The Worst Is Still Ahead: The Privileging of Free
Investment over Environmental Protection under
NAFTA
by
Yasmin Mahmoud Salama Gabr
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws (LLM)
Graduate Department of the Faculty of Law
University of Toronto
© Copyright by Yasmin Gabr (2015)
The Worst Is Still Ahead: The Privileging of Free Investment over
Environmental Protection under NAFTA
Yasmin M. S. Gabr
Master of Laws (LLM)
Faculty of Law Graduate Department
University of Toronto
(2015)
Abstract
When created, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was considered historic
since it was the first multilateral trading regime to incorporate environmental considerations.1
This dissertation argues that NAFTA's model of liberalized investment has instead given priority
to economic growth over environmental protection. It is true that in some cases, foreign
investment triggered through NAFTA brought clean technologies; 2 however, these gains are
exceptions rather than the rule. I contend that economic stimulation under NAFTA is coupled
with a weak environmental institutional framework, made up of side agreements and institutions
that are inhibited by, inter alia; the uncertainty of interpretation of its environmental provisions;
the expansive definitions of measures covered, and is exacerbated by the existence of Chapter 11
dispute settlement mechanism.
1
Grandbois, M., & Bouchard, M. C. A. (2011). Public Participation in Transnational Law: Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters in North American treaties. Macquarie J. Int'l & Comp. Envtl.L., 7, 1.
2
Gallagher, K. P. (2004). Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond. Stanford University
Press.
ii
Acknowledgments
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Jutta Brunnee for her
aspiring guidance, invaluably constructive criticism, patience, and immense knowledge during
all the time of research and writing of this dissertation. I am sincerely grateful to her for sharing
her truthful and illuminating views on different issues related to my dissertation which were very
fruitful for shaping up my ideas and research. I could not have imagined having a better advisor
and mentor for my master's study.
I would also like to thank my parents for the support they provided me through my entire life and
my siblings for being supportive and caring.
iii
Table of Contents
Introduction..........................................................................................................................
Chapter One – Overview of NAFTA Key Provisions.........................................................
1.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................
1.2 Pre-NAFTA Trade Liberalization Efforts..................................................................
1.3 Objectives of NAFTA.................................................................................................
1.4 NAFTA Key Provisions.............................................................................................
1.4.1 Elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers (trade in goods)......................
1.4.2 Rules of Origin.....................................................................................................
1.4.3 Trade in Services..................................................................................................
1.4.4 Government Procurement.....................................................................................
1.4.5 Foreign Investment...............................................................................................
1.4.6 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)......................................................................
1.4.7 Dispute Resolution..............................................................................................
Chapter Two –Investor's Rights under NAFTA Chapter 11............................................
2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................
2.2 Article 1101 - Scope of Coverage.............................................................................
2.3 Article 1139 - Investments and investors…………………………………………..
2.4 Articles 1102 and 1103 - National Treatment and Most Favored Nation (MFN)
Treatment……………………………….…………………………………………..
2.5 Article 1105 - Minimum Standard of Treatment…………………….......................
2.6 Article 1106 - Performance Requirements................................................................
2.7 Article 1110 – Expropriation.....................................................................................
Chapter Three - NAFTA's Approach to Environmental Protection......................................
3.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................
3.2 Background Brief of Inclusion of Environmental Provisions in NAFTA………….
3.3 NAFTA Environmental Provisions…………………………………………………..
3.3.1 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Chapter 7).................................................
3.3.2 NAFTA Chapter 11 adjudication of SPS Measures…………………………...…
3.3.3 Standards-Related Measures..................................................................................
3.3.4 Impact on State and Provincial Laws.....................................................................
3.3.5 Impact on Environmental Treaties.........................................................................
3.3.6 Investment.........................................................................................................
3.4 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).....................
iv
1
3
3
4
5
7
7
8
10
10
11
12
14
16
16
17
18
20
22
23
28
31
31
32
34
34
36
38
39
40
41
41
3.4.1 NAAEC Enforcement Provisions...........................................................................
3.4.2 Provisions on Environmental Impact Assessment..................................................
3.4.3 Dispute Settlement Processes.................................................................................
Chapter Four – Dispute Resolution Mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 11.........................
4.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................
4.2 Fundamental Rules of Procedure..................................................................................
4.3 Case Law......................................................................................................................
4.4 Reasons to Purge ISDS from NAFTA…………………………………………….….
4.4.1 Legitimacy– Are foreign investors allowed to Evade Legal liability?...................
4.4.2 Transparency – Public Disputes, Private Tribunals................................................
4.4.3 Review of Arbitral Awards.....................................................................................
4.4.4 Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators.........................................................
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................
Bibliography..........................................................................................................................
v
43
46
47
54
54
54
57
61
62
63
68
72
74
77
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to review the provisions and processes of NAFTA specifically
relevant to investor protection and environmental regulation to be able to identify the on-going
clash between investors' rights and environmental regulation. The analysis will look into the
impact of Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism on environmental protection, demonstrating
the danger it represents to the sovereign capacity of the States to enact laws applicable within
their territory and the damage it has inflicted to the protection of the environment by sometimes
forcing the reverse of some environmental laws.
In the first chapter of my thesis, I will present an overview of NAFTA as a comprehensive trade
agreement that improves virtually all aspects of doing business within North America. I will
examine its key provisions to identify NAFTA overarching obligations related to tariff reduction
and/or elimination for goods, market access commitments, rules governing trade in services and
other provisions.
In the second chapter, I will discuss investors’ rights according to Chapter 11 of NAFTA which
contains a variety of new – despite being long established rights in most of the Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) and International Investment Agreements (IIAs)- rights and
protections for investors and investments in NAFTA countries which ensure agreed standards of
protection to foreign investors. I will look at different interpretations of the established rights as
explained in relevant academic literature and support them by case studies.
In the third chapter, I will look at NAFTA environmental provisions in detail. It will first
examine the key chapters dealing with environmental concerns and their impact on state and
provincial regulatory power in addition to some relevant environmental provisions. This chapter
then deals with NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the new institution established under its umbrella, the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) setting out its specified purposes and
programs. Overall, this chapter is intended to contribute to an understanding of the potential
environmental effects of NAFTA's initiative to liberalize trade and investment.
1
2
The fourth chapter gives an outline of the main rules of procedure of investor-state dispute
resolution mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 11. It then discusses some cases that demonstrate
the reach of Chapter 11 mechanism into critical areas of public policy making in relation to
environmental matters. A focus is put on the concerns that have been raised with respect to
Chapter 11 process of dispute resolution including deficits of legitimacy and transparency. It
considers the disadvantages of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism under
NAFTA and demonstrates how investors can abuse the investor-state system, which may raise
further questions about ICSID’s viability going forward. This will be supported by relevant case
law to manifest the clash between the full realization of foreign investors’ rights and the
protection of environment.
Chapter One
Overview of NAFTA Key Provisions
1.1 Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in December 1992 and entered
into force in January 1994, has clearly led to greater economic integration in North America3.
NAFTA was regarded as both controversial4 and significant5 when first proposed, due to it being
the most comprehensive structure for trade and investment negotiated at the time engaging three
nations with such radically different levels of development and for incorporating environmental
protection. NAFTA included several ground-breaking provisions6 that served as a model for the
subsequent generation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in Western Hemisphere and other parts
of the world influencing negotiations in areas of trade, foreign investment and related issues.
Whether NAFTA has been a remarkable success story for all three partners or not is not our
concern in this dissertation. But it is worth noting that, as with all trade agreements, NAFTA
triggered massive debate amongst scholars. Advocates argued that the agreement would help
create thousands of new jobs, raise living standards, reduce income disparity in the region, and
improve environmental conditions in a country like Mexico. On the other hand, opponents
forewarned that the agreement would launch a race-to-the-bottom in wages by causing huge job
losses in the region as companies move production to Mexico to benefit from lower costs,
undermine democratic control of domestic policy-making and threaten health, environmental and
food safety standards.
3
Brookhart, L. (1993). Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American FreeTrade Agreement. Washington, DC: U.S. International Trade Commission, 7ff.
4
Miller, C. (2013). Atlas of US and Canadian Environmental History. Routledge, 198.
5
Meredith, G., Kose, M., & M. Towe, C. (2004). How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican Economy? Review and
Evidence.International Monetary Fund, Vol 4-59, 4.
6
Until NAFTA, trade agreements only dealt with cutting tariffs and lifting quotas to set the terms of trade in goods
between different countries. While NAFTA contained rules to which each state was required to conform all of
its domestic laws regardless of whether voters and their democratically-elected representatives had previously
rejected the very same policies in state legislatures or city councils.
3
4
The rules contained in the NAFTA agreement can be taken as a baseline for the purposes of our
analysis. NAFTA’s rules consist of those specified in the agreement itself and its tariff annexes.
Of key interest are rules that change those of the Canada- United States Free Trade Agreement
(CUFTA) or the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and hence this chapter makes
some comparisons to the rules found in these two agreements. We will first touch upon preNAFTA trade liberalization efforts and the agreement's objective and then this will be followed
by a discussion of those of NAFTA's specific rules that are of greatest relevance.
1.2 Pre-NAFTA Trade Liberalization Efforts
Of course the process of North American economic integration was well under way long before
NAFTA, particularly between US and Canada. A good example is the landmark Automotive
Products Agreement (commonly known as the 1965 Auto Pact) signed in 1965 between the
United States and Canada 7 that greatly liberalized trade in cars, trucks, tires, and automotive
parts between the two countries. The Auto Pact was recognized as the backbone8for creating an
integrated North American automotive sector. 9 Also, the United States and Canada recently
marked the 26th anniversary of the January 2, 1988 signing of the CUFTA which was one of the
most economically significant bilateral FTAs signed by the two countries.10
In the case of Mexico, the government had been implementing reform measures to liberalize its
trade since the mid-1980s, which shifted Mexico from one of the world’s most protected
economies into one of the most open. Mexico’s first steps in opening its closed economy focused
on reforming its import substitution policies in the mid-1980s. Further reforms were made in
1986 when Mexico became a member of the GATT.11 As a condition of becoming a GATT
7
See the US-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement, signed at Johnson City, Texas, on 16 January 1965.
Text
available
at:
http://www.stewartlaw.com/Content/Documents/HR%20-%20United%20StatesCanada%20Automotive%20Products%20Agreement.pdf , P. 31.
8
Hufbauer, G., C., (2005). NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. Peterson Institute, 367.
9
The Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement removed tariffs on cars, trucks, buses, tires, and
automotive parts between the two countries. NAFTA effectively superseded this agreement.
10
US International Trade Commission (2009).The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, 6th
Report, DIANE Publishing, Chapter 3 US Trade Policy since 1934, 82.
11
The Free Trade Areas of the Americas: Expanding Hemispheric Trade. Economic Perspectives (An Electronic
Journal of the US Department of State 2002), Vol 7(3), 26.
5
12
member, for example, Mexico agreed to lower its maximum tariff rates to 50%. By 1990, when
NAFTA negotiations began, Mexico had already taken significant steps towards liberalizing its
protectionist trade regime as it now has 12 FTAs involving 44 countries.13
Hence, NAFTA was in reality an extension of the free trade relations that existed under CUFTA
at the time and an opportunity to expand the growing export market to the south. An FTA with
Mexico would help U.S. and Canadian businesses expand exports to a growing market of almost
120 million people. 14 U.S. officials also recognized that imports from Mexico would likely
include higher U.S. content than imports from Asian countries.15
1.3 Objectives of NAFTA
Free trade agreements are, in general, credited with enhancing economic linkages between
countries, increasing the availability of lower priced consumer goods and improving living
standards and working conditions. NAFTA, as a multilateral FTA, had been expected to
stimulate trade and investment in North America beyond the levels that existed in 1991. The
agreement is designed to lead to a more efficient use of North American resources, land and
labor by the gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and removing
impediments to investment such as performance requirements16 and investment screenings.17In
12
For details, see: Moore, M. O., & Suranovic, S. M. (1994). Welfare Effects of Introducing Antidumping
Procedures in a Trade-Liberalizing Country. Journal of Economic Integration, 9 (2), June 1994, 241-259.
