" What If They All Start Demanding It? " Online Presence of Circassian, Kurdish and Laz Associations Advocating Linguistic Rights

“What If They All Start Demanding It?” Online Presence of Circassian, Kurdish and Laz Associations Advocating Linguistic Rights Gülşah TÜRK Yıldız Technical University Introduction Citizens of Turkey speak a variety of languages as their mother tongues while the medium of education is Turkish. Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities have minority status as a result of Lausanne Treaty and ­ even though their schools experience unique problems ­ they have the right to use their languages as means of education. Other linguistic minorities cannot receive education in a public institution in their mother tongue. The 42​nd​ article of the 1982 constitution states that “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education”. Despite differences in the conditions of these linguistic minorities, almost all of them placed the right to mother­tongue in their agenda from 1990s onwards, a decade identified with identity politics not only in Turkey but around the world. Especially Kurds but also the Laz and the Circassians are among the most vocal in terms of linguistic rights. This paper aims to analyze the place given to the right to mother­tongue education within these associations and their use of the Internet and social media while promoting the language. Background Despite being the successor of the multi­ethnic and multi­lingual Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the new born Republic of Turkey was​ based on ​Turkishness, which prevented the recognition of any ethnic / linguistic minorities within. The only exception was the non­Muslim minorities whose right to mother tongue education was recognized in the 40​th ​Article of the Lausanne Treaty (Eraydın, 2008, p. 167). As a result, Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities in Turkey were able to open schools and give / receive education in their languages. However; as these are not public schools but rather supported by communities themselves, it can be said that the Republic of Turkey has not yet offered its citizens education in their mother tongues. Even though there was no law that prohibited any language in education in the 1924 Constitution, the Law of Unification of Education​ (​Tevhid­i Tedrisat Kanunu) that passed on 3​rd ​March 1924 aimed at a centralized education system whose means of education was Turkish. As Hüseyin Sadoğlu (2010) in his book on language policies in Turkey states, there was no official discussion on the rights of Muslim citizens to mother tongue education (p. 289). He claims that ​ this policy aimed at ​Turkifying the Muslim ethnic groups. As in the 1924 Constitution, 1961 Constitution, as well, had no reference to supporting or prohibiting mother tongue education in languages other than Turkish. The multilingual composition of the society, however, had not disappeared. The censuses conducted by the state continued asking its citizens their mother tongues until 1985 (a ​ recent publication by Aslan ​et al. (2015, p. 65) points out that the data on this item after the 1965 census are not shared with researchers). According to these data obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute, there were at least 21 languages accepted as their mother tongues by citizens of Turkey. This number cannot have significantly decreased to this day since a more recent survey by KONDA (2006, p. 19) lists more than 15 mother tongues (the exact Gülşah TÜRK number of the languages is not given as some languages are grouped under certain categories such as Caucasian, Balkan or Turkic languages). In the 1982 Constitution, which was drafted after the 1980 ​coup d’état, education in any of these languages was prohibited to prevent any such demands. Article 42 of the constitution states that “​No language other than Turkish shall be taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens ​ at any institutions of teaching or education” (MRG Report, 2009). Despite ­ or as a result of ­ these restrictions on any open claims to and recognition of ethnic identities, ethnic associations started to proliferate starting from the second half of the 1980s. In his article on the immigrant associations in Turkey, Alexandre Toumarkine (2002) claims that non­Turkish associations gained more flexibility in the softer political climate during the presidency of Turgut Özal, who recognized the cultural Kurdish identity (p. 427). This cannot be named as the only factor as the world in the 1990s saw a rise of identity politics based on ethnicity after the end of the Cold War, which had polarized the world thus far. The increase in the number of ethnic associations in Turkey did not necessarily mean any change in state policies regarding languages. Language policy changes, however, did arrive with Turkey­EU relations. Helsinki Summit that took place in 1999 lead to reforms in human rights and democratization, which involved legal changes concerning languages other than Turkish (Eraydın, 2008, 170). The first of these legal changes was the “​Regulation on the teaching of traditional