elites in the Assembly of RS who were their legal representatives and
only protectors of their interests in the institutions of the RS. Therefore, he
initiated an idea that Bosniak elected political elites in the Assembly of RS
need to meet Muslim returnees to Banja Luka during the Friday congregational
prayer in places of worshipping such as the building of the Islamic community
in Banja Luka which stands next to the Ferhat Pasha Mosque and show to the
people that they are with them and people can count on them according to
their capacity.23
For Edhem Camdzic, Mufti of Banja Luka, political and security situation
in the city and its suburbs is much better today than before. Number of
returnees has increased; however, the process of people’s return to their house
of origin has not been inished as still some would like to return. Meanwhile,
state institutions must help process of return with reconstructing demolished
religious buildings and providing sustainable return. Mufti Camdzic always
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conveys the message of coexistence, peace, harmony, tolerance and
reconciliation among all people of Bosnia in general and Banja Luka in
particular. In 2011 Ramazan Bayram (Eid al-Fitri) speech he called for:
“…coexistence, dialogue and understanding in RS and the whole
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Islamic community will put its utmost
efforts to facilitate such process and make the strength of belief be
present among all people. Religion has to fasten, we have to be united,
not to leave next to each other but to leave together and help each
other”.24
Mufti Camdzic claims that Ferhat Pasha Mosque’s message is universal
and it has always been the message of religion, coexistence, reconciliation,
dialogue, tolerance and multiethnic nature of Banja Luka. Past events should
not be forgotten but people have to turn to the future. In this context state
institutions have to provide equal opportunities for all citizens of Banja Luka
so that they feel free and safe in their houses, schools, mosques.25
Islamic community of Banja Luka had tried several times to get in touch
with the representatives of the Orthodox Church in RS in order to facilitate
and promote the process of coexistence and reconciliation in a peaceful and
democratic way. This included invitation to attend religious feasts such as
bayram celebration, opening of the rebuild mosques, common condemning
of attacks on the religious buildings etc. However, religious authorities of
the Orthodox Church have always been reluctant to accept such an offer
and never reply to the calls coming from the Islamic Community. As a result
of this Islamic community has stopped such kind of activities of a direct
invitation.26 Somehow, contacts among the religious leaders at the lower level
do exist however, these contacts are merely formalistic without any motive
and concrete results. In December 20011, Islamic community proposed even
through the USA embassy in Sarajevo some initiatives and programs to be
organized at the level of religious teachers of all religious communities in
Banja Luka. However, none from the Orthodox community turned up for
that event.27
According to some Bosniaks in Banja Luka, they consider themselves being
neglected by Bosniak political elites from Sarajevo, who concentrate only on
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina except few such as Tarik Sadovic,
Sefket Haizovic and late Omer Brankovic. In spite of the fact that some
of them stayed in Banja Luka during the whole war sometime even under
the unbearable circumstances. Those Bosniaks who still reside in the city are
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being disunited. In this context, unfortunately, they see Islamic community
as the only factor that is capable of bringing them together and struggling
for the interests of Bosniaks in Banja Luka. Many things for the betterment
of Bosniaks in Banja Luka and its surrounding areas could have been
done immediately after the war. Unfortunately, it is too late today.28 Islamic
Community in Banja Luka has become a service for merely burying dead
people. This is one of the most severe problems faced by Muslims in Banja
Luka in the post-war period that only old and disabled people have been going
back to the city, live there for a while and die. Thus, the Bosniak population
of the city drastically decreases from one year to another. According to the
Chief Imam of Banja Luka, 170 Bosniaks died and only 5 new-born Bosniak
kids were born in the city last year.29 This resulted in the fact that according to
some estimates the total number of Bosniaks residing in Banja Luka is around
ive thousands in addition to much more who hold the identiication card
issued in the local municipality but stayed either abroad or in the Federation
of B&H.
Conclusion
Throughout the history Banja Luka was known for its multiethnic and multireligious composition. During the last war city demographic picture drastically
changed as almost all non-Serb population had been either killed or expelled
from the city. All buildings that resembled an Islamic heritage were totally
destroyed including Ferhadija and Arnaudija mosques that were under the
UNESCO list of protected monuments.
Reconciliation process requires full inclusion of all sides that were involved
in the conlict and the role of religious communities and their representatives
have to be taken seriously into consideration due to the very strong role played
by a religion in the recent times. Islamic community tried its best to facilitate
the process of return, co-existence, mutual understanding and reconciliation.
However, it’s very clear that in the case of Banja Luka there has been no will
at all coming from the Orthodox community to take part in the process. As a
result of this no desired results have been achieved so far.
Notes
1.
2.
Cheryl de la Rey, Reconciliation in Divided Societies. In Christie, D. J., Wagner,
R. V. and Winter, D. A. (eds.). Peace, Conlict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st
Century, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001, pp.251-261.
See “Faith-based NGOs and international peace-building” Special Report no.76,
United States Institute of Peace, October 21, 2001, p.5. Available at: http://www.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
usip.org/iles/resources/sr76.pdf, (Accessed February 12, 2012).
Rosemary Nagy, “Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and
Thin Accounts of Solidarity”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No.2,
2002, p.326.
Staub E., and Bar-Tal, D., Genocide, mass killing and intractable conlict: Roots,
evolution, prevention and reconciliation. In Sears D., Huddy L. and Jarvis R.,
(eds.), Handbook of Political Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003,
pp.710-755; Staub E., and Pearlman L.A., Healing, reconciliation and forgiving
after genocide and other collective violence. In Helmick S.J.and Peterson R.L.
(eds.), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Conlict Transformation,
Randor: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001, pp.205-229; Staub E., Pearlman
L.A., Gubin A. and Hagengimana A., “Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving and the
Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention and its
Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda”, Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol.
24, No.3, 2005, pp. 297-334.
Bloomield D., Teresa B. and Luc H., Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: A Handbook,
Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, pp. 12-21.
Kriesberg L., External Contributions to Post-Mass rehabilitation. In Beatrice P.,
Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities,
New York: United Nations University, 2007, pp. 252-256.
Staub E., Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conlict:
understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps toward
a General Theory, Political Psychology, Vol.27, No.6, (December 2006), pp.868-9.
Ross M.H. and Rothman J., Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conlict Management:
Theorizing Success and Failure, New York: Macmillan, 1999; Salomon G. and Nevo
B., Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practice around the World, Mahwah:
Erlbaum, 2002, pp.27-36; Kalman H.C. and Fisher R.J., Conlict analysis and
resolution. In Sears D., Huddy L. and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003, pp.315-357.
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.266, No.3,
Sep.1990, pp.47-60.
Scott M. Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously. In Fabio
Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return
from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 24.
Ibrahim Kalin, Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic
Tradition. In Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conlict Resolution in
Islam, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010, pp. 3-4.
Sulayman Nyang and Douglas Johnston, “Conlict Resolution as a Normative
Value in Islamic Law: Application to the Republic of Sudan”. In Douglas
Johnston (ed.), Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford
University Press, pp. 210-230.
Constituion of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1,
[Ustav Islamske Zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, clan 1], available at: http://
www.rijaset.ba/images/stories/Ustavi/Ustav_IZ-e_iz_1997.pdf. (Accessed on
July 6, 2014).
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14. See The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: http://
www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=830:theislamic-community-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina&catid=59:islamskazajednica&Itemid=198, (Accessed on March 21, 2012).
15. See “The Platform of the ICBH on Dialogue” [Nacrt Platforme Islamske Zajednice
za Dijalog], available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=5756:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-zadijalog&catid=262:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih&Itemid=76.
(Accessed on July 6, 2014). Translation taken from Ahmet Alibasic, “Muslims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Challenges of our Times”. Paper presented
at the conference “The Islamic Factor in the New Political and Security Strategy in the
Balkans and Southern Caucasus”, the institute of Turkish and Central-Asian Studies
of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 17-19 November, 2011,
pp.8-12.
16. Ibid., pp.12-13.
17. See 1941 Resolution of Banja Luka’s Muslims, Banja Luka: Bosnjacka klturna bastina
u Banja Luci, 2007, pp.3.9.
18. Demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991, available at: http://
www.hdmagazine.com/bosnia/census/cens-sz.html, (Accessed on March 21,
2012).
19. Andras J. Riedlmayer, “From the Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural
Heritage” in Maya Shatzmiller, Islam and Bosnia: Conlict Resolution and Foreign Policy
in Multi-Ethnic States, Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2002, pp. 98135.
20. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7,
Chapter 1, Article 1.
21. Interview with Tarik Sadovic, former member of the RS National Assembly.
Interview conducted on April 13, 2012. Private archive.
22. See Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International
Intervention, New York: Oxford University press, 2002, pp.154-56.
23. Ibid.
24. Dnevni Avaz, “Eighteen years after demolishing, bayram prayer irst time prayed in
Banja Luka’s Ferhat Pasha mosque”, August 30, 2011.
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with Mersudin Hodzic, the Secretary General of Banja Luka’s Islamic
Community, Interview held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic
Community in Banja Luka, private archive.
27. Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis, interview held on April
11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive.
28. Interview with the staff of “Merhamet kitchen” in Banja Luka, interview held on
April 11, 2012 in the Merhamet building in Banja Luka, private archive.
29. Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis.
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References
Ahmet Alibasic, “Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Challenges of our
Times”. Paper presented at the conference “The Islamic Factor in the New Political and
Security Strategy in the Balkans and Southern Caucasus”, the institute of Turkish and
Central-Asian Studies of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 17-19
November, 2011.
Beatrice P., Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and
Communities, New York: United Nations University, 2007.
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.266, No.3,
Sep.1990, pp.47-60.
Bloomield D., Teresa B. and Luc H., Reconciliation after Violent Conlict: A Handbook,
Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003.
Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V. and Winter, D. A. (eds.). Peace, Conlict, and Violence: Peace
Psychology for the 21st Century, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2001.
Constituion of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, [Ustav
Islamske Zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, clan 1], available at: http://www.rijaset.
ba/images/stories/Ustavi/Ustav_IZ-e_iz_1997.pdf.
Demographic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 199, available at: http://www.
hdmagazine.com/bosnia/census/cens-sz.html
Dnevni Avaz, “Eighteen years after demolishing, bayram prayer irst time prayed in
Banja Luka’s Ferhat Pasha mosque”, August 30, 2011.
Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return
from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
“Faith-based NGOs and international peace-building” Special Report no.76, United
States Institute of Peace, October 21, 2001. Available at: http://www.usip.org/
iles/resources/sr76.pdf, Accessed February 12, 2012.
Helmick S.J. and Peterson R.L. (eds.), Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy
and Conlict Transformation, Randor: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001.
Ibrahim Kalin, Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic
Tradition. In Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conlict Resolution in
Islam, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010.
Interview with Tarik Sadovic, former member of the RS National Assembly. Interview
conducted on April 13, 2012, Private archive.
Interview with the Secretary General of Banja Luka’s Islamic Community, Interview
held on April 11, 2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka,
private archive.
Interview with the chief imam of the Banja Luka majlis, interview held on April 11,
2012 in the building of the Islamic Community in Banja Luka, private archive.
Interview with the staff of “Merhamet kitchen” in Banja Luka, interview held on April
11, 2012 in the Merhamet building in Banja Luka, private archive.
Kalman H.C. and Fisher R.J., Conlict analysis and resolution. In Sears D., Huddy L.
and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Kriesberg L., External Contributions to Post-Mass Rehabilitation. In Beatrice P.,
94
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Simon C. and Albercht S., (eds.), After Mass Crime: Rebuilding States and Communities,
New York: United Nations University, 2007.
Maya Shatzmiller, Islam and Bosnia: Conlict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic
States, Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2002.
Qamar-ul-Huda (ed.), Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conlict Resolution in Islam, Washington:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010.
Rezolucija Hrabrih Banjaluckih Muslimana 1941 [1941 Resolution of Banja Luka’s Brave
Muslims], Banja Luka: Bosnjacka kulturna bastina u Banja Luci, 2007.
Rosemary Nagy, “Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin
Accounts of Solidarity”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No.2, 2002,
pp.323-346.
Ross M.H. and Rothman J., Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conlict Management: Theorizing
Success and Failure, New York: Macmillan, 1999.
Salomon G. and Nevo B., Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practice around the
World, Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002.
Sears D., Huddy L. and Jarvis R., (eds.), Handbook of Political Psychology, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Sears D., Huddy L. and Jervis R., Political Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003.
Scott M. Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously. In Fabio Petito
and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Staub E., Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conlict:
Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps toward
a General Theory, Political Psychology, Vol.27, No.6, (December 2006), pp.867-894.
Staub E., Pearlman L.A., Gubin A. and Hagengimana A., “Healing, Reconciliation,
Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: An
Intervention and its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda”, Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No.3, 2005, pp.297-334.
Sulayman Nyang and Douglas Johnston, “Conlict Resolution as a Normative Value
in Islamic Law: Application to the Republic of Sudan”. In Douglas Johnston (ed.),
Faith-based Diplomacy Trumping Realpolitik, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: www.
ohr.int
The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=830:the-islamic-communityin-bosnia-and-herzegovina&catid=59:islamska-zajednica&Itemid=198, (Accessed
on March 21, 2012).
“The Platform of the ICBH on Dialogue” [Nacrt Platforme Islamske Zajednice
za Dijalog], available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=5756:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih-zadijalog&catid=262:nacrt-platforme-islamske-zajednice-u-bih&Itemid=76.
(Accessed on July 6, 2014).
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Intercultural Interaction between
Bosnian and Turkish Students
Tuba Boz
Introduction
While there is a plethora of deinitions and scholarly literature on culture, this
paper focuses on the impact of culture on communication, on intercultural
interaction. When I discuss various aspects and deinitions of “culture” with
irst year university students, they usually respond by giving observable “tip
of the ice-berg” examples, such as food, dance, music, clothing and history.
However after some relection and discussion, students begin to recognize
how in fact, ‘culture teaches one how to think, conditions one how to feel, and
instructs one how to act, especially how to interact with others…’1 Based on
three years of ethnographic research, participant observation and informal
interviews conducted at the International University of Sarajevo (IUS), this
paper focuses on the deeper aspects of culture and its inluence on perceptions
and behaviour and examines the experiences of Turkish and Bosnian students
studying at IUS. Notably, three signiicant issues emerged over the course of
the study: one, the impact of culture shock experienced by Turkish students;
two, overlapping beliefs, rituals and customs that stem from shared religion,
namely Islam; and inally, how their values contribute to their choice of a
conservative or liberal lifestyle as well as their perceptions of one other. It is
important to state from the outset what this paper will not examine. It is not
within the scope of this paper to delve into historical and political debates in
an effort to question what constitutes Bosnian identity, Bosniak identity or
Turkish identity. For the purpose of this paper, Bosnian refers to any person
who is a citizen of Bosnian and Herzegovina and Turkish refers to citizens of
the Republic of Turkey.
Ethnography and Intercultural Communication
Intercultural interaction and communication are becoming increasingly
important areas of investigation and academic study as result of increased
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mobility of people throughout the world. Temporary and permanent migration
for political and economic reasons, for education, trade or employment
requires individuals to be prepared for cultural encounters which entails a
degree of cultural awareness and skills for cross-cultural and intercultural
communication. Hall’s classiication of high-context and low-context
communication provides a useful framework for analyzing intercultural
communication. According to Hall low-context communication refers to
explicit verbal communication where as high-context communication relies
on implicit and non-verbal communication. Although we cannot classify any
culture or society in a dichotomous manner that is categorically as high-context
or a low-context culture, these categories are useful for studying the general
communicative structures and patterns within various cultures. Accordingly to
Hall, generally, countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada and
much of Europe are classiied as low-context cultures, and countries in Africa,
Asia and the Middle East Asia are classiied as high-context cultures due to
the emphasis placed on non-verbal communication and complex deference
systems. It is important to note here that this paper focuses on students from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which can be considered a low-context culture and
students from Turkey, which can be classiied as a high-context culture. 2
Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings (Boz, 2013)3 examines
intercultural communication among and between IUS staff and students using
Hall’s high/low context cultures in detail.
While culture and intercultural communication are complex subject
matters, ethnographic research is a particularly suitable approach for studying
intercultural interaction at the International University of Sarajevo (IUS),
as it gave me an opportunity to observe, examine and experience social
interactions and intercultural communication irst hand. Teaching in a crosscultural setting revealed that much of the apparent miscommunication that
occurred was directly connected to differences between what Hall classiied
as high–context and low-context cultures, different values and culture shock
experienced by Turkish students in Bosnia. Ethnography is no longer used
in remote and “exotic” places by anthropologists conducting ieldwork, but
rather ethnographic research is now employed by a number of disciplines for
“offering a unique approach to understanding the meanings and intentions
that shape the nature of human and social conduct” (Spradley 1971 cited in
Clark, p. 1).4 Clark explains, that an “ethnographic perspective is uniquely
suited to multicultural practice because of its abiding concern for the emic
point of view, for understanding situated meaning, for acknowledging multiple
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voices and realities, for grasping the other’s frame of reference, for verstehen.”5
The combination of both emic and etic perspectives in ethnographic research
allows for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis. Fieldwork enables the
investigator to gather in-depth data within a natural “everyday life” context.
The advantages of using informal interviews is explained by David Fetterman
(2010) who states, “informal interviews are useful throughout an ethnographic
study in discovering what people think and how one person’s perception
compares with another’s.”6 Therefore, informal interviews are a particularly
useful technique for investigating questions related to intercultural interaction
and cross-cultural communication.
Values in Intercultural Communication
It is not only one isolated incident that inspired me to write this paper, however,
one particular discussion that emerged in a lecture related to the symbolic and
tangible elements of nation building in my class made up of mainly Bosnian
and Turkish students drew my attention, and propelled me to focus more
deeply on intercultural communication between the students. The discussion
on the signiicance of the national lag, national anthem and national holidays
sparked an intense debate about what a national lag signiies. Turkish students
spoke passionately of what the Turkish lag represents and what it means to
them. They had a shared narrative that elucidated the meaning of the white
crescent and star on a red lag. The Bosnian students held various opinions;
that the lag was important in representing the independent state of Bosnia
and Herzegovina after so much bloodshed, while others felt that the lag was
imposed by the international community and they did not feel such an afinity
towards the lag. It took some time for students to consider the historical, social,
political and cultural dimensions of each state that in fact inluenced their
understanding and perception of the lag and national anthem. The different
values attached to symbols were striking over the course of discussions.
Milton Rockeach sheds lights on how values affect intercultural
communication, when people from different cultures come together to interact,
their messages are relect their deep-seated value orientations, for example
those who value collectivism over individualism. Therefore, “an understanding
of cultural value systems can help identify similarities and differences between
people from different cultures from which intercultural communication can
proceed”. 68 Before delving into an analysis of the different values held by the
respective cultural groups, it is important to consider the potential different
categorizations of a population. Kevin Avruch elucidates:
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“Individuals are organized in many potentially different ways in
a population by many different (and cross-cutting) criteria: for
example, by kinship into families or clans; by language, race or creed
into ethnic groups; by socio-economic characteristics into social
classes; by geographical region into political interest groups; and by
occupation or institutional memberships into unions, bureaucracies,
industries, political parties, and militaries.”7
While these categorizations are relevant at national and regional levels, they
also are relevant to this case-study. While the students at IUS come from diverse
national backgrounds, the vast majority are from Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Turkey; however, we must consider whether they are from metropolitan or
rural areas; their religious afiliations; their socio-economic status; their liberal
or conservative values. Avruch explains:
“The more complex and differentiated the social system, the more
potential groups and institutions there are. And because each group
or institution places individuals in different experiential worlds,
and because culture derives in part from this experience, each of
these groups and institutions can be a potential container for culture. Thus no
population can be adequately characterized as a single culture or
by a single cultural descriptor. As a corollary, the more complexly
organized a population on sociological grounds (class, region,
ethnicity, and so on), the more complex will it cultural mappings
appear (Avruch 1998: 17-18; emphasis in the original). SpencerOatey and Franklin 2009:40)”
The challenge in researching and clearly deining culture is noted by Gumperz
who emphasizes “the fact that ‘culture’ in the sense of a transcendent identity
composed of values and norms and linearly related to forms of behaviour is
not necessarily there”. He argues that “what can be observed and analysed
in intercultural communication are different conventions of communication,
different speech styles, narrative patterns, in short the deployment of different
communicative repertoires… But in actual fact, not ‘culture’ is deployed, but
communicative repertoires.”8 However, it is ‘culture’ that guides the different
communicative repertoires. It is critical to consider the broader social context
when examining intercultural interactions. For example, Turkish students have
the time and willingness to engage in social and extracurricular activities with
the purpose of strengthening their relationships with Bosnian and students
of different cultural backgrounds. However, we have to take into account that
Bosnian students are in their home country and have social commitments to
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family, relatives and friends. Turkish and other international students have to
build new relationships in a new context. Therefore, it is important, where
appropriate, to incorporate intercultural interaction into the curriculum in
order to build intercultural competence to prepare students for a globalised
world. This is best integrated into assessments that require team work rather
than explicitly and solely delivered via content or intercultural communication
theory. Further, the level of English language proiciency of student affects
their intercultural interactions both inside and outside the class. Students who
are luent in English regardless of whether they are Bosnian or Turkish are
more conident and therefore more likely to communicate and interact with
their friends and professors. On one occasion, in a Sociology lecture made
up of ifty students, non-Turkish students were invited to attend a seminar
regarding a Scholarship program offered by the Republic of Turkey. The
remaining Turkish students in the class asked whether they could speak in
Turkish. Considering that more than half of the class had left to attend the
seminar, I decided to hold a class discussion instead of continue the lecture.
Students who often remained silent in the class displayed critical and passionate
engagement with the material and explained that they were shy to speak in
English in front of their peers who were more proicient in English language.
The experiences of some of the Turkish students at IUS can be compared
to that of international students in the United Kingdom. A Chinese student
studying in Britain explains:
Although we were scornful of the Greek students’ somewhat
showy performance [in class], in fact, in the back of our minds we
were really envious of their courage. We felt upset about ourselves;
after all, they have gained from the interactions. From the bottom
of our hearts, we Chinese want to interact with the teacher and are
willing to talk to them, but we are just constrained by old mindsets
and cannot pluck up the courage (Xiong, 2005: 157).9
Predictably, language barriers present a signiicant barrier to intercultural
interaction. The responses of forty students can be classiied under various
categories of reactions to national cultural differences. In addition, the cultural
classiication of foreign/international students and domestic/local students
must be factored when studying intercultural interaction. The different
experiences of the respective student groups need to be examined in light of
local/international student interaction. Culture shock is a part of intercultural
communication in this case. Turkish students, Ayse and Ahmet relect on
Turkish-Bosnian student interaction at IUS:
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“Turkish Students are here away from their country so they see
the university as their kind of second home but Bosnian students
have many things to do here so they don’t spend too much time at
university”.
While Ayse has a pragmatic explanation concerning limited interaction
between Turkish and Bosnian student, Ahmet expresses a sense of
dissatisfaction with the level of relations between Bosnian and Turkish
students:
I see in the campus, in the faculty, there is too much prejudice
between Turkish students and Bosnian students. …Turkish
students are more ready to embrace Bosnian students into their
social environments. Because before we came to Bosnia, we were
aware that Bosnian people are part of our brotherhoods…
This discontentment is a relection of disappointment that comes along
with experiencing a reality different to what was expected, a reality that differs
from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Turkish imagination elucidated by some
of the Turkish students, especially in relation to afinities built between the
two cultures through the Islam, the Ottoman Empire and more recently the
war. The student’s responses shed light on the culture shock they experienced;
these will discussed in the ensuing sections.
