A Fifteenth-Century Metaphysical Treatise: Preliminary Remarks on the Colliget principiorum of Heymericus de Campo

Przegl¹d Tomistyczny, t. XIV (2008), s. 231–1 ISSN 0860-0015 Dragos Calma, Ruedi Imbach A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE: PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM OF HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO* Qualis unusquisque est, talia dicit et operatur et taliter vivit (Heymericus de Campo) Ferventi Heymerici amico Zenoni Kaluza I. INTRODUCTION I.1. Life and Works Heymericus de Campo or Heymeric van de Velde was born before 1395 near Eindoven, the Netherlands. Before 1410 he studied at the Faculté des Arts in Paris under Jean de Maison Neuve (Iohannes de Nova Domo), an important figure in late Albertism. In approximately 1415, he received the title of Magister artium and immediately undertook studies in theology. Between 1420 and 1422 he left Paris for Cologne, where he completed his theological studies, took on several administrative positions and began a long and profound friendship with Nicholas of Kues. He stayed in Cologne until being sent by the University in 1432 to the Council of Basel (1431– –1449), where he spoke several times. At this time he wrote nearly a dozen works, including the Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis, divini et humani philosophice doctrinalium. On February 17th, 1435, Heymericus left the Council and in April of the same year became a professor at the very new University of Leuven, where he occupied numerous administrative positions before quickly reaching that of rector of the institution, which he remained until 1453. He died in 14601. * Research supported by the „Fritz Thyssen Stiftung für Wissenschaftsförderung” (Cologne); the authors thank Dominique Poirel for his help in developing the description of Codex Cusanus106. 1 For more general information on his life and works, see especially R. IMBACH / P. LAD NER, Heymericus de Campo, Opera selecta, Freiburg Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 2001 232 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Heymericus is the author of a very large body of treatises, which remain for the most part in manuscript form; among them are a commentary on the Sentences, composed around 1424, a very interesting Tractatus problematicus in which he imagines a dialog betwen Thomists and Albertists, several commentaries on Aristotle, and some theological treatises, including a curious Centheologicon in which he presents 100 different possible theologies2 . (Spicilegium Friburgense, 39); M. HOENEN, Heymeric van de Velde. Eenheid in de tegendelen, Baarn: Ambo 1990; ID., Academics and Intellectual Life in the Low Countries: The University Career of Heymeric de Campo († 1460), „Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale”, 61 (1994), p. 173–209; ID., Denys the Carthusian and Heymeric de Campo on the Pilgrimages of Children to Mont-Saint-Michel (1458), „Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age”, 61 (1994), p. 387–418; ID., Academic Theology in the Fifteenth Century. The Sentences Commentary of Heymericus de Campo († 1460); P.J.J.M. BAKKER et al. (ed.), Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza, Turnhout: Brepols, 2002, p. 513–559; Z. K ALUZA, La voix créatrice de Dieu. Remarques sur l’Alphabetum de Heimeric de Campo, in: Haijo JAN WESTRA (ed.), From Athens to Chartres [Texte imprimé]: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought: Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau, Leiden / New York / Köln: E.J. Brill, 1992, p. 439–468; ID., Dialogus Heimerici de Campo cum Godefrido de Campo, „Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale”, 38 (1971); J.-D. CAVIGIOLI, Les écrits d’Heymericus de Campo (1395–1460) sur les oeuvres d’Aristote, „Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie”, 28 (1981), P. 293–371; R. IMBACH, Quelques remarques sur le traité De sigillo eternitatis de Heymeric de Campo”, in: M. HOENEN / A . DE LIBERA (hrsg.), Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters, Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995 (Studien und Texte zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, XLVIII), p. 297–302. On Heymericus’s participation in the Council of Basel, see especially Florian HAMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. Universalwissenschaft und Konziliarismus bei Heymericus de Campo, Münster: Aschendorff, 2006; J. HELMRATH, Das Basler Konzil, 1431–1449, Köln: Böhlau, 1987; ID., Die Konzilien von Pisa (1409), Konstanz (1414– –1418) und Basel (1431–1449): Institution und Personen, Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 2007; P. LADNER, Revolutionäre Kirchenkritik am Basler Konzil? Zum Konziliarismus des Heymericus de Campo, Basel 1985 (Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel, 19); ID., Der Ablass-Traktat des Heymericus de Campo. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Basler Konzil, in: Festgabe Bischof Anton Hänggi (= Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte, 71 (1977) I-II), p. 93–140; see also ANNA FREDRIKSSON A DMAN, Heymericus de Campo: Dyalogus Super Reuelacionibus Beate Birgitte: A Critical Edition with an Introduction, Uppsala 2003 (Studia Latina Upsaliensia, 27). 2 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Tractatus Problematicus, Cologne 1496. On the Tractatus see G. MEERSSEMAN, Geschichte des Albertismus, II; M. HOENEN, Heymeric van de Velde († 1460) und die Geschichte des Albertismus: Auf der Suche nach den Quellen der albertistichen Intellektlehre des Tractatus Problematicus, in: M. J.F.M. HOENEN, A. DE LIBEra (eds.), Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus, p. 303–331; A. DE LIBERA, L’empreinte de la pensée. Cultures et philosophies de l’Allemagne médiévale. Sources, développement, diffusion; H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS, Heymeric van de Velde (a Campo), denker op een kruispunt van wegen. De ‘logische’ kwestie uit zijn ‘Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et Sanctum Thomam’, „Algemeen Ne- A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 233 The Colliget, which the authors are currently editing in the light of work begun by J.-D. Cavigioli at the University of Fribourg, is contained in Codex Cusanus 106 from the Library of the Hospice of Saint Nicholas at Bernkastel-Kues. The codex has retained all of its original elements, including parchment guard-leaves with a right-hand watermark nearly identical to Piccard type III.919, dated 1503; its recent reconstitution (2007) added only an guard leaf 3 . It contains 22 quires: 16(1–12), 26 (13–24), 36(25–36), 46(37–48), 56(49–60), 68(61–76), 76(77–88), 86(89–100), 96(101–112), 106(113–124), 116(125–136), 126(137–148), 136(149–160), 145(161–170), 156(171–182), 166(183–194), 177(195–208), 187(209–222), 197(223r–236v), 207(237r–250v), 216(251–262), 226(263–274). Quires 1–5, 7–16 and 17–20 are in paper with an ox-head watermark (close to Briquet type 14297), of southern or central French origin, very common and dated 1424–1427. The paper of quire 6 is slightly smaller than the others, with three different watermarks: (1) the first kind is a simple ox with a tail, Italian in origin and nearly identical to Piccard type VI.906, dated 1434, and to AT8500–4255_64 of the Wasserzeichen des Mittelalters, also dated 14344 ; derlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte”, 75 (1983), p. 13–24. On the Centheologicon see R. IMBACH, Das Centheologicon des Heymericus de Campo und die darin enthaltenen Cusanus-Reminiszenzen: Hinweise und Materialien”, „Traditio”, 39 (1983), p. 466–477; ID., Theologia Raymundi Lulli memoriter epylogata: Das Ramon Lull gewidmete Kapitel im Centheologicon des Heymericus de Campo, „Estudios Lulianos”, 23 (1979), p. 185–193; ID., Einheit des Glaubens. Spuren des Cusanischen Dialogs De pace fidei bei Heymericus de Campo, „Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie”, 27 (1980), p. 5–23. The commentary on the Sentences was recently identified by Hoenen in Codex Cusanus 24. 3 The authors cite the series, numbers and production years of watermarked paper according to C.-M. BRIQUET, Les Filigranes, dictionnaire historique des marques du papier dès leur apparition vers 1282 jusqu’en 1600, a facsimile of the 1907 edition with supplementary material contributed by a number of scholars, ed. by A. Stevenson, Amsterdam: Paper Publications Society, 1968; G. PICCARD, Die Wasserzeichenkartei Piccard im Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, 1961–1996. In addition, it is very useful to consult the website WZMA — Wasserzeichen des Mittelalters (http://www.ksbm.oeaw.ac.at/wz/wzma.php) organized by A. Haidinger, M. Stieglecker and F. Lackner. Here, PICCARD, Die Wasserzeichenkartei, vol. XVII Hand und Handschuh. The authors are pursuing and completing the masuscript descriptions of J. MARX, Verzeichnis der Handschriftensammlung des Hospitals zu Cues bei Bernkastel/Mosel, Trier 1905, p. 105–106, and Pascal Ladner in: R. IMBACH / P. LADNER, Heymericus de Campo, p. 21. They wish to thank Ms. Gabriele Neusis, librarian of the Library of the Hospice of Saint Nicholas at Bernkastel-Kues, for her precious assistance in the preparation of this study. 4 In PICCARD, Die Wasserzeichenkartei, vol. XV, Verschiedene Vierfüssler; it is analogous to Briquet 2774, dated 1423. 234 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH (2) the second watermark, Piedmontese, is a bunch of grapes with a thick, curled stem, very close to Briquet type 12998, dated ±1450, and of a form that Piccard dates after 1424 5 ; (3) the third watermark is a crown with one floret, common in Switzerland, France, the Netherlands and Germany but of Piedmontese origin in this case; it resembles Piccard’s series 321–323, dated c. 1435 6 . This quire is thus composed of several types of paper made between 1430/1435 and 1450. It contains the Theoremata tocius universi (f. 63r–65v) and the Ars demonstrativa (f. 65v–76v), which may have been composed around 1429–14327 ; it is not impossible that Heymericus brought these works to Basel, which might explain their presence in a codex containing works composed during the Council. The last two quires (21 and 22) of the codex contain paper with a watermark of the cross of St. Anthony or the letter T, Piccard type, series I.47– –49: this may be paper of German origin (Cologne or Trier) made around 1427–1430; this watermark is close to forms from the paper mills of Basel, of which the oldest seems to date from 1443 8 . It can thus be affirmed that the paper on which the texts of Cusanus 106 are found seems to have been produced after 1420 and probably before 1450, which corresponds to the period of the Council of Basel (1431–1449); this is particularly interesting because several works (Sermo factus Basilee in synodo (...), f. 1r–6v; Tractatus de sigillo eternitatis (...) a magistro Heymerico de Campo Basilee tempore concilii editus, f. 77r–85r; Disputatio magistri H. de Campo de potestate ecclesiastica in concilio Basiliensis collecta f. 89r–188r; Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis (...), f. 195r–274v) were composed by Heymericus de Campo during his stay in Basel 9. Piedmontese origin is confirmed by H. K ÄLIN, Papier in Basel bis 1500, 1974, p. 367. 6 In the WZMA, number AT8500–4165_311. 7 The Theoremata totius universi was ed. by E. COLOMER, Heimeric van den Velde entre Ramon Llull y Nicolas de Cusa, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens, 21. Bd., hrsg. von Joh. VINCKE, Münster: Achendorff, 1963, p. 229–232. J.-D. Cavigioli has edited the Ars demonstrativa in: R. IMBACH / P. LADNER, Heymericus de Campo, p. 129–167. 8 PICCARD, Die Wasserzeichenkartei, vol. XI, Kreuz. Cf. H. K ÄLIN, Papier in Basel, p. 210, p. 413 type 101 and p. 349. 9 The Tractatus de sigillo eternitatis has been ed. by R. Imbach and P. Ladner in: R. IMBACH /P. LADNER, Heymericus de Campo, p. 93–128; the Disputatio magistri H. de Campo de potestate ecclesiastica can be found partially edited in F. HAMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit, p. 265–335. More information on the other texts of the codex may be found in: R. IMBACH / P. LADNER, Heymericus de Campo, p. 20–21. 5 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 235 The codex contains several blank folios at the end of quires 1 (folios 7r– –12v), 2 (folios 22v–24v), and 7 (folios 85v–88v). The texts following the blank folios are new treatises, copied on different quires and by different hands; these works were therefore not copied one after the other but were rather bound together by different quires. The Colliget is copied out on quires 17 to 22, so on two different types of paper: one of French origin dating from 1424–1427, the other German, produced between 1427–1430. In quire 18, between folios 213v–214r, a small sheet is added, sewn in near the center of the folio. Filled in by the same hand as the other folios of the quire, it contains on both recto and verso a section (decimum septimum principium, from Distinctio Tertia, Secunda Pars of the Colliget principiorum) of the text of f. 231v; this sheet is not numbered. Two copyists’ hands follow one another in the copy of the Colliget, hand A starting on f. 195v and continuing up to f. 250v, and hand B starting on f. 251r and going to the end of the treatise, which corresponds to the end of the codex (f. 274v). Thus hand B transcribes the text on the last two quires, which are different both in composition and in paper type from the quires copied by hand A. These two copyists’ hands are furthermore different from all the others in the codex. Here is a diagram of these 11 hypotheses: hand A quire 17, f.195r f. 231v – 214r chapter added on insert hypothesis 188 f. 250v, hypothesis 198, end of quire 20 hand B beginning of quire 21 f. 251r, hypothesis 190 f. 253v hypothesis 200 f. 274v same text, with variants 236 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH One part of the text is common to both copyists: hand A copies the text from the Colliget up to and including hypothesis 198 of the Quarta Pars, Distinctio Prima; the text transmitted by hand B begins at hypothesis 190, but this 190 in fact corresponds to hypothesis 188 from hand A. This means (1) that the two additional hypotheses counted by hand B are anterior to hypothesis 188/190 and (2) that there are 11 hypotheses copied by both hands, with different numbering. Hand B does not continue copying the treatise beyond the place where hand A stops. The composition of the quires of Codex 106 makes it possible to affirm that the two quires of hand B (n° 21 et 22) were added during the original binding after the hand-A quires. The redundant part was not eliminated during the binding and the numbering of the hypothesis was not corrected to correspond to hand A. The Tabula of the treatise, copied by hand B on f. 273v–274v, stops at hypothesis 10 (Ex nihilo nihil fieri vel de aliquo annihilari) and Heymericus does not specify the number of hypotheses that he intends to discuss. The situation becomes more complicated if one considers that hand A’s hypothesis 196 / hand B’s 198 refers back to hypothesis 195: (f. 250r hand A / f. 252v hand B): „Centesima nonagesima sexta / octava yipothesi: In illis conceptibus et effectibus iuxta prefata in centesima nonagesima quinta yipothesi ordo actionum memorie et voluntatis sunt etc.” This corresponds to hypothesis 195 according to the numbering of hand A. It can thus be supposed that hand B or its model text add two hypotheses to hand A’s text or to its model and that it modifies the numbering in order to take this addition into account, but without changing or rewriting the texts of the following hypotheses: the internal reference remains in conformity to the text (or model text) of hand A, which was probably complete, despite the numbering change. Heymeric may have revised and completed his text and sent it to Nicholas of Kues, who did not remark upon or was not interested in the two supplementary hypotheses and simply bound the two quires that he had just received (or had just had copied) along with the quires that he already had. This would explain why the codex has the same text for 11 hypotheses. A further argument supports