A baseline study of
youth identity, the
media and the public
sphere in South Africa
A baseline study of youth
identity, the media and the
public sphere in South Africa
Report compiled by Vanessa Malila
Contributions by Jane Duncan, Irene Costera Meijer, Nico
Drok, Anthea Garman, Larry Strelitz, Lynette Steenveld,
Tanja Bosch, Musa Ndlovu and Media Tenor
School of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University
January 2013
ISSN: 978-0-620-55785-6
i
Acknowledgements
The project on youth identity, the media and the public sphere in South Africa
was led by Prof Jane Duncan, Highway Africa Chair of Media and Information
Society, at Rhodes University in South Africa. The research project was funded
by the South Africa Netherlands Research Programme on Alternatives in Development (SANPAD), and partnered in the Netherlands with Prof Irene Costera
Meijer (of VU University of Amsterdam) and Prof Nico Drok (of Windesheim
University). In South Africa, the following people contributed to the study:
• Prof Anthea Garman, Associate Professor at the School of Journalism and
Media Studies at Rhodes University
• Prof Larry Strelitz, Head of Department of the School of Journalism and
Media Studies at Rhodes University
• Prof Lynette Steenveld, Associate Professor at the School of Journalism and
Media Studies at Rhodes University
• Dr Tanja Bosch, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Film and Media Studies at
the University of Cape Town
• Dr Musa Ndlovu, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Film and Media Studies at
the University of Cape Town
The project also included contributions Media Tenor, an international media
analysis institute “in the ield of applied Agenda Setting Research, serving partners in the corporate, government and scientiic world with strategic media
intelligence” (http://www.mediatenor.co.za/ou_who_we_are.php).
The project funding provided scholarships and mentorship opportunities for
two MA students: Samantha Griiths (supervised by Tanja Bosch) and Anja Venter (co-supervised by Tanja Bosch and Musa Ndlovu). The project also provided
funding for two PhD students: Zwakele Ngubane (supervised by Jane Duncan),
and Admire Mare (co-supervised by Jane Duncan and Herman Wasserman).
The research team acknowledges the assistance of Prof Sarah Radlof (Department of Statistics at Rhodes University) in the statistical analysis of the survey
results; members of the Mellon Media and Citizenship Project (School of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University) for conducting focus group discussions in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng; and Anthony Sparg for transcription
and translation of a number of the focus group discussions.
ii
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 12
LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 15
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 15
Youth........................................................................................................................ 15
Citizenship ............................................................................................................. 19
Public sphere [media, popular culture]:
Constituting youth as citizens ....................................................................... 23
Media, youth, and politics ............................................................................... 24
New media, youth and politics ...................................................................... 28
METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 31
FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................... 37
Media coverage on the youth ........................................................................ 37
Issue coverage on the youth .......................................................................... 38
Education ............................................................................................................... 38
Unemployment and the social situation of youths................................ 40
Crime........................................................................................................................ 42
Media and institutional trust.......................................................................... 58
Civic identity and the media ........................................................................... 68
Civic engagement and the media ................................................................. 74
iii
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................... 81
REFERENCES............................................................................................................... 86
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 96
APPENDIX ONE ................................................................................................... 96
APPENDIX TWO ................................................................................................111
APPENDIX THREE ............................................................................................113
Illustrations
Figure 1: Gender and ethnic representation ............................................ 38
Figure 2: Volume of top issues associated with the youth................. 39
Figure 3: Volume and ratings of coverage on wage subsidies ......... 41
Figure 4: Volume and ratings of top health issues................................ 42
Figure 5: Volume and ratings of top crime-related issues ................. 43
Figure 6: Volume and ratings of organisations or programmes
focused on youth development................................................. 44
Figure 7: Volume and ratings of political parties’ youth divisions
Percentage of covereage: youth division vs all others .... 45
Figure 8: Volume of coverage on young political leaders .................. 46
Figure 9: Ratings of coverage on young political leaders .................. 46
Figure 10: Media used for news ................................................................. 47
Figure 11: Media used for news — Google............................................. 50
Figure 12: Most important source of news — Dutch indings ........ 52
Figure 13: Interest in news — Dutch/SA comparison ........................ 53
Figure 14: Volume and ratings of top issues ......................................... 57
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Figure 15 ............................................................................................................. 58
Figure 16: Trust in local government ....................................................... 59
Figure 17: Trust in national government ................................................ 60
Figure 18: Institutional trust ........................................................................ 62
Figure 19: Media trust .................................................................................... 64
Figure 20: Media trust across race ............................................................ 66
Figure 21: Evaluation of news reporting ................................................. 68
Figure 22: News media relevance across age ........................................ 69
Figure 23: News media relevance across race ...................................... 70
Figure 24: What would make the media more relevant to you? .... 72
Figure 25: Youth participation .................................................................... 75
Figure 26 ............................................................................................................. 77
Figure 27: Did you vote in the last national elections? ...................... 79
Acronyms
ANC
ASSA
AWB
COSATU
DA
HSRC
ICT
IFP
SA
SABC
SMS
TV
UCT
UKZN
African National Congress
Actuarial Society of South Africa
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
Congress of South African Trade Unions
Democratic Alliance
Human Sciences Research Council
Information and Communication Technology
Inkatha Freedom Party
South Africa
South African Broadcasting Corporation
Short Message Service
Television
University of Cape Town
University of KwaZulu-Natal
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eXeCUtIVe sUMMARY
The aim of this study is threefold: It investigates the ways in which various forms of media, including new media, shape youth identity in South
Africa. Secondly, it probes the possible ways in which media contribute
to the civic identity of South African youth. Thirdly the study explores
whether the media relect youth voices. Information from this study will
show if and how the media contribute to the construction of the social identities of the South African youth and if these identities help the
youth to contribute to the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy.
This information will also contribute towards formulating media policy
that is responsive to the needs and interests of the South African youth.
MetHoDoLoGY
This analysis is based on three sets of data:
Quantitative survey data comes from survey questionnaires completed
by 956 respondents, mostly between 15 and 30 years of age in four
provinces: Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape.
These sites were selected for a combination of reasons. The provinces
are the four most populated provinces in South Africa (Census 2011).
Two of the provinces are uniquely representative of particular historical
classiications of the South African population: Coloured people form
the majority of the population in the Western Cape (Hendricks, 2005:
118) and the majority of Indian South Africans live in KwaZulu-Natal.
According to the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) (2000) the
province was divided along racial lines in the following way – 84.9%,
Black African, 1.5% Coloured, 8.5% Indian, 2.4% White.1 A practical
consideration for choosing the locations was the fact that the institutional partners were based here: Gauteng – Media Tenor, Eastern Cape
– Rhodes University, Western Cape – University of Cape Town, and KwaZulu-Natal – Durban University of Technology. Just over 87% (87.2%) of
respondents were between 15 and 30 years old, with only 12.8% above
31 years. The information therefore shows a bias towards younger re1
http://www.sahealthinfo.org/bod/kwazulunatal.pdf
1
spondents. There was a fair gender balance across respondents with
50.8% female respondents and 49.2% male respondents. Because race
remains a signiicant socio-economic indicator in post-Apartheid South
Africa, respondents were asked to identify themselves as Black African
(57%), Coloured (13%), Indian (11%) and White (6%). Due to the relatively small numbers of Indian and Coloured respondents and because
there were no signiicant diferences in responses across questions for
these two categories and they have been grouped together in the results. There is a more extensive discussion on the race categories in the
main section of the report.
Media Tenor2 conducted a quantitative content analysis of the kind
of media coverage of the youth in both print and broadcast (television
only) media in South Africa. A total of 8736 articles were analysed from
South African print media between January 2011 and July 2012. Articles were chosen on the basis of whether they have the youth as subjects. Each article was analysed for the following variables:
• Who/what is the subject
• what is the ield of business of the subject
• where does the action take place
• what time does the statement refer to
• what topic is the statement about
• who is the source of the statement
• and the tone or value of the statement (whether it is negative, positive or neutral).
Print media analysed were: Beeld, Business Day, Business Report, Business Times, Cape Times, City Press, Daily Dispatch, Daily Sun, Die Burger, FinWeek, Financial Mail, Isolezwe, Mail & Guardian, New Age, Rapport, Sake24, Sowetan, Star, Sowetan, Star, Sunday Independent, Sunday
Times, Times, Witness. Broadcast media analysed were the following
news broadcasts, all on television: SABC3 News@One, E-TV News, Afrikaans News, SABC2, English News, SABC3, Zulu/Xhosa News, SABC1,
Sotho News, SABC2, KykNet (Afrikaans), SiSwati/Ndebele News, SABC1,
2
Media Tenor is an international media analysis institute “in the ield of applied Agenda Setting Research, serving partners in the corporate, government and scientiic world
with strategic media intelligence” (http://www.mediatenor.co.za/ou_who_we_are.php).
2
SABC3 news@10 and SABC3 Africa News Update.
Focus group discussions provide qualitative information and ofer
insight into a number of issues that emerged in the quantitative data.
Focus group discussions were conducted in three provinces in South Africa: Gauteng, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. In total 14 focus group
discussions were conducted with a total of 107 participants across the
demographic range: unemployed / employed (full time and part time),
students (full time and part time), young people living in rural and urban
areas, and participants across all racial categories. In addition to a better
understanding of the survey data, the focus group discussions ofer a
deeper understanding of young people’s perceptions of community, civic and political engagement, media use, and attitudes towards the media
in relation to political and civic engagement. The choice of focus group
participants was shaped by the results of the survey and participants
were identiied based on variables that showed particular relevance in
the results emerging in the survey data. These variables include age,
rural/urban location, gender, race, and employment status.
A qualitative policy analysis was conducted to provide an overview of
youth policies in South Africa. The analysis focuses on whether general
youth policy and speciically media policy promote active youth participation in the public sphere. Researchers analysed the National Youth
Policy 2009-2014, the Children’s Act, the Films and Publications Act,
and the Media Development and Diversity Agency Act. The aim of the
policy analysis is to allow the research to make policy recommendations based on key focus areas identiied by the government. This policy
analysis is related to the key indings of the study and allows for recommendations for better youth engagement and participation in the public
sphere through the media.
3
FInDInGs
The indings are collated in relation to information from the surveys, the
focus group discussions, the content analysis and in comparison with
the research conducted by the Dutch partners.
Media coverage on the youth
The content analysis identiies trends of reporting on the youth as well
as issues most closely associated with youth. The analysis focuses on
reportage of organisations and programmes concerned with youth development. The analysis also examines political coverage on youth.
In general the content analysis shows an unbalanced trend of reporting on gender with young males receiving almost 20% more coverage
than young women. Analysis of long-term media trends indicates that
the share of coverage on women is decreasing over time. Another imbalance in coverage emerges with regard to coverage of White youth
and Coloured youth. While coverage of Black African and Indian youth
is relatively proportionate to population estimates, the content analysis shows more coverage of White youth compared to coverage of Coloured youth. According to Statistics South Africa’s population estimates
for 2011 there are 8.64% Coloureds and 9.09% Whites currently living
in South Africa, Yet White young people receive more than twice the
amount of coverage when compared with coverage of Coloured youth.
Education was by far the top issue in terms of volume associated with
the youth covered in the media. A total of almost 1 500 news items
focused on education in the review period with the next biggest issue –
crime – getting mentioned in just over 200 items. Of the 1 500 items,
almost 1 200 were either negative or neutral news items with the remainder being positive. See Figure 2 for a breakdown of the volume and
ratings of top issues in the media associated with South African youth.
In terms of crime, the top three issues in terms of volume related to coverage of rape/sexual abuse (more than 40), murder (less than 35) and
kidnapping (less than 30). The third issue in terms of volume was health
with about 200 articles. Of these, the biggest volume of news items was
4
about HIV and AIDS (just more than 40), followed by pregnancy (just
more than 20). Substance abuse, food poisoning and neonatal deaths
were the next biggest health issues in terms of volume, all of them being
covered in between 15 and 20 news items.
The lowest number of news items covering the youth related to social
services, politics and the justice system (each with about 50 news items
for the time period in review).
Media use
Most respondents say they use radio news most for getting information (70.8%), with SA TV3 news (67.3%) as the second highest source of
information. Google or other search engines was the third most-stated
source of news media (62.8%). The medium used the least by survey
respondents to gather news is tabloid newspapers (38.5%). Figure 10
gives a breakdown of indings in terms of media usage.
Unemployed youth favour SA television (SA TV) and radio most as
news sources (both at 82.5%). SA TV is also the most favourite source
of employed youth (71.9%). Radio news is the most signiicant source
of news for youth attending school (73.4%) with Google or other search
engines the second most preferred source (68.9%). The most preferred
way for young people in college of university to access the news is
through Google or other search engines (68.4%). Six out of 10 young
people (61.3%) in this category said they use social media as a news
source – the highest amongst all the occupation categories4.
Media usage amongst South African youth is surprisingly comparable
with the young people in the Netherlands who also still favour traditional broadcasting media rather than printed newspapers. South African
youth favour radio more than television as opposed to Dutch youth who
favour television over radio as their most important news source.
The survey distinguished between South African television and international television. SA TV includes South African channels such as SABC, e-TV, KykNet and Soweto-TV.
3
4
Google or other search engines as a news source: In school, 52.9%; employed, 50.5%,
and unemployed, 39.5%.
5
Perhaps more revealing in terms of what young people use media for,
are the results regarding their interest in speciic topics. Survey respondents were asked to rate a number of speciic media topics according to
those they are most interested in. The results reveal not only their interest in popular culture (which was the highest at 86.3%), but also their
signiicant lack of interest in politics or topics that relate to politics. Of
the two lowest topics of interest, both related to politics, with political
actions the least interesting (34.6%), and politics/government the second lowest (37.9%).
Media and institutional trust
Respondents were asked about their trust in local, provincial and national
government. The results show signiicantly low levels of trust in all three
levels of government with trust in local government showing the lowest level. Only 34.4% respondents say they trust local government a great
deal or quite a lot. Close to four out of ten (38.3%) respondents say they
trust provincial government quite a lot or a great deal and 40.9% of respondents say they trust national government a great deal or quite a lot.
There is no signiicant change in levels of trust across the diferent age
categories of survey respondents. Figure 16 illustrates diferences across
other variables like race, rural / urban, income and employment.
Race is a signiicant variable in levels of trust in public institutions. Indian/Coloured youth show very low levels of trust across all institutions.
White youth are also less trustful of public institutions than Black African youth. White youth are most trustful of private companies. Black
African (77%) and Indian/Coloureds respondents have high levels of
trust in religious institutions (73.3%) and White youth have low levels
(53.4%) of trust in religious institutions.
Young people in South Africa are generally uninterested and mistrustful of political institutions and political parties. This includes low levels of trust in the legal system, the police, and in parliament. Only 30.7%
of respondents say they trust political parties either a great deal or quite
a lot. This mistrust in political institutions and political parties could
have implications for strategies to strengthen democracy or building
civic identities in South Africa.
6
Young people who live in rural areas are more trusting of public institutions than those who live in large cities. Interestingly, those who live in
rural areas show less trust in the older generation (75.1%) than those
who live in large cities (77.8%), while those who live in small towns
show the highest levels of trust in the older generation (80.5%). This
trend is reversed when one examines trust in religious institutions with
respondents in rural areas showing higher levels of trust (75.3%) than
those in large cities (69.8%), and respondents in small towns (78.3%)
showing the highest levels of trust in religious institutions.
Compared to levels of trust in political institutions, levels of trust in the
media are signiicantly high amongst South African youth: TV news
(79.5%), radio news (78.3%) and newspapers (71.9%). Almost six out of
ten respondents say they trust magazines and social media (59.2% and
57.7% respectively).
Most young South Africans note the older generation as an institution they trust most (77.4%). Although there are some diferences
amongst race groups (Indians/Coloureds, 84%; Black Africans, 76.5%;
Whites, 75.4%) these are relatively high in comparison with trust shown
in other institutions. Figure 18 provides a breakdown of levels of trust
in diferent institutional categories.
Civic identity and the media
One of the aims of the research project is to determine whether young
South Africans use the media to establish their civic identity and whether the media form part of the resources they draw on to establish their
identity as South African citizens.
In order to evaluate this quantitatively, respondents were asked which
entertainment and lifestyle media they felt provided the most relevant
information to them as young South Africans. Interestingly the top
three media most relevant to respondents are radio (37.7%), social
media (34.1%), and Google or other search engines (33.8%). This is
signiicantly diferent (except for radio) to usage igures for the media
that show TV, radio, and SMS as the three top media regularly used
by young people. This may indicate that while young South Africans
7
regularly use certain media, they ind the information they receive on
those platforms as less than relevant to their lives.
When asked which media they felt provided the most relevant news
and information the results were quite diferent (again except for radio) with the top three being radio (44%), SA TV news (42.9%), and
mainstream newspapers (39.1%). Trends across age groups show that
the older respondents become, the more relevant these three media
are to them. Mainstream newspapers’ relevance to 15-20 year olds is
30.9%, but for 21-30 year olds it is 44.9% and for 31+ year olds it is
49.2%. The indings further show that young White South Africans ind
the news and information from the media more relevant than other race
groups. (Except for tabloids that show low levels of relevance across all
race categories.) Figure 22 gives a breakdown of the relevance of news
media across race groups.
Focus groups discussion probed the relevance of news media in more
depth. When focus group participants were asked if they felt the news
media was relevant and of interest to young people the results varied.
The generally negative perceptions about the news media raised by
focus group participants correspond with the survey results. Focus
group participants raised two issues in particular: the irst was that negativity in the news media is unappealing to them and secondly, that
they ind the news media irrelevant because it does not help them to
make sense of speciic contexts. Figure 24 shows a breakdown of survey responses to the question what could make the media more relevant
to young people.