13
World Trade Organization (WTO), Regional Trade Agreement Database, available at http://www.wto.org; and
Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System, available at http://www.sice.oas.org.
These include agreements with most countries in the Western Hemisphere including the United States and Canada
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western
Hemisphere and entered into agreements with Israel, Japan, and the European Union.
14
"México, Proyecciones de Población". Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO). Retrieved 2013-09-09.
Available at: http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Proyecciones_Datos
15
Kenton, L., V., (Ed.). (2005). Manufacturing Output, Productivity and Employment Implications. Nova Science
Publishers, pp56-57.
16
Performance requirements are used to describe any requirement established by regulatory authority to try to
influence the behavior of foreign investors and secure certain benefits for their economies. They may constitute, for
example, licensing requirements in specific sectors, or may relate to capital structure and management of an
investment such as local equity requirements. As a result, they can distort investment decisions by imposing
conditions on investors that are not related to market considerations.
17
An illustration of the foreign investment screening process is to require foreign investment proposals in excess of
certain monetary thresholds to be screened and approved as being in the ‘national interest’ prior to their execution.
6
addition, the agreement covers other subjects that will affect business in the region, such as
intellectual property rights and environmental issues.
Article 102(1) is specific in the manner in which it lays out the appropriate context for
interpretation of NAFTA’s text. It not only sets out the aims of substantially increasing
investment opportunities and promoting conditions of fair competition in the free trade area, but
it also provides that these objectives are “elaborated more specifically through its principles and
rules, which include national treatment, most favored nation treatment, and transparency".
It is an easy task to list the objectives of NAFTA as clearly outlined in Article 102 of the
agreement, however, it would be more realistic to ask what benefits the consumers and
businesses are actually reaping from the three countries free trade alliance.
Consumers
participate in international trade each day as they purchase goods and services that cross
international borders. This free movement of goods and services are sometimes confronted with
barriers – such as quotas limiting the quantity of products imported or labeling requirements –
that can significantly increase the cost of products.
Under NAFTA free trade regime, consumers are expected to enjoy variety of choices in goods
and services, lower prices, improved quality products and stronger health and safety standards.
Creating more jobs by expanding access to imported goods and services is another benefit under
NAFTA. This is evidenced by the 1996 increase of import-supported jobs when the US exports
to Canada and Mexico created an estimated 2.3 million jobs which represented an increase of
311,000 jobs since 1993.18
Moreover, businesses would have access to the large North American market, new investment
opportunities, effective dispute settlement procedures and compatible standards of goods
between the three countries. The provisions of NAFTA suggest that the economies of the three
countries would be rather described as an integrated marketplace driven by supply and demand
than by barriers to trade.
18
Clinton, B. (1997), Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, DIANE
Publishing, Executive summary, i.
7
1.4 NAFTA Key Provisions
Many of the CUFTA provisions were incorporated into, or rather expanded in NAFTA.
However, the CUFTA did not include, or specifically exempted, some issues that would appear
in NAFTA for the first time.
In this section I will provide an overview of key NAFTA provisions including elimination of
tariff and nontariff trade barriers, rules of origin, trade in services, government procurement,
foreign investment, intellectual property rights protection, and dispute resolution. Labor and
environmental provisions were included in separate NAFTA side agreements. Major focus will
be placed on foreign investment and dispute resolution under Chapter 11 as they make an
essential part of my dissertation.
1.4.1 Elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers (trade in
goods)
Given that CUFTA was already in place, most of NAFTA market opening measures resulted in
the removal of U.S. and Canada tariffs and quotas applied to imports from Mexico, and
correspondingly Mexican trade barriers applied to imports from the United States and Canada.
NAFTA provisions gradually eliminated tariffs on US, Canadian and Mexican products and most
non-tariff barriers on goods produced and traded within North America over a period of fifteen
years after it entered into force. 19 Some tariffs were removed immediately while others were
phased out in various schedules of five to ten years.20
NAFTA includes a provision that allows the option of accelerating tariff reductions if the
countries involved agreed.21The agreement also contains safeguard provisions through which the
19
Glick, L., A., (2008). Guide to United States Customs and Trade Laws after the Customs Modernization
Act (Third Ed.). Kluwer Law International, 22.
20
Glick, L., A., (2010). Understanding the North American Free Trade Agreement: Legal and Business
Consequences of NAFTA, Kluwer Law International, 13.
21
US International Trade Administration (1993). North American Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities for U.S.
Industries: NAFTA Industry Sector Reports, The Administration, 50.
8
importing country could restrict imports if the domestic industry faced serious damage as a result
of increased imports from another NAFTA country.22
Standard-Related Measures (SRM)23constitute an example of technical trade barriers that were
not extinguished but were revamped to protect and serve the needs of the domestic economic
groups. 24 SRM may directly or indirectly affect trade in goods or services, hence the reason
NAFTA stipulates that SRM must provide both national treatment and most-favored nation
treatment.
Furthermore, NAFTA encourages agreements between governments and private sector
organizations for mutual acceptance of test results and certification procedures and establishes
conformity assessment procedures. This aims at determining whether the requirements set out in
technical regulations or standards are being complied with.25
1.4.2 Rules of Origin
The success of NAFTA in promoting trade creating comes despite its restrictive rules of origin.26
The rules of origin established by NAFTA at the outset have been very tough as they require that
products contain substantial North American content in order to enjoy NAFTA trade
preferences.27 The purpose of the rules of origin is to prevent "trade deflection"28, by precluding
third-country exporters from exploiting a NAFTA country for merely trans-shipping products
with the lowest tariff rate or undergoing only minor operations to receive NAFTA preferential
tariff treatment. Only North American goods traded among the three NAFTA partner countries
are eligible for NAFTA benefits. According to Article 401 of NAFTA, two rules of origin
22
The importing country may increase tariffs, or impose quotas in some cases, on imports during a transition period
if domestic producers faced serious injury as governed by Article 802 of NAFTA.
23
Standards-related measures are included in Chapter nine of NAFTA. NAFTA affirms the right of the Member
States to adopt, apply, and enforce standards-related measures to promote safety and protect people, animals and
plants, and the environment.
24
Melder, F. E. (1940).The Economics of Trade Barriers. Indiana Law Journal, Vol 16(2), p. 129.
25
North American Free Trade Agreement, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289, Articles 906 - 908, respectively.
26
Supra note 8, at 24.
27
Rosenberg, J. (1995). Encyclopaedia of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the New American
Community, and Latin-American trade. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 396.
28
Zechner, C., (2002). Expanding NAFTA: Economic Effects on Chile of Free Trade with the United
States (International conomics 1 . M nster: Lit, 86.
9
29
mechanisms are utilized: tariff-shift rules as provided by Annex 401 origin rules, and valuecontent rules30 for those goods which do not meet Annex 401 rules of origin.
That said, NAFTA rules of origin are seen as market-distorting as they have a protectionist side
effect in certain sensitive sectors (notably textiles, apparel31 and autos32).NAFTA rules of origin
for textiles and apparel define a triple transformation test for when imported textile or apparel
goods qualify for preferential treatments. For most products, the rule of origin is “yarn forward”,
which means that goods must be produced from yarn made in a NAFTA country to benefit from
preferential treatment.
33
Moreover, this suggests that these rules may create significant
administrative burdens to trade in goods within NAFTA – by keeping lengthy records on sources
of components used in highly fabricated goods. For example, it was found that compliance costs
entailed by rules of origin significantly offset, and in some cases outweigh, market access
preferences granted under NAFTA - particularly in textiles and apparel.34
Recognizing this problem, some progress has been made since NAFTA was ratified. NAFTA
members have negotiated changes that allow simpler and less restrictive product-specific rules of
origin. The first changes were negotiated for some products including alcoholic beverages and
petroleum which went into effect in January 2003 in Canada and the United States and in July
2004 in Mexico.35
29
Tariff-shift rules require that all non- NAFTA inputs must be in a different tariff classification than the final
product. For instance, a manufacture in a Member State of porcelain tableware decorated in several colors, and the
final product holds a certain tariff heading. Certain materials (plain porcelain tableware, pigments and decorative
designs) from countries outside the free trade zone are used to produce it. If the plain tableware is classified in the
same tariff heading as the final decorated tableware, the working carried out in the Member State of the free trade
zone does not fulfill the product specific rules based on tariff change and the decorated tableware therefore cannot
be considered as originating in the free trade zone.
30
Under NAFTA's value-content rules, a set percentage of the value of the good must be North American. For
instance, in order for computers to qualify for duty-free treatment under NAFTA, the motherboard (a key
component which generally accounts for between twenty percent to forty percent of the value of a computer) must
be made in North America.
31
NAFTA rules of origin for textiles and apparel define when imported textile or apparel goods qualify for
preferential treatments. For most products, the rule of origin is “yarn forward”, which means that goods must be
produced from yarn made in a NAFTA country to benefit from preferential treatment.
32
Supra note 8, at 24.
33
For more details, see: Hufbauer, G., & Schott, J. (1993). NAFTA: An assessment (Rev. ed.). Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics, 6.
34
Supra note 8, at 24.
35
Low P., Baldwin R. (2009). Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System, Cambridge
University Press, 289.
10
1.4.3 Trade in Services
NAFTA Chapter 12 addressing trade in services establishes a set of basic rules and obligations
among partner countries. The agreement basically expands on initiatives in the CUFTA to create
internationally-agreed regulations that ensure cross-border trade in services is conducted in a non
discriminatory manner.36The principles cover a wide spectrum - the provision of services within
a NAFTA country, from one NAFTA country to another, within a NAFTA country by an
individual provider from another NAFTA country, or the consumption of services in one
NAFTA country by consumers from another NAFTA partner. 37 However, there were some
country-specific exclusions and reservations. These included maritime shipping (United States),
film and publishing (Canada), and oil and gas drilling (Mexico).38
1.4.4 Government Procurement
Chapter Ten of NAFTA is devoted to achieving greater transparency in and competition for
government procurement by eliminating the discriminatory practice of requiring the use of
domestic purchasers/suppliers. The mechanisms for liberalizing and opening the government
procurement market to non-discriminatory bidding include predetermined procedural disciplines
as set out in Sections B and C of Chapter Ten and the principles of national treatment and most
favored-nation treatment which will be discussed below under Chapter Two. NAFTA Chapter
Ten covers federal government agencies, provincial or state government entities, and enterprises
in each contracting State.39It applies to contracts for goods and services greater than $56,190 and
construction contracts greater than 7.3 million for federal departments and agencies.40This entails
that NAFTA broadens the scope of liberalized procurement practices in terms of the number of
entities and types of contracts covered than either the GATT Procurement Agreement 41 or the
36
MacDonald, L. (2000). Free Trade Risks and Rewards. Montreal: Published for the McGill Institute for the Study
of Canada by McGill-Queen's University Press, 278.
37
Supra note 25, Article 1213 (2).
38
United States General Accounting Office (GAO , “North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major
Issues, Volume 2,” Report to the Congress, September 1993, pp. 35-36.
39
Supra note 25, Article 1001.
40
Schaffer, R., Agusti, F., Dhooge, L. (2014). International Business Law and Its Environment, Cengage Learning,
387.
41
Government procurement is addressed in the WTO by the Government Procurement Agreement, a plurilateral
agreement i.e. accession to the agreement is voluntary.
