EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW Law & Business EDITORS Jörg Monar ADVISORY BOARD Professor of Contemporary European Studies, Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex (Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome) Dr Gianni Bonvicini Professor Jacques Bourrinet (University Paul Cezanne (Aix Marseille III)) Nanette Neuwahl Prof. Dr Günter Burghardt Professor of European Law, Centre for Reasearch in Public Law, University of Montreal (Ambassador (Ret.)) Professor Marise Cremona ASSOCIATE EDITOR (Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence) Professor Christophe Hillion Professor Alan Dashwood Europa Institute, University of Leiden, The Netherlands (University of Cambridge) Professor Sir David Edward (Judge of the Court of Justice of the EC, 1992–2004) BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Dr Geoffrey Edwards Professor Alasdair Blair (University of Cambridge) Department of International Studies and Social Sciences Coventry University George Eliot Building Coventry CV1 5FB, UK Tel: +44 (0)247-688-8014 Fax: +44 (0)247-688-8679 Email: a.blair@coventry.ac.uk Professor Piet Eeckhout BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Prof. Dr Josef Molsberger Professor Sven Biscop (Emeritus Professor of Economic Policy, University of Tübingen) EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) Rue de Namur 69 1000 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2-213-40-23 Fax: +32 (0)2-223-41-16 Email: s.biscop@irri-kiib.be EDITORIAL OFFICE Saïd Hammamoun Center for Research in Public Law University of Montreal C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville Montreal QC Canada H3C 3J7 Phone: +1 514 343-6111 # 2661 Fax: +1 514 343-7508 Email: said.hammamoun@umontreal.ca (King s College London) Lord Hannay of Chiswick (House of Lords) Professor Christopher Hill (University of Cambridge) Prof. Dr Horst G. Krenzler (Former Director-General External Relations and Trade, European Commission) Professor David O’Keefe (Founding Joint Editor) Dr Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament) Ambassador Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent (Former Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Belgium to the European Union) Professor Loukas Tsoukalis (University of Athens; President, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) Lord Wallace of Saltaire (House of Lords) Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler (New York University School of Law) Prof. Dr Wolfgang Wessels (University of Cologne) Published by: Kluwer Law International P.O. 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No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to: Wolters Kluwer Legal Permissions Department, 76 Ninth Avenue, 7th Floor, New York NY 10011-5201 United States. E-mail: permissions@kluwerlaw.com. European Foreign Affairs Review 15: 611–628, 2010. © 2010 Kluwer Law International BV. Interrogating the European Union’s Democracy Promotion Agenda: Discursive Configurations of ‘Democracy’ from the Middle East MICHELLE PACE* Abstract. Following the electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections of January 2006, the international community reacted by suspending aid to the democratically elected Hamas government. Across Middle Eastern societies, this move and the events that followed since ushered in a complete loss of credibility in the discourse of external actors like the European Union (EU) and their declared quest for promoting democracy in the region. Are we witnessing the demise of the EU’s democracy promotion agenda given the perception from the Middle East (ME) in regard to its inconsistent discourse? This article aims to address how a critical engagement with the ways in which the EU constructs itself as a normative power, in its attempts at exporting its model of liberal democracy, might shed light on questions central to contemporary EU-ME relations. In particular, it surveys discursive configurations of ‘democracy’ in the ME. By way of conclusion, the article holds that the EU should reflect on these internal and diverse debates, which may in turn necessitate a reframing of its own discourse on democracy promotion in the ME: this process of reframing need not negate its principles. I Exporting the Democracy Package: An Introduction The European discourse of liberal democracy has been a popular topic in academic as well as policy-making circles. It is often argued that processes of political liberalization and democratization have served to bring about peaceful co-existence within Europe and that these successful processes can be emulated elsewhere. Thus, in a democratic context, discursive principles play a crucial justificatory role in the making of foreign policy. Much of the literature on democracy promotion has thus looked at the European Union (EU)’s normative foundations for exporting democracy. At the same time, however, there remains considerable concern about the apparent lack of effectiveness of EU efforts at promoting democracy in regions like the Middle East (ME).1 * Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham. The author is grateful for the funding for this research from the British Academy (LRG45504) and the Economic and Social Research Council (First Grants Scheme RES-061-25-0075). 1 This needs a qualification as it is a challenging point in democracy studies. Evaluations of EU efforts at democracy promotion and associated impacts and effectiveness are challenging because the EU is not the sole actor in the field. At the same time, both the European Commission and Civil Society Organizations argue that the EU contributes to processes of democratization, albeit through small, incremental, and gradual steps. Observing progress or effectiveness in specific areas such as freedom of expression or freedom of the judiciary may help analysts understand better the challenges at hand. 612 MICHELLE PACE EU democracy promotion efforts aimed at this region are often presented as responses to the ‘reality’ of the ME, which is mainly read in terms of instability, conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and economic underdevelopment.2 However, events such as the Palestinian elections of January 2006 reveal that the ‘reality’ of democratization in the ME is much more complex than what EU discursive practices imply.3 While, as Volpi’s contribution to this volume shows, authoritarian regimes respond to EU pressures for democratization through staged reforms, the real challenge to these regimes’ power bases stems from the claims made by their peoples – which are increasingly being represented by Islamist groups.4 In particular, since the events of 9/11 and the US-led ‘war on terror’, Islam has become the new securitized object in EU discourse on the ME.5 One of the main understandings is that Islamism is incompatible with democracy, and the EU, among other external actors seeking to promote the liberal kind of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,6 has found itself in a cul de sac: how does it export its liberal democratic discourse, which worked so well in the European context, to a region that, in the EU’s framing, is not ‘ripe’ for democratization? This dilemma was further accentuated when, first, the Muslim Brotherhood – a key, albeit outlawed, Islamist opposition force, in Egypt – won a fifth of parliamentary seats at the 2005 elections. Second, as mentioned above, in the January 2006 elections, Hamas, (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement – which is on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations – won seventy-four seats in the 132-seat chamber (56% of the seats). Fatah 2 S.E. Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy (Cairo: Cairo Press, 1996); D. Pool, ‘The Links between Economic and Political Liberalization’, in Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, eds T. Niblock & E. Murphy (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 40–54; Commission of the European Communities, ‘The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ (Brussels, 2001). See also N. Pratt, Democracy & Authoritarianism in the Arab World (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). 3 R. Hinnebusch, ‘Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique’, Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373–395. 4 The average person’s protest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region today is against large-scale, deeply embedded, corrupt practices (of ruling parties and regimes). Thus, votes for Islamist parties need not necessarily reflect a belief in Islamist politics and political ideology. 5 Interview with Osama Ghazali Harb, Democratic Front party (Cairo, 31 Mar. 2008); see also O. Roy, The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2007). Securitization refers to a process whereby an issue, such as Islam, is presented as ‘posing an existential threat to a designated referent object’, which then requires exceptional measures and/or emergency action to deal with it. This securitized issue is thereby removed from the realm of politics to the realm of security. See B. Buzan, O. Wæver, & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21. 6 As the terms MENA, ME, and Arab-Muslim are used throughout this article, it is important to clarify that the region under discussion here is the geographic area that is wider that the ‘Arab world’ and includes Israel, Iran, and Turkey (the latter two being non-Arab Muslim countries). However, it is narrower than the ‘Muslim world’ as it excludes countries like Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 613 (a reverse acronym from the Arabic name Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, literally Palestinian National Liberation Movement), the Western-backed, secular movement was placed second, with 36% of the seats. The position adopted by Hamas on the Middle East Peace Process caused concern in Israel and internationally. The movement’s charter calls for the destruction of the Jewish state, and its paramilitary wing had played a leading role in the second Intifada, carrying out numerous suicide bomb attacks and rocket strikes against Israeli civilians. The Israeli Government had said it would not cooperate with a Palestinian administration that includes Hamas, while the Middle East Quartet (UN, EU, Russia, and United States) called on Hamas to renounce violence and to recognize Israel and honour past accords or face a dramatic cut in aid to the Palestinian Authority. Hamas responded by saying that it would seek funding from Arab states and other sources to compensate for any shortfall.7 The EU, along with the United States and Israel, thereafter decided to boycott Hamas and refused to officially engage its political leadership.8 The international legal implications of the EU’s relations with the Palestinians after the 2006 elections are explored further in the contribution by Khaliq in this volume. Across Middle Eastern societies, this move and the events that followed since, ushered in a complete loss of credibility in the discourse of external actors like the EU and their declared quest for promoting democracy in the region, in particular, by calling for ‘free, fair and transparent elections’. It was, after all, the EU’s own 186-member election observation mission that declared these elections to have been largely free and fair.9 More pertinently, questions and debates have ensued in regard to the EU’s normative position. The EU’s stance in particular has strengthened the belief in the region that it is the EU’s lack of understanding/misreading of Middle Eastern affairs that dominates its agenda – and especially its external relations – and not its normative ‘posturing’. The EU is in fact often considered as a hesitant spectator in the unfolding of Middle Eastern events, awaiting the United States to give its green light for any move in this region.10 7 M. Pace, ‘A “Modern” Islamist Democracy? Perceptions of Democratisation in Palestine: the Case of Hamas’, paper presented at the BRISMES conference (Leeds, 4–6 Jul. 2008). 8 T. Diez & M. Pace, ‘Normative Power Europe and Conflict Transformation’, in Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. R. Whitman (London & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, April 2011). 9 EU Election Observation Mission West Bank and Gaza, ‘Statement of Preliminary Conclusions and Findings: Open and Well-Run Parliamentary Elections Strengthen Palestinian Commitment to Democratic Institutions’, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88201.pdf> [Quartet statement on Pal elections, London 30 Jan. 2006] Council S031/06., 3 Oct. 2008. 10 Interviews with Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (Ramallah, 4 Sep. 2007); Nasr Al-Din Sha’r, Deputy Prime Minister and Education Minister, National Unity Government (Nablus, 10 Sep. 2007); Diaa Rashwan and Amr al Shobky, both at Al Ahram Centre (Cairo, 26 and 25 Mar. 2008); and with Abou El ElaMady, Al Wasat Party (Cairo, 24 Mar. 2008). 614 MICHELLE PACE Moreover, the EU’s discursive principles on democracy have, in the eyes of its ‘targets’ in the ME, shown serious signs of inconsistency. Elections are opportunities for accountability in a (democratic) political process. Fatah had lost the confidence of the Palestinian people not least due to its corrupt practices. For all the rhetoric about democracy and good governance, the international boycott on Hamas has had negative effects, not least in the area of Palestinian institutional reform where the European Commission had started to register some useful progress.11 The formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) between Hamas and Fatah in February 2007 had offered the EU an opportunity to build on and renew its reform-oriented, democracy promotion agenda. However, although accountability usually means that the representatives (of the people in a democracy) have to pay for the full consequences for their actions, the EU decided to continue with its support solely for the very representatives (Fatah) that the people rejected through their vote. This action is a clear evidence of a crisis in the EU’s discourse on and practice of democracy promotion in the ME. Adding to the EU’s quagmire in Palestine, Islamist opposition groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, are also popular elsewhere in the MENA region.12 So, while the EU continues to support authoritarian regimes that rule over populations mainly unversed in a democratic culture and ethos, the increasing popular voices of Islamist groups induce the EU to react to their situation in new ways that contrast with its embedded and preferred discursive practices. While Islamists increasingly accept democratic procedures, they aim to build a different type of nation-state, which in turn challenges what European policy makers consider as democratically acceptable.13 This dilemma for the EU is explored further in Kandil’s contribution to this volume. In order to present an immanent critique of the EU’s discourse on democracy promotion in the ME, this article seeks to, first, tease out the construction of normative power Europe and unintended consequences of the EU’s discourse on democratization in the MENA – which has thus far been founded on a positive image of the EU as a force for good. When brought under closer scrutiny, what is uncovered is that with democracy being valued as an unquestionable good in and of itself, the EU’s discourse actually has an embedded sense of fear, insecurity, and threat vis-à-vis the ME.14 Moreover, by including democracy promotion in its external 11 For example, the EU had successfully put pressure on Palestinian good governance mechanisms including a single treasury account. 