Islam, Values and Culture Shock
The classiications used in this paper, such as Bosnians, Muslims, and Turkish,
does not imply that we are treating cultures as completely homogenous,
however simple, we need such categories in order to examine and to discuss
intercultural interaction in this case-study. Students’ responses afirm that
Islam plays an important role in facilitating intercultural communication but
different lifestyle practices, religious interpretations and values are the cause
of miscommunication. According to Bennet,10 culture shock is a common
experience for individuals who reside in different cultural environments for
extended periods of time. He explains, from a psychological perspective,
culture shock refers to the sense of loss and feelings of deprivation in relation
to social networks, such friends, social status and possessions; feeling helpless
and unable to cope in the new social context; irritation, frustration and anger
with “foreign practices”; feeling isolated and rejected by members of the new
culture, or rejecting the new culture; a sense of confusion in their social role,
values and identity. If we take into consideration, the interaction of different
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cultures in one setting, in this case a university, as a microcosm of multicultural
contexts in European countries, we can relect on issues of integration in an
objective and cogent manner, taking a proactive approach for improving social
cohesion rather than addressing issues primarily using the frame of racism and
xenophobia discourses. Indeed, this does not mean racism and xenophobia
do not exist in Europe, but rather emphasizes the importance of having a
comprehensive and clearer approach and means to decipher what are simply
different interpretations of values and social interaction.
Bennett’s11 developmental model of intercultural sensitivity is suitable
for studying the responses of Bosnian and Turkish students. While culture
shock is experienced by Turkish students who are foreigners in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bosnian students are also interacting with their Turkish peers
and staff members at the university and also need to develop their intercultural
and cross-cultural communication skills. Bennett’s developmental model
includes various reactions to cultural differences: “denial of difference” which
refers to individual’s inability to interpret cultural, which may stem from naïve
observation and benign stereotyping. “Defence against difference” includes
the recognition of difference together with a negative evaluation of variations
from the native culture which is characterized by dualistic us/them thinking
and explicit negative stereotyping. “Minimization of difference” underscores
the similarities between people and acknowledges the supericial cultural
differences such as eating customs. “Acceptance of difference” refers to an
appreciation of cultural differences in behaviour and values, and “adaptation
to difference” refers to the development of communications that facilitate
intercultural communication, namely effective use of empathy and frame of
reference shifting to communicate across cultural boundaries. The “integration
of difference” is deined as the internalization of bicultural or multicultural
frames of reference.
The responses of the students in this case-study highlighted the impact of
culture shock and signiicance of Islam in their interaction with their peers
and their understanding each other’s cultures. For example, Bosnian student,
Dzenita noted that “People in Bosnia and Turkey celebrate Eid al-Adha and
Eid al-Fitr in a very similar way.” Muhammed, a Turkish student explained,
“Tassavvuf is another similarity that two cultures share. There are still
“tekkes” in Bosnia practicing the way of tarikats as Turks do.” Turkish student
Bilgehan referred to religion as a transnational culture that encompasses racial
and national cultural differences:
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In Ramadan Bayram, Turkish people visit their relatives; it is the
same for Bosnian Muslims. This is my second year in Bosnia. I saw
three Bayrams in Bosnia. When we went to Bayram namaz and
we went to a village for Kurban charity, it is the same for Turkish
people. Actually it is the same for Muslim people in the world.
Conversely, the following student responses can be characterized by dualistic
thinking and categorized as “defence against difference”: “Most of our
Bosnian friends don’t like to participate in activities but most of the Turkish
students who are studying at this university, even the student whose grades
are not good have something in mind” Muhammed. Signiicantly, while this
response can be classiied as dualistic thinking, it is accompanied by positive
stereotyping rather than negative stereotyping:
I believe that we shouldn’t do anything to improve the relationship
because culture is something that only belongs to you. Bosnians
have to show their culture and Turkish have to how theirs. If we
try to improve the relationship between these cultures, then there is
going to be a common new culture and Turks will be lose some of
their habits and Bosnians will lose theirs. This is bad for everybody.
This statement relects a concern over the consequence of fusion between
the cultures which may affect the authenticity of each culture. Signiicantly
the student has respect for both cultures and feels the need to protect both
cultures. Concerns over prejudice and stereotyping were raised by Rukiye:
Between the students, there is a feeling that Turkish students have
stereotypical views of Bosnians and Bosnians have a stereotypical
view of Turkish students. If we had more international students in
the university, there could be a better balance. Because wherever
you have two big groups, there will always be some separation.
However, we can see in an effort to minimize cultural differences student’s
responses can be there is recognition of supericial cultural differences. The
similarities between humanity and common basic values s underscored.
Signiicantly, students made references to western culture as a connecting force
young people from both cultures; Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina bilateral
relations as well as to the aid and support given during the war; religion, in this
case Islam. Kubra, a Turkish student explained:
Maybe only among the older generation in Bosnia the Ottoman
culture exists, yet among the younger generation, I could not notice
the same thing. They are mostly attracted to Western way of life and
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thinking, the same as most of the young Turkish generation.
Kubra’s observation relects Ergun’s response regarding the similarities
between modern society’s capital cities, “actually the big and developed
cities of countries can be similar because of capitalism and globalization”.
Turkish student, Oguz explained how he aims to deal with and minimize
cultural differences especially in the context of social interaction and socially
acceptable behaviours displayed on public transport. This response is in
contrast to Ergun’s response who stated that cultures should be protected and
expressed concern over the fusion of cultures which he believes will destroy
the national cultures.
My Bosnian friend can yell in the bus or tram, and they can behave in
a more relaxed way and speak very loudly, however these situations
are wrong for me according to my culture which is different than
my friends. I explained how to solve this problem, I said ‘problem’
because it is a problem for me. I talk to him sometimes and explain
my view and he sometimes understands my point of view and starts
to change a little bit but I think this problem will be solved. Turkish
people who live in Bosnia will affect each other. They start to change
Turkish people and Turkish people start to change Bosnian people
and we’ll ind a middle way.
The impact of international relations, bilateral agreements and Turkey’s
foreign policies towards the Balkans were raised by two Bosnian students,
Mija and Aldijana who referred to Turkey’s role in providing aid and support
for Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war as a reason for friendly social
relations:
Bosnian and Turkish mentalities are very similar. Considering that
Bosnia was for a certain time a part of the Ottoman Empire, that
conclusion does not come as a surprise. The most important legacy
that the Ottoman Empire left for Bosnia is the cultural part. That is
why Turkey and Bosnia are connected and have good relations. The
similarity of two countries is religion. Both countries are majority
Muslim countries. Bosnia was a part of Ottoman countries, and so
they have a historical connection. Based on that, it is not unusual to
have some of the same rituals, food and words. When it comes to
differences, I personally would say that the Turks have a connection
with from my perspective, have a strong sense of togetherness.
They are very religious and very traditional, conservative if I may
say. They stick to their values, and in my opinion are very critical
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to those who do not share their ideas. When it comes to Bosnians,
I would say that they are more lexible in areas that Turks hold on
to very tightly. Bosnians are more open to changes and are more
relaxed, even when it comes to religious aspects.
Turkey’s relations with Bosnian and Herzegovina have a deep social impact
and inluence the social interactions between the students as it situates Turkey
in a positive light.
In my opinion the relationship between Turkey and Bosnia is very
friendly. Bosnian people love Turkey because Turkey was one the
key countries that helped Bosnia during the war which took place
20 years ago. They were sending food, money and medical support
to Bosnian people and Turkey was one of the irst countries that
accepted Bosnian independence. Mija
Correspondingly, Emina mentioned the support provided by the Republic
of Turkey as a contributing factor in the positive relations socials relations
between the students:
After the war a lot of good things, related to the relationship
between the states are made. This university is a very good
example. Turkey is opening a lot of schools all over my country,
from primary level to universities. It is maybe the best way because
through education, mutual help, we learn about each other. Also
when Turkish politicians support BiH in any way, we develop some
of trust in Turkey and Turkish people.
The international relations between both countries have a signiicant impact
on the social relationships of Turkish and Bosnian students in this case-study.
Further, an overarching ield that connects the two national cultures in this
case-study is religion, namely Islam. Religion minimizes national cultural
differences; however, we cannot simply categorize religion as a supericial
similarity because it affects every day life and social interaction for those who
are religious. As argued by Nalini Tarakeshwar et. al, ‘religion is inextricably
woven into the cloth of cultural life. The culture of a religious sub-group
can be manifested in various ways, including in member’s values, beliefs and
orientations to life, in their communicative conventions…’12. The inluence
of religion on culture is revealed in the examples students provide concerning
the hijab, visiting tekkes, celebrating bayram, going to the mosque, and using
classiication of religious conservatism or liberalism to describe one another’s
values and lifestyle practices. Such religious symbols and rituals provided by
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the students illustrate both the similarities and the differences between national
cultures of the students who participated in this study. Turkish student Mustafa
considered the style of hijab worn by Turkish and Bosnian females as a cultural
symbol which showed the similarities between Bosnian and Turkish cultures.
The style of hijab, of course having hijab is farz [fard] for Muslim
women. But the style I guess is about culture. We can see Arabian,
Malaysian and Turkish women wear it differently. So Bosnian and
Turkish women wear it in a similar way. Mustafa
Kemal explained that while he never visited a tekke in Turkey, his visit to a
tekke in Bosnia surprised him as the nasheeds were sung in Turkish language.
I never go to tekke in Turkey but when I heard there is a tekke in
Sarajevo, I was interested and I went there. They were all Bosnian,
and nobody knew Turkish but they were singing nasheeds in Turkish
language and I was surprised and shocked.
Conservatism is another topic students referred to. Bosnian student Damir
for example, considers Turkish culture to be more conservative than Bosnian
culture. He emphasizes the multicultural frame of referencing in Bosnia
because of its multi-religious and multicultural make up.
The religious similarities have an impact on some customs, for
example Bayram. Both of the cultures have during history been
living with other ethnicities, and therefore developed a sense for
multiculturalism and respect for others who are different. I may add
that I think that Turkish culture is more conservative than Bosnian
in the sense that it connects much more to religion than Bosnians.
Edin too describes Turkish students as religiously conservative. What is
signiicant here is he believes religious conservatism is not only connected to
individual religiosity, but what he deems to be the inluence of conservative
trait of Turkish society.
Similarities are seen through religion, but there are also differences.
I think Turks are much more religious but not because (not in all
cases) they are religious themselves, but because society is different.
Edin
While religion guides values, the national cultures inluence how religion is
interpreted and practiced or not practiced in daily life.
Our religion is the same and as a covered girl, we do not feel
ourselves outside of society. Hatice
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Here, it is important to consider recent Turkish history where the hijab
was banned in universities and public institutions. Such discriminatory policies
marginalized female students who wore the hijab and they were excluded from
tertiary education. Moreover, this feeling of belonging Hatice expressed is
connected to the university’s location in cosmopolitan capital city Sarajevo,
which is more culturally diverse than other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Shared tradition and religious conservatism is an overlapping area which brings
Turkish and Bosnian students closer together, but paradoxically it can also
become a barrier. Turkish student Sumeyra refers to her friendship with her
Bosnian roommate noting cultural similarities namely, religious conservatism:
I have a Bosnian roommate; her approaches to events are almost the
same as Turkish people. She is conservative. She has a conservative
approach and I don’t feel like I am from another nation. We talk
about traditional issues and religious issues. They celebrate Bayram
in the same way.
Several students explained that they are ready to embrace cultural difference
and their responses can be seen in light of the classiication of “acceptance
of difference”.
The similarities between these two cultures began with the conquest
of the Ottoman Empire, but the fact is that my country was always
conquered by someone so with that in mind we can understand why
our culture does not belong to anyone at all, but it is a sum of many
cultures which developed throughout the centuries. Similarities can
be seen through a pride of histories. Both people in Turkey and
Bosnia are proud of their history, but it is also based on different
grounds. Turks are mainly proud because of their great Empire,
because in one point of history they were the greatest force in the
world. On the other Bosnian people are proud because, contrary
to the Turks, we were under someone’s rule, and now we exist
as an independent state, despite a harsh history we achieved our
independence and existence.
Adaptation to difference is relected in the responses of Bosnian students
Marijana and Turkish student, Seyda. Signiicantly, while adaptation to
difference refers to the development of communication skills enabling
intercultural communication, through the use of empathy, common language
also emerged as a barrier if overcome could signiicantly improve intercultural
interaction:
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Bosnian and Turkish students at our university don’t have close
interaction with each other as much as they have with other friends.
Most of the Turkish students prefer to hang out with Turkish
friends, the case is similar with Bosnian students. I believe that
language might be a cause of this problem. I think this is a problem
because we are living in the same environment. I do not want to
generalize, there are some students who have close Bosnian friends.
However, when I observe the majority I don’t see this.
Better language proiciency will lead to improved relationships between
Bosnian and Turkish students as there is a demonstrated willingness to interact
not solely for the purpose of “cultural exchange” but to have social interaction
and genuine form relationships with each other as peers, as students at the
same university, faculty or program. Marijana explains:
Turks appreciate Bosnians very much, and Bosnians appreciate
Turks. In my opinion, the main reason why those interactions
may occasionally be of poor quality is language barriers. From
my experience, I have learned that Turks are not eager to talk with
Bosnians. When I asked a Turkish friend why that is, he explained
to me that Turks are not very good at English, well not as good
as Bosnians, he said, and that is why they do not interact with us.
So, as I understand, Turks are a very proud people and they would
rather not talk to Bosnians than be ashamed. So, I would state that
minimizing that problem would lead to a better level of interaction
between Turks and Bosnians at an everyday level. Marijana Sego
The majority of the student’s responses can be classiied under Bennett’s
developmental model of intercultural sensitivity. While the student’s responses
can be classiied under defence minimization, acceptance, or adaptation to
difference, none of the responses relect the integration of difference which
entails the internalization of bicultural or multicultural frames of reference.
While this study is based on micro-level analysis of social interaction between
Bosnian and Turkish students, we can extrapolate that in addition to the problem
of xenophobia and discrimination in Europe towards the “other”, there are
subtle elements that tend to be overlooked in intercultural communication,
and that divergent perceptions and misinterpretations tend to emerge through
various deference systems in cultures, and the different meanings attached to
various symbols. The importance of relexivity is underscored in this paper.
While much has been written about eurocentrism, it is vital that we relect on
our ethnocentric views.
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Notes
1.
J.W. Neuliep, Intercultural Communication: A Contextual Approach, (California: Sage
Publications, 2012), p. 46.
2. E. T. Hall, The Silent Language, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959).
3. T. Boz, ‘Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings’, M
Mulalic, H. Korkut, and Elif Nuroglu (ed.), Turkish - Balkans Relations: The Future
Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations and Relations, (Istanbul:
TASAM, 2013).
4. J. Clark, Beyond Empathy: An ethnographic approach to cross-cultural social work practice,
University of Toronto. No date. Cited in Boz, 2013.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. D. M. Fetterman, 2010. Ethnography: Step by Step, Third edition. (Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications, 2010), p. 41.
7. K. Avruch, Cross-Cultural conlict Analysis and Resolution. (EOLSS: Arlington, USA,
no date).
8. J. Gumperz, Discourse strategies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
9. Z. N. Xiong, Cross-Cultural Adaptation and Academic Performance: Overseas
Chinese Students on an International Foundation Course at a British University,
2005, PhD Thesis, University of Luton, 2005.
10. Bennett, M.J. (1986). A developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity.
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 10 (2), 179-95, p. 180.
11. Ibid.
12. N. Tarakeshwar et al., ‘Religion: An Overlooked Dimension in Cross-Cultural
Psychology’, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 34, no. 4, 2003, pp. 377-394,
p. 377.
References
Avruch, A., Cross-Cultural conlict Analysis and Resolution, (Arlington: EOLSS, no date).
Bennett, M.J., “A developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity,”
International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 10 (2), 1986.
Boz, Tuba, “Intercultural Communication in Turkish and Bosnian Settings,” M.
Mulalic, H. Korkut, and Elif Nuroglu (ed.), Turkish - Balkans Relations: The Future
Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations and Relations, (Istanbul:
TASAM, 2013).
Clark, J., Beyond Empathy: An ethnographic approach to cross-cultural social work practice,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, No date).
Fetterman, D. M., Ethnography: Step by Step, Third edition, (Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications, 2010).
Gumperz, J., Discourse strategies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Hall, E. T., The Silent Language, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959).
Neuliep, J. W., Intercultural Communication: A Contextual Approach, (California: Sage
Publications, 2012).
Xiong, Z.N., Cross-Cultural Adaptation and Academic Performance: Overseas
Chinese Students on an International Foundation Course at a British University,
2005, PhD Thesis, University of Luton, 2005.
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Interfaith Dialogue Initiatives in Kosovo
Jeton Mehmeti
Introduction
Kosovo has a multiethnic and multi religious society. Majority of its population
are Muslims, while Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Jews make
the minority groups. Kosovo, just like the rest of Muslim majority Western
Balkan countries, was renowned for the interreligious harmony amongst its
diverse religious communities. However, the 1998-99 war interrupted the
harmony amongst faith communities. The relationship between Kosovo
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, the former predominantly belonging to the
Islamic community and the latter mostly belong to Christian Orthodox Church
was severally damaged. Although religion was not the driving force behind the
war, it was an inseparable part on how the parties identiied each other, the
reason why religious monuments were a primary target during and after the
war. According to a post-war survey “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in
Kosovo 1998-1999” submitted to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as evidence for the trial of Slobodan Milosevic,
nearly half of the mosques and Islamic congregation spots were damaged
or destroyed during the war, and over 30 percent of Christian Orthodox
buildings were damaged or destroyed too.
The ICTY document shows that religious and cultural heritage suffered great
losses during the war. Mosques dating from the ifteenth-century, Sui shrines,
eighteenth-century madrasahs, a ifteenth-century hamam, historic archives
and libraries of Islamic community were destroyed during the seventeen
months of ighting. On the other hand, between June and October 1999 many
Orthodox Churches and monasteries, some dating from the medieval period,
suffered serious structural damage or were destroyed completely. Roman
Catholic architectural heritage was not spared either, although in much smaller
scale compared to the former ones. “These acts of reciprocal vandalism seemed
motivated on both sides more by the desire to eradicate the evidence of the
other’s presence in Kosovo than by religious fanaticism”, says an International
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Crisis Group Balkans Report. The multiethnic harmony was challenged once
more in 2004, in an inter-ethnic riot which ended with 19 people dead, nearly
a thousand injured and many churches and mosques damaged. Such events
made interfaith dialogue in Kosovo an imperative activity. In general, heads of
religious communities have shown a good commitment to engaging in dialogue
activities. Indeed, the irst meeting among religious representatives happened
during the war, and continued in a regular manner until it was interrupted by
2004 events, to resume again in 2006.
Foreign embassies in Kosovo and international religious and non-religious
organizations have contributed in organizing interfaith conferences and other
initiatives that promote dialogue, tolerance and reconciliations. Two of those
organizations whose mission is to promote interfaith dialogue and who have
been active in Kosovo are Tony Blair Faith Foundation and Fethullah Gülen
Movement, whose engagement in Kosovo will be elaborated here. This is a
descriptive study that looks at the history of interfaith dialogue in Kosovo
since 1999 and while acknowledging the contributors to organizing interfaith
meetings, some of the challenges to interfaith engagement are also identiied.
In addition, an explanation on the notion, objectives, paradigm, principles and
etiquette of interfaith dialogue is identiied.
The notion of interfaith dialogue
There has often been an association between religion and conlict, in many
local or international wars, where religious differences were the primary cause
of the conlict or at least made the differences between two sides wider.
The Kosovo-Serbia war was not entirely a religious war, although religious
authorities played a signiicant role. Although religion can contribute to
violent conlicts, it can also be a powerful factor in the struggle for peace and
reconciliation. This is possible when two or more faiths come together to
explore and promote the possibility of peace. These are indeed elements of
interfaith dialogue. “At its most basic, interfaith dialogue is a simple concept:
persons of different faiths meeting to have a conversation”, says Smock
(2002). This conversation is carried out amongst people of different faiths on
a common subject, with the purpose of learning from and about one another.
But dialogue is not debate, suggests Leonard Swidler (Smock, 2002). In
dialogue each partner must listen to the other as openly and sympathetically as
possible as he can, in an attempt to understand the other’s position as precisely
as possible. Swidler further categorizes interfaith dialogue into three areas:
the practical – where we collaborate to help humanity, the spiritual dimension
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– where we attempt to experience the partner’s religion, and the cognitive –
where we seek understanding of the truth. Interfaith dialogue is necessary
both during the armed conlict as well as during the peace building process.
Successful dialogue during the conlict can lead towards peace, while dialogues
after the war can help reduce if not eliminate prejudice and discrimination
against members of another religious community.
Despite the positive outcome from interfaith dialogue, in multi religious
societies, some religious groups are wary from interfaith engagements. This
is mainly the case when a particular religious group takes the initiative for
organizing such events, as other religious groups may express suspicions
behind and wariness at the motives behind such efforts as Kamar Oniah
Kamaruzaman (2010) lists several reasons behind the lack of positive response
to interfaith initiative:
“Conversion - the fear that one may get converted into the faith of the
dialogue partners; dilution of faith – the suspicion that inluential arguments
in the dialogue may dilute one’s faith; defensive – the apprehension that
one may hear something unpleasant or discomforting about one’s religion;
embarrassment – the anxiety that one may be embarrassed at dialogue sessions
if one fails to expound one’s religion well enough; disservice – the worry that
one may do a disservice to one’s religion if one fails to explain or defend it
properly; inferiority complex – the nervousness if one is good enough to
enter into dialogue; social innuendoes – the feeling of discomfort that fellow
adherents may suspect one’s commitment to one’s religion if seen to associate
with adherents of other religions; agenda – the dread that one may be lured
into supporting hidden agendas; history – the memories of unpleasant history
and painful encounters with certain religious communities”, are among the
chief reasons why religious groups feel anxious from engaging in interfaith
dialogue.
For interfaith dialogues to be well received and be accepted and so become
more effective, it is irst necessary to clearly clarify the premises and paradigms,
the objectives and the etiquette of such efforts, something that Kamaruzaman
refers to as the “what”, the “how” and the “who” of the initiatives. Interfaith
initiatives can be classiied into two, interfaith dialogue which is the discursive
part where all participants will be discussing about the stance or position of
their religion vis-à-vis certain issues, and interfaith engagement which is the
practical part where the various faith communities cooperate and work together
for a common good. Since in interfaith dialogue the positions of the religions
on certain issues are to be discussed, it is therefore imperative that the dialogue
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partners and participants be among those who are competent, knowledgeable
and committed to their religions. This is to avoid misrepresentations of the
religions. In general, interfaith dialogue should be a platform to know more
about each other, to learn from each other, to set up report and establish
respect for all. Thus, interfaith dialogue is not a theological debate, nor is a
platform for conversion and polemics. Moreover, discipline, respect, sincerity,
sensitiveness, sympathy, responsibility, patience, among others should form
the fundamentals of the etiquette of interfaith dialogue.