11
42
CUFTA .Nonetheless, NAFTA allows the parties to deny the benefits of the government
procurement provisions for strategic and national security reasons as well as to protect health,
safety, morals, the environment, or intellectual property.43
The process of liberalizing North American government procurement markets under NAFTA
still seems to be far from complete. This is implied by Article 1024 that states that Parties may
commence further negotiations no later than 1998 with a view to further liberalize their
respective government procurement markets. This was marked by the 2010 Canada-US
Agreement on Government Procurement where both governments commit to exploring the
potential to a longer term agreement that liberalizes government procurement further than either
NAFTA or to the GATT.44
1.4.5 Foreign investment
NAFTA's Chapter 11 provides a road map for the flow of investment capital within North
America. NAFTA's coverage of investment issues includes all forms of ownership and interests
in a business (minority and majority interests): tangible property, intangible property, and
contractual rights.45
Chapter 11 is divided into 3 sections. Section (A) setting out the investment obligations as agreed
to by the NAFTA Parties. These obligations relate to the treatment of investors and investments
of the other NAFTA Parties in their territories. They will be explained in detail in Chapter Two.
Section (B) laying out the procedures for the settlement of disputes between a Party and an
Investor or an investment of another Party within its territory. This investor-protection
mechanism provides recourse for alleged breaches of the provisions of Section (A) of Chapter 11
by a Party that have resulted in loss or damage to the investment of an investor. Investors may
42
Weiler., J., H., H. & Cho., S. (2006). The Law of Regional Economic Integration in the American Hemisphere:
Unit
XV
Government
Procurement,
pp.
2-3.
Available
at:
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/courses/nafta/docs/NAFTA_UnitXV_GovProc_2006.pdf.
43
Supra note 25, Article 1018.
44
Available at: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-vendreaugouvusa/procurement-marches/agreementaccord.aspx?lang=eng
45
Supra note 25, Article 1139.
12
also use the dispute settlement mechanism outlined in Section B of Chapter 11 to resolve certain
disputes arising out of alleged breaches of the NAFTA Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises) and
Article 1502(3) (Monopolies and State Enterprises). When investor rights were first introduced,
the Chapter 11 provisions were, prima facie, uncontroversial, in fact, they were hailed as a better
forum than national courts for resolving investment disputes.46 In practice, however, Chapter 11
rules (e.g. the ban on indirect expropriation under Article 1110 and the minimum standards under
Article 1105) have fostered litigation by business firms against a broader range of government
activity than originally envisaged. Dispute settlement mechanism will be explained in detail later
in Chapter Four, and finally section (C) consisting of definitions of certain terms found in the
NAFTA Chapter 11.
The principles included in the NAFTA are not unprecedented, and the dispute resolution
mechanisms listed for investor-state disputes are drawn from literally hundreds of bilateral
investment treaties.47 Despite of that, investment provisions were subject to some reservations
maintained by NAFTA countries such as Mexico that reserved the right to prohibit foreign
investment in the energy sector in order to maintain its constitutional ban in this regard. 48
1.4.6 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
IPR are rights granted to inventors, artists, and other creators regarding the use of their
innovations.49The focal point of NAFTA's Chapter 17 differs in some aspects from the general
coverage of the whole agreement as presented earlier in this chapter in that its focus is placed on
the protection of intellectual property rather than measures associated with liberalization of trade
and improving market access. NAFTA built upon and went beyond the then-ongoing Uruguay
Round negotiations that have created the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
46
Coe Jr, J. J. (2003). Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes,
Issues, and Methods. Vand. J. Transnat'l L., 36, 1424.
47
Bishop, R., Crawford, J., & Reisman, W. (2005). Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials, and
Commentary. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1391.
48
See Brookhart, supra note 3, at 17-1, 17-2.
49
Gailly, B. (2010). Developing Innovative Organizations: A Roadmap to Boost Your Innovation Potential.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 128.
13
(TRIPS) agreement in the World Trade Organization and on various existing international
intellectual property treaties including the Berne Convention and Geneva Convention.50
The rationale for incorporating IPR protection provisions in a trade agreement like NAFTA is to
ensure its consistency with free trade principles; otherwise trade will be rather strangled if the
laws of one country do not protect the intellectual property of its trading partners. NAFTA's
approach in this regard involves three main points. First, Chapter 17 of NAFTA provides for
minimum standards of intellectual property protection revolving around non-discriminatory
national treatment in IPR protection provided by each party in its territory.51 Second, NAFTA
requires that effective and expeditious enforcement procedures are in place and available to
rights holders to ensure that IPR holders are protected from infringement by imported products.52
In all events, IPR enforcement measures should not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade. Finally, in addition to Chapter 17 provisions, the more general enforcement provisions are
found in Chapters 11 and 20. IPR holders in the three NAFTA countries can have recourse to
mechanisms of both mentioned chapters when domestic law doesn’t adequately protect their
rights in case of IPR infringements. Chapter 11 allows a private investor to bring a claim directly
against a NAFTA state party that has allegedly infringed its intellectual property rights and
caused damages. Chapter20 provides a procedure for one state party to bring a complaint against
another, to be settled by means of a specified dispute resolution process.53
The threat to public welfare from intellectual property rules rises when the protection of IP
holders' rights comes at the expense of environmental protection. 54 The U.S. competitive
advantage in high technology is now fully protected under NAFTA, while a country like Mexico
would be the country most affected by the inclusion of IPR in NAFTA due to the expected
shortcomings in a developing country's IPR protection. Developing countries had traditionally
50
Condon, B. (2002). NAFTA, WTO, and Global Business Strategy: How AIDs, Trade, and Terrorism Affect Our
Economic Future. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 116.
51
Barbour, E. (2010). Trade Law: An Introduction to Selected International Agreements and US Laws. CRS Report
for Congress, DIANE Publishing, 36.
52
Ryan, M. (1998). Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 123.
53
For more details, see Stamatoudi, I. (2010). Copyright Enforcement and the Internet (Information Law Series ed.,
Vol. 21). Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 94.
54
An example is the negative effect of intellectual property protection on biodiversity. For more details, see
McManis, C. R. (1998). Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection:
Biodiversity and Biotechnology, The. Wash. ULQ, 76, 255.
14
excluded food and medicine from their IPR laws to insure that these basic necessities are
accessible, affordable and not controlled by monopolies. 55 But now under trade rules, living
things – plant, animal, and human – can be patented on a world-wide scale.
1.4.7 Dispute resolution
This part covers the different methods of dispute resolution mechanisms provided by NAFTA
chapters for various purposes such as the interpretation and application of the agreement,
antidumping and countervailing cases...etc, which are briefly discussed below. The Chapter 11
dispute settlement mechanism falls within these methods and will be discussed in detail in
Chapter four of this dissertation.
The number of dispute settlement processes introduced in NAFTA is commensurate with the
general notion laid down by the agreement concerning trade liberalization and breaking down
any related barriers as the possibility of trade friction becomes greater. Starting with the general
dispute settlement related to interpretation and application of NAFTA, NAFTA permits
complainants to choose between NAFTA and WTO dispute settlement56 for any matter arising
under both agreements, but not to pursue the same complaints in both forums. However, the rules
and coverage of both NAFTA and the WTO Agreement differ in certain respects 57; therefore,
NAFTA is sometimes regarded as the only available mechanism for resolving disputes involving
obligations that only exist under NAFTA.
Moreover, NAFTA created a Trilateral Trade Commission to regularly review trade relations
among the NAFTA governments and to discuss the general implementation of NAFTA and
related problems. 58 The Commission may also establish bi-national or tri-national panels, as
appropriate, of private sector trade experts to resolve NAFTA disputes involving interpretations
55
Wallach, L., & Sforza, M. (1999). The WTO: Five Years of Reasons to Resist Corporate Globalization (A Seven
Stories Press 1st ed.). New York: Seven Stories Press, viii.
56
Supra note 25, Article 2005.
57
Perdikis, N., & Read, R. (2005). The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes
between the European Union and the United States. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 21. Bogdandy, A.,
Mavroidis, P., Meny, Y. (2002). European Integration and International Co-ordination: Studies in Transnational
Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 419.
58
Supra note 25, Article 2001.
15
59
or application of the NAFTA. The panels will rule on whether or not an action taken by a
NAFTA country is consistent with its NAFTA obligations. If the panel finds an action
inconsistent, the panel will make a recommendation and calls for the NAFTA country to follow
it "wherever possible". If a country decides not to comply with a panel's recommendation, it
must offer acceptable compensation. If not, the aggrieved country can retaliate by withdrawing
equivalent trade benefits concessions.60
Special provisions were also contained in NAFTA to deal with disputes involving environmental
and health issues as panels may call upon experts for advice. Scientific review boards may be
convened to provide written reports on factual issues to assist panels. 61 This provision is an
improvement over the CUFTA, which requires the approval of both parties for scientific input.62
There are also special bi-national panels to review antidumping and countervailing duty cases as
set out in Chapter 19 of NAFTA. The panels' mandate is limited to whether decisions rendered
by Mexico, the U.S. or Canada are consistent with their domestic law. Further, NAFTA
encourages and facilitates the use of alternative dispute settlement, including arbitration, for
international commercial disputes between private parties. Each country must have in place legal
mechanisms to enforce arbitration contracts and awards.63 Finally comes along the innovative
provision of NAFTA that allows any investor from US, Canada or Mexico to seek binding
international arbitration in disputes with NAFTA governments involving monetary damages
arising from violations of the NAFTA's investment provisions for example, over just
compensation in the event of expropriation.
59
Supra note 25, Articles 2008-2010.
Supra note 25, Articles 2018-2019.
61
Supra note 25, Article 2015.
62
Charnovitz, S., "NAFTA: An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions", Environmental Law Reporter (vol. 23,
February 1993), p. 28.
63
Supra note 25, Article 2022.
60
Chapter Two
Investor's Rights under NAFTA Chapter 11
2.1 Introduction
Unlike other trade agreements, such as the WTO Agreement, NAFTA devoted one of its chapters
to address investment issues according rights to foreign investors to acquire, own and operate
broad categories of NAFTA-defined “investments” 64 within the NAFTA nations. NAFTA's
investment chapter (Chapter 11) contains a variety of new – despite being long established rights
in most of the BITs and IIAs - rights and protections for investors and investments in NAFTA
countries.
This Chapter analyzes the substantive legal provisions embedded in Chapter 11 that extend the
unprecedented reach of the investor-state process. I will begin with explaining the expansive
range of state actions that are covered under the notion of “measures” and the range of investors
and investments that are covered. I will then move to the five separate obligations imposed on
NAFTA governments which play an important role in defining the relationship between the
investor-state process and environmental regulation. This chapter argues that the investor-state
process in Chapter 11 contains an extensive combination of rights and remedies provided to
foreign investors in the context of an international trade agreement.
The original purpose of the investor-state protections appears, on its face, to be defensive - to
protect against capricious and unjustified government actions against foreign investors.65 Today,
however, the exercise of these rights has drastically changed. They are now being used by
The term “Investment” under Article 1139 of NAFTA is broadly defined, including anything from an enterprise to
a debt security. A holder of a bond from a multinational enterprise is thus an investor, and enjoys the extensive legal
rights discussed in this Section.
65
Salacuse, J. (2010). The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 238.
64
16
17
foreign investors in a strategic manner to shield themselves from the adoption of new laws or
regulations that would have an adverse economic impact on them.66
The threat to environmental and public welfare regulation-making from these protections arises
from the unprecedented wide coverage set out in Chapter 11. A broad range of government
actions are included under the word “measure.”67It clearly covers all forms of environmental
regulation and the administration of those regulations, for instance, environmental assessment
and permitting procedures.