this notion. Immediately after the 200 hypotheses, the text of hand B specifies: A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 237 f. 253v: Sequitur conclusiva additio totius sicut prefertur dupliciter partitionis: Hiis suppositionibus seu ypothesibus tamquam propositionibus non omnibus in philosophia Aristotelis eruditis, merito precognitis si adantur nonnulle auctoritates et maxime, que sunt propositiones per se note, patebit copiosus introitus omnia problemata ex principiis philosophie circa creatorem et creaturas ventilari solita rationabiliter determinandi. Accedat atque primo illa evidentissima cunctis veritatis scrutatoribus auctoritas: omnis doctrina... Deinde accedat hec auctoritas: oportet addiscentem credere I Elenchorum... Deinde subdatur hec dignitas: omne totum est maius... Preterea addatur hec dignitas: quecumque uni termino... Insuper addatur hec maxima: finitum et infinitum... etc. The conclusiva additio totius may point to all the hypotheses that precede it: Heymeric wants to give them more weight by referring to authorities and to propositions per se note; what follows, up to the beginning of the section devoted to law on f. 254v, is a long series of commented citations on the themes discussed in the hypotheses: hiis suppositionibus seu ypothesibus adantur auctoritates. It can be affirmed that this entire section, from f. 253v au 254v, is an addition with which Heymeric intended to enrich an anterior version, identical to the text copied by hand A, and that Nicholas of Kues noticed and retained, perhaps according to the express wishes of the author. The chapter copied on the insterted sheet (decimum septimum principium, from Distinctio Tertia, Secunda Pars) by hand A and bound into the quire is not a later addition. It seems that the copyist forgot to copy it in its correct place, realized his mistake and rectified it. Furthermore, the Tabula mentions this chapter, with the same number and title, in the order of the text. However, this same table of contents mentions a chapter 11 (De differentia verorum scibilium a non scibilibus prime philosophie, from Prima Pars, Distinctio Prima) that is missing in hand A’s text. Without this mention of it in the Tabula, it would be impossible to notice the chapter distinction through internal composition or argument development. It is certain that the text from which hand B composed or copied the table of contents was not the hand-A text, but it is not at all clear why the table stops at hypothesis 10 of the Quarta Pars. It can be deduced from the above considerations that the text copied by hand A and that copied by hand B are different; hand A’s text is incomplete (missing chapter 11) and was quite probably revised and completed by 238 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Heymeric himself; the text copied by hand B was apparently copied from this second version. Text A contains marginal corrections in the section concerning the 11 shared hypotheses; these corrections are to be found again in the text copied by hand B. It is thus tempting to suppose that text A, or at least this section of it, was improved based on text B or on its model. Codex Cusanus 106 thus provides a composit text whose two versions (one before and one after corrections) were bound together in order. The authors are not aware of any other copy of the Colliget, but it must be assumed that at least two models existed for the text copied by hand A and by hand B. The Colliget is annotated in the margins by two hands: one is, without a doubt, Nicholas of Kues’ and the other, hand C, is unidentified and differs in ink and letter shape from the writing of copyists A and B. Most of hand C’s notes are in the interior margin10 and concern textual corrections or additions only; sometimes, hand C makes corrections between the lines, but there are also infralinear scribal corrections. Nicholas of Kues’ notes are exclusively found in the exterior margin and, with two exceptions11, do not concern the doctrive exposed by Heymeric. In Nicholas’ notes, it is possible to distinguish two kinds of ink and of quill, which seem to correspond to two distinct readings: for the text copied by hand A, Nicholas took notes only in brown ink and a duller quill; for the hand-B text, he took notes only in black ink and with a sharp quill. In all, Nicholas took 38 notes spread out as follows (see the diagram): the Secunda Pars has none, while the Prima Pars has 13 notes of which 10 are in the Distinctio Tertia; the Tertia Pars has 5 notes, while the Quarta Pars alone contains more notes than all the other sections together: 20 notes, grouped around the 111 corollaria concerning ius naturalis12 . 10 The exceptional hand-C notes in the exterior margin: 214v, 245v, 247v, 248v; the authors identified one hand-B note in the exterior margin f. 255r. 11 The two specific cases are on f. 225v (hand A), where Nicholas replaces an ex by an et and on f. 258v (hand B), where he corrects domini into dominii. 12 Here are some examples: (f. 198r) „Quod est secundum Boethium”; (f. 198v) „Nota, quare Stoici ponunt puncta et lineas habere esse realiter distinctum”; (f. 201r) „Nota, potentia existendi est ultima in essendo inter nihil et actum medians”; (f. 201r) „Universale est in particularibus vere et est unum in multis, sed forma idealis non est universalis, sed singularis, cum sit subsistentis”; (f. 203r) „Nullum creatum est totaliter activum vel passivum”; (f. 203v) „Actus simpliciter precedit potentiam et potentia actum secundum viam originis”; (f. 256v) „Ius naturale est proprietas nature sub ratione forme”; (f. 258v) „Actum presidet potentiam”; (f. 258v) „Actus finit potentiam / ex duobus 〈 exis- A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 239 Nicholas of Kues is a very important figure in the history of the Colliget; his marginal notes and the conservation of the codex in his personal library have just been mentioned, but it is especially important to note that this work was composed at Nicholas’ request, while Heymericus was at the Council of Basel. He explicitly refers to this fact twice in the last part of the treatise: first (f. 254v) he underlines the fact that he must rely on his thesaurus memorialis as he no longer has access to his library, being extra solitam mei studii bibliotecam in synodo Basiliensi; the other reference (f. 272r) indicates that the present council is debating about the superiority of the synod over the Pope. In the last chapter of the treatise Heymericus affirms that he composed this work ad instantiam cuiusdam preceptoris mei precipui in omni scientia antiquorum inquisitoris studiosissimi (f. 273v). This specification clearly must refer to Nicholas of Kues himself, as none of the masters known to Heymericus were present at the Council of Basel. Furthermore, in other contexts Heymericus uses the same words to designate his friend the Cardinal; in a letter addressed to Theodorus of Xanten, Heymericus demonstrates his habit of reading the works of his preceptor pen in hand for the manuscripts containing them are, according to him, full of his marginal and infralinear notes: Vidi raptim opera de quadracione circuli tam mathematica quam theologica, una cum + dialogica variarum christianismi sectarum inter se fractim dissidencium concordia per ingeniosam domini et preceptoris nostri communiter et precipui adinvencionem conficta, que mihi studioso ingenii sui mirabilis scrutatori reliquerunt magnam attencius, quam in margine copiarum vestrarum currenter visarum notavi, tempore vacuo conscribendi occasionem. Nescio si preter solitam nostre communiter in eadem sentencia consonancie morem, que desuper notare cepi eisdemque copiis vestris perfunctorie inscripsi, erunt eidem preceptori nostro usquequaque grata13. tentibus 〉 in actu non fit unum”; (f. 258v) „Ordo necessarius in rebus”; (f. 258v) „Nota quomodo celum est medium”; (f. 259v) „Forma est continere et materia contineri”. 13 This charming testament to intellectual friendship is here reproduced according to the transcription of F. H AMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit, p. 340. According to Hamann’s notes, Heymeric alludes here to the following works of Nicholas: De mathematicis complementis, De complementis theologicis and De pace fidei. 14 JOHANNES TRITHEMIUS, Catalogus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, sive illustrium virorum, cum appendice eorum qui nostro etiam seculo doctissimi claruere, in: ID., Opera historica, ed. Marquard Fresher, part. I and II, Frankfurt 1601, ND Frank furt/Main, Minerva, 1966, part I, p. 355. On the relationship between Heymericus de Campo and Nicholas of Kues, see F. HAMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. 240 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Furthermore, the indication in omni scientia antiquorum inquisitoris studiosissimi seems to allude to Nicholas’ manifest interest in ancient manuscripts. Furthermore, on a very important page, Johannes Trithemius14 notes that Heymericus wrote (edidit) several texts at the Council of Basel at Nicholas’ request: Heymericus de Campo, natione Teutonicus, gymnasii Coloniensis vicecancellarius, vir in diuinis scripturis eruditissumus et in philosophia Aristotelica nulli suo tempore suo secundus, ingenio subtilis et disputator difficilium quaestionum egregius. Scripsit multa praeclara opuscula, de quibus tamen pauca in manus nostras hucusque peruenerunt. In concilio Basiliensi personaliter fuit, missus ab universitate Coloniensi, ubi ad instantiam magistri Nicolai de Cusa, postea Cardinalis, edidit: Compendium quaestionum, lib. I: Post plerosque occasio15 Super Sententias, lib. IV: Ut dicit Augustinus in libro De esse et essentia, lib. I: Esse et non esse repugnant Compendium divinorum, lib. IV: In hoc opusculo subcontinens Quaestiones varias, lib. I De authoritate concilii, lib. I Sermones multos, lib. I Et alia complura. Claruit in concilio Basiliensi, vbi multa scripsit et disputauit. Anno domini 1438, sub Alberto Imperatore16. Aside from being a collection of principles of natural, divine and human law explained in a philosophical way, as the title describes it, the Colliget is a remarkable storehouse of quotations. In spite of having had no access to his library, Heymericus explicitly quotes 1380 authorities, which is to say an average of 17 citations per folio. In comparison, the entire commentary The Compendium mentioned here is neither the Compendium divinorum ed. by J.B. Korolec, nor the Colliget under discussion in this article: the incipit does not correspond to either of the two wor ks. Cf. J.B. Korolec, Compendium divinorum Heimeryka de Campo w rkp. BJ 695. Studia nad dziejami albertyzmu koloñskiego, „Studia Mediewistyczne”, 8 (1967), p. 19–75 and 9 (1968), p. 3–90; ID., Quelques informations sur le Compendium divinorum de Heimericus de Campo ainsi que sur un commentaire inconnu de ce Compendium, „Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum”, 10 (1961), p. 33–39. 16 Z. Kaluza compares the catalogue of Iohannes Trithemius to that of Rouge-Cloître in Trois listes des oeuvres de Heimeric de Campo dans le Catalogue de Rouge-Cloître, „Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum”, 17 (1973), P. 15, n° 63. See also Z. K ALUZA, Materia³y do katalogu dzie³ Heimeryka de Campo, „Studia Mediewistyczne”, 12 (1970), P. 3–28; J.-D. CAVIGIOLI / R. IMBACH, Quelques compléments aux catalogues des oeuvres d’Heymericus de Campo, „Codices Manuscripti”, 7 (1981), p. 1–3; K. R EINHARDT, Werke des Heymericus de Campo († 1460) im Codex Cusanus 24, „Traditio”, 50 (1995), p. 295–310. 15 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 241 on the Metaphysics of Albert the Great contains around 850 explicit quotations, the Florilegium morale Oxoniense Secunda Pars (Flores Auctorum) has 1400 and the Auctoritates Aristotelis 3000 citations17. To these must of course be added all of Heymericus’ frequent implicit references. The authors’ examination of the first 15 folios has revealed that all the instances of explicit quotations from Aristotle come from various collections of philosophical maxims, notably from the well known Auctoritates Aristotelis and probably from a personal compilation. Aristotle is certainly employed to a very great extent by Heymericus, but he also refers to Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite, the Liber de Causis, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lullus, Albert the Great and twice to Iohannes de Nova Domo18 . Sometimes Nicholas of Kues notes these references in the margin of the work as if Heymericus’ thesaurus memoralis were a kind of florilegium for the Cardinal19. II. ON THE GENERAL OUTLINE AND STRUCTURE OF THE TREATISE The first indication of the meaning and intention of the work comes in its very last chapter. This passage lists the three aims that the author has pursued. He wanted first to bring together a collection of philosophical judgments in accordance with theological doctrine and concerning divine, natural and human law. Second, the work had to give the opportunity to progress on the way to salvation to those who seek these principles. Finally, In the same direction, see M. HOENEN, Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks. The Promptuarium argumentorum (Cologne 1492), in: ID. (ed.), Philosophy and Learning: Universities in the Middle Ages, Leiden / New York / Köln, E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 329–269. 18 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 227v: „Creatio rationis est creatum primum se habens pariformiter in generatione entis rationis sicut materia prima in generatione entis physici, ut dicit ille subtilis resuscitator positionis Alberti Magni M〈 agister 〉 Jo〈 hannes 〉 de Nova Domo in quibusdam considerationibus suo tractatui De esse et essentia annexis”. Ibid., f. 229r: „Nam ut inquit Iohannes de Nova Domo quod distinctio rationis est in ratione sicut in subiecto et termino rationis ratiocinantis eo, quod est totaliter in ratione”. 19 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 198r: „(...) et esse fluens ab essentia nondum est, ut dicit Boethius in suis Ebdomadibus, sed quod subsit, id est habet terminum in fundamento existendi, quod a Boethio dicitur ‘quod est’, hoc solum vere est, cum sit communis terminus ipsius fieri suscitati desub ex nihilo et ipsius esse desuper exerciti ab essentia”. 17 242 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH and most interestingly, Heymericus testifies that he wanted to construct, for his own use, a summa, a treasure trove that he will be able to dip into as he begins to lose his memory. The explanation that he gives for the genesis of this personal compilation is fascinating: all images that have been inscribed into a human memory by Aristotle’s mode of intellection constitute a veritable doctrinal treasury of intelligible things, a thesaurus that allows us to comprehend divine, natural and human truths 20. This Colliget was therefore composed, as he mentioned above, not out of books or authors, but out of his own thesaurus memorialis, in order to be of use to him in his old age. Ut ergo huic operi finis principaliter intentus imponatur 〈 … 〉 sciens, quod intentioni proposite de commemorando fundamentalia philosophie principia in obsequium theologie, consona iuris divini, naturalis et humani colligentis iudicia aliquatenus satisfeci studiosisque illius veritatis tripartite scrutatoribus ad proficiendum in via salutis eterne occasionem obtuli 〈 … 〉 et mihimetipsi in dies memorie vivacis retentiam perdenti quemdam thezaurum ad modum chaos confusi secundum multiformium ex eo formabilium circa scibilia spiritualia cuiuslibet legis rationalis tractatuum seminaria continentem confeci in laudem scientiarum domini et sine preiudicio sententie sanioris cuiuslibet me peritioris philosophi, iuriste aut theologi sub correctione quoque horum et quorumlibet aliorum veritatem theologicam sapienter zelantium21. The title and the mode of composition of the treatise are evocative of the compilers of Latin florilegia, who often use the verb colligere (as early as the 12th century) to define their work and its result, a gathering or an anthology of knowledge22 . In a lovely passage, Hugh of Saint-Victor explains, like HeyHEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 214r: „Totius proprium phantasma si depingatur in memoria humana, ad quam naturaliter reflectitur nature humane intelligentia, ut habetur III De anima, constituitur in homine quidam doctrinalis omnium scibilium modo humano thezaurus ad intelligendum veritates divinas, naturales et humanas (...)”