Place of religion during the war
Before we engage in a discussion about interfaith dialogue in local context
it should be clear that the Kosovo war was not a religious war, nor a war
started on religious incidents. However, religious people played a crucial role,
in particular the Serbian Orthodox Church who blessed its army’s activities in
“defending” Kosovo, Serbia’s “soul, mind and heart”. This way the Orthodox
clergy gave the war a holy dimension. Religion and conlict are two concepts
often associated with one another. Madeline Albright (2006) suggests that
policy makers should understand the role of religion when they analyze the
situation in different parts of the world, because, in case of conlicts, religion
should play a role in encouraging peace and not be a further aggravation of
the conlict. She further explains how different religions have many things in
common, like preaching for peace, love and social responsibility.
In Kosovo’s case religion and everything that was religious became a
target of parties involved in the conlict due to the perception that religious
monuments represent the existence of a community i.e. while mosques
represented the existence of Albanians, Orthodox Churches represented Serbs’
existence. Destroying religious monuments was considered a way to wipe out
the existence of the group too. Thus, what Serbs did to Islamic monuments
during the 1998-1999 war, Albanians tried to do to Serbian Orthodox
monuments during the irst months after the end of the war, although the
level of damage to Orthodox Church is signiicantly lower compared to the
human and technical losses done to the Islamic Community. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia show that of 498 mosques that
were in active use, approximately 225 of them were damaged or destroyed
during 1998-1999. Much of this damage was clearly the result of the attacks
directed on the mosque: explosive devises planted in the mosque or inside the
minaret, artillery aimed at the minaret or ires started in the mosque. In some
cases, anti-Albanian and pro-Serbian grafiti were written on mosque walls.
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At least four of these mosques were built in 1400s, another four in 1500s, a
ifteenth-century hamam, eighteenth-century madrasahs, Sui shrines, libraries
and archives of Islamic heritage, among others, were all destroyed.
The same documents show that close to 80 Orthodox Churches and
monasteries were damaged and destroyed between June and October
1999, half of them suffering serious structural damages or were destroyed
completely. The major medieval Orthodox shrines however have been under
close guard by KFOR and have not been affected.
While the attack against Islamic heritage was a coordinated attack carried
out by Serbia’s state military action against Kosovo, one may argue that the
destruction of Orthodox churches was not an orchestrated campaign, it was
carried out by individuals who saw this as a retaliation opportunity for the
destruction of mosques.
Another offensive against religious monuments was repeated on 17-18
March 2004 during the inter-ethnic clash between Kosovo Albanians and
Kosovo Serbs. Again Orthodox Churches and mosques became a target were
groups expressed their anger and hostility. Such events should be an alarm, at
least for religious leaders, that their religious adherents do not fully understand
the role of religious monuments and other sites. Rancor and frustrations
should not be allowed to be manifested in burning down and destroying
religious objects no matter who they belong to.
Responding to the call for dialogue
Regardless of many problems and dificulties that the Kosovo society had to
go through during and after the war, which created an even wider gap among
ethnic and religious groups, one can strongly argue that the interfaith dialogue
in Kosovo long preceded the technical and political dialogue between Kosovo
and Serbia. Indeed the irst interfaith dialogue in Kosovo was held during
the war on 1 March 1999 in Prishtina. This dificult meeting was organized
by the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP)1, an international
organization based in New York, who managed to bring together for the
irst time representatives of three traditional religious communities that exist
in Kosovo. The leaders of the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox
Church and the Catholic Church expressed opposition to the misuse of
religion for political reasons on all sides and called on all parties not to use
religious symbols to promote violence or intolerance. They also expressed
their determination to maintain direct contacts among religious communities
and to build channels of communication.
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The level of interfaith dialogue continued on informal basis since then,
in most cases these meetings were convened by international organizations
and were held in various places such as: in Vienna on 15-16 March 1999,
Amman 29-30 November 1999, Sarajevo 9 February 2000, Pristina 9-10
April 2000, Oslo 29 September 2001, Sarajevo 1 November 2003, etc.2 There
were also other meetings in different occasions which were organized mostly
by international representatives in Kosovo, who were serving in Kosovo in
diplomatic or civilian missions. It is important to note here that the interfaith
dialogue meetings had been regularly held until 17 March 2004. On this day
19 people (11 Albanians and 8 Serbs) were killed on the worst clash between
Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians since 1999, and a number of religious
buildings were destroyed. These events were a step backward to interfaith
dialogue initiative, but not the main obstacle to the progress of dialogue.
The main obstacles to dialogue and reconciliation were the involvement of
the Serbian Orthodox Church in politics, its refusal to accept the new reality
in Kosovo, and the hesitation to apologies for the crimes committed by the
army whose military campaign it had blessed. The irst reason that hindered
the success of interfaith dialogue in Kosovo during the last decade was the
involvement of the head of SOC for Kosovo, oficially known as the bishop
of Raska and Prizren (i.e. Kosovo) Artemije, in the political developments of
Kosovo. He was, at that time, also the head of the Serb National Council of
Kosovo, a political position which came in direct conlict with his position as
the spiritual leader of Kosovo Serb community. He was continuously warned
from his counterparts, the former president of the Islamic Community of
Kosovo and Grand Mufti, Rexhep Boja, and the late cleric of the Catholic
Church of Kosovo, Mark Sopi, that he should not interfere in the politics.
Indeed, any political intention or motivation can hinder the low of dialogue
initiatives, especially in the case of Kosovo where the essence of the problem
was more of a political, ethnic, and social character, rather than a religious one.
The Orthodox Church was politically inluenced by Serbian Government,
which could be one of the reasons why the Church never apologized for the
crimes committed by Serbia against Albanian civilians and the destruction of
Islamic heritage during the war. The Church did not show any signs either
towards accepting the new reality of Kosovo created after June 1999 when
NATO troops and the UN convoy started a new phase of peacekeeping and
state building. Therefore, the Church deserves a great deal of the blame why
the Kosovo Serb community is not fully integrated in Kosovo’s political and
socio-economic life.
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After March 2004 events, the Serbian Orthodox Church categorically
refused any form of inter-religious engagement with the rest of religious
communities of Kosovo. This decision was against the declaration signed by
three religious communities in previous meetings which called for respecting
the common moral norms. If one had any reasons to withdraw from the
dialogue, then it would be the Islamic Community of Kosovo, which suffered
the most from an unjust war blessed by the Orthodox Church. Instead, they
chose to stay because boycotting the interfaith dialogue was deinitely not
the way nor a method for solving the problems. Dialogue opens new doors
and new opportunities for all Kosovo citizens represented by their religious
leaders. The tradition of interfaith meetings resumed in 2006 and continues to
this day although not on regular basis.
Privileges of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo
Religion, although rarely being the principal cause of conlict, was nevertheless
a contributing factor to the Balkan wars, especially in the Bosnia and
Herzegovina war of 1995 and in Kosovo war in 1999. The latter pushed the
profoundly secular organization NATO, whose member states practice several
religions, to ight the irst war in its ifty-year history to protect Muslims who
were being expelled from Kosovo from Orthodox Serbs. The Serb military
operation during the Kosovo war was from the beginning blessed by the
orthodox clergy. And when religious authorities support a military activity,
then the activity becomes a sacred endeavour, while the whole conlict
becomes more fanatical. Hans Küng once said that the “most fanatical and
cruellest political struggles are those that have been coloured, inspired, and
legitimized by religion” (Smock, 2002).
Traditionally the Serbian Orthodox Church has been closely linked with
politics and politicians and has never hesitated to publically call for political
actions against other groups. The head of SOC during the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, the late Patriarch Pavle, never distanced its Church neither
apologized for the genocide and aggression of Serbian regime towards the
non-Serb nation, especially towards Muslims in Bosnia, Croatians in Croatia
and Albanians in Kosovo. When Pavle was hospitalized before his death, then
the acting Patriarch bishop Amillohije Radoviq made a political statement:
“damned be the one who recognizes Kosovo,” referring to the countries
that were recognizing Kosovo as an independent state after the declaration
of independence in 2008.3 Pavle’s successor Patriarch Irinej in his inaugural
speech promised to “protect Kosovo and Metohia, because Serbia without
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Kosovo and the holy sites that are there, is without soul, mind and heart.”4
A more positive discourse towards Kosovo and inter-religious engagements
was recently seen from the new Bishop of Raska and Prizren Teodosije. During
the interfaith conference held in Peja on 24 May 2013 he spoke about the
importance of the dialogue not as a tool to merge different faiths but rather as
a mechanism to achieve better understanding of one another’s tradition and
teaching and deine areas in which religious groups can work together to offer
a signiicant contribution to the society. “We are deeply aware that the painful
events of the last decades and particularly the armed conlict intensiied the
atmosphere of animosity between the Serbian and Albanian communities in
Kosovo but we also believe that the power of forgiveness and reconciliation
is stronger and we have to ind the way out of the vicious circle of hatred and
prejudices. In this process, we religious leaders have a particularly important
role and responsibility in front of God our Creator and Benefactor,” said
Teodosije in his speech at the conference.5 He also stated that although the
conlict in Kosovo was not a religious conlict, religion has nevertheless played
a role in the culture of the people who misleadingly still see religious sites
as symbols of national ideologies rather than the house of God. “We must
change this perception and this is our primary task now,” said Teodosije.
Today the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys full protection by Kosovo
institution, and unlike the Islamic Community and other religious organization,
the status of the SOC was clearly regulated even before the declaration of
independence. The document upon which the new state of Kosovo was
formed, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement of the
Security Council, shortly know as the Ahtisaari Proposal, as it was designed by
the former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari, was designed to make Kosovo a
multi-ethnic society, giving non-Albanian communities substantial power and
tremendous inluence in all sectors. To avoid any religious favouritism, irst
and foremost, the Proposal demands that the Constitution of Kosovo afirms
that Kosovo has no oficial religion and that it shall be neutral on questions of
religious beliefs. Annex V of Ahtisaari Proposal, although entitled Religious
and Cultural Heritage, in all of its six pages speaks only about SOC. Here the
rights, privileges and immunities of the Church are deined, and guarantees
that Kosovo shall recognize the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo,
including monasteries, churches and other religious sites, as an integral part of
the Serbian Orthodox Church seated in Belgrade.
This document also guarantees the SOC that it will be free to receive
donations and other beneicial support from within or outside Kosovo, and
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the latter shall grant customs duty and tax privileges to the SOC, in addition
to those enjoyed by all religions in Kosovo, for economic activities of the
Church. The Proposal guarantees that all SOC monasteries, churches and
other religious sites will have security and physical protection by Kosovo
Police, while a selected number of these sites will have special protection
through the establishment of Protective Zones. Any industrial and commercial
construction in Protective Zones, such as structures taller than the monastery,
street constructions, shops, public gatherings and entertainment, etc., are
prohibited or they should seek the agreement of SOC. The territory of some
of these zones today is clearly regulated by speciic laws on such zones, while
some sites are limited up to one hundred meter area around their perimeter.
Indeed some of these monasteries and churches date from the fourteenthcentury, and there is no doubt that their existence enriches the cultural heritage
of Kosovo, only that neither the Proposal nor any other legislation protects
in a similar manner other religious sites, such as many mosques that were
built in the ifteenth-century by the Ottomans. To this date the legal status
of the rest religious organizations is not deined and the only law that speaks
about religion is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo, which is a
very general law that speaks about freedom to express one’s religion, freedom
of religious association, and while it repeats that there is no oficial religion
in Kosovo, it does not even mention any names of recognized religious
communities in Kosovo, not to speak of protection or economic activities.
Thus, of the ive largest religious communities that exist in Kosovo, namely
Islamic Community, the Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the
Protestant Church and the Jewish Community, only the status of the SOC is
properly regulated, while others are registered merely as non-governmental
organizations. Among them the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) seems
to suffer the most from the status quo, who has repeatedly asked from the state
institution to adopt a new law on religious communities that would eventually
deine their legal status as well as provide some sort of inancial support and
help ICK to retain many of its land that was originally given to the mosque as
waqf and then claimed by the state during the Serbian occupation.
Contributors to interfaith dialogue
Almost all interfaith dialogue conferences, roundtables and other initiatives
that brought together representatives of religious communities in Kosovo were
organized by foreign organization. Among the organizers are foreign embassies
serving in Kosovo, religious and non-religious international organizations
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like OSCE, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Gülen Movement, as well as local
governmental and non-governmental organizations. Among all contributors
to interfaith tolerance and dialogue in Kosovo, the Gülen Movement has been
very active and deserves a bit of attention. The “Gülen Movement”, whose
educational activities today reach over 130 countries,6 opened its irst ofice
in Kosovo in 2004. Today it is known as the Foundation for Education and
Culture “Atmosfera”. A movement inspired by the teachings of its founder,
M. Fethullah Gülen, a scholar who preaches for tolerance and dialogue among
civilizations, one of irst activities of the Foundation was to translate and
publish his books into Albanian language. So far, at least 16 books of M.
Fethullah Gülen have been published in Albanian, including his well-known
book “Towards a global civilization of love and tolerance,” which was received
very well from the Albanian intellectuals. Besides books, this foundation has
organized conferences on the necessity of interreligious and intercultural
dialogue for the world peace. In addition, the foundation has opened schools
and dormitories.
The “Gülen Movement” is a well respected organization, whose activities
show that it tries to eliminate intolerance, poverty and divisions among
civilizations, religions and ethnicities. The personality of Fethullah Gulen,
his ideas, philosophy and his contribution to education and interfaith dialogue
have been discussed among Albanian intellectuals, like in the 26 May 2007
conference on the “The necessity of interfaith and intercultural dialogue for
global peace” organized in Tirana. One of the speakers at this conference
Muhamed Pirraku talks about the contribution of Fethullah Gülen in
interfaith and intercultural dialogue, while quoting Gülen saying “Today the
interfaith dialogue is a necessity and the irst step towards its implementation
is forgetting the past, ignoring the disputable arguments and giving priority to
the common points, which are more than the disputes”.7 He even proposed
that the “Gülen Movement” and its contribution to interfaith and intercultural
dialogue become a part of university’s curricula as a study subject.
In 2008 another conference was organized on the contribution of
Fethullah Gulen. Zyhdi Dervishi, a renowned sociologist, in his presentation
acknowledged the contribution of Gülen and his call for dialogue among
religions, cultures and civilizations. Another presenter, Gjergji Sinani, supported
the idea of “Gülen Movement”, who as he said “strives to overcome enmity
and hatred and unite the society through tolerance and conciliation, because
only in this way the culture and knowledge can be in favor of the society.8
Another speaker, Kiril Temkov said that, “Gulen’s ideas could be fundamental
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against prejudices and the building tools for a peaceful thinking. This is what
we need today – a friendly hand to walk together and universal hope to restore
peace all around the globe”.9 These are just a few examples on how Albanian
intellectuals, although belonging to different religions, have found in Gulen’s
ideas the best alternative and the best example for enhancing interfaith dialogue
in this region. In general, Fethulla Gulen’s ideas have been widely discussed in
conferences, papers and articles particularly during the last decade.10
Another example of promoting interfaith dialogue in Kosovo is set by Tony
Blair Faith Foundation. He is a politician who knows well the history of the war
in Kosovo, and who is widely regarded as a hero in Kosovo for his contribution
both on NATO intervention and peace building process. During his visit in
Kosovo in 2012 the former Prime Minister not only spoke about the role of
dialogue in promoting peace and tolerance, he managed to establish concrete
programs of that nature too. To teach to the new generation dialogue and
negotiation skills his organization has agreed to launch two major programs
in Kosovo. First, a Memorandum of Understanding between his Foundation
and the Government of Kosovo for implementing the Foundation’s global
schools programme Face to Faith in Kosovo schools was signed between Mr.
Blair and Kosovo Minister of Education and second, a partnership with two
universities in Kosovo, the University of Prishtina and the American University
of Kosovo for joining the Faith and Globalization Initiative was established.
This partnership aims to offer university courses that will train current policy
makers and future leaders to examine the role that religion plays in areas where
there are political and religious tensions.
Another major contribution of Tony Blair Faith Foundation was the
organization of a major international interfaith conference in Peja in May
2013. This conference, which was also supported by the Kosovo Government
and some foreign embassies, brought together representatives of all Kosovo
religious communities as well as international scholars to discuss the role of
religion in a secular state that aims EU integration. Events like these bring high
level politicians to talk about the role of religion in society, and they attract
media attention too.
Concluding Remarks
The interfaith dialogue could have been successful if there had been a political
dialogue prior to it, because the essence of the problem in Kosovo is more
of a political, ethic, and social character, rather than a religious one. Kosovo
needs to keep the interreligious harmony which was inherited for centuries
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and in this aspect our religious communities should be very careful, in order
not to allow any escalation of any kind of interreligious intolerance against
any group. This is a not only a religious duty, but also one of the valuable
standards of any democratic and civilized society.
Religious communities could play an important role in restoring normal
life in Kosovo, if their religious leaders have good will and sincerity, and if
there is support from the local institutions. People of religions are more than
anyone else in close contacts with the ordinary people in all situations, in the
happy and in the sad situations of life, during daily prayers, and weekly and
yearly observances. Their words have signiicant meaning to the believers.
In fact, leaders of religions can do even more for the nation’s peace than
political leaders. Religious leaders often have more people listening to them.
Their presence and interests transcend all boundaries, political, national,
geographical, cultural and linguistic. As such, their inluence, and their power
and impact could be more than those of political leaders. Thus, it should be
their duty to communicate the message of tolerance and forgiveness.
Notes
1.
http://www.wcrp.org/news/press/ecrl-kosovo-03-05-08, (Accessed on
14.2.2009).
2. http://www.bislame.net, (Accessed on 13.2.2009).
3. Qemajl Morina, “Kisha ortodokse serbe dhe shqiptarët,” Edukata Islame, nr.
91/2010, Bashkesia Islame e Kosoves: Prishtine.
4. Ibid.
5. Bishop Teodosije’s statement at the Interfaith Conference in Peć, Kosovo, 24
May2013.
6. Muhamed Pirraku, “Fethulla Gulen, urelidhes i botes islame me perendimimin,”
p. 46.
7. Muhamed Pirraku, http://al.fgulen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task
=view&id=522&Itemid=26 (Accessed on 15.2.2009).
8. http://al.fgulen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=535&It
emid=26, (Accessed on 15.2.2009).
9. Ibid.
10. The author has conducted two studies on Gülen Movement in Kosovo. First
paper “The need for interfaith dialogue in Kosovo – the contribution of Gülen
Movement” was presented at: The ifth International Conference on Islam in
the Contemporary World, at Louisiana State University, 2009, USA. Second
study is now published, see: Jeton Mehmeti. The role of education in Kosovo
– the contribution of Gülen Movement, edited book: The Gulen Hizmet
Movement and its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of Altruistic Activism
in Contemporary Islam, Sophia Pandya and Nanacy Gallagher (Ed.), publisher
Brown Walker Press, Florida USA, 2012.
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References
Albright, M. (2006). The Mighty and the Almighty: Relections on America, God, and World
Affairs. USA: Harper.
Kamaruzaman, Kamar Oniah. (2010). Religion and Pluralistic Co-Existence. Kuala
Lumpur: IIUM Press.
International Crisis Group Balkans Report (2001). Religion in Kosovo. Pristina/Brussels.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2002). The Destruction
of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo, 1998-1999: a post war survey. The Hague.
United Nations Security Council (2007). Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Settlement
Status. New York.
Smock, R.D. (2002). Interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding. Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace.
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Waqf-Based Institutions in Kosovo
in the Post-Ottoman Period
Islam Hasani
Before proceeding with our concerned subject matter, it is necessary to
state some of the facts regarding Kosovo as it gives clearer picture to the
reader. Kosovo over 6 years ago declared its independence and up to date
is recognized by more than 100 countries. As a newly established country it
faces challenges in different sectors until it matures as an independent country.
Although Kosovo is declared as secular state according to Gallup surveys,
90% of Kosovo people claim religion plays an important part in their daily life.
The capital city of Kosovo is Prishtina, and its size is around 10,887
km². The climate is mainly continental with some Mediterranean and alpine
inluences, and summers are quite warm and winters cold. The temperature
extremes range from +35C in summer, to -20C in the winters. Kosovo has
an area of 1.1 million hectares and more than 53 % of it is land that can be
cultivated. Around 60% of the population lives in rural areas and the rest live
in urban areas.
Waqf as an Institution: The religion of Islam controls and regulates all
affairs of human beings. It provides comprehensive guidance for all affairs. It
covers economic issues as well, they are found in the main sources of Islam,
the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad peace be on him
and other sources of Shari’ah. The history of the Prophet Muhammad is very
rich in this regards and there are many lessons available for regulating socioeconomic life.
After the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) migrated from Mecca to Medina
one of the important events that happened was the establishment of
economic and inancial institutions. The Prophet, a respectable, truthful, and
experienced merchant who had visited Palestine, Yemen, and the Gulf region
for trade purposes, and who had endured the effects of a severe economic
embargo placed on him by the pagans of Mecca, was conscious of the
signiicance of the reality that socio-economic independence leads to political
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sovereignty.1 One of the ways for reaching socio-economic independence is
the empowerment of waqf institution.
With the passing of time the Islamic state expanded rapidly. It consisted of
Muslims from different races and places. With the expansion of the Islamic
state there was an increase in economic activities which furthered the need
for inance. There were various types of inance in Arab countries before
Islam. However, under Islamic rule, inance and inancial practice changed
in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Lending and borrowing of wealth
existed before, but it was practiced with the involvement of Riba (interest).
Interest is strongly prohibited and condemned by the Qur’an.2 As the relevant
Qur’anic verse indicated, those who had practiced interest in the past were
allowed to keep what they had earned before, but they were not allowed to
continue with charging interest.
After the death of the Prophet (PBUH) early Muslims were faced with
economic situations that did not exist at the time of the Prophet. Originating
from the basis of Islamic teachings, Islamic economic thought started
developing as scholars were forced to ind solutions for new problems. Early
Caliphs with the help of fuqaha’ (Muslim jurists) established some basic
principles of large scale state administration.3
Islamic scholars paved the way to vast business opportunities and
international trade. The mainstream of Islamic economy was trade and this
was insistently pursued during the irst 800 years of its commencement. A
combination of several economic and political factors, including the ability
to mobilize adequate resources, was responsible for the increased prosperity
of the Islamic world. These factors provided a great boost to international
trade. By the middle ages, international inancial network had been established
supporting trade between Muslim communities. This system was highly
developed of the time, and continued to be so until the banking system was
introduced by the West in the 16th century.4
Kosovo and other parts of Balkans during the time they were part of the
Ottoman Empire from 15th century until beginning of 20th century have had
very organized educational and inancial institutions. Knowing the importance
of the economic development the Ottomans developed all aspects of the
economy. In the inancial sphere, they established Bayt al-Mal (treasury house).