Another substantive factor is also the resulting unique ability for investors to bring issues of
public interest into the arbitration process. This covers the ability to challenge both new
environmental laws and regulations even if they will possibly have an effect on a potential
investment68, and the enforcement of those that exist69. This is heightened by the inclusion of an
expansive definition of “investor”70; indeed, a minority shareholder in a foreign investment can
initiate arbitration even without the consent of the actual company involved.
2.2 Article 1101 - Scope of Coverage
Article 1101(1) of NAFTA defines the scope of coverage of the investors' protections. Despite
being a defined term under NAFTA, the wording of this article uses the broad term measure as it
states that "This chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to....".
Article 201 of NAFTA states that the term “measure" includes any law, regulation, procedure,
66
Grinspun, R., & Shamsie, Y. (2007). Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North America, and the
Corporate Agenda. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 416.
67
Supra note 25, Article 201.
68
For example, Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of America, which is a NAFTA arbitration conducted in
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules before the ICSID Additional Facility. Glamis is a publicly-held
Canadian corporation engaged in the mining of precious metals, who alleged injuries relating to a proposed gold
mine project in Imperial County, California. Glamis challenged Senate Bill 22, a regulation that was newly issued
by California State Mining and Geology Board at the time and could have adversely affected Glamis Plan of
Operations if implemented. Glamis claimed damages of not less than $50 million.
69
An example is Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada, an Ad Hoc
NAFTA Arbitration conducted under UNCITRAL Rules. This was a lawsuit against Canada by the manufacturer of
an agricultural pesticide, lindane. Following an elaborate scientific review, the Canadian Pesticide Regulation
Agency banned lindane in the early 2000s on health and environmental grounds. Chemtura lobbied against the
enforcement of the ban in Canada, challenged Canada’s measures in the Federal Court of Canada, and then sued
Canada under NAFTA Chapter 11.
70
Supra note 25, Article 1139.
18
requirement or practice.” The definition itself is not firm the word "includes" implies that there
are other forms of government actions that could also be considered a measure under NAFTA,
such as policies or orders.
A relevant case here is the Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of
America. 71 This case involves an award issued by the Mississippi state courts in O'Keefe v.
Loewen Group, Inc, 72 resulting in a $500 million damage award against the Loewen Group, a
Canadian investor. This arguably raises a question as to whether a jury ruling in a civil contract
case constitutes a "government measure" against which foreign investors are granted NAFTA
protections. A preliminary ruling issued by the ICSID tribunal in this case stated that there is
nothing that prohibits Chapter 11 claims related to private law and civil procedures. 73 This
illustrates the potential breadth of the term “measure” as used in Chapter 11.
2.3 Article 1139 - Investments and investors
The scope of Chapter 11 is further defined by Article 1139 which defines the term "investment"
to include virtually any enterprise, any form of equity participation in an enterprise; debt
security; any loans to an enterprise; property, including intangible or intellectual property,
acquired in the expectation of an economic benefit; interests arising from the commitment of
capital or other resources in the territory of a party; and so on. It follows that minority
shareholders in a company and often passive investors can all use the rights granted to investors
under Chapter 11 without even having the consent of the concerned company itself. 74In other
words, an investor is only required to show loss or damage to his interest in an investment – that
could be a fairly minimal investment - in order to file an action under Chapter 1175 and which
can be used to found full challenges to environmental measures.
71
The Loewen Group Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. The United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Notice of Claim, Submitted by Loewen Group on October 30, 1998.
72
O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Circ. Ct. 1st Jud.Dist., Hinds County 1995).
73
The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity: Proceedings of the 31st Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 24-26, 2002 (p. 127). (2004). The
Hague: Kluwer Law International.
74
The company consent is only required only if the investor was actually suing on behalf of the company, rather than
out of alleged damage to its own investment in the company.
75
Supra note 25, Article 1121.
19
An illustrative example is Lone Pine Resources Inc. v The Government of Canada, which was
filed in November 2013 under NAFTA Chapter 11. Lone Pine is organized under the laws of and
is registered in the State of Delaware, while its principal place of business is based in Calgary,
Canada where it has its facilities and maintains its operations. It held several permits and
approvals from the government of Quebec to recover shale gas from beneath the St. Lawrence
River.76 A moratorium was placed by Quebec on hydraulic fracturing operations beneath the St.
Lawrence River by suspending Lone Pine's permits relating to oil and gas resources and
subsequently implemented legislation purporting to revoke these permits without compensation.
Lone Pine is seeking damages in $ 250 million in damages claiming that Canada violated its
obligations under Chapter 11, including Article 1105 to accord U.S. investors with “treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security,” and also its obligation under Article 1110 not to expropriate investments of U.S.
investors without a public purpose, without due process, and without the payment of
compensation.77.It is thwarting to even think that Canada would have to pay Lone Pine in order
not to continue its drilling operations for safeguarding the environment - ironically a scenario
that any domestic investor would not be privileged enough to enjoy. At this pace, we are likely to
see even more dangerous cases attacking environmental laws and regulations in private tribunals.
It appears that the major investment in relation to this claim is the company organized under the
laws of Alberta where its conduct of operations is located, and the establishment mainly and
largely affected by Quebec actions is the same Canadian, not the enterprise registered in
Delaware. This suggests that the mere registration of the company in Delaware was used to
qualify it as a foreign investment in order to have access to the extraordinary rights and remedies
established in Chapter 11.
76
Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (NonConfidential) (8 November 2012), online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
<www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/lone-01.pdf> at paras 2-8.
77
Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration - Paragraph 14,
(September 6 2013) <http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1607>
20
2.4 Articles 1102 and 1103 - National Treatment and Most
Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment
These two principles establish the backbone of the non-discrimination obligation imposed on
NAFTA countries. 78 The national treatment and MFN standards establish the obligation to
accord to investors of other NAFTA countries no less favorable treatment than they give to their
own investors or investors of another Party or non-parties.79 Put differently, all NAFTA parties
shall be “most-favoured”.
Ethyl Corporation, a US Company, manufactured a fuel additive, MMT, to increase the octane
level in unleaded gasoline. MMT contains manganese, a potential human neurotoxin. Ethyl's
wholly owned Canadian subsidiary, Ethyl 80Canada, imported this gasoline additive into Canada
and, after processing it, distributed it across the country. 81 In 1997, because of health and
environmental considerations, the Canadian parliament prohibited the import of MMT into
Canada and also prohibited inter-provincial trade of the additive within Canada under a federal
statute. Ethyl claimed damages in a tribunal established under the rules of the UNCITRAL.82
Invoking the "national treatment" article, Article 1102, Ethyl alleged that by banning MMT's
import in the absence of a domestic ban on the production and sale, Canada had breached its
obligation to treat foreign sovereign in a "no less favorable manner" than domestic investors. 83 It
alleged that the import ban created less favourable treatment for investors that imported MMT
than for investors that manufactured MMT, or a competitive product, domestically. However,
there had never been any domestic Canadian production of MMT – it was only imported.84
78
Singh, K. (2003). Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO: Issues and Illusions, Manila: Asia-Pacific
Research Network Public Interest Research Centre, 20.
79
Supra note, Articles 1102-1103.
80
It passed the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act 1997, c. 11.
81
Murphy, S. (2002). United States Practice in International Law: Volume 1, 1999-2001. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 234.
82
Ibid.
83
Statement of Claim, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, October 2, 1997, paras. 33-36.
84
Nanda, V., & Pring, G. (2012). International Environmental Law and Policy for the 21st Century: 2nd Revised
Edition. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 567.
21
In its Notice of Arbitration, Ethyl argued that "even formally identical equal treatment could in
practice still result in less favourable treatment for a foreign product, and that the term “no less
favourable” calls for “effective equality” in treatment in respect of the application of laws and
regulations.85
In Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, the investor, as
mentioned earlier, was the defendant in a civil suit filed against its US subsidiary in Mississippi.
Loewen's central allegation was that the Mississippi civil proceedings were deliberately biased
that they amount to a denial of justice of procedural and substantive aspects contrary to the
minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA.86It further alleges bias and lack of due process
by effectively being denied the right to appeal which is considered a denial of its right to equal
protection under the law, and hence of the national treatment obligation. The Notice of Claim
invoked, among other grounds, the national treatment obligation based on the no less favourable
treatment standard. This was tied to deliberate efforts to inflame the jury specifically because of
the company’s foreign status.87
Further, it is common in US civil cases for excessive jury awards to be reduced on appeal for
"good cause". To initiate an appeal, Loewen would have had to post a bond into court of 125%
of the award against it, a requirement beyond its financial capacity. The appeal court had the
discretion to reduce this requirement, but refused to do so, instead required the bond to be posted
within seven days of its decisions for the appeal to be heard.88
Finally, it is useful to note that the national treatment and MFN principles apply to all stages of
conducting business between NAFTA parties and a potential investor. They apply to “the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments." 89 This would include, for instance, environmental assessment and
85
Notice of Arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
and the North American Free Trade Agreement, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, April 14, 1997, para. 15-17.
86
Matiation S. (2014), Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free Trade Commission
Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 J. Int'l L. 451, 452. Available at:
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/3
87
Supra note 71, Notice of Claim, October 30, 1998, pp. 50-51.
88
Supra note 85, at 456.
89
Supra note 25, Article 1102 (1), (2) and Article 1103 (1), (2).
22
issuing permits based on environmental studies or factors. This too could make a good argument
for foreign investors to challenge like measures for being encumbering or constraining
conditions in relation to the construction or operation of a facility as compared to a domestic
facility and, therefore, provide a basis for compensation.
2.5 Article 1105 - Minimum Standard of Treatment
Article 1105 contains a requirement to accord foreign investors "minimum standard of
treatment" as per the norms on treatment of aliens under international law. The text leaves this
requirement undefined by including vague prose about fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security in accordance with customary international law. 90 The purpose of setting
such a minimum standard is to ensure that the national treatment test is not applied so as to
produce a situation where nationals and foreign investors are treated equally badly. 91 They
should be met, whether domestic investors receive a similar minimum level of guarantees or not.
The threshold of this minimum standard provision lies in providing due process and good faith
considerations that ensure fair and equitable treatment of an investor.92 This entails being free
from malicious, unreasonable or discriminatory measures.
Several cases provide some
illustration of the nature and role of the minimum international treatment provision under
Chapter 11.
In S.D. Myers v. Canada, a US hazardous waste disposal company operated a PCB waste
treatment service in Ohio. It had a Canadian affiliate, S.D. Myers Canada. The affiliate exported
PCB to its parent company in Ohio for treatment and recycling services. The US Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) authorized such imports through an enforcement discretion,
although it had determined them to be harmful both to humans and the environment and had
banned them under its Toxic Substances Control Act for 15 years prior to that time. Canada then
90
Bjorklund, A., & Fortier, L. (2014). Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy, 2012-2013. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, USA, 293.
91
Mann, H., & Moltke, K. (1999). NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the
Investor-state Process on the Environment. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable
Development, 32.
92
Vandevelde, K. J. (2010). Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, A.NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol., 43:43, p. 48.
23
banned exports of PCB wastes under its Environmental Protection Act.93 The S.D. Myers Notice
of Intent to arbitrate states simply that the PCB export ban was promulgated in a discriminatory
and unfair manner which constituted a denial of justice, thereby breaching the requirement of
Article 1105.94 A majority of the tribunal also concluded that a breach of article 1102 establishes
a breach of 1105, in part because the minimum standard was considered broader in scope than
the national treatment provisions.95
In the aforementioned Loewen Group case, the linkage between the alleged inappropriate
treatment by the host country and the fact that they are foreign investors is highlighted. In its
claim, Loewen alleges that the Mississippi judicial process violated NAFTA provisions in
relation to foreign investor’s entitlement to a fair and impartial hearing before any court or
tribunal, free of irrelevant and discriminatory remarks and considerations. It further argues that
the introduction of anti-Canadian testimony and counsel comments during the trial violated
Articles 1102 and 1105. 96
Loewen’s arguments also address the concepts of a substantial denial of justice through an
egregiously wrong or excessive judgment (or decision), or through a procedural denial of
justice.97 Therefore, it follows that the mentioned concepts are be properly recognized as part of
the minimum standard requirement.
