Du Toit, A. (2013). Acts, imagined landscapes: reflections on the discourses of land reform in
South Africa after 1994. Journal of Agrarian Change, 13(1), 16–22.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joac.12006
Real acts, imagined landscapes: Reflections on the discourses of
land reform in South Africa after 1994
Andries du toit
Abstract
This paper discusses the discourses by which land reform policies in South Africa have
been justified and criticized. Critical thought is needed about the underlying assumptions
and frameworks informing policy and critique. While key aspects of populist, ‘Left’ and
liberal ideologies helped mobilize support for land reform after 1994, they framed questions of equitable transformation and justice in ways that obscured the terrain of struggle
rather than revealing it. The broad consensus on the legitimacy of land reform in the
initial decade after 1994 was underpinned by narratives about redress and reconciliation
that privileged reparative justice above distributive equity. It tended to obscure the
complex trade-offs and impacts involved in implementation. Coherent policy-making was
further undermined by simplistic oppositions between ’market’ and ‘rights-based’
approaches that often led to ill-targeted policies. Land and agrarian reform needs to be
liberated from this symbolic burden. It should be informed by an understanding of the
nature of inequality in South Africa and the contribution that agrarian change can make
to reducing it.
Time to think
Why do we want land and agrarian reform in South Africa? Why should its policies
be supported? Much can be said about its stated purposes and goals, but why do these
goals matter – and to whom? Rather than evaluate land policies in terms of their own
objectives, this paper sets them in context and explores their role in the larger moral
and ideological economy of post-Apartheid politics.There are divergent understandings
of what land and agrarian reform is about, or why it matters. Land and agrarian
reform is contested, available to be annexed or appropriated by a range of different
political and ideological projects. Moreover, ‘land reform’ is hardly ever only about
land.‘Land’ matters not simply as a resource or material reality, but also as an empty
signifier (Laclau 1990): a ‘field of meaning’ available for appropriation by a wide range
of different political projects; a powerful, material metaphor for deeply conflictual
political processes extending well beyond the matters directly addressed in land reform
policy.
Andries du Toit, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, Private
Bag X17, Bellville 7535, South Africa. E-mail: adutoit@plaas.org.za
The thoughts set out here arise from many years and hundreds of conversations with friends and colleagues.
Particular acknowledgements are due to Henry Bernstein, Deena Bosch, Colleen Crawford Cousins,
Lungisile Ntsebeza, Cherryl Walker and Gavin Williams. My thanks are also due to the anonymous
reviewers of this article. But this piece is particularly dedicated to the memories of Kobus Pienaar and
Johann Hamman, fighters for equitable rural change and social justice, both of whom played a crucial role
in the early years of this debate, but who are not around anymore to continue it.
University of the Western Cape Research Repository
adutoit@plaas.org.za
Land reform is therefore in part also a metaphorical act, and relates to struggles and
antagonisms that extend well beyond its literal and material consequences. These issues
cannot be ignored. We need to think more critically about how land and agrarian
reform is imagined and evaluated. Without such thinking, questions of equitable
transformation and justice are too easily framed in ways that obscure the terrain of
struggle rather than revealing it, and which make complex policy questions harder,
rather than easier, to resolve.
A fragile consensus
One of the more interesting aspects of the land reform agenda of the early 1990s is
that it existed at all. In the early years of the transition, the South African debate
about land and agrarian policy seemed irreconcilably divided (the ANC for mass
collectivization; an NGO Left built around the struggles of isolated rural communities;
an urban-based union movement informed by an adversarial, industrial model of
labour relations; truculent representatives of ‘organized’ – i.e. white – agriculture
promising to let loose the dogs of war if their way of life was interfered with; and
business opinion – also white – seeing white farming as a liability, but deeply worried
about nationalization and property rights). In a short while this gave way to a broad
consensus around the Department of Land Affairs’ White Paper on land reform (DLA
1997). Usually, accounts of this shift focus on the compromise on the property clause
(e.g. Ntsebeza 2007), but this does not answer the question of what enabled this
compromise to be accepted so widely. An important role was played by a series of
policy interventions (by the World Bank, but also by South African agricultural
economists inside the DBSA and policy- makers inside the ANC) that allowed the
development of an agenda that appeared to reconcile the aims of national
reconciliation, deracialization, global economic integration and jobs for the poor
(Williams 1996; Hall 2010). This was made possible by the way in which these very
different projects were framed as elements of a seamless narrative of enlightened
humanist modernization.
This programme commanded assent across a wide spectrum of political opinion. But
this support drew on a number of different legitimizing frameworks, each of which
presupposed a very different political project. One discourse was primarily
concerned with notions of national food security, sustainability and economic efficiency.