12 It is important to clarify that this is not such a recent development. The process actually started back in the 1970s and not only in the Arab world (and has recently received a further boost). See, G. Kepel, The Revenge of God. The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). 13 M. Pace, P. Seeberg, & F. Cavatorta, ‘The EU’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical Inside-Out Approach’, Democratization 16, Special Issue, no. 1 (2009): 3–19. 14 P.J. Burgess, ‘Europe as a Community of Values: The Question of Security’, Paper Presented at UACES Conference (Edinburgh, 1–3 Sep. 2008). EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 615 relations policies towards the MENA, there is an implicit understanding in the EU’s discursive practices that political change in the MENA is somehow external to this region.15 Thus, secondly, this article attempts to survey a range of ongoing and current discussions in the MENA about political change – which the EU may not be aware of, in an attempt to illustrate the distorted perception of the region in the EU’s discourse. This spectrum of Arab intellectual thinking will hopefully help us understand better the current search for political change in the MENA. By way of conclusion, and in terms of potential solutions to the current crisis, the article holds that the EU still retains a capacity to recognize emerging voices in the region. For the EU to free itself from the current paradoxical situation, it cannot be intimidated by embedded rules that crush alternative thinking. To reflect upon alternative values need not negate the EU’s own discursive principles. II European Union Discursive Principles Ian Manners’ seminal 2002 article on Normative Power Europe16 has since triggered a wide and ongoing debate on the EU’s role in international relations among scholars, including those working on EU external relations in regions as diverse as the Balkans, South Caucasus, and the ME.17 Some have focused their attention on how the EU’s normative power discourse has become a method and a norm in itself for promoting democracy in other states.18 In his original conception of the EU as a normative power, Manners argued that the EU may be characterized by a set of common principles shared by its Member States, which act as a whole to diffuse ideals such as democracy and rule of law in other regions. The EU’s international identity is thus marked not by a military posture but by a predisposition to promote its values through its interaction with and the socialization of other actors.19 The EU’s promotion of democracy in the MENA has primarily focused on encouraging regular elections based on the normative principle that people in the region should be given the political power to vote for those who rule them. The EU also promotes pluralism from below by strengthening civil society, which is 15 M. Pace, ‘Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: The Limits of EU Normative Power’, Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 39–58. 16 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–258. 17 F. Bicchi, ‘Our Size Fits All: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 286–303; A.E. Juncos, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU as a Normative Power in the Western Balkans: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, and E.J. Stewart, ‘Mind the Normative Gap? The EU in the South Caucasus’, in ed. R. Whitman, n. 8 above; M. Pace, ‘The Construction of EU Normative Power’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 5 (2007): 1041–1064, to mention just a few. 18 B. Powel, ‘A Clash of Norms: Normative Power and EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia’, Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 193–214. 19 T. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe”’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 613–636. 616 MICHELLE PACE perceived as an essential pillar of democratization processes. A final important element in the EU’s democratization agenda is a logic that supporting economic development in the MENA will lead to transitions to political pluralism.20 Holden’s contribution to this volume illustrates this well with reference to Egypt. However, it has often been acknowledged that the EU’s real drive in the MENA is its strategic interest in a stable and secure neighbourhood rather than democracy per se.21 Thus, recent debates have been questioning the EU’s self-perception as a normative actor in international politics. While some scholars make the case for a more realist understanding of EU policy making focusing on the EU’s real interests,22 others have convincingly outlined how a combined interests and values approach is better suited to explain political outcomes in EU external relations, particularly in the context of the wider Mediterranean.23 This current thinking reflects the view of the EU as an international actor, which mixes normative positions with realist policies. It is argued that this is very much the case in the MENA, when it comes to the EU’s (flawed) democracy promotion strategies. A discourse approach can shed further light on this. Moreover, a normative power is expected to act consistently and stand up for the very norms it seeks to export, even when these collide with interests (a value or norm can be an interest, too). Principles serve as a guide for the functioning of international relations,24 and in the practice of international relations, democracy is all too often taken by Western agents like the EU as a necessary and a universal good. Democracy is valued for its intrinsic peaceful implications, and it is also taken as the solution to economic underdevelopment, instability, and insecurity.25 20 B.A. Roberson, The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit (London: Routledge, 1998). M. Pace, ‘Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2007): 657–673. 22 R. Youngs, ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 415–435; A. Hyde-Price, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 217–234; F. Cavatorta, ‘Engaging Authoritarianism. The European Union, Syria and Normative Power’, paper presented at the UACES conference (Edinburgh, 1–3 Sep. 2008). 23 M. Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity. Meddling with the Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 2006); F. Bicchi, European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); A. Storey & V. Durac, ‘“Normative or Realist” versus “Normative and Realist”: The Case of the European Union and Morocco’, paper given at the EUSA conference (Los Angeles, 23–25 Apr. 2009). 24 S. Vasilyan, ‘The EU as a Conflict Dealer in the South Caucasus: Civilian/Normative but Immoral?’, paper presented at the UACES conference (Edinburgh, 1–3 Sep. 2008). 25 This reasoning is based not least on an eighteenth century European Enlightenment discourse. During earlier times, Europe witnessed revolts, wars, and famines. It is thus believed that with man’s enlightenment, reasoning, and progress, liberalism emerged, which, in turn, brought about peaceful relations between European states. And this enlightenment logic is precisely what the EU seeks to export in the MENA, but not until the latter half of the twentieth century. S. Zweig, The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography (London: Cassell, 1943), 14. 