2.6 Article 1106 - Performance Requirements
Article 1106 provides a series of prohibitions on host countries against making the right of
investment dependent on fulfilling certain requirements or conditions to be imposed on investors
as a condition of entry and establishment. Requirements like the sourcing of domestic inputs or
those linked to the export or import of a manufactured product might reduce the investment's
93
Nanda & Pring, supra note 83, at 569.
Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, July 21, 1998, para. 12.
95
Matiation, supra note 85, at 476.
96
Supra note 71, Notice of Claim, at para. 43-139.
97
Supra note 71, Notice of Claim, at paras. 50-59.
94
24
efficiency and competitiveness. 98 Unlike most provisions of NAFTA, these performance
requirement prohibitions apply to all investments, domestic and foreign. 99 However, domestic
investors are not allowed to have recourse to any of the remedies that foreign investors have
under the investor-state process.
The main performance requirement prohibitions are set out in Article 1106(1). There are two
separate environmental exceptions for these rules. The first exception is included in Article
1106(2), a technology requirement that might fall under paragraph (f) 100 but that is imposed in
order to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental requirements is not considered
in violation to the prohibition in that paragraph, as long as it is in line with Articles 1102 and
1103, i.e. is non-discriminatory.
The second one is in Article 1106(6 . It allows, by way of exception, measures “(a necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, or (b) necessary for the conservation of living or
non-living exhaustible natural resources,” provided the measures are not applied in an arbitrary
or unjustifiable manner, and do not constitute a disguised barrier to trade or investment. This
exception brings into play the necessity test under trade law in order for a measure to be noninconsistent.
In the trade law context, in the Appellate Body Report concerning
Brazil's imposition of an import ban on retreaded tyres, it set out the elements of the Article XX
test as follows: in assessing the necessity of the impugned measure, "a panel must consider the
relevant factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the
contribution to the achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade restrictiveness.101
98
Newcombe, A., & Paradell, L. (2009). Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment. Austin:
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 418-419.
99
Supra note 25, Articles 1101(1) (c) and 1106 (1).
100
Article 1106 (f)reads as follows: "No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, or enforce
any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct
or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory: [...] (f) to transfer
technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory, except when the
requirement is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or
competition authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws or to act in a manner not inconsistent with
other provisions of this Agreement [..].
101
This test is derived from Article XX of the GATT. Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres
(Brazil - Retread Tyres), Report of the Appellate Body WT/DS332/AB/R (2007) at para. 178.
Availableat:
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009Html.aspx?Id=81686&BoxNumber=3&DocumentPartNu
mber=1&Language=E&Window=L&PreviewContext=DP&FullTextSearch=#KV_GENERATED_FILE_000012.ht
m
25
There are no clear-cut guidelines as to what constitutes a performance requirement.102In the S.D.
Myers case, it was argued that a trade measure constitutes a performance requirement, with the
export ban on PCB wastes being identified as a performance requirement for waste disposal
operators to use Canadian services and facilities only, thereby creating a preference for Canadian
service providers.103
Also, in the Ethyl case, the trade ban on the gasoline additive MMT was argued to be a
performance requirement, in breach of the obligation not to require an investor to achieve a
certain level of domestic content for inputs into its products or manufacturing processes. Ethyl
claimed that (1) the ban forced it to use domestically produced substitutes in place of the additive
it was importing, (2) it required Ethyl to build MMT facilities and operations in each Canadian
province, and (3) it forced them to open and operate domestic production facilities to use only
domestically produced MMT. 104
While Ethyl considered the effect of the ban on its business operations, the Canadian government
relied on the text and form of the legislation. This is evidenced in its Statement of Defence as it
stated that Article 1106 was “intended to cover conditions or obligations placed on the presence
or operation of a business in the territory of a Party,” and the legislation placed no such
requirements on any investor.105These examples manifest a high probability that a trade measure,
which could be driven by environmental considerations, be challenged as a performance
requirement under Chapter 11, be it an import or export ban, a quota, or a tariff.
In another recent NAFTA arbitration convened under the Additional Facility Rules, Mobil
Investments Inc and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada (‘Mobil’
106
, the tribunal
has ruled in favour of two US-based oil companies in a dispute over research and development
expenditure obligation imposed by the Canadian province of Newfoundland. It ruled that Canada
102
Rovine, A. (2008). Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers
2007 (Vol. 1). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 59.
103
Nanda & Pring, supra note 83, at 570.
104
Supra note 82, para. 43.
105
Statement of Defence, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, 27 November, 1997, para. 86.
106
Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case
No.ARB(AF)/07/4. Notice of Intent submitted by Claimant on 2 August 2007.
26
breached NAFTA Article 1106 (Performance Requirements) 107 and could not benefit from a
reservation specifically adopted for such measures under NAFTA Article 1108.108The dispute
arose following the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board’s (the
Board) adoption of new guidelines in 2004 requiring investors in offshore petroleum projects to
spend a fixed percentage of project revenues on an annual basis on R&D and E&T activities.109
These guidelines were adopted under the Accord Act which is listed as a “Non-Conforming
Measure” (NCM) in the NAFTA, and hence excluding it from the treaty’s restraints on
performance requirements.110The objective of the reservations to treaty provisions is intended to
provide States with regulatory flexibility within its territory. The Accord Act was an attempt by
Canada to ensure that investment in offshore oil reserves produced long term benefits for
sustainable growth and development and to address the oil projects’ many environmental and
technological challenges.111
Despite the fact that the subject of the dispute is indirectly relevant to environmental protection,
it is useful to look at the tribunal's interpretation of an example of performance requirements in
light of Articles 1106 and 1108. There are two relevant provisions in this regard. The first is
NAFTA Article 1108(1) which lists exceptions to which treaty's restraints on performance
requirements should not be applied. These exceptions include any existing NCM
112
and an
amendment to any NCM provided that the amendment does not decrease the conformity of the
measure in order to benefit from the reservation "non decreasing conformity test".
The second provision is Annex I, paragraph (2)(f)(ii) which extends the definition of a protected
NCM to any subordinate measure adopted or maintained under the authority of and consistent
with the measure "consistency test". The question is now did the tribunal consider the R&D
107
Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation
v. Government of Canada, 22 May 2012, para. 246.
108
Ibid, paras 405-413.
109
Glick, supra note 20, at pp. 27-28.
110
Johnson, L. Mobil v. Canada – Ratcheting Down the Scope of Treaty Reservations. Investment Policy Hub,
UNCTAD, 10 September 2013.
111
Ibid.
112
This includes the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, 1987, c. 32 as per Schedule of
Canada to Annex I of NAFTA Agreement.
27
expenditure requirement an amendment to a NCM that must follow the “the non decreasing
conformity test" or a New Subordinate Measure (NSM) that must follow the consistency test?
The tribunal acknowledged the above distinction in its Decision on Liability and Principles of
Quantum (May 22, 2012) [Mobil Majority], paras 305-307). However, the tribunal considered
the expenditure requirement an NSM and applied to it the “non-decreasing conformity” test
instead of the “consistency test". In other words, the Majority reformulated the consistency test
as "whether the new measures enlarge [or unduly expand] the non-conforming features of the
reservation." (Mobil Majority, 336, 341, 411.)
The Majority seems to suggest that only the “character” of burdens imposed by NCMs and
NSMs (as opposed to their weight) can vary, (Mobil Majority, para 339) despite that the three
NAFTA Parties (Canada, Mexico and the United States agreed that a NSM “could impose some
additional and/or more onerous commitments than those that were imposed by the earlier
measure." (Mobil Majority, paras 374, 400).
The question remains; why did the majority proceed in such fashion? One might suggest that the
tribunal might have interpreted it this way out of fear that State Parties might circumvent the
more demanding test for amendments by adopting subordinate measures instead – at the expense
of ensuring the correct application of law. This calls into question the neutralism and impartiality
of the forum in which investor-state disputes are resolved. In doing so, the tribunal failed to
address the specific objectives of reservations to NAFTA as mentioned above as opposed to the
overarching purposes of NAFTA as a whole on which it relied heavily in favour of investors.
Further, the majority of the tribunal give no specific guidance on how “consistency” should be
established in future cases, leaving States with some uncertainty as to what performance
requirements may be permitted under the scheduled reservations.113 Given how an unjustified
breach of NAFTA was found, this award represents a potential expansion of liability under
investment treaties in a manner unforeseen by States.
113
Bendayan, R., Valasek, M. Requiring Foreign Investors to Spend Specific Amounts in R&D Violates NAFTA
Chapter 11: Decision on Liability in Mobil v Canada. Publications by Norton Rose, March 2013.
28
2.7 Article 1110 – Expropriation
Article 1110 of NAFTA guarantees foreign investors just compensation, in addition to some
other restraints imposed on NAFTA state parties in favor of foreign investors as we will explain
below, from the NAFTA governments for any direct government expropriation or indirect
expropriation or any other action that is "tantamount to" an expropriation 114 . There are two
narrow exceptions in Article 1110 setting out certain types of regulatory or administrative
actions that do not constitute compensable measures.115Chapter 11 cases have raised the question
of what circumstances provide sufficient grounds for governments to pay compensation to
foreign investors as a result of environmental protection measures that have an effect equivalent
to expropriation on their business.
The provision on the protection from expropriation is found in Article 1110(1) 116, it provides for
three types of expropriation – as listed above- and four conditions that all must be met in order
not to be in breach of NAFTA rules on expropriation. This of course indicates an intensified risk
of the scope of compensable measures being expanded under this article.
Hence, a measure can be for a valid public purpose, non-discriminatory, and enacted with full
due process but it would still require compensation to be paid if it falls within one of the three
types of expropriation.117 An easily recognized example of direct expropriation is implementing
a public purpose project with legitimate benefits to the public118 such as building a train line
across an existing residential area to be able to transport people more effectively. In order to do
this, it is necessary to expropriate the land even though the owner may not be willing to sell it
and we see no reason to exclude such a result for foreign investors. However, this involves
114
The majority of investment treaties do not provide a definition of indirect expropriation, including NAFTA, which
can be interpreted to create unlimited expectations by investors. In general, tribunals view the two expressions
“indirect expropriations” and “measures tantamount to expropriations” as covering the same concept of being
restrictive measures that fully or partially deprive the investor of its rights.
115
See Article 1110(7) and (8) for these exceptions.
116
Article 1110 (1) states that: " No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment (“expropriation” , except:(a for a public purpose;(b) on a non-discriminatory, (c) in accordance with due
process of law and Article 1105(1) ;and(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2through 6."
117
Mann & Moltke, supra note 90, at 38.
118
Vadi, V. (2014). Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 121.
29
considering whether the state's laws are compatible with investment principles in relation to
expropriation in order to prevent arbitrary expropriation without just compensation taking place.
But, the regulation of different forms of investment activity with a view to preserving the
environment and preventing harm to human health is simply not the same. For instance, an
environmental ban may cause project facilities to suspend its operations temporarily or to
terminate some production line, or to prevent certain products from being used or sold, any of
which clearly impacts on a company’s operation and management. Does this type of measure
constitute a case where the investor will be fully indemnified? Or is it a measure for which the
investors should accept the risks involved and bear its costs because it is driven by
environmental rationale?