Civic engagement and the media
In part, this research aims to examine the levels of engagement by the
youth in diferent kinds of civic, social or political activity. Survey responses and focus group discussions relect low levels of political activity and engagement. Willingness to vote, political activity and general
interest in politics was particularly low amongst South African youth
across the categories, and this is perhaps one of the most striking results of the data. Survey respondents were asked which activities they
had been involved in during the last 12 months. Of the options, politi8
cal activities were often at the lowest level of responses. The data show
young South Africans tend to participate more in civic or social activities. Helping a neighbour was the most common answer from survey
respondents (79.1%), with being involved in a social group (67.4%) and
being active in a religious activity (64.9). Respondents reported relatively low participation even in activities speciically aimed at youth
involvement, such as activity in a youth movement, and being part of
the student council. Figure 25 gives a breakdown of participation levels
in 16 diferent activities.
While levels of involvement in political activities are low across all categories of respondents, young Black Africans show higher levels of involvement in political activities than other races. Black African respondents
are signiicantly more involved in youth movements (40.8%) than both
White (36.5%) and Indian/Coloured (36.3%) respondents. With regards to
trade union activity Black African respondents are almost twice as likely
to be involved (13.8%) than White (7.5%) and Indian/Coloured (7.6%) respondents. Black African respondents are almost three times more likely
to be involved in party political activities (23.3%), than White respondents
(8.2%), and almost ive times more likely than Indian/Coloured respondents (5.8%). One category where Indian/Coloured respondents are signiicantly more involved is in religious activities. Indian/Coloured youth
show the highest levels of involvement (71.3%) over Black African youth
(67.1%), and White youth (46.3%). White youth show the highest levels
of involvement in activities that take place online (posting views to an
online blog/group, and visiting online forums).
In focus groups, engagement in political and civic activities (such as
charitable work and signing a petition) was further examined. These discussions provide greater insight into some of the reasons for the lack of
participation and engagement. Focus group participants were asked at
diferent points during the discussions about the problems they face as
youth and whether they feel they can do anything about these problems.
The responses reveal perceptions of a lack of agency with regards to
being active in their communities or helping other people. Some of
the responses indicate that the youth themselves feel they need to give
assistance but they are not in a position to help others.
9
Conclusions and recommendations
Do the media relect youth voices?
While young people use traditional and some new media for gathering
news and information, there is a strong sense from the results that the
youth do not feel that the media are relevant to them. This may indicate
that while young South Africans regularly use certain media, they ind
the information they receive on those platforms as less than relevant
to their lives. It could be in the interest of the media and especially the
news media, to investigate issues of media relevancy and what it means
for young people in more detail. This investigation could include targeting more content speciically towards young South Africans. This is
particularly true of Black African and Indian/Coloured youth who feel
strongly about the need for youth content in newspapers.
Do the media contribute to the construction of social identities?
The results of this study illustrate that young people across South Africa
need support in developing a civic identity. The older generation has
emerged as a key support system for young people in this study. This
can be used to great advantage by educators, NGOs, the National Youth
Development Agency, government departments, private companies and
other facilitators in thinking creatively about ways to engage young
people (across all key categories) in civic and political life.
It is evident that young people use a range of media to build their civic
identities, that they use the media to access news, and that there are high
levels of trust in the media in general. The Media Development and Diversity Agency, which engages with community media across the country,
should be required to engage more with young people about conceptions
of relevance, trust and content targeting youth in general. The MDDA
could also encourage recipients of its funding to target young people.
The youth and the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy
Willingness to vote, political activity and general interest in politics was
particularly low amongst South African youth across the categories. The
data further show that young people are mistrustful of politics and political processes. The indings also generally show that youth are uninterested in politics as a topic for media consumption.
10
Two issues emerge in relation to these indings that need further investigation: The irst, is the disparity between respondents reporting low
levels of interest in voting, but reporting relatively high levels of having
actually voted in the last national and local government elections. The
second issue to explore is a possible relationship between actual voting,
willingness to vote and the low levels of trust in public and political institutions reported in the survey and in focus groups.
Media policy responding to youth needs
Young people with access to the internet (whether through their mobile
phones or laptop/PC) are using this resource to ind information that
is relevant to them. This is an avenue for further engagement with the
youth if levels of access, literacy, afordability and usage are increased.
This is particularly true for Black African youth, unemployed youth and
youth with little or no schooling. Access to internet resources will allow
young people to control the content they receive, ind information and
news that is relevant to their context and perhaps even generate content
of their own that can be shared by other youth. The use of search engines, and other online media do play a role in news awareness amongst
some South African youth. It is also evident that because of the perceived lack of relevance in traditional media, those who can are using
online sources to gather information and news that is relevant to them.
The National Youth Policy document addresses some of the issues related to technology where it proposes access to ICTs as one of the ways in
which opportunities for young people can be enhanced (2009:31). The
policy document mentions ICT peer education as among the youth’s responsibilities and proposes that young people should “engage in peer to
peer education to promote youth development in areas such as literacy,
use of information and communication technology, healthy lifestyles to
prevent no communicable [sic] diseases like HIV and AIDS and others,
violence prevention and peace building” (2009: 20). This is an important step towards responding to the needs of the South African youth as
expressed in the survey and focus group discussions.
11
IntRoDUCtIon
The aim of this study is threefold: It investigates the ways in which various forms of media, including new media, shape youth identity in South
Africa. Secondly, it probes the possible ways in which media contribute
to the civic identity of South African youth. This civic function of the media, as captured partly in Habermas’s notion of the public sphere5, is important if youth are to become integrated into the fabric of society and
participate in its development. Thirdly the study explores whether the
media relect youth voices. Failure on the part of the media to articulate
youth aspirations and frustrations may contribute to feelings of alienation. This alienation is already evident in youth disengagement from
and disafection with societal institutions. Information from this study
will show if and how the media contribute to the construction of the social identities of the South African youth and if these identities help the
youth to contribute to the strengthening of South Africa’s democracy.
This information will also contribute towards formulating media policy
that is responsive to the needs and interests of the South African youth.
In South Africa, youth6 constitute 70% of the population. Those 15 years
and younger constitute 35% of the population (Statistics South Africa
2009). Although most aspects of South Africa’s youth remain under-researched, Gower (2009) notes that nearly three million of the 6.7 million
young South Africans are disengaged from society’s major institutions.
They are either unemployed or not engaged in any education or training
activities – a problem the Ford Foundation referred to as a ‘social time
bomb’ (Gower 2009). A large number of youth have been engaged in
recent protest action in South African and discontent among the youth
has been recognised as a key factor in the social unrest (Bernstein and
Johnston 2007; Gower 2009). Youth were also at the forefront of many
Habermas theorized the notion of the “public sphere” as a space where individuals
could debate issues of public importance. This debate generated public opinion and
attempted to articulate some of society’s most important issues. The importance of the
public sphere is that it was a space between the state and the private realm in which
citizens could participate (Habermas, 1989).
5
6
The National Youth Policy deines youth as anyone between the ages of 14 and 35
years.
12
of the xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa during May
2008 (Bekker, 2010).
These events suggest that many youth are alienated from contemporary
South African democratic political culture. Cognisant of this, this project
investigates the ways in which various forms of media shape youth identity, how the media can contribute to the development of a youth civic
identity to enable young people to become integrated into the democratic fabric of South African society and participate in its development.
The focus on the media is important from both a liberal and radical perspective because of its potential to create a public space for discussion
and dissent (Golding & Murdock, 2000; Dahlgren 2000). Most current
theorising about the media’s (and particularly journalism’s) role in society is based on Marshall’s (1964) theorising of citizenship. Murdock,
for example, argues that journalism is judged by the extent to which it
facilitates and promotes the various dimensions of citizenship outlined
by Marshall, namely the civil, political, social and cultural rights which
constitute citizenship as a particular identity (Murdock 1992: 20). The
level of youth alienation implies that the media may not be playing this
role suiciently. This raises important questions about the impediments
by the media to fulilling this democratic function and whether the state
is playing a facilitating role in this regard. To a large degree, the exercising of citizenship rights implies a responsibility on the part of citizens to
become informed and to be media literate so that they can use the media
to inform their civic actions (Firestone 2010).
Much of the research on youth and media has been conducted in the
North7 and has shown that youth media consumption patterns are
changing. For example, in Northern countries, television viewership has
been declining for some time now. Youth interest in news and current
afairs has been waning (Buckingham 1997; Costera Meijer 2006; Costera Meijer 2008) and youth appear to be increasingly drawn to participatory media, especially mobile and Web 2.0-based social networking
tools. In contrast, research by Strelitz (2002) on the South African media
7
The Global North represents the economically developed societies of Europe, North
America, the UK and Australia amongst others.
13
indicates a strong coincidence between race, class and an interest in
traditional sources of news. In South Africa, as in the rest of Africa, radio
remains the most heavily consumed medium (SAARF 2009) but when
it comes to the use of mobile communication, preliminary research in
South Africa is contradictory. A pilot study conducted by Duncan (2013)
indicated that mobile media were used by Black African working class
youth for survival purposes (for example, checking for jobs), rather than
for social networking, whereas preliminary unpublished research undertaken by Schoon (2011) in the Hooggenoeg Coloured township of
Grahamstown indicates a strong social networking aspect to the use of
mobile phones.
The media can play an important role in enabling youth participation
in the development of the country. This research investigates whether
the media are, in fact, playing this enabling role. Youth need access to
diverse media technologies and genres to ensure that they have meaningful choices in what media they consume and how they exercise their
voices. Ideally, they should be able to select from a range of diferent
media that allow them to make sense of their lived context, think critically about their own life conditions, to re-imagine ways in which these
conditions could be diferent, and to exercise their voices as citizens
to give efect to these re-imaginings. However, South African society
is characterised by uneven development and this is relected in youth
access to media. If youth voices are absent from South Africa’s development agenda, or if more privileged youth are in a better position to
shape public discourse on development issues, then those youth on the
margins of society may be less able to inluence the direction of society.
This may lead to a reinforcement of uneven development and a continued marginalisation of the needs and aspirations of Black African working class and female youth.
14
LIteRAtURe ReVIeW
Introduction
We have used the following conceptual frameworks to illuminate our
study:
1. Youth
2. Citizenship
3. The public sphere: constituting youth as citizens
4. Media, youth, and politics
5. New media, youth and politics
Youth
From an international perspective, Ruthanne Kurth-Schai usefully identiies three distinct images of youth in contemporary theorising. On the
one end of the spectrum, children/youth are seen as victims of adult
society and in need of protection (1988: 114). On the other end, they
are viewed as dangerous and in need of guidance or as a threat to adult
society (see also Finn and Checkoway, 1998: 335). In between these two
perspectives, youth are seen as incomplete, incompetent and in need of
guidance - as “learners of adult society” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 115). As a
result, youth are confronted with “confusing and contradictory patterns
of protection and pressure, with conlicting perceptions of their abilities and inadequacies, rendering their social presence inconsequential
and their social power invisible” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 116). Kurth-Schai
suggests that cultures in which children and youth undertake socially
useful tasks produce “heightened self-esteem, enhanced moral development, increased political activism, and the ability to create and maintain
complex social relationships” (1988: 117). The recognition that children
can perform important tasks such as nurturing (even of smaller siblings)
is key to their capacity for “social insight and environment-shaping competence” (Kurth-Schai, 1988: 116).
In South Africa, diferent, sometimes contradictory, terms have been
used to describe its youth. The ‘Young Lions’ and ‘Lost Generation’ refer
to Black African youth of the 1970s and 1980s (Boyce, 2012; Seekings,
1996). Mattes (2011) suggests a broader historical typology: He divides
the electorate into the Pre-apartheid Generation (those who reached
15
their formative years before the National Party came to power in 1948);
the Early Apartheid Generation (those who turned 16 between 1948
and 1960); the Grand Apartheid Generation (spanning formative years
between 1960 and 1976 when apartheid was sedimented throughout
South African life); the Struggle Generation (people who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996 during a time of continued political violence and
resistance), and the Born Frees who entered adulthood and “came of age
politically after 1996” (2011: 4), after South Africa’s irst democratic
elections.
“Beginning in 1997, a group of people began to move through
the ages of 16, 17 and 18 and enter the political arena with
little if any irst-hand experience of the trauma that came before … their irst political experience, possibly casting a vote
in the 1999 election, was with a relatively normal, though
clearly reform-minded democratic political system. While
some backward looking dramas were still being played out,
such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the order
of the new day was forward-looking: massive state investment in construction of houses and other infrastructure, the
transformation of the state, educational reform, and growthoriented economic development.” (Mattes, 2001: 4)
Based on studies by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa)
in 1998, and by Afrobarometer from 2000 to 2008, Mattes notes that
the proportion of Born Frees has increased rapidly from 5% of eligible
voters in 2000, to 31% in 2008. This cohort is now the second biggest
segment of voters, just behind the Struggle Generation (43%). Signiicantly, the Born Frees is 83% Black African and 43% urbanised. Despite
the transformatory intentions of the ANC government, this generation
sufers, just as previous generations did, from low levels of education,
low levels of school completion and joblessness. Despite their coming of
age in an era of political stability and change, they live with high levels
of physical and material insecurity. These include “victimisation by corrupt bureaucrats, exposure to crime, shortages of food or cash income,
or the loss of friends or family to AIDS” (Mattes, 2011: 7). Mattes characterises the lives of the Born Frees as “continuity rather than sharp
generational change” (2011: 7).
16
In an Afrobarometer study to test ‘demand for democracy’ and ‘democratic commitment’, Mattes inds an instrumentalist attitude among
[South African] voters in judging the eicacy of democracy revolving
around whether it delivers services and other beneits. Compared with
other studies across Africa, Mattes claims that the features that predispose other Africans towards a positive attitude to democracy are startlingly absent in South Africa:
“The most striking result is the absence of any positive impact of education, or of news media use, two indings very
much at odds with what we know about other emerging African democracies” (2011: 11).
In addition, interactions with government oicials or elected representatives are “generally negative”. These interactions alienate South Africans from democracy rather than ‘habituate’ them towards it”, and this,
Mattes concludes, is particularly acute among the Born Free Generation
(2011: 11-12). His overall conclusion is that the post-apartheid generation is less committed to democracy than their parents:
“… Whatever advantages might accrue from the new political experiences of political freedom and a regular, peaceful,
electoral process, are diminished by frustrating encounters
with the political process, victimisation by corrupt oicials,
and enduring levels of unemployment and poverty” (2011:
14).
This research echoes the indings of a 2005 Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC) report that “…there are in general low levels of participation by young South Africans in organised activities” (HSRC, 2005:
30). It notes that as much as 75.3% of the research sample has never
participated in a community society or club. Evidence also seems to
suggest that the South African youth are turning away from traditional
forms of political participation such as voting as young people do not
see the point of doing so (Matshiqi, 2011).
Boyce (2010) challenges these pessimistic views on the basis of an
HSRC Social Attitudes Study dealing with youth. In Boyce’s view the
17
HSRC report indicates that a majority of youth do have faith in democracy in South Africa and its social institutions but that they, along with
other age groups, are dissatisied with public service. Boyce does not
feel that perceptions of their heightened dissatisfaction and disafection
are a correct portrayal (2010: 93). He proposes that the HSRC survey
shows that despite their general experience of “low levels of life satisfaction at present” Black African youth are generally more positive
about various aspects of life in South Africa than Indians, Coloured and
Whites (2010: 96). While acknowledging that race is still a major determinant of attitude among South African youth Boyce suggests, “the
general perception of disinterested and disillusioned youth seems to be
incorrect and unfair in many instances. Results illustrate that it is often
older respondents [the 25-35age group] who are more pessimistic. Further, when youth are dissatisied, their dissatisfaction appears to relect
wider national sentiment” (Boyce, 2010: 100).
Gerrit Kamper and Jo Badenhorst share Boyce’s view. Kamper and
Badenhorst’s survey of 391 Black African adolescents (focusing on the
impact of social change on Black African youth in post-apartheid South
Africa) shows “a general spirit of optimism and independence exists,
paired with a strong desire to escape the trappings of poverty and the
inferiority of the past” (2010: 243). Drawing on other studies (Heaven
et al, 2000; Everatt, 2002; Tyson and Stones, 2002; and Möller, 2005)
they argue that despite their present circumstances many Black African
youth have high expectations of a brighter future:
“Equal opportunity policies have raised expectations of job
opportunities…black youth in general share the consumerism of South Africa’s wealthy classes, but many lack the history of participation in the struggle or the ability to argue
that current consumption is an extension of a reward for
earlier political sacriices. Although they might be politically
aware and engaged, they are overwhelmingly not politically
active to the extent their predecessors were” (Kamper and
Badenhorst, 2010: 246).
Drawing on these and another study (Gaganakis, 2004) Kamper and
Badenhorst claim that Black African youth do “feel empowered” (2010:
18
246). They propose that Black African youth in South Africa exhibit individualism (evidenced by a desire to “pursue unique destinies and private
satisfaction”), independence, a desire to use academic qualiications as
an escape from working-class occupations and they aspire to jobs formerly reserved for Whites. Kamper and Badenhorst compare their own
study to similar studies done in Europe (Alsaker and Flammer, 1999:
Crocket and Sibereisen, 2000; and Larson et al, 2002) and show that in
South Africa a major impediment faced by South African youth is societal
instability. This is evident in the high levels of poverty (26.3% of South
Africans were living below the food poverty line in 2008-20098), unemployment (25.5% in 2012), HIV and AIDS (life expectancy for South Africans was 52 in 2010) and violent crime. In short, they argue that Black
African youth “feel excited” about the future, and even though many live
in “dismal circumstances” they believe these will change for the better.