21 EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 617 However, what seem to escape the EU’s framing are the unintended consequences of its discourse on democracy in the ME. Following their surprise victory at the January 2006 Palestinian elections, Hamas bought into external pressures for moderation and embarked on a transitory process by forming a NUG with Fatah. Given the EU’s normative posture in Palestine, Hamas officials thought that such moderate positions would be read by the international community, in particular by the EU, as steps deserving of international recognition.26 However, the discourse on possible conciliatory steps undertaken between various wings of the Islamist movement failed to ease the international sanctions on the Hamas government.27 From the Hamas viewpoint, it seems that its representatives’ expectations from the EU’s image as a normative power were a serious miscalculation in that they had entered into the NUG thinking that the EU would eventually be more lenient and cooperate with the new government.28 So while the EU may genuinely be interested in seeing some developments towards political reform in the region, it is important to challenge the normative assumptions underpinning this approach, particularly as they have unintended consequences for the very ‘targets’ of its democratizing policies. It is, in fact, the perceptions and reactions of those on the receiving end of EU policies that, in turn, lead us back to the EU’s crisis in democracy promotion in the ME, reminding us that EU policy-making processes are not unidirectional but influenced by the reading of people in the MENA.29 I have argued elsewhere that there is in fact an implicit understanding in the EU’s democracy promotion strategies towards the MENA that the grammar of democratic change30 in the MENA, specifically of the liberal democratic kind that the EU believes is the only model for political change, is somehow alien to this region. (This liberal democratic discourse that lies at the heart of EU policy practice is a problem.)31 The lively and ongoing debates within the MENA region about 26 Interviews with Dr Basim Naim, Ministry of Youth, Sport and Health, and Dr Ahmed Yousef, Office of the Prime Minister (Gaza, 11 Sep. 2007). 27 A. Hovdenak, ‘Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions’, Democratization 16, Special Issue, no. 1 (2009): 59–80. 28 Diez & Pace, 2011, n. 8 above. MB officials also expected the international community to respond positively to Hamas’ moderate positions. Interviews with Mohammed Habib and Esam Elerian, Headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cairo, 26 and 27 Mar. 2008). 29 Pace, Seeberg, & Cavatorta, 2009, n. 13 above. 30 Here I borrow Aletta J Norval’s concept of political grammar, meaning the vocabularies we use and the practices we engage in. On the grammar of democracy specifically, Norval argues that this should be ‘understood as delimiting a horizon of what is sayable and doable at any given point in time, as well as what we may expect from others and what others may expect from us in the articulation of claims upon one another’. See A.J. Norval, Aversive Democracy. Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8. See also Pace, 2009, n. 15 above. 31 M. Pace, ‘Liberal or Social Democracy? Aspects of the EU’s Democracy Promotion Agenda in the Middle East’ (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009), <www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Pace_paper12.pdf>, 23 Dec. 2009. 618 MICHELLE PACE the need for political change attest otherwise. It is thus the task of this article to highlight some of these key debates. III Discursive Configurations of ‘Democracy’ in the Middle East: Tradition, Reform, and Diversity In his book on Making Islam Democratic, Asef Bayat argues that the ideals of democracy have less to do with the essence of any religion and more to do with its praxis. He focuses our attention on how democracy is practiced in the MENA region through various forms of political contestation including protests and other social struggles by youth, professionals, and women’s groups. Bayat does not underestimate the highly challenging relationship between religion, politics, and everyday life in the region and highlights the demands of the people for political change.32 In fact, in the MENA, there is a vibrant, albeit diverse, spectrum of thinking about the ideal form of governance for the region. In this article, I attempt to shed light on the diversity of these debates in terms of content as well as geography. By no means does this survey cover all the diverse opinions within the MENA on this issue. What one has to keep in mind is that what unites these diverse opinions is the imprint left on the region by Western colonial rule in its various manifestations: political, economic, cultural, and military. In the post-independence years, MENA rulers attempted to Westernize their societies through the replication of Western institutions and practices that they had absorbed. By the end of the twentieth century, cultural imperialism had penetrated most (rural as well as urban) areas and all levels of Muslim societies.33 While others have attempted to draw up a typology of the diversity of thought in the Muslim world,34 I choose to focus on the key debates on political change in the MENA without categorizing or labelling these voices. These discourses on democracy in the MENA are important for the people in the region. My aim is thus to present an overview of the discourses on democracy in the region and to uncover the range of views on political change in the MENA. This survey will in turn lead us to question what exactly motivates the EU when it stipulates that it supports democratization in the MENA and help us better understand the lack of results in the EU’s commitment in this policy sphere. 32 A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007). 33 See A.S. Ahmed, Postmodernism and Islam. Predicament and Promise (London & New York: Routledge, 1992). 34 See, e.g., W. Shepard, ‘Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3 (1987): 307–335. I. Harik also provides a similar typology in his Democratic Theory and Modernity: Western and Islamic Perspectives (London & Beirut: Al Saqi Publishers, 2001). For all references in Arabic, the author wishes to thank Haya AlFarra and Hazem Kandil for research support on these sources. EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 619 If we are to make sense of the crisis in the EU’s discursive framing of democracy promotion in the MENA, we need some clarity about an area as complex and diverse as the Arab-Muslim world. IV Voices on Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa Supporters of the growth of democratic movements and institutions in the MENA do not necessarily make reference to Islam in the context of political change. In fact, there are voices in the MENA region who pursue change in the political sphere without making reference to religion. Fazlur Rahman, for example, argues for ‘the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam, that is, without their being derived, or organically linked to the principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna (practice)’.35 Saad Eddin Ibrahim is another Arab thinker representing progressive forces in the region. Ibrahim is an Egyptian sociologist, prolific author, and democracy and human rights activist. He is the founder and director of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies in Cairo. In 2001, together with twenty-seven co-defendants, he was charged with accepting foreign funds without authorization and for disseminating false information considered harmful to Egypt’s interests by the Supreme State Security Court. Often perceived and criticized by other opposition groups in Egypt as a voice who adopts Western grammar and discourse on democracy,36 Ibrahim argues that democracy is a continuous process of struggle and contestation, and with an ongoing need for renewal. Many perceive him as the founder of the civil society movement in Egypt. While in prison, Ibrahim engaged with Islamists in a protracted dialogue on democracy. It was during this period that the events of 9/11 occurred and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Party for Justice and Democracy (PJD) in Morocco won the elections in their respective countries. Ibrahim accepted Turkey’s offer for exile (2007/8) precisely to be able to closely observe the AKP’s experiment with democratic politics.37 For Ibrahim, the Turkish model is a clear manifestation of how a constitution in a predominantly Muslim country can explicitly separate the tenets of religion from politics and state affairs.38 He also insists that, in the struggle for democracy in Egypt, he is prepared to work with opportunities including those stemming from Islamist voices in the region. It is external actors like the EU that adhere to the 35 F. Rahman, ‘Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 1, no. 4 (1970): 311. 