. 21 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 273v. 22 Cf. M.A. ROUSE and R.H. ROUSE, Florilegia of patristic Texts, in: Les Genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales. Définition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain–la–Neuve, 25–27 mai 1981, Louvain–la– Neuve, 1982 (Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales, 5), p. 169: „The words that the florilegist chooses to express the activity of compilation reveal something of his attitudes and unconscious assumptions. Virtually all, of course, from Defensor (i.e. Defensor de Ligugé, end of the VIIth century, compilator of the Liber scintillarum) onward, use the neutral word colligere.” Cf. R.H. ROUSE and M.A. ROUSE, The Florilegium Angelicum: its 20 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 243 mericus, the need to collect in one’s memory the principles of knowledge using the same verb, colligere23 : De memoria hoc maxime in praesenti praetermittendum non esse existimo, quod sicut ingenium dividendo investigat et invenit, ita memoria colligendo custodit. Oportet ergo ut, quae discendo divisimus, commendanda memoriae colligamus. colligere est ea de quibus prolixius vel scriptum vel disputatum est ad brevem quandam et compendiosam summam redigere, quae a maioribus epilogus, id est, brevis recapitulatio supradictorum appellata est 24 . It is important to insist on the fact that the word colliget, in the title, is not a verbal form as one might suppose but rather a substantivised form that entered Latin vocabulary in 1255 when Averroes’ medical work Kitab Al-Kulliyate fil-Tibb (Book of Universal Medicine) was translated under the title Colliget25 ; this transliteration/translation has the advantage of reproducOrigin, Content, and Influence, in: J.J.G. A LEXANDER and M.T. GIBSON (ed.), Medieval Learning and Literature: Es says presented to Richard William Hunt, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 94: „Et quia omnes mittere non potui, elegi et collegi de omnibus in quibus letaretur et delectaretur anima tua”. 23 The compilers could provide a Biblical foundation for their work by citing Ruth 2, 2–3: „dixitque Ruth Moabitis ad socrum suam si iubes vadam in agrum et colligam spicas quae metentium fugerint manus ubicumque clementis in me patris familias repperero gratiam cui illa respondit vade filia mi abiit itaque et colligebat spicas post terga metentium accidit autem ut ager ille haberet dominum Booz qui erat de cognatione Helimelech”. Another Biblical passage could also be invoked to illustrate the work of collecting, namely the words of Christ after the miracle of the loaves and fish (Jn 6, 12): „ut autem impleti sunt, dixit discipulis suis: colligite quae supersunt fragmenta, ne pereant.” On this subject, see M.-D. CHENU, Studi di lessicografia filosofica medievale, a cura di G. SPINOSA, Firenze: Olschki, 2001, p. 57–68; A.J. MINNIS, Late-Medieval Discussion of Compilatio and the Rôle of the Compilator, „Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur”, 101.3, (1979), p. 385–421; N. HATHAWAY, ‘Compilatio’: From Plagiarism to Compiling, „Viator”, 20 (1989), p. 19–44. 24 HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, Didascalicon, III, 11, éd. Ch. H. BUTTIMER, Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon, De studio legendi, Washington, 1939 (The Catholic University of America, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, X). 25 It is published in the Venice edition (Iuncta 1562), vol. X (reprinted by Minerva, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, Suppl. I) under the title Liber de medicina qui dicitur Colliget; on f. 1ra: „Quando ventilata fuit super me voluntas per nobile preceptum ex parte nobilis domini Audelach Sempse a mirelmomini de Marocho (...) et precepit mihi compilare unum librum, in quo continetur tota scientia Medicinalis in Arabico (...) tunc declinavi virtutes meas ad suum servitium, et compilavit istum librum universalem, et vocavi nomen suum Colliget: eo quod incoepi in eo ordinem doctrinae a rebus universalibus, et ab illis procedam, quosque deveniam ad particularia sicut sit in doctrina trium specierum compositionum, secundum quod est declaratum supra I Physicorum; ita feci in isto libro, 244 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH ing the sonority of the Arabic and of rendering, through its obvious paternity from the verb colligere, the intention of the work of Averroes: a collection of all medical problems and remedies, moving from the universal to the particular in such a way that all of its contents might be used for other works. Moreover, but without any ambition to discuss his ecclesiological position, the authors would like to draw attention to Heymericus’ choice to write such a treatise during the Council of Basel. There is no need to force the interpretation, but it would perhaps not be fruitless to emphasize how Heymericus, by defending the authority of the synod, uses the same word colligere and pleads in favor of a composite, reuniting the representatives of the universal church. According to him, the proper work of the synod is ad instar forme totius hominis omnes suas partes tam materiales quam formales virtualiter in se colligere et per hanc virtuosam efficaciam se supra omnes et singulas eius partes active sive operative convertere ministerio cuiuslibet pro libito utendo, sicut totus homo dicitur per oculos videre, per aures audire et sic de aliis26. The Colliget of Heymericus has the same aim as it reunites all the most representative opinions of universal knowledge, and the entire set of these opinions brings into evidence each of is component principles. The presence of the word colligere in this fragment and its occurrences in the work should also be highlighted because it seems to be of particular interest: it appears several times with the sense of resumption or deduction (e.g. prout colligitur ex dicto Libro causarum) and once more to express the aim of the treatise (cf. supra n. 2). Its usage here, when Heymericus is describing the council, does not seem insignificant. The choice of this word in a work of this form and title is in agreement with his definition of the synod. This is more evident if we take into account that in the De potestate ecclesiastica Heymericus uses only the term congregatio to define the synod: ergo concilium generale pro reformacione universalis status ecclesiastici tam in capite quam in membris Basilee congregatum est per auctoritates pape et cardinalium etc. (p. 332) quod ego primo consyderavi comprehendere universales regulas huius scientie et postea intendi ire ab illis ad membra sua, et ad partes suas in uno alio libro, quem componam, si placebit Deo, ideo vocavi ipsum Colliget”. The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae and the Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch do not take into account the use of colliget as a substantive. 26 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 271v–272r. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 245 ergo eiusdem est potentie generale concilium congregare et dissolvere (p. 333) in generali christifidelium sinodo in nomine Christi congregato presencialiter est idem Christus patrum in ibi congregatorum intermedius, sicut cor in corpore, ut iudex in consistorio (p. 320)27. The work is made up of four parts divided into distinctiones and chapters. The logic of the sequence is not always easy to follow, but if one pays particular attention to the manner in which problems are presented it is possible understand the structure of the text, which is illustrated in the Appendix. The Prima Pars of the treatise opens with a discussion drawn from Albert the Great about the three philosophical schools (the Stoic, Epicurean and Peripatetic) and ends with an explanation of the aims of the work. The first part of the treatise closes (f. 207r) with a fascinating observations on what a „question” is and on the philosophical modes of understanding; following Aristotle, Heymericus underlines that every question should be treated as an investigation of the unknown, which can only be grasped by the intellect through recourse to that which is already known (per aliquod precognitum), in the sense that every question on what is known as last in the order of knowledge is assumed as the first (questionem proprie formamus de aliquod posteriori presupponente prius). This idea is taken up at the start of the Secunda Pars, where he lists the principles that are already known (precognita principia) and upon which are founded all philosophical questions and attendant ways of knowing; he affirms that these are the non-demonstrable principles, the first of which, simpliciter precognitum ab omnibus instinctum nature et presuppositum ab omnibus scientie cupidis, is, of course, the principle of non-contradiction. The Secunda Pars, which is entirely dedicated to this principle, ends with a very long discussion of the principles of understanding, which will be taken up in the Tertia Pars with the question of what can be known with certainty. In its last chapter, this part contains four dogmata on topics taken from contemporary philosophers, which are all in turn treated in the Quarta Pars. One can see from all this that the central topic of the Colliget is the search for a metaphysical theory of understanding that would explain the principles of divine, natural and human law. This becomes clearer with a closer look at each of the four parts. 1) The Prima Pars lists the foundations for the research to come. First, there is the separation of philosophy into three genres based on the princi27 Quoted from F. HAMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. 246 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH ples of the universe. Then a small treatise on universals and on the division of sciences leads to some long observations on metaphysics and its object. These end with several pages on the analogy of being. This section includes relatively important divisions dedicated to other classical topics like the categories, the transcendentals, potency, the act and finally a summary of Aristotle’s four forms of opposition (contradiction, contrariety, relative and privative opposition). 2) As has been mentioned above, the Secunda Pars of the treatise is entirely dedicated to the first principle of all, that of non-contradiction. It shows, in three steps, the inferior principles that can be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction by applying it to the four causes, to the three modes of opposition and to the four principles of understanding 28 . These eleven inferior principles are complemented, in distinctions II to IV, by twenty-six other principles 29. 3) The Tertia Pars of the treatise is dedicated to the questions that come about when one applies principles known per se or when one tries to draw conclusions from them. Heymericus, following Aristotle (Analytica posteriora II.1), concentrates on four kinds of questions: si est, quid est, quia est, propter quid est. From the first one, si est, he poses fifteen further questions about the first and eternal truth that take into account the other three types of questions 30. The same concern dominates the third distinction, HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 208r-v: „Quorum primum est, quod ordo est primum in entibus ad se invicem (...) Secundum principium est, quod uno posito in natura vel ratione necessario ponuntur tria. (...) Tertium principium est, quod neque in entibus neque in non entibus potest procedi ad infinitum. (...) Quartum principium est, quod tantum tria sunt fiendi correlativa obiecta, scilicet movens tantum, movens principalius motum et mobile tantum, secundum quod dicit Philosophus VIII Physicorum et II Metaphysice”. 29 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 209r: „Nulla multitudo potest esse simpliciter infinita. Omnis pluralitas binaria resolvitur originaliter ad oppositionem. Quod nichil est otiosum aut vacuum in natura eo, quod otium abnegatur ab actu et vacuum a potentia actui coniuncta. Quod ubi actus vincit potentiam, ibi esse, posse et agere est a materia separatum aut separabile ac per hoc, si sic, existat intellectuale. Quod ubi potentia vincit actum, ibi esse est corruptibile. Quod omnis anima nobilis habet tres operationes, scilicet divinam, intellectualem et animalem”. 30 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106: „An sit quid scibile? 28 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 247 which presents three theoremata about this eternal truth and develops them in forty-three questions; the fourth distinction raises problems concerning the created truth and world, treated in a particularly complicated manner: Heymericus starts off with four suppositions from which four corollaries are deduced, which lead to five difficulties, followed in turn by four docgmata which continue with 199 hypotheses through which, says Heymericus, one can reach the diversity of modern doctrines. Indeed, these hypotheses are diverse in nature: some are logical, some cosmological, and others are derived from physics, metaphysics, ethics or politics 31. One of the logical rules may be considered first by way of example: (hyp. 1) Possibili posito in esse nullum sequitur impossibile, along with a metaphysical rule on emanation and conversion: (hyp. 31) Sicut infima per media procedunt a summo omnium principio sic econverso infima per media redeunt ad idem principium, and a political rule: (hyp. 163) Lex viva est aptior ad regendum civitatem quam mortua, id est scripta. This section of the Quarta Pars is conceived in such a way that the formulation of each hypothesis is followed by an indicaSi omne universale est scibile? Quid est formaliter vere scibile an verum complexe significabile? An illud dictum Philosophi I Ethicorum sit verum, quod omne verum est vero consonum? An intellectus habitu veritatis informatus sit intentionum secundarum rationalis trivii formaliter distinctivarum scientifice fabricativus? An veritas scientiarum humanarum sit eterna? An huiusmodi veritas eterna sit respectu omnium quomodolibet verificandorum deteminata? Si veritas bene distinguebatur in veritatem rei et signi Si veritas prima imponat necessitatem in rebus ab ea verificabiliter causatis? Si veritas prima sit omniformiter omnisciens? An omnia intelligit illa veritas in sua essentia?” 31 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106: „Possibili posito in esse nullum sequitur impossibile. (hyp. 1) Ad formaliter impossibile sequitur quodlibet (hyp. 2) Quidquid repugnat contradictorie opposito, hoc necessario convenit proposito. (hyp. 3) Sicut infima per media procedunt a summo omnium principio, sic e converso infima per media redeunt ad idem principium. (hyp. 31) Corpora celestia triplici desuper influunt gubernaculo, scilicet motu, lumine et virtute. (hyp. 32) Nullum corpus potest movere per se primo se ipsum. (hyp. 34) Lex viva est aptior ad regendum civitatem quam mortua, id est scripta. (hyp. 163) Virtus legis superordinaria iusti legalis particulariter in casibus non provisis directiva. (hyp. 164)” 248 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH tion of its sources; the name appearing most frequently is of course that of Aristotle, but a certain number also come from the Liber de causis. In this first distinction one finds, as would befit the styles of Heymericus and Lullus, an interesting alphabetum iuris naturalis32 . In the Tabula (f. 274v) a marginal addition makes the Quarta Pars begin with the 198/200 hypotheses, but Heymeric establishes a direct link between the dogmata and the hypotheses33; this group of hypotheses may thus be seen as a complement to the Distinctio Quinta of the Tertia Pars. It may be considered as a collection of the most important principles of the philosophical tradition. The conclusiva additio totius (earlier quoted), which is perhaps the fruit of a revision, adds to it a series of Aristotelian authorities in order to complete the documentation. One argument in favor of the organization of the treatise that is being proposed here is linked to its contents: in this way, the thematic unity of the last part, entirely concerned with law, is conserved. 