Land reform, from this point of view, required the abolition of the institutional
environment that had protected inefficient farmers from market pressures and that had
created an oppressive racial order in the countryside. The aim was to create an
efficient, globally integrated and deracialized commercial agricultural sector.
A second framework situated land reform within the problematic of national
reconciliation, restorative justice and reparation. Support for land reform was premised
on the need to deal with the politically charged legacy of land theft and dispossession.
This discourse had two very different inflections: on the one hand, there was a
populist, African nationalist project that emphasized the injustice of colonial land theft
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and problematized the legitimacy of the post-Apartheid racial order as such. Closely
related to it but quite distinct, was an essentially liberal discourse focusing on
restitution, reconciliation and redress within a post-1910 framework.
A third framework understood injustice as pivoting crucially on the violation of
human rights. From this point of view, land and agrarian reform needed to create a
legal framework that could protect and empower the marginalized and vulnerable. A
fourth stream saw land reform as serving the aims of equitable economic growth and
agrarian transformation, and saw land reform as ‘kickstart[ing] rural development’ (ANC
1994).
The ability to link these four discursive frameworks was at one and the same time the
programme’s greatest strength and its greatest weakness. The narrative crafted by the
RDP and the White Paper presented land reform as of a ‘win–win’ process that would
deliver stability, reconciliation, justice and economic growth. But its very success in
creating a compelling metanarrative made it all the more difficult to name, and engage
with, the contradictions and tensions that emerged when trying to implement this
vision.
Dreams of reparation
One consequence was that the implementation of land reform became entangled
with the psychological and political aftermath of Apartheid’s history, and the challenge
it posed for the formation of a coherent national identity. An important role was played by
the apparent fragility of the consensus upon which political stability depended, and
the enormous risks (real or imagined) associated with the dread possibility of a
return to de facto civil war. But these dynamics also contributed to the highly charged
nature of the terrain of reconstruction itself. Anger at the injustices of the past; fear of
retribution; sorrow, fear and guilt about injustices caused; confused desires for
redemption and vindication – all these were (and still are!) richly present for all
participants. This means that the politics of South African identity formation are what
Freudians would call deeply cathected: every event or act is pregnant with meanings
infused by histories well beyond the intentions of the actors; every fact (however
nuanced and complex reality might be) is available for construction as evidence for
powerful and often reductive narratives of betrayal, retribution, bad faith, triumph,
failure and so on.
Into this superheated crucible fell the policies and implementation of rural development
and land reform. Cherryl Walker has described the burdens imposed by this reparative
project on the implementation of land restitution (Walker 2005). One of the striking
aspects of restitution policy has been the disjuncture between the wide and unreflective
public support for the idea of restitution and the messy, conflictual and unsatisfactory
nature of implementation. On the Left, this is commonly seen simply as the result of
promises betrayed and the failure of ‘political will’. Others blame bureaucratic
incompetence and inefficiency. What these explanations fail to take into account are the
difficulties that arise when the implementation of real-world policy is entangled with an
essentially symbolic drama: one in which the injustices suffered by specific claimants
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come to stand for the violence of Apartheid itself; in which claimants come to
represent Apartheid’s victims as such; and in which the redress of particular wrongs
serves as metaphorical healing for ‘the nation’ as a whole. Compelling as these
associations might be, they do not offer a helpful framework for the resolution of the
significant real-world complexities of implementation. Rather than a process in which
victims could be (actually and symbolically) recompensed, restitution has become a
policy deluged by jostling victims with conflicting and overlapping claims – and this in
a rights-based and judicial framework in which anyone with access to a lawyer can hold
the process hostage.
The converse is also true. The problem is not only that land reform implementation can
be derailed by symbolic politics. In addition, nation-building is not served by making
something as important as ‘national reconciliation’ and the legitimacy of the postApartheid order depen- dent on something as tricky as land reform.The sustainability of
the post-Apartheid order does require dealing with the political legacies of the past. But
these legacies should be addressed in more effective and constructive ways, and need to
go well beyond the specificities of local histories of land loss.
Quite distinct from the restitution project’s concern with reconciliation and nationbuilding are more populist approaches that expect land reform to address the history
of colonial land theft before 1910. As is evident from Mugabe’s famous description of the
need for land reform as ‘the last colonial question’ (Mugabe 2000), such demands
problematize the legitimacy of the post-colonial political order as such. Given the lack
of equitable social change and the persistence of deep racial inequalities 17 years after
the transition, their appeal is understandable. But such demands have dangerous
consequences for progressive politics – and not only because of the potential
destructiveness of a Zimbabwe-style ‘fast track land reform’ for South Africa. As Walker
has pointed out, these discourses give pride of place to Apartheid-era and essentialist
constructions of identity, and often marginalize gender (Walker 2005). In addition,
they are often premised on idealized notions of a pre-colonial past. The tendency to
link land and identity so closely and ahistorically creates huge problems in the context
of the high degrees of migrancy, mobility and ongoing displacement to be found in
present-day Southern Africa. In addition, essentialist Africanist discourses about colonial
land theft potentially provide ideological cover for processes of elite enrichment that
have little to do with equitable change.