The inance of the Islamic state at that time was through local treasury houses
and the central treasury house. The local treasury houses were established
in every province of the Islamic state and the central treasury house was
established in state’s capital. 5
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Another important Islamic institution which is well known in the Islamic
civilization is the voluntary institution called Waqf, which was established by
the Prophet Peace be on him himself in the light of Qur’anic teachings for the
support of the general welfare, and which exists in all Muslim countries. There
was a difference in the organization of funds from waqf and from baitul-mal,
when Companions of the Prophet Peace be on him voluntarily offered their
properties for the public use, he did not take it in the name of the baitul-mal
but under the name of waqf. During the Ottoman time this institution was
very much alive and played an important role for the general welfare of the
Muslims of Kosovo.6 The Ottomans developed very much these institutions
in all countries they were present. In particular they had very sophisticated
the system of taxation and inancial system. There have been investment and
other transactions done under the baitul-mal and waqf institutions during that
time.7 They facilitated investment and trade besides serving the purpose they
were initially established.8
This continued to be the case with Kosovo as well until 1912 when Ottomans
started withdrawing from Balkans and Muslims were left under the regime
of the kingdom of Serbia-Montenegro. When Serbo-Montenegrians came to
power they considered Muslims as betrayers for accepting Islam and started
all sorts of genocide on the Muslim population for the reason of reverting
them back to Christianity.9 On the economic aspect they started coniscating
their properties, many waqf places and Islamic community properties as well
as private properties belonging to religious people were taken by force and
turned into public places which were under the state control. Some mosques
and Madrasahs which were considered property of Islamic community built
in the cities were turned into army basis, or police station and even prison and
some others who were built in the villages were turned into horse farms and
depot for state for army ammunition.10
From the facts mentioned, it is obvious that the baitul-mal as a inancial
institution in Kosovo during the communist regime did not function at all.
The same fate goes with waqf institutions, not only people stopped endowing
into these places but most of them that were endowed earlier did not survive
the terror caused by the Yugoslavian and Serbian regime. However, after the
declaration of independence by Kosovo many are expecting that the position
of religion and religious institutions would change for better but up to date
nothing has been done in regards to getting back those waqf properties that
were coniscated before. According to the politicians and especially the ruling
party Kosovo is a new country and many things have taken place and this is
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the process that cannot be solved in a short period.
Waqf-Based Institutions in Kosovo: Another important Islamic institution
which is well known in the Islamic civilization is the voluntary institution of
waqf, which was established by the Prophet (peace be upon him). The waqf
continues to be an important institution in all Muslim countries: they take the
form of document records of endowments of cash, land, water-wells, books,
buildings, etc. Many waqf documents that are preserved in private and public
collections posses high artistic qualities; they display high quality calligraphy,
illumination and other decorative elements.11
The institution of waqf has played very important role in the Islamic society.
Waqf has had a great impact in the life of Muslims and Islam and has been
studied from different perspectives, like: religious, moral, economic, politic
and social perspective. Ottomans have showed great interest and respect to
follow the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in serving
the Ummah by taking care for the wellbeing of the people. Kosovo, being
part of the Ottoman Empire since 14th century has followed Ottomans in this
regard. For pure religions reasons waqf have been dedicated to humans and
there are waqf dedicated for animals as well. Muslims of Kosovo not only have
endowed waqf in Kosovo territory but they have contributed to building waqf
properties throughout Ottoman Empire territory.
Types of waqf established in Kosovo: There have been a good number of
waqf established in Kosovo territory which seems not easy to cover all of
them and divide them in groups based on their dedication and function. The
following can be categorized based of their function:12
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Building and maintenance of the Mosques, Musala, tekke and tombs;
Madrasahs and other scientiic and research institutions;
Shelter services, hans, hamams and health buildings;
Libraries, bookshops, and the like;
Wells, water systems, fountains:
Public kitchens, kinder gardens and nurseries:
Help for widows and needy people;
Food and clothes for the students of the Madrasah;
Funeral services of the poor people;
Land
From the list of the types of waqf can be shown that it has played a very
important role into the life of Kosovo Muslims, in religious aspect as well as
cultural, social and humanitarian aspect.
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Waqf has played very important role in the formation and development of
many cities and other dwellings in the territory of Kosovo. In urban places
there are more waqaf properties that have dedicated for special purposes.
Today we can ind waqf institutions that are named according to the person
who has endowed it or according to the purpose it has been dedicated.
Nowadays, Islamic Community of Kosovo, the highest religious organ of the
country, beneits from these kinds of waqf that have been endowed long ago for
the purpose of helping the religious life in Kosovo and for the maintenance of
the mosques and well being of religious leaders. Waqf in other words were the
only means for keeping alive Islam and Muslims in the territory of Kosovo.
Islamic Community of Kosovo headed by Grand Mufti of Kosovo is the
only body that is responsible for organizing religious life in the country. It
takes care of different waqf properties that have survived from the communist
regime. Current challenge for Islamic community is to process procedures for
getting back some properties coniscated earlier and there is enough evidence
for the ownership of them by Islamic Community. Religious life in Kosovo is
organized well, Islamic community is spread throughout the country, in every
city or town there is Islamic council for organizing religious life locally and
all of them report to the Grand Mufti’s ofice that is located at the capital
city. There are records available for many waqaf properties in Kosovo that
were coniscated by the then regime some records still exist but some were
destroyed.13
Currently there are nearly 80014 religious objects in the territory of Kosovo
that function under the jurisdiction and care of the Islamic Community of
Kosovo:
713 Mosques
13 Masjids
5 Mektebe
5 Madrasahs (3 for boys and 2 for girls)
1 Faculty of Islamic Studies
1 Madrasah for Hifz (Tahizul Qur’an)
After the end of war in Kosovo in 1999, 195 new mosques have been
built. Also 212 out of 218 of the mosques that were destroyed during the
war have been reconstructed, 6 of them have yet to start building in the same
place because reconstruction of them is not possible due to the level of the
demolition caused by the Serbs.
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There is quite good number of shops15 that were left by people as waqf for
the purpose of inancing mosques activities. Some of them are still in function
and in some places are considered as the only economic source for the survival
of mosques activities. Also there parts of land that have been endowed to
serve as an asset to the mosque, there are cases that mosques were built in
such land and also some were used for giving them with rent and the rental
income was used for the dedicated purpose.
Islamic community of Kosovo has survived economically from donations
from people that were organized as a yearly membership for every person and
this was on voluntarily basis because they had no power to make everybody
pay. The other income was the rental income from these waqaf properties.
Islamic Community of Kosovo was never inanced by the state so they had to
work very hard for little income in order to survive, even today is not inanced.
Although Kosovo is declared as a secular state and it has bitter history in the
past under communist regime that fought religion in all aspects a worldwide
survey published this year puts Kosovo alongside countries that consider
religion to be relevant for its people. The list is topped by Bangladesh, Niger,
Indonesia and Malawi. According to Gallup, 90% of Kosovo people claim
religion plays an important part in their daily life.
In conclusion, we can agree that, Kosovo has passed through hard times
after the withdrawal of Ottomans from Balkans. The communist regime that
dominated in the twentieth century was against everything religious and in
particular Islamic. Besides passing through this bitter history there is great
lesson to be remembered that things cannot be taken for granted and this
made people more active in this aspect.
On the other side, the survival of religious institutions was very dificult
after the withdrawal of Ottomans and it took some time to reorganize and
ind a way to function without help of the government. The position of
baitul-mal and waqf institutions was in a very bad shape; many were coniscated
and destroyed making it even harder for religious institutions to function.
Nowadays Islamic Community of Kosovo is more active and religious life
is being better organized and the institution of waqf is gradually taking the
place it deserves. There is a lot to be done in this regard but we are very
optimistic that better days are coming for Islamic Community of Kosovo and
its institutions.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Cengiz Kallek (1995), “Socio-Politico-Economic Sovereignty and the Market of
Medina”, Journal of Islamic Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2, IIUM Press, pp. 2-3.
Al Baqarah: 275.
Ahmed Abdel-Fattah El-Ashker, (1987) The Islamic Business Enterprise, London:
Croom Helm, pp. 15-19.
Nik Norzrul Thani, (2003) “Using Gold in International Trade Settlements: The
Legal and Regulatory Issues” Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. International Conference on
Gold in International Trade: Strategic Positioning in Global Monetary System.
Abdul Azim Islahi, (1996) op. cit., pp. 372.
Justin McCarthy (1997), The Ottoman Turks – An introductory History to 1923,
London: Longman, p. 8.
Murat Cizakca (1996), A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships The Islamic
Word and Europe, with Speciic to the Ottoman Archives, Leiden: E.J. Brill, p. 131.
Halil Inalcik (1993), The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays
on Economy and Society, vol. 9. Bloomington: Indiana University English Studies, p.
223.
Norman Cigar, (2003), Roli i Orientalisteve Serbe per Justiikimn e Gjenocidit ndaj
Muslimaneve ne Ballkan (The Role of Serbian Orientalists in Justiication of
Genocide Against Muslims of the Balkans) trans. Xhabir Hamiti, Prishtine.
Logos-A, pp. 27-29.
Jusuf Osmani (1992), “Rezistenca e Kuadrit dhe e Institucioneve Fetare Kunder
Reformes Agrare dhe Kolonizimit ne Kosove Midis dy Lyfterave Boterore”, (The
Resistance of Religious Staffs and Institutions Against the Agrarian Reform and
Colonization in Kosovo Between the two World Wars) International Seminar Feja
Kutura dhe Tradita Islame Nder Shqiptaret October 15-17 1992. Held in Prishtina.
pp. 481-483.
Ibid.
Sadik Mehmeti, (2009) “Roli i Vakeit ne Perhapjen e Kultures dhe Arsimimit
Islam ne Vendin Tone” (The role of Waqf in Spreading Islamic Culture and
Education in our Country) Takvim – Kalendar 2009, p. 128.
Sadik Mehmeti, “Veshtrim Tri Vakefnameve Origjinale (1608) te Mehmed Pashe
Kacanikliut,” Edukata Islame No. 89, 2009, p. 92.
Oficial statistics published by the ofice of the Grand Mufti of Kosovo on
December 2010.
Around 500 in the whole territory of Kosovo.
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Ferit Vokopola’s Religious and National
Contribution for the Albanian Cause
Islam Islami
Introduction
Ferit Vokopola, not only made his name as an Albanian Muslim devoted
patriot, but also as a diplomat, lawyer and publicist, who gave valuable ideas in
the ield of journalism. Vokopola will remain one of the outstanding Muslims
of the Albanian national igures, and inspirer for the Albanian cause.1 His
contribution is multi-dimensional; he was a believer, patriot, philosopher,
essayist, poet; he wrote and translated poetry, and was a Sui sheikh. His
writings have been published mainly in the magazine Zani i Naltë [“Highest
Voice”], published in Tirana from October 1923 till April 1939, while from
1939 to 1944, he wrote for monthly religious magazine Kultura Islame [“Islamic
Culture”] published by the Albanian Islamic Community in Tirana.2
Ferit Vokopola was born in Berat on 18 August 1887, but was originally
from Vokopola which was an important center of religious and socio-cultural
milieu and a connecting point between the cities of Berat and Skrapar. At the
same time, Vokopola was an important centre of the well-known Albanian
Patriotic Movement. Although Vokopola’s family settled in Berat in the early
19th century, it did not cut the ties with the place of origin.3
In 1938, Vokopola with his exhausted efforts managed to unify the four
Sui sects namely Sa’adi, Rifa-i, Kadiri and Tijani,4 which came together and
formed their own organization called “Divine Light” in Tirana.
This organization, besides the implementation of Islamic rules and
obligations, aimed at establishing and developing educational and spiritual
purity. A publication of a newly initiated magazine namely Njeriu [“The
Human”] in July 1942 in Tirana, where it focused in expressing above mentioned
organization’s ideas and initiatives in the ields of religion, literature, culture
and spirituality. In the following section, we will try to elaborate further on this
latest magazine by looking at the contents of it.
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Magazine of “The Human”
The editorial board of “The Human” magazine deined the essence of
theoretical mysticism, and this was indicated in the irst issue of the magazine:
“In the beginning, mysticism reached the level of devotion and purity, and
later on was illuminated with other spiritual virtues such as humility, surrender,
love, benevolence, etc. and at the end followed the self-denial and total
devotion towards God. Thus mysticism became a treasure of noble virtues.”5
Based on the content analysis and appearance of religious-cultural magazine
‘The Human’, one can draw certain information and results, which would
somehow contribute to the Albanian historiography with high signiicance of
the culture and religious spirit.
The ‘Human’ magazine was published beginning from July 1942 until
September 1944. Vokopola drastically turned the focus of magazine into
Islamic Mysticism (Tasawwuf) which managed to achieve its aims and
recognition from all others.
Vokopola with his selective and well articulated manuscripts for the
magazine explained in details the meaning of life from different perspectives
such as philosophical, historical, moral, social, scientiic and sentimental
signiicance. But above all, he had set the task of writing on important human
mystical life following the “twelve thousand years” old history with extensive
problematic assertions and denials.
Religious Contribution
Ferit Vokopola’s religious contribution is multi-dimensional, where he
essentially focuses on spirituality namely Suism as it deals with internal
improvement of man. The man is created from the body and soul, in which
both taken together have a particular importance to the existence of human
being. In Vokopola’s writings one can observe the revival of spirituality in
people and religious persons in particular. In the second issue of the magazine,
he wrote the article “In the Brink of Mysteries,” where he attempts to ind
the divine strength that create the human structure in a beautiful image, and
inspired him with excellent spirit.6 In this article, he tries to deine general
analytical thoughts and studies by looking at the stages of history of mysticism
dating back to the old Egyptian civilizations and comparing with the following
other civilizations.
In this regard, Vokopola related the discovery of truth with the majestic
spirit/soul and body that weighs the secrecy of the beginnings and the ends.
Although his intended opinions was not meant to be understood by all the folks
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of people except the educated.. According to him, the old Egyptians before
everyone comprehended this impossibility, Isis, which lied before the gate of
the little chapel under the ground, held on its knees a closed book; its face
was covered with a veil and under its magic bed carried a description reading:
“No man on earth has lifted my cheesecloth!”7 Despite this, he indicates
that Brahma of India, Hermes of Egypt, Pythagoras of Plato, and all the
eminent people tried to uncover the mystical body of Isis in their beliefs and
principles. By willing to serve the spiritual development of the human being
to the highest divine spheres, they divided these fragments into two types:
esoteric and exoteric treatments. In a way that the most important problems
are learned from erudite people, and those who have an extraordinary spiritual
talent.
Ferit Vokopola’s deinitions to Tasawwuf relected also in his stands as a
Sui master. The Islamic Tasawwuf derived from the Qur’anic verses, Hadiths
of the Prophet Muhammad and interpretations of the traditional of scholars
whose existential wisdom was also referred as Islamic mysticism. In principle,
Tasawwuf aims to provide general spiritual tradition of Ali, the cousin of the
Prophet Muhammad. As Vokopola wrote, the wise men of the time Ali said
that in order to gain supremacy over the lust (nafs), one should move towards
physical, moral and mental integration. Such transformation can be done only
by exercising the mind, heart and energy through the masters (shaykh), in order
to waken up the feelings of the soul. With such effort and action as well as
with mediation of the real religious leader (shaykh), one can strengthen the
relationship with the hidden powers of the universe.
In the paper “Where does humanity go?,” Vokopola elaborates on the issues
related to disputes and divisions, whose sources are very deep and he judges
impartially on these complicated problems. He believes that the propulsive
causes were born along with the animal element inside the human nature.8
As an argument for this view, he refers to the irst human tragedy, the murder
of Cain (Qaabil) by Abel (Habil). Here, he mentions two main factors as the
cause of this progress: the mind and soul, which are two inseparable powers
in the ield of civilizing developments.
Furthermore, in the paper “Why Two Souls Struggle?,” he presents each
side of this world, every ield of human activity, the efforts of two souls
struggling with one another, with an ardour increasing each day and which
attract man towards meaninglessness of moment as a gift for a dubious future.
These two souls, not coming closer to each other, are comprised of old
and new mentality, of two different incomprehensible worlds, and therefore
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can never agree without avoiding the targets of the extremity, and without
being subject to real reasoning required by the reality of the common good.
The author attacks the egoist feelings that prevails the opinion of a constant
disruption, which cannot fully develop the frozen souls for the common good,
the supreme goal, and for the non-susceptible mentality laming eternally
inside the pure, conscious people with remarkable mind for high worldly
realizations.9
Vokopola through allegory which is recognized as the language of Tasawwuf
tries to explain the human world, being shaken between different systems of
capitalism, rationalism and liberalism. He tries to defend esoteric and exoteric
knowledge as a legacy of oriental civilization, with wisdom of their spirit by
trying to introduce into the empty hearts of human society the high feelings of
a real love as well as the effort to halt the ardour of the unconstrained power
of materialism, which aims at modern civilization. Driven by altruistic feelings
strikes the self-consent, the greedy self-proit which bow to the appealing lusts
of instant entertainment, regardless that every new thing originates from the
depths of old life, and that by maintaining this spirit, Vokopola believes that
the appearance of civilization can be transformed. He concludes the article
with a hope that the severe sufferings and full of sacriice will be compelling
lessons for the establishment of a fair peace, where the two souls struggle only
for this sacred purpose.
Vokopola’s religious contribution is also seen in other activities of his life,
when in 1920s there were possibilities to establish an Islamic high school with
modern physiognomy. Initiators of this idea and struggle were recognised
personalities of Albanian politics during those years. The group of initiators
was consisted of Haiz Vehbi Dibra, Senator Sali Vuciterni, Ferit Vokopla and
Qamil Bala.
The established Madrasah was aimed at preparing knowledgeable religious
leaders, equipped with high knowledge of religious, philosophical and scientiic
achievements within the domain of contemporary education.
Albanians produced many erudite scholars of the Qur’anic Sciences and
Exegesis of the Qur’an (Tafsir). Among the irst who studied the Quran at the
end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were Ferit Vokopla,
Haiz Ali Korca, and Vehbi Dibra. These scholars were undoubtedly the
distinguished during the past two centuries.
The Communist regime, the government of Enver Hoxha, the Dictator,
imprisoned Vokopola. However, while in prison, he neither fell into despair,
nor pessimism. During the imprisonment, he was often quoted saying: “I am
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neither pessimistic nor opportunist, but optimistic.” And he proved to be
right, because the opportunity comes only with hard work and dedication of
creative intelligence to create values of society and the nation.
National Contribution
Ferit Vokopola was a patriot and idealist serving the independent state of
Albania as well as the realization of independence and accomplishment of
the old Albanian dream. One can observe this in his opinion towards Ismail
Qemali and delegates of the Congress of Vlore.10
In his article: “I Met Him!,” he dedicated this piece of writing to the
establishment of an independent Albanian state as a fundamental political
premise for developmental capacity of all Albanians. Vokopola on the occasion
of Qemali’s hundred centenary,11 he evokes memories from key moments
of his meeting with Ismail Qemali. He reveals some meetings with him, but
points out the decisive moment for Albania, much different than other times,
which expression at such moments were wisdom and exemplary love for all.
The draft of the Declaration of Independence was published in the
newspaper Revival of Albania, a body of the Provisional Government of Vlora
under the auspices of the youngest signatory of the Independence Act, where
Ferit Vokopola was at the age of 25. During the years 1920-1928, he was
elected as Deputy of Vlora, and during the years 1928–1939 he was a Deputy
of Berat. At this time, in co-operation with Sali Vuciterni and the others,
he becomes one of the pioneering organizers for the establishment of the
Albanian Muslim Community, and provided a signiicant contribution for the
establishing a Madrasah (Islamic high school) in Tirana.
Between the years of 1927-1928, he served as the Minister of Agriculture
in the Albanian government.
With his deep knowledge and conviction to the religion of Islam, he was
dedicated himself to the translation of the Qur’an, in which he completed in ten
years. When he was released from prison, he found an awkward environment
which was brought by the communist regime, freedom of speech and thought
was banned, and opponents were hostile toward religion.
In such circumstances, being a speaker of oriental languages, he was offered
the associate position at the Institute of History, where he served as an
interpreter of historical and archival documents from the Ottoman-Turkish
language until he passed away in 1969. He is remembered among Albanian
Muslims to be a proliic scholar, multi-lingual, activist, and revivalist of Sui
intellectual tradition in Albanian speaking milieu.
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Notes
1.
Archive of the Institute of History (AIH), Tirana; Ferit Vokopola Fund, Historical
Studies and Opinions, Albanian Huruis, Their Origin and Doctrine, dos. A-III.233.
2. Albanian National Library, “Zani i Naltë” magazine, October 1923-April 1939,
“Kultura Islame” 1939-1944.
3. Yvejsi M, “Ferid Mustafa Vokopola” 1887-1969, www.zemrashqiptare.net (Accessed
on 06.07.2014).
4. AIH Tirana, Necip Alpan Fund, “Unknown Aspects of Albania,” Dos.AV.13, p.12.
5. “Deinition of Mysticim in Islam,” “The Human” Magazine, Vol. 1, July 1942,
Tirana, p.7.
6. Ferit Vokopola, “In the Edge of Mysteries,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana,
September-October issue 1942.
7. Ibid.
8. Ferit Vokopola, “Where Does Humanity Go?”, The Human Magazine, Vol. 9,
Tirana, March 1943-XXI, p. 1.
9. Ferit Vokopola, “Why Two Souls Struggle,” The Human Magazine, Vol. 12, Tirana,
June 1943-XXI, p. 1.
10. Out of total 84 Albanian delegates at the Congress of Vlora, only 41 arrived
in Vlora and proclaimed indpendence of Albania. Among the delegates were
also Don Nikol Kacorri, Abdyl Aziz, Rexhep Mitrovica, Dhimiter Tutulani, Abdi
Toptani, Mid-hat Frasheri, Qemal Elbasani, Luigj Gurakuqi, Bedri Pejani, Nebi
Sefa, etc.
11. Ferit Vokopola, “Hoisting the National Flag,” The Human Magazine, November
1942, p. 4.
References
Archive of the Institute of History (AIH), Tirana; Ferit Vokopola Fund, Historical
Studies and Opinions, Albanian Huruis, Their Origin and Doctrine, dos.A-III.233.
AIH Tirana; Necip Alpan Fund, “Albania in so far unknown aspects” dos.AV.13, p. 12
Albanian National Library, Zani i Naltë, October 1923-April 1939.
Albanian National Library, Kultura Islame, 1939-1944.
Vokopola, Ferit, “Deinition of Mysticim in Islam,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, Vol.1,
July 1942.
Vokopola, F. “In the Edge of Mysteries,” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, SeptemberOctober, 1942.
Vokopola, F. “Hoisting the National Flag” in The Human Magazine, Tirana, November
1942.
Vokopola, F. “Why Two Souls Struggle,” in The Human Magazine, Vol. 12, Tirana, June
1943.
Vokopola, F. “Where Does Humanity Go”, in The Human Magazine, Vol .9, Tirana, March
1943.
Vokopola, F. “Importance of the Point in Mysticm and Atomisim of Mysticism,” in
The Human Magazine, Vol.7, Tirana, February 1943.
Yvejsi, M. “Ferid Mustafa Vokopola” 1887-1969, www.zemrashqiptare.net (Accessed
date 06.07.2014).