languages ​ and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” in 2003. Through this regulation, opening private courses to teach languages other than Turkish was now possible. Even though the first private language course in Kurdish was opened in 2004, these courses experienced many practical problems. The next move towards the teaching of these languages was the introduction of the elective language classes under the title “​living languages and dialects” in 2012. For now, these classes cover Kurdish, Lazuri, Georgian, Adyghe and Abkhaz language. In 2014 three private schools to give education in Kurdish were opened by the 1 initiatives of NGOs and political parties ​, and have not yet gained official status. Throughout this process, many cultural associations actively advocated the right to mother tongue education and took active part in the promotion and realization of the legal changes. Even though Kurds were the pioneers and the most vocal among the ethnic groups to demand linguistic rights including the right to mother tongue education, almost all linguistic minorities currently have associations / organizations that are actively demanding their rights. Some examples include Istanbul Kurdish Institute, Kurdî­Der, Kurd­Kav (Kurdish Culture and Research Association), Laz Institute, Laz Cultural Association, HADIG (Hemshin Culture Research Association), KAFFED (Federation of the Caucasian Associations), Georgian Culture House (​Gürcü Kültür Evi), SUDEF (Federation of Syriac Associations). Methodology Within the scope of this study, it would be difficult to analyze all associations established by ethnic groups in Turkey. Therefore, associations founded by three linguistic groups ­ Kurds, the Laz and the Circassians have been chosen for analysis. Kurds were simply chosen because they are the largest linguistic community in Turkey after Turks. They are also the first to actively demand linguistic rights. Even though the Laz and the Circassians are not significantly larger than many other communities, they have been more active and visible regarding linguistic rights. (Arabic speakers are the second largest linguistic minority after Kurdish speakers; however, their 1 ​http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/kurtce­egitim­verecek­okullar­acildi 2 Gülşah TÜRK situation is not as relevant to the purpose of this paper). The paper will first provide an historical overview of the cultural associations founded by these three groups in the last two decades, explain how they have positioned themselves in the struggle for linguistic rights and look at the strategies they have used to advocate the right to mother tongue education. Then, the Websites and / or social media accounts of these associations will be analyzed to be able to see how these groups have been using the Internet and the social media for their causes and what the present discourse is. Kurdish Associations for Linguistic Rights Kurdish speakers ­ together with Zazaki speakers ­ constitute at least 13% of the population in Turkey (KONDA, 2006). However, their struggle for the right to mother­tongue education is not only significant because of the relatively high number of Kurdish speakers in the country but also for the armed struggle it is associated with. Interestingly, Nesrin Uçarlar (2009) points out in her work on Kurdish linguistic rights that the armed group PKK did not give much priority to linguistic rights. There were actually other groups that advocated linguistic rights more actively in the 1960s­70s such as PSK (the Party of Socialist Kurdistan) (p. 215). From 1990s onwards, however, cultural associations that prioritize linguistic rights have been established. Istanbul Kurdish Institute, which was established on 18 April 1992 (Uçarlar, 2009, p. 145) is one of them. Their aim is stated as “provid[ing] research on Kurdish language, literature and history, and to contribute to the standardisation of the Kurdish language” (p. 145). In 1996, another organization Kürt­Kav (Kurd­Kav ­ Kurdish Foundation for Culture and Research) was founded with the purpose of “carrying out research on fundamental rights and freedoms, research and investigation in the areas of the Kurdish language, culture, and history, and activities contributing to the solution of health problems and the development of sports” (p. 146). Even though they had not been legally recognized until 1996, they opened the first Kurdish 2 language course in 1993, which was closed down shortly after. ​ The foundation has experienced certain internal problems that prevented it from being as influential as the others. In 2006, the director of Istanbul Kurdish Institute, Sami Tan, and his friends initiated TZP Kurdî (Kurdish Education and Language Movement) (p. 227). This initiative works through certain institutions, one of which is naturally Istanbul Kurdish Institute. Diyarbakır Kurdish Institute and Kurdî­Der also work within the Movement. Kurdî­Der (Association for the Research and Development of Kurdish language) was founded in Diyarbakır in 2007 and it also aims to increase the use of the language within the community. For this purpose, both the Institute in Istanbul