Rights and violations
The enactment of reparative fantasies is not the only way in which concerns with
historical injustices animate land and agrarian reform policy. It is also important to
consider a related but distinct project – one that is focused on the protection and
realization of human rights. Here, I want to focus on the difficulties faced by rights-based
approaches in engaging effectively with equitable transformation on South Africa’s
commercial farmlands. These difficulties relate in particular to the way in which rightsbased approaches often involve a tendency to frame issues of social justice as pivoting
essentially on the defence of people against the violation of their rights by other actors
(see, e.g., HRW 2011). Advocacy campaigns on behalf of farm workers or other
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marginalized rural people all too often portray poor and marginal people simply as
powerless victims who need to be rescued or defended from the depredations of
powerful persecutors. It is easy to see why this happens – particularly when
campaigners need to appeal to distant, apolitical and uninformed audiences in the
global North. But powerful as such narratives are, they can lead to a dangerous
narrowing of the scope of concern. Activists are not well served by a legal framework that
allows them only to become involved when there has been a violation. Not only do such
approaches involve unrealistic expectations about the extent and reach of the regulatory
power of a capacity-strapped state. In addition, they all too often involve an exclusive
concern with the apparent exceptionalism of particular violations, while failing to
problematize the exploitative social relations and impoverishing practices that constitute
the normal operations of capitalist economies.
Perhaps the most significant example is the promulgation and implementation of the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997, which sought to address farm
worker vulnerability by creating a regulatory framework for evictions and by providing
for the establishment of tenure rights at retirement age for long-term farm dwellers. It
may indeed be that this strong emphasis on land rights was appropriate in parts of
the country (e.g. in Limpopo) where the key interests of farm workers themselves
were indeed bound up with long-existent and economically vital relationships to
contested land (Cousins and Hall 2011). But in labour-absorptive Western Cape
horticulture, where farm workers’ livelihoods were primarily dependent on
employment, and where a high degree of mobility was an essential part of the survival
and coping strategies of a transient farm dweller population (Waldman 1993), the policy
did little to shift power relations in farm workers’ favour, and arguably did much to
worsen them. Research is divided on the extent to which ESTA contributed to the
uneven but significant trend towards the downsizing, casualization and externalization
of farm labour.
Clearly agro-food deregulation, supermarket power, price pressure and the tightening of
labour law also played a key role. But it is hard to deny that it exacerbated those trends
(Du Toit and Ally 2004; Ewert and Du Toit 2005). With the stroke of a pen, the
promulgation of ESTA turned Western Cape farmers’ investments in farm worker
housing into liabilities: while, in the 1980s, modernizing employers had seen the
improvement of housing as essential to retaining skilled workers, housing was now seen
as a foothold for the establishment of unwanted tenure rights. It also killed off any
chance, slender though it may have been, of a ‘corporatist deal’ in which progressive
elements of commercial agriculture, the state and the union movement could agree on
ways in which farm employment could be protected under conditions of
globalization.
The issue is not whether rights in general are good things (obviously the entrenchment
and defence of rights can be vital), but the question is which rights, how and where. The
answers to those questions need to be based on an understanding of the nature of
capitalist exploitation, historical process and local social relations of power. In the
absence of such an understanding, purely rights-based approaches have little critical
traction, and can all too easily be marginalized or appropriated by a liberal politics.That,
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at any rate, is what happened on the farmlands of the Western Cape. The tendency of
rural CBOs and NGOs to focus on the excesses of an increasingly beleaguered and
marginalized white family farming class have led them to ignore, and sometimes even to
collude with, the large-scale consolidation of corporate and agribusiness power.
Placing distributive justice at the centre
What then, are the options for an agrarian politics concerned with social equity in
South Africa? A concern with reparative justice all too easily sidelines a focus on presentday distributive justice, and a narrow focus on rights (including land rights) risks
ignoring or legitimizing the social processes and relations of capitalist exploitation.
What would it look like to put distribu- tive justice and a concern with social inequality
at the centre of agrarian policy? This is a complex issue, but it is possible to list some
basic strictures, warnings and guidelines.