Investors' allegations suggest that liability of the government is not affected by the fact that it has
acted for legitimate environmental reasons and in accordance with its laws. As established
earlier, just compensation is required as long as the measure is classified as either an indirect
expropriation or tantamount to expropriation under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, even if the conditions
from (a) to (c) of Article 1110 (1) are satisfied and no matter how critical the public purpose of
the action taken. As NAFTA countries adhere to a general policy of trade and investment
liberalization, this type of regulatory measures is more likely to be challenged using the
alternative legal recourse provided for foreign investors under Chapter 11.
In its Notice of Arbitration,
thyl argued that an “expropriation exists whenever there is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of a property right.” 119 In its
Statement of Claim, Ethyl relied on the MMT ban adverse effects on its business to assert the
threshold of "measures tantamount to expropriation".120
In the Loewen case, it argued in its Notice of Claim that "under settled international law, an
expropriation occurs where government action interferes with an alien’s use or enjoyment of
property”. 121 In particular, it clearly demonstrates the connection between the effects on an
119
Supra note 84, para. 32.
Supra note 82, para. 37
121
Supra note 71, Notice of Claim, October 30, 1998, para. 164.
120
30
investment and the notion of a measure tantamount to expropriation. It argued "The excessive
verdict, denial of appeal, and coerced settlement were tantamount to an uncompensated
expropriation in violation of Article 1110 of NAFTA…these measures had the effect of severely
infringing and interfering with Loewen’s property rights…they were also the product of antiCanadian discrimination, and thus not imposed on a non-discriminatory basis under Article
1110". 122
Finally, Article 2103(6) of NAFTA draws a very important model of bureaucratic review before
certain types of measures can be challenged. NAFTA's "gatekeeper" model is applied to chapter
11 challenges with respect to taxation issues.123It requires private parties to submit their claims to
competent authorities designated within each party for a determination whether the challenged
governmental action constitutes an expropriation in violation of investor protection under
Chapter 11. 124
Each of the above mentioned investor privileges is fraught with significant uncertainty as to how
they will be applied in an investment context, particularly in light of the uncertainty in the
terminology of some terms such as "measure" as previously discussed. Nevertheless, I contend
that cases where environmental or health and safety measures have been utilized as a cover for
protectionism will be clearly distinguishable from those where action was motivated by a
legitimate desire to protect the public and/or the environment.
122
Ibid, paras. 162, 167
Mann & Moltke, supra note 90, at 58.
124
Supra note 25, Article 2103(6) and Annex 2103 (6).
123
Chapter Three
NAFTA's Approach to Environmental Protection
3.1 Introduction
As we have seen, the discussion and examples in the first two chapters illustrate that NAFTA is
one of the most far reaching and innovative trade agreements. NAFTA text deals with trade,
investment, and other aspects of economic life. It brought about extensive changes to the rules
governing North American trade and related activities. These rules often go beyond those of
previous bilateral agreements such as the CUFTA and multilateral agreements such as the
GATT/WTO.125
Further, we have demonstrated that NAFTA's model grants foreign investors extensive privileges
and provides for their private enforcement outside of the domestic courts system. To be able to
fully realize how, in practice, foreign investors' rights laid down by NAFTA may come into
conflict with the protection of the environment, it is important to consider how NAFTA
approaches environmental protection issues and to assess the potential impact of trade and
investment liberalization under NAFTA on the environment.
This chapter begins with an introduction that addresses the background to how environmental
provisions were included in NAFTA. The analysis is then split into two parts. The first examines
the key chapters dealing with environmental concerns -Sanitary and Phytosanitary (S&P)
Measures and Standards-Related Measures (SRM) and their impact on state and provincial
regulatory power in addition to some relevant environmental provisions. The second part
discusses NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement 126 , the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the new institution established under its umbrella, the
125
US Trade Law and Trade Policy. Economic Perspectives (An Electronic Journal of the US Department of State
June 1997),Vol 2(3), 32.
126
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreements also include the US-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) signed between US and Mexico and established two bi-national institutions - The Border
Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and The North American Development Bank (NADBank).
However, although relevant, we will not cover this bilateral cooperation in the context of this dissertation.
31
32
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). To be able to envisage the impact of CEC, it
is of central interest to examine its specified purposes, programs and agenda. Overall, this
chapter is intended to contribute to an increased understanding of the potential environmental
effects of NAFTA's initiative to liberalize trade and investment. It is designed to provide a
number of possible ways in which NAFTA's rules and its institutional forces may be transformed
into environmental impacts. It does not comprehensively provide a conclusive assessment of
NAFTA’s actual environmental effects.
3.2 Background Brief of Inclusion of Environmental
Provisions in NAFTA
In negotiating NAFTA's comprehensive trade accord, none of the governments of Canada,
Mexico, and the United States initially intended to include environmental provisions as part of
the negotiations.127However, the serious trans-border environmental problems, in particular air
and water pollution and disposal of hazardous wastes, faced by United States, Canada, and
Mexico nurtured environmental advocates' pressure, which began demanding the reinforcing of
previous bilateral environmental agreements 128 such as La Paz 129 , and eventually the three
governments were pressed to accept and include the environmental provisions in NAFTA.130
The environment-related provisions included in NAFTA were unsatisfactory to environmental
groups131, they were only politically plausible for the Congress to approve the main NAFTA text
in 1992 and were lauded for their inclusion in a trade agreement132 where the economies of a
127
Graubart, J. (2008). Legalizing Transnational Activism the Struggle to Gain Social Change from NAFTA's
Citizen Petitions. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 5-6.
128
A budgetary and Economic Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Washington, DC:
Congressional Budget Office, July 1993, 96.
129
The La Paz Agreement (Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area) was signed by Mexico and the United States in 1983 in La Paz, Baja California Sur, Mexico. It
established a framework for cooperation on environmental problems that has been carried forward by subsequent
presidential administrations in Mexico and the U.S and is implemented through multi-year bi-national programs.
130
Hernandez, O. (2008). Policy Change and Environmental Governance at the U.S.-Mexico Border: The Creation
and Development of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission/North American Development Bank. Ann
Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 153.
131
Steinberg, R. (2002). The Greening of Trade Law: International Trade Organizations and Environmental Issues.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 191.
132
Tiemann, M., “NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives,” Congressional Research Service. (March
1, 2000).
33
major industrial country (the United States) and a developing country (Mexico) were brought
together, along with Canada, to create a major free trading zone.
This reluctant acceptance by the three governments, accompanied by their differences in terms of
environmental priorities and laws were sufficient to give an early indication of how limited the
scope of environmental provisions would be. Consequently, numerous environmental groups
started to question whether NAFTA does enough to protect the environment and public health.133
However, the NAFTA was recognized as inadequate to fill the gaps by the Clinton
administration and there was a strong consensus that NAFTA should seek to improve
environmental quality. 134 In an effort to remedy some of the said problems related to
environment and labor, Clinton stated that he would not sign legislation implementing the trade
agreement until new “supplemental agreements” had been negotiated with Mexico and Canada
regarding those issues.135 Given the considerable divergence between the three countries in their
environmental regulatory powers, priorities, and the status of environmental regulations, they
mainly focused on the enforcement of environmental laws and the assurance that NAFTA would
not undermine the value of environmental standards existing at the time as we will explain
below.
In the end, environmental issues were addressed in two supplemental agreements to the NAFTA.
These were the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the
US-Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement (BECA) which will not be covered in
this paper. NAAEC promotes trilateral cooperation on environmental matters and includes
provisions to address a party's failure to enforce environmental laws and the dispute settlement
process.136
133
Steinberg, supra note 130, at 190-191.
Charnovitz, supra note 62, at 24.
135
Rubin, S., & Alexander, D. (Eds.).(1996). NAFTA and the Environment (NAFTA Law and Policy Series, Vol. 3).
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 26.
136
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), 32 ILM 1482 ( 13 September 1993),
Article 1.
134
34
3.3 NAFTA Environmental Provisions
The preamble of the NAFTA agreement expresses the resolve of the NAFTA governments to
undertake their obligations "in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation, ... to strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations [and] to promote sustainable development."137 This at least provides a shield against
accusations directed to the parties' when complying with their environmental obligations which
are often described as trade barriers.
3.3.1 Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Chapter 7)
Article 724 defines Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) as "standards that protect human
or animal life or health in a state's territory from risks arising from the introduction,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease, or from the presence of an additive, contaminant,
toxin or disease-causing organism in a food, beverage or feedstuff, or from a disease-causing
organism or pest carried by an animal or plant, or a product thereof, ….".
Considering the provisions contained within NAFTA Chapter seven and the SPS jurisprudence
that has emerged therefrom, it appears that there are five fundamental principles that would
apply in consideration of SPS measures. First, there is a clear recognition of the sovereign right
of states to formulate, adopt, implement and maintain SPS measures to protect human, animal or
plant life or health, including measures that could be more stringent than international standards
subject to certain agreed rules according to Article 712 setting out the basic rights and
obligations of the parties.
It reserves to each party the right to set its appropriate levels of protection for human, animal, or
plant life or health that are considered appropriate in the circumstances by those states.138 As
appears from the text of the agreement, it places no restrictions on the utilization of this right,
save for two regulatory conditions. The first is that each party is required to consider, where
137
138
Supra note 25, Preamble.
Supra note, Article 712 (2).
35
relevant, the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks, when
dealing with animal or plant pests or disease.139 The second condition is that each party shall,
with the objective of achieving consistency in such levels, avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in such levels in different circumstances but this applies only where such
distinctions result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good of another Party or
constitute a disguised restriction on trade. 140 The operative language of these two conditions
suggests that neither of them represents a threat to the environment or public health.
Second, although there is little discipline on the level of protection that a party sets, the S&P
chapter does regulate measures used to achieve such protection. For example, the measure must
be "necessary" for the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health141 and can be applied
only to the extent "necessary" to achieve the party's chosen level of protection.142My concern
here is that since NAFTA incorporates many of GATT's obligations by reference, there is a
possibility that the term "necessary" be parochially interpreted in the same manner as the
counterpart GATT provision, Article XX (d). 143 Third, NAFTA also requires that a measure be
based on sufficient scientific basis and an appropriate scientific risk assessment and not
maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it.144
Fourth, SPS measures must result neither in an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
a party's goods and like goods of another Party or between goods of another Party and like goods
139
Supra note 25, Articles 715 (2).
Supra note 25, Articles 715 (3).
141
Article 712.1 reads as follows: "Each Party may, in accordance with this Section, adopt, maintain or apply any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health in its
territory, including a measure more stringent than an international standard, guideline or recommendation."
142
Article 712.5 reads as follows: "Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts,
maintains or applies is applied only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate level of protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility."
143
Article XX (D) of the GATT provides that: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (d) necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enforcement, ….". For a GATT-inconsistent measure to be justified, it must be shown
that: (1) that the measure must be designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not themselves
inconsistent with some provision of the GATT (2) that the GATT-inconsistent measure is necessary to secure such
compliance. Several GATT and WTO panels have interpreted the term "necessity" within the context of relevant
Article XX exceptions. However, the exact scope and meaning of the necessity test as interpreted by GATT and,
later, by WTO tribunals remain unclear.
144
Supra note 25, Article 712.3.