“It appears that a new generation of Black African youth is emerging,
creating its own culture and style, and developing its own particular
goals and social problems” (Kamper & Badenhorst, 2010: 255).
Citizenship
Citizenship describes the condition of one’s membership of a polity. Marshall (1950) identiies three main dimensions that constitute citizenship
as a particular social identity with associated rights and institutional
means for securing them: the political, civil, social and cultural (Golding and Murdock, 1989:181; Murdock, 1992: 20; and Dahlgren, 2000:
317). The irst of these sets of rights is political rights, which ensures the
rights of democratic participation in the exercise of political power. The
second set of citizenship rights, civil rights, guarantee the individual’s
freedom within ‘civil society’. Social rights secure members’ general life
circumstances within the state, and refer to such areas as social security,
welfare, education, health care etc. In other words, social rights refer to
“the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live
the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in so8
This is the lowest category for poverty levels and amounts to R305 per month, “while
roughly 38.9% and 52.3% were living below the lower-bound poverty line (R416) and
the upper-bound poverty line (R577) respectively” (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 5).
19
ciety” (Marshall, T.E. qtd. Murdock and Golding, 1989: 182). This range
of rights was partly what the struggle for South African citizenship was
about, and what was potentially signiied by the 1994 elections.
More recently, the idea of ‘cultural citizenship’ has challenged the idea
of citizenship as a “discourse of stability by which the modern state
could achieve a degree of integration by compensating for the inequalities of class” (Delanty, 2007: 1, quoting Marshall, 1950). Citizenship is
now “part of the transformative discourses of contemporary society in
which the problem of inclusion has become more acute” (Delanty, 2007:
1). Delanty speaks about how (in particular referring to the UK and Austria); there is ‘governmentalisation’ of citizenship. In these terms citizenship is understood to be a ‘cognitive competence’. Many governments
now adopt a strategy “into which the individual as citizen is inserted”
(Delanty, 2007: 3). Instead of citizenship referring to an existing identity
of belonging to a polity, it is seen as one that is acquired: learning to
become a citizen (Delanty, 2007). This view shifts the focus from membership to “common experiences, cognitive processes, forms of cultural
translation and discourses of empowerment” which can take place in the
informal context of everyday life and is inluenced by the critical and
formative events in people’s lives. Citizenship is therefore not just about
rights and responsibilities, but also more importantly about capacity for
action, the learning about the self and the relationship of the self and
other. In Delanty’s view, citizenship is a quality of “identity and action”
(2007).
Citizenship, says John Hartley, is a term that suggests ‘association among
strangers’ (2010: 233). This association involves struggle, contestation
over meanings and identities, difering power relations. Hartley argues
further that strategies of inclusion and appropriations of citizenship are
uneven and unequal. He takes issue with a static and universal understanding of citizenship, which denies that at the heart of this ‘association’, is a discursive practice that grapples with the problem of how to
reconcile strangers in “modern associated life” (2010: 234). Hartley
points out that the term ‘citizen’ usurps the place of ‘subject’ and moves
the power of the state from the monarch to the people. Hartley also proposes that the state continues to monopolise the power to decide who
“among those people count as citizens” (2010: 234).
20
Hartley then turns to cultural citizenship as an idea which, when propounded by Toby Miller, is deined as ‘the right to know and speak’ in
addition to ‘the right to reside and vote’ (political citizenship) and ‘the
right to work and prosper’ (economic citizenship) (2010: 238 quoting
Miller, 2006: 35). Cultural citizenship extends citizenship from public
participation to social entitlements and “exposes the concept to challenge by its traditional opposite – the consumer” (Hartley 2010: 238).
“… Most people in aluent societies experience themselves
as citizens and consumers, publics and audiences, workers
and traders, all at once. Furthermore, it is now possible to
express relational and identity associations, and to take actions and participate in collective decisions, through global
commercial consumer culture. So citizenship as consumption is startling to social theory, but lived by millions” (Hartley, 2010: 238).
Hartley claims that social and digital media enable citizenship to include
the following three features: play, the ability to self-organise, and to produce relational identities through changing and patterned relationships
within communication systems. Play is the performative aspect of deliberation and participation that is not reduced to rationality, the comedic,
competitive, entertaining, festive or body-centred. Self-organisation is
possible because citizenship, in this sense, is discursive rather than narrative. Apart from allowing individuals to self-organise, it also enables
citizens to self-represent and construct for themselves what the associational relations among strangers will be.
Hartley says the history of mediated communication since the nineteenth century shows how “completely civic engagement itself is ‘abstracted’ from local and personal realities” (2010: 244). By contrast
new media technologies make it possible for citizen-consumers to create their own knowledge, their own self-representation and their own
mutual relations. “Recognition of what’s needed for ‘healthy democratic
functioning’ requires renewed attention to these demotic aspects of citizenship” (Hartley, 2010: 245).
Based on research conducted in the UK (Nottingham) in 2005 and 2006
21
based on New Labour’s attempt to ‘renew citizenship’, Hart shows how
young people are posed in government policies as a ‘threat’ to democracy. She poses that young people are treated as recipients for programmes
of education and control about citizenship, and that paradoxically by
making them the focus of such programmes as in need of ‘discipline
and training’ they are alienated from a sense of inclusive citizenship
(Hart, 2009: 643). Hart argues for a “broader deinition of citizenship”
that enables youth participation and enables them to express what they
think their contributions could be. She argues for ‘cultural citizenship’
as an approach to citizenship, rather than the ‘highly normative’ concept
deined by government policy in which the condition of citizenship is
pre-determined and then policed through surveillance of behaviour that
doesn’t conform (2009: 643). For cultural citizenship theorists, equality of citizenship is only realisable in a context where the experiences
and views of citizens themselves, whatever their background, culture or
social location, are recognised and respected (Hart, 2009: 645). Hart
says a cultural citizenship approach acknowledges diferences between
young people, and that treating young people as a homogeneous group
in need of ‘responsibilisation’ is the source of much of their negative
experience of citizenship.
Another approach to citizenship is to view it from the perspective of
civic engagement. Civic engagement can be located within the broader
construct of social capital: a critical resource for positive social, emotional, and intellectual development (Winter, 2003). Jobson (2011)
notes the importance of building social capital through civic engagement as a strategy for the development of youth leadership in South
Africa. Many theorists argue that civic engagement (for example, participation in clubs) is a vital and pre-requisite component of democratic
practice, and that civically engaged youth are more likely to exhibit prosocial behaviour (Winter, 2003; Galston, 2003; Flanagan and Levine,
2010; Zaf, Boyd, Li, Learner and Learner, 2010; and Youniss, Bales,
Christmas-Best, et al, 2002). The beneits of social capital and civic engagement accrue from the view that social capital is a resource, like
inancial capital, that can be used to achieve a diverse range of personal or collective goals for the general development of communities
(Putnam, 1993; Granovetter, 1973; Adler and Kwon, 2002; and Winter,
2003). In South Africa where levels of unemployment and poverty are
22
high, especially among the youth, social capital and civic engagement
become a necessity. The potential beneits of high social capital and
civic engagement could positively impact on the abovementioned social
challenges facing the country.
Public sphere [media, popular culture]:
Constituting youth as citizens
Habermas theorises the ‘public sphere’ as a common meeting point for
the debate through which public opinion could be formed. Through participation in such debate, citizens attempt to articulate some of society’s
most pressing issues bridging the realms of the private and the state.
As Garnham notes, Habermas’s concern was to ind a way “to establish
‘solidarity among strangers’” (2007: 203). For Habermas this entailed
separating the private from the public, and establishing a mode of discourse – ‘rational critical debate’ – through which citizens could thrash
out issues of public concern. The public sphere could be seen as a site
through which the state is put in touch with the needs of society and
as a regulatory institution against the authority of the state (Habermas,
1989: 31; Garnham, 2007: 206). In the digital age, the ‘public sphere’
concept has been used to describe the internet as a ‘cyberspace’, ‘global
public sphere’ (Sparks, 2001) and a ‘virtual public sphere’ (Papacharissi,
2004).
Habermas’s theorisation has come under much criticism especially with
regards to its perceived neglect of issues such as gender, class and age
(Fraser, 1992; Negt and Kluge, 1972). It has also been criticised for sidelining the role of alternative media (Schudson, 1997; Dahlgren, 2007;
Buckingham, 1997; and Gitlin, 1998), ignoring the existence of ‘counter-public spheres’ and multiple public spheres (‘sphericules’) (Dahlgren,
2007; Gitlin, 1998), disregarding ‘dissensus’ and the agency of audiences.
Equally important for this study is the critique of Habermas’s assumption
that the public sphere fosters rational deliberation. This assumption ignores Bakhtinian notions of dissimilarity, dialogical engagement and ‘carnival and spectacle’ (Gardiner, 2004: 30). The concept of the alternative
public sphere is most relevant here because it allows one to explore how
youth creatively appropriate and adapt new media such as Facebook and
mobile phones to construct identities – potentially as citizens.
23
Another position regarding the public sphere debate is to look at virtual
spaces in terms of popular culture instead of the Habermasian concept
of rational debate. Popular culture is deined here in terms of its opposition to power: ‘The people versus the power bloc’ rather than ‘class
against class’ (Hall, 1981: 238). Conceptualising social media – which
allow diferent kinds of people to interact as ‘produsers’ (producers +
consumers) (Bruns, 2007) – as popular culture ofers a ‘way out’ of the
theoretical impasse between critics and advocates of the public sphere.
Alternative media, as part of the alternative public sphere, is deined as
“a gamut of media forms that ofers the means for democratic communication to people who are normally excluded from media production”
(Atton, 2002: 4). Alternative media also enable oppositional groups to
advance their political goals (Pickard, 2007; Dockney et al, 2010: 77;
and Couldry, 2003). Extending this argument, studies on the subaltern,
drawing on Gramsci’s work on popular culture and hegemony, have
lauded the role of popular forms of media in constituting an alternative
public sphere especially for subaltern and marginalised groups in society (Willems, 2011). This echoes James C. Scott’s (1976) theorisation
of everyday forms of resistance9 and Gluckman’s ‘Rituals of rebellion’10,
which allow one to account for hidden transcripts relating to the critique
of power that ‘goes on ofstage’ and which power elites cannot decode.
This is a useful way of thinking about youth protest (and diferent concepts of citizenship) as it departs from the narrow deinition of resistance
and related identities referring to physical and material protests in the
streets, to include a set of practices used by the dominated to challenge
those who make attempts to dominate them (Willems, 2010: 4).
Media, youth, and politics
Research into the relationships between youth, media, and politics does
not present a clear-cut picture. For example, although research shows
that youth who read newspapers and consume media are more likely
to engage in various kinds of civic activities (Buckingham, 1997; Lopez
9
In his book ‘Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance’, Scott (1985) argues
oppression and resistance are in lux and that by focusing too much on events such as
organised rebellion, we miss subtle but powerful forms of “everyday resistance”.
10
This work by Gluckman (1952) recounts his theory that ceremonies among tribes in
South-East Africa strongly express social tension.
24
et al, 2006; and Amadeo, Torney-Purta & Barber, 2004), many Northern scholars argue there is no longer a straightforward, unambiguous
interrelationship between watching or reading the news, civic identity and social identity among young people (Barnhurst and Wartella,
1998; Buckingham, 1999; Beekhoven & Van Wel, 1998; Katz, 1993;
Livingstone, 2002). Chafee & Yang (1990: 141) argue that ‘televisiondependent citizens’ can hardly be seen as citizens at all as they are less
likely to vote, understand political processes, and be involved in politics
(quoted in Buckingham, 1997: 346). This raises questions about the salience of the consumption of particular media to political engagement.
Putnam (1995 & 2000), and more recently Mindich (2005), suggest
that the marginal signiicance of news and current afairs programmes
in the lives of Northern youth is indicative of their limited social involvement. On the basis of research in the Netherlands, Costera Meijer (2006,
2008) and Drok (2009) conclude that young people’s interest in news is
still indicative of their social engagement but does not impact on their
actual news use. In other words it appears that for some Northern youth,
the informative function of news and media is becoming secondary to
their communicative function (Costera Meijer, 2008). A driving concern
about the relationship between youth, media and civic engagement is
the inding by the Times Mirror (1990) study that suggests young people who are not well-informed politically may fall prey to ‘blind faith’ in
political leaders (p345).
Other research on youth culture challenges this pessimistic view. Researchers have indicated that adolescents’ views are mediated by their
relationships with peers and parents, and they therefore argue it is not
just youth media consumption that is important, but whether and how
youth discuss the ideas they get from the media with their peers and
family (Boyd et al, 2011). These researchers argue for the critical importance of ‘communication competence’ (Shah, McLeod & Lee, 2009;
McLeod, Shah, Hess, Lee, 2010). This competence ‘includes media use
(with focus on public afairs news consumption) and interpersonal communication (discussion of public afairs and politics with others), as underpinning civic competence’ (Boyd et al, 2011: 1169). These communicative abilities are described by civic scholars such as Battistoni (2000)
and Kirlin (2003) as an ‘important aspect of civic development and critical for efective civic participation’ (Boyd et al, 2011: 1169).
25
Given the complexity of the relationship between youth, media and civic
engagement, it is helpful to unpack some of the key issues that have
been raised through research. A key argument that underpins this relationship is the link between ‘information’, often associated with ‘hard
news’ and political involvement. A fundamental question is whether being informed enhances public ability to fulil democratic responsibilities. Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996) think this is the case, but Lupia &
McCubbins (1998) argue that citizens don’t need much knowledge to
fulil their duties as citizens. The existing research centres on a debate
about the relevance of traditional forms of news media to today’s youth,
as they attempt to relate broader political events to their everyday lives
(Katz, 1992; Buckingham, 1997; and Costera Meijer, 2006). Buckingham (1997) links these concerns to Habermas’s notion of the public
sphere, which underpins traditional notions of journalism and its contribution to democratic culture. However, in order to achieve this social
engagement in the public sphere, Habermas privileges ‘rational critical
debate’ – a position which has been critiqued, as discussed earlier in this
report.
Buckingham (1997) is critical of the ‘rigid distinction between the public and private’ in which there is no place “for the ‘irrational’ side of
language, for rhetoric or narrative, nor indeed for aesthetics, for ceremony, or ritual, indeed, for precisely those elements which characterise popular cultural forms” (1997: 354-355; see also Fraser, 1990; and
Costera Meijer, 2001). Yet, it is precisely these ‘irrational’ forms, and the
new communications technologies that enable them, to which Northern
youth are attracted. Baum (2002, 2003) shares this view and argues
that so-called ‘soft news’, which is ‘typically more sensational, more personality-centred, less time-bound, more practical, more incident-based
than other news’ (Patterson, 2000: 4), is a way of attracting viewers to
issues – such as foreign policy – they may not otherwise be concerned
about. Baum does acknowledge Prior’s research, which found that soft
news, is “unlikely to be consistently associated with increases in general
factual knowledge about politics” (Baum, 2003: 174). In contrast, Patterson (2000) argues that ‘hard news’ is still important, but that ‘soft
news’ and what he calls ‘critical journalism’ is a turn-of for viewers
and both, in diferent ways, are weakening democracy. Patterson argues
that people who prefer ‘hard news’ are heavier consumers of news than
26
those who prefer soft news, and that the trend towards soft news has
contributed to the decline in news consumption (2000). In addition, Patterson suggests that critical journalism – what Barnett (2002) describes
as ‘journalism’s disdain for politics’ – has weakened people’s interest in
politics and their interest in news (Patterson, 2000: 2).
From this Northern research it appears that many topics in routine
news programmes and so-called quality newspapers are not appealing,
and staples like domestic politics, international politics, culture and the
economy are of least interest to young people.
Jenkins’ argument about convergence culture11, and Couldry’s use of
the term ‘mediation’12 point to the complex ways in which content lows
between diferent media and genres in the new media environment. This
ofers opportunities for youth consumers to become producers of meaning, with an attendant shift in their identities. This is consistent with
Hall’s view of the construction of identity in post-modernity.
The Northern debates about youth engagement with media are about
the extent to which popular new technologies such as online or mobile
social networking should be used to engage the youth around issues that
are meaningful to them, and in this way possibly foster a civic identity
that could potentially enable their participation in social/political life.
This is relevant given the recognition that these new media technologies enable the constitution of ‘public sphericules’13 (Gitlin 1998), which
may enhance participation in public life as intermediate spaces in which
aspects of democratic citizenship are developed (see Curran 2000).
11
Jenkins explores this theme in his book ‘Convergence Culture: Where Old and New
Media Collide’, which examines the relationships between media convergence, culture
and collective intelligence (2008).
12
Couldry regards mediation as the “variety of dynamics within media lows” (2008:
380) and argues that mediation is the relationship between media production and what
lows back into social and cultural life.
13
Gitlin argues that because society has become so multicultural, fragmented and
complex we can no longer speak of one public sphere, but that there are numerous
public sphericules which are emerging.
27
new media, youth and politics
The use of the internet and new media to mobilise the youth and other
politically active citizens to engage in alternative political activity follows the premise made by many politicians and researchers who regard
new media as a means through which to capture this ‘apathetic’ and
non-participatory group. There are examples of British politicians using the internet to connect with their constituencies (Gibson & Ward,
1998), governments using mobile phones to encourage voting (Dale &
Strauss, 2009) and using the internet as a key source of information
provision (Xenos & Moy, 2007). The assumption is that the internet is
an alternative means to engage and connect with young people because
young people are not engaging in traditional political activity as a result
of not consuming traditional mass media. Carpini (2000) cites research
that found 70% of young people between 18 and 25 years regarded the
internet as a source of valuable political information. He adds that “what
these technologies seem clearly to provide is access to young adults, an
increased ability for organized interests to more efectively reach young
adults, and new or easier opportunities for already engaged (and perhaps interested but not yet engaged) young adults to participate and do
so more efectively” (2000: 348).