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Religious Diversity and Albanians
Qani Nesimi
Globalization as social, political, economic and cultural process is found in
all stages of human kind history. In different periods the meaning of the
word globalization, like any other term in different times and environments
has changed, even in the absence of this term, semantically is manifested in
various forms of understanding. Therefore, we can mention the case of the
Qabil (Cain) and Habil (Able), who wanted to dominate even Allah with his
thoughts and desires, i.e. Allah to be under the inluence of his thoughts and
desires. Also, as another important historical moments, we might mention the
tendency of Alexander the Great for complete Hellenization of the World,
intention of the Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman empire for cultural and
religious uniication, the tendency of the Buddhist Chandragupta Maurya, or
different tendencies for dominance in Mediterranean, India, Asia and Persia,
as it is the case with St. Paul. Also here we should mention the tendency for
colonial globalization of Portuguese, Spaniards and British, like the trips of
Christopher Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and etc.1
Islam as original, divine and universal religion does not recognizes “we” and
“them”, or centre and periphery, a single place, or only East or only West, as it
is the case with dominant culture in the globalisation process, which says that
the West and North America are Centre of the World, while the rest of the
regions are just e periphery of this main world power. The Islam declares: “To
Allah belongs the East and the West. Wherever you turn there is the presence
of God...”2 The centre of spiritual cosmology is the system of collective
beliefs and values, which do not recognize any material or geographical
boundary.3 For instance we can mention the case of Tarik ibn Zeyad, when he
reaches in Spain, he burned the ships because he was convinced that he did
not step down on foreign land but the whole land belongs to mighty Allah,
the divine speech of Hz. Omer in the steps of church and not inside of the
church, it is of a great importance that Muslims whenever they went they
have not destroyed the native/local culture nor they have rubbed it, but they
have helped, developed or restarted the culture in that country, or they have
developed a good tradition in that country.
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Another aspect of critical approach of Islam toward globalisation is the
failure to give advantage to some individuals over others, namely Islam denies
the theory that a group of people or individuals, classes or nations should rule
with other people, some are more privileged in comparison to others. As well
denies the mission of white people, the chosen nation, as it is the case with the
German nation, Hebraism, Christianity, Castes System in Hinduism, etc. With
this falls down the theory the globalization of economics, politics and local
culture. In the holy Qur’an is stated:
O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and
made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed,
the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of
you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.4
Albanians belong to two major universal religions, Islam and Christianity.
Multiple data for material and spiritual culture of the Albanian people testify
that two-religious afiliation of Albanians (Christians and Muslims), makes
richer and more complicate their national identity. There is no doubt that
three-religious afiliation has its negative side, which makes vulnerable the
Albanian national identity, if one of these religions would have been in favour
of political and social institutions. Another moment that negatively affects and
contributes to the decay of religious and national harmony is over-stressing
and over-distinguishing the religious feelings. For this reason the Albanian
renaissance intellectuals will do intellectual battle to reduce over-stressed
awareness at the natural level of awareness for religion. Anti-clerical approach
of the Albanian renaissance intellectuals is not anti-religious approach, because
majority of them were religious and believers, without taking in consideration
their religion afiliation. In fact, their opposition was concentrated against
over-stressing religious consciousness, which impede the development and
consolidation of national consciousness, which had confusing inluence in
the national integration process and spiritual faith Albanian people. Even the
famous saying of Vaso Pasha, “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”,
should not be understood as an anti-religious or unfaithfulness approach, but
it must be understood within the time frames and semantic aspect when he
lived, but always taking into account the question to which this statement is
referred to.5
The famous saying “Fe e Shqyptarit asht Shqyptaria - The Religion of the
Albanians is Albanianism”, taking into account the political and expansionist
circumstances that dominated at that time on the Balkan Peninsula, does not
represent anti-religious or unfaithfulness approach. The author in the above
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mentioned verses wants to stress out those feelings against disruption and
against disputes. Thus, the author before coming to his famous saying “The
Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism”, he is says the following verses:
“...Albanians! We are killing among brothers/in hundred bands we are divided;...” “a
foreigner comes and resides at your home/toa shamed you with your wives and sisters;
for that amount of money that you will earn/do not forget the word (besa) that you have
given to your ancestors..”, “let’s die as our ancestors did/to not be ashamed in front of
God”(Shqyptarë! Me vllazën jeni tu evram/dhe më një qind çeta jeni shpërndamë;...”, “...
vjennjeriihuej, jurrinëvotër/me juturpnue, me grue, me motër; edhepërsa para që do tëitoni/
besën e t’parëvet’gjithë e harroni...”, “...Të desim si burr at që diqnemotit/e të mos ma
rohna përpara Zotit”).6
In coloration to the Vaso’s verses, academician Krasniqi says: “the verses
of Vaso Pashë Shkodrani “The Religion of the Albanians is Albanianism,” are
not an expression of romantic patriotism of the 19th century, but inding of
the truth, evidence of high national awareness. Many people misunderstand
these verses, as an atheist, or anti-religious expression. The poet was a catholic
believer and patriot, he was not against religion, but he supported the idea that
Albanians, like other nations over everything should put the national interest,
we should love our nation with a love set in the degree of love for religion and
religion should not be in any way element of divisions between the Albanians,
but the only condition for the existence the Albanian nation.”7
The communist ideology, i.e., Enver Hoxha’s ideology, based on anti-religious
principal, according to Feraj, not that only banned everything religious, but
even nationalist idea that are expressed to keep alive the strong national and
tolerant spirit of Albanians, has tried to present as atheist and anti-religious
approach, in relation to Pashko Vasës’s verses “The Religion of the Albanians
is Albanianism”, it does not come the Enver Hoxha’s atheism. Feraj says that
in the Vasës’s verses is expressed the need to put the national identity over the
religious identity. This requirement is found in the majority of nations and
other people and is not something particular only for the Albanians. However
the requirement for hierarchy of identities, to set national identities over the
religious identity and atheism it does not appears logically. Secondly in the
Vasës’s verses is expressed the joint need for the Albanian nationalism in multireligious environment, however even the need for tolerance does not results
with atheism.8 While Gazmend Shpuzain relation to the Vasos’s poem, says
this poem does not has anti-religious content and neither is against religious
ceremonies or against faith.9
So, the process of globalisation by benign an opportunity for many positive
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elements, same time serves as opportunity for bad elements in this process.
Nowadays, in the Albanian society, according to Rexhep Qosja, globalization
has given to a phenomenon, which cannot be positive even for those that deal
with this process. This phenomenon is called over-distinguishing the religious
awareness. Over-distinguishing of religious awareness among Albanians
is done in different manners, over-distinguishing of the religious catholic
awareness is supported now for several years by different political and state
institutions in Kosovo and Albania, obviously under the inluence of some
religious institutions of foreign states, especially through some foreign media,
which continue to be present in Balkans as “lobby of Barbarian Orient” and
as “lower category of civilization”. But what makes this situation harder is
participation of some intellectuals and creators form various ields of arts
and sciences in e over-distinguishing the religious awareness, especially those
intellectuals who write novels in Albanian.10
In some intellectual circles, having discussed the issue of Islamic
fundamentalism, say that the same does not exist among the Albanians, in
this case they also try to cover that in the Albanian identity main important
factor is Islamic culture and civilization. Also, by denying the presence
and importance of Islamic culture and civilization in shaping the Albanian
identity, they try to do through the question of Islam to which belong the
majority of Albanians is the obstacle of the integration of Albanians, namely
integration of Albania and Kosovo, into the European Union. The idea if
the Albanians would have belonged only to western civilization, they would
not have been divided in several countries and today they would have been
part of the big European family, this is only supposition. Because in actual
circumstances that Albanians are in the Balkans, is result of many political
and economic circumstances, many individual and group interests that have
happened during the history of Balkans and beyond. For instance we can
mention the communist regime of EnverHoxha. This is proven with the postcommunist period and putting down the eastern communist ideology and the
appearance of political and cultural pluralism in Balkans. For instance here we
can mention the NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
Signing of the accession agreement for EU membership with Turkey, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia and others. Therefore nowadays if
you say that the spiritual identity of Albanians is only the Christian identity,
it means to become religious propagandist or religious politician that is not
saying the truth and does not contributes to harmonious coexistence of the
three religions in the lives of Albanians.
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Among Albanian intellectual community there are two poles divided based
on their opinion about their religious identity. At one pole are those who think
that the Albanians should return to their religious origins, namely the decline
of Christianity, more speciically to return to their Catholic Christian routs. In
this pole belong Ismail Kadare, Aurel Plasari, Piro Misha etc. Meanwhile in
the other pole stand those who think that the religious identity of Albanians is
consisting by Islam and Christianity. In this pole are the Albanian intellectuals
Rexhep Qosja, Muhamedin Kullashi, Shkëlzen Maliqi etc., it should be clear
that members of the second pole are not supporters of Islam and opponents
of the Christianity. These are personalities that do analyses of the actual
Albanian issue concerning the Albanian identity. But being a sympathizer of
one religion is something else.
Eqrem beu Vlora shows another way of identiication of Albanians.
According to him, Albanians were divided into two groups. In the irst group
were those that were saying “tyrk elhamdulil-lah” (Turks, Lord protect us) and
“gjaurë” (orthodox and catholic Albanians). In this case the expression “tyrk
elhamdulil-lah” should not be taken in its narrow sense, that is should not
be considered as ethnic afiliation. So, with this statement Albanians did not
wanted to become or declare themselves as Turks, but this is an expression
that wants to minimize the Albanian Islamic religious afiliation, which
was spread by anti-Albanian and anti-ottoman policies lead by priests and
politicians of Orthodox faith, namely the Greeks. At that time (19th and 20th
century) anti-Albanian policies were presenting an effort that automatically
if you are a Muslim you are Turkish, which is not true at all. The expression
used by Albanians “tyrk elhamdulil-lah” it was not used to show their ethnic
background or to declare themselves as Turkish but to show their religious
afiliation. Even nowadays there are old Albanians, if you ask about their
religious afiliation would say “jam tyrk elhamdulil-lah”, and s/he speaks, writes
and communicates in Albanian and they are ready to sacriices everything
about the Albanian culture. While the expression “turko alvanoi” (TurkishAlbanians), was used by the Orthodox Greek policy, which is a real paradox, it
remains among one of the anti-Albanian methods used by the policies of the
time in order to achieve their goals. Eqrem Beu continues by saying: ‘in the
history and literature of the Balkans nations, the motive of persecution and
atrocities of Muslim Albanians against the Christian Albanians was drawn and
coloured with hundreds of colours, was described, wept and sung in hundreds
of ways. A continuous propaganda during last century had cultivated among
people of the Balkans a deep hate against Turks and Albanians, a hate that was
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materialized in the most monstrous crimes during and after First World War.
“My intention is not to defend either Turks or Albanians, but for the sake of
truth I want to stress out this fact: that in these 4-5 years period Greeks, Serbs,
Montenegrins, Bulgarians, committed that much crime against Albanians that
was not done against them for 4 to 5 centuries.”11
There is no social identity which could say that is completely original and
authentic identity. Every identity is a result of historical and social identity.
Particularly there is no social identity which is simple, uniform intermediate.
All identities, even individual identities are structured and complex identities.
Exclusion from this category do only those most primitive social groups, that
their development is at a tribe level, where their lives are held in complete
isolation, without contact and interactions with other groups and societies. Until
recently, such groups are existing in the jungles of Africa and South America.
Albanians, surprisingly, have created one of the most complex national
identities in the region and possibly on the planet. Albanian lands divided by
mountains and valleys in dozens of regions, where communication between
them has been very dificult, despite invasions, splits and corrugation, they
have remained up to date a compact land inhabited by Albanian-population.
In the lands where they live, irrespective of country and their status, Albanians
are majority. They are majority in Kosovo; in the part of Macedonia where
they live, in the Preshevo valley; in the border stripe between Montenegro
and Albania. Albanians have not occupied foreign lands, but their lands are
occupied by neighbouring states. Ethnic (Great) Albania, politically and
geo-strategically is presented as ghost and unrealizable dream, while it is an
undeniable reality in the region. The other greater miracle of the complex
Albanian identity is the high level of tolerance among religions. Albanians
have in their corpus of identity all the major European lessons.
Although the being and the identity of the Albanians in any aspect it has
not been put in doubt, this does not mean they do not have or will not have
different challenges arising from tearing mobility of Albanian society (or
more accurately, societies) in transition. The enormous shakes actually that
Albanians are facing in political, economic and cultural life cannot go without
consequences, or at least without a serious re-deining of their identity. In
positive terms current processes should lead to reconstruction of the state
and institutions on sound foundations and more stable than those of the
twentieth century. After the collapse of the institutions built on a mixture of
communist and nationalist ideologies, now should be installed new laws and
institutions, based on an individual’s right and liberal principles.12
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Albania accommodates people of different religious traditions, communities
and ethnic minorities are considered Albanians as well. The relationship
between the Albanian identity and Islamic culture is of extremely important
nature. Indeed, the word which describes the word “nation” in Albanian is the
word “komb”. The word “komb” has its origin in the Arabian word “kaum”,
which has come to the Albanian culture through the Ottoman language.
Thus, in order to deine the very notion of the Albanian nation, the founders
of Albanian nationalism chose precisely this Arabic word. The issue of
the relationship between Islamic culture and Albanian identity is very well
represented in this symbolic example.13
Broadly, the role of Islam is argued to be positive in the construction
of Albanian identity. This idea is partly supported by some academicians
and historians who defend this thesis, by saying that the reason behind our
conversion into Islam was to distinguish our ethnicity from the Serbs and the
Greeks. This view has made many Albanians to think that the main reason for
conversion into Islam was to “save” the national identity.14
Albanian elites, being aware of the weakness of the existence of the
Albanian state to face ideological and military power of the nations around,
tried to legitimize the existence of their state by undertaking a series of radical
reforms in order to smoothen and blurry Ottoman and Islamic traditions, by
trying to “Westernize” the characteristics of our society. The question then
was how to become less Muslim. This is how the politics of hiding Muslim
identity, came in light, by deleting or hiding all the noticeable features of
Islamic and Ottoman culture. All visible signs of the Ottoman past started to
disappear, starting with the magniicent architecture of the urban buildings,
markets and sarays. Their destruction was intended to show that Albania
had taken very seriously the way of modernity as understood by the socialist
revolution. Each of the obvious signs of the Oriental past became a daily target
for propaganda and subject to repressive laws of the communist dictatorship.
This declared war, irst against tradition and later against the religion, Muslims
and Christians, became an Albanian brand.
Christianity whether Orthodox or Catholic, are seen as a modern European
label and fashion which exceeds secularism, although perceived as something
very natural. Examples of the Albanian politicians, who openly participate
in Sunday mass, follow Christian rituals, are getting married in church and
participate in religious ceremonies. According to them this is natural and
according to Albanian customs. In contrary, is unheard and unseen for a
Muslim Albanian politician to attend a prayer or even publicly to show the
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smallest his/her Islamic afiliation. Moreover, in parliament we see Christian
political party, while the very idea of creating a nominal Muslim party would
create something similar to an earthquake of a high magnitude. Schoolbooks
also often contain Christian fundamentalist interpretations and the same
are served as facts to children of various confessions. In response to this,
fearing Albanian elites, including religious ones, began to limit the number
of mosques or just closing them. Bureaucrats stopped their public prayers
and participation in Islamic religious ceremonies. They felt they had to show
serious signs of de-Islamization and de-Ottomanization of Albanians.15
In my opinion we Albanians can enter into European Union only by
showing the actual religious reality. Neither words nor thoughts for departure
from Islam, or returning back to Christianity, nor hiding Albanian religious
reality, it will accelerate the integration process. Those who think that leaving
or abandoning Islam is the condition for our integration into the EU do
not do anything else as they just show their subjective feelings and hide the
Albanian reality.
Notes
Josip Simic, Religijeicrkvepredizazovomglobalizacije, FilozofksaIstrazivanja,
116 God. 29 (2009), s. 745-761; Globalization and Religion, Conference on
Globalization, Conlict & the Experience of Localities, Rome, Italy, 8-29 June
2007 (director programs Ms. Mahjabeen Khaled-Institute of Hazrat Mohammad
(SAW); Mehmet Aydin, “Kuresellesmeye Genel Bir Bakis”, Kuresellesme, Stamboll:
Ufuk Kitaplari 2002, f. 11-13; Adrian Civici, Globalizimi…ante portas, Tirane, 2009,
pp. 18-21.
2. Qur’an: Baqara, 115.
3. Davutoglu, p. 52.
4. Qur’an, Hujurat, 13.
5. Rexhep Qosja, Ideologjia e shpërbërjes, trajtesë mbi idetë çintegruese në shoqërinë e sotme
shqiptare, (Tiranë: Toena, 2006), pp. 23-28.
6. Pashko Vasa, VepraLetrare 1, botoi “Naim Frashëri”, Tiranë 1987, f. 37-39.
7. Mark Krasniqi, Toleranca fetare mes myslimanëve dhe katolikëve në Kosovë,
Feja, kultura dhe tradita islame ndër shqiptarët, simpozium ndërkombëtarënë Prishtinë15,16,17Tetor, 1992, botoi Kryesia e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës, Prishtinë
1995, p. 206.
8. Husamedin Feraj, Skicë e mendimit politik shqiptar, (Skopje: Logos-A, 1999), p. 280.
9. Gazmend Shpuza, Millet Sistemi Çerçevesinde Arnavutların Durumu, Osmanlı
IV, ed. Güler Eren, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara 1999, pp. 294-297.
10. Qosja, p. 29.
11. Eqrem bej Vlora, KUJTIME 1885-1925, Tiranë, 2003, f. 152, 335-336.
12. ShkelzenMaliqi, the author is philosopher and publicist, article has been taken by
the weekly journal “Java” published in Prishtina.
1.
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13. Ervin Hatipi, Identiteti shqiptar, www.forumi.kuranidhesuneti.net (Accessed on
20.11.2010).
14. Sami Frashëri, Kush e prishpaqënnë Ballkan, (Skopje: Logos-A, 2005); Roberto
Morocco Dela Roka, Feja dhe kombësia në Shqipëri 1922-1942, (Tiranë: Elena Gjika,
1996).
15. Ervin Hatipi, Identiteti shqiptar, www.forumi.kuranidhesuneti.net (Accessed on
20.11.2010).
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Religious Organization of the Montenegrin
Muslims after the Berlin Congress
Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič
Muslims in Montenegro successfully preserve continuity of their organising,
despite the fact that their community now operates in the eight state
structures.1 Despite being the smallest federal unit in all federal state structures
prior to declaration of independence of Montenegro, representatives of
this community have always demonstrated their active and constructive
attitude towards establishment, preservation and maintenance of vitality of
organisation of Muslims.
Islamic Community was established in Montenegro2 as one of the
outcomes of a complex set of decisions following the 1878 Berlin Congress.3
The congress was hosted by Germany’s Chancellor Otto von Bismarck,
who, together with other European superpowers at the time, had intended
to control territorial and power redistribution which had been following the
gradual decay, and eventually, collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Prior to formal establishment of this religious community, Montenegro
and the Ottoman signed an agreement to recognise the right of Montenegrin
Muslims to founding of their Islamic community and guaranteed them the
liberty to independently manage religious affairs and property.
The irst Mufti, Hajji Salih Huli of Ulcinj, a Muslim Albanian dominated
part of Montenegro, was authorised by Montenegrin Duke Nikola to apply
principles of Shari’ah as it had been the case under the Ottoman rule. The
seat of the Islamic Community had initially been in Ulcinj, but subsequently
was moved to Podgorica. Already in 1883, the Mufti left to Shkodra, Albania,
due to disagreements with the Duke’s administration. Upon request of Duke
Nikola for appointment of a new Mufti, Istanbul sent Hajji Mustafa Tikveshlija
of Bulgaria. Tikveslija strongly objected the authorities’ order that burial can
be allowed only after 24 hours pass, and returned to Istanbul objecting to antiShari’ah elements of the order.4
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The third Mufti was Murteza Karadzuzovic from Bar, Montenegro. He
was the irst Mufti appointed by Montenegrin sovereign authorities, i.e.
King Nikola the First. The High Meshihat based in Istanbul completed this
appointment in accordance with the Shari’ah principles in 1912.5
These correct relations and cooperation between Montenegro and the
Ottoman Empire in the past two decades of the 19th and in the beginning
of the 20th century, until the First Balkans War, had been just a segment of
generally stable bilateral relations.
During the period, the two countries signed several agreements on
their borderlines. Also, the Turkish authorities provided guarantees to the
Montenegrin Government for getting a loan from the Imperial Ottoman
Bank for activities on establishing and preservation of peace and order on
Montenegrin borders. At the time, their main common fear originated from
expansion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The First Balkan War in 1912
gathered Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro against the Ottoman
Empire. King Nikola resisted to enter into this coalition at irst, as he had
suspected that the two great empires might reconcile at one point as well as the
other allies, and that this would leave Montenegro out of the new equation.6
Karadzuzovic had been leading the community until Montenegro merged
with Serbia in 1918, after the Mufti’s Ofice was moved irst to Nis, Serbia.
Eventually, the Grand Mufti’s Ofice responsible for Serbia and Montenegro
was located in Belgrade, newly-established capital of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes. Until 1930, there were two Islamic communities in
the Kingdom: one with its seat in Serbia, covering Serbia with territories of
now independent Kosovo and Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, and
second for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia managed by the
Reis Ofice located in Sarajevo.
Under rein of Aleksandar Karadjordjevic the First, centralisation of the
Belgrade inluence and his personal authority escalated in every segment of
public life of the Kingdom. In 1929, the King named his rather multi-ethnic
and multi-religious state the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, under the slogan: one
people – one king – one state. Religious communities were not exempted from
these logics.
The two communities had inally merged in 1930, when the main seat
of the Islamic Community was located in Belgrade. Further administrative
centralisation of the Islamic Community under the new constitutional
circumstances continued in 1936 when the Constitutional of the Community
abolished the institution of Mufti ofices. At this time, main seat of the
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Community was moved from Belgrade, Serbia to Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
After the Second World War ended in 1945, along-awaited stabilisation of
the newly created political and social circumstances, both in Yugoslavia and
in general, inally allowed Muslims to reorganise themselves in accordance to
the new situation.
According to the records of the Montenegrin Islamic Community,
Montenegrin imams had taken an active role in the debate on new draft
constitution of the community in on 13 August 1947. Just days later, on 26
August 1947 delegate and nominee from Montenegro, Ibrahim Fejzic was
appointed for the irst Reis in the Federative Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. In
line with this new constitution, Waqf assemblies and assembly board established
in every federative republic resulted from both the new constitutional setup, but also the need for decentralisation of religious activities in post-war
Yugoslavia. Islamic Council of Elders was established in Montenegro in 1948.
This enabled formal re-emerging of organising and management of religious
activities of Muslims on level of Montenegro.
As all other religious communities existing in the Socialist Yugoslavia,
the Islamic Community was not exempted consequences of logics and
indoctrination of the Communist ideological mainstream, which had inevitably
brought along marginalisation of religion.
Following decomposition of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1992, Islamic communities of different republic have become independent.
The Montenegrin Islamic Community are currently organised in thirteen
local communities coordinated from Montenegrin capital of Podgorica.
They operate in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Community
from 1994. Rifat Fejzic has been the Reis (Head) since 2003. Local boards of
the community are located in all places signiicantly inhabited by Muslims:
Podgorica, Ulcinj, Bar, Ostros, Dinos, Tuzi, Rozaje, Berane, Petnjica, Bijelo
Polje, Pljevlja, Plav and Gusinje.
Islamic Community in this country is inevitably ethnically heterogeneous.
According to results of the 2011 census presented by Montenegrin Institute
for Statistics, out of 30,439 Albanians 22,267 declare themselves as Muslims.
Out of 53,606 Bošniaks, 53,453 are Muslims, while 20,537 persons who
ethnically declare themselves as Muslims, 20,270 are Muslims in religion as
well. Among 278,856 of those who prefer Montenegrin civil identity, there are
12,758 Muslims. In addition, out of 6,251 Roma, 5034 are Muslims.