and Kurdî­Der have opened language courses in Kurmancî and Zazakî, and teacher trainings. The language courses use the book HINKER, which was prepared by the Institute. The movement celebrated 3 the International Mother Language Day on 21​st ​February in 2011 ​ and has continued to do so since then. TZP Kurdî and its constituent institutions did not approve of the elective courses that were introduced to the public school curricula as they saw this as a merely symbolic move and demanded the right to mother­tongue education. They did not participate in the preparation of the books to be used in these courses (the books were prepared by Mardin Artuklu University). To protest the elective courses, the Kurdish political party of the time BDP (Peace and Democracy 4 Party) called for a school boycott in 2013 ​, which turned into an annual protest strategy. The 2 3 4 ​http://rudaw.net/turkish/interview/02042015 ​http://www.yuksekovahaber.com/haber/dunya­anadil­gunu­kutlaniyor­46460.htm ​http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/09/16/hakkaride.anadilde.egitim.icin.okul.boykotu/723609.0/ 3 Gülşah TÜRK 5 same call was repeated the following year by many organizations including Kurdî­Der ​. TZP Kurdî also pioneered the foundation of three Kurdish schools, which have not gained official status yet. Despite the initial neglect of cultural rights by PKK, the efforts to teach Kurdish language have increased and the demands for the right to mother tongue education have been expressed through these associations. The symbolic moves by the state are not accepted and even condemned. Linguistic rights, for most Kurds, are highly political as the recognition of their language is related to the recognition of the Kurdish identity. Laz Cultural Associations A report by the Minority Rights Group states that there are between 750.000 ­ 1.5 million Laz living in the country (MRG, 2009). The number of Lazuri (Laz language) speakers, however, is probably lower. KONDA report (2006) estimates it as approximately 0,12% of the adult population today. The Laz in Germany could be said to have pioneered the Laz language movement. The Lazuri alphabet based on the Latin alphabet was developed in Germany in 1984 (Koçiva, 2014, p. 75). Laz culture movement that had its roots in Kaçkar Culture Association founded in Germany in 1992 and the LAZEBURA Association in 1997 (p. 81). The attempt to found a Laz Culture Institute or Association in Turkey in 1992 had to be postponed for the reaction it received from the press (Yılmaz, 2015). However, the OGNI magazine in Lazuri and Turkish came out as a result of this process. One of the earliest organizations, SIMA Association established in İzmit in 1996 does not address the Laz identity openly. In 2000s many others were established with a clear Laz identity emphasis. Laz Culture Association in 2008, Laz Culture and Solidarity Association (Ankara) in 2009, Lazika Publishing Collective in 2010 and Laz Institute in 2013 all work for the survival of Laz language. Also in 2010 Lazuri School (Lazuri Mektebi) started a project for education in Laz language (Koçiva, 2014, p. 81). However, Laz culture movement has been highly fractured. Even though LAZEBURA Association have been active in demanding cultural rights such as publishing a statement on Laz language and culture in 2011, Koçiva (2014) expresses the lack of cooperation among these organizations (p. 82). In contrast with the politicized nature of the Kurdish linguistic rights movement, Laz movement is mostly trying to stay away from any ‘political demands’. In his article comparing Kurdish and Laz movements, Zeki Sarıgil (2012) includes the comments of Laz activists on the nature of their movement. Gülay Burhan, the chairperson of SIMA, emphasizes that “the Laz people identify themselves primarily as Turks and secondarily as Laz”. Mehmedali Barış Beşli from Laz Cultural Association states that they are “only concerned with the protection and promotion of the Laz language and culture” and Aytekin Lokumcu from the Laz Culture and Solidarity Association claims that they “do not have any demands or needs such as education in Lazuri” (pp. 270­271). Although these views do not represent the perspectives of the whole movement, it is clear that there is a tendency to define the movement as ‘merely cultural’. These associations organize language courses and publish books in the language. Laz Institute also took active part in the preparation of the curriculum of the elective courses in Lazuri and the books to be used in 6 the courses ​. For the International Mother Language Day, Laz Culture Association organized a 7 concert in 2011 ​ and it has been being celebrated by Laz activists since then. What seems to define the Laz culture and language movement has been the internal problems among 5 6 7 ​http://www.imctv.com.tr/41671/2014/09/yeni­egitim­ogretim­yili­okul­boykotu­ile­basliyor/ ​http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al­jazeera­ozel/lazca­ders­kitabi­yolda ​http://www.lazuri.com/tkvani_ncarepe2/lazuri_ambari_14022011_lkd_nananena_canda.html 4 Gülşah TÜRK organizations and mainly two stands, one demanding the recognition