36 Interview with Refaat Al Said, Tagammu Party headquarters (Cairo, 22 Mar. 2008). 37 Interview with Dr Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Professor of Political Sociology, Indiana University (currently in exile in Turkey) (London, 6 Mar. 2008). 38 Although Turkey was often mentioned by interviewees as a ‘model’, one needs to keep in mind the special role of Turkey in the Middle East and its completely diverse genesis of state, power, and politics since Ataturk. For some analysts, the ‘Turkish argument’ in the Arab democratization debate has already become a non-debate (in policy-making circles and among scholars alike). 620 MICHELLE PACE politics of fear when engaging with the MENA region.39 This does not mean that the EU should support the more progressive factions in the Middle East but rather support those voices who are gaining the sympathies of their own people. Saad Eddin Ibrahim is a problematic figure in this context: as an anti-regime voice, he is trapped by international actors, such as the United States, that support him. Thus, his discourse does not serve to help Egyptians out of their current political deadlock in terms of needs and freedoms. Arab regimes have become thick skinned when it comes to criticism from the likes of Eddin Ibrahim, whose criticism is simply ignored by the Mubarak government. Clearly, a desire for change is what unites these prominent individuals across the MENA region. However, in diverse ways, they are trying to create alternatives to ideas and systems that they believe no longer work. Some present a forwardlooking, dynamic, and innovative stance in bringing about a reconstruction of their social and political order. Other voices from the region contend that tradition can be accommodated in a democratic political process. By tradition, I do not only refer to religion but to Islam more generally, as a way of life here. Tradition encompasses all human practices that are passed on from one generation to the next and include belief, and more broadly, the common inheritance of a social group.40 One can therefore speak of traditions as espoused by Rafik Habib.41 Another key advocate of modern day democracy is Tarek Al Beshri,42 who emphasizes that the cornerstones of this form of governance are justice and consultation. He argues that the Islamic political dictum ‘justice is the foundation of rulership’ obliges the political ruler to account for the desires and needs of all the members of the polity and that, in light of the rapid increase in population, the only feasible channel for expressing these desires and needs is parliamentary representation. Al Beshri, a highly respected judge in Egypt, reflects on what he sees as the most challenging aspect in Arab-European relations: the historical conflict between Arab-Islamic values, systems of governance and beliefs on the one hand and Western values, systems, and lifestyles on the other. Following Western colonization of the region, Al Beshri argues that the Arab-Islamic world was left with a practical 39 Interview with Ibrahim, London. For a further critical analysis on the politics of fear in EU external relations, see J. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (Oxford & New York: Routledge, 2006). Huysmans explores how fear has become a practice and technique in EU governance of its neighbouring areas. The politics of framing fear through external relations explains how EU-MENA relations are modulated through EU rational choices. 40 N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, & B.S. Turner, The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (London: Penguin Books, 1994). 41 Interview with Dr Rafik Habib, a prominent Coptic thinker (Cairo, 25 Mar. 2008). See also Rafik Habib, ‘Islamic Sharia for Copts only!’, Almesryoon (newspaper in Arabic), 22 Apr. 2008, <www.almesryoon.com>. 42 T. Al Beshri, What is Modernity? (Cairo: Dar AlShorouk, 2005). EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 621 confusion: which Western prescriptions should the former world imitate/revive, develop or change to, substitute for, or reform? He laments how such prescriptions encouraged Arab leaders to select from Western models those elements that could enable them to remain in power. In terms of the best form of governance for the MENA region, Al Beshri argues, just like Rafik Habib, that such an assessment requires an awareness of the core characteristics of a society. Thus, tradition in the Arab-Islamic world is based on an Islamic faith, which in turn characterizes the Arab-Muslim identity. He accepts that such a cultural identity is open for revival and developments.43 In fact, he does not discard the possibility of adopting or emulating certain features of European values and systems and argues that democracy is one of the best means of ending oppression and discrimination and enables people to self-rule. However, Al Beshri also argues that in order to be part of the ‘modern’ age, the Arab-Muslim world cannot see the imposition of universal values and systems imprinted in the region as Arab societies have undergone different historical trajectories.44 The liberation movements in the Arab-Islamic world against European colonizers in the 1950s were accompanied by a decline in religious authority and religious systems of reference (but not in the religious faith or Islamic beliefs of the people). Thus, since then, there has been a cultural and political conflict between secular, national movements and Islamist, national movements. This conflict extended over time to the regimes in power (often secular) and those who have been able to mobilize the masses, outside the state’s authority (often Islamist movements). A very good case in point here is the Fatah and Hamas movements of Palestine.45 Al Beshri compares the historical trajectory of Arab nationalist movements and European/Western progressive/reformist movements arguing that the latter promoted the separation of religious affairs from state affairs and relied on the slow transformation of social institutions through democratic means. It was the constitutional framework of countries with a parliamentary suffrage that favoured a gradualist approach.46 Thus, Al Beshri argues that with such a system of reference and with such a framework of political, economic, and social rights, reformist 43 See also L.D. Lybarger, Identity & Religion in Palestine. The Struggle between Islamism & Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007) for a thorough investigation of the development and changes in Palestinian political identity over the past decades. 44 Although this discourse may be read as a species of contextualism, which dichotomizes the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’, Al Beshri does not imply that these are mutually exclusive. His point is to highlight the importance of understanding the different historical trajectories in the Middle East and those in Europe. 45 Interview with Nasr Al-Din Sha’r, Deputy Prime Minister and Education Minister in NUG government (Nablus, 10 Sep. 2007). 46 See W.E. Paterson & I. Campbell, Social Democracy in Post-War Europe (London and New York: MacMillan, 1974). 