The question is whether the internet and new media are mobilizing
young people to engage in traditional political action and civic duties.
Researchers and theorists regard the issue from within two camps – the
optimistic and the pessimistic. The optimists believe the internet and
new media will enable more democratic engagement because it lowers
the cost of communicating about politics and political activity, it lowers
the cost of being associated with organisations which engage in political activity and it makes participation cheaper and easier (Rheingold,
2000). The pessimists argue the internet plays no signiicant role in
changing political behaviour (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Sustein, 2005).
Despite the pessimism, the general trend towards engagement of youth
on the web does suggest it is a tool for promoting participation in political and civic action. Montgomery et al argue, “the Web is already integrated into most young people’s window on the world, and that it ofers
them a broader perspective than any before” (2004: 126). These as28
sumptions, coupled with a declining rate of youth participation, means
that there seems to be a juncture between internet usage and recapturing the ‘wayward’ youth. Coleman argues that “observing that very
young people who are mostly politically alienated and disengaged are
the most active users of the internet, it is argued that if the interactive
features of the internet were used to encourage young people to civic
and political activities this might serve to overcome traditional barriers
to participation” (2007: 258). Research suggests that the internet is a viable tool for engaging youth in political activity. The internet is also able
to capture the attention of the youth and encourage them to participate
in civic and political life (Iyengar & Jackman, 2004). Research by Walton & Donner (2011) suggest that mobile communications can be used
in the same way as the internet to engage young people in political action and voting during elections. Their research provides evidence that
the mobile internet, the use of SMS and social networking tools such
as MXit can be key factors in mobilizing young people during election
periods.
Research on the use of Facebook as a particular medium of social communication amongst youth has provided mixed results (Pew Research
Centre 2011; Boyd, 2008). Cyber-optimists have branded social media
the ‘new vessel’ of cyber-democracy and a ’tool of political freedom’,
which enables social movements and activists to reinvigorate democratic processes (Downing, 2001). Clay Shirky, a cyber-optimist, sees new
media technologies as having the potential to ’organise, plan, and coordinate direct political actions – elections, demonstrations and insurrections’ (2011). In response, cyber-pessimists like Malcolm Gladwell
(2010) dismiss social media activism as based on weak ties and therefore limited to low-risk participation. Evgeny Mozorov adds that social
media are afecting the world “but it also looks like the other side – the
authoritarian governments – are getting empowered as well” (2011: 5).
Despite this seemingly endless theoretical debate, new media technologies such as SMS messages and mobile media have been seen as enabling
activism worldwide (Kellner, 2002: 182; Fuchs 2006: 293, Nyamnjoh,
2009; Moyo, 2010; Ekine, 2010; Willems, 2010; Atwood, 2009; Ndlela,
2009; Neumayer and Ral, 2008; Makinen and Kuira, 2008). Online
social networks are believed to have played a key role in recent democratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (Joseph, 2011; González-Bailón,
29
2011), leading to the coinage of the concept ‘Twitter/ Facebook Revolutions’ (Christensen, 2011; Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, 2011). Social network sites such as Facebook, Twitter and BlackBerry Messenger
have been used by the Occupy Movement in the United States (Sassen,
2011), protesters in the 2011 London riots (Bright, 2011) and rioters
in ‘Occupy Nigeria’ (Fripp, 2012) to facilitate and coordinate political
activity. This fuelled debates on the relationship between social network
sites and political action.
Internet access and usage igures in South Africa are diicult to determine but some research estimates them at 20% (World Wide Worx),
which makes it one of the least used means of communication and information gathering in the country, heavily outweighed by radio (77%) and
television (69%) (RIA Household Survey, 2008). More recent research
has suggested this igure might be higher, with one third of South Africans accessing the internet daily (de Lanerolle, 2012). What is signiicant about this number is that the researchers suggest 84% of these
users access the internet through their mobile phone, with only 18%
accessing through a computer. While ixed internet may not hold out
much hope as a means of mobilizing young South Africans to engage in
political action, perhaps holding greater potential is the mobile phone,
which has high penetration, and usage rates. With mobile phone access
at around 83% (RIA household survey, 2008), the potential for reaching
young South Africans via their mobile phones is a possibility.
30
MetHoDoLoGY
The study uses qualitative and quantitative research methods to provide
information about general trends, as well as more nuanced perceptions
of the relationship between media consumption and usage, and civic
identity and engagement of South African youth. These data provide
an assessment of the media genres that most commonly raise issues affecting youth. The data also examine which media are perceived to be
more conducive for enabling youth voices to be heard and responded to.
These methods further provide research data for how the media assist
in the construction of civic identity and enhance potential for youth participation. The research tools were also constructed to establish whether
media policy promotes youth participation in the public sphere.
The quantitative methods include survey questionnaires and media content analysis. The qualitative methods include focus groups discussions
with young people and an analysis of youth policy in South Africa. The
methods and rationales for particular methodological choices have relected those used by the project’s Dutch partners (Irene Costera Meijer and Nico Drok) in a similar project conducted in the Netherlands
in 200914. While the Dutch study provided excellent tools, which were
used for the South African study, the researchers were also conscious
of the diferent contexts in which the studies were undertaken, and this
was taken into account in the South African research. The indings of
the South African project combined with the Dutch research provide an
international comparative dimension to the indings.
The key objective of the study was to investigate trends in youth media consumption and usage. Four provinces – Gauteng, Eastern Cape,
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal – were chosen for a combination of
reasons. The provinces are the four most populated provinces in South
Africa (Census 2011). Two of the provinces are uniquely representative
of particular historical classiications of the South African population:
Coloured people form the majority of the population in the Western
14
The Dutch project report is available at: http://www.windesheim.nl/~/media/Files/
Windesheim/Research%20Publications/111006_DrokSchwarz20Jongerennieuwsmediabetrokkenheid20compleet.pdf
31
Cape (Hendricks, 2005: 118) and the majority of Indian South Africans
live in KwaZulu-Natal. According to ASSA (Actuarial Society of South
Africa, 2000) KwaZulu-Natal is divided along racial lines in the following way – 84.9% Black African, 1.5% Coloured, 8.5% Indian and 2.4%
White15. A practical consideration for choosing the locations was the
fact that at least one contributor to the project were based in each of
the provinces.
Quantitative surveys were conducted with 956 young people, between
15 and 30 years of age across the four sites16. Because the research was
conducted across a number of diferent sites in the provinces there was
no sampling frame for the populations of the speciic sites. Instead, the
quota sampling method was used which allows for a representation of
population at each particular site. Random sampling was excluded as
a method of data collection because it was not possible to efectively
and scientiically sample the population in a random way in any of the
sites. Furthermore, many researchers argue that besides the savings in
time and money, a well-designed quota sample should be at least as
representative as a random sample and is therefore legitimate to use for
making statistical inferences (Kruskali & Mosteller, 1979; Yule, Udney
& Kendall, 1950). While quota sampling should be representative of the
broader population, depending on which characteristics of the target
population are chosen as key indicators, this may not always be possible. This was the case in this study as a result of the characteristics chosen to categorise the sample. Due to the fact that South Africans are still
strongly inluenced by race17, race was chosen as a key variable. One of
the challenges is, that in many places quotas for races other than Black
African would have been challengingly small and would have made the
quota diicult to work with when other characteristics (namely gender,
age, and education) were added to race. It is for this reason that the
quota sample in this study is not a strict relection of the population
classiications at the wider national or provincial level. It is also for this
15
http://www.sahealthinfo.org/bod/kwazulunatal.pdf
16
See Appendix One for survey questionnaire administered to participants.
“Race” has historically been used as a deining characteristic in South Africa. Because of the historic legacy of a race-based system such as Apartheid, there are still
social, political and economic diferences between people of diferent races.
17
32
reason that KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were key sites for
the survey because of their proportionately larger populations of the
smaller race categories.
Just over 87% (87.2%) of respondents were between 15 and 30 years
old, with only 12.8% above 31 years. The information therefore shows
a bias towards younger respondents. These numbers relect one of the
challenges of quota sampling: those administering the questionnaires
may not always stick to the quotas as stringently as required (Babbie,
2013). There was a fair gender balance across respondents with 50.8%
female respondents and 49.2% male respondents. As mentioned, race is
a signiicant factor in South Africa because it is still a determining factor
for many life trajectories. While the Dutch study did not use race as a
variable for the quota sample, the researchers of the South African study
felt that race could not be disregarded in this study. As a result of Apartheid conditions of diferent race groups in South Africa are diferent.
To evaluate media use and consumption, and the relationship between
media use and civic identity it was important to consider the impact of
racial categories.
Respondents were asked to categorise themselves according to the historical race categories (Black, Coloured, Indian, and White)18. Respondents consisted of Black African, 57% (2011 national igures, 80%), Coloured, 13% (2011 national igures, 9%), Indian, 11% (2011 national
igures, 2.5%), and White, 6% (2011 national igures, 9%). Due to the
relatively small numbers of Indian and Coloured respondents and because there were no signiicant diferences in responses across questions for these two categories they have been grouped together in the
results. This is to ensure that results are easy to read and to ensure that
the most signiicant results can be included in the report without making it too extensive.
Considering the age of the respondents, it is not surprising that just
under one third of respondents (31%) were still in school (called learners throughout the report). Almost four out of ten (23%) were studying
18
These igures do not correspond with national igures as a result of the quota sampling method used – see previous explanation.
33
at either a college or university (called students throughout the report).
Just more than one out of ten (12%) respondents said they were unemployed. This is well below the oicial 2012 national igure of 25.5%
(Statistics South Africa). More than three out of ten (34%) said they were
either in full time employment (23%) or that they were employed part
time (11%). These igures could relect the fact that a number of surveys and focus groups were administered in sites close to universities
or other tertiary institutions.
This survey generated the expected large amount of data. This report
will focus on results that are regarded as signiicant and relevant to the
focus of the study: consumption and use of the media by the youth for
the purpose of constituting civic identity and political participation. Key
correlations were made considering the following variables: race, age,
education, location, income, school type and occupation. Each of these
variables include a number of categorisations:
•
•
•
•
•
Race: Black African, White, Indian/Coloured
Age: 15-20 years old, 21-30 years old, 31 or more years
Education: none/little schooling, Grade 12, tertiary education
Location: large city, small town, rural area
Income: less than R1500, between R1501 – R3300, between R3301
– R9000, between R9001 – R21 000, more than R21 001
• School type: township, ex-Model C19/private school, other
• Occupation: unemployed, scholar, student, employed
Some variables produced analytical challenges. These include school
type. Respondents who provided ‘other’ as school type but did not provide further details regarding the school. Almost 50% (46.5%) of respondents stated that they attend an ex-Model C or private school and 41.3%
19
During apartheid there were separate departments responsible for White children’s
schools, Black African children’s schools and Coloured children’s schools. The House
of Representatives (HOR) was the department that handled coloured children’s schooling, the Department of Education and Training (DET) handled Black African children’s
schooling and the White children’s schools were known as Model C Schools. Even today,
Model C schools still typically have better facilities, better teachers and better educational opportunities for children than township or rural schools (http://www.my-capetown-south-africa.com/south-african-schools-and-education-system.html)
34
attend township schools. Location was another variable which proved
challenging. Results show indistinct diferences between the categories
small town and rural area (and could perhaps have been grouped together for purposed of analysis). Cross tabulations within these key
variables have been included in the study only where signiicant associations occurred in the results. These results are based on the Pearson
Chi-Square test, where a p-value of less than 0.05 indicates a signiicant
association between the variables.
Media Tenor conducted a quantitative content analysis of the kind of
media coverage of the youth in both print and broadcast (television
only) media in South Africa. A total of 8736 articles were analysed from
South African print media between January 2011 and July 2012. Articles were chosen on the basis of whether they had youth as the subject.
Each article is analysed for the following variables:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Who/what is the subject
what is the ield of business of the subject
where does the action take place
what time does the statement refer to
what topic is the statement about
who is the source of the statement
and the tone or value of the statement (whether it is negative, positive or neutral).
Print media analysed were: Beeld, Business Day, Business Report, Business Times, Cape Times, City Press, Daily Dispatch, Daily Sun, Die Burger, FinWeek, Financial Mail, Isolezwe, Mail & Guardian, New Age, Rapport, Sake24, Sowetan, Star, Sowetan, Star, Sunday Independent, Sunday
Times, Times, Witness. Broadcast media analysed were the following
news broadcasts, all on television: SABC 3 News @ One, E-TV News, Afrikaans News, SABC 2, English News, SABC 3, Zulu/Xhosa News, SABC 1,
Sotho News, SABC 2, KykNet (Afrikaans), SiSwati/Ndebele News, SABC
1, SABC 3 news @ 10 and SABC 3 Africa News Update.
Focus groups discussions were then conducted in three provinces in
South Africa: Gauteng, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal. In total 14 focus group discussions were conducted with a total of 107 participants
35
across the demographic range: unemployed/employed (full time and
part time), students (full time and part time), young people living in rural
and urban areas, and participants across all racial categories. The purpose of the focus group discussions was to gain a deeper understanding
of young people’s perceptions of community, civic and political engagement, media use, and attitudes towards the media in relation to political
and civic engagement. Participants for the focus groups were selected
through purposive sampling, as well as snowball sampling. Focus group
studies in media research rarely seek to obtain focus groups representative of the population. Rather, focus groups are selected according to
dimensions that may be signiicant to the way in which people use and
interpret media. For this project, the choice of focus group participants
was shaped by the results of the survey and participants were identiied
based on criteria drawn from the survey results such as age, location,
gender, race, and occupation. Diferent moderators conducted the focus groups in KwaZulu-Natal using a diferent moderator’s guide and
moderating procedures than the moderators in Gauteng and the Eastern
Cape. This posed analytical challenges despite similarities in the general
objectives of conducting the focus groups.
A qualitative policy analysis was also conducted to provide an overview
of South African youth policies. The particular focus was to analyse
whether general youth policy and speciic media policy promote active
youth participation in the public sphere. Researchers analysed the National Youth Policy 2009-2014, the Children’s Act, the Films and Publications Act, and the Media Development and Diversity Agency Act. The
aim of the policy analysis is to allow the research to make policy recommendations based on key focus areas identiied by the government. This
policy analysis will be related to the key indings of the study and allow
for recommendations for better youth engagement and participation in
the public sphere through the media.
36
FInDInGs
The indings are collated in relation to information from the surveys,
the focus group discussions, the content analysis and in comparison
with the research conducted by the Dutch partners. The indings will be
discussed within the following categories:
1. Media coverage on the youth
2. Media use
3. Media and institutional trust
4. Civic identity and the media
5. Civic engagement and the media
Media coverage on the youth
This report is aimed at identifying trends of reporting on the youth as
well as issues most closely associated with young people. The analysis
focuses on reportage on organisations and programmes concerned with
youth development. The analysis also examines political coverage on
youth.
Traditional media became increasingly negative towards issues associated with the youth during 2012. Coverage on the youth was linked to
concern regarding societal challenges in general. Growing pertinence
was given to unemployment, inequality as well as the situation of the
poor. Major contributors towards negative focus on the youth was the
ousting of Julius Malema as ANCYL leader, the quality of, and access to,
education as well as growing concern regarding social unrest as a result
of disillusionment on the part of unemployed youths.
In general, there is an unbalanced representation of youth in the media
based on population statistics from Statistics South Africa 2011. Based
on these igures there is an unbalanced trend of reporting on gender
with young males receiving almost 20% more interest than young women. Analysis of long-term media trends indicates that the share of coverage on women is subsiding over time.
Media reportage of various race groups is also unbalanced. According to
37
Statistics South Africa’s population estimates for 2011 there are 8.64%
Coloureds and 9.09% Whites currently living in South Africa, Yet White
young people receive more than twice the amount of coverage when
compared with coverage of Coloured youth.
Figure 1
Gender representation over time
Racial representation: January
2011 - September 2012
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
3%
21%
9%
67%
Men
Women
White
Coloured
Black African
Asian
Basis: 5864 statements in SA:
January 2011 – September 2012.
Basis: 5864 statements in SA media over ime:
January 2011- July 2012.
Issue coverage on the youth
education
The media took greatest interest in challenges faced by the youth and
issues that were either contributing to, or were as a result of, inequality
and social circumstances. The media were particularly focused on education seen as – the key to alleviating poverty and inequality.
38
Figure 2
Volume and ratings of top issues associated with the youth
Education
Crime
Health
Social situation of the youth
Accidents
Employment
Culture
Social services
Politics
Justice system
0
200
400
600
Negative
800
Neutral
1000
1200
1400
1600
Positive
Basis: 2572 aricles in SA media: January 2011 – September 2012.
Education received growing negative attention during 2012. Three incidents gave rise to growing media perceptions that education is facing
a crisis:
• The stampede at the University of Johannesburg during the beginning of 201220. The issue highlighted the shortage of space at
institutions of higher learning in South Africa. The Daily Maverick
(10/01/2012) reported: “It was not too hard to igure out there would
be a lot of tense people at UJ on Tuesday. South Africa’s university
system has room for 150,000 irst-year students. One-hundred-andeighty-thousand matriculants whose results qualify them for further
study won’t get a place”.
• The Eastern Cape education crisis since 201121 focused increased
20
On the 10th January 2012 one person was killed outside of the University of Johannesburg in a stampede of more than 10 000 people. The woman was the mother of a
prospective student who had been standing in queues with her son, along with the other
thousands, in the hope of registering for the new academic year.
21
The Eastern Cape Province has been plagued by a number of challenges in the education sector. These include strikes by teachers over pay, shortage of teachers for key
39
media awareness on ailing education standards. Much debate pertained to Helen Zille’s ‘educational refugees’ utterance22.