of a Laz identity and language and another having a tendency to identify with their identity at a more cultural rather than at a political level. Circassian Associations Circassians in Turkey mostly speak Adyghe and Abkhaz languages. According to KONDA report (2006), 0,11% of the adult population refer to their mother­tongues as Circassian. In his work on the Circassian diaspora in Turkey, Ayhan Kaya (2011) states that the terms ‘Caucasian’ or ‘North Caucasia’ had to be used in the public sphere for decades instead of ‘Circassian’, especially in the names of the organizations, for this word had negative connotations for the Republican political elite, who defined the Circassians as ‘traitors’ or ‘reactionaries’ (pp. 100­101). After the 1980 coup, Kaya points at the existence of two camps, one aligned with the dominant Turk­Islam synthesis and identifying itself as ‘Circassian­Turk’ while others emphasized their Circassian identity (pp. 104­105). This bears resemblance to the two main stands the Laz also take. As in the case of the Laz associations, the 1990s saw the foundation of Circassian cultural associations. Even though there had been Circassian associations before (Dost Eli Solidarity Association ­ 1946 and North Caucasian Culture Association ­ 1964) (p. 106) , the ones established in 1990s had more emphasis on identity. Main organizations were the Kafkas Association (Kaf­Der) founded in 1993 and Kafkas Foundation and United Caucasian Association founded in 1995 (pp. 106­107). Both Kaya (2011) and Taymaz (2001) point out that Circassian associations take on a more multiculturalist view with the EU process in 2000s. Before the legal changes on the teaching of mother tongues, 8 Circassians announced their demands for linguistic rights ​. Especially Kaf­Der, which is now KAFFED (Federation of Caucasian Association), seems to advocate the linguistic rights more actively. For this purpose, KAFFED organizes language courses and trains language teachers through its constituent associations. The federation also took active part in the preparation of the elective language course curriculum for the public schools. A recent development, however, has sparked a crisis among Circassian associations. ADDER (Adyghe Language Association), which was established in 2012, developed a Latin alphabet for the language which originally uses 9 Cyrillic alphabet ​. The association, then, prepared a new curriculum and materials to be used in 10 the elective courses, which KAFFED did not approve of ​. Despite this disagreement, most Circassian associations seem to be supportive of linguistic rights. As Kurdish and Laz associations did in 2011, the Circassian Association in Bursa organized a demonstration for the 11 right to mother­tongue education on International Mother Language Day ​. This day have gained more importance for all the linguistic groups and been celebrated with different activities and organizations since then. Online Presence For the social movements it is important to make use of the Internet and especially the social media to popularize their cause, get support and publicity. Social media accounts are also useful to mobilize people and organize mass events. Associations working for linguistic rights in ​http://www.bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/14055­cerkesler­anadilde­ogrenime­hazirlaniyor ​http://www.danef.net/adder_pdf/1417438454_ad.pdf 10 ​http://www.kaffed.org/haberler/federasyondan/item/2584­alfabe­konusunda­zorunlu­açıklama.html 11 ​http://www.bianet.org/biamag/azinliklar/128044­cerkesler­anadilde­egitim­istedi­mart­ta­mitinge­hazirlaniyor 8 9 5 Gülşah TÜRK Turkey also inevitably use social media and the Internet. Almost all organizations analyzed have Facebook and Twitter accounts. The analyzed pages were ​https://twitter.com/enstituyakurdi​ and https://www.facebook.com/enstituyakurdi​ for Kurdish Institute, https://www.facebook.com/amedkurdidernavend​ and ​https://twitter.com/kurdidernavend​ for Kurdi­der, ​https://www.facebook.com/LazEnstitusu​ for Laz Institute https://www.facebook.com/lazkulturdernegi​ and ​https://twitter.com/lazkultur​ for Laz Culture association and ​https://twitter.com/KAFFED​ and https://www.facebook.com/Kafkas.Dernekleri.Federasyonu​ for KAFFED. The aim of this research is to see whether and how the Kurdish, Laz and Circassian cultural associations / institutes use social media to advocate the right to mother­tongue education, interact with the language groups themselves and to interact with the broader public. To this end, I’ve chosen to analyze the Facebook and Twitter accounts of Kurdish Institute and Kurdi­der Amed, Laz Institute and Laz Culture Association, and KAFFED (Federation of Caucasian Associations). First, I’ve compared the number of their followers / fans, number of their tweets, their most retweeted/favorited tweets and most liked/shared posts on Facebook. This is to see whether they are active on social media and whether their activities have wide influence. Kurdish Institute has around 1,700 followers on Twitter and more than 8,000 fans on Facebook while Kurdi­der Amed has more than 6,000 followers on Twitter and around 5,000 fans on