4) The Quarta Pars is composed of three distinctions and discusses the triad of divine, natural and human law. It should be noted that Heymericus again indicates his sources along with rules and principles, but now he is using the terms regule and canones. The relationship between natural law and human law is interpreted in terms of correspondence and similitude 34 . HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 255v: „Amor est virtus unitiva per affectionem boni finaliter activa. Bonum pertinet ad naturam sub ratione finis acceptam. Cuiuslibet entis a summo bono creati natura est illius boni similitudo participata. Deus est summum bonum amore, caritate, extasim et zelum universe creature regitivum, id est formaliter et finaliter provisivum. Eiusmodi providentia cuiuslibet nature condite vestigialiter impressa est intrinseca essendi et bene essendi rectitudo seu iustitia etc.”. Heymericus composed an alphabetical treatise edited by J.B. KOROLEC, Alphabetum doctrinale, in: R. IMBACH / P. LADNER, Heymericus de Campo, p. 205–219. 33 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 235r: „Sane quia predicta docgmata continent plurima, de quibus philosophi moderni tam metaphysici quam mathematici quam etiam physici, rationales et morales sunt in suis sententiis et interpretationibus diversimodi, subduntur nonnulle ipotheses talis varietatis, precipue, ni fallor, radices. Quarum examinata digestio non parum, ut arbitror, proderit ad dearticulatius ea, que sub quadam generalitate confusa premittuntur, perscrutandum et ad veritates huiusmodi opinionum, prout fuerit verisimilius, concordandum”. 34 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 265v: „Adest deinceps iurium humanorum in ymagine iustitie naturalis resonantium dicente Philosopho, quod omnis constitutio humana debet sequi naturam, artificialis declaratio ex prehabitis, sicut ymago ducitur ab exemplari adinventa”. 32 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 249 It is also notable that the author discusses the Decalogue in this context and, as mentioned earlier, gives particular attention to problems of knowledge. The fourth and last distinction in the work deals with ecclesiastical law and here Heymericus quickly restates his conciliatory position. This over-brief summary on this unpublished work can at least demonstrate that with this treatise Heymericus tries to embrace the totality of human knowledge in a synthetic form. He is convinced that the most adequate way to accomplish this aim is with a collection of rules and principles, or several lists of propositiones, which though not known in themselves (per se nota) can at least lead back to such rules. The title already marks it out as a collection of this type. The stated aim of a universal science can moreover be found in two other works of the same period, the De sigillo eternitatis and the Ars demonstrativa; however, unlike these two works, which present a particular method or approach, the Colliget is a set of doctrines that indicate not only the path to follow but also the content. In fact, the work to which the Colliget can most profitably be compared is the Compendium divinorum. The Colliget and the Compendium are related to one another not only in composition and intent but also in doctrine. The tenet of the Compendium is philosophiae flores in hoc opusculo sub compendio colligere and therefore poses several hundred propositions that are found, in part, in the Colliget: Colliget principiorum (f. 209v) Unde sequitur ulterius, quod omnis multitudo eo modo, quo est una et finita, eo modo est ordinata. (f. 235v, 14hyp.) Quadruplex est omne creatum, scilicet superius, inferius, infimum et subinfimum, prout colligitur ex dicto Libro causarum eo, quod quoddam est esse, quod nec magnitudine distenditur nec motu distrahitur nec per contrarietatem et privationem ad maleficium inclinatur; aliud 〈 est 〉, quod magnitudine distenditur, sed est immobile et incorruptibile; aliud est, quod extenditur magnitudine mobili, sed incorruptibili; et aliud est, quod est corporeum, mobile Compendium divinorum Theorema primum: omnis multitudo est finita. Corrolarium: in omni multitudine est dare primum et utimum. Corrolarium: nulla multitudo est penitus expers ordinis. (p. 56, l. 9–1135) Quod sic dearticulatur, quoniam quadruplex est esse, scilicet: esse superius, quod nec magnitudinem distenditur nec motu distrahitur nec contrarietate determinatur nec privatione ad maleficium inclinatur, et hoc est esse substantiarum intellectualium; est esse inferius, quod quantitate distenditur et motu, puta esse substantiarum corporearum ingenerabilium et incorruptibilium, sicut corpora celestia; et rursus esse infimum (infinitum Korolec), quod contrarietate determina- Quoted according to J.B. Korolec, „Compendium divinorum Heimeryka de Campo” Studia Mediewistyczne 8 (1967), p. 19–75 and 9 (1968), p. 3–90. 35 250 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH et corruptibile. Sed primum vocatur a Peripateticis esse superius, secundum esse inferius, tertium esse infimum, quartum esse subinfimum eo, quod primum per victoriam sue actualitatis supereminet potentie; secundum cadit quidem ad potentiam, sed non obumbratur per privationis umbram; tertium cadit ad potentiam et obnubilatur caligine privationi in motu non abiciente a substantia degentis; quartum vero totaliter immergitur potentie privative ipsius materie substantialiter de contrario in contrarium transmutabilis. tur, puta esse substantiarum sensibilium generabilium et corruptibilium; est etiam esse subinfimum (subinfinitum Korolec), quod privatione ad maleficium inclinatur, sicut esse materiae, temporis et motus, ista enim semper sunt in fieri et per consequens sub maleficio privationis, et ideo illa dicuntur esse creata propter nihil. Quodlibet tamen horum esse immutabilem ordinem habet ad suam causam universalem, a qua causatur et principiatur, et ideo de quolibet ipsorum potest formari quaestio „an est”. This subject may merit a paper in itself, but for the moment it shall simply be noted that the debate on the four types of question, centered on the si est from the first distinction of the Tertia Pars, takes up and develops a discussion found in the fourth part of the Compendium divinorum (p. 34– 39). It could also be added that this brief examination of the mutual dependence of these two works has revealed not only a certain constancy of philosophical interests between them but also faithfulness to sources, references and the manner of treating the subjects. III. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES III. 1. The ancient philosophical schools and contemporary debates This long presentation of the structure of the treatise now brings us to some of the essential topics of the work. To return to the diagram provided above, the Colliget begins with a description of three philosophical sects and continues with a small treatise on universals, followed by several chapters on categories. Such an organization is not accidental in any way and places the work in the context of late Albertism and, more precisely, parallel to contemporary debates on universals 36 . Here is the first sentence of the Colliget: On Jean de Maisonneuve and the late Albertists, see G. MEERSSEMAN, Geschichte des Albertismus, vol. I: Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus, Paris, 1933 (Institutum Historicum F.F. Praedicatorum Romae, ad S. Sabinae. Dissertationes Historiae, III); vol. II: Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen, Rome, 1935 (Institutum Historicum F.F. Praedicatorum Romae, ad S. Sabinae. Dissertationes Historiae, V); ID., Les origines parisiennes de l’albertisme colonais, AHDLMA, 7 (1933), p. 121–142; A.G. WEILER, Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les universaux, „Vivarium”, 6 (1968), p. 108–154; Z. K ALUZA, Les dé36 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 251 Quoniam teste Philosopho, ideo parvus error in principio est magnus in fine, quia principium est minimum quidem in quantitate, sed maximum in virtute unde fit, quod principium est plus quam dimidium totius. Ideo nimirum Stoici ponentes principia omnium esse pure formalia, utputa ydeas seu exemplaria, Epicurei ponentes universorum principia esse pure materialia et Peripatetici ponentes principia entium quolibeta compositorum esse partim formalia, partim materialia, utputa ex actu et potentia essentiata, sunt diversi philosophi veritatum realium scrutatores equivoci, inter quos dumtaxat illi sunt censendi veridici, qui suas assertiones conforma〈 n 〉t nature rei37. The work begins with the same sentence as De ente et essentia by Thomas Aquinas, but continues with an overview of the first philosophical schools or sectae38 , the remote source of which may be Albert the Great 39. However, Heymericus’ text must rather be examined alongside the unpublished commentary on the Metaphysics by Iohannes de Nova Domo, which also contains a synthesis of many pages from Albert 40. Both this commentary and the buts de l’albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne), in: M. HOENEN / A . DE LIBERA (eds.), Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus, p. 207–295; ID., Le De universale reali de Jean de Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales, „Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie”, 33 (1986), p. 486–489; ID., Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècle, Bergamo: Lubrina, 1988, p. 87–120; S. WLODEK, Albert le Grand et les Albertistes du XVe siècle. Le problème des universaux, in: A. ZIMMERMANN, Albert der Große. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981 (Misc. Med., 14), p. 193–207. 37 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 195r. 38 One must consider the meaning of the word secta in accordance with the etymology given by Isidore of Seville in his Etymologiae, lib. 8, cap. 3, par. 4: „Secta a sequendo et tenendo nominata. Nam sectas dicimus habitus animorum, ac instituta circa disciplinam vel propositum, quem tenendo sequuntur, longe alia in religionis cultu opinantes quam ceteri”. But Seneca (De clementia II, 5–6) is already speaking of the secta stoicorum: „scio male audire aput imperitos sectam stoicorum tamquam duram nimis et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium; obicitur illi quod sapientem egat miserere negat ignoscere. Haec si per se ponantur, invisa sunt; videntur enim nullam delinquere spem humanis erroribus, sed omnia delicta ad poenam deducete. Quod si est, quid veri habet haec scientia quae dediscere humanitatem iubet portumque adversus fortunam certissimum mutui ausili ocludit? Sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est, nulla amantior hominum et communis boni attentior ut propositum sit usui esse, ut auxilio nec sibi tantum sed universis singulisque consumere”. 39 A LBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a Prima Causa, ed. W. FAUSER, Münster: Aschendorff, 1993, I, lib. 1, 1; ID., Metaphysica — libros quinque priores, ed. B. GEYER, Münster: Aschendorff, 1960, lib. I, 3, c. 2. See also ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Buch über die Ursachen und den Hervorgang von allem aus der ersten Ursache, liber primus, übersetzt und hrsg. Von H. A NZULEWICZ, M. BURGER, S. DONATI, R. MEYER und H. MÖHLE, Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2006, p. 2–8. 252 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Colliget use the same division to discuss the problem of universals. Therefore, the opening of the Colliget should not be considered as an overview of the history of philosophy, as can be found in Albert, but rather an element that belongs with the debates and discussions of the fifteenth century. Heymericus 41 tells us that the three ways to understand universals are distinguished by the three sects as follows: according to the Stoics (assimilated here with Plato), universals are ante rem and emanant a datore formarum; according to the Epicureans they cadunt sub sensu quo habent esse materiale, and according to the Peripatetics they cadunt in intellectum reflexum ad sensum. Out of this separation Heymericus reformulates Albert’s ideas on the philosophies of the three schools: superhuman for the Stoics, subhuman for the Epicurians and human for the Peripatetics. Vides ergo, quantum differat philosophia divina et superhumana Stoicorum et philosophia sensualis seu subhumana Epicureorum a philosophia humana Peripateticorum, et quam recte Aristoteles, qui fuit princeps et archidoctor Peripateticorum, ambulat in medio illorum extremorum ad modum, quo homo est secundum proprium gradum sue speciei inter creaturam pure spiritualem cognoscentem per divine artis ideas et creaturam pure corporalem, in qua, si fuerit cognitiva, non potest esse nisid cognitio sensualis, participative medius, communicans videlicete cum Deo et spiritibus creatis per intellectum et cum bestiis per sensum et consistens in se ipso per rationem hinc inde a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia et e converso discursivam42 . 40 IOHANNES DE NOVA DOMO, Ms. Darmstadt, Landesbibliothek, 401, f. 8v–9r: „Ad primum dicendum quod inter veteres philosophosantes, usque ad tempus Aristotelis inclusive, fuerunt in universo tres scole: prima epycuriorum, secunda stoycorum, tertia perypateticorum. In prima ergo scola plurimi primum principium opinati sunt omnia eorum que sunt principia esse in sola specie materie, quia nullam penitus speciem tunc posuerunt, nisi illam que est in specie materie et hanc retulerunt esse causam entis et motus. Et ita materiam posuerunt esse principium omnis entis sensibilis, quia ultra illa nulla alia entia posuerunt. Et ita de principiis entium insensibilium non curaverunt, potissime inter epycuros dicentes hoc esse principium omnium sensibilium ex quo omnia fiunt et in quod ultimo omnia corrumpuntur etc.”. 41 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 195r: „Quia autem Stoici considerabant veritates rerum ideales ante rem, secundum scilicet quod emanant a datore formarum, sicut imago sigilli fluit a sigillo in ceram, Epicurei vero considerabant huiusmodi veritates, secundum quod cadunt sub sensu quo habent esse materiale et accidentaliter sensibile, sed Peripatetici considerant eas secundum quod cadunt in intellectum reflexum ad sensum, ad imaginationem et ad se ipsum — iuxta differentias abstractionis triplici independentie seu separabili〈 ta 〉tis formarum intelligibilium, id est universalium, a materia individuante correspondentis idem intellectus —, sicut exemplariter pa- A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 253 Thus, Heymericus shares an opinion that was common at the start of the fifteenth century and according to which the theses of the ancient schools corresponded, as Zenon Kaluza has demonstrated, to the modern debates between realists and nominalists. It is necessary moreover to recall that in the Tractatus problematicus Heymericus designates Iohannes de Nova Domo as the author of the common association between the Epicureans and the nominalists 43 ; however, the oldest account of this association dates from 1403 and was made by Guillaume Euvrie 44 . In this very text, one should note the strong emphasis that Heymericus places on the worth and eternal excellence of the Peripatetics. This idea of Aristotle as a via media can already be found in the works of Guillaume Euvrie 45, but Heymericus makes use of it to show that this excellence comes from the fact that peripatetic philosophy is the best adapted to the intermediary nature of man, who is in between purely spiritual entities and the natural world: communicans videlicet cum Deo et spiritibus creatis per intellectum et cum bestiis per sensum. Peripatetic philosophy is therefore the way of understanding that best corresponds to the human being, and metaphysics holds a privileged position (science belonging, like physics and mathematics, to the philosophia realis). tet in forma intelligibili lapidum, quam primo apprehendit intellectus reflexus ad visum sui coloris eius superficiem tingentis”. 