• The Limpopo book scandal23 caused a media outcry. The focus on
the textbook scandal in Limpopo was responsible for a spike in negative coverage on education for the South African government during
the third quarter. A relatively stable rating for most of 2011 was
derailed by persistent coverage on Limpopo.
Unemployment and the social situation of youths
Social unrest
Unemployment and the social situation of the youth received intensiied
debate. Media scrutiny of the issue was fuelled by strong support for
former ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema’s aggressive stance on
the nationalisation of key industries (particularly mining and banks) as
well as land reform. The increased violence associated with protests and
strikes intensiied concern of a looming social uprising. General Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), Zwelinzima
Vavi, a prominent source on social unrest, reportedly argued that the increase in violent public protests in the country was the beginning of an
uprising. He stated that unemployment – especially unemployment of
the youth in SA – was a ticking time bomb and that social programmes
such as the Expanded Public Works Programme and the social grants
system that beneited 15 million people were not enough and were not
a viable solution (Business Day, 07/06/2012).
The Youth Wage Subsidy
The Youth Wage Subsidy24 received extensive media debate during 2012.
subjects, poor infrastructure, and calls for the dismissal of the Eastern Cape head of
education Modidma Mannya,
22
In April 2012 Democratic Alliance leader, Helen Zille, who is also Premier of the
Western Cape, called learners from the Eastern Cape who move to the Western Cape
with the purpose of gaining better education, “education refugees”.
23
In June 2012 the media reported that Grade 10 pupils in the Limpopo province
had still not received textbooks which were scheduled to be delivered in January. This
became a national scandal because the national education department had taken over
running the provincial education department in December of the year before.
24
In 2011 the Treasury suggested a subsidy for employers who take on irst-time
40
Much interest focused on the fact that Cosatu had opposed the subsidy.
Cosatu claimed the subsidy would aid proitability levels of enterprises
at the expense of workers. The trade union also argued the government
would be unable to monitor whether the subsidy would be used for the
intended purposes (The Mail & Guardian, 20/06/2012). It was reported
that the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
strongly supported the subsidy. The youth subsidy received heightened
levels of interest when DA and Cosatu supporters were involved in street
battles, as the DA tried to march to Cosatu House to highlight Cosatu’s
opposition to the scheme. The media criticised the ANC’s ‘deafening silence’ regarding Cosatu’s violent reaction against the DA’s march (The
Mail & Guardian, 16/05/2012). The ANC and government received intensiied scrutiny when they seemed to have backpedalled on the youth
wage subsidy so as to win back Cosatu’s favour. Journalists said: “Until
consensus is reached, unemployed youth will remain a political football”
(Daily Maverick 23/11/2012).
Figure 3
Volume of coverage on wage subsidies
Ratings of coverage on wage subsidies
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%
-60%
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
Jan-11
Feb-11
Mar-11
Apr-11
May-11
Jun-11
Jul-11
Aug-11
Sep-11
Oct-11
Nov-11
Dec-11
Jan-12
Feb-12
Mar-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jun-12
Jul-12
Aug-12
Sep-12
Jul-12
Sep-12
Jun-12
Aug-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jan-12
Mar-12
Feb-12
Dec-11
Oct-11
Sep-11
ANC
Nov-11
Jul-11
Aug-11
Apr-11
Jun-11
Mar-11
May-11
Jan-11
Feb-11
0
Government
ANC
Government
Basis: 815 statements January 2011 – September 2012.
Health
Regarding health issues, the media focused most extensively on HIV.
The press were particularly focused on the prevention of HIV; less interest pertained to the prevalence of the virus. The media were particularly
critical of the commonness of teenage pregnancies as well as substance
workers in a two year programme which aimed to improve employment nationally. The
Youth Wage Subsidy was to be implemented in April 2012, but had been stalled due to
discussion between relevant parties and organisations.
41
abuse. Substance abuse was closely linked to the contraction of HIV as
well as the incidence of crime.
Figure 4
Volume of top health issues
associated with the youth
Ratings of top health issues
associated with the youth
HIV/Aids
HIV/Aids
Pregnancy
Pregnancy
Substance abuse
Substance abuse
Food poisoning
Food poisoning
Neonatal deaths
Neonatal deaths
Circumcision
Circumcision
Cancer
Cancer
Contraceptive Devices
Contraceptive Devices
Mental health
Mental health
Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis
0
10
20
30
40
50
0%
Number of reports
20%
Negative
40%
60%
Neutral
80%
100%
Positive
Basis: 141 aricles in SA media: January 2011 – September 2012
Crime
The youth received much reportage in connection with crime – most noticeably violent contact crimes such as sexual assault and murder. The
sexual assault of a mentally-handicapped girl caused a media outcry and
resulted in increased media debate on societal elements that contribute
to the youth committing such violent acts. To this efect, director of the
Medical Research Council’s Gender & Health Unit Rachel Jewkes was
quoted as saying: “Parental absence was signiicantly associated with
raping, as was the quality of afective relationship with parents related
to raping. Experiences of bullying and being bullied were much more
common among men who raped” (City Press, 22/04/2012).
News that a minor had admitted to killing the former leader of the rightwing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), Eugene Terre’Blanche not
only resulted in intensiied focus on murder, but also stimulated media interest regarding claims that young people were exploited as farm
workers.
42
Figure 5
Volume and ratings of top crime-related
issues associated with the youth
Rape/Sexual Abuse
Murder
Kidnapping
Violent crime in gen.
Arson
Vandalism
Drug related crime
Fraud
Assault
Prostitution
0
10
20
Negative
Neutral
30
40
50
Positive
Basis:: 141 aricles in SA media: January 2011 – September 2012
Coverage on organisations or programmes focused on youth
development
The organisations or programmes aimed at youth development received
either much scrutiny or a dearth of media interest. The mismanagement
of funds as well as a failure to meet expectations was at the heart of
media concern.
The National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) has been shrouded
in controversy since its inception in 2009. NYDA received much negative attention during November 2011 as it was reported that ousted
ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema “astutely placed many of his
Youth League allies in lucrative positions within (NYDA)” (Cape Times,
43
17/11/2011). Questions regarding exorbitant salaries during March
2012 perpetuated beliefs that the NYDA is a ‘fat cat’ organisation
plagued by nepotism. The media quoted DA Youth leader Makashule
Gana as saying that: “We have known for a long time that the ANC Youth
League-aligned national NYDA board is running an employment agency
for pals. It is only now that we can see just how focused on staing, to
the exclusion of real youth development, the NYDA board is – to the
point that its plans are simply nonsensical” (News24; 14/03/2012). Opposition parties again called for the National Youth Development Agency to be disbanded during September after its annual report revealed
irregular expenditure of R133 million during the past inancial year.
The Department for Women Children and People with Disabilities (DWCPD) has consistently attracted negative focus. The department received
renewed scrutiny during August due to the fact that the DA had asked
Public Protector Thuli Madonsela to investigate the department’s failure
to deliver on its mandate.
Figure 6
Volume and ratings of organisations or programs
focused on youth development
NYDA
DWCPD
NYC
Umsombovu Youth Fund
NYS
0
500
1000
Negative
1500
2000
Neutral
Basis: 4537 statements in SA media: January 2011 – September 2012.
44
2500
Positive
3000
Coverage on political parties’ youth divisions
Analysis of political coverage associated with the youth indicates that
the media agenda mostly centre on issues of importance to the ANC
Youth League. The ousting of former ANCYL leader Julius Malema25 is
a pertinent example. The media show little interest in the youth wings
of opposition parties. Not only was the ANC Youth League most in focus,
but the League also achieved the greatest share of coverage when looking at the total amount of coverage on the ANC. Other youth divisions received less than 5% of total coverage on their respective political parties.
Figure 7
Volume and ratings of political parties'
youth divisions
Percentage of coverage: youth
division vs. all other divisions
ANCYL
ANC
YCL
SACP
DA Youth
UCD
IFP Youth Brigade
IFP
COPE Youth Movement
DA
VF Youth Ministry
COPE
UCDPYL
VF
NFP
NFP Youth Movement
0
20000
Negative
40000
Neutral
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
60000
Youth league/division
Positive
Other
Basis: 494908 statements in SA media:
January 2011 – September 2012.
Basis: 6512 statements in SA media:
January 2011 – September 2012.
The ANC Youth League’s political afairs received most pertinence. Much
less interest pertained to the youth wing’s policies regarding issues pertaining to issues of interest to the youth. The ANC Youth League’s policy
regarding the nationalisation of mines was the only policy receiving extensive media discussion. As such, it could be argued that political debates regarding issues of importance to the youth are neglected.
Julius Malema had been president of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) until he was
expelled from the ANC after being found guilty of sowing divisions within the party. This
was a controversial decision as he was strongly supported by certain factions of the ANC
as well as being popular amongst the ANCYL.
25
45
Not only did the youth divisions of political parties receive mostly negative media attention, but there was also a lack of media conidence in
young up-and-coming political leaders. Julius Malema dominated coverage on young leaders.
Figure 8
Figure 9
Ratings of coverage on young
political leaders
Volume of coverage on young
political leaders
Julius Malema
Julius Malema
Lebogang Maile
Lebogang Maile
Buti Manamela
Buti Manamela
Makashule Gana
Makashule Gana
Fikile Mbalula
Fikile Mbalula
Anele Mda
Anele Mda
0
10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
0%
Number of statements
20%
Negative
40%
60%
Neutral
80%
100%
Positive
Basis: 45663 statements in SA media: January 2011 – September 2012.
Media use
Most respondents said they used radio news most for getting information (70.8%), with SA TV news (67.3%) as the second highest source of
information. Google or other search engines was the third most stated
source of news media (62.8%). The medium used the least by survey
respondents to gather news were tabloid newspapers (38.5%).
46
Figure 10
Media used for news
Other
Tabloids
Int online news
Local online news
SA entertainment TV
Other radio
Social media
Newspapers
Magazines
International TV
Google/search engines
SA TV news
Radio news
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
Unemployed youth use tabloid newspapers signiicantly more than others in the employment category (58.8%), but are at the same time the
highest users of SA TV news (82.5%). There is equally high use amongst
unemployed youth of radio news as a source of news (82.5%). Of the
media surveyed, employed youth use SA TV news most to obtain news
(71.9%). Employed youth also use mainstream newspapers signiicantly more than other occupation categories (61.7%)26. Employed youth
use tabloid newspapers least to obtain news (36.1%). Radio news is
the most signiicant source of news for youth attending school (73.4%)
with Google or other search engines the second most preferred source
(68.9%). The most preferred way for young people in college of university to access the news is through Google or other search engines
(68.4%). Six out of 10 young people (61.3%) in this category said they
use social media as a news source – the highest amongst all the occupation categories27.
Mainstream newspaper use: In school = 46.8%, in college/university = 53.3%, and
unemployed = 54.4%.
26
27
Google or other search engines as a news source: In school = 52.9%, employed =
50.5%, and unemployed = 39.5%.
47
The data show strong disparities for the use of Google and other search
engines as a source of information for news amongst South African
youth. Although unemployed youth show the lowest usage of Google or
other search engines (40.4%), this igure is still much higher than general internet usage igures across South Africa. There is disagreement
about the number of internet users in South Africa. Some statistics show
igures of 20% (World Wide Worx) while another more recent study
showing evidence of up to one in three people in South Africa, or 12.3
million people, accessing the internet (De Lanerolle 2012: 6).
More interestingly is the comparatively low number of respondents who
said they use either local online news websites (40.5%) or international
news websites (39.2%) to obtain news information. This is signiicantly
lower than the igures for Google and other search engines across all
respondents (62.8%), but still signiicantly higher than the average for
internet use across South Africa. This may point to the fact that young
people are using the internet to ind speciic information, using search
engines to ind relevant information rather than relying on generic local
or international news websites.
Youth with tertiary education also use Google or other search engines as
their most preferred source for news most often (71.8%) and signiicantly more than respondents with lower education levels. (No/little schooling, 53.1%, Grade 12, 65.5%.) Seven out of 10 (71.9%) respondents with
little or no education use radio news as a source of news most. SA TV
news is also a predominant source of news (70.6%) in this category. Respondents with Grade 12 education also use radio news most to access
news (74%), with Google and other search engines as the second most
used medium for news access (65.5%)
Younger survey respondents (15-20 years) use radio news most to access news (70%) and Google or other search engines almost as much
(68.8%). Google and other search engines saw signiicant disparities
amongst diferent age categories. Older respondents (31 years and older) use this technology the least of those surveyed (49.2%). While 60.3%
of 21 – 30 year olds also use Google and other search engines for news
access, this medium was the third most used within this age group after
radio news (72.3%) and TV news (71.8%).
48
Black African respondents use both radio news and TV news equally as
sources of information of the media surveyed (74.1%). SA TV news is
used signiicantly less amongst White youth (46.3%), who use Google
and other search engines most to access their news (78.2%). Indian/Coloured youth also use radio news the most to access news (68.2%). Tabloid newspapers are the least preferred news source (38.1%) among this
group. Signiicantly, more Black African youth use tabloids as a news
source (45.8%) than White youth (11.6%).
Youth with high income levels28 use Google and other search engines
the most to access news (80.8%) and use tabloid newspapers the least
(20.2%). Radio news is the most accessed media for those in the lowest
income category (80%), while least used amongst this group is international online news websites (28%). The second lowest income group use
SA TV news as their predominant source of news (82%). This category
is the highest users of this medium amongst all income categories while
the highest income group use SA TV the least (56.7%). Radio news is
used most by the third lowest income group as their most signiicant
news source (71.4%), while radio news show signiicantly lower igures
as a preferred source for the higher income groups (60-61%). The second highest income group uses Google and other search engines, and
local online news sites as the two highest sources for news (both 69.2%).
Respondents from rural areas (79.1%), small towns (68.9%) and cities
(68.1%) all use radio news as the most preferred source of information.
Respondents from rural areas use international online news websites the
least (31.6%). Respondents from rural areas (53.9%) use tabloid newspapers as a news source signiicantly more than those in large cities (31.7%).
Tabloid newspapers are the least preferred medium of information for
urban respondents as well as respondents in small towns (38.1%). Almost
eight out of ten respondents in rural areas (76.7%) prefer SA TV news as
a source of information while 63.1% of urban respondents and 67.1 of
respondents in small towns prefer the same medium. Local online news
websites, social media, and Google or other search engines show no signiicant diference in usage by respondents from diferent areas.
28
Income was divided into the following categories – less than R1500, between R1501
– R3300, between R3301 – R9000, between R9001 – R21 000, and more than R21 001.
49
Signiicant diferences are evident between respondents who attend different types of schools with respondents attending township schools
using predominantly SA TV news (75.1%), and radio news (74.6%) as
sources for news. These respondents also use tabloid newspapers signiicantly more (47.1%) than respondents who attend ex-Model C or
private schools (28%). Respondents from township schools also use local community newspapers signiicantly more (51.9%) than those who
attend or private schools (34.5%). Only 58.2% of respondents from exModel C or private schools use SA TV news as a news source. This is
not only signiicantly lower than respondents from township schools,
but also signiicantly lower than the overall percentage. Of the media
surveyed, respondents from ex-Model C or private schools use predominantly Google and other search engines (71.6%) and radio news (66.1%)
to obtain news.
Figure 11
Media use for news - Google
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
It seems that young people have an interest in using online resources
(particularly search engines) to ind news information but they may be
prohibited by cost, access and education. Young people who are better
50
educated, employed or in an educational institution are more likely to
use online resources for gathering news. There is no signiicant diference in the use of Google or other search engines as a news source
amongst respondents who live in diferent areas (Pearson Chi-Square
– 0.107).
Media usage amongst South African youth is surprisingly comparable
with the young people in the Netherlands who also still favour traditional broadcasting media rather than printed newspapers. South African youth favour radio more than television as opposed to Dutch youth
who favour television over radio as their most important news source.
Young people in the Netherlands also use online news proportionately
more as sources of news than printed newspapers. While South African
youth use online resources to access news, Dutch youth use search engines rather than news websites to gather news. If one regards these
results in relation to theory discussed in the literature review, this may
suggest young people from the North and from South Africa may be
well placed to access information about political and civic activity from
online sources. At the same time, political and civic organisations would
be well placed to use online tools to engage with young people. The
fact that South African youth who were surveyed use search engines to
gather news at such a signiicantly high level may suggest however that
in order to use the internet as a tool to engage young people, civic and
political organisations would need to target the material carefully at this
audience in order to attract their attention. It also suggests that these
young South Africans would need to be interested in a topic in order to
use the internet (whether on a PC or their mobile phone) to search for
information and news about this issue.
51
Figure 12
Most important source of news —
Dutch findings
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
It seems from both the survey and focus group results that young people do have some interest in consuming news. When asked which three
media genre they enjoy the most, the survey respondents mostly answered soap opera’s (47.1%), which may indicate why TV consumption
is so high for young people. News is the second most enjoyable genre
(40.9%), with situation comedies as the third most enjoyable (39.6%).
When asked which genre of media they prefer, focus group respondents echoed these indings by noting comedy, soap opera’s, news on Al
Jazeera, documentaries and sport. The fact that news scores relatively
highly amongst the youth may have to do with the ‘politics of the remote’ as a number of focus group respondents noted that they watch
particular programmes because those with the power over the remote
were watching them. One participant notes:
“For me, it’s not [that] I don’t enjoy news but it’s about the
politics of the remote control in residential communal properties. I don’t look forward to watching news but just watch
it as and when I have time.”
52
Another notes:
“At 7pm you know it’s time for the news at home so we just
stay and watch with our parents.”