622 MICHELLE PACE movements could observe progress ensued in Western societies. This has not been the case in the Arab-Islamic world where the system of reference has been a religious, Islamic one.47 Thus, although the Western model of governance was prescribed and imposed on the Arab world, it has not been accompanied by social and accountable institutions encompassing systems of rights, rules, and regulations (which would at the same time allow people to defend, protect, and relate to their system of belief). Arab rulers have taken advantage of this gap and, as a result, have made themselves unaccountable to the people. The legacy of a dual and overlapping system of governance and values is thus what the Arab-Islamic world has been faced with: on the one hand, what has been inherited from an Islamic civilization, on the other, the prescriptions imposed by Western colonial powers. While clearly impressed by the West’s capacity to organize syndicates, political parties, and social movements, Al Beshri maintains that Islam as a reference point and as a way of life ensures cultural harmony in the Arab world. On the specific Western emphasis on civil society as a core pillar of democracy, Al Beshri argues that the West limits the definition of civil society to non-governmental organizations that mediate between society and the state. Al Beshri points at the difficulty of developing civil society – as defined by the West – in the Muslim world. Since most Muslim countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes that are ruthlessly repressive, any ‘tangible’ organization (one that has headquarters and branches, annual budgets, official records, employees, and so on) can be easily targeted by the government – that is, of course if it manages to secure a government permit to function in the first place. Therefore, Al Beshri concludes, such a civil society will either play a decorative role or it will become completely isolated from society and evidence seems to bear this out.48 Islamic history, however, offers an alternative. In Islamic history, civil society was never institutionalized or centralized; it was always fluid and flexible. Sufi movements, village and urban ‘ulama, mosque wardens, councils of elders, and other traditional forms of civil society played the same role that civil society organizations perform today. In fact, these traditional forms of civil society are still active in Muslim countries. The problem is that because they do not fit Western criteria, Muslims act as if these traditional forms do not exist; they are basically off their radar. As a result, they receive scarce attention from researchers, activists, or donors, and no effort is made to develop and support them. This is again, Al Beshri laments, a by-product of Muslims’ blind faith in ‘modernization’: traditional bodies are overlooked, even if they are essential, and modern organizations become an obsession, even if they are completely inadequate. 47 See also A. Black, ‘The Difference between Cultures: What Can We Learn From a Comparative History of Political Thought’, paper given at the Social and Political Thought Seminar Series, Department of Sociology (University of Warwick, 27 Oct. 2008). 48 See A. A. Jamal, Barriers to Democracy. The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Some of the findings of the other contributions to this volume also provide evidence for this. EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 623 Muhammed Selim Al-’Awa (Secretary-General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) and one of the main intellectual forces behind al-Wassat Party in Egypt) is another Arab intellectual who does not support a secular state but a democratic Islamic polity that allows non-Muslims to practice their religion freely while respecting the right of the majority to dictate public policy.49 Other contemporary voices in the MENA region try to adapt the tenets of the main faith in the region, Islam, to changing times and circumstances.50 The demands of Muslims across the region today aspire to improvements in their daily lives, be they economic, political, and social, as well as to having some say in these affairs (political rights). Rather than a passive reading of the Koran, these reformist voices adopt a flexible and human interpretation and understanding of Islam, which can accommodate pluralism. Gamal Al-Banna, an Islamic scholar and younger brother of Hassan Al-Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood), for example, argues that ‘there is no contradiction between total freedom of thought and religion’ and that ‘Islam does not pretend to a monopoly of wisdom’.51 This intellectual dissident distances himself from conservative, extremist positions and believes that his faith is compatible with a liberal society.52 Such a reformist voice thus challenges doctrines that stipulate that Islamism (i.e., those parties that claim religious legitimacy and symbolism) and democracy are incompatible, but there remains the dilemma of how to reconcile Islamism with modernity through the creation of a life view that is attuned to both.53 But Al-Banna reiterates the real diversity within Islamism and insists that Islamism exists as a monolith only in the imagination of the West.54 Another Middle Eastern thinker is Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the Tunisian political activist and co-founder of the Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party, formerly the Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique, Movement of Islamic Tendency or MTI, founded during a brief ‘spring’ of Tunisian political liberalization in 1981). His movement clearly offered a worrying challenge to the rule of Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali. When the Nahda party was outlawed, Ghannouchi 49 See, e.g., M. Selim Al-’Awa Fi al-Nizam al-Siyasi le al-Dawla al-Islamiya (On the Political Order of the Islamic State) (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 2006), and M. Selim Al-’Awa Al-Din wa alWatan: Fusul fei ‘ilaqat al-Muslimeen bei ghir al-Muslimeen (Religion and the Motherland: Chapters in the Relationship between Muslims and Non-Muslims) (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2006). 50 See R. Wright, ‘Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation’, Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 64–75. 51 Interview with Gamal Al Banna, Islamic scholar (Cairo, 24 Mar. 2008). 52 T.G. Ash, ‘We are Making a Fatal Mistake by Ignoring the Dissidents within Islam’, The Guardian, 15 Mar. 2007, <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/mar/15/religion.comment>, 9 Oct. 2008. 53 J. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995). 54 Ash, n. 52 above. This does not discard the fact that some Islamists also hold a monolithic view of the ‘West’. 