140
36
of any other country, where identical or similar conditions prevail. It is useful to note that the
introductory clause of Article XX of GATT Agreement precludes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination where the "same" conditions prevail, but NAFTA goes further, forbidding such
discrimination where "identical or similar conditions prevail."145Finally, SPS measures must be
developed and imposed in a transparent manner.146
Overall, these principles are designed to prevent the use of SPS measures as disguised
restrictions on trade by constraining their use to legitimate cases, while safeguarding each
country's right to take SPS measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Furthermore, Article 714 provides that "without reducing the level of protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, the Parties shall, to the greatest extent practicable and in
accordance with this Section, pursue equivalence of their respective sanitary and phytosanitary
measures." This means that parties may work on ensuring that domestic food safety standards,
for instance, are met by imported goods provided that those standards are not in fact disguised
trade barriers. Nevertheless, the text reassures that it is not an absolute requirement by adding the
phrase "to the greatest extent practicable". The NAFTA also established a committee on S&P
measures to oversee implementation of the SPS provisions and to promote technical cooperation
between the three parties.147
3.3.2 NAFTA Chapter 11 adjudication of SPS Measures
It is of considerable concern to touch on the way in which a NAFTA investment tribunal might
deal with an investment dispute involving SPS measures in the fields of human, plant, and
animal life or health. Chapter 11 rules do not even include a fundamental exception provision
that deliberately ensures that no provisions may be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement of measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; such as those
found in NAFTA Article 2101(1) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article
XX(b). The articles most likely to be invoked in the context of SPS measures are 1102, 1103,
145
Supra note 25, Article 712.4.
Supra note 25, Article 718.
147
Supra note 25, Article 722.
146
37
1105 and 1110 concerning national treatment, (MFN) treatment, the minimum standard of
treatment and compensation for expropriation, respectively.
So, in any SPS dispute arising under NAFTA Chapter 11, it is important to rely upon the abovementioned SPS five principles to interpret and prove the content of the investors' privileges, set
out in Chapter 11, in any given case. This authority is derived from NAFTA Article 1131(1).
NAFTA Article 1131(1) requires tribunals to decide matters before them in accordance with
"NAFTA itself and the applicable rules of international law."
For instance, article 1105(1) states that investments must be provided with “treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security." NAFTA tribunals are expected to consider the relevant SPS principles when necessary,
however, the mere breach of one of the rules applicable to SPS measures doesn’t necessarily
constitute a breach of Chapter 11 obligations, as illustrated below.
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,148 the tribunal ruled that the breach of a rule of international law
by a host Party may not be decisive in determining that a foreign investor has been denied “fair
and equitable treatment”, but the fact that a host Party has breached a rule of international law
that is specifically designed to protect investors will tend to weigh heavily in favour of finding a
breach of Article 1105 i.e. it can certainly be regarded as a manifestation of a failure to secure
the necessary amount of “fair and equitable treatment” for an investment in any given case.
A useful report to cite here is one issued by the WTO Appellate Body concerning a ban imposed
by the EU on imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with any of six specific
hormones "Beef Hormones Report". This report reflects a manifestation of the connection
between Article 1105 and Article 712 (3) (c) (which is akin to article 5.1 of WTO SPS
Agreement). The WTO Report requires the existence of a reasonable relationship between the
operation of the SPS measure and a valid risk assessment procedure. 149 A valid risk assessment
148
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, para.264 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Nov. 13, 2000) (partial
award).Available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf
149
WTO Appellate Body Report on European Community Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), para.193.
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf
38
would normally require a government to identify a problem and its possible hazards, and to
evaluate the associated risks, and how the proposed measure might reduce the risks. In the Beef
Hormones Report, the Appellate Body did not consider the risk assessment presented by the EC
as valid ones because it did not focus specifically enough on residues in meat for the first five
hormones and that for the sixth hormone, MGA, no risk assessment had been performed. 150
3.3.3 Standards-Related Measures
As SRM Measures have been dealt with before in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, my discussion
here will be confined to its environment-related provisions. Article 906.1 states that "recognizing
the crucial role of standards-related measures in achieving legitimate objectives, the Parties shall,
in accordance with this Chapter, work jointly to enhance the level of safety and of protection of
human, animal and plant life and health, the environment and consumers."
Article 906.2 further states that "without prejudice to the rights of any Party under this Chapter,
[..] the Parties shall, to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective
standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties".
In a nutshell, NAFTA parties have made commitments by signing this agreement to make
compatible and enhance environmental standards while explicitly securing their right to set their
own levels of environmental and health protection. Also, NAFTA leaves out the "least trade
restrictive" test included in Article 9.4 (4) 151 of the GATT Agreement, which requires that
standards "shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective".
This grants the governments greater regulatory flexibility under NAFTA rules than under GATT
rules.
150
Ibid, para. 201.
Article 9.4 (4) reads as follows: "No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to trade between the Parties. To that end,
standards-related measures shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate objection,
taking into account of the risks that non fulfillment would create."
151
39
3.3.4 Impact on State and Provincial Laws
As we have seen earlier, the sovereign right of nations to set their own levels of environmental
protection is repeatedly and explicitly reaffirmed in NAFTA. It represents an interlocking set of
obligations of the central governments of Canada, the United States and Mexico. One of these
obligations is to take "all necessary measures" to give effect to the provisions of NAFTA,
"including their observance … by state and provincial governments."152
NAFTA explicitly allows the parties, including sub-states and provinces, to enact environmental
or health standards that are tougher than national or international standards.
153
Accordingly,
sub-states and provinces are obliged to take the necessary measures, which could take the form
of enacting environmental measures, and eventually they will sit on their hands while their
proposed measures are being reviewed by and challenged before dispute settlement panels. This
is because sub-states and provinces are not parties to NAFTA and, hence, have no rights under
it.
It is useful to consider a hypothetical example. Assume that Florida enacts a food safety measure
that is more stringent than international or federal government standards. Enforcing this measure
requires the prohibition of importing certain products from Mexico. In response, Mexico files a
complaint. Florida cannot invoke NAFTA Article 712 to state that this standard constitutes its
appropriate level of protection because this right is only available to parties. Nothing even
permits Florida to defend itself before a dispute settlement panel. Even if the US, presumably,
decides to defend Florida's measure, another potential hurdle might arise as a result of the above
mentioned SPS first principle requiring parties to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions" in
levels of protection in different circumstances. The U.S. could then be asked to justify why
Florida needs a higher standard than the other 49 states. Mexico might allege that Florida's
measure is overprotective and hence arbitrary. This example proves that NAFTA, as it stands, is
not even capable of providing the protection that would be anticipated by its environmental
provisions. Article 712, for example, gives the parties the right to set their appropriate level of
152
153
Supra note 25, Article 105. The Standards' chapter (Article 902) has a much weaker requirement.
As evidenced by Articles 712 and 715 for instance.
40
environmental protection, however, when enforced a sub-state might encounter serious practical
challenges as illustrated above.
3.3.5 Impact on Environmental Treaties154
In my view, trade treaties should always yield to environmental treaties given that trade is a
direct cause of environmental problems and that the fast-paced trade regime needs to be reined in
by inviolable environmental regulations, however, NAFTA gives little attention to that. NAFTA
addresses its relationship to international environmental agreements involving a NAFTA party. It
identifies three trade-related environmental agreements that may take precedence over NAFTA
where implementation conflicts arise, provided that the agreement is implemented in the least
NAFTA-inconsistent manner. 155 The listed agreements include the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) which authorizes restrictions on certain
types of environmentally-harmful trade.156 U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada bilateral waste-trade
agreements also are included, and the parties may add others.157 This explicit statement on treaty
hierarchy seems like a promising principle.
154
Independently from NAFTA side agreements, the three parties are also signatories to other international
environmental pacts such as UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (excluding Canada which has turned its back on
Kyoto Protocol in 2011). This extends the reach of the environmental obligations imposed on these countries.
However, although relevant, we will not cover these agreements in the context of this dissertation.
155
Pursuant to Article 104.1 of NAFTA, the Parties are required to use the least restrictive means that is “reasonably
available” and would be “equally effective” for achieving compliance with their obligations under the listed
environmental agreements. Hence, a measure taken pursuant to a listed environmental agreement may still be
deemed inconsistent with NAFTA.
156
For instance, the Tuna-Dolphin GATT case where the United States stated that under the CITES, a party is
obligated to prohibit the importation of products in order to protect endangered species found only outside the
jurisdiction of that party.
157
See Mexico - United States Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border
Area, 14 Aug. 1983, 22 ILM 1025 "La Paz Agreement", Canada-United States Agreement Covering Trans-boundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste, 28 Oct, 1986, T.I.A.S No. 11099.
41
3.3.6 Investment
Article 1114.2 of NAFTA states that "a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate" from
domestic health, safety, or environmental measures to encourage an investor.158 Regrettably, in
my opinion, this provision is not given due weight because of its non-mandatory language, a real
prohibition would use "shall" rather than "should." This non-mandatory nature is heightened by
stating in the same article that it is "inappropriate" to relax environmental measures to encourage
investment, not that it is deemed a fundamental breach of NAFTA to do so. Also, it only
discourages relaxation of environmental laws if done solely to encourage investment, and not
that it is forbidden under any circumstances. Finally, a party who considers that another one is
inappropriately relaxing safety or environmental measures is to request a consultation with a
view to avoiding such encouragement and not even to be heard by a NAFTA dispute-settlement
panel.
3.4 North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC)
This part will examine key provisions of the NAAEC and will discuss briefly the role of the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) established by NAAEC, which is intended to
support national institutions in minimizing the negative environmental impacts of trade.
The (NAAEC) entered into force on January 1, 1994, the same day as NAFTA. 159 By creating a
free trade zone and in light of the absence of any enforceable sanction for breach of Article
1114(2), NAFTA may entice the parties to relax their environmental laws in favor of liberalizing
trade and investment.160 This led to the approach of the NAAEC being to protect and enhance the
North American environment in the context of free trade161, through increased cooperation on
trans-boundary problems and better environmental practices and joint environmental programs.
158
Supra note 25, Article 1114.2.
Johnson. P. M., Beaulieu. A. (1996). The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New
Continental Law. Island Press, 2.
160
Ibid, at 112.
161
As indicated by its objectives set out in Article (1).
159
42
The NAAEC identifies a diverse array of potential cooperation
162
bound by the ability of the
three countries to reach unanimity on priorities and lines of action in its annual program of work.
To achieve its objectives and help the Parties implement its provisions, the NAAEC created the
CEC163, an international body designed to investigate allegations of environmental violations by
NAFTA countries, as per Article 8 and set out its structure, procedures and functions in Articles
9 to 12. The CEC does have a mandate to assist in developing a constructive relationship
between trade and environment issues.
164
Ideally, CEC would: (a) address regional
environmental concerns by broadening environmental cooperation165; (b) help prevent potential
trade and environmental conflicts 166 , acting as a dispute settlement mechanism to resolve
government-to-government environmental disputes167, and (c) promote the effective enforcement
of environmental laws and regulations in all NAFTA countries.168
The CEC consists of a Council, Secretariat and Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). 169 It is
directed by a Council consisting of cabinet-level environmental official of each country.170An
independent secretariat is appointed by the Council and headed by an executive director who is
charged with selecting the CEC's staff.171 The council and the secretariat will be advised by a 15person Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).172
As part of its duty to serve as a forum for discussion of environmental matters that may arise
between the Parties, the Council adopts a cooperative work program on a range of issues
162
Article 10(2), for example, sets forth a non exhaustive list of nineteen possible areas for the Parties to consider
and develop recommendations, including: pollution prevention techniques and strategies; transboundary and border
environmental issues; exotic species that may be harmful; environmental matters as they relate to economic
development and “other matters as it may decide.”
NAAEC, supra note 135, art. 10 (2).
163
Steinberg, supra note 130, at 174.
164
McKinney, J. (2000). Created from NAFTA: the Structure, Function, and Significance of the Treaty's Related
Institutions. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 110.
165
Ten Years of North American Environmental Cooperation: Report of the Ten-year Review and Assessment
Committee to the Council of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, published 15 June 2004, pp. ix,x.