As one might expect, interest in news increases with age amongst both
South African and Dutch youth. South African school attendees are
signiicantly less interested in national news (63.5%) as a media topic
than unemployed youth (71.1%), students (73.6%) and employed youth
(77.3%).
Figure 13
Interest in news – Dutch SA comparison
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15-20 NL
15.0
21-30 NL
15-20 SA
10.0
21-30 SA
5.0
0.0
Perhaps more revealing in terms of what young people use media for,
are the results regarding their interest in speciic topics. Survey respondents were asked to rate a number of speciic media topics according to
those they are most interested in. The results reveal not only their inter53
est in popular culture (which was the highest at 86.3%), but also their
signiicant lack of interest in politics or topics that relate to politics. Of
the two lowest topics of interest, both related to politics, with political
actions the least interesting (34.6%), and politics/government the second lowest (37.9%).
There are signiicant diferences in politics as a media topic of interest
amongst diferent races with lowest interest from the Indian/Coloured
respondents (23.3%) and highest amongst Black African respondents
(44.5%) (White respondents = 30.6%). The media topic that was of
most interest to the Indian/Coloured respondents was popular culture
– which showed similar levels across all races and no signiicant diferences amongst the respondents. Black African respondents show strong
levels of interest in education (86.9%), while signiicantly fewer Indian/
Coloured respondents showed an interest in this topic (74.4%) and even
fewer White respondents showed an interest in this topic (68%). White
respondents showed strong interest in comedy/humour (87.8%), popular culture (86.4%) and health (83.7%). Health was also of strong interest
to the other respondents and showed no signiicant diference amongst
diferent races (Black African = 79.6% and Indian/Coloured = 80.3%).
Very few of the topics of interest surveyed show any signiicant diference amongst the income categories across survey respondents. ‘Breaking news’ was of least interest to respondents earning lower incomes.
Comedy/humour show an increased interest as income increased (highest earners, 88.5% and lowest earners, 64.7%). Careers/job hunting is of
most interest to those who earn the least (80%) and of least interest to
those who earn the most (60.6%). Interest in education as a media topic
increases signiicantly as income decreases, and social justice is of most
interest for the highest income earners (73.1%). Only 48.2% of middle
income earners think social justice is an interesting media topic29.
As with income, diferences in age show few signiicant distinctions in
which media topic is of most interest to respondents of diferent ages.
Older respondents (45.9%) think politics/government is of most interest while younger respondents think the same topic is of the least
29
Less than R1500 = 63.3%, R1501 – R3300 = 60%, R9001 – R21000 = 63.1%
54
interest (31.6%). National news is of most interest to the middle age
group (77.1%) but least interesting to the younger respondents (65.4%),
and comedy/humour is more interesting to the youngest respondents
(83.1%) than to the oldest respondents (69.7%). All of the respondents
ind political actions to be the media topic of least interest to them, while
both the two younger age categories ind popular culture to be the most
interesting. The oldest respondents go against this trend as they ind
education to be the media topic of most interest to them (86.1%).
Popular culture is the media topic of greatest interest to those with
no/some schooling (88.4%), as well as those with Grade 12 (87.5%).
Health is the topic of most interest to respondents with high education
levels (83.8%). More than seven out of 10 (73%) of respondents with
higher education are interested in international news, signiicantly more
than those with Grade 12 (63.9%) and those with little or no schooling
(60.3%). Interest in sport is higher amongst those with less education
(79.7%) than those with Grade 12 (70.6%) or those with higher education (69.3%).
Interest in popular culture is high across all the respondents. Respondents who are employed show marginally more interest in education
(83.7%) than popular culture (83.4%). The only media topic that shows
signiicant diference across this category is national news, which is of
most interest to those working (77.3%) and of least interest to learners (63.5%). This seems to be linked to the age of the respondents as
younger respondents show less interest in national news (65.4%) than
the older respondents (21-30years = 77.1%, and those over 31 = 73.8%).
Respondents who live in large cities are least interested in politics
(32.8%) but not signiicantly less than respondents from small towns
(38.1%) and from rural areas (49.5%). Popular culture was the topic of
most interest to both those living in large cities (86.9%) as well as those
in rural areas (89.9%), while education was of most interest to those living in small towns (86%).
Very few of the media topics surveyed show signiicant diferences
across school categories. Respondents from township schools show
the most interest in education (85.2%) and popular culture (84.4%) as
55
media topics. The interest in education as a media topic was signiicantly higher than those in ex-Model C or private schools (76.4%) and
may have been strongly inluenced by the diiculties that township and
poorer schools have in accessing educational resources such as textbooks, infrastructure and teachers. While popular culture is the topic
of greatest interest to respondents from ex-Model C or private schools
(88.6%), these respondents also show high levels of interest in comedy/
humour (84.3%) and topics of human interest (79.1%).
Interestingly, two of the most highly regarded topics – education (81.3%)
and health (80.3%) – were also two of the topics most associated with
youth in media reporting between January 2011 and September 2012.
The content analysis show education, crime and health were the three
topics most associated with the youth in media reporting with education
outweighing all the other topics. This may indicate a link between media coverage and topical interest by readers. As with the survey results,
politics as a topic scored very low in terms of media coverage associated
with the youth. Again, one may see a greater interest in politics and political activity amongst the youth if the media associated such activities
with young people in a positive way in their coverage of youth in South
Africa.
56
Figure 14
Volume and ratings of top issues associated
with the youth
Education
Crime
Health
Social situation of the youth
Accidents
Employment
Culture
Social services
Politics
Justice system
0
200
400
Negative
600
800
Neutral
1000
1200
1400
1600
Positive
The kinds of media topics that South African youth are interested in are
strongly matched by those in the Dutch study. As with South African
youth, popular culture is of most interest to youth in the Netherlands,
while political actions is the topic of least interest. But the data also
show signiicant diferences between the two cultures. Religion, for example, is one media topic of relatively high interest to South African
youth, but scores much lower in relation to other topics amongst the
young people in the Netherlands. While breaking news is one of the topics of moderate interest to young South Africans, it is one of the topics
of most interest to youth in the Dutch study. Figure 15 shows relative
levels of importance/interest across the two countries.
57
Figure 15
0
50
100
150
200
250
Popular culture
Education
Health
Human interest
Comedy/humour
Cultural/arts
Careers/job-hunting
Sports
Religion
National news
Breaking news
Local news
International news
Technology/computers
Personals/dating
Environmental issues
Social injustices
Electronic games
Business / finance
Politics/government
Political actions
SA (N=956)
NL (N=1029)
Media and institutional trust
Respondents were asked about their trust in local, provincial and national government. The results show signiicantly low levels of trust in
all three with trust in local government showing the lowest level. Only
34.4% respondents say they trust local government a great deal or quite
a lot. Close to four out of ten (38.3%) respondents say they trust provincial government quite a lot or a great deal and 40.9% of respondents say
they trust national government a great deal or quite a lot. There is no
signiicant change in levels of trust across the diferent age categories
58
of survey respondents. There are however signiicant diferences across
other categories, as illustrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16
Trust in local government
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Levels of trust in provincial government follow the same patterns as
those in local government, with Black African respondents reporting the
highest levels of trust amongst the race categories (Black African, 44.3%,
Indians/Coloureds, 29.4%, and Whites, 31%). Respondents with the lowest levels of schooling reported the highest levels of trust amongst the
education category (no/some schooling, 42.6%; Grade 12,39.6%, and
tertiary educated, 31.8%), and respondents who are employed have lower levels of trust than those where are unemployed (employed, 33.5%;
unemployed, 48.1%). Respondents with less monthly income are signiicantly more trusting of local government than those with higher incomes. Almost six out of ten respondents (57.4%) say they trust local
government while only two out of ten respondents (19.8%) in the highest earning category have trust in local government. Of the respondents
living in in rural areas 44.6% say they trust local government – signiicantly more than respondents from large cities (27.9%) and small towns
59
(38%). Respondents from township schools also trust local government
signiicantly more (35.4%) than those who attend ex-Model C or private
schools (33%). The same kind of pattern emerges when one examines
levels of trust in national government. Trust in the national government
is highest amongst Black African respondents, respondents with low levels of schooling, the unemployed, lowest earners, respondents who live
in rural areas and who respondents who attend township schools.
Figure 17
Trust in National government
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Race is a signiicant variable in levels of trust amongst South African
youth. Indian/Coloured youth show very low levels of trust across all
institutions. White youth are also less trustful of public institutions than
Black African youth. White youth are most trustful of private companies. Black African (77%) and Indian/Coloureds respondents have high
levels of trust in religious institutions (73.3%) and White youth have low
levels (53.4%) of trust in religious institutions.
It seems that young people in South Africa are generally uninterested
and mistrustful of political institutions and political parties. This in60
cludes low levels of trust in the legal system, the police, and in parliament. Only 30.7% of respondents say they trust political parties either a
great deal or quite a lot. Young people who earn more are less trustful of
public institutions, including the police, while those with lower incomes
are more trusting of the older generation. Unemployed youth are more
trusting of public institutions. This could be because they rely on public
or state assistance such as child support grants and other social grants.
Young people who live in rural areas are also more trusting of public
institutions than those who live in large cities. Interestingly, those who
live in rural areas show less trust in the older generation (75.1%) than
those who live in large cities (77.8%), while those who live in small towns
show the highest levels of trust in the older generation (80.5%). This
trend is reversed when one examines trust in religious institutions with
respondents in rural areas showing higher levels of trust (75.3%) than
those in large cities (69.8%), and respondents in small towns (78.3%)
showing the highest levels of trust in religious institutions.
Young people with lower levels of education show higher levels of trust
across public institutions than those with higher levels of education.
Attitudes towards religious institutions show high levels of trust across
the education category. This pattern is the same for levels of trust in
the older generation across the education category. Respondents from
township schools show higher levels of trust in most political processes
including local party elections (34.9%) and political parties (32.9%) as
compared to respondents from ex-Model C or private schools (33.5%
and 25.7% respectively). Respondents from all types of schools show
the highest levels of trust in the older generation, with those from township schools showing signiicantly higher levels of trust (80.4%) than
those from ex-Model C or private schools (77.1%). Higher income earners show lower levels of trust in public institutions, the police and parliament, but higher levels of trust in public companies than lower income
earners. Respondents with low income show signiicantly high levels of
trust in the older generation when compared with higher earners.
61
Figure 18
Institutional trust
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
These indings correspond with the responses from participants of the
focus group discussions who reported that their experiences with politicians are generally negative because politicians tend to make promises
that are never kept. One respondent, when asked about meetings with
politicians, said:
“They don’t always keep their promises. Those are some of
the things we have experienced in the meetings.”
Another argued that meeting with a politician was a negative experience
because of the ‘political propaganda”.
These remarks relate to experiences around voting at municipal (local)
and national level and many focus group participants reported negative
experiences around voting. This will be discussed in more detail later in
the report.
62
The high level of trust among respondents in religious institutions
(73.3%) and the older generation (77.4%) is signiicant. While respondents show trust in religious institutions respondents did not show
signiicant interest in consuming religious content through the media
either in the survey data or the focus group discussions. So while Indian/Coloured South African youth distrust the government and political
institutions they do turn to their religious institutions and leaders as a
source of trust. White youth on the other hand show little trust in political institutions or religious institutions.
Most young South Africans note the older generation as an institution
they trust most (77.4%). Although there are some diferences amongst
race groups (Indians/Coloureds, 84%; Black Africans, 76.5%; Whites,
75.4%) these are relatively high in comparison with trust shown in other
institutions. It is possible that trust in the older generation stems for a
culture of trust and respect amongst all race groups for their elders. It
is also likely that as trust in other institutions weakens, youth are turning to the older generation as a point of stability and a source of assurance. The literature review in this report points to a more theoretical
understanding of the importance of relationships between young people
and their parents in the formation of civic identity and shaping political
participation.
Compared to levels of trust in political institutions, levels of trust in
the media are signiicantly high amongst South African youth: TV news
(79.5%), radio news (78.3%) and newspapers (71.9%). Almost six out of
ten respondents say they trust magazines and social media (59.2% and
57.7% respectively).
63
Figure 19
Media trust
90.0%
80.0%
71.9%
70.0%
60.0%
57.7%
78.3%
79.5%
59.2%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Social media Magazines Newspapers Radio news
TV news
It is interesting that respondents regard newspapers as more trustworthy than social media. Usage statistics in this survey show that young
people use newspapers much less than social media. (Although they do
not use social media for news gathering purposes.) Also interesting is
the fact that young people said they use radio news to gather news information more than TV news and yet trust TV news more than radio
news. This is perhaps linked to access to television, as well as some of
the indings from the focus group discussions, which indicate a preference for television because it allows them to see what was being discussed in the news broadcast. This inding also correlates with indings
from studies in the North which provide evidence that showing imagery
of what happens counts as proof for young people that the reporting is
reliable (Costera Meijer, 2006). In the South African focus group discussions this was noted by a number of participants. One participant noted:
“I would say that I trust TV the most because they always
show what happened live. They don’t just say that something
happened. There is something, a picture that shows you that
something did happen so that you trust it and it’s live.”
64
Another participant added:
“I like TV because you can see that thing when it is happening and you can see that it happened, but in the newspaper
you cannot see it happen, it is written.”
Finally, a third participant reiterated these feelings by stating:
“TV is real because the cameras were there, so it’s something
real and newspaper people were not there.”
Focus group respondents acknowledge that the media may sometimes
be biased and that reporting is inluenced by proits and politics:
“The media chase money so they thrive on controversial topics to sell papers”
“It’s like the media can be controlled by political powers …
if they can control it, then that means they [politicians] have
something to hide.”
One respondent notes that trust in the media “depends on your education or media literacy to be able to dissect facts from opinion. The ordinary people believe the news as nothing but facts”.
The survey indings support this. Respondents with less schooling and
who are unemployed are more trusting of the traditional media (broadcasting and print). Signiicantly more respondents who are unemployed
trust TV news (91%) compared to respondents who are employed (74%).
This trend continues with trust in radio news. Unemployed respondents
trust this medium more (89.1%) than those who are employed (74.1%).
Social media is trusted almost equally by both unemployed respondents
(63.7%) and employed respondents (60.75).
Race also seems to be a signiicant indicator in levels of trust in diferent
types of media. Black African youth show higher levels of trust in television news (83%) than both White (78%) and Indian/Coloured youth
(74%). Black African youth show lower levels of trust than White youth
in all other media.
65
Figure 20
Media trust based on race
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
Black African
40.00%
White
30.00%
Indian/Coloured
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
TV News
Newspapers
Radio News
Social Media
Respondents across diferent age categories show no signiicant diference in levels of trust in media. The only signiicant diference is a relation
between education and trust in television as a source of news. Respondents with little or no schooling show high levels of trust (85.1%) when
compared with respondents who had Grade 12 (79.1%) or a college/
university education (73.5%). Respondents with lower levels of income
show signiicantly higher levels of trust across all media than those with
higher incomes, and those who live in rural areas show signiicantly
higher levels of trust across all media than respondents in large cities.
Respondents from township schools show signiicantly more trust in
media than those from ex-Model C or private schools. Trust across this
category was highest for both types of schools in television news (township, 81.4% and ex-Model C or private schools, 77.6%).
Trust in media could be related to how well respondents think the media
are reporting on news in South Africa. Media that scored highly in the
survey when respondents were asked whether they felt the media were
doing a good or bad job in reporting the media correspond with levels
66
of trust. SA TV news is regarded as doing a good job (81%) but only
marginally better than radio news (79.9%). Mainstream newspapers
also score highly overall (70.2%). Surprisingly, international TV (DSTV),
score the highest level of trust (84.1%). This may be related to feelings
expressed by focus group respondents about the bias of both proits and
politics in the South African media.
Respondents in the survey and focus group participants show little trust
in the tabloid press. When asked in the focus group discussions which
media they trusted, participants not only noted ones that they did trust,
but also speciically pointed to the tabloid press as publications which
cannot be trusted: “It’s best staying away from the tabloids.” When
asked speciically if they trusted tabloid newspapers, most focus group
participants were disparaging of tabloid newspapers and said they read
them only because they were ‘fun’ or because they were ‘bored’ and
needed entertainment. Other phrases used to describe the tabloids include ‘sensational’, ‘senseless’, ‘untrue’, and one participant noted that
they ‘stretch things to a point that it is not true anymore’.
This mistrust in tabloids is further relected in the survey results which
show that respondents (40.7%) feel the tabloids are doing a good job of
reporting news almost half as much as SA TV news. When asked if they
felt that tabloid newspapers were credible or trustworthy, only 19.2% of
respondents agreed.
67
Figure 21
Evaluation of news reporting
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Very good/good
Okay
Not very good/Bad
Civic identity and the media
One of the aims of the research project was to determine whether young
South Africans use the media to establish their civic identity and whether the media form part of the resources they draw on to establish their
identity as South African citizens. It is often taken for granted that the
media are central to identity formation (Marshall 1964, Murdock 1992).
This assumption needs to be explored further to better understand how
young people create a sense of themselves, and particularly how they
establish their civic identity and their sense of social responsibility in
the South African context.
In order to evaluate this quantitatively, respondents were asked which
entertainment and lifestyle media they felt provided the most relevant
information to them as young South Africans. Interestingly the top three
media most relevant to respondents were radio (37.7%), social media
(34.1%), and Google or other search engines (33.8%). This is signiicantly diferent (except for radio) to usage igures for the media that show
TV, radio, and SMS as the three top media regularly used by young people. This may indicate that while young South Africans use certain media regularly, they ind the information they receive on those platforms
68
as less than relevant to their lives. This is particularly surprising considering that soap operas and situation comedies are the genres most
favoured by young people – genres they are consuming although they
don’t consider them to be relevant to their lives. This inding may be related to the potential of social media platforms that allow young people
to search for, select, regulate and generate entertainment and lifestyle
information that is relevant to their lives. This corresponds to research
done by Buckingham (1997), which shows that young people are drawn
to Web 2.0 technology because of its participatory nature.