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This Islamic Community is self-funded. According to the Montenegrin
Constitution from 2007, it is also entitled to assistance of the state, as all
other religious communities in this tiny European country. On 30 January
2012, Prime Minister Igor Lukšić and Reis of the Islamic Community Rifat
Fejzić signed the agreement regulating relations between the Government
and the Islamic Community in Montenegro. On the occasion, Luksic and
Fejzic pointed out that this agreement is to both further strengthen the
constitutionally deined relations, as well as an additional incentive to promote
Montenegro as a European country that cherishes tolerance and wealth of
differences.
Montenegro aspires to regulate relations between the state and the religious
communities functioning in the country, in order to create a legal framework
for adopting the law on legal status of religious communities and law on the
restitution of property rights.7
Islam gained its legal status by the Constitution of the Principality of
Montenegro in 1905 and the agreement from 2012 can also be interpreted as
preservation of legal and formal continuity of the Islamic Community and the
oficial recognition of Islam in Montenegro. Although Muslims of Montenegro
were not always self-governed during the recent history, vitality and coherence
of their Islam-driven thought, organisational and spiritual ideas have always
been able to ind their way towards formalisation and implementation through
different forms of Islamic communities that they had been a part of.
Multi-ethnic in composition of its membership, the Islamic Community
successfully resisted all challenges of ethnic-based turbulences that the
Balkans went through since decomposition of Yugoslavia. Both this proile
and modus operandi have proven to be rather unique in comparison to the
situation in other former Yugoslav countries.
Its constructive and consistent functioning has continuously been an
important contribution to enhancement of social cohesion within the Republic
of Montenegro. Also, the oficial rhetoric and performance of this religious
community has proven to be extremely valuable for afirmation of stability
both domestic and regional, but also important for aspiration of Montenegro
to approximate the European Union structures through respecting and
advancement religious rights of its citizens.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Principality of Montenegro; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Kingdom
of Yugoslavia; Federative Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia; Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; State Union of Serbia
and Montenegro; independent Republic of Montenegro.
Montenegro is one of six republics of former Yugoslavia, bordering Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and having a sea border with Italy.
This country covers 13.812 km2. According to the 2011 census, this country has
620,029 inhabitants.
Representatives of Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Russia and Turkey held the congress in the period 13 June - 13
July 1878.
Agovic, Bajro; “Islamic Community in Montenegro”, Oficial Portal of the
Montenegrin Islamic Community - http://www.monteislam.com/islamskazajednica-u-crnoj-gori (Accessed on 29.08.2014).
Ibid.
Andrijasevic, Zivko; Rastoder, Serbo (2006): “Crna Gora i velike sile”, Zavod za
udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Podgorica, pp. 60-61.
Statements and full text of the agreement available on: http://www.monteislam.
com/novosti/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori-i-vlada-crne-gore-potpisaleugovor-kojim-se-deinise-uredenje-medusobnih-odnosa
References
Andrijasevic, Zivko; Rastoder, Serbo (2006): “Crna Gora i velike sile”, Zavod za
udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Podgorica
Crampton, Richard J. (2002) “The Balkans since the Second World War”, Pearson
Education Limited, London.
Jelavich, Barbara; (1994) “History of the Balkans, XX century, Volume 2”; Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Todorova, Marija; (1997) “Imagining the Balkans”, Oxford University Press, New
York.
Websites:
Institute for Statistics of Montenegro (MONSTAT) - http://www.monstat.org/cg/
page.php?id=534&pageid=322
Government of the Republic of Montenegro - http://www.gov.me
Oficial Portal of the Montenegrin Islamic Community - http://www.monteislam.
com/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori
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Waqf Institutions in Macedonia throughout the
History and Current Challenges
Sherif Abdullahi
The idea of waqf is as old as the humanity. Muslim jurists argue that the irst
waqf ever made is the sacred building of Ka’bah in Makah since the Qur’an
mentions that it is the irst house of worship set for people: “The irst House
(of worship) appointed for men was that at Makkah: Full of blessing and of guidance for
all kinds of beings…” [Qur’an, 3:96]. Waqf is “holding an asset and preventing
its consumption for the purpose of repeatedly extracting its usufruct for
the beneit of an objective representing righteousness/philanthropy”.1 This
deinition grants perpetuity to waqf, i.e., it applies to non-movable properties
whose beneit can be extracted without consuming the property itself.
Therefore, waqf widely relates to land and buildings. However, there are waqf
of books, agricultural machinery, and cattle’s, shares and cash money.2
This institution of waqf is deined by privately ownership where the corpus
is endowed for a charitable purpose in perpetuity and the revenue generated
meets the objectives for which the waqf was established. The waqf stands as an
important philanthropic Islamic institution which played a signiicant role in
Islamic civilization as inherited institutions from the past and which possesses
huge potential for reconstruction of economic and social life in Muslim
countries and communities.3 Historically the waqf institution was supporting
and providing health, education, other public services such as water supply
for the cities, public kitchen, public bath, and many other services and goods
at no cost to the central government. The waqf could fulil public services as
mentioned above (health, education, municipal, etc.) by voluntary donations
made by the well-intentioned founders. Therefore, privately accumulated
capital was voluntarily endowed to inance all sorts of social services to the
society, which not only reduced the government spending and budged deicit,
and lowered interest rates, but also ensured a better distribution of income in
the society.4
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This article aims is to provide an overview of developments and the role
of waqf institutions in Macedonia throughout the history and highlights the
current challenges. It considers the history of the waqf in Macedonia and its
development during three phases. The irst section gives a snapshot of the
concept of waqf. The second section will discuss the development and role
of waqf during the Ottoman Empire era. The third section will discuss the
post Ottoman Empire era, respectively the period from 1918 – 1990. The
forth section deals with the period from 1991 until present. The inal section
summarizes the discussion.
Socio-economic Dimension of Waqf Institutions of Macedonia
and its Implications during the Ottoman Era
Historically, Macedonia was important centre in southern Balkans, where its
geographic and strategic position, as far as business, trade and industry are
concerned, played an important role in socio-economical life. As an example,
the city of Manastir (Bitola), was developed into important urban and business
centre as a result of its advantageous location on the Via Egnatia and continued
to be develop during the Ottoman Empire period. In Macedonia, after the
Ottoman Empire established the socio-economical, juridical and cultural
changes began to appear in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.5
From early stage of Islam, it was know that Caliphs and pious people
made a practice of devoting part of their wealth for establishing endowment
institutions. The revenue from religious institutions was derived from private
charities, principally in the form of permanent endowment of the land and
other movable and immovable properties either by deed of waqf or habs. In
fact in Muslims societies, philanthropic institutions were always part of the
life of the nation. The property restrained (mawquf or mahbus) was thereby
withdrawn from all further transfer of ownership, and its usufruct was devoted
to a speciic aim which was designated by the endower (waqif). Such waqfs were
created by innumerable and wealthy governors and private person from earliest
century of Islam for the beneit of mosques, madrasahs, tekkes and all other
forms of charitable, by the intention or theory were ininite or in perpetuity.6
These kinds of endowments were widely practiced in the Balkans especially in
Macedonia. In Macedonia under the Ottoman rule, anyone Muslim or dhimmi
(non-Muslim) was entitled to form the waqf. The objectives for which waqfs
were established apart of religious purpose are numerous such as mosques
and zawiyahs, educational institutions (madrasahas, maktabs and libraries), public
goods such as roads, bridges, fountains and lighthouses, hospitals, hostels and
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kitchens were provided by these private means, as charitable institutions. In
addition to this, many waqfs were founded to supply money (cash waqfs) to the
needy and to give assistance in kind, such as aid for the poor inhabitants of
the particular villages and quarters of town, and food and clothing for elderly
and children. All these types of endowments were called waqf khayri (public
waqf) which may distinguish from another type of waqf called waqf ahli (family
waqf).7 The later is a type of waqf where the endower would allocate property in
the same way as other wafqs, but the revenues it accrued would be solely for the
provision of livelihood for his descendants as long as any remain, and from
which succeeding generations might beneit from it.
From the early nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire administration
introduced a special ministry for awqaf and established awqaf laws. The Law
of Awqaf of 29th November 1863 (19/6/1280H) was the most important
among others. This law was applicable in many countries after the dividing
up the Ottoman Empire in 1918 such as Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
and Palestine.8 A title deed of endowment was called waqiyyah and was
drafted institutionally before a qadi (judge) in the court, was registered in
the sijil (register) and approved by the Sultan (Caliph). In the waqiyaahs of
both types of endowment, public and family, the properties and revenues
derived from each which meant to maintain them and all persons appointed
to manage or administer and serve them, together with the salaries, were
diligently particularized. Although the waqf institution was a inancially and
administratively independent, in the Ottoman Empire in general, the state
controlled and conirmed all waqfs, since they had the character of freehold
property.9 The founder of a waqf (Waqif) was free to appoint anyone he wished
as administer. In all waqf the endower appointed an administrator (Mutawalli),
which is called “tawliyyah”. In large waqfs usually are superintendent, called a
“Nazir”, and was usually appointed as well. The Mutawalli was responsible for
all matters related to the waqf, taking measures for the collection and growth
of its income, using these funds to fulill the conditions of the endowment, to
pay the foundation’s employees, and for maintenance and repair. The Nazr was
an inspector, determining whether or not the conditions of the endowment
being fulilled. Once a year, the principal oficers and employees of the waqf
would meet to discuss whether they had accomplished their duties stipulated
by the waqiyyah. This group could request for the Mutawalli’s dismissal. The
state, through the local qadi or a specially appointed inspector, audited the
accounts of each waqf. The aim of all these precautions was to ensure that the
institution continued to fulill its proper function.10
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Since all waqfs were recorded in the qadi’s sijjils, it is possible by an
examination of the sheer extant of the archives of various provincial courts to
obtain detail and exact igures of the numbers, destinations, and character of
waqf foundations during the Ottoman era in Macedonia. People, who owned
a property, from the Sultan and his family down through the social ranks,
were establishing waqfs. Cities in Macedonia were not exception to this pattern.
However, in comparison to other cities where the population was considerably
higher, the number of waqf institutions established in Manastir (the city of
Bitola, Macedonia) was suficient. During the 18th century, the number of waqf
institutions that were established in the city of Manastir was less than 10% in
comparison to the waqf institutions established in Aleppo, Syria, during the
same period. There were almost ifty waqf institutions in Manastir compared
to ive hundreds in Aleppo.11
Apart from immovable waqf institutions which were considered the
essentials of socio-economical life, the movable or cash waqf institutions were
established and played an import role to facilitate all business activities in the
society. The qadi sijils or registers of Manastir contain hundreds of court cases,
which recorded how loans, inancing, rate of return, debt and others forms
of crediting through cash waqf institutions were implemented in the society.
In Macedonia, most of cash waqf institutions were managed by appointed
administrator who acted as a sole manager for cash waqf institution, and who
was responsible for collection of the revenues generated, the preservation
and increasing the funds of the cash waqf institution under his management.12
During 18th century, the numbers of craftsmanship was more than one hundred
and twenty and continued to increase. Beside of craftsmanship the Ottoman
Empire administration established guild’s organizations or corporations. They
acted as intermediary bodies between individuals and central government, by
securing manpower, social control, quality of goods and services, taxes and
others.13 To facilitate all above mentions activities, the cash waqf institutions
were very important. Through the cash waqf institutions, companies were
inanced and supported to engage in productions of goods and services,
obtaining new skills far away from their local home town, and inanced to sell
their products around entire the Empire and outside.14
Waqf Institutions of Macedonia between 1918 – 1990
After the collapse of Ottoman Empire 1918, the Kingdom of SCS (Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes) established its presence in Macedonia. They annulled
and dismissed all lists and registers of waqf, thus, the SCS regime took and
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destroyed a huge number of Muslims institution and property (mosque, khans,
mills, madrasah and hamams etc.), with one purpose to expel Muslims from the
Balkans. Then, After the Second WW, the communist regime established its
presence in former Yugoslavia which Macedonia was part of that federation.
Again, all waqf institutions that were left during the SCS regime untouched,
communist continued with same speed of nationalization, expropriation
and usurpation of waqf institutions, based on the name of public interest or
agrarian reform.15
As the data are scare, destroyed and some still locked in the archives
related to waqf property, bellow, the data, facts and documents (all they are
cumulative) are presented about the waqf property usurped in different manner
by communist regime beginning from the year of 1945 in the cities of Skopje,
Tetova, Gostivar, Manastir (Bitola), Diber, Resnje, Struge and Oher, or cities
which belong to the western part of Macedonia and mostly Muslims population
is concentrated and some other cities in east part of Macedonia which actually
a small number of Muslims are living because they faced hardest exodus than
the other part.16
Communist regime in different ways and by different acts, took huge
number of waqf property some especially in city of Skopje capital city of
Macedonia. Based on the archive of the Islamic Community of Macedonia,
the waqf properties such as land, houses, shops, hammams, madrasahs, tekkes and
others which are usurped, are shown below.
The city of Skopje
Table 1
Number of the Act
Numbers of different
Acts
Date
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Number of
houses
Numbers of different
Acts
1959 - 1969
Numbers of different
parcels
102
1957 - 1968
Number of parcels
Numbers of different
parcels
Surface in total
16.599 m2
Nationalization Central Body (government institution) decided to nationalize
Ibni Pajko waqf property (shops) that is around old market in the city of
Skopje, by act number 146-a/59, on 13.05.1960. In total, was usurped 166 m2
of Ibni Pajko waqf building.
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Table 2
Number
of shops
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Numbers of different Acts
1960
Numbers of different parcels 40
The city of Tetovo
Also, the state communist regime usurped great numbers of waqf in this
city. They started from the most beautiful and wealthy tekke in the Balkans
and entire Ottoman Empire, named Arabati Baba Tekke. According to the
decision 14049 date 16.08.1947 in behalf of the agrarian reform, state usurped
all property (land) of the tekke, cemeteries and tekke itself.17
Table 3
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Surface in
total
Numbers of different
Numbers of different
1947 - 1988
724.864 m2
Acts
parcels
No. of
Number of the Act Date
Number of parcels shops/
houses
Numbers of different
Numbers of different
1960
33
Acts
parcels
Also state nationalized and usurped some mosques and their gardens, shops
and schools (madrasah), lately the have been destroyed and demolish and the
places transform either to parks and streets or other building.
Table 4
Number of
the Act
Date
Number of
parcels
Name of the
Mosque
Surface
in total
4565/55
21.02.1958
3723
Selce Bek
937 m2
4571
04.03.1957
3506
Sinan Tekke
1740 m2
03-6832/1
03.07.1965
2185-2186-2137 Tupan Mosque
Without act
1645
3046 m2
Mehmet Celebi 1104 m2
6.985 m2
Total
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The city of Gostivar
Same in Gostivar as in majority Muslims populated cities in Macedonia, state
sometimes by acts, but sometimes even without acts usurped and nationalized
numbers of tangible waqf assets.
Table 4
Number of the Act Date
Number of shops
and houses
Number of shops
754
27.12.1959 1 house
270 m2
754
27.12.1959 3 shops
79 m2
675
27.12.1959 16 shops
327 m2
Total
676 m2
Also, the government has expropriated Muslim cemeteries so called “Turk
Cemeteries”, by number of parcel 706 date 1951–1952, which irst of all the
parcel has been transformed to city market then later transformed to the park.
In the year of 1938 after the beautiful Yuri Mosque has been demolished,
its place was transformed to market. The state usurp 28 shops around the
mosque that were part of the tangible waqf for purpose of generating cash as
a cash waqf for the support of the mosque and madrasah and other expenses
for the mosque, still until today these shops are in use by different people and
return back to the real owner the Islamic Community of Macedonia. There
are other waqf tangible and non tangible assets that were taken in the villages
around the city, such as Toplice, Kalishte, Negotine, Pirok, etc.18
The city of Manastir (Bitola)
Historically, the city of Manastir, with its geographic and strategic position as
a junction of several roads, most famous Via Egnatia, was an important center
of Macedonia during the Ottoman Empire and was a capital city of Vilayet
of Manastir. Later, during the 19th–20th century, Manastir was known as a city
of consults, because of many foreign diplomatic establishments.19 Compare
to the most of the cities in the Ottoman Empire territory, number of waqfs
founded in Manastir was very high. For instance, during the 18th century, waqfs
was less than 10 percent in comparison to the city of Aleppo in Syria. When a
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new waqf institution was to establish be it tangible or cash, public or family, it
had to be approved by the court as being legitimate and oficial before being
functional. A number of waqf institutions were recorded in the sijils (registers)
of city of Manastir. Most of these endowments either waqf khayris (public)
or waqf ahlis (family) established for maintenance of other institutions such
mosque, madrasahs and maktabs, for paying salaries for the oficials of these
institutions. Some waqfs were established for the purpose of feeding the people
in need, and some other waqfs were founded with the purpose of beneiting
the family members and their descendants from the cash generation that these
waqf were made.20
Property that was registered and recognized in the Ottoman’s sijils (registers)
as waqf property, during the SCS regime was coniscated and destroyed with
the purpose of expelling Muslims from their territories. But under the new
communist regime in power from 1945 to 1990, the remaining waqf assets
nearly all were either demolished or coniscated. The communist regime
denied the existence of waqf property. Today, in this city only around 15 waqf
properties remain in existence and majority of them are not in function for
the purpose that they have made. Below the table shows in total the surface of
the shops, houses, land and others that are seized.21
Table 5
Number of the Act
Number of parcels
Date
Numbers of different Acts 1945 - 1988
Surface in
total
Numbers of different
266.511 m2
parcels
The city of Dibra
Same situation was with the city of Dibra, state seized and demolished numbers
of waqfs. Some waqf properties have been mosques during the Ottomans, but
latter in during the Bulgarian occupation between the 1919 and 1920, one of
the mosque had changed to church which exist as a church until today, then
another mosque that in 1950 was burned, Communists did not allow to be
rebuilt it again.22
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Table 6
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Numbers of different
1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels
Acts
Surface
in total
5.671 m2
The city of Resnje
From the evidence that Islamic Community of Macedonia possess in this city
there were large waqf property but usurped from communists and given to
individuals or state companies. State registers of the properties from 1936,
recording a large numbers of waqf, but in the name of land reforms and public
interest, only few waqf properties remain.23
Table 7
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Surface in
total
Numbers of different
1955 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels 297.797 m2
Acts
The city of Struga
Same situation happened in the city of Struga, state seized and demolished
numbers of waqf properties. In 1997 the oficial letter from Mufti’s Ofice of
Struga was addressed to the Islamic Community of Macedonia saying that the
large number of waqf property is destroyed, usurped and nationalized.
Table 8
Number of parcels
Surface in
total
Number of the Act
Date
Numbers of different
Acts
1955 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels 297.797 m2
The city of Ohri
The beautiful city of Ohri was well known for the numbers of mosques and
madrasahs and they had a large number of waqf (land and shops) for supporting
the activities of madrasahs. Same here the waqf properties either destroyed or
usurped.24
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Table 9
Number of the Act
Date
Number of parcels
Numbers of different
Acts
1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels
Number of the Act
Date
Numbers of different
Acts
1945 - 1990 Numbers of different parcels
Number of shops and
houses
Surface in
total
38.955 m2
Shops in
total
31
The table below shows the mosques, madrasahs and cemeteries that are usurped
or fully destroyed.
Table 10
Number
Date
of the Act
14312/51021614312/6
2679
1953 (demolished)
1353
1953 (demolished)
1473
1953 (demolished)
328
1953 usurped
1412
1953 (demolished)
2776-2774
2001 (demolished)
No. of taken Name of the
parcels
Mosque
303-469/92
Surface
in total
Mosque
1.664 m2
Madrasah Sherif
Beg
Emin Mahmud
mosque
1951 (demolished)
1.037 m2
1.027 m2
Cemeteries
2.405 m2
Hajji Hamza
mosque
Imaret mosque
(now is church)
Hajji Qazim
mosque
4.516 m2
1951 (demolished)
Madrasah
1945 (demolished)
Peshtan mosque
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The Eastern Part of Macedonia
In this side of the country, Muslim population was under high state pressure
and their properties were damaged or usurped with main reason to expel from
the country to send to Turkey. Therefore, to make it happen, the communist
regime destroyed and seized waqf properties. After they demolished large
numbers of mosques, madrasahs, and other waqf institutions, the remaining
left, government coniscated and divided between non-Muslim people. As
data shows, during the Ottoman Empire era, there was huge number of waqf
institutions, but by expelling the Muslims people and destroying their wealth in
various ways such as expropriation and nationalization, nowadays a very small
number of waqf institutions remained untouched, only 5 to 10 mosques from
hundreds that were.25
In the year of 1958 in the city of Shtip local municipally by the act 04183/1 demolished the Sultan Murat mosque by surface of 940 m2 which was
in the city center and replaced by the primary school. Another mosque, by
the name Husamedin Pasha, was tried to be demolished, irst attempt was
done by SCS Kingdom and they transformed the mosque to butchery, then
latter, communist regime attempted to demolish but was actively protected
by Muslim community. Then, in 1994, the Orthodox Church of Macedonia
tried to transform the same mosque to a church, but without success. The
Islamic Community of Macedonia strongly opposed this action and local and
international authorities were alarmed.26
Same situation happened with other cities in eastern part of Macedonia
such as Veles, Kocan, Kratove, Radovish, Strumic, etc. Based on the data
from Evliya Celebi (1611–1682, a famous Ottoman traveler), who noticed
that in the city of Veles there has been many mosques, one madrasah, one
khan (motel) and ifty shops as a waqfs, but today only one mosque stand in
this city. For the city of Kocan data says that there were four mosques, one
madrasah, one watch tower, and some houses and shops for generating cash
to support above mention waqf institutions. In the city of Kratove documents
prove that there were twenty mosque, one madrasah, one tekke, two hammams,
three hundred and ifty shops for generating cash to support waqf institutions.
City of Radovish had ive mosques, one madrasah with rooms for students,
one tekke, one hammam, three khans (motels), one library and one hundred and
ifty shops. In the city of Strumica data says that there were many mosques,
madrasahs, hammams, tekkes, ive hundreds shops and seven khans for traders,
with the purpose to generate cash to support above mention waqfs.27
Besides government and non-Muslims who were destroying the waqf
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property, even some irresponsible Muslim individuals who were in charge
on protecting and managing the waqf property, they themselves mismanaged,
and, in some cases seized the waqf (be it shop or house) and sold to a third
party for the compensation or some still are using the waqf property without
paying respect to the purpose of that waqf institution. Need to mention some
real examples that took place and are documented. In the village of Velusa
municipally of the city of Strumica Sheikh Rustem had sold the cemeteries
that were registered under the act 1749 and the surface was 8000 m2, this
shameful events is proven by sate documents from the archives by the Act
07-3/1750 date 30.12.1982. Rasim Demirov as authorized person from the
Islamic Community of Macedonia in the city of Shtip, on 04.11.1979, in the
village of Zrnovci municipally of Kocani, has sold land parcel by number 3984,
surface 509 m2. In the same city authorized person Bulent Mehmedov from
Islamic Community of Macedonia, instead protecting and managing the waqf
property, in 16.12.1982, has sold land parcel number 315, surface 500 m2, to
another Muslim individual by the name Muhamed Abdij Mehmedov. The sale
contract is registered in the city of Strumica by act number 408/80.28 These
facts show that sometimes even authorized oficials of the Islamic Community
of Macedonia implicated in usurping and destroying the value of the waqf
property, just to beneit personally and without taking into the consideration
that all waqf properties belong to Muslim community in perpetuity.