42 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 195v. 43 Z. K ALUZA, Le De universali reali de Jean de Maisonneuve”, p. 486–497; see also A. DE LIBERA, Épicurisme, stoïcisme, péripatétisme. L’histoire de la philosophie vue par les Latins XII–XIII siècle, in: A. HASNAWI, A. ELAMRANI-JAMAL et M. AOUAD (éd.), Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque. Actes du colloque de la Société internationale d’histoire des sciences et de la philosophie arabes et islamiques. Paris, 31 mars–3 avril 1993, Leuven-Paris: Peeters-Paris, Institut du Monde Arabe, 1997 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 79), p. 343–364. In the Colliget Heymericus is explicitly talking about nominales Epicurei, co. Cusanus 106, f. 199v: „Et rursus cum dicat Philosophus II Topicorum, quod in paucioribus via magis, et VIII eiusdem, quod frustra fit per plura, quod potest fi〈 e 〉ri per pauciora, eligibilius videtur dictam varietatem essendi sub paucitate indistincta, prout faciunt nominales Epicurei, restringere quam sub multitudine distincta dispergere, presertim cum sine iudicio nostre salutis possent omnia salvari, que pertinent ad sufficientiam cognitionis diuine etd humani absque tali entium pluralitate”. 44 Cf. Z. K ALUZA, Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris, p. 15sq. 254 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH III. 2. The concept of metaphysics Metaphysics, on account of its object, takes first place in theoretical philosophy; Heymericus indicates 46 that the task of metaphysics, and in some sense its ultimate aim, is the establishment of principles for all the sciences. The status of supreme science given to metaphysics means not only the allure of its dominance over other sciences, but also its noble character, for not all men are capable of it: metaphysics presupposes constantly going beyond any and all cognitive images. Heymericus describes it as theologia gentilium, a science given by God, which deals with God alone and which is forever stretching itself out, seeking God, but which is at the same time forbidden to the fleshly man, too attached to the images and passions of the sensible world. This explains the rarity of men prepared to devote themselves to this selective, almost aristocratic, intellectual practice. Metaphysics, and no other kind of philosophy (practical, moral etc.), is a manner of living that requires long intellectual exercises through which man frees himself from images of this world and from all that is fleshly and devotes himself entirely to a spiritual life. These statements are especially interesting because that which authors of Antiquity, in particular Neoplatonists, saw in the practice of philosophy in general, Heymericus applies to metaphysics or, in other words, to all the knowledge that obviously depends on the Aristotelian tradition and also to Arabic commentaries translated in the XIIIth century (Avicenna, Averroes) or to Latin commentaries starting with Albert the Great. The influence of Aristotle and his commentators is obvious for Heymericus holds that it is a noble science, moderatrix and fondatrix, superior to the others; a science of axioms, data a Deo, which lays down the foundations of all human knowledge: Qui ergo habet aures audiendi, audiat, quid hec scientiarum et artium fundatrix, doctrix et regina suis loquitur discipulis, ipsa scilicet metaphysica, quam Aristoteles non immerito vocat theologiam? Quia ipsa est scientia a Deo proxime data et de Deo, in Deo et ad Deum veritatum spiritualium contemplativa. Et ideo quia carnalis homo non sapit ea, que Dei sunt, ut dicit Apostolus, nimirum pauci sunt homines huius sapientie capessende propor45 Guillaume Euvrie writes to Gerson: „secta vero tertia inter prescriptas mediat et ab Aristotele incepta per Alexandrum, (...), Averoym, Boecium, Alber tum, sanctum Thomam ceterosque perypateticos acerrimis laboribus atque continuis nostre fuit etati tradita”. Cf. E. Pellegrin, A Humanist from the Time of Charles VI etc., cited by Z. K ALUZA, De universali reali, p. 487. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 255 tionati discipuli seu auditores idonei, siquidem homines sunt plerumque carnales magis imaginibus et passionibus materie sensibilis 〈 quam 〉 convicti vite spiritualis dediti47. To these Heymericus adds two more essential objects of study: 1) the being as being and transcendentals and 2) the principle of non-contradiction. A striking passage shows all this clearly: metaphysica habet pro proprio obiecto ens inquantum ens et eadem est scientia oppositorum, ideo illud principium ‘de quolibet esse vel non esse, de nullo vero simul’ 48. In one of the most beautiful passages of the treatise 49, Heymericus continues on to say that metaphysics is the speculative science, cultivating man by showing him the highest and most general causes; it perfects the human intellect and instructs it in what is divine, that is to say in being considered in the highest degree. It is not a human science because man is not like God or like separate substances and, since the object of metaphysics is God’s being, metaphysics is the wisdom of divine possession (sapientia divine posHEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 196r: „Et quia primum in unoquoque genere et ordine est metrum et mensura omnium secundorum, X Metaphysice, eadem ratione patet, quod metaphysica, que est inter scientias reales primaria, est omnium aliarum philosophiarum doctrix et moderatrix verifica, cui idcirco convenit harum principia stabilire et lumen sue veritatis primarie secundum analogiam capacitatis proprie singularis participare, prout evidenter satis deducit I et II Metaphysice Philosophus. Quo fit, quod nemo potest esse aut dici verus et resolutus philosophus, nisi fuerit in philosophia prima, metaphysica seu theologia gentilium eruditus”. 47 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 197r. 48 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 195v: „Ergo metaphysica est philosophia divina speculans veritates universorum entium, secundum quod in eis relucet esse divinum, quod in eo est immateriale et efficienter, exemplariter atque finaliter causale, in causatis vero est vestigialiter tale. Manifestum est, quia metaphysica habet pro proprio obiecto ens inquantum ens eo, quod omne, quod est, aut est ens creatum aut increatum, id est Deus aut creatura, quibus nichil invenitur commune quam ens simpliciter in sua transcendentia extra omne genus determinatum consideratum. Cui enti quia contradicit non ens simpliciter, et eadem sit scientia oppositorum, ideo illud principium ‘de quolibet esse vel non esse, de nullo vero simul’, cum reliquis generibus oppositis illi contradictioni subordinatis, cadit proprie in consideratione primi philosophi seu metaphysici. Et ex eodem fundamento, quidquid convertibiliter aut differenter se habet ad ens simpliciter, cuiusmodi sunt verum, bonum cum suis oppositis, aut etiam antecedenter vel consequenter sicut principium, causa, natura, elementum cum suis differentiis, universale, particulare, substantia, accidens cum suis differentiis, omne tale cadit sub doctrina sapientie metaphysicalis”. 46 256 ZENON KA£U¯A sessionis), common to both God and man (Deo et homini communis). Man can only attain this wisdom through the abstraction of the sensible world and of the image. This abstraction enables him to formulate true and solid theorems in the light of divine intelligence, and to generate, before the eyes of the intellect, a complete science from which nothing, or nearly nothing, is missing. Born in the light of divine intelligence, this science is perfect and needs no other science to elucidate it, as an object born in sunlight needs no other light source to be visible 50. Reading these fragments provides a better understanding of the structure of the Colliget: the Prima Pars is dedicated to metaphysics, containing several chapters on being and transcendentals, and the Secunda Pars is entirely dedicated to the principle of non-contradiction. Heymericus’ interest in this principle defines the research of every metaphysician, so it has to occupy an essential place in the construction of the work. Before the third and last topic is approached, it should be indicated that this part of the Colliget contains the most interesting marginal notes of Nicholas of Kues. When Heymericus uses an example taken from human sight and sunlight to explain the reasoning of metaphysics, the Cardinal of Kues notes this: nota quomodo metaphysica est de visu mentis; when one reads these words, it is impossible not to speculate on the influence of Heymericus on the mind of the Cardinal in the following remarkable fragment from his Compendium: Habemus igitur visum mentalem intuendum in id, quod est prius omni cognitione. Quare id qui id, quod sic videt, in cognitione reperire satagit, se frustra fatigat, sicut qui colorem solum visibilem etiam manu tangere niteretur. Habet se igitur visus mentis ad illum essendi modum quasi ut visus sen49 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 196v: „(...) metaphysica est scientia speculativa docens per causas altissimas et universalissimas, in quolibet genere cause materialis et formalis, efficientis et finalis primarias instruendo intellectum nostrum divinum secundum quod huiusmodi, id est secundum esse suum superius, per quod non reflectitur ad corpus vel ad vires anime corpori affixas eo, quod hec scientia non est proprie scientia humana, prout homo disconvenit cum Deo et substantiis separatis, sed est sapientia divine possesionis, Deo et homini communis, quam non attingit homo nisi per studium omnimode a natura sensibili et imaginabili abstractionis perveniendo ad theoreumata in lumine intelligentie universaliter agentis recta et firmiter stantia et per hoc, pro foribus nostri oculi intellectualis, ad generandum scientiam promptam indagine discursus inquisitivi parum aut nullatenus indigentem se offerentia, sicut visibile positum in oculo sub lumine solis non indiget adminiculo candele aut alterius luminis ad hoc, quod representet speciem sue visibilis veritatis”. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 257 sibilis ad lucem, quam certissime esse videt et non cognoscit. Praecedit enim omnia, quae visu tali cognosci possunt. Illa etiam, quae per ipsum cognoscuntur, signa sunt ipsius lucis. Colores enim, qui visu cognoscuntur, signa sunt et termini lucis in diaphano. Ponas igitur solem patrem esse sensibilis lucis, et in eius similitudine concipe deum patrem rerum lucem omni cognitione inaccessibilem, res autem omnes illius lucis splendores, ad quos se habet visus mentis sicut visus sensus ad lucem solis51. III. 3. Aristotelianism and Lullism The third aspect of the Colliget that will be discussed here is its tendency to bring together the doctrines of Aristotle and Lullus. Following Aristotle, Heymericus considers metaphysics as a science of first principles, notably the principle of non-contradiction. It is therefore not surprising to note that Heymericus explicitly poses the question of whether a Philosophus realissimus should study axioms. The response to this question specifies that ens rationis participates equally in being and that the broad reasoning of metaphysics includes this question. One should also notice that the author speaks here of the transcendentia metaphysice speculationis, an expression that is very rare in scholastic language 52 . The evident Aristotelian character of the treatise is complemented by aspects that combine doctrines of Lullus. It is true that Aristotle is very frequently cited, while Lullus is only explicitly named seven times, always accompanied by a reference to Aristotle; however, three aspects of the Lullian doctrine play an important role in this treatise. 1) Already, within the 25 principles of knowledge there are several of the absolute principles of Lullus. Heymericus mentions bonitas, magnitudo et duratio, virtus veritas et gloria and he makes several allusions to the nine absolute and relative principles 53 . Manifestly, he is setting himself the task 50 Undeniably, the Heymerician conception of metaphysics ought to be more precisely situated in the history of this discipline’s interpretation during the Middle Ages. In Th. Kobusch’s very well documented article on metaphysics in the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd 5, L-Mn, hrsg. von J. RITTER, K. GRÜNDER, Basel: Schwabe, 1980 Heymericus is not mentioned, but he probably deserves a place in an overview of the evolution of the Medieval notion of metaphysics. 51 NICHOLAS OF CUES, Compendium, I, 1, Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2002, p. 2. 52 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 206v: „Forte miratio est in foribus: Cur metaphysicus, qui est philosophus realissimus, se intermittit de oppositionum generibus, que potius pertinent ad philosophum rationalem et presertim logi- 258 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH of bringing together the strange modus loquendi of Lullus with that of Aristotle. 2)_More important than this first point is the dynamic conception of the real that Heymericus inherits from Lullus 54 , as this passage illustrates: Quartum principium est, quod nichil est otiosum aut vacuum in natura eo, quod otium abnegatur ab actu et vacuum a potentia actui coniuncta55. While it is true that this text recalls the Aristotelian thesis that states that nature does nothing in vain, that thought is here combined with the Lullian obsession with otiositas. 3) The last topic that comes from Lullus is the restatement of the triad - tivum, - bile, - is, which Heymericus tries again to bring into agreement with Aristotle 56 . Tied to this triad is the thesis that any perfect order must be made up of 3 elements. This is notably attested to by the triad principium, medium et finis57. Reading these fragments, Nicholas of Kues made the following note in the margins: ordo non sine ternario! cum quam realem philosophum ? (...) Ergo cum ens rationis sit participium intelligibile ipsius esse qui nimirum ad proprietatem entis logici, cuiusmodi est enuntiativa, se extendit transcendentia metaphysice speculationis. Alioquin metaphysica non esset originalis scientiarum rationalium sicut realium et moralium fundatrix et magistra”. 53 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 215r: „Et ex hoc novem sunt principia enti facto per creationem diversimode appropriata. Quorum tria dividunt simplicitatem originalem 〈 essentie 〉, tria separant integritatem virtualem potentie et tria disiungunt facultatem tricausalem operationis extrinsece”. 54 It has already been established that R. Lullus had a significant influence on H. de Campo and Nicholas of Kues; the latter had several of Lullus’ works in his library (codex Cusanus 83), which he annotated abundantly. On this subject, see especially E. COLOMER, Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull. Aus Handschriften der Kueser Bibliothek, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1961; ID., Zu dem Aufsatz von Rudolf Haubst ‘Der junge Cusanus war im Jahre 1428 zu Handschriftenstudien in Paris’, „Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft”, 15 (1982), p. 57–70; R. HAUBST, Der junge Cusanus war im Jahre 1428 zu Handschriften-Studien in Paris, „Mitteilungen und Forschungesberichte der Cusanus-Gesellschaft”, 14 (1980), p. 198–205. On the relationship between Heymericus and Lullus, see R. IMBACH, Theologia Raymundi Lulli memoriter epylogata.... Nicholas’ notes are published in Cusanus-Texte 3, Marginalien 4, Raimundus Lullus: die Exzerptensammlung aus Schriften des Raimundus Lullus im Codex Cusanus 83, ed. U. ROTH / W. BEIERWALTES, Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1999. 