Facebook. Both of them have 300­400 tweets each. Considering that they have had these accounts for the last three years, we can say that they tweet once every couple of days. They do not post more frequently on Facebook either. Laz Culture Association has around 250 followers on Twitter and around 2,500 fans on Facebook while Laz Institute has more than 10,000 fans on Facebook. It does not have a Twitter account. Even though Laz Culture has a Twitter account, it had around 60 tweets in the last five years most of which are announcements for events. It also posts once every couple of weeks. KAFFED has around 4,000 followers on Twitter and around 50,000 fans on Facebook. They tweet and post more often than the other organizations with more than 2,000 tweets and daily posts. I will be analyzing the social media accounts of these organizations for their similarities and differences in their discourses regarding language and mother­tongue education and in representations and use of their languages. The organizations and the language communities may be positioning themselves differently in the mother­tongue education debate in Turkey. However, their practices and discourse are mostly shaped by the language policies and the discourse of the Turkish state, the most dominant being monolingualism. While the 42nd Article of the Constitution bans the teaching of any languages other than Turkish as a mother tongue, it hasn’t only rendered any demands for mother­tongue education illegal but also has created a ‘monolingual habitus’ which is defined as “the deep­seated habit of assuming monolingualism as the norm in a nation” (Gogolin, 1997). Not only for the majority Turkish speakers but also for the minority language groups one nation­one language or one culture­one language correspondence has been a norm through the language regime that the state has created. Monolingualism shows itself in different aspects on the pages of these organizations. The Kurdish Institute social media accounts are for the great part in Kurdish (mostly in Kurmanji, occasionally in Zazaki) while Kurdi­der occasionally posts in Turkish as well and sometimes in both languages. Despite the monolingualizing efforts of the Turkish state, there is still a high rate of bilingual Kurdish­Turkish speakers. However, it is also known that literacy in Kurdish is quite low. According to Öpengin’s study (2012) 32% is semi­literate in Kurdish. Broc 6 Gülşah TÜRK states that only 28% of Kurds in Turkey are literate in Kurdish. Therefore, it seems that the Kurdish­only social media accounts have a strategic purpose rather than serving an actual need. These pages create an almost monolingual public space in Kurdish which is the opposite of the imposed monolingual public space in Turkish. While the Kurdish language here appears as a tool of resistance against the language policies of the state, it also creates “linguistic insecurity” (Öpengin, 2012) for those who are not literate or proficient in Kurdish. The comments and responses to the posts on these pages are predominantly Kurdish as well. Even though the users can respond in any language they want, a predominantly monolingual page might be limiting their interaction. (A comment for the post announcing the start of Kurdish courses at the Institute asks whether the education is in Kurdish only and whether someone who only speaks Turkish could learn the language.) The language policies of the state have a visible effect on the social media practices of Laz and Circassian groups as well. As a result of the monolingual education in Turkish, the majority of those who identify themselves as Laz are monolingual Turkish speakers. There are more bilingual Circassian­Turkish speakers (only 6% of the Circassians who took part in Kaya’s study (2011) were monolingual Turkish speakers). However, literacy in the language is vital for the social media use. While for the Laz which is an endangered language, literacy is almost non­existent, there are relatively more literate people in Circassian (around 15% according to Kaya’s study (2011)). The posts of the Laz associations include some phrases in the Laz language, the interaction is predominantly in Turkish. In contrast with the Kurdish Institute and Kurdi­der whose pages names are in Kurdish, their page names are not in Lazuri but in Turkish. For KAFFED the interaction is almost always in Turkish. Even though they retweet some users who write in Adyghe language, they do not post in the language which might be related to the problem of posting in Cyrillic alphabet but it also related to the fact that their followers/fans are mostly not literate in the language. The social media accounts of these organizations are also the sites of identity construction. These three groups construct, produce, reproduce and represent their identities through different strategies. Especially for the Laz and Circassians, identity and the role of the language within that identity is constantly negotiated within the community through their responses to the posts of the organizations. The Kurdish organizations that have been analyzed here do not represent all Kurds so among their followers are those who do