When asked which media they felt provided the most relevant news and
information the results were quite diferent (again except for radio) with
the top three being radio (44%), SA TV news (42.9%), and mainstream
newspapers (39.1%). Trends across age groups show that the older respondents become, the more relevant these three media are to them.
Mainstream newspapers’ relevance to 15-20 year olds is 30.9%, but for
21-30 year olds it is 44.9% and for 31+ year olds it is 49.2%.
Figure 22
News media relevance across age
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
15-20
30.0%
21-30
20.0%
31+
10.0%
0.0%
Mainstream
Newspapers
Radio News
69
SA TV News
The indings further show that young White South Africans ind the
news and information from the media more relevant than other race
groups. (Except for tabloids that show low levels of relevance across all
race categories.) This may relect a tendency in the South African news
media to provide content that disregards Black African and Indian/Coloured youth, or that White South African youth are accessing news
media that is more relevant to their own particular lived experience.
Figure 23
News media relevance across race
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
Black African
30.0%
Indian/Coloured
20.0%
White
10.0%
0.0%
Mainstream
Newspapers
Radio News
SA TV News
Local online
news
When focus group participants were asked if they felt the news media
was relevant and of interest to young people the results varied. The
generally negative perceptions raised by focus group participants correspond with the survey results as illustrated above. A number of participants mentioned Julius Malema speciically in response to this question,
saying the news media pay too much attention to Malema. One respondent said: “Politicians – Zuma and Malema must stop it now. Please we
want our own space now.” Another argued that he would “like to see less
of Julius Malema”.
A large portion of focus group participants feel the news media they are
exposed to are not interesting or relevant to them because it portrays
negative stories. One participant said: “The media only tell us about the
problems. That is what makes me apathetic.” Another said: “I’d like to
70
see more things that are uplifting on the media.” Another participant,
referring to the miners’ strikes30, said: “They [the media] must give us
something we can learn from and leave the strikes. We are not learning
anything from the strikes.”
Focus group participants also said the news focus on issues which are
outside of their particular context:
“If it could be that the content of the news focus on our local
areas and show things that afect people, it would be best.”
Another reiterated this point: “I would like the media to focus on things
closer to home; on our issues.”
Another said:
“Most of the time we hear about international news, so if you
could go to these places like farms and see how people live.
It would be interesting to me to see how they live.”
Finally, one respondent used a city in the Eastern Cape as an example of
how the media are failing to make news relevant to young people:
“Mthatha is only on the news when Nelson Mandela is
around. News is everywhere but we hardly see those news.”
These focus group results indicate that the media are failing to engage
young people with information and news that is relevant to them, that
is contextualised either by geography or in terms of youth issues. The
survey results show that as young people begin to gain qualiications
they will begin to look at local online media for more relevant information (no/some schooling, 24.7%; Grade 12; 29.7%; tertiary education,
30
On 16 August 2012,the police killed 34 miners during striking action for better wages against
gold mining company Lonmin at the Marikana mine. The incident was signiicant not only because of the large number of people who were killed, but also because it evoked comparisons with
Apartheid-era treatment of striking workers. This incident came to be known as the Marikana
Massacre and caused widespread condemnation of the police action by both local and international organisations.
71
43.2%). As mentioned previously, when it comes to entertainment and
lifestyle media, the youth are already moving away from traditional media as their biggest sources. This move could continue as mobile internet and mobile applications for social media become more accessible
and afordable to young people in South Africa.
When asked what would make the media more relevant to young people
like themselves, respondents noted that one of the most important ways
to make the media more relevant is to ensure that it helps them understand the world they live in. Focus groups participants also emphasised
a focus on their lived contexts. This points to an expectation by youth
to relate media information to the world they live in. These indings
are similar to those from Dutch youth, who wanted to understand their
world better and learn more from the news than they felt they received
(Costera Meijer, 2006).
Figure 24
What would make the media more relevant to
you?
100.00%
86.90%
90.00%
80.00%
77.80%
77.90%
79.40%
79.90%
69.20%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
More coverage More positive More coverage
BY youth
coverage of
of youth
youth
Access
Help me in my
Help me
education and understand the
career
world I live in
The data is signiicant in relation to the content analysis data. Although
the content analysis shows education as the topic most associated with
youth, the survey results show that respondents feel strongly that the
72
media are not helping them in their education or their career. This could
be attributed to the fact that only a small portion of the media coverage on education was positive. So while the media is reporting a great
deal on topics that young people feel are relevant to them, the nature of
the reporting not of value to the youth. Participants in the focus group
discussions said that although they watch soap operas, they would ind
programming focused towards their careers more beneicial:
“When you get SABC, ok, mostly they broadcast soapies. Why
not broadcast more like career guidance programmes, or
programmes that advise you about jobs that are out there?”
Survey respondents (70.6%) felt strongly that every newspaper should
have a youth page. This is an indication that young people are not able
to relate to content in newspapers. Interestingly, Black African youth,
and Indian/Coloured youth feel more strongly than White youth with
regards to this statement (see table below). This links with data that
show White youth ind newspapers more relevant than Black African
and Indian/Coloured youth and as a result are less inclined towards the
need for a speciic youth page.
table 1
every newspaper should have a youth page
Black African
Indian or
Coloured
Total
White
No/No response
25.9%
29.1%
42.2%
29.3%
Yes
74.1%
70.9%
57.8%
70.7%
The general apathy towards news content and the notion that newspapers should include a youth page was echoed in the focus group discussions. Par ticipants said news content should be targeted towards young
people rather than generic programming:
“We want diferent news for diferent audiences. The way
in which news is presented is not captivating for the youth.
There needs to be a rethink about news presentation strategies and formats. We need more entertaining programmes.”
73
If the youth feel like they are not receiving relevant, contextual and targeted information from the news media, then it is less likely that they
will engage with the media as a source of identity formation.
Civic engagement and the media
One part of civic identity is engagement with civic and political activity.
In part, this research examines the levels of engagement by the youth
in diferent kinds of civic, social or political activity. Survey responses
and focus group discussions relect low levels of political activity and
engagement. Willingness to vote, political activity and general interest
in politics was particularly low amongst South African youth across the
categories, and this is perhaps one of the most striking results of the
data. Survey respondents were asked which activities they had been involved in during the last 12 months. Of the options, political activities
were often at the lowest level of responses. The data show young South
Africans tend to participate more in civic or social activities. Helping
a neighbour was the most common answer from survey respondents
(79.1%), with being involved in a social group (67.4%) and being active
in a religious activity (64.9).
74
Figure 25
Youth participation
Helped a neighbour
79.10%
Involved in social group
67.40%
Active in religious activity
64.90%
Posted to online group/blog
47.60%
Volunteer for charity
41.50%
Donated to charity
41.30%
Visited online forum
37.10%
Active in a youth movement
37%
Addressed a social problem
36.30%
Signed a petition
32.80%
Attended debate
27.70%
Part of student council
27.10%
Public demonstration
21.90%
Written letter to media
18.90%
Active in a political party
16.60%
Active in a trade union
11%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Respondents reported relatively low participation even in activities speciically aimed at youth involvement, such as activity in a youth movement, and being part of the student council. In focus groups, engagement
in political and civic activities (such as charitable work and signing a petition) was further examined. These discussions provide greater insight into
some reasons for the lack of participation and engagement. Focus group
participants were asked at diferent points during the discussions about
the problems they face as youth and whether they feel they can do anything about these problems. The responses reveal perceptions of a lack of
agency with regards to being active in their communities or helping other
people. Some of the responses indicate that the youth themselves feel
they need to give assistance but they are not in a position to help others:
“How can you say that you are going to help someone…if
you yourself are not employed or…earning so much [little]
that you can only help yourself.”
75
Another respondent reiterates: “Basically as an individual I’m not sure
what I can do personally as a person.”
While levels of involvement in political activities are low across all categories of respondents, young Black African South Africans show signiicantly higher levels of involvement in political activities than other races. Black African respondents are signiicantly more involved in youth
movements (40.8%) than both White (36.5%) and Indian/Coloured
(36.3%) respondents. This pattern is similar with regards to trade union
activity where Black African respondents are signiicantly more involved
(13.8%) than White (7.5%) and Indian/Coloured (7.6%) respondents. One
sees a similar proportion of involvement by Black African respondents
in political parties (23.3%), with White respondents (8.2%), and the lowest level of involvement in political party activity by Indian/Coloured
respondents (5.8%). One category where Indian/Coloured respondents
are signiicantly more involved is in religious activities. Indian/Coloured
youth show the highest levels of involvement (71.3%) over Black African
youth (67.1%), and White youth (46.3%). White youth show the highest
levels of involvement in activities that take place online (posting views
to an online blog/group, and visiting online forums).
Respondents with higher education levels are signiicantly more engaged in online activities than those with no/some schooling and those
with Grade 12. Levels of engagement in other political or youth activities show no signiicant diference across the diferent levels of education. Young people in rural areas or small towns are generally more
involved in youth and political activities than those in large cities. Online
activities (posting views to an online blog/group, and visiting online forums) are signiicantly higher in large cities than small towns and rural
areas. Employed youth are signiicantly less involved in political activities such as being active in a political party or part of a trade union than
those who are unemployed or in school or college. Students in college
or university are signiicantly more involved in online activities (posting
views to an online blog/group, and visiting online forums) than either
learners, employed or unemployed youth.
76
Compared to Dutch youth, South Africa’s youth is signiicantly more
engaged, particularly in activities that are time consuming such as helping a neighbour and being involved in religious activities. See Figure 26.
Figure 26
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Helped a neighbour
Been involved in religious activities
Posted your views to an online group or blog
Volunteered for a charity or community group
Given money to a charity or community group
Visited online forums about issues (e.g.…
Signed a petition (online or other)
Been part of a student council or any kind of…
Attended a debate on a social/political issue
Participated in a public demonstration
Been active in a political party
SA
NL
As a key indicator of political activity, voting patterns amongst the
youth were surveyed and probed in the focus group discussions. Three
out of ten (27.9%) respondents did not vote in the last national elections, 42.1% did vote, and 30% said they were not old enough to vote
at the time. While the igure for those who voted is relatively high, it is
still lower than the igures for the last national election when 56.7% of
eligible voters cast their ballot31. Slightly more respondents say they
voted in the last municipal elections (40.7%), while 34.5% say they did
not vote, and 24.8% saying they were not old enough to vote at the time.
When asked if they intended to vote in the next elections (both national
and municipal), the vast majority of survey respondents said they did.
31
Data gathered from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://
www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=ZA)
77
More than eight out of ten respondents (82%) said they intended to vote
at the next national elections and 78.3% said they intended to vote at the
next municipal elections.
One of the few questions that show a disparity between the survey
results and the focus group discussions was the question of voting. A
strongly negative perception of voting emerge from the focus group discussions, particularly amongst unemployed participants who say that
they do not vote because they feel let down by having done so in the
past. Some of the responses from participants include:
“No it’s useless. I’m not going to vote anytime soon.”
“I have never voted too. I don’t see the use of voting.”
Personally I’ve lost trust in politicians, and the last time I
voted was 2006.”
“Never voted, because the thing is I feel that the party that’s
in power right now, even if it loses its nantsika… its rule,
another party’s going to do the same thing that they are…
the one in power is doing, so I don’t really participate in
politics.”
“I’ve never voted. And I will never vote, because the government is going to do what they want anyway.”
These kinds of responses relate to results discussed previously in this
report with regard to institutional trust and the lack of trust in political
institutions.
78
Figure 27
Did you vote in the last national elections?
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
Yes
30.0%
No
20.0%
Not old enough
10.0%
0.0%
One of the reasons ofered by participants in focus group discussions
for not voting is that their vote will not improve government services
(such as health, education, roads, transport, etc). This perception emerges from almost all the focus groups. One respondent argues: “
It’s all the same, if you vote or not because nothing improves.
Your vote does nothing.”
Another says:
“We have been voting for a long time and there is nothing
going on. It is like as it was before.”
One respondent notes:
“I was saying that the vote will make a change to people that
are already living that life, not to us people living here in the
location.”
79
There was not a single positive comment with regards to the potential
inluence of voting on government services within the focus groups consisting of unemployed participants.
Young people further seem to be uninterested in information and news
about politics or political activity. When asked if news about political
actions interest them, 34.6% of survey respondents said yes. Similarly
when asked about interest in politics or the government as a media topic
only 37.9% of survey respondents are interested. This could be related
to responses to questions about the necessity of the media for citizens to
be engaged in society. Almost ive out of ten respondents (47.3%) agree
with the statement the media (especially news media) are not necessary
for citizens to be engaged in South Africa. One can relate these indings
to the discussion in the literature review on the complexity between
media consumption, information gathering and civic engagement. Researchers do not agree on how this relationship inluences young people, and the results of the study also seem to show some challenges to
traditional views regarding consumption and action.
80
ConCLUsIon AnD ReCoMMenDAtIons
The extensive amount of data collected through the surveys, focus groups
and content analysis have resulted in interesting and sometimes surprising results with which to examine the relationship between the youth,
civic identity, civic engagement and the media. As discussed in the literature review, the relationship between media consumption (particularly
traditional news media) and civic engagement has often been taken for
granted. The aim of the study is to examine this relationship more closely
within the South African context and to probe further the nuanced relationship between the media and young people in relation to the public
sphere and their place within it. The indings illustrate that although there
are strong correlations across the diferent variables chosen for the survey results (age, location, occupation, income, race, school, education),
some disparities are emerging. One example of such a disparity is relatively high levels of voting amongst many youth respondents reported in
the survey, but low levels of trust in public and political institutions.
What is most evident from the data is the mistrust of politics and political processes amongst the South African youth. The indings also generally show that youth are uninterested in politics as a topic for media
consumption. This disinterest has implications for the identity of young
South Africans who are disengaged from political activity (although voting patterns seem relatively high). The indings suggest that if the South
African government and other political institutions want to engage with
the youth they would need to consider inserting political information in
the kinds of media that young people are interested in, and media they
enjoy using the most. The National Youth Policy is one key strategy for
engaging youth in civic and political life if it were able to harness trends
of media access and media use among young people. The youth policy
acknowledges for example that young people have the right to ‘access
information which is age appropriate’ (2009: 19), but does not provide
information on how this can be achieved and how to go beyond age appropriateness to context appropriateness. A key inding in this study is
that young people feel the media are not relevant to them. Generating
relevant media that engage young people could be set as a key objective
by agencies such as the National Youth Development Agency and the
Media Development and Diversity Agency.
81
While young people use traditional and some new media for gathering
news and information, there is a strong sense from the results that the
youth do not feel that the media are relevant to them. In order to make
politics and civic engagement more integral to the identity of young
people the media need to be made relevant to the youth in the genres
that they enjoy most (soap operas and situation comedies). Baum (2003)
argues that one way of attracting viewers (in this case young viewers) to
certain topics (such as policy or politics) is to use ‘soft news’. Soft news
is deined as information that is entertaining and personally useful to
the recipient, as opposed to hard news which is argued to be news of a
breaking event which involved major issues or ‘disruptions in the routines o daily life’ (Baum & Jamison, 2011:122). Participatory media may
also be a strategy for engaging with young people and producing media
that is relevant to their lives. Community radio stations in South Africa
have been using participatory methods in engaging young people in the
content production for some time. This could be expanded as a possible
avenue for engaging young people on civic and political issues32.
The indings show that it would be in the interest of the media and especially the news media, to target more content towards young South
Africans. This is particularly true of Black African and Indian/Coloured
youth who feel strongly about the need for youth content in newspapers.
The content analysis shows that ‘the media’s tone of reporting on the
youth became increasingly negative during 2012 and coverage was mostly problem-focused’. Comments from focus group participants show that
this is regarded as a shortcoming in attracting youth to the media. The
indings further show a need for more contextualised coverage of young
people. This could make young people feel that they are being addressed
in a positive way and it could help young people understand their world
better. The National Youth Policy identiies six ‘priority target groups’
(2009: 1) among the youth: young women, youth with disabilities, unemployed youth, school-aged out-of-school youth, youth in rural areas, and
youth at risk. Interaction with these groups can be used to guide policy
makers, civil organisations, public institutions and the media to target
young people in a more nuanced way than is currently the case.
32
A shortcoming of the survey questionnaire was not to consider community radio as a source of
news, information, entertainment or communication.
82
The results of this study illustrate that young people across South Africa
need support in developing a civic identity. NGOs, the National Youth
Development Agency, government departments, and private companies
could provide such support. The older generation has emerged as a key
support system for young people in this study. This can be used to great
advantage by educators and other facilitators in thinking creatively
about ways to engage young people (across all key categories) in civic
and political life.
Young people with access to the Internet (whether through their mobile
phones or laptop/PC) are using this resource to ind information that
is relevant to them. This is an avenue for further engagement with the
youth if levels of access, literacy, afordability and usage are increased.
This is particularly true for Black African youth, unemployed youth and
youth with little or no schooling. Access to Internet resources will allow
young people to control the content they receive, ind information and
news that is relevant to their context and perhaps even generate content of their own that can be shared by other youth. Young people make
up a large majority of the South African population, and while voting
igures are relatively high in these survey results, the lack of trust and
engagement with political activity by young people should be worrying
for government and civil society. The use of new media and mobile media such as SMS can be a powerful tool for engaging and empowering
young people to be active citizens.
Media literacy is another issue emerging as a possible key to encourage
political and civic engagement. The word ‘media’ does not occur in the
National Youth Policy document. The closest is the occasional reference
to ICTs. For example, increasing young people’s access to ICTs is seen
as one of the ways in which opportunities for young people can be enhanced through involvement in political and civic activities (2009:31).