55 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 409v. 56 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 221v: „Quod considerans Raymundus Lulli dicit quodlibet principium primitivum perfici originaliter ex tribus correlativis, scilicet -tivo, -bili et -re, utputa veritatem ex verificativo, verificabili et A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 259 IV. CONCLUSIONS This paper represents a first assault upon the Colliget principiorum, a text that is difficult to understand not only on account of the doctrines that it deals with but also because of Heymericus’ intensely complicated way of expressing himself. His reader has no other choice but to accept interminably long sentences, to read them with patience, to resolve their difficulties with ingenuity and, most important, never to give up or become discouraged before his galling style. That is exactly what Heymericus demands of his reader in the last paragraph of the treatise, and not without irony: queso sine precipitio examinis maturi perlegi et ingeniose resolvi meoque stilo fortassis quibusdam tedioso, quia difficili ideoque difficili, quia enthymematice troncato et citra diffusionem sententie breviloquo, veniam dari58. In this treatise it is futile to look for ample demonstrations, pro and contra arguments, responses or determinationes; Heymericus’ texts reflects his tight, compact thought process, which appears as a solid block of ideas linked by strongly forged chains, difficult to undo. The only way to understand it is to study its general form first in order to grasp its internal articulations. In choosing to epress himself by compendia, collectiones and tabulae (the titles of his works), Heymericus wants to produce a synthesis of knowledge that will make it possible to comprehend reality and divine being; he wants to find the discursive form that will facilitate access to the truth as verificare et sic de aliis. Cui videtur concordare Philosophus II Celi, ubi dicit finem rei esse eius operationem, et I Ethicorum, quod felicitas [222r], que est finale bonum nature feli〈 ci 〉tabilis, co〈 n 〉sistit in operatione intrinseca illius nature non impedita”. 57 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 218r: „Responsio: quia pro regula prehabitum est, quod omnis ordo perfectus consistit in tribus, scilicet primo, medio et fine seu ultimo, ideo veritas que consistit in ordine verificantis et verificabilis, completur in trinitate tali, ut sit quedam veritas originalis tantum, quedam originalis originata et quedam originaliter tantum, quarum prima est in intellectu cognoscente et causante dei, secunda in re per lumen illius intelligentie causantis intelligibiliter formata ex hoc apta nata generare suam speciem seu similitudinem intelligibilem in intellectu cognoscente per apprehensionem intelligibilem; tertia in huiusmodi intellectu cognoscente tantum”; f. 258v: „Quia ordo non habet esse perfectum nisi in ternario principii, medii et finis, et iustitia sit facultas ordinativa, ideo unitas et binarius et quodlibet expers ordinis excedunt a lege iustitie naturalis”. 58 HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Colliget principiorum, cod. Cusanus 106, f. 273v. 260 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH quickly and surely as possible. Through formal structures, he seeks the means towards a good philosophical investigation and towards the most perfect participation possible in divine knowledge. The lapidary formulae and innumerable maxims to which entire chapters are devoted—one need only glance at the table of contents to remark upon them—and the geometrical figures, such as the seal of eternity, are monumenta of the truth, signs that recall eternal truth. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 261 ANNEX 1 COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM IURIS NATURALIS, DIVINI ET HUMANI PHILOSOPHICE DOCTRINALIUM MAGISTRI HEYMERICI DE CAMPO59 TABULA TRACTATUUM, DISTINCTIONUM ET CAPITULORUM HUIUS VOLUMINIS TRACTATUS PRIMUS: De vere scibilibus in communi60 Distinctio prima (f. 195r – 198r) Capitulum l: De triplici secta philosophorum. Capitulum 2: Quod solum universale est per apprehensionem intelligibile et scibile. Capitulum 3: Quod quinque sunt universalia realia et de causa sue universalitatis. Capitulum 4: Quomodo universalia sunt principia sciendi. Capitulum 5: De triplici scientia reali secundum Perypateticos. Capitulum 6: De differentia philosophie Stoycorum, Epycureorum et Perypateticorum et utilitate scientifica solius philosophie Perypateticorum. Capitulum 7: De necessitate et utilitate philosophie rationalis et moralis. Capitulum 8: Quod philosophia realis est pure speculativa, rationalis partim speculativa, partim practica, sed moralis tantum practica. Capitulum 9: Quod tripartita est tam rationalis quam moralis philosophia. Capitulum 10: Quod philosophia realis precedit rationalem et hec moralem quodque metaphysica est prima philosophia. Capitulum 11: De differentia verorum scibilium a non scibilibus prime philosophie61. Capitulum 12 De materia generali prime philosophie. Capitulum 13: De qualitate doctrine et discipline metaphysicalis. Capitulum 14: Quare prima philosophia seu metaphysica est paucis nota. Capitulum 15: De causa huiusmodi raritatis. Capitulum 16: Qualiter prima philosophia est omniscia aliter quam logica. Capitulum 17: Qualiter decem generalissima specificant esse metaphysicum. Capitulum 18: Qualiter metaphysice subiacent alie scientie. 59 The authors here reproduce the table of contents of the treatise as it is found at the end of codex 106, f. 273v–274v, in the text of hand B, which, as has been noted, stops at hypothesis 10 of the Quarta Pars, Distinctio Prima. Based on this, the titles of the hypotheses up to number 188 (190) have been reconstructed; the rest of the titles are reproduced as they are found in the manuscript of the text. 60 Only the first part of the work has a specific name in its tabula: Tractatus primus: De vere scibilibus in communi. The other three are simply named Secunda Pars, Tertia Pars, Quarta Pars. 61 This chapter is missing in the codex. 262 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Capitulum 19: Qualiter ens predicatur analogice et non univoce aut equivoce. Capitulum 20: Quomodo ens est simpliciter yliathim. Capitulum 2l: De differentia triplicis scibilis prime philosophie. Distinctio secunda (f. 198r – 200v) Capitulum l: De differentia originali principiorum fiendi et essendi. Capitulum 2: De diversificata opinione philosophorum circa numerum predicamentorum. Capitulum 3: De differentia reali illorum secundum Aristotelem. Capitulum 4: De varia appellatione distinctionis realis. Capitulum 5: De causis realis distinctionis decem predicamentorum. Capitulum 6: De epilogo seu sufficientia illius distinctionis. Capitulum 7: De rationibus illum denarium impugnantibus. Capitulum 8: De solutione earundem rationum. Capitulum 9: De primis entis simpliciter proprietatibus, scilicet uno, vero, bono. Capitulum 10: De proprietatibus convertibilibus ipsius entis simpliciter. Capitulum 11: De convertibili habitudine dictarum proprietatum cum ente affirmato. Distinctio tertia (f. 200v – 205r) Capitulum l: De simplici fluxu esse facti per creationem et processu eiusdem. Capitulum 2: De universalibus illum fluxum distinguentibus. Capitulum 3: De ydentitate talium formarum cum suis particularibus. Capitulum 4: De convenientia et differentia forme totius a composito et forma partis. Capitulum 5: De individuatione et suppositatione formarum. Capitulum 6: De potentie in activam et passivam divisione et secupla earum subdivisione. Capitulum 7: Qualiter potentia materie formalis est triplex. Capitulum 8: Quod omnes potentie passive sunt secundum Philosophum naturales impotentie de genere qualitatis, unde eliciuntur septem corollaria. Capitulum 9: De vario actus et potentie suorumque causatorum ordine. Capitulum 10: De differentia et ordine actuum. Capitulum 11: De natura potentie et ordine actuali formarum intentionata. Capitulum 12: De origine ordinis econversi in illis. Capitulum 13: De proprietate originaliter activa earundem. Capitulum 14: De proprietate causaliter motiva ipsarum. Capitulum 15: De comparatione virtuali et activa intentionum veri et boni. Distinctio quarta (f. 205r – 207r) Capitulum 1: De proprietatibus scibilis creati negativis. Capitulum 2: De differentia, origine et ordine quattuor oppositionum. Capitulum 3: De habitudine originali oppositorum ad invicem. Capitulum 4: De contradictionibus aliis oppositionibus participata et differentia huius participationis. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 263 Capitulum 5: De nonnullis dubitationibus et earum solutionibus62. Capitulum 6: De vario modo innotescendi triplicis generis scibilis. PARS SECUNDA Distinctio prima (f. 207r – 209r) 〈 Capitulum l: 〉 De origine distinctionis questionum scibilium. Capitulum 2: De certitudine irrefragabili illius principii: ‘de quolibet esse etc.’ Capitulum 3: De quattuor principiis corollariis ex illo communi ortis. Capitulum 4: De principiis a contradictione participata. Capitulum 5: Quod ordo mediatus, principii et finis parit ubique trinitatem. Capitulum 6: De plurimis vere cognitionis principiis ex illo ordine pullulantibus. Capitulum 7: De habitudine originali et causali taliter ordinatorum. Capitulum 8: De summaria entis cognoscibilis divisione summam principiorum cognoscendi ponente. Distinctio secunda (f. 209r – 212r) Capitulum l: De potestate notionali illius principii: ‘si oppositum in opposito 〈 etc. 〉’. Capitulum 2: De virtute illius principii: ‘nullum ens affirmatum potest esse simpliciter plurale’. Capitulum 3: De potestate illius principii: ‘omnis pluralitas binaria etc’. Capitulum 4: De potestate illius principii: ‘nihil est otiosum aut vacuum in natura’. Capitulum 5: De potestate illius principii: ‘ordo originalis et originatus se habent e contrario’. Capitulum 6: De potestate illius principii: ‘actus est radix necessitatis etc’. Capitulum 7: De potestate illius principii: ‘ubi actus vincit potentiam, ibi esse etc’. Capitulum 8: De potestate illius principii: ‘ubi potentia vincit actum etc’. Capitulum 9: De potestate illius principii: ‘ubi potentia et actus adequantur’. Capitulum 10 De potestate illius principii: ‘omnis actus immaterialis est universalis’. Capitulum ll: De potestate illius principii: ‘omnis fluxus spiritualiter ad extra potestativus’. Capitulum 12: De potestate illius principii: ‘exigit potentie et actus conversio’. Distinctio tertia (f. 212r – 213v) Capitulum l: De potestate illius principii: ‘anima nobilis habet tres operationes’. Capitulum 2: De potestate illius principii: ‘sunt duo universi gubernacula’ 63. Capitulum 3: De potestate illius principii: ‘amor divinus formatus naturali iustitia’. Capitulum 4: De potestate illius principii: ‘necesse est omne activum predominari’. 62 In the text the order of the two chapters is reversed: the chapter De vario modo innotescendi triplicis generis scibilis preceeds the part De nonnullis dubitationibus et earum solutionibus. 63 gubernacula] gubernabili cod. 264 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Capitulum 5: De potestate illius principii: ‘participative activa et passiva etc’. Capitulum 6 De potestate illius principii: ‘omne, totum et perfectum convertuntur’. Capitulum 7: De potestate illius principii: ‘proprium est mensure etc’. Distinctio quarta (f. 213r – 215v) Capitulum l: De potestate illius principii: ‘exigit entis analogi etc’. Capitulum 2: De 81 principiis positivis et totidem negativis. Capitulum 3: De tribus principiis essentialiter intrinsecis, que sunt magnitudo, bonitas, duratio. Capitulum 4: De tribus principiis potestativis in qualibet natura completa. Capitulum 5: De tribus principiis operativis. Capitulum 6: De novem principiis diversimode enti creato propriis. Capitulum 7: De improprietate usus loquendi artis ex illis principiis procedentis. PARS TERTIA Distinctio prima (f.215v – 218r) Capitulum l: De notificatione vere scibilis in speciali. Capitulum 2: De distinctione scibilis scientialis a sapientiali. Capitulum 3: De differentia doctrine sapientialis a scientiali ex parte modi sillogizandi. Capitulum 4: De numero quaternario questionum vere scibilium. Capitulum 5: De questione ‘si est’ in genere, an sit quid scibile. Capitulum 6 De hoc, quod inter universalia, que sunt solum scibilia, accidens, proprium est proprie scibile. Capitulum 7: De eo, quod est formaliter scibile, utputa vero complexo significabili. Capitulum 8: De intellectu illius auctoritatis: ‘omne verum vero consonat’. Capitulum 9: De modo formationis intelligibilis intentionum secundarum rationalis trivii. Capitulum 10: De modo, quo veritas scientie humane est eterna. Capitulum 11: De materia determinate enuntiationis verificabilium. Distinctio secunda (f. 218r – 220v) Capitulum l: De differentia veritatis rei et signi. Capitulum 2: An veritas prima imponit rebus necessitatem aut propter essendi possibilitatem. Capitulum 3: An et quomodo veritas sit omniformiter omniscia. Capitulum 4: De modo precognitionis omnium verorum in essentia prime veritatis. Capitulum 5: De modo precognitionis verorum causatorum in prime veritatis potentia. Capitulum 6: De prescientia dei causali. Capitulum 7: An omnia quomodolibet noscibilia presint et intelligibiliter secundum proprium modum in prima veritate. Capitulum 8: De intermedio veri inter primum et bonum ordine. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 265 Distinctio tertia (f. 220v – 224r) Capitulum l: De attributis accidentalibus prime veritatis. Capitulum 2: Quod veritas divina est per trecentos duodecim rationes ei intelligibiliter accidentes distinguibilis. Capitulum 3: Quod illa multiformitas est indivisibiliter in deo. Capitulum 4: Continens sub uno theoremate vigesima quinta enuntiabilia veritatis eterne. Capitulum 5: De duodecim veritatibus sub uno theoremate. Capitulum 6: De sex notabilibus veritatibus sub uno theoremate declaratis. Distinctio quarta (f. 224r – 230r) Capitulum l: Qualis veritas sit in elementis rei create. Capitulum 2: Qualiter omne ens creatum est verum. Capitulum 3: Quod deus omnia simul creavit in veritate essentiali. Capitulum 4: Qualiter creatio est communicabilis et incommunicabilis creature. Capitulum 5: Qualiter angelus, celum, materia et tempus sunt coeva. Capitulum 6: Quod creatura non est coequeva creatori. Capitulum 7: Qualiter deus creando sibi assimilat creaturam. Capitulum 8: Qualiter creatio est creata et non creata. Capitulum 9: Qualis fluxus sit creatio aut simplex aut compositus64. Capitulum 10: De perfectione triplici ipsius creationis. Capitulum 11: Quomodo rationes rerum creabilium dicuntur in deo creari. Capitulum 12: Quod esse quiditativum est terminus simplicis creationis. Capitulum 13: Quomodo huiusmodi simplex emanatio differt a causatione, elementatione et principiatione. Capitulum 14: De termino creationis passive. Capitulum 15: Quod primum creatum secundum rationem est esse. Capitulum 16: Qualiter terminus proprius illius creationis prime et simplicis est esse. Capitulum 17: Qualiter essentie rerum sunt create et 〈 es 〉se existentie habent aliud esse participatum. Capitulum 18: Qualiter omne creatum est primo possibiliter. Capitulum 19: Qualiter quelibet creatio tam simplex quam composita terminatur ad singulare. Capitulum 20: Qualiter potentia subiectiva est terminus creationis simplicis. Capitulum 21: Qualiter in omni creatione concurrunt tria fiendi principia. Capitulum 22: Qualiter hec se habent equaliter et inequaliter in creato. Capitulum 23: Qualiter se habet distinctio illorum principiorum ad distinctionem generis et differentie. Capitulum 24: De multiplici distinctione divinarum perfectionum. Distinctio quinta (f. 230r – 235r) Capitulum l: De quattuor suppositionibus veritatem distinctionis antecedentibus. Capitulum 2: De corollariis ad has suppositiones veritatibus. 64 compositus] propositus cod. 266 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Capitulum 3: De differentia: quomodo est perfectio simpliciter. Capitulum 4: De causis proportionum numeralium. Capitulum 5: Quo numerus est de primis entis principiis. Capitulum 6: De natura reali ipsius numeri. Capitulum 7: De triplici numero, scilicet originali, originato et horum medio. Capitulum 8: Qualiter est et non est unus omnium numeralium numerus. Capitulum 9: De distinctione unius essentialis Capitulum 10: De sex perfectionibus essentialibus numerorum. Capitulum 11: De doctrinali differentia numerorum materialium, id est rerum numeralium. Capitulum 12: De doctrinali proportione numerorum figurarum et tonorum. Capitulum 13: De doctrinali inductione utilitatum proportionum numeralium. Capitulum 14: De modo doctrinalis consonantie omnium numeraliter discordantium. 