identify themselves with them. Even though the primary aim of these pages is to advocate language rights, they do not only post or tweet about language and these pages represent a Kurdish identity constructed through references to colors, traditional clothes, the Newroz holiday, common pains such as bombings and deaths both recent and historical, historical figures most of whom are Kurdish writers or those who shaped the Kurdish language. For instance, the most liked Facebook post by the Kurdish institute is a Newroz celebration and the third most retweeted tweet is the news about an individual killed in Kobane. Kurdi­der’s most retweeted tweet is a picture of a mother from a funeral after a bombing and the other two most retweeted tweets are in support of the people in the Sur region of Diyarbakır. The social media accounts seem to imagine a nation and address them in Kurdish. As Sheyholislami (2010) observes “for many Kurds … Kurdishness is imagined in the Kurdish language”. There is also a reference to ​welat (country) which adds to the imagination of the nation. Several visuals read “our language in our country”, “a free language and an autonomous country”, “a person’s language is their country”. 7 Gülşah TÜRK While these organizations actively work for the functional and most importantly public use of the language by providing language courses, printing books, training language teachers and also opening Kurdish­medium schools in the recent years, the Kurdish language and the alphabet exist on these pages as a symbol of Kurdish identity as well. Language is mostly associated with life, freedom, honor, the (Kurdish) people and the country. Some common phrases used in visuals and in language day events are “There is no life without language”, “Our language is our existence”, “Free language, free existence”, “Kurdish language is sweet and nice”. The Kurdish movement is known to not approve of and to condemn the elective courses as a symbolic move and to demand education in the mother tongue. For this reason the word perwerdehî (education) is commonly used in phrases such as “I want education in my language” and “A language is not a language without education”. As I have mentioned earlier, alphabet is also a strong symbol along with the colors for the representation of the identity. The letters that are present in Kurdish alphabet but not in the Turkish alphabet such as ‘w’, ‘x’ ‘q’ or ‘ê’ are used in the visual images or posters. This is a reference to and a protest of the ban on these letters by the Turkish state. While the Kurdish identity, language and the claims for the language rights are represented through these pages, there are not many comments or responses to their posts or tweets. It seems that the followers of these pages are, as I mentioned before, do not only identify themselves as Kurds but identify themselves with the Kurdish identity as represented on these pages. Therefore, there is no visible negotiation of the identity through interactions within these pages. The negotiation of the identity is more visible on the Laz associations’ pages. As Serdar (2015) claims in her article on ethnic boundary making of the Laz, the Laz identity is constructed through “the particular symbolic usage of language and the narratives of culture, behaviors, humor and life style” while there is no heroic history narratives, colors or flags. Therefore, on the Laz Culture Association page language is represented as a “cultural” element along with Laz music, folklore and traditional clothes while Laz Institute also uses its social media account to raise awareness for the Laz language education and for the language policies of the state as well as to develop literature in Laz language. This would mean politicizing the Laz identity which has mostly survived through de­politicization. However, despite the approach of the organizations to the Laz language and the Laz identity, the comments to their posts display a heated debate on what being Laz means. Serdar (2016) also refers to Lazness as a blurred identity which defines itself as “belonging to the national identity as well as the particular ethnic identity”. This is claimed to function at a vertical and a horizontal level. While a vertical blurred identity means defining oneself primarily as a Turk and secondarily as Laz, a horizontal blurred identity equates Lazness and Turkishness either by highlighting neither of them or by politicizing the Laz identity. The Laz Institute seems to represent the latter but not all of its followers define themselves with it. For instance, under a video to promote the elective Laz courses and which was shared around 2000 times, we can see an example of these two conflicting identifications with Lazness. Those who identify themselves primarily as Turks and secondarily as Laz question and criticize the promotion of Laz language in public schools. The common arguments are that Lazness is already experienced locally, in villages and at home with families and Laz language is spoken in these private spaces while in the public space they are Turkish. Along with the national identity, another significant element that seems to affect how