624 MICHELLE PACE was granted political asylum in Britain in 1993.55 Since his exile, and through his various travels to Europe and the United States, Ghannouchi has been exposed to diverse democratic systems and their workings in practice. On the issue of democracy, he argues that the role of Islam is to provide the system with moral values and to promote an Islamic system that includes free elections, a free media, protection of minorities, majority rule, equality of all religious and secular parties, and full rights for women.56 In effect, this implies that these liberal values need to be incorporated more clearly into modern interpretations of Islam. Often described as another important, liberal thinker, the Egyptian (now retired and living under continuous government protection) Chief Judge Muhammad Sa’id Al-’Ashmawy studied Islamic and comparative law and practiced law as a high court judge. In his writings, he strongly opposes the ideology and practice of Islamic extremists in Egypt as well as the idea of an Islamic state. According to Al-’Ashmawy, sovereignty is not vested in God but in the nation or the people. For instance, current secular Egyptian law accommodates Shar’ia law in some respects such as civil affairs and some social practices such as adultery but does not accommodate Shar’ia courts as in Saudi Arabia. He thus argues for the place of Islamic law in contemporary politics and society in Egypt and is convinced that only enlightenment of the Arab masses will bring about a transition to political liberalization, progress, and freedom in his country and elsewhere in the MENA region. As a reformist voice, his writings attempt to highlight the Islamic faith’s abuse by some groups through their irrelevant, unjust, and corrupt practices and to encourage believers not to allow their faith to be used against them.57 The above is simply a small sample of the diverse views of how political liberalization can come about in the MENA, a predominantly Muslim region. This leaves us with the question: from a discursive perspective, which of these views present challenges to the discursive principles of the EU on democracy promotion in the ME? The voices presented here are seeking to build alternative governance structures in the MENA that sit comfortably with pluralistic political processes and often without Muslims having to sacrifice the essentials of their beliefs. This is what David Edgar calls a progressive path, which requires a new reframing of the EU’s discourse on democracy promotion.58 55 C. Alexander, ‘Opportunities, Organizations and Ideas: Islamists and Workers in Tunisia and Algeria’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 4 (2000): 465–490; and M.E. Hamdi, The Politicisation of Islam: Essay on Democratic Governance (Westview: Boulder, CO., 1998). 56 See Wright, 1996, n. 50 above. 57 The author conducted a private interview with Muhammad Sa’id al-’Ashmawy (Cairo on 31 Mar. 2008). See C. Fluehr-Lobban (ed.), Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Sa’id al-’Ashmawy (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2002). See also H. Goddard, ‘Islam and Democracy’, Political Studies Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2002). 58 D. Edgar, ‘Preachers of Pluralism’, The Guardian, 29 Oct. 2008, 32. EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 625 V From Aspect Blindness to Aspect Dawning to Aspect Change in EU Discursive Principles Institutionalizing what Norval calls a democratic ethos59 in the MENA requires an ongoing struggle to re-enact and re-engage with democratic practices, given that people in the region cannot freely act as democratic subjects in their daily lives. In other words, there is no embedded democratic culture in the MENA because democratic practices are not as entrenched in these societies as in the West. People do not have direct experience of democracy, and for the freeing of their subjectivity, democracy has to be conceived as a never-ending process and struggle.60 As I have attempted to show above, there is already a small group of voices who espouse this perception of democracy in the region. From the EU’s point of view, the real diversity of voices in the MENA calling for political liberalism requires an ongoing learning and knowledge-seeking process and appreciation of the history of this region and Arab identity and subjectivity.61 It therefore appears that what the West needs to recognize is the need to address the problem of how a not-yet democratic people can come to make laws instituting a new democratic order.62 Central to this process of democratic subjectivity is the power and role of rhetoric and persuasion. It is in this context that a reframing of the EU’s discourse on democracy can play a role. Rather than promoting itself as a force for good in the region, EU discursive practices have to play on their persuasive and rhetorical power in the ME. When the European Parliament (EP) issued a critical resolution on the situation of human rights in Egypt, in January 2008, the Egyptian government reacted with a strong response arguing that the EP was interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs. For Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the very fact that the Egyptian government felt obliged to respond to this criticism from the EP is a sign that the democracy discourse has become pervasive and a burden of responsibility for the governments in the MENA.63 Thereby, such regular statements from the EP keep the issue of democracy alive and create a stronger awareness among the masses of the fruit of freedom of expression. This is what Rosemary Foot sees as the essence of discursive constraints placed on repressive regimes by the democracy discourse. Such regimes have serious concerns about their country’s image at the global level and have therefore no interest in openly claiming support for changes in the parameters of international norms and conventions. Although there remains a gap between these countries’ legal commitment to international norms 59 Norval, 2007, n. 30 above. Dr Mohamed Kadry Said refers to this democratization process as a path of continuous negotiations and bargaining for people’s rights and freedoms. Interview with Kadry Said, Al Ahram Centre (Cairo, 23 Mar. 2008). 61 Interview with Osama Ghazali Harb, Democratic Front party (Cairo, 31 Mar. 2008). 62 Norval refers to Rousseau’s lawgiver in this regard, see Norval, 2007, n. 30 above, 135. 63 Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Professor of Political Sociology, Indiana University, 6 Mar. 2008. 60 626 MICHELLE PACE and their actual behaviours, the democracy discourse enables and empowers other groups in MENA societies to challenge their governments.64 It also follows that, rather than being blinded with preconceived perceptions and mis-readings of the ME, what is needed is for the EU to experience an ‘aspect dawning’ wherein the diversity of views in the MENA is recognized. By recognizing alternative values, the EU need not negate its own values. Through such recognition, the EU can possibly emerge from its crisis by way of alternative ways of thinking about democracy and the ME. This is what Norval calls ‘aspect change’. For Norvall, this requires a rethinking of liberal democracy. Drawing upon deliberative (Habermas, Rawls) and post-structuralist (Mouffe and Laclau) approaches to democracy, Norval offers a Wittgenstein-inspired way of understanding global complexities of the formation of a democratic subjectivity through what she terms ‘aversive democracy’: it is through people’s ordinary contestations in their political spheres that their democratic freedoms and responsibilities are constituted.65 For the EU, this means reflecting on aspect change and moving beyond fixed understandings and instead engaging in more active interactions with other actors in the MENA, beyond the region’s authoritarian regimes and progressive forces from the region that speak the EU or US speak. This engagement must include an understanding of Islamist discourses on democracy for a reframing of the EU’s own discourse, which better captures the exact political nature of ME historical trajectories and of these diverse individuals and groups, at the same time as it encapsulates their surrounding institutional environments and how they aim to operate in a more liberal and open, political system. VI Conclusion: Reframing the EU’s Democracy Promotion Discourse in the Middle East Following the electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections of January 2006, the EU had to rethink its arsenal of democracy discourse. Reactions from the Middle East emphasize the EU’s boycotting of a democratic government. It therefore appears, in the eyes of Middle Eastern societies, that the Liberal (Party) is more important for the EU than the Democratic (Party). The EU is now perceived as supporting those who lost the elections in Palestine (Fatah) because they claim to be liberal in the Western sense. As highlighted in this article, this major event in the Middle East has led to a rethinking process in Brussels about the democracy promotion discourse in the EU. The article argues that in the process of reframing the EU’s discourse on democracy in the ME, what is at stake is a recognition of democracy as a certain mode of identification, of a particular way of 64 R. Foot, ‘Human Rights and Global Governance: Efficacy, Power and Legitimacy?’, paper given at the POLSIS Departmental Seminar Programme, Autumn Series (University of Birmingham, 8 Oct. 2008). 