〈 Complementum de nonullis ypothesibus 〉 De introductione ypothesum. (f. 235r–254v) Ypothesis 1: Quod possibili posito in esse nullum sequitur impossibile. Ypothesis 2: Quod ex impossibili formali sequitur quodlibet. Ypothesis 3: Quidquid repugnat contradictorie opposito, hoc convenit proposito. Ypothesis 4: Ad simpliciter necessarium sequitur quodlibet in actu vel potentia. Ypothesis 5: Quidquid non est in potestate principii, non est in potentia principiati. Ypothesis 6: Qualia sunt principia virtualiter, talia principiata possibiliter. Ypothesis 7: Unumquodque fit, ut aptum natum est fieri. Ypothesis 8: Natura fugit superfluum et diminutum et frustra nihil facit. Ypothesis 9: Vacuum et otium sunt de numero naturaliter impossibilium. Ypothesis 10: Ex nihilo nihil fieri vel de aliquo annihilari65. 〈 Ypothesis 11: Quattuor sunt cause primarie universales mundo inferiori concurrenter et ordinate influentes. 〉 Ypothesis 12: 〈 Omnis causa primaria plus influit super causatum quam secundaria. 〉 Ypothesis 13: 〈 Causa prima et intelligentia sunt supra tempus. 〉 Ypothesis 14: 〈 Quadruplex est omne creatum, scilicet superius, inferius, infimum et subinfimum. 〉 Ypothesis 15: 〈 Ut materia participat esse a forma, sic quantitas molis ipsius materie participat sur extensionis mensuram 〉 Ypothesis 16: 〈 Omne passivum immobile dependet ab appropriato et activo et motore. 〉 Ypothesis 17: 〈 Virtualiter quantitativa activi ad passivum aut motivi ad mobile proportio non est prescise equalitatis. 〉 Ypothesis 18: 〈 Quecumque sunt mutuo activa et passiva, sunt proportionaliter sese extendentia et a se invicem excessa. 〉 Ypothesis 19: 〈 Sicut unaqueque res in esse, posse et agere secundum ordinem originis prius est, quam potest, et potest quam agit ita e converso secundum ordinem End of the tabula in the manuscript. The titles that follow reproduce the beginning or the totality of the first sentence of the chapter corresponding to the hypothesis; each hypothesis is numbered in the codex. 65 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 267 sui finalis reductionis prius coniungitur suo principio ut obiecto sue operationis quam sue potentie aut essentie. 〉 Ypothesis 20: 〈 Omne totum virtuale est in parte sui generis, speciei seu anologie secundum exigentiam finis. 〉 Ypothesis 21: 〈 Que a suo principio desuper in regionem dissimilitudinis dispergit et elongat primaria mundi perfecta per sex dies instauratio 〉 Ypothesis 22: 〈 Prima perfectio principii prevenit novem gradibus primam perfectionem principiati. 〉 Ypothesis 23: 〈 Omne ens ex quattuor causis perfectum est secundum proportionem ordinis. 〉 Ypothesis 24: 〈 Sicut potentia materie est secundum se indistincta versus superius formaliter. 〉 Ypothesis 25: 〈 Prima formalis materie distinctio est quaternaria. 〉 Ypothesis 26: 〈 Differentiarum formalium gradualis ordo respondet distinctioni originali. 〉 Ypothesis 27: 〈 Licet quattuor elementa sint in esse, posse et agere et pati naturali ad intra conformiter subordinata tamen in ordine alterutro ad extra sunt valde difformiter inequalia. 〉 Ypothesis 28: 〈 Sicut trigonum est in tetragono, sic elementa sunt virtualiter seu potentialiter in mixto. 〉 Ypothesis 29: 〈 Secundum numerum proportionum mediarum inter quatuor elementa geometrice reperibilium resultat necessario numerus possibilis elementorum. 〉 Ypothesis 30: 〈 Quamvis dicantur esse quatuor qualitates prime tamen omnes sunt in genere loquendi active et passive. 〉 Ypothesis 31: 〈 Sicut infima per media procedunt a summo omnium principio, sic e converso infima per media redunt ad idem principium. 〉 Ypothesis 32: 〈 Corpora celestia triplici desuper influunt gubernaculo, scilicet motu, lumine et virtute occulta. 〉 Ypothesis 33: 〈 Quale est proprium passivum in passiva, formali et finali potentia, tale est suum activum in virtute vel originali efficentia et formativa finalique providentia. 〉 Ypothesis 34: 〈 Nullum corpus potest movere per se primo se ipsum. 〉 Ypothesis 35: 〈 Omne movens se ipsum est animatum. 〉 Ypothesis 36: 〈 Omne movens instrumentaliter effectivum est moventi principaliter provisive finaliter subordinatum. 〉 Ypothesis 37: 〈 Moventia et mota subordinata sunt taliter connexa, quod mota tantum incipiunt. 〉 Ypothesis 38: 〈 Omnis motus firmatur ad aliquod immobile. 〉 Ypothesis 39: 〈 Est triplex motus ex parte sui moventis, scilicet naturalis, animalis, violentus. 〉 Ypothesis 40: 〈 Omnis motus ex parte potentie subiective sui mobilis aut est simplex aut compositus. 〉 Ypothesis 41: 〈 Omnis motus, inquantum est forma fluens post formam dependet in sua unitate et divisione a termino ad quem. 〉 Ypothesis 42: 〈 Tot sunt differentie motus formalis, quot genera essentiendi de potentia in actum fluxibilia. 〉 268 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Ypothesis 43: 〈 Secundum tres differentias esse extrinsece agentis sunt dumtaxat tria genera accidentis. 〉 Ypothesis 44: 〈 In hoc differunt potentia motiva nature, anime vitalis et cognitive, quod illa est tantum formalis, hec effectiva, ista finalis. 〉 Ypothesis 45: 〈 Omnis motus naturalis est de contrario in contrarium. 〉 Ypothesis 46: 〈 Sicut intelligere est in intelligentibus vivere et esse et vivere in viventibus esse, sic motus naturalis implicatur formaliter in motu vegetabili et animali. 〉 Ypothesis 47: 〈 Universaliter loquendo in habentibus consequentiam originalis ordinis primum est in secunda, secundum in tertia etc. 〉 Ypothesis 48: 〈 In hoc differunt natura, anima et intellectus, quod illa est tantum ad unum, hec ad plura, ista utroque modo, scilicet ad unum finaliter, sed ad plura formaliter. 〉 Ypothesis 49: 〈 Natura, anima et intellectus seu intelligentia sunt tria universi rerum genera. 〉 Ypothesis 50: 〈 Natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius, in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens. 〉 Ypothesis 51: 〈 Que qualia quanta sunt entia naturalia potentialiter, id est generice, hec talia et tanta sunt animata seu viva partim actualiter partimque potentialiter. 〉 Ypothesis 52: 〈 Sicut possibilitas essendi consequitur naturam generis sic actiones et passiones sunt singularium. 〉 Ypothesis 53: 〈 Divisio puri generis terminatur ad multas species subalternas, que sunt genera et species. 〉 Ypothesis 54: 〈 Totum universale supra omnes partes sue potestatis distributive reflexum fit totum in quantitate. 〉 Ypothesis 55: 〈 Propter contrarietatem differentialem in potestate formali unius generis contentarum necessario omne genus dividitur ad minus in duas species. 〉 Ypothesis 56: 〈 Athoma speciei specialissime natura salvatur in quolibet eius individuo essentialiter et potestative tota. 〉 Ypothesis 57: 〈 Motus celi est vita quedam hominibus deorsum subsistentibus. 〉 Ypothesis 58: 〈 Ut esse precedit vivere et vivere ipsum intelligere, ita e converso intelligere precedit vivere et vivere ipsum esse. 〉 Ypothesis 59: 〈 Omne instrumentum ad cooperandum sui artifici respectu plurium effectuum finaliter ordinatum est necessario secundum numerum et ordinem talium effectuum numerosum et dispositum. 〉 Ypothesis 60: 〈 Homo est minor mundus ad instar mundi maioris. 〉 Ypothesis 61: 〈 Oportet, quod ars in hoc imitetur naturam, ut omnia, que agit, agat secundum unum propositum et unum finem. 〉 Ypothesis 62: 〈 Ars imitatur naturam, inquantum potest, scilicet finaliter in ordinando omnem perfectionem omnem perfectionem eius ad hominem tamquam in finem sibi et nature propaganti communem. 〉 Ypothesis 63: 〈 Vis seu violentia contrariatur nature a toto genere. 〉 Ypothesis 64: 〈 Natura anime subiecta agit multiformiter uno modo. 〉 Ypothesis 65: 〈 Unumquodque agit, secundum quod est. 〉 Ypothesis 66: 〈 In hoc differt anima nobilis ab ignobili, quod illa est virtualis motrix, non autem essentialis informatrix. 〉 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 269 Ypothesis 67: 〈 Quia primum secundum viam processionis seu egressus est ultimum secundum viam conversionis. 〉 Ypothesis 68: 〈 Propter mutuam essentie, vite et intelligentie supra se invicem in esse originis reduplicationem, quodlibet est in alterutro secundum modum illius, in quo est. 〉 Ypothesis 69: 〈 Proprium est forme dare esse commune eidem et anime ex participatione vite et luminis intelligibilis vitaliter et noscibiliter se exerere. 〉 Ypothesis 70: 〈 Exigit proprii activi ad suum proprium passivum determinata et specifica proportio. 〉 Ypothesis 71: 〈 Nichil agit supra vigorem essentialem sue forme nec ens in potentia potest reducere se ipsum in actum. 〉 Ypothesis 72: 〈 Omne tale per participationem dependet a tali per essentiam. 〉 Ypothesis 73: 〈 Cuiusmodi est ens materiale ex participatione formali nature in esse materiali, posse passivo et agere formali, id est moveri, cuiusmodi est ens animatum in esse vitali, posse activo et agere effectivo, id est movere, et tale est huiusmodi ens materialiter cognitivum in esse, posse et agere finaliter seu intentionaliter passibili. 〉 Ypothesis 74: 〈 Tria sunt genera essentialia vivendi vita prima, quattuor gradus vivendi proprii vitae. Ypothesis 75: 〈 Tres sunt potentie vite vegetabilis, scilicet nutritiva, augmentativa et generativa. 〉 Ypothesis 76: 〈 Motus solis in obliquo circulo est causa generationis et corruptionis inferiorum. 〉 Ypothesis 77: 〈 Quecumque communicant in eadem materia et differunt suis formis specificis, sunt eiusdem generis et ad invicem transmutabilia. 〉 Ypothesis 78: 〈 Omnia, que fecit deus, perseverant in eternum. 〉 Ypothesis 79: 〈 Sicut multiplex reducitur ad simplex et plura ad unum, sic transmutatio difformiter perpetua necessario reducitur ad aliquam mutationem uniformiter sempiternam. 〉 Ypothesis 80: 〈 Lumen et occulta celorum influentia sunt communia quatuor causarum universalium. 〉 Ypothesis 81: 〈 Quinque sunt sensibilia communia, scilicet magnitudo, numerus, motus, quies et figura. 〉 Ypothesis 82: 〈 Omne cognoscibiliter obiectum est potentie cognitive sibi appropriate finaliter motum, sensibiliter apprehensum. 〉 Ypothesis 83: 〈 Quelibet causa agens propter earum originalem in causa prima idemptitatem implicat ordinate et distincte secundum modum sue proprietatis causative utramlibet aliam. 〉 Ypothesis 84: 〈 Nichil habemus de tempore nisi nunc et omnia, que cadunt sub tempore, tabefiunt et senescunt. 〉 Ypothesis 85: 〈 Quia duratio est perfectio seu virtus intrinseca forme dantis esse nisi communicantia in eadem causa mobiliter essendi communicant etiam in una mensura sue durationis in tali esse. 〉 Ypothesis 86: 〈 Idem est esse in toto et dici de omni. 〉 Ypothesis 87: 〈 Est triplex contingens, scilicet ut in pluribus, ad utrumlibet et raro seu ut in paucioribus. 〉 270 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Ypothesis 88: 〈 Omnis causa per accidens annectitur cause per se. 〉 Ypothesis 89: 〈 Virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. 〉 Ypothesis 90: 〈 Unumquodque entium naturalium est determinatum operatione quadam. 〉 Ypothesis 91: 〈 Motus maiores excludunt minores. 〉 Ypothesis 92: 〈 Natura movet et influit intime, anima extensive et intelligentia conversive. 〉 Ypothesis 93: 〈 Ex eisdem nutrimur, ex quibus sumus. 〉 Ypothesis 94: 〈 Anima dominatur corpori sicut dominus servo. 〉 Ypothesis 95: 〈 Actus activorum sunt in patiente et disposito. 〉 Ypothesis 96: 〈 Omne medium, per quod defertur species sensibilis ad sensum, est eiusdem potentie passive cum ordine sensitivo. 〉 Ypothesis 97: 〈 Ex quo forma non agit nisi in virtute sui exemplaris et formativi agentis, patet quod agens est inter agens intrinsecum et naturale et totaliter extrinsecum seu finale medium. 〉 Ypothesis 98: 〈 Estimandum est animal constare quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam et munitam. 〉 Ypothesis 99: 〈 Natura dat unicuique, quod sibi conveniens est. 〉 Ypothesis 100: 〈 Modica alteratio in membro principali facit magnam alterationem in toto corpore. 〉 Ypothesis 101: 〈 Manus est organum intellectus, cuius vigor pollicis aequatur vigori omnium digitorum cuius operatio est recipere et retinere. 〉 Ypothesis 102: 〈 Nichil est prius se ipso et ideo nec generat, nec movet se ipsum. 〉 Ypothesis 103: 〈 Qmnia a fine appellari iustum est. 〉 Ypothesis 104: 〈 Intellectus semper est rectus. 〉 Ypothesis 105: 〈 Excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum. 〉 Ypothesis 106: 〈 Omnia, que fiunt, ab ente in actu fiunt. 〉 Ypothesis 107: 〈 Natura non abundat in superfluis nec deficit in necessariis. 〉 Ypothesis 108: 〈 Consuetudo est altera natura. 〉 Ypothesis 109: 〈 Cuius est potentia, eius est actus. 〉 Ypothesis 110: 〈 Sursum in homine est simile cum sursum totius universi. 〉 Ypothesis 111: 〈 Omnia animalia appetunt delectationem. 〉 Ypothesis 112: 〈 Delectatio maior expellit minorem. 〉 Ypothesis 113: 〈 Debemus inspicere formas et delectari in artifice, qui fecit eas. 〉 Ypothesis 114: 〈 Modicum probabiliter scire de altissimis est delectabilius quam scire multum per certitudinem de minus nobilioribus. 〉 Ypothesis 115: 〈 Theorice sunt desiderabiliores practicis. 〉 Ypothesis 116: 〈 Prima causa est prima bonitas dives in se et dives in aliis, regens omnia. 〉 Ypothesis 117: 〈 Quidquid est causa cause, est causa causati. 〉 Ypothesis 118: 〈 Omnia bonum appetunt. 〉 Ypothesis 119: 〈 Finem honoramus, laudamus autem ea, que sunt ad finem. 〉 Ypothesis 120: 〈 Melior est usus rei quam possessio. 〉 Ypothesis 121: 〈 Virtus et ars sunt circa difficile. 〉 Ypothesis 122: 〈 Nullus est beatus vel bonus nolens eo, quod nos sumus domini nostrarum operationum a principio ad finem. 〉 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 271 Ypothesis 123: 〈 Maior est virtus bona operari quam prava non operari. 〉 Ypothesis 124: 〈 Secundum veritatem solus bonus est venerandus. 〉 Ypothesis 125: 〈 Malum seipsum destruit, quod, si integrum fuerit, importabile erit. 〉 Ypothesis 126: 〈 Iustitia est pulcherrima virtutum. 〉 Ypothesis 127: 〈 Ius naturale habet apud omnes eandem potentiam. 〉 Ypothesis 128: 〈 Nemo potest sibi ipsi proprie iniuriam facere. 〉 Ypothesis 129: 〈 Impossibile est prudentem esse. 〉 Ypothesis 130: 〈 Homines fiunt dii virtutum excellentia. 〉 Ypothesis 131: 〈 Regnum est optima politia. 〉 Ypothesis 132: 〈 Maioribus debetur honor, minoribus indigentibus lucrum. 〉 Ypothesis 133: 〈 Servus debet suo domino honorem obedientie servilis fundatum in timore . 〉 Ypothesis 134: 〈 In omnibus oporteret imitare, quod melius est. 〉 Ypothesis 135: 〈 Unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime vult bona. 〉 Ypothesis 136: 〈 Nihil dat, quod non habet. 〉 Ypothesis 137: 〈 Proprium est unitive providentie naturalis legi omnia sibi subiecta proprotionaliter adunare. 〉 Ypothesis 138: 〈 Ex quo forma et finis coincidunt in natura, idcirco quecumque univoce participant eandem formam, necessario sibi invicem adequantur absolute secundum exigentiam unitatis formalis et proportionaliter seu analogice secundum exigentiam habitudinis finalis. 〉 Ypothesis 139: 〈 Ut sic habet equale ad maius et minus, sic mediat inter duo extrema vitia moralis virtus. 〉 Ypothesis 140: 〈 Exigit naturalis ipsius appetitus sensitivi, qui est rationalis per participationem intellectui practico subordinatio. 〉 Ypothesis 141: 〈 Est quintuplex bonum hominis, scilicet bonum in genere, bonum circumstantie, bonum morum, bonum heroicum et bonum divinum. 〉 Ypothesis 142: 〈 Bonum obiectale virtutis moralis est in genere triplex, scilicet bonum delectabile, utile et honestum. 〉 Ypothesis 143: 〈 Tria sunt voluntaria principia, scilicet naturalis potentia electiva, scientia et voluntas libera. 〉 Ypothesis 144: 〈 Liberum arbitrium est totum potestativum dictorum principiorum inseparabiliter comprehensivum. 〉 Ypothesis 145: 〈 Potestas rationalis valet ad opposita. 〉 Ypothesis 146: 〈 Ad preteritum nulla est potentia. 〉 Ypothesis 147: 〈 Est duplex in natura libera voluntas, scilicet naturalis seu notionalis. 〉 Ypothesis 148: 〈 Felicitas est in genere boni finaliter voliti, quo adepta cuncta adaptata succedunt. 〉 Ypothesis 149: 〈 Finalis bulesis et thelesis in homine conformitas consistit in duobus. 〉 Ypothesis 150: 〈 Primum in intentione est ultimum in executione. 〉 Ypothesis 151: 〈 Omne per suam naturam ordinatum in finem precognitum tendit naturaliter, vitaliter et delectabiliter in ipsum. 〉 Ypothesis 152: 〈 Felicitas est premium virtutis. 〉 272 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Ypothesis 153: 〈 Premium et meritum sibi invicem correspondent sicut voluntarius effectus et suum effectuale principium. 〉 Ypothesis 154: 〈 Premii et meriti commensuratio est in genere loquendo trifaria, scilicet congrua, digna et condigna. 