Waqf Institutions of Macedonia from 1991 until the Present Days
After communist regime collapsed and Macedonia introduced pluralist
political system, situation for waqf institution unfortunately remained the
same. On 20.01.1992, Islamic Community of Macedonia, made a request
No.60 to the Committee of Property Denationalization asking for return of
all waqf properties and compensation for the waqf properties that had been
damaged and destroyed or were built something else in the place of the waqf
property. On 12.06.1997 the Ministry of Finance oficially replied to the
request of the Islamic Community of Macedonia, which stated that: “because
of lack of the law for denationalization, waqf properties will be returned or
compensated in the future”. After one year, the government approved the law
for denationalization in terms of returning and compensation the usurped
property during communist regime, but still is hard to be implemented. The
government institutions purposely delaying the procedures when it comes to
return the waqf properties compare to the church properties. The table below
shows the waqf properties that need to be return in possession of the Islamic
Community of Macedonia and still pending until present days.29
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Table 11
Type of the Waqf properties that has
Surface in m2
to be returned to ICM30
Buildings (mosques, madrasah, hamams,
19.135 m2
khans, imarets, and watch towers)
Cultivated land
3.869.806 m2
Parcels in mountain
1.934.903 m2
Meadows
825.000 m2
Uncultivated land
335.942 m2
Construction land
22.123 m2
Total
7.006.909 m2
The Denationalization Law in the Republic of Macedonia
In 1998, Parliament of Macedonia approved the law for denationalization,
but the law did not directly state that waqf properties and church properties
will denationalize. Thus, on 10.03.2000 Islamic Community of Macedonian
together with the Orthodox Church of Macedonia proposed to the
parliament to amendment the law by no. 33-1048/1. They requested that
waqf properties and church properties to directly to be mentioned in the law
for denationalization. After the parliament accepted the request of these
two religious institutions, still the law did not fulill the expectations of the
Islamic Community of Macedonia. In the new revised law state: “Property will
be returned, respectively will be given compensation for property taken from individuals,
religious temples, monasteries and waqf, which had been taken after 2 august 1945.” 31
In the law itself there are too many acts and legal gaps that make dificult
for the Islamic Community of Macedonia to get the waqf properties in their
possession. The act 10 states: “The nationalized property that is in public interest will
not be return, but instead will be compensated in these events: - the property that had been
taken by law and had remained for public interested such as roads, city squares, parks, and
other municipally infrastructural buildings; - the property that is in possession of army and
security forces of the state; - the construction land that supposed to be build for purposes
of above postulates and public interested; - the property that after was nationalized is in
the service of public interest which is proven by law.” Therefore, from the content
of the law itself is derived that Muslims will not get back all waqf properties
and even will not be compensated for the waqf properties that had been taken
and are still in function or for public interest. The Islamic Community of
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Macedonia several times intervened by new proposals to amendment the actual
denationalization law but without success. The approved law should have been
implemented from the year of 2002, until now very little has been done. In
some cases the situation has be worsen, such in the case of watch tower of
the city of Manastir (Bitola), which the Orthodox Church of Macedonian had
put a cross on top of that waqf institution. Same happed in the city of Prilep.
Summary
From the article, we can conclude that what was built during the 500 hundred
years of Ottoman Empire period was destroyed or usurped during the last
hundred years, both by the SCS (Serbs-Croats-Slovenes) Kingdom and later
by the Communist regime. Additionally, in Macedonia even after the political
system changed to the democratic and pluralist one, still the waqf institutions
facing destruction and usurpation.
As we mentioned early that huge number of waqf properties has to
be returned back to original owner that is the Islamic Community of
Macedonia, still it is not happening, the government is delaying the process of
denationalization. Present government of Macedonia is undertaking it’s not
fulilling the dateline of law for denationalization. A proposal from the Islamic
Community of Macedonia was given to the government and municipally of
capital city to rebuild in the city square the 500 hundred years old “Burmali
mosque” which was destroyed in 1924 during the SCS regime. Instead, giving
the permission to be rebuilt, ironically, the government will build in the waqf
property another building.
Another, big case is about Kapan Khan as waqf institution in capital city of
Skopje. In 2009 government approved the request of the Islamic Community
of Macedonia that Kapan Khan has to be returned. But, one year later,
government changed the decision that the Kapan Khan belong to the state as a
public interest. Muslims in city of Prilep want their 500 years old mosque in the
city center to be rebuilt after non-Muslims destroyed during the ethnic conlict
in 2001. After 13 years, still city municipally is not allowing Muslim population
of this city and the ICM to rebuild the burnt mosque. As we mentioned earlier
in the same city during the 1990s, by intervention of the Orthodox Church of
Macedonia, they put on top of a watch tower a cross, same action they did with
Manastir’s watch tower, and is well known that these watch towers belong to
Muslim culture and civilization as a waqf institutions. Unless these problems are
not addressed and resolved properly, the fear for another ethnic and religious
conlict in the country and in the region is highly likely.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Kahf, Monzer: “Waqf: A Quick Overview”.
Ibid.
Hasanuddin Ahmed and Ahmedullah Khan: (H1418): “Strategies to Develop Waqf
Administration in India” IRTI, Jedah, KSA.
Cizakca, Murat (2000): “A history of Philanthropic Foundations” Bogazici University
Press, Istanbul, Turkey.
For details see Idriz, Mesut (2010): “The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A
Model Paradigm for Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records”, Pelanduk
Publication, Kuala Lumpur.
Cizakca, Murat (2000): “A history of Philanthropic Foundations” Bogazici University
Press, Istanbul.
Idriz, Mesut (2005): “Waqf Property and its Administration in the Ottoman Empire:
A Case of Manastir with Special Reference to 18th Century Judicial Records” Hikmet Journal of Scientiic Research, Adeksam, Gostivar.
Kahf, Monzer: “Waqf and Its Sociopolitical Aspect”.
İnalcık, Halil, (1989): “The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600”, Aristide
D. Caratzas, NY.
Idriz, Mesut (2010), “The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for
Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records”, Pelanduk Publication,
Kuala Lumpur.
Ibid.
“Turskite Dokumenti za Istorija na Makedonskiot Narod-Serja Prva, (1607-1623)” vol.1.
Vishko, Ali, “Manastiri me Rrethina”.
Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule (1354-1804).
Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
Ibid.
Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
Idriz, Mesut (2010), The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for
Applied Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records, Pelanduk Publication,
Kuala Lumpur.
Ibid.
Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ahmet, Sherif (2006), Vakefet ne Maqedoni ne Periudhen Osmane (in Albanian) Nun,
Shkup.
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28. Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 - 2001 (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
29. Ibid.
30. For more information in details about waqf properties refer to Islamic Community
of Macedonia and Archives of Macedonia respectively.
31. Bilsimi, Taxhedin, Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 – 2001.
References
Ahmet, Sherif (2006), Vakefet ne Maqedoni ne Periudhen Osmane (in Albanian) Nun,
Shkup.
Bislimi, Taxhedin (2007), Vakei ne Maqedonij 1391 – 2001, (in Albanian) Bashkesia
Islame e Maqedonise, Shkup.
Cizakca, Murat (2000), A History of Philanthropic Foundations, Bogazici University Press,
Istanbul.
Hasanuddin Ahmed and Ahmedullah Khan (Hijrah Year 1418), Strategies to Develop
Waqf Administration in India, IRTI, Jeddah.
Idriz, Mesut (2005), “Waqf Property and its Administration in the Ottoman Empire: A Case
of Manastir with Special Reference to 18th Century Judicial Records”, Hikmet - Journal of
Scientiic Research, Year 6, Vol. 2, Adeksam, Gostivar.
Idriz, Mesut (2010), The Balkan City of Ottoman Manastir – A Model Paradigm for Applied
Shariah with Reference to Ottoman Judicial Records, Pelanduk Publication, Kuala Lumpur.
İnalcık, Halil, (1989), The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, Aristide D.
Caratzas, New York.
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Continuity of Islam in the Southern Balkans:
Muslim Turkish Minority of
Western Thrace as a Case Study
Ali Hüseyinoğlu
Introduction
Islam in Greece has been an old phenomenon in southern Europe and
Balkans. After its formation in 1830, Greece signed various agreements with
the Ottoman Empire so that signiicant number Muslim communities with
different ethnic origins continued to live on the old and new lands of Greece.
These treaties, such as the Treaty of Istanbul (1888) and Treaty of Athens
(1913), enabled the formation and strengthening of various state mechanisms
to protect rights of Muslims living in a country where the vast majority of
its society was Orthodox Christian. Members of the minority are primarily
followers of Sunni Islam. Only a small section of them belong to the AleviBektashi sect.
The World War I had a great impact on states and societies across the
European continent. The map of the whole Europe was redrawn from which
autochthonous, national and imperial minorities were highly affected. After the
collapse of multiethnic empires, many people belonging to minority groups
found themselves in disadvantaged and discriminated positions compared to
the majority community. In this new map of Europe, both Greece and Turkey
agreed on a population exchange process between the two countries. Thus,
around half a million ethnic Turks who lived in Greece would be exchanged
with around 1.5 million Greeks living across Turkey (Pentzopoulos 2002:69).
This would not only contribute to homogenization of both countries
(Huseyinoglu 2012:123) but also would free them from those people who
had widely been perceived by members of the majority community to be the
“possible Trojan horse” of the neighbouring kin state.
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Two communities were exempted from the abovementioned population
exchange process; the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and Greek
Orthodox Christian (Rum) Minority of Istanbul, Imbroz and Tenedos Islands
located by the Dardanelles Strait. Both communities were numbering around
120.000 people in the 1920s. The incorporation of Western Thrace into
Greek territories may be interpreted as an indication for the overall increase
in the number of Muslims living in Greece. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Greek
Population Exchange, half a million people’s leaving from Greek soil, was a
severe blow against the Islamic presence across the country.
In fact, this demographic downturn of Muslims in Greece would come to a
halt with the large inlux of both legal and illegal immigrants in the beginning
of 1990s. Originating primarily from Southeast Asia, Africa and Albania, the
gradual low of these people enabled the formation of strong Muslim presence
particularly in urban Greek centres such as Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras
where Muslims count more than half a million altogether in a country with
around 11 million population (see Triandafyllidou 2001:92-93). This was a
clear and signiicant increase in the overall number of Muslims in Greece. Yet,
this study argues that it is still highly dificult to talk about strong cooperation
and collaboration between the “old” Muslims and “new” Muslims of Greece
given that both communities belonging to the same religion cannot enjoy the
same religious liberties of Islam since Greece conines enjoyment of groupbased minority rights - known also as individual rights with a collective aspect
- to a certain geographical area and a speciic community, i.e. Muslim Turks
living inside the region of Western Thrace. Meanwhile, either individual or
collective initiatives that will enable the beginning of close and continuous
cooperation between these two Islamic entities on different parts of Greece
have been almost nonexistent since the beginning of the 1990s.
As it is previously underlines, there are a number of Muslims across Greece
living outside of Western Thrace. Most of them are immigrants who live in
main urban centres where there are more possibilities to work and survive.
Athens is the number one city where hundreds and thousands of immigrant
Muslims live. However, they still struggle for even basic religious liberties,
e.g. an oficial house of prayer/mosque. In this respect, Athens still stands as
the only capital city of the European Union without a mosque although the
initial demands and discussions for its establishment dates back to the end of
the 19th century (Triandafyllidou and Gropas: 2009:963). Despite the fact that
many discussions have recently been raised by Greek oficials for building of
a mosque in the capital city, no step has been taken yet for the beginning of
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its construction. Similarly, Muslims living in Athens suffer from not having an
Islamic cemetery. Their demands for an Islamic cemetery keep falling on deaf
ears of Greek oficials and state representatives (Antoniou 2007:165).
Other than Muslim immigrants, today, while talking about Islam in Greece
one should also take into consideration the small but historical Muslim Turkish
minority in the two islands of the Dodecanese, Rhodes and Kos islands
whose presence goes back to the Ottoman administration of the Aegean
Sea. Known also as Oniki Ada Türkleri (Dodecanese Turks), the autochthon
Muslim islanders of Rhodes and Kos became citizens of Greece when all of
the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece in 1947. In the 1950s, they
actually constituted a signiicant community numbering around 10.000 people
(Tsitselikis 2012:103).
In time, however, their numbers gradually decreased as a result of Greek
policies of discrimination and violation of their group-based collective rights.
For example, unlike the functioning of bilingual Turkish-Greek minority
primary schools no bilingual schooling in both their mother tongues (Turkish)
and the state language (Greek) has been available for the Muslim Turkish
islanders since the early 1970s. Thus, basics of Islam could not been taught
inside the school area. Along with the lack of minority schooling, visiting
the island one can spot tens of mosques on both islands. But, only two
of them are given necessary permission to function as a house of prayer.
Some of them are actually restored. Nevertheless, many of them still remain
either dilapidated or have already collapsed because of the lack of necessary
restoration and renovation facilities carried by the Greek authorities (see Gross
2011; Sevi2009). As of 2014, henceforth, around ive thousand Muslim Turks
remain on both islands who cannot fully beneit from fundamental group
based collective rights emanating from their ethnic and religious identities as
native Turks and Muslims of the Dodecanese.
Related with the main theme of this study, it is useful to underline the
following point. According to practices of the Greek state since 1923, there
has been only one-oficially recognized minority in Greece whose members’
individual and collective rights and liberties are safeguarded by Greek state
mechanisms. This is the Muslim Turkish Minority in Western Thrace. No
other community across the country is perceived and interpreted within the
framework of minorities and minority rights in Greece. In the context of
Greece, any kind of oficial recognition of a group as a minority automatically
brings together some obligations for the state to protect and promote survival
of that group. This is possible only if that group is granted some group-based
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special rights emanating from international agreements that Greece signed
and ratiied, e.g. religious liberties of Western Thracians based on Articles
37-45 of the Lausanne Treaty (FEK A’ 238, 25.8.1923).This has been the case
for the old Muslims of Greece since 1923 but never for those new Muslims
members of whom settled in different parts of the country after 1923.
The abovementioned lack of Islamic common spaces is not limited with
Athens. It is the same with all other parts of Greece except the region of
Western Thrace where mosques and cemeteries have fully been functioning
inside the region of Western Thrace since 1923. From this point of view,
members of the Muslim Turkish minority have a variety of group-based
collective rights that aims to safeguards the religious autonomy of Islam in
Western Thrace. Nevertheless, the fate of Islam outside of Western Thrace
is completely depended either on Greek domestic law or the mercy of the
Greek state apparatuses-oficials, both of which remain insuficient to protect
religious liberties of those Muslims living in other parts of the country.
Although members of the autochthonous Muslims in Western Thrace have
had many religious freedoms since 1923, various kinds of limits to those rights
as well as their applicability in practice constitute one of the fundamental
aims of this study. Having made a brief clariication regarding the distinction
between the old and new Islam in Greece1, the following sections of this
study focuses on the main characteristics of Islam in Western Thrace. While
doing so, it also questions to what extent religious freedoms of the Minority
in Western Thrace have been protected and promoted by Greece since the
incorporation of the region into Greece in 1923. For this purpose, three main
sections that fall within the religious liberties of the Minority is elaborated:
religious representation and leadership (muftis, imams), Muslim charitable
foundations and sacred places (mosques, cemeteries).
Religious Representation
Provisions of the 1913 Athens Treaty, signed between Greece and the
Ottoman Empire, were incorporated into Greek law with Law No. 2345/1920
(FEK A’ 148, 3.7.1920) that gave a number of religious rights for Muslims
across the country. One of the most important aspects of this treaty regulated
the election of the religious leaders, i.e. the Chief/Grand mufti of Greece and
the regional muftis at each prefecture with Muslim concentration as well as
the administration of Muslim charitable foundations/awqaf. Various issues of
religious autonomy, conscience and belief codiied by the aforementioned law
would be reinforced with the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne, an international
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treaty that has been one of the most frequently invoked international treaties
by members of the Muslim Turkish minority, Greece and Turkey while
speaking about religious liberties of the minority in Western Thrace since the
mid 1920s.
The policy of Greece towards preservation of Islam on the former Ottoman
lands has usually been ambiguous with matters about religious representation
at regional and national level, i.e. the Head Mufti of Greece and the muftis of
Xanthi (İskeçe), Komotini (Gümülcine) and Evros (Meriç) Prefectures. In fact,
the Law No. 2345/1920 provided for elections of the Head mufti (Başmüftü)
who would have represented all Muslims of Greece. Nevertheless, such
elections never occurred mainly because the vast majority of Muslims (around
half a million) had to leave Greece as a result of the compulsory population
exchange between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. This number would
further decrease by the 1950s since the Cham Albanian community had to lee
the Epirus region located in northeastern part of Greece on the grounds that
they had cooperated with Italian and Albanian forces against the Greek Army
during the World War II. Thus, old and new lands of Greece were largely
freed from the historical presence of native Muslims. The incorporation of
the Dodecanese Island in the Aegean Sea in 1947 and the large inlux of
immigrant Muslims after the end of the Cold War actually contributed to the
overall increase in the number of Muslims in Greece. As of 2014, one can come
across with Muslims in different parts of Greece. Yet, no Greek government
promoted reestablishment of a central religious institution, i.e. Chief Muftiate,
which will be responsible for matters of all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity
and country of origin, living across the Greek mainland and its islands.
Unlike the consistency of Greece regarding the highest religious
representation of Islam on its own lands, issues related to the religious leadership
at the local level varies before and after the beginning of 1990s. From 1923
until the death of the Mufti of Komotini in 1985, Greek governments allowed
members of the Minority to deine their own muftis in all three prefectures
of the region. Nevertheless, the Law No.1920/1991 (FEK A’11, 4.2.1991)
abolished this right and transferred it to the Greek state. Thus, all three muftis
started to be appointed by Greece. Here, the main reason of this change was
stated that muftis, also, had partial judicial function in matters of marriage and
inheritance arising from the application of Shari’ah/Islamic Law. However,
this judiciary power was not newly introduced. Muftis had had those rights
and obligations since the Ottoman times (see Tsitselikis 2012:390-399).
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In fact, this policy change was a clear indication of the Greek state’s anxiety
about growing bonds between the functioning of muftis as well as imams who
afiliated themselves with these religious leaders and the political mobilization
of the minority especially throughout the 1980s. This is a decade when
minority members, for the irst time after 1923, acted and reacted collectively
and effectively at all local, regional and international levels against decadeslong human and minority rights violations by the Greek state in Western
Thrace. The critical juncture, in fact, was the 29th of January 1988. For the irst
time after 1923, more than 10,000 minority members, both men and women,
gathered in Komotini so as to protest against the Greek state’s oficial denial of
the ethnic Turkish identity of the Minority and the continuity of violations of
their fundamental human and minority freedoms (see Chousein 2005:77-117).
In this rising activism of the minority ighting for return of their individual
and group based rights enshrined in the Greek constitution as well as the
bilateral-international treaties that Greece signed and ratiied, the role of
religious clergymen of the minority, both muftis and imams, was of utmost
importance; they were among the primary actors who had a slightly higher
education than other minority members. Thus, they contributed to the
development of consciousness among the minority about their rights that had
been violated by the Greek state for a long time.
Seeing this link, the Greek state opted for new policies to control the
religious leadership of local Muslims for the sake of increasing its overall
control over the minority. The irst step was to introduce the aforementioned
law and appoint one mufti at each prefecture of Western Thrace for ten years.
For this sake, the death of the Mufti of Komotini, Hüseyin Mustafa Efendi,
in 1984 provided suitable grounds for Greece to cease the election of muftis
and rather start appointing them. Thus, Meço Hafız Cemali was appointed as
the new mufti of Komotini, whose tenure was renewed twice in 2001 and 2011
for ten years. Developments over the appointment of muftis in Xanthi would
not go different from the events in Komotini. When the mufti of Xanthi died
in 1990, Greece appointed Mehmet Şinikoğlu as the new mufti of Xanthi
under the new law. As for the Evros Prefecture, Mehmet Şerif Damataoğlu
was appointed to the mufti’s ofice in Didimotiho in 1986, and he still remains
in his ofice.
Not surprisingly, this manner of appointing the muftis in the beginning of
the 1990s created strong resentment in the Muslim community against the
intervention of the Greek state into the realm of religious autonomy. One
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of the main indications was that the vast majority of congregations living in
all three prefectures refused the appointed muftis. Instead, they accepted the
elected ones as their religious heads. For instance, many of them sided with
both Ibrahim Şerif and M. Emin Ağa, the elected muftis of Rhodopi and
Xanthi respectively, when they were put on trial in the 1990s for usurping
the authority and title of the appointed muftis. Both muftis applied to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1997 and 1999 respectively.
Regarding their cases, i.e. Serif versus Greece (ECtHR Judgement 1999) and
Agga versus Greece (ECtHR Judgement 2002), the Court concluded that Greece
had violated the rights to the freedom of thought, religion and conscience in
Western Thrace.
In spite of the ECtHR decisions, Greece keeps rejecting the statuses of
them as muftis. Yet, both of them continue functioning as elected religious
leaders of Muslims in Western Thrace. Thus, from the early 1990s until today,
there are two parallel muftis in Komotini and Xanthi (one appointed and one
appointed mufti at each prefecture), and one appointed mufti in Didimotiho.
This contested and double-headed structure of religious representation of
the autochthonous Muslims Turkish minority of Western Thrace continues
to cause various problems in terms of the practice of Islam in everyday life,
while simultaneously disregarding a clearly-expressed and democratic popular
will of the minority to deine their religious leaders.
Muslim Charitable Foundations
Muslim charitable foundations/awqaf remained at the epicentre of the religious
and social lives of Muslims under the Ottoman Empire. In Greece, a country
with a predominant Orthodox Christian population, religious charitable of
Muslims have been playing even a more signiicant role in the promotion and
the protection of the socio-economic wellbeing of the minority in Western
Thrace since 1923.In fact, awqaf had a historical importance in Western Thrace
on the grounds that revenues coming from those moveable and immovable
properties of these organizations enabled to provide food and shelter for the
poor people as well as taking care of schools and sacred religious places such
as mosques, tombs and Islamic cemeteries. In this respect, the more valuable
lands and properties were owned by a waqf the more money was used for socioeconomic development of that locality or sub-region. Thus, Administrative
Boards of Komotini and Xanthi, the two main cities of Western Thrace with
high minority concentration, had more revenues than any other awqaf located
in small municipalities and villages.
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From 1923 until the advent of the junta regime in 1967, there had been
no major problem between the minority and the Greek authorities regarding
the functioning and administration of awqaf. Nevertheless, the dictatorship
removed all those members of the Administrative Boards of Awqaf who were
deined by the Minority and replaced them with those minority members
appointed by the military rule. Although democracy returned to Greece by
1975, this authoritarian application never ended. As of 2014, Muslim Charitable
Organizations in Western Thrace are still governed by those members of the
Minority who had been appointed by the colonel’s regime four decades ago.
Similar to what happened with Muftis, this was another signiicant violation
of right for members of the Minority to deine those people who would
administer charitable foundations of their own society. In this way, Greece
also increased its power and control over historical moveable and immovable
properties of its native Muslim nationals. Today, Muslim Turks of Western
Thrace have no full access to the accounts of those properties belonging to
awqaf. So it is dificult to make comparison regarding the number of properties
of awqaf in the past and the ones in the present. What is apparent is that a
number of valuable awqaf, particularly the ones located in the city centres of
Komotini and Xanthi do not belong to the Muslim Turkish minority any more.