this vertical Laz identity is constructed is the Kurdish movement and politics. Those who criticize efforts of these Laz organizations to promote education in their languages do so by stating that they are not separatists and they do not have Kurdish claims. The discourse used by the Laz Institute, 8 Gülşah TÜRK therefore, do not address a single Laz identity and is often contested. KAFFED social media accounts’ representation of Circassian identity and the negotiation and contestation of certain elements are similar to the case of the Laz Institute in some aspects. However, the most important element that determines the discourse on their pages could be the diasporic identity. Kaya (2004) refers to the networks that the Circassians in Turkey and Caucasus share as “crucial in the formation and the maintenance of a diasporic identity”. This diasporic identity includes the narratives of the homeland and return and also a common historical suffering during the 1864 exile and it is quite significantly represented on the KAFFED social media accounts. Among most retweeted tweets and the most liked posts, there are the news on Circassians from Turkey visiting the homeland and many posts on the language also refer to the homeland. The possibility of visiting and communication with the homeland provide Circassian languages a linguistic capital that the Laz language does not have. Therefore, for the Circassians education in their language might have more than a symbolic meaning. The alphabet is also another significant element in this diasporic identity as represented by the KAFFED pages. While the community negotiates the practicality and the standardization problems that the Cyrillic alphabet brings about, teaching the language in Latin alphabet is unacceptable by the organization. Alphabet is only one aspect of the identity that is negotiated in comments and responses. As in the case of the Laz identity, we can also talk about a vertical blurred identity for many Circassians who identify themselves primarily as Turkish and distance themselves from any linguistic rights demands that could be labeled as “Kurdish demands”. The two most discussed posts by the organization are the news on the condemnation of the Circassian genocide by the Kurdish movement. The massive reaction by many followers of the page results from the reluctance to wear the same shoes as the Kurds. Among these comments there are some who state that Circassians also protect their language but “not like the Kurds who kill and destroy”. Even though the discourse on the language used by KAFFED shows that it might have a functional value for many Circassians who want to visit or return to the homeland, most do not respond well to “politicizing” their identity by standing where the Kurdish movement stands. Conclusion The right to mother­tongue education in Turkey is finally being discussed after more than 90 years of monolingual education in Turkish. Even though there were struggles to protect and promote languages other than Turkish in the 1980s and 1990s, cultural associations founded then did not put the linguistic rights in their immediate agenda. In the 2000s, however, both EU process and the legal changes that it has brought lead to a more active struggle on protecting and promoting the languages and demanding education in the mother­tongue. While almost all ethnic / linguistic groups have cultural associations, Kurdish, Laz and Circassian associations have been very active in the linguistic rights issue in the last decade. From the analysis of the representations of language and linguistic rights online, it is concluded that the Kurdish organizations have a clear ethnonationalist representation of their identity and language, they accept nothing less than education in the mother­tongue as a proper recognition of the language. Therefore, they do not support or promote elective courses in public schools. The Laz organizations seem to be prioritizing the language issue more than the Circassian associations, which refer to the 1864 exile and genocide as a more defining element of their identity than the Adyghe or Abkhaz languages. One reason why the Laz and the Circassians do not have an ethnonationalist representation of their identities might be that through the assimilation policies 9 Gülşah TÜRK many Laz and Circassians came to identify themselves as ‘Turks’ or as ‘Turk­Laz’ and ‘Turk­Circassian’. This also positions many Laz and Circassians against the ethnic Kurdish struggle. Therefore, rather than demanding any political recognition or the right to mother­tongue education, they seem to emphasize their languages as a cultural element to be protected. Even though this is not the perspective of all Laz and Circassians, there seems to be a general tendency to do so. Further research including interviews is necessary to be able to understand better the perspectives of the communities regarding education in their mother­tongues. 10 Gülşah TÜRK REFERENCES Aslan, Ş., Yardımcı, S., Arpacı, M. & Gürpınar, Ö. (2015). ​Türkiye’nin etnik coğrafyası: 1927­ 1965 Ana Dil Haritaları. Istanbul: MSGSÜ Yayınları. 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