〉 Ypothesis 155: 〈 Amor est virtus unitiva, qua voluntas coniungitur suo volito. 〉 Ypothesis 156: 〈 Tres sunt actus seu effectus amicitie, scilicet benivolentia, benificentia et concordia. 〉 Ypothesis 157: 〈 Ex quo secundum nuper habita amor prosivus movet superiora ad inferiorum provisionem, inferiora ad superiorum oboedientiam et paria ad mutuam concordiam. 〉 Ypothesis 158: 〈 Regens est dignius recto. 〉 Ypothesis 159: 〈 Ex bono fit bonum sicut ex homine homo. 〉 Ypothesis 160: 〈 Quia civitas est civium unitas et amicorum sunt omnia communia ideo optimum est civitati, ut sit una. 〉 Ypothesis 161: 〈 Prudentia est propria virtus principis. 〉 Ypothesis 162: 〈 Turba melius iudicat quam unus tantum. 〉 Ypothesis 163: 〈 Lex viva est aptior ad regendum civitatem quam mortua, id est scripta. 〉 Ypothesis 164: 〈 Virtus legis superordinaria iusti legalis particulariter in casibus non provisis directiva dicitur vel conscientia vel epykia. 〉 Ypothesis 165: 〈 Medium facilius obedit rationi. 〉 Ypothesis 166: 〈 Sine iustitia, fortitudine, prudentia, temperantia nemo dicitur bonus. 〉 Ypothesis 167: 〈 Princeps debet esse deicola, ut exemplo sue obedientie qua obedit suo superiori, trahat suos subditos ad obediendum sibi. 〉 Ypothesis 168: 〈 Quanto aliquid est peius, tanto maiori indiget cautela. 〉 Ypothesis 169: 〈 Nobilitas generis et divitie sunt principales fontes seditionum. 〉 Ypothesis 170: 〈 Omnes honores appetunt. 〉 Ypothesis 171: 〈 Pravus socius est, qui impedit commune opus. 〉 Ypothesis 172: 〈 Peccatum est fieri per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora. 〉 Ypothesis 173: 〈 Omnes transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt. 〉 Ypothesis 174: 〈 Simpliciter notum est non, quod omnibus est notum, sed dispositis intellectu. 〉 Ypothesis 175: 〈 Homines in pluribus sunt mali, in paucioribus boni. 〉 Ypothesis 176: 〈 Qui dubitat, an oporteat deos venerari aut parentes honorare, non indiget ratione, sed pena. 〉 Ypothesis 177: 〈 Unumquodque principiorum est sibi ipsi fides. 〉 Ypothesis 178: : 〈 Prius est esse quam non esse natura et ratione. 〉 Ypothesis 179: 〈 Opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescant. 〉 Ypothesis 180: 〈 Oppositorum est eadem disciplina. 〉 Ypothesis 181: 〈 Duo sunt opera sapientis, scilicet non mentiri et mentientem manifestare. 〉 Ypothesis 182: 〈 Licet sit eadem potentia rationalis oppositorum, tamen illa ratio potest simul reduci in actus intelligendi vel considerandi oppositos. 〉 A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 273 Ypothesis 183: 〈 Omne ens immateriale est simul et inseparabiliter perfectum in esse, posse et agere. 〉 Ypothesis 184: 〈 Omnis substantia immaterialis est intellectualis plena formis. 〉 Ypothesis 185: 〈 Omnis causa secunda est secundum modum sue nature instrumentum cause prime. 〉 Ypothesis 186: 〈 Omnis creatura nature, gratie et glorie capax ad fontem nature, gratie et glorie universorum naturabilium, gratificabilium et glorificabilium cognitive conversa est speculum deiforme omnium in lumine naturali gratuito et glorifico illius fontis intellectualis virtualiter relucentium multiforme. 〉 Ypothesis 187: 〈 Qui creavit omnia simul, hec ad tres sese consequentes ordinavit fines, scilicet proximum, medium et ultimum. 〉 Ypothesis 188 / 19066: De triplici finali bono. 〈 Est triplex bonum finaliter intentum. 〉 Ypothesis 189 / 191: De bonorum finalium subordinatione. 〈 Sicut in subordinatis finaliter per gradus essendi primum est finis secundi, secundum tertii et sic deinceps, sic in subordinatione finaliter potestativa actus potentie superioris est finis actionis potentie inferiorum gradatim descendendo. 〉 Ypothesis 190 / 192: De finis et gratia cuius distinctione. 〈 Duplex est finis, scilicet quo et gratia cuius seu finis operis et finis intentionis. 〉 Ypothesis 191 / 193: De vera hominis felicitate eiusque ad virtutes heroycas morales, naturales et intellectuales intentus. 〈 Vera hominis felicitas est finis omnium agibilium humanorum. 〉 Ypothesis 192 / 194: De tribus nocionalibus vite humane fructibus. 〈 Qualis unusquisque est, talia dicit et operatur et taliter vivit. 〉 Ypothesis 193 / 195: De proportionalibus mediorum inter extrema nature, vite et intelligentie differentiis. 〈 Inter quelibet duo extrema in esse, posse et agere perfecte distantia, cuiusmodi sunt contraria, phisicaliter continetur septem media per totidem gradus mixture finaliter ordinata. 〉 Ypothesis 194 / 196: De regni virium anime rationalis ad regnum totius universi conformitate. 〈 Principatus virum ostendit. 〉 Ypothesis 195 / 197: De triplici cuiuslibet potentie rationalis actu, scilicet simplici composito et decomposito. 〈 Tres sunt cuiuslibet potentie intellectualis actus se consequentes, quorum primus est simplex, secundus ex simplicibus compositus, tertius de compositus. 〉 Ypothesis 196 / 198: De differente illorum actuum ordine. 〈 Ordo actionum memorie et voluntatis sunt directe obvii et conversi sicut principium indisciplinis et finis in agibilibus. 〉 Ypothesis 197 / 199: De triplici vita quam anima communicat corpori ad instar triplicis celi motus. 〈 Vita, quam animam communicat corpori, est trifaria, scilicet formalis, effectiva et finalis. 〉 On the double numbering, see supra p. XXX; from this point on in this document, the titles will be given according to the copy of hand B; in this last variant, the parts corresponding to each hypothesis are designated by the word capitulum and by a numbering system that is independent from the rest, but the first sentence also contains the word ypothesis. Thus on f. 251r it is written: „Capitulum sextum. De triplici finali bonum. Centesima nonagesima ypothesis: Est triplex bonum etc.” 66 274 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH Ypothesis 198 / 200: De impressionibus metheorologice et conformibus vivi passionibus. 〈 Lumen et motus sunt cause calorum in materia calefactibili, prout docet experientia. 〉 Conclusiva additio totius. QUARTA PARS PRINCIPALIS 〈 Distinctio prima 〉 (f. 254v – 256v) Capitulum l: De prohemio dicendorum. Capitulum 2: De legis ad ius comparatione et quintuplici voluntatis summi legislatoris significatione. Capitulum 3: De appropriata operum creationis, distinctionis et ornatus diversitate et originali omnium legum et iurium naturalium in opus ornatus resolutione. Capitulum 4: De legitima ornatus mundani cum veritate signi consonantia. Capitulum 5: De iurium et legum versus superius concordia. Capitulum 6: De legum et iurium versus inferius sine dicte conformitatis preiudicio contrarietate multiformique dissimilitudine. Capitulum 7: De canonum terminalium alphabeto. Distinctio secunda: De quibusdam documentis et corollariis dicta principia iuridice appropriantibus (f. 256v – 265v) Capitulum 1: De quattuor iuris naturalis differentia. Capitulum 2: De undeviginti corollariis iuris naturalis diffinitivis. Capitulum 3: De corollariis 〈 iuris 〉 nature distincte conclusionibus. Capitulum 4: De corollariis iuris nature ornate conclusionibus. Capitulum 5: De iuribus fatalibus nature propagabilis. Distinctio tertia: De imaginariis iustitie naturalis in iure humano resonantiis (f. 265v – 272r) Capitulum 1: De novem iuris naturalis mundi maioris in mundo minori relucentiis. Capitulum 2: De novem iuribus humanis naturaliter exemplatis. Capitulum 3: De decem principiis Moysi naturaliter iustificatis. Capitulum 4: De dubiis circa preceptum primum incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 5: De dubiis circa preceptum secundum incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 6: De dubiis circa tertium preceptum incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 7: De dubiis circa quartum preceptum decalogi incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 8: De dubiis circa quintum preceptum et sextum decalogi incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 9: De dubiis circa precepta decalogi septimum et octavum incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. Capitulum 10: De dubiis circa duo ultima decalogi mandata incidentibus et eorum solutionibus. A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 275 Capitulum 11: De virtutibus et vitiis in iure naturali fundatis et carismatibus gratuitis huiusmodi virtutes supervescentibus. Distinctio quarta et ultima: De multiformi statu ecclesie ad instar mundi et hominis institute eiusque origine et salutari regimi (f. 272r – 273v) Capitulum 1: De triplici casu ecclesiastici novenario ad instar iustitie originalis totius universi atque hominis conditi ordinato et legitimato. Capitulum 2: De triplicis legis genus humanum a suo lapsu gradatim sublevantis necessitate et de redemptorum qualitate suorumque ministeriorum legalium ecclesiastica ordinatione. Capitulum 3 et finale: De totius presentis operis epilogo, eius motivo et utili proposito necnon sue compositionis inartificiose excusatione et humili omnium enuntiabilium in eodem sub circumspectione correctorum idoneorum offertorio. 276 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH ANNEX 3 COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM Prima Pars, Distinctio Prima Capitulum 1. De triplici secta philosophorum. [195r] Quoniam teste Philosopho, ideo parvus error in principio est magnus in fine, quia principium est minimum quidem in quantitate, sed maximum in virtute unde fit, quod principium est plus quam dimidium totius. Ideo nimirum Stoici ponentes principia omnium esse pure formalia, utputa ydeas seu exemplaria, Epicurei ponentes universorum principia esse pure materialia et Peripatetici ponentes principia entium quolibeta compositorum esse partim formalia, partim materialia, utputa ex actu et potentia essentiata, sunt diversi philosophi veritatum realium scrutatores equivoci, inter quos dumtaxat illi sunt censendi veridici, qui suas assertiones conforma〈 n 〉t naturae rei. Ex quo ab eo, quod res est vel non est, oratio dicitur vera vel falsa propter hoc, quod eadem suntb principia essendi et cognoscendi, I Physicorum. Capitulum 5. De triplici scientia reali secundum Peripateticos. Quia autem Stoici considerabant veritates rerum ideales ante rem, secundum scilicet quod emanant a datore formarum, sicut imago sigilli fluit a sigillo in ceram, Epicurei vero considerabant huiusmodi veritates, secundum quod cadunt sub sensu, quo habent esse materiale et accidentaliter sensibile, sed Peripatetici considerant eas, secundum quod cadunt in intellectum reflexum ad sensum, ad imaginationem et ad se ipsum – iuxta differentias abstractionis triplici independentie seu separabili〈 ta 〉tis formarum intelligibilium, id est universalium, a materia individuante correspondentis idem intellectus —, sicut exemplariter patet in forma intelligibili lapidum, quam primo apprehendit intellectus reflexus ad visum sui coloris eiusb superficiem tingentis. Idem intellectus deinde apprehendit eandem formam, secundum quod est denudata et evestita a specie coloris, sed circumscripta per figuram certe magnitudinis, quod fit per sui reflexionem ad imaginationem propriam talium quantitatum determinatarum speculatricem. Deinde idem intellectus accipit huiusmodi formam intelligibilem lapidis, secundum quod est nuda quiditas sue veritatis substantialis, tam quantitatem imaginabilem quam etiam qualitatem sensibilem natura et causalitate eo modo, quo substantia precedit accidens, prevenientem, quod fit per aversionem sui luminis intelligibilis a sensu et imaginatione, et per consequens conversionem seu collationem eiusdem in se ipso et ad se ipsum. Et quia sic abstrahentium non est me〈 n 〉dacium, ut dicit Philosophus II Physicorum — licet exigat ordo conversus nostri modi abstrahendi, quo venamur scientiam a pos- A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY METAPHYSICAL TREATISE ... COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM ... 277 teriori procedendo ad prius secundum naturam, quod posteriora secundum viam abstractionis sint priora secundum viam naturalis originis, ut testatur idem Philosophus I Physicorum —, idcirco Peripatetici distinguunt rerum materialium tripliciter scientiam realiter speculativam, scilicet physicam, metaphysicam et mathematicam, prout declarat Philosophus V Metaphysice propter hoc, quod natura lapidis, sicut cuiuslibet alterius rei materialis, est essentia formalis fluens in lumine intelligibili sui universalis agentis, scilicet Dei constituentis eam per creationem in esse pure substantiali et simpliciter, sine concretione imaginabili vel sensibili, intelligibilid; item Dei agentis per ministerium celestis constellationis huiusmodi lapidem universaliter figurantis; item Dei agentis per ministerium virtutis mineralis huiusmodi lapidem in certa specie nature ponentis. Itaque in una re secundum iudicium confusum sensibilis Epicurei sunt tres subordinate veritates seu formalitates universaliter reales, secundum quas idem lapis est tripliciter scibilis iuxta verum iudicium intelligibile Peripateti〈 corum 〉. Capitulum 6. De differentia philosophie Stoicorum, Epicureorum et Peripateticorum et utilitate scientifica solius philosophie Peripateticorum. Vides ergo, quantum differat philosophia divina et superhumana Stoicorum et philosophia sensualis seu subhumanac Epicureorum a philosophia humana Peripateticorum, et quam recte Aristoteles, qui fuit princeps et archidoctor Peripateticorum, ambulat in medio illorum extremorum ad modum, quo homo est secundum proprium gradum sue speciei inter creaturam pure spiritualem cognoscentem per divine artis ideas et creaturam pure corporalem, in qua, si fuerit cognitiua, non potest esse nisi cognitio sensualis, participative medius, communicans videlicet cum Deo et spiritibus creatis per intellectum et cum bestiis per sensum et consistens in se ipso per rationem hinc inde a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia et e converso discursivam. Propter quod non inepte idem Philosophus deridet ideas tamquam ad generationem cognitionis aut beatitudinis humane inutiles, sicut patet I Posteriorum, VII Metaphysice et I Ethicorum; et pari modo ipse rationabiliter abicit a veritate cognitionis humane Democriti, Leucippi, Empedoclis, Anaxagore et aliorum Epicureorum opiniones, sicut patet I Physicorum, I De generatione, I Metaphysice. 278 DRAGOS CALMA, RUEDI IMBACH PIÊTNASTOWIECZNY TRAKTAT METAFIZYCZNY: WSTÊPNE UWAGI O COLLIGET PRINCIPIORUM HEIMERYKA Z CAMPO S T R E S Z C Z E N I E Artyku³ przynosi pierwszy opis jednego z najbardziej interesuj¹cych dzie³ Heimeryka z Campo (ok. 1396–1460), Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis divini et humani philosophice doctrinalium, zachowanego w rêkopisie Biblioteki Kuzañskiej: Codex Cusanus 106. Po opisaniu rêkopisu (zeszyty, rêce kopistów i uk³ad traktatu), autorzy analizuj¹ wybrane problemy, poruszone w tym jeszcze niewydanym dziele, zredagowanym na proœbê Miko³aja z Kuzy w czasie trwania Soboru Bazylejskiego (1431–1449). Podkreœlaj¹ najpierw, ¿e u¿yty w tytule termin ‘colliget’ jest rzeczownikiem odnosz¹cym siê najpewniej do tytu³u Awerroesowego traktatu medycznego Kitab Al-Kulliyate fil-Tibb, prze³o¿onego na ³acinê jako Colliget; lecz to samo s³owo odnosi siê równie¿ do wielu miejsc w Biblii, do tradycji ³aciñskich florilegiów albo do przepisów Didaskalikonu Hugona ze Œw. Wiktoryna. Wed³ug s³ów samego Heimeryka, dzie³o zosta³o pomyœlane jako cenny skarb na lata staroœci, kiedy s³aba pamiêæ nie bêdzie ju¿ doœæ sprawna, by przypomnieæ podstawowe pryncypia metafizyki, teologii i prawa. Colliget mo¿e byæ uwa¿ane za jeden z pierwszych traktatów metafizycznych napisanych na Zachodzie, niezale¿nie od tradycji komentarzy do analogicznych dzie³ Arystotelesa i Avicenny. W istocie, Heimeryk pojmuje metafizykê jako królowê nauk, jako naukê dan¹ przez Boga, mówi¹c¹ o Bogu i w Bogu (in Deo): metafizyka jest t¹ dziedzin¹ wiedzy, któr¹ cz³owiek i Bóg dziel¹ pospo³u. Autorzy artyku³u wskazuj¹ równie¿ na stanowisko Heimeryka wobec trzech staro¿ytnych szkó³, czyli „sekt” filozoficznych (epikurejskiej, stoickiej i perypatetyckiej), którym w rzeczywistoœci mia³a odpowiadaæ sytuacja aktualna w filozofii. Z pewnym te¿ naciskiem podkreœla siê wp³yw filozofii Rajmunda Lulla na myœl Heimeryka i próbuje wskazaæ w samym Colliget kilka przyk³adów tego wp³ywu. Trzy Aneksy uzupe³niaj¹ artyku³: tabula capitulorum, schemat traktatu oraz tekst kilku pocz¹tkowych rozdzia³ów.