65 Communication between Aletta Norval and the author, 24 Oct. 2008. EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AGENDA 627 life, in particular contexts. In the case of the ME, this requires a deepening of our understanding of the making of democratic claims and the forging of democratic arguments.66 In a May 2007 resolution, adopted by the EP on the EU’s strategy for reform in the Arab world, there already appears to be a conflation of European and Arab discourses on democracy and political reform.67 There is therefore a realization (aspect dawning) in EU discourse that change in perceptions of the other is needed, and in turn, this brings us back to Norval’s work on the need for a change in our political grammar. In the EP’s discourse, there is an implicit recognition that there may be other factors that the EU needs to acknowledge in its quest to promote democracy in the MENA. Most importantly, democracy is never fully achieved by its very nature. In Derrida’s terms, we need to think about democracy ‘to come’.68 The strength of such an annunciation from the EP is the acceptance and appreciation of historical trajectories, intended or unintended consequences of EU policies towards the region thus far, and how the EU is perceived by the very targets of its policies in the MENA. The Islamist thinkers covered in this article emphasize that democracy is not a substance apart from the practice verifying it. Thus, their demands point at a wish for a space of shared meaning. As Norval stipulates, ‘The accompanying awareness of multiplicity helps to establish the minimum conditions we need in order to get a democratic dialogue underway’.69 Therefore, rather than focusing solely on electoral assistance, economic development, and mere diplomatic events on, for instance, inter-religious dialogue, what is needed is a new platform where the EU’s discourse opens up to critical voices from the ME, such as those outlined in this article. Only through seeing things in a new way (aspect dawning), on the part of the EU, can these voices freely express their thoughts about political change without the supervision of either their regimes or any religious authorities. This requires revisiting what the EU has been doing so far in terms of democracy promotion and a reframing in the EU’s discourse, moving away from any monolithic conceptions about democracy in the ME. By engaging with critical voices from the ME and creating the space for these voices to freely express their views on political change, the EU’s discursive framework has the potential to have a direct impact on the people of this region. Studies on contemporary forces calling for political change in the MENA region suggest that these are emanating from within rather than from without the countries concerned.70 For external actors like the EU, this requires an effort to come closer to the reality and diversity within the MENA, if it still wants to be engaged 66 See Norval, 2007, n. 30 above. European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 10 May 2007 on reforms in the Arab world: what strategy should the European Union adopt?’, P6_TA (2007)0179 (Brussels, 2007). 68 J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), 306. 69 Norval, 2007, n. 30 above, 106. 70 See, e.g., S. Lawson, ‘Democracy and the Problem of Cultural Relativism: Normative Issues for International Politics’, in Democracy and International Relations. Critical Theories/Problematic Practices, ed. Helen Smith (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000), 71–89. 67 628 MICHELLE PACE in democracy promotion efforts. So, rather than focusing primarily on the normative power of norms and their universality, the EU needs to move into a new phase whereby each MENA neighbour is understood according to its own specific circumstances. This means that rather than looking outside-in the region, what the EU needs is an aspect change or inside-out approach, whereby both regimes and opposition voices are understood in terms of their preferences for political change.71 This may require the EU to include Islamist thinkers in a new progressive reframing of its democracy promotion discourse. According to Norval, those seeking their subjectivity as democrats need to become democrats. In Palestine, the political grammar of occupation has to be replaced by Palestinians’ identification as democrats. In Egypt, the political grammar of authoritarianism and Mubarak’s tight grip on political power have to be replaced by the Egyptian people’s identification as democrats. A very good case in point is the sexual harassment case brought forward to the Egyptian courts by Noha Roushdy against Sherief Gomaa Gibrial in October 2008. The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights applauded the court’s decision, which sentenced Gibrial to a three-year sentence and fined him EGP 5,001. Such a sentence, the ECWR argues, restores confidence in the Egyptian legal system’s ability to defend women subjects from such crimes in every step of the process and assures women that their rights will be protected.72 Such evidence of people’s identification as democrats goes hand in hand with the role of persuasion, and rhetoric becomes central to any account of democratic subjectivity. Much contemporary conceptual work highlights, on the one hand, the importance of not limiting our discussion on democratization in regions like the MENA to deterministic stereotypes about Islamic, traditional societies. On the other hand, we cannot make claims to universal positions that promote a single, liberal democratic model of governance.73 If external actors like the EU are genuinely interested in promoting freedoms in the MENA, then a closer inspection of the real interests of elites in this region versus the demands of people, grassroots, opposition groups, and movements is called for. Through such an aspect dawning, the EU can listen more to diverse voices in the MENA and how they perceive the EU’s efforts in the area of democracy-building – its functionality and regional relevance. Thus, the EU can support such processes of identification by encouraging more similar claims to be put forward by people in the ME identifying as free individuals. In other words, the EU can aspect-learn more ways to improve its efforts and move the agenda forward (to aspect change). This is something for the incoming EU Presidencies to take seriously. 71 See M. Pace & P. Seeberg (eds), ‘The European Union’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical Inside-Out Approach’, Democratization 16, Special Issue, no. 1 (2009). 72 Quoted in Abdel-Rahman Hussein, ‘Landmark Sexual Harassment Case Ends in Three-Year Sentence’, Daily News Egypt, <www.thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=17280>, 31 Oct. 2008. 73 See Norval, 2007, n. 30 above, and S. Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific. Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). AIMS The aim of the Review is to consider the external posture of the European Union in its relations with the rest of the world. Therefore the Review will focus on the political, legal and economic aspects of the Union’s external relations. 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