In recent decades, awqaf in Western Thrace also started to face loss of
properties due to excessive taxes. Although the debts of waqfs to Western
Thrace were expunged under the new Law No. 3554/2007, the income
tax and ines imposed on them remained intact. As a result, Administrative
Boards of Waqfs needed more revenue to compensate this loss. To do so,
some properties needed to be sold that would decrease the overall number of
properties owned by awqaf. For instance, the total debt of the Komotini Aqwaf
recently rose to 775,463 Euros in 2009. This resulted in the revocation of 23
shops and one farm owned by Komotini Awqaf (Hayrullah 2009:10).
Talking to members of the Minority, it is frequent to hear many complaints
about appointed members of awqaf who are blamed to cooperate with Greek
authorities for the loss of valuable awqaf properties across Western Thrace. In
fact, the Greek Parliament adopted Law No. 3647/2008 that foresees elections
for those minority members governing administrative boards of awqaf.
However, such an election never took place in the last six years. This research
underlines that any kind of ignorant manner of local and national Greek state
apparatuses related to inding solutions to fundamental problems in the realm
of administration and functioning of the Muslim charitable foundations of
the minority keeps violating Islamic liberties in Western Thrace and prevents
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autochthonous Muslim Turks from enjoying their rights fully as citizens of
Greece and the European Union.
Sacred Places of Islam
Compared to various problems regarding the functioning of the two main
religious institutions of the Muslim Turkish minority in Western Thrace,
mosques have been functional in all three prefectures of the region. With
a few exceptions, performing prayers inside and outside of mosques as well
as the echoing of the call for prayer, adhan, ive times a day have never been
prevented by Greek authorities since 1923. Based on a recent report, more than
250 mosques across Western Thrace were reported to serve for the religious
needs of Muslims (WTMUGA Report 2012:7). At some villages, there are
also some masjids that function for the same purpose. A number of mosques
and masjids are constructed after 1923 with money collected primarily from
Muslim congregations across Western Thrace while the old ones are remnants
of the long administration of Western Thrace by the Ottoman Empire.
As of today, major problems keep occurring about the building of new
mosques and/or maintenance of the old ones. Until recently, the Law No.
1369/1938 (FEK A’317, 10.9.1938) required Muslims to apply to the local
Metropolitan Greek bishop to get the necessary permission for construction
of an Islamic house of prayer. From time to time, local Greek authorities
together with local metropolitan bishops either delayed or refused to give
permits for construction of new mosques or restoration of old ones. In
the municipality of Iasmos (Yassıköy), for instance, it was reported that local
authorities insisted on refusing to provide the necessary building permit to
complete a half-built minaret for almost three decades (Whitman 1990:27).
From the mid-1990s, such restrictions against building permits lessened and
inally the bishop’s role regarding the construction of places of worship
was transferred to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs in 2006
(Giannakou 2006). Therefore, as of 2014, the local metropolitan churches
have no oficial say in the establishment of mosques and less problems occur
regarding the building of new mosques.
Along with oficial permission, major problems between the minority and
Greek authorities continue to occur on matters regarding the height of the
minaret. According to practices of the Greek governments, minarets should
not be taller than the church bells, i.e. no more than 16 meters long. In the
past, many oficial construction certiicates were granted for establishment of
mosques with minarets not taller than 16 meters. But recently, some problems
occurred between the Greek authorities and the minority when some Muslim
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Turkish villagers demanded the same height but the former rejected their
application on the grounds that the Greek law limits the height of minarets
with 7.5 meters (Kirbaki 2008). Since then, minority members have been
refusing any limitation of minarets with shorter than 16 meters. They also
interpret this application as another discouraging factor to construct minarets
adjacent to their houses of prayers, which also violates their religious freedoms.
Islamophobia, a rather new concept in the Western World, is not a new
phenomenon for members of the Muslim Turkish minority. Mosques, that are
one of the most apparent symbols of Islam, have occasionally been targeted
since 1923 by extremist and Islamophobic individuals or groups who feel
uncomfortable with the historical presence of Turkish and Muslim identities
in Western Thrace. Looking through the local Turkish-language newspapers
of the Minority, it becomes blatant that arson attacks towards sacred places
of the minority, e.g. mosques, masjids, cemeteries and Turkish associations in
the past and today. It is common for almost all incidents that no individual or
group of people is brought in front of the Greek courts and punished since
they remain unidentiied by the Greek authorities.
The most popular example is the mosque located in the Toxotes village
of Xanthi where only a handful of Muslim Turks live. This mosque was
attacked and severely damaged four times between 2006 and 2012 (Millet
Gazetesi, 24.5.2012). Along with Islamophobia, anti-Turkish sentiments are
also displayed through hate-motivated attacks to sacred places of Islam.
For example, one of the most famous slogans against Turks and Turkey, i.e.
Τουρκός Καλός, μόνοΝεκρός! [The best Turk is the dead Turk] was written
in bold capital on the wall of a Bektashi tomb located in downtown Xanthi.
(Hayrullah, et.al. 2014:36). It is possible to foresee that similar attacks targeting
either the ethnic Turkish identity or Islam in Western Thrace may increase as
a result of growing extreme nationalism and xenophobia inside the Greek
society in recent years.
Less problems seem to occur with functioning of Islamic cemeteries in
Western Thrace. Each locality with a Muslim Turkish concentration has its
own house of prayer and cemetery. Religious funerals can be freely performed
at cemeteries according to the rules and practices of Islam. Still, cemeteries,
similar to mosques, cannot escape from becoming possible targets of hatemotivated and Islamphobic attacks. From time to time, it is possible to come
across with incidents where some tombstones of Muslim graveyards were
destroyed during the night while those attackers could never be identiied and
put before the Greek courts.
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Visiting all three prefectures of Western Thrace, it is easy to spot many
dilapidates buildings, mosques, cemeteries and tombs most of which constitute
the Ottoman heritage of Western Thrace. In spite of unabated demands of
members belonging to the Muslim Turkish minority, restoration of the Ottoman
heritage is either very slow or non-existent. For instance, the restoration of the
Çelebi Sultan Mehmet Mosque, one of the oldest buildings of the Ottoman
heritage in the Balkans and Europe dating back to the 14th century, started in
the mid-1990. As of 2014, its restoration has not inished yet. My visit to this
mosque earlier this year indicates that there is a lot more work to be done as
well as big amounts of money to be spent. Given that Greece is under a heavy
economic crisis any expectation regarding the mentioned-above restoration
as well as other Ottoman heritage sites remains weak. Along with need for
restoration there were a few cases of the conversion of small Ottoman shrines
(tekkes) into small churches. For instance, the Hıdır Baba Tekkesi in Petrota
(Taşlık) and the Kütüklü Baba Tekkesi in Selino (Gereviz)-Ksanthiwere either
partially of fully converted into places for Orthodox Christians (Kürşat 2008;
Tahsin 2011).
Religious Schooling – Madrasahs
Regarding religious schools/madrasahs in Western Thrace, there has been a
numerical decline since 1923. Two years after the Lausanne Peace was signed,
the total number of madrasahs was reported to be 16 across Western Thrace;
eight in Komotini, three in Xanthi, and one in each of Εchinos (Şahin),
Pachni (Paşevik), Dimario (Demercik), Oraio (Yassıören) and Sappes (Şapçı)
(Andreadis 1956:74). Yet, madrasahs gradually closed and by 1939, only four
madrasahs remained inside the region; all of them were functioning in Komotini
(Tsitselikis 2003:50). Since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949, only two
of them have been functioning for religious schooling of the Minority; one
is located in Komotini and the other one in Echinos Municipality of Xanthi.
The primary function of madrasahs was to satisfy the minority’s need for
imams/preachers inside and outside the mosques, ranging from leading daily
and weekly prayers to teaching the holy Qur’an.
Until the beginning of the 1970s, most of the courses taught in the two
madrasahs were primarily in Turkish and Arabic. Nevertheless, this started to
change when courses instructed in Turkish were gradually replaced by courses
taught in Greek. This also enabled increasing number of Greek teachers to
start teaching at religious schools of Muslim, which has widely been interpreted
by the minority as an indication of the increasing state control over religious
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education. As of 2014, the vast majority of courses are taught in Greek while
the total number of Minority students attending to these schools is not more
than 500 (Huseyinoglu 2012:251-256). This study underlines that the madrasahs
actually ceased to function as preparing the next-generation imams and local
religious clergymen of the minority. Rather, they keep providing education
similar to that at Greek public schools. Thus, the vast majority of Muslim
Turkish students who inish religious schools sit for the national university
entrance exam and try to win a place at a Greek higher education institution.
Only a few of them choose to develop their knowledge of Islam at the tertiary
level and start functioning as clergymen inside Western Thrace.
Concluding Remarks
The survival of Islam passed from different phases of inclusion and exclusion
in Western Thrace. Despite many controversies between the minority and the
Greek state, Islam is still alive in Western Thrace. Nevertheless, a variety of
problems concerning the religious autonomy of the minority, some of which
are elaborated in this research, keep violating religious freedoms of those
Greek citizens belonging to the Muslim Turkish minority; the obstruction of
the election of muftis and members for the administrative boards of waqfs,
arson attacks against mosques and cemeteries are some of the major issues
indicating that both individual and collective rights of the minority in the ield
of religion has not been fully implemented and safeguarded yet by Greek state
mechanisms.
The continuation of such violations of religious rights in the second decade
of the new millennium also highlights the lack of an effective dialogue between
the minority and the Greek state apparatus both at the local and national levels.
This study emphasizes that it is mainly the Greek state oficials who decide
on the fate of religious autonomy without any cooperation with the minority
members. Thus, it is a matter of fact that the latter have almost no say throughout
the decision making process which determines the extent of religious liberties
in Western Thrace. Given that Greece insists on tackling minority-related issues
without starting any effective dialogue with the minority members in Thrace,
then, this study anticipates that a variety of problems in the realm of religious
autonomy of the minority will likely to continue in the second decade of the
millennium. This will probably result in widening of the gap between the Greek
state and the minority as well as the gap between the minority and majority locals
of Western Thrace, thus contributing to further isolation and ghettoization of
the Muslim Turkish entity inside the society of Greece.
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Notes
1.
For a recent and comprehensive study on old and new Islam in Greece see
Tsitselikis (2012).
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Belief, 9-10 July 2009, Hofburg-Vienna/Austria.
Hayrullah, P; Huseyinoglu, A; Kabza, C. (2014), A Report on Western Thrace Turkish
Minority, (Komotini: PEKEM Publications).
Huseyinoglu, A. (2012) “The Development of Minority Education at the Southeasternmost Corner of the EU: The Case of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace,
Greece,” PhD dissertation (unpublished), (Brighton: University of Sussex).
Kirbaki, Y. (2008) ‘MinareboyuAtina’yadertoldu [Athens is disturbed from the height
of Minaret]’. Online. Available http://www.radikal.com.tr/ Radikal.aspx?aType
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Kürşat, Kağan Yusuf (2008), ‘BatıTrakya’daHıdır Baba TekkesiVeYaşananlar [What
happened with the Hidir Baba Tomb in Western Thrace]’. Available at http://www.
turkocagi.org.tr/index.php/kultursanat/kueltuer-sanat-guendemi/729-gundem
[Accessed on 7 July 2014]
Millet Gazetesi, 24.5.2012.‘Bir seçim arefesinde daha Okçular Camii’ne taşlı saldırı [The
Okcular Mosque has been attacked again on the eve of elections]’.
Pentzopoulos, D. (2002), The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact on Greece Reprint with the Preface by Michael Llewellyn Smith (London: Hurstand Company).
Sevi, S. (2009), ‘Rodos Türkleri Yunanistan’dan Açılım Bekliyor [Turks of Rhodes are
waiting for new measures/policies from Greece]’, Zaman, 6 September.
Tahsin, I. A. (2011) ‘Kütüklü Baba Türbesinde İkonlar Yerini Bulmuş [The icons have
taken place at the Kutuklu Baba Tekke/Tomb]’. Online. Available at http://www.
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Triandafyllidou, A. (2001), Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, New York,
Routledge.
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Forum on Minority Issues, 27-28 November 2012, Geneva/Switzerland.
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Contributors
Mesut Idriz
Dr. Mesut Idriz, a native of Macedonia, received his graduate and doctoral
degrees from the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization
(ISTAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Currently he
is Professor of Comparative History of Civilizations, Law and Ethics, and
Political Science courses at the International University of Sarajevo. He has
taught in various countries and international institutions (Malaysia, Turkey and
Kosovo) and was Chief Editor at MPH Group Publishing (Kuala Lumpur).
He is Vice-President of Dituria Foundation, a philanthropic organization
based in Macedonia that serves towards the studies on science and culture. He
has published, edited and translated numerous academic books and articles
concerning the Balkans, Ottoman and Muslim history, Islamic civilization,
history of Islamic education (particularly the tradition of ijazah, diploma). He
has co-edited a book titled Past, Present & Future of Turkish-Albanian-Macedonian
Relations, (Ankara: ADAM Publications, 2012). [idrizmesut@yahoo.com]
Osman Bakar
Dr. Osman Bakar, a native of Malaysia, received his PhD in Islamic philosophy
from Temple University, Philadelphia (USA). He is currently Chair Professor
and Director of Sultan Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Centre of Islamic Studies
(SOASCIS), Universiti Brunei Darussalam. Formerly Malaysia Chair of Islam
in Southeast Asia at the Prince Talal al-Waleed Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington DC. He is also Emeritus
Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Malaya. Dr. Bakar
is an author of 18 books and more than 300 articles on various aspects of
Islamic thought and civilization, particularly Islamic science and philosophy.
His most well-known books are Classiication of Knowledge in Islam (1992) and
Tawhid and Science (1992). [obbakar@yahoo.com]
Muhamed Ali
Dr. Muhamed Ali is as assistant professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, International University of Sarajevo, where he teaches courses in the
area of law and political sciences. Previously, he served as lecturer at the faculty
of Islamic Sciences in Skopje, where he taught courses of Islamic Law and the
Philosophy of Islamic Law. He actively participates in different international
conferences and is author of several articles published in edited books and
international academic journals. [muhamedali@hotmail.co.uk]
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Christoph Marcinkowski
Dr. Christoph Marcinkowski is an independent German consultant and
scholar in Islamic Studies based in Berlin. His work focuses on Shi’ite and
Persianate societies, especially in the Arabian Gulf region, the Indian Ocean
and Southeast Asia. He obtained his MA from the Free University of Berlin
and his PhD from the International Islamic University of Malaysia, Kuala
Lumpur, both in Islamic Studies. For more than 15 years, he has taught and
done research at universities and policy think tanks in Malaysia and Singapore
and has also been in the editorial team of Columbia University’s renowned
Encyclopedia Iranica (New York).He is also an External Research Associate for
the Bahrain Institute of Banking and Finance (BIBF), focusing on ethics in
Islamic banking and inance, and a Senior External Expert for the Middle
East Institute’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) in Washington DC. He has
organized several international conferences on interreligious issues and human
rights in the Middle East. Among his 12 books are The Islamic World and the West
(Berlin: LIT, 2009) and Islam in Europe (Kuala Lumpur: IAIS Malaysia, 2012).
[cwm_marcinkowski@yahoo.de]
Anja Zalta
Born in Maribor, Slovenia, Dr. Anja Zalta studied Sociology, Ethnology and
Cultural Anthropology at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where
she received her PhD in Sociology in 2002. She is an Assistant Professor of
Sociology of Religion, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts, University
of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and author of many articles on religious traditions and
identities, inter-religious dialogue, ethics and human rights. She is the author of
the book Light in the Occident and co-editor of Poligrai, the international edition
of the Slovenian journal for the interdisciplinary (sociological, philosophical
and anthropological) study of religion. In 2013 she has received Turkish
Research Grant to study Religious (Christian) Minorities in Turkey. She is also
a certiicated mediator with specialization in Conlict Resolution and Conlict
Transformation from the International Peace Training at Stadtschlaining,
Austria. Currently she is working as a visiting researcher at the Nan Tien
Institute in Wollongong, Australia, in the project entitled Mindfulness and Conlict
Transformation. [anyazalta@yahoo.com]
Senad Nanić
Senad Nanić is architect and publicist from Zagreb, Croatia, with M.A. in
philosophy of science (Kuala Lumpur, 1996). As architectural designer he
worked in Istanbul, Sarajevo, and Zagreb. He designed more than 80 projects
having over 50 realizations ranging from city planning to public, business and
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residential buildings, interiors and interventions on architectural monuments.
He was president of Preporod - Cultural Association of Croatian Bosniaks (20012014). He is member of editor’s board of Preporod’s rewarded magazine Behar
publishing column Multimonolog and articles in philosophy of science, Islamic
arhcitecture and arts, social and minority studies. He published three books,
Al-Ghazzali’s Natural Philosophy (1998), Zagreb Mosque (2009), Multimonolog
(2011). He was consultant on documentary Muslims of Europe produced by
European Broadcast Union (2007). He teaches Islamic arts, culture and civilization
at Islamic High School in Zagreb. [senad.nanic@zg.t-com.hr]
Muhidin Mulalič
Dr. Muhidin Mulalič, a Bosnian, received his PhD from the International
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in 2007. Before joining
the International University of Sarajevo (IUS), he has been teaching in various
higher learning institutions in Malaysia. He has published many academic
articles in various journals and book chapters. His latest book is A Survey of
Early Muslim Historiography published in 2011, Kuala Lumpur. [mmuhidin@
hotmail.com]
Meliha Teparič
Born in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Meliha Teparič is lecturing at
the Faculty of Art and Social Sciences, International University of Sarajevo.
She completed her BA and MA in the Academy of Fine Art, University of
Sarajevo. She is a PhD candidate at the Department of History of Art, Faculty
of Philosophy, University of Zagreb. She has 48 collective exhibitions in
the country and aboard, 7 solo exhibition, and 3 art awards. She has several
published articles. [melihateparic@yahoo.com]
Mirsad Karič
Dr. Mirsad Karic graduated from the Department of Political Science,
International Islamic University Malaysia and joined the International
University of Sarajevo in October 2007. He is an Assistant Professor and
has been teaching courses dealing with comparative politics and religion
and politics. He has contributed chapters in edited volumes and published
several articles in various journals. He is currently working on a book titled
“Consociationalism as a power-sharing approach: Case study of the postDayton Bosnia and Herzegovina”. His research and teaching interests cover:
International Relations Theories, Comparative Politics (with special reference
to Political Participation, Elections and Electoral Studies) and Islam and
Politics. [mirsad39@hotmail.com]
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Tuba Boz
Dr. Tuba Boz, a native of Australia, is a social researcher with extensive
experience in the ields of anthropology, media and strategic communications.
She earned her PhD from the Monash University in 2009. She works on
interdisciplinary projects for academic institutions, the media industry, nongovernment organizations and government departments. She is currently a
consultant to the chairperson at the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
(TASAM), Vice President of European Muslim Initiative for Social Cohesion
(EMISCO) and is a lecturer at the International University of Sarajevo
(IUS). [tboz@ius.edu.ba]
Jeton Mehmeti
Jeton Mehmeti is a young publicist born in Kosovo. He holds two BA degrees
from the International Islamic University Malaysia, one in Comparative
Religion and one in Mass Communication. He earned his MA degree from
the Central European University, Budapest. He is the recipient of Marshall
Memorial Fellowship for academic exchange in the USA. His irst book
Tensions between Freedom of Expression and Religious Sensitivity – the Case of Danish
Cartoons, was published in Germany in 2011. He has published articles in
various journals in the USA, Turkey, Austria and Bulgaria, and has presented
papers in Los Angeles, Kuala Lumpur, and Brussels. His latest article is The
Economic and Social Involvement of Turkey in Kosovo, published in a special issue
entitled “The Balkans: Past, Present and Future Prospects,” Journal of ADAM
Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 1, 2012. He is a promoter of interfaith dialogue
and has been part of many TV shows, roundtable discussions and other
interfaith initiatives. He is a lecturer of communication at the University of
Prishtina. [mehmetijeton@gmail.com]
Islam Hasani
Dr. Islam Hasani is the economic advisor to the Grand Mufti of the Republic of
Kosovo, and also in charge of awqaf development projects within the presidency
of the Islamic Community of Kosovo. He is actively involved also in supervising
the Shari’ah affairs to Banks and Microinance institutions in Kosovo. Prior to
joining Grand Mufti’s ofice, he was teaching at the Kingdom University in the
Kingdom of Bahrain. He was also Managing Director of START Microinance
institution in Kosovo. He is author of three books, ive journal articless, around
40 magazine and conference papers. He holds bachelor in Shari’ah from the
Faculty of Islamic Studies in Prishtina, Master in Islamic Civilization from the
International Islamic University Malaysia and PhD in Islamic Banking from the
University Malaya, Malaysia. [islamhasani@hotmail.com]
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Islam Islami
Islam Islami is PhD candidate at the South Eastern European University,
where he is working on the dissertation to be completed by the end of
2014 with the theme “Egypt amid State Secularism and Political Islamism.”
He is actively involved in both academic and non-governmental institutions
in Macedonia and abroad. He has been oficial interpreter of the Islamic
Community of Macedonia. He is presently lecturer at the Isa Beg Medrese in
Skopje. [islamii81@hotmail.com]
Qani Nesimi
Dr. Qani Nesimi is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Religion at
the State University of Tetovo, Macedonia. He earned his PhD from the
University of Saint Cyril and Methodius with the theme: “The Ottoman State
relations with Christians in Republic of Macedonia 15-16 century”. Besides attending
various international conferences, he has published ive books in Albanian
language and he is the translator several works from Turkish, Bosnian and
Arabic languages into Albanian. He is also an academic advisor to the Rector
of the International Balkan University, Macedonia. [qnesimi@yahoo.com]
Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič
Lejla Ramič-Mesihovič is a researcher, analyst and political scientist from
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her academic background is in literature of
countries of former Yugoslavia and political sciences, with particular focus on
international relations. She is specialized in geopolitics of the Southern Balkans
countries. Her professional history includes agency journalism, running of
International Relations Department of the BiH Union of Journalist, political
activism and activism in the NGO sector and political mentoring, advising and
consultancy. Currently, she is a PhD candidate at the International University
of Sarajevo. [lejla_mesihovic@yahoo.com]
Sherif Abdullahi
Sherif Abdullahi, a native of Macedonia, is currently Head of Islamic Banking
at New Kabul Bank, Kabul, Afghanistan. He obtained a Master in Islamic
Finance from INCEIF, The Global University in Islamic Finance, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. He is a PhD candidate in Economics and Muamalat at
Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM), Malaysia. [sherifabdullahi@yahoo.com]
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Ali Hüseyinoğlu
Dr. Ali Hüseyinoğlu was born in Komotini/Greece. After secondary and
high school education in Istanbul/Turkey, he received his BA and MSc from
the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University
(METU) in Ankara/Turkey. His master thesis, awarded with the best thesis
of 2005 at METU, was about continuities and changes of the Greek minority
policy of Western Thrace in the post-Cold War era. In 2012, he completed
his doctoral studies at the Department of International Relations, University
of Sussex/UK. His thesis was about the historical development of the
educational regime of the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace
in Greece after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Currently, he is an Assistant
Prof. in the Balkan Research Institute at Trakya University in Edirne, Turkey.
[alihuseyinoglu1@gmail.com]
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