Understand and accept the reality of urbanization. To begin with, any agrarian policy
needs to accept the ‘extreme and exceptional’ nature of the South African ‘land question’
as articulated by Henry Bernstein (1996). Agrarian policy cannot be about ‘turning back
the clock’. It has to be about equitable social transformation in the interests of South
Africa’s poor as they exist at this moment in history – including the urban poor. Land and
agrarian reform is not an exclusively ‘rural’ matter: it is about food security, economic
justice and livelihoods both in town and in the countryside.This means that agricultural
land should be seen as a valuable national resource – and that land reform policy should
consider the food needs of the urban poor.
From this, it follows that the challenges arising out of ‘the land question’ cannot be dealt
with in terms of land policy alone. The marginalization and structural exclusion created by
land theft (and by capitalist adverse incorporation) needs to be dealt with – but the
response needs to take the form of a coherent policy for pro-poor growth that informs
economic policy more generally. Similarly, the potent political charge created by the
memories and transmitted histories of Apartheid injustices need to be dealt with – but
it is only in a small minority of cases that they can be dealt with through the vehicle of
land reform.
This does not mean that there is not a land question. We should accept the reality of poor
people’s land demands: but this is not a demand for a return to an agrarian past. It is a
demand for tenure security and residential land that will allow for security, survival and
‘accumulation from below’ in the harsh and unforgiving context of the present-day
South African economy. The key problem relates essentially to design of equitable
human settlements, local government, land use and spatial planning. One question is
how land reform can be used more assertively to reconfigure Apartheid’s spatial
legacy in rural areas. Another challenge is developing a sense of how tenure security and
land-based activities form part of a mix of economic activities in peri-urban areas and
denser rural settlements (Aliber et al. 2011). We should, by the way, forgo the stirring and
meaningless talk about ‘vibrant rural communities’ that characterizes develop- ment
speak on this issue (e.g. DRDLR 2009). Such language merely encourages a flight into
fantasy. We should focus instead on the reality of what’s there – marginalized and
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hybrid livelihoods supported by remittances, social grants and informal self-employment
– and figure out how these can be protected, sustained and encouraged to grow.
We should recognize that we still lack convincing models of commercial agriculture that are
economically equitable and environmentally sustainable. Here, we are in a double bind.
Large-scale commercial agriculture is unlikely to contribute to meaningful levels of
employment, is unsustainably reliant on fossil fuels and agrochemicals, and without
expensive racial transformation it will remain a political embarrassment. The potential
of small-scale agriculture to deal with these difficulties is a matter of intense scholarly
debate (see, e.g.,Wiggins 2009). Although small-scale agriculture may be more efficient
in some respects, and though it is probably more employment intensive, small-scale
farmers are poorly positioned to compete in centralized, buyer-driven value chains, are
not necessarily more committed to sustainable practices, and are unlikely to be able to
meet the urban poor’s demand for cheap food (Mather 2005). More seriously, even if a
small-farmer sector could in theory meet all these requirements, there is the small
matter of getting there. Outcomes are path dependent, and transformation will be
costly. There is a need to go beyond general and ideological battles around the virtues of
small- versus large-scale farming; and to explore whether there are viable and workable
models for change.
A focus on land and agrarian reform that looks only at landownership and at primary
production is misdirected, and will ignore the ways in which agribusiness and large
corporations are trans- forming the agro-food sector in their own interests. A progressive
agrarian policy will therefore need to focus on the contestation of power relations in the
food system as a whole. While land reform implementation has gone adrift, and while
rural NGOs have focused on the outrage of human rights violations by a dwindling
population of commercial farmers, the stable door is open and the horse has bolted:
commercial restructuring of agriculture here and abroad is driving processes of
jobless de-agrarianization for huge surplus populations who have been pushed off the
land, but who are no being reabsorbed into non-farm employment (Li 2007). One
challenge is developing approaches to reining in corporate power, and at the very least
ensuring that value chain governance happens in more pro-poor ways. Another is
finding ways of supporting the development of local food economies not entirely
dominated by corporates, and in which small farmers and local vendors can participate.
What emerges, then, is a politics of agrarian reform that perhaps seems much more
modest. The argument of this paper involves questioning the heroic role often thrust
upon ‘land reform’ in popular imagination on the Left. Far from seeing land reform as
a central, self-contained project of massive redistribution, it is better imagined as a
component of a much more encom- passing but also more constrained process of
political and socio-economic change in South African society as a whole.
Does this amount legitimizing the ‘status quo’ in the South African countryside? I do
not think so. A radical project of critique and fostering equitable social change in South
Africa is possible. But such a project has to start with a recognition of the terrain as it
exists at this time, not as we would wish it to be; with an accurate assessment of
where the critical points of contestation really are – and with critical awareness of
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the often unexamined underlying assumptions, desires and fantasies that animate and
inform discussion about what is, and what should be, in our agro-food system.
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