The policy document mentions ICT peer education as among the youth’s
responsibilities and proposes that young people should “engage in peer
to peer education to promote youth development in areas such as literacy, use of information and communication technology, healthy lifestyles
to prevent no communicable [sic] diseases like HIV and AIDS and others,
violence prevention and peace building” (2009: 20).
83
The use of search engines, and other online media do play a role in news
awareness amongst some South African youth. It is also evident that
because of the lack of relevance in traditional media, those who can are
using online sources to gather information and news that is relevant to
them. The government, educational institutions and NGOs could promote online media as a resource for young people to gain news and
information that could build their civic identity. More young South Africans should have more access to not only the technology, but also the
skills and education required to use media technologies as a resource to
learn more about themselves and the world they live in.
It is evident from the content analysis that the media’s tone of reporting
on the youth became increasingly negative during 2012 and coverage
was mostly problem-focused. The ramiications of Apartheid on the development of the youth are evident in media coverage. The press focused increasingly on unemployment, inequality as well as the situation
of the poor. Growing debate regarding the social situation of the youth
resulted in greater scrutiny of access to, and the quality of, education.
There is an increasing perception that education is in crisis. The stampede at the University of Johannesburg, the Eastern Cape education crisis as well as the Limpopo books scandal contributed towards growing
concern of an education crisis. The Youth Wage Subsidy received much
debate during 2012. The media reported that the ANC-led government
had backpedalled on the Youth Wage Subsidy so as to win back Cosatu’s
favour. Cosatu strongly opposed the Youth Wage Subsidy and was in
favour of a job seekers grant. The outcome of the debate has not yet
been fully determined.
The high levels of trust of the media in general, particularly amongst
Black African and unemployed youth, may point to the need for better
media literacy and better understanding of the manner in which the media as an institution operates within broader society. Young people are
also perhaps not literate in the manner in which the media can be used
to inform their civic actions (Firestone 2010). The failure of the media
to be a resource for young people’s evolving civic and political identity
and the lack of mention of media in national, and local policy documents which are targeted at the youth, should be a key point of focus for
those who work with young people. It is evident that young people use
84
a range of media to build their civic identities, that they use the media
to access news, and that the media is strongly trusted by most South
African youth. The Media Development and Diversity Agency, which engages with community media across the country, should be required to
engage more with young people and encourage recipients of its funding
to target young people.
It is evident that young people use a range of media to build their civic
identities, that they use the media to access news, and that the media is
strongly trusted by the youth surveyed. The Media Development and Diversity Agency, which engages with community media across the country, should be required to engage more with young people and encourage recipients of its funding to target young people.
85
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APPenDICes
APPenDIX one
survey Questionnaire
sAnPAD QUestIonnAIRe
A. DeMoGRAPHICs
Age:
Gender:
Female
1
Male
2
Other
3
Refused to answer
4
B. soCIAL enGAGeMent/soCIAL InteRests
3.
over the last 12 months, in which of the following activities have you
participated or been involved in? Answer yes or no.
Given money to a charity or community group
1
Volunteered for a charity or community group
2
Helped a neighbour
3
Been active in a political party
4
Been active in a youth movement
5
Been active in a trade union organisation
6
Been involved in religious activities
7
Been actively involved in a social group
(sports team, cultural organisation)
8
Been part of a student council or any kind of elected student body
9
Participated in a public demonstration
10
Signed a petition (online or other)
11
Attended a debate on a social/political issue
12
Attempted to address a social problem
13
96
4.
Written an email or a letter to a newspaper or magazine to express your
opinion on an issue
14
Posted your views to an online group or blog (Twitter, Facebook) about a
community or social/political issue
15
Visited online forums about issues
(e.g. discussion forums, YouTube or picture galleries)
16
None of the above
17
Did you vote in the most recent elections?
Yes1
no0
no, I was not old
enough2
National election
Local government (municipal) election
Refuse to answer
5.
Do you intend to vote in the next election?
Yes1
no0
National election
Local government (municipal) election
Refuse to answer
6.
How much trust do you have in the following?
A great deal1
Local government
Provincial government
National government
Local party elections
Political parties
Public institutions (eg. Dpt
of Home Afairs, Telkom,
Post Oice)
Private companies
Police
Legal system
97
Quite a lot2
Not very
much3
Not at all4
Parliament
Religious institutions
Labour unions
Older generation
Television news
Newspapers
Radio news
Social media
Magazines
7.
Which of the following media topics are of particular InteRest to you? Answer
yes or no.
Popular culture (music, fashion/beauty, movies, television, entertainment,
celebrity events, news, gossip; scandals)
1
Cultural/arts events and news (art, dance, drama, theatre, opera, books)
2
Sports
3
Health/ exercise/keeping it/diet
4
Social injustices/people or causes I can help
5
Political actions/activism
6
Politics/government
7
Local news/current events
8
National news/current events
9
International news/current events
10
Breaking news
11
Business and inance
12
Technology/computers/gadgets
13
Environmental issues/climate change
14
HIV/Aids
15
Education
16
Personals/dating/relationships
17
Comedy/humour
18
Electronic games/video games/online games
19
Careers/job-hunting
20
Religion
21
Human interest
22
98
8. Which of the following issues are you most concerned about?
Very
concerned1
Concerned2
Undecided3
Somewhat
concerned4
Not
concerned5
Education
Health eg HIV/
Aids
Housing
Economy eg
unemployment,
cost of living
Service delivery
Crime and safety
and security eg.
corruption, rape,
violence against
women
Lack of social
amenities for
young people
C. MeDIA Use
9.
Which media do you use to get the information/entertainment you are
interested in? tick all that apply
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc)
1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc)
2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops
3
Local online news sites
4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera)
5
Google and other search engines
6
Social media
7
Radio news
8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc)
9
South African TV news
10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.)
11
International TV (DSTV)
12
Magazines
13
Other: name
14
99
10. Which media do you normally use to obtain news? tick all that apply.
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc)
1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc)
2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops
3
Local online news sites
4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera)
5
Google and other search engines
6
Social media
7
Radio news
8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc)
9
South African TV news
10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.)
11
International TV (DSTV)
12
Magazines
13
Other: name
14
11. Which media do you normally use to get information on entertainment and lifestyle (eg. fashion, food, travel)? tick all that apply.
Mainstream newspapers (Star, Cape Times, etc)
1
Tabloid newspaper (Sun, Son etc)
2
Local community newspapers/knock and drops
3
Local online news sites
4
International online news sites (Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al Jazeera)
5
Google and other search engines
6
Social media
7
Radio news
8
Other radio (talk shows, morning live etc)
9
South African TV news
10
South African TV entertainment (soaps, Soul City etc.)
11
International TV (DSTV)
12
Magazines
13
Other
14
100
12. From the list below tick the 3 that you enjoy most?
Soap operas (radio/TV)
1
News
2
Documentaries
3
Reality shows
4
Situation comedies (sitcoms)
5
Fictional stories
6
Special interest blogs
7
Internet/video games
8
Advice and self-help (magazines or online)
9
Celebrity news
10
Analysis and commentary on current events
11
Opinion columns (in either newspapers or magazines)
12
D. MeDIA AnD teCHnoLoGY
13. to what extent do you think the following media are doing a good or bad job
regarding the reporting of news?
Very good1
Good2
Mainstream
newspapers (Star, Cape
Times, etc)
Tabloid newspapers
(Sun, Son etc)
Local community
newspapers/knock and
drops
Local online news sites
International online
news sites (Guardian,
BBC World, CNN, Al
Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk
shows, morning live
etc)
101
Okay3
Not very
good4
Bad5
South African TV news
International TV (DSTV)
Magazines
14. to what extent do you the following media are doing a good or bad job
regarding the reporting of entertainment and lifestyle?
Very
good1
Good2
Okay3
Not very
good4
Bad5
Mainstream newspapers (Star,
Cape Times, etc)
Tabloid newspapers (Sun, Son
etc)
Local community newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online news sites
International online news sites
(Guardian, BBC World, CNN, Al
Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk shows,
morning live etc)
South African TV news
South African TV entertainment
(soaps, Soul City etc.)
International TV (DSTV)
Magazines
15. Which of the following do you Use regularly—at least once a week? tick all that
apply.
Radio
1
TV
2
Paid printed newspapers
3
Free printed newspapers
4
Basic cellphone
5
Smart phone (Blackberry, iPhone, Android)
6
MXit
7
Facebook
8
102
Twitter
9
SMS
9
Other social media
10
Tablet PC (iPad, Galaxy)
11
MP3 player (iPod etc)
12
Music/video downloading / sharing sites
13
Digital camera/video camera
15
Video games (games console)
16
Desktop computer with internet connection
17
Desktop computer without internet connection
18
Laptop computer with mobile/internet connection
19
Laptop computer without mobile/internet
connection
20
Online local news sites
21
Online international news sites
22
Google and other search engines
23
Blogs/ forums
24
YouTube, Flickr and similar
25
Facebook, LinkedIn
26
Wikipedia
27
16. on a scale of 0 to 10, how interested are you in keeping up with news and
current events as covered on tV, radio, certain internet websites, and
newspapers?
Scale 0 to 10
(not at all to extremely interested)
1
17. In an average day, how much time do you spend keeping up with news and
current events?
None
1
15 minutes or less
2
16-30 minutes
3
31-60 minutes
4
More than 1 up to 2 hours
5
More than 2 hours
6
103
18. `Where does your understanding of the following issues come from?
Education
Health (eg.
HIV/ Aids)
Housing
Mainstream
newspapers
(Star, Cape
Times, etc)
Tabloid
newspaper
(Sun, Son etc)
Local
community
newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online
news sites
International
online news
sites (Guardian,
BBC World, CNN,
Al Jazeera)
Radio news
Other radio (talk
shows, morning
live etc)
South African TV
news
South African TV
entertainment
(soaps, Soul City
etc.)
International TV
(DSTV)
Magazines
104
Politics
Crime,
safety and
security
(eg. rape,
violence
against
women,
corruption,
etc)
The
economy
(eg.
unemployment, cost
of living)
19. How good a job are the media doing in covering the following issues?
Very good1
Good2
Not very
good3
Bad4
Education
Health eg HIV/Aids
Housing
Economy (eg. cost of living,
unemployment
Service delivery
Crime and safety and security
(eg. corruption, rape and
violence against women,
corruption)
Issues that afect youth in
particular
20. We are trying to understand how you view diferent news and information
sources. How do you ind the following media? Answer yes or no.
They are
credible/
trustworthy1
They
provide
in-depth
coverage2
Mainstream
newspapers
(Star, Cape
Times, etc)
Tabloid
newspaper
(Sun, Son etc)
Local
community
newspapers/
knock and drops
Local online
news sites
International
online news
sites (Guardian,
BBC World, CNN,
Al Jazeera)
Radio news
105
They cover
a range of
issues3
They
provide
information
relevant to
me4
They are
enjoyable to
use5
Other radio (talk
shows, morning
live etc)
South African TV
news
South African TV
entertainment
(soaps, Soul City
etc.)
International TV
(DSTV)
Magazines
Other
21. We are trying to understand how you view of diferent entertainment and
lifestyle sources. Please select all the attributes that apply to each of these
media:
They are
credible/
trustworthy1
They
provide
in-depth
coverage2
Mainstream
newspapers
(Star, Cape
Times, etc)
Tabloid
newspapers
(Sun, Son etc)
Local
community
newspapers/
knock and
drops
Local online
news sites
106
They cover
a range of
issues3
They
provide
information
relevant to
me4
They are
enjoyable to
use5
International
online news
sites (Guardian,
BBC World,
CNN, Al
Jazeera)
Google and
other search
engines
Social media
Radio news
Other radio
(talk shows,
morning live
etc)
South African
TV news
South
African TV
entertainment
(soaps, Soul
City etc.)
International TV
(DSTV)
Magazines
22. Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
Strongly
agree1
If you’re well informed about current
events/ news/social issues you get
ahead in your school and in your
career
If you’re well informed about current
events/ news/social issues you are
respected by others
I regularly discuss news/current
events/social issues with my friends
I regularly discuss news/current
events/social issues with my family
I discuss news/current events/social
issues on blogs, webforums, etc
107
Agree2
Disagree3
Strongly
disagree4
23. What would make the media more relevant to you? Answer yes or no.
I shouldn’t have to go to much trouble to access the media
1
The media should include more coverage of people my age
2
The media should include more positive coverage of people my age
3
The media should include more coverage BY people my age
4
The articles would help me do better in my education and career
5
The media would help me better understand the world I live in
6
None of the above
7
24. Please tell us which of the following statements apply to you?
1
Much of the news is not relevant to me
2
In our home we watch TV news almost on a
daily basis
3
Following the news is important for your
general knowledge
4
News is mostly dull
5
The news media are often unnecessarily
negative
6
News should be less about problems and
more about solutions
7
News media are often biased
8
In our home a newspaper is read almost on
a daily basis
9
I ind newspapers something for old people
10
News consumers are more likely to be
engaged citizens
11
Every newspaper should have a youth page
12
Entertainment is more relevant to me than
news
13
25. Are you a south African citizen?
Yes
1
No
0
108
26. If you answered no to question 4, what is your nationality?
27. Please indicate in which of the Apartheid racial categories you would
have been placed prior to 1994*33
Black
1
Indian
2
Coloured
3
White
4
Refused to answer
5
28. What type of school was the last one you attended?
Ex-Model C (well-resourced South African Public School)
1
Township school (under-resourced South African Public School)
2
Private
3
Other
(please specify)
4
29. Which of the following best describes where you live?
Large city
1
Small town
2
Rural area
3
30. What is the highest level of education of parent/guardian (one parent,
whichever is highest)
None to some schooling
1
Matric/Grade 12
2
Technical college certiicate (trade qualiication)
3
University certiicate, diploma or degree (professional qualiication)
4
*33We are aware that the use of these racial categories is controversial and apologise to
those who might take ofence. However, although socially constructed, these apartheidera racial categories remain an important social reality for most South Africans and
remain indicative of life chances and experiences.
109
31. What is your highest level of education?
None to some schooling
1
Matric/Grade 12
2
Technical college certiicate (trade qualiication)
3
University certiicate, diploma or degree (professional qualiication)
4
32. Monthly household income
Less than R1500
1
Between R1501 and R3300
2
Between R3301 and R9000
3
Between R9001 and R21000
4
More than R21001
5
I don’t know
6
33. Which of the following best describes your current situation?
In school
1
FET/college
2
University
3
Working part-time
4
Working full-time
5
Unemployed
6
110
APPenDIX tWo
Focus group discussions moderator’s guide
– eastern Cape and Gauteng
Let’s begin with where you live:
1.
Thinking about the problems you face as young people today, which is the most
important problem you face?
a. Do you think there is something you can do about these problems? What?
2.
Do you think the information you get from the news media is useful to give you a
better understanding of these problems?
a. What is most useful about this information?
b. What is least useful about the information?
3.
Can you recall anything you have read in the newspaper, heard on the radio,
watched on television or read on social media that made you want to go out and
do something about it?
a. What did you do?
b. Did you use the media to help you do this?
c. Did you ask your friends or others who live in your community to help you?
4.
If you want to do something about a problem in this community / neighbourhood
how would you ind out if there are other people who would join you?
now let’s talk a bit about your experience with elections and political meetings:
5.
Think of the last time you voted in an election – either local or national
government – what or who helped you most in deciding which party to vote for?
6.
Have you ever attended or participated in a meeting with politicians – nationally
or locally?
a. Did that experience motivate you to get more involved in politics?
7.
Have you ever participated in a community meeting about problems facing this
community?
a. Did that experience motivate you to get more involved in your community?
8.
Do you think that your vote will improve the quality of government services? (like
education, or health care or roads or housing)
111
now I would like to talk about ways in which you get and share information
9.
Do you think there is enough information in the news media that is of interest to
young people?
a. What would you like to see more of? Why?
b. What would you like to see less of? Why?
10. What media that you use do you trust most? Why?
a. Do you trust the news in tabloid newspapers like The Sun or The Daily Voice?
Why?
And the last two questions:
11. What do you think are the responsibilities of younger citizens, like yourselves, in
South Africa?
a. What do you think it is that newspapers or the radio or television or social
media can do to help young people do that?
12. Could you live without newspapers, or the radio, or television or social media?
Why?
112
APPenDIX tHRee
Details of focus group discussions
Focus group 1 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants:
9
Age groups:
15-17
No of males:
5
No. of females:
4
Focus group 2 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants:
10
Age groups:
18 - 23
No of males:
4
No. of females:
6
Focus group 3 – Kwazulu-Natal
No of participants:
9
Age groups:
23 - 30
Focus group 4 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
5
No. of females:
2
Focus group 5 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
4
No. of females:
3
Focus group 6 – Eastern Cape (Grahamstown)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
5
No. of females:
2
113
Focus group 7 – Eastern Cape (Alice)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
6
No. of females:
1
Focus group 8 – Eastern Cape (Alice)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No. of females:
7
Focus group 9 – Eastern Cape (East London)
No of participants:
8
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
3
No. of females:
5
Focus group 10 – Eastern Cape (EL)
No of participants:
8
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
6
No. of females:
2
Focus group 11 – Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth)
No of participants:
6
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
6
Focus group 12 – Eastern Cape (PE)
No of participants:
7
Age groups:
18-36
No of males:
5
No. of females:
2
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Focus group 13 – Gauteng (Johannesburg)
No of participants:
6
Age groups:
18-25
No of males:
2
No. of females:
4
Focus group 14 – Gauteng (Johannesburg)
No of participants:
5
Age groups:
26-36
No of males:
2
No. of females:
3
115