166
Black, B., Hassenzahl, D., & Stephens, J., Gift, N., &Weisel, G., (Eds.). (2013). Climate change: An
Encyclopaedia of Science and History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 1051.
167
Ibid, at 9.
168
Ibid.
169
Steinberg, supra note 130, at 174.
170
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 9 (1).
171
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 11 (1), (2).
172
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 16.
43
concerning the North American environment.
173
The CEC Secretariat provides technical,
administrative and operational support to the Council as well as preparing an annual program,
budget, and reports on matters within the scope of the approved annual work program.174 Reports
on any other environmental matters, including any issue related to whether a country has failed
to enforce its environmental laws and regulations, may not be reported independently as the
preparation of which may be blocked by the Council.175Except for a few important exceptions,
Council decisions are taken by consensus.176 As for the JPAC, it consists of fifteen individuals
appointed by the head of state in each country to advise the Parties on any matter within the
scope of the NAAEC, and to comment on the Secretariat’s work plan.177
Despite the divergence in the level of development across the three parties, the CEC is financed
equally by the three of them.178 The CEC was originally promised a $15 million annual budget in
1994, but as of 1999, was operating on a $9 million dollar budget.179 The inadequate funding of
the CEC has resulted in various shortages, and has contributed to its limited scope and
autonomy. 180It must have also led to a less than efficient performance of its mandate functions
especially in relation to enforcing environmental legislation and to performing as a dispute
settlement mechanism.181
3.4.1 The NAAEC Enforcement Provisions
In regard to enhancing levels of environmental protection, the preamble of the NAAEC reaffirms
“the importance of the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA, including enhanced
173
Wold. C. (2008), Evaluating NAFTA and The Commission for Environmental Cooperation: Lessons for
Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agreements, Saint Louis University Public Law Review Vol.
XXVIII:201, 216.
174
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 11 (5), (6), (7).
175
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 13 (1).
176
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 9 (6).
177
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 16.
178
Clarkson, S. (2008). Does North America Exist?: Governing the Continent after NAFTA and 9/11. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 125.
179
Haefner. S., Parts of the Whole: Critiquing and Repairing Free Trade under NAFTA, available at:
http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2005/hafner2005.pdf
180
Wold, supra note 172, at 227.
181
Le Prestre. G. P., Stoett. J. P. (2006). Bilateral Eco-politics: Continuity and Change in Canadian American
Environmental Relations Global Environmental Governance Series. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 18.
44
levels of environmental protection.”
182
This principle is reiterated among the objectives of the
agreement set out in Article 1, one of which is to “foster the protection and improvement of the
environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future
generations.”183 These provisions connote a policy against lowering environmental standards and
its degradation.
Part Two of the NAAEC discusses "Obligations."
184
The three governments committed
themselves to "promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of
environmental goals" and to "consider" prohibiting the export of pesticides or toxic substances to
the other two parties when the use of the pesticide or substance is banned in one's own territory.
185
The NAA C also requires Parties to “effectively enforce” its environmental laws through
appropriate government action. Further, Parties are required to ensure that administrative and
judicial proceedings are transparent and available and that appropriate sanctions and remedies
are provided to compel enforcement with environmental law.186
Perhaps the most lofty commitment in the NAAEC is the one carried forward in Article 3 which
reinforces the principles laid down in NAFTA Article 1114 (2) and NAAEC Preamble as shown
above, which states:
"Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic
environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to
adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall
ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental protection
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations."187
One may be surprised by the odd mix of mandatory wording (“shall” in NAAEC that is usually
followed by words that often weaken the obligation. Article 3 is an example, as it requires that
each Party “shall ensure that its laws and regulations … and shall strive to continue to improve
182
NAAEC, supra note 135, Preamble.
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 1(a).
184
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 2.
185
NAAEC, supra note 135, Art. 2.1 (f), 2.3
186
NAAEC, supra note 135, Art.5 (1), (2).
187
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 3.
183
45
those laws and regulations.” Similarly, commitments are often framed in an overambitious
language such as “strive for”, “promote”, or “seek to”.
Ironically, at the conclusion of the negotiations of the NAFTA side agreements on August 13th,
1993, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor boasted that NAFTA and its side agreements
would guarantee that America's burdensome environmental and labor regulations could never be
lessened: "No nation can lower labor or environmental standards, only raise them, and all states
and provinces can enact even more stringent measures....".
188
On August 17, Kantor again
opined that, under NAFTA, "no country in the agreement can lower its environmental
standards...ever”.189
Nevertheless, nowhere do the Parties define or establish threshold limits for “high levels", the
commitment embodied in this article, in my opinion, is still vague and because a country may
modify its laws as it sees fit, it is unclear whether this provision will operate as Kantor suggests.
190
The other obligation to “strive to continue to improve” environmental laws and regulations is
no different; it is only an implied obligation not to lessen them in force or effect, while it could
be stronger if it was simply “to improve” them.
Yet, Article 3 in its present form might seem like the most straight forward expression in the
NAAEC reinforcing NAFTA Article 1114(2). Other provisions of the NAAEC may be
supportive of the weak language of Article 3 too. For instance, Article 10(3)(b) states that:
"the Council shall strengthen cooperation on the development and continuing
improvement of environmental laws and regulations, including by[,] without reducing
levels
of
environmental
protection,
establishing
a
process
for
developing
recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental technical regulations,
188
Announcement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements on Labor and the Environment, Statement by Ambassador
Mickey Kantor, U.S. trade representative, August 13, 1993, p. 2.
189
Kantor, M., "At Long Last, A Trade Pact to Be Proud Of," Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1993, p. A14.
190
One might suggest that “high levels of environmental protections” can be evaluated in light of Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration which calls for states to enforce their own environmental laws and cooperate in ensuring that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not have trans-boundary effects by causing damage to the
environment of other States. Despite being non-binding, it includes provisions that are understood to reflect
customary international law.
46
standards and conformity assessment procedures in a manner consistent with the
NAFTA."191
Further, Article 10(6)(b) gives the CEC a potent role in the implementation of NAFTA Article
1114(2), requiring it to "provide assistance in consultations under Article 1114 of NAFTA where
a Party considers that another Party is waiving or derogating from, or offering to waive or
otherwise derogate from, an environmental measure as an encouragement to establish, acquire,
expand or retain an investment of an investor, with a view to avoiding such encouragement."
These commitments and most of the other party obligations in the NAAEC have rightly been
described as “akin to unilateral declarations of intention since they are not enforceable under the
NAAEC.”192
3.4.2 Provisions on Environmental Impact Assessment
The NAAEC also put into effect provisions regarding environmental impact assessment, article
2(1)(e) obligates each party to "assess, as appropriate, environmental impacts."193Further, Article
10(6)(d) requires the CEC Council to "consider on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of
the NAFTA." Conducting environmental assessment is an important tool for considering the
environmental implications of economic development and for which the CEC has developed
models194. For instance, concerning the scale effects of economic activities (i.e., more tradestimulated economic activity means more impact), the work of the CEC has shown that the
increased production, resource exploitation, transportation and energy needs that result from
increased trade “pose serious challenges to environmental infrastructures and policy
implementation".195 Indeed, the environmental impacts have been well documented to show that
191
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 10(3)(b).
Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note, 158, at 146.
193
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 2(1)(e).
194
The C C has concluded that “no single or ‘best’ assessment method exists, and that a range of different
approaches, models, indicators and means of building meaningful correlations between free trade and environmental
change ought to be pursued simultaneously. Work thus far shows a sufficient empirical basis to suggest causality
between trade liberalization and trade expansion, and changes in both environmental quality, and environmental
policies.” Scott Vaughan & Greg Block, C C Secretariat, Free Trade and the Environment: The Picture Becomes
Clearer 31 (2002).
195
Wold. C. (2008), supra note 172, at 224.
192
47
the commitments to environmental protection in the post-NAFTA period have weakened and
regrettably resulting in substantial depletion of specific natural resources. For example, NAFTA
has led to increased water pollution from nitrogen loading in areas of intensive farming.196
3.4.3 Dispute Settlement Processes
Perhaps most notable are the NAAEC's dispute settlement processes that, as a last resort, may
impose monetary assessments and sanctions in order to effectively enforce their environmental
laws. The NAAEC established two measures: a citizen-driven accountability mechanism that can
yield detailed investigative reports, called factual records, on allegations that a party has failed to
effectively enforce its environmental law,197 and a party-to-party dispute process that can lead to
monetary sanctions or loss of NAFTA benefits. 198
We will see below how these processes could be described as deliberately convoluted; however,
this is justified by the Parties' reluctance to adopt effective measures. Historically, Mexico and
Canada staunchly resisted the incorporation of dispute provisions in the side pacts and only
accepted a compromise process that was long on consultation and short on adjudication.199
3.4.3.1 Citizen Driven Submissions
The CEC secretariat permits "submissions" by any NGO's and private persons residing in North
America to challenge whether Parties are enforcing their environmental laws. 200 Once a
Submission on Enforcement Matters (SEM) is received the Secretariat reviews it to determine
whether it meets certain criteria, and if so, whether it merits a response by the accused party. One
of the factors that the Secretariat considers in deciding whether to solicit a response from a party
is whether "private remedies available under the Party's law have been pursued." The secretariat
may then seek a response from the accused country201 and thereafter may recommend that a
196
Zepeda, E., Wise, T. A., & Gallagher, K. P. (2009). Rethinking Trade Policy for Development: Lessons From
Mexico Under NAFTA, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16
197
NAAEC, supra note 135, Articles 14, 15.
198
NAAEC, supra note 135, Articles 22-36.
199
Hufbauer, supra note 8, at 55.
200
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 14 (1).
201
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 14(2).
48
factual record be assembled subject to approval by the council.
202
However, if the matter is the
subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding, the secretariat may not pursue
it.203With a majority vote of the Council,204 the Secretariat conducts a detailed investigation into
the allegations and produces a factual record,205 which requires a majority vote of the Council for
publication.206
Once a factual record is assembled, the role of the secretariat comes to an end. It is now up to
one of the parties to the treaty to initiate an action if the matter is to be further pursued.207 In
other words, the Factual Record is simply a summary of the facts found by the Secretariat as well
as the legal arguments put forward by the Submitter and whether the Party is effectively
enforcing its environmental laws.208 It provides information to allow members of the public to
decide for themselves if the party has failed to effectively enforce its laws, but it may not provide
a conclusion of its own, make recommendations or require a remedy, neither is it not an
arbitration award or any type of adjudication. 209 It serves only to spotlight the Party's
environmental enforcement practices.210 The Factual Record derives its authority solely from the
independent investigation and fact finding conducted by the CEC Secretariat.211
It appears from the above that the development of a factual record is very intricate and restricted
to cases of public initiation. The Council is only entitled to order the Secretariat to develop a
factual record concerning specific enforcement practices if three conditions are met together: (a)
a submitter identifies them in a submission, (b) if the Secretariat determines that development of
a factual record concerning them is appropriate, (c) and makes a recommendation to that effect to
202
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 15(1).
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 14 (3) (a).
204
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 15(2).
205
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 15(2)-(6).
206
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 15(7).
207
Gerrard, M., & Foster, S. (Eds.). (2008). The Law of Environmental Justice Theories and Procedures to Address
Disproportionate Risks. Chicago: Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, American Bar Association, 768.
208
Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 158, at 158.
209
Ibid.
210
Knox, J. H., & Markell, D. L. Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis of the NAFTA
Environmental Commission. Texas International Law Journal, 47(3):505, 516.
211
Hufbauer, supra note 8, at 160. See also: Wilson, J. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and North
American Migratory Bird Conservation: the Potential of the NAAEC Citizen Submission Procedure, Journal of
International Wildlife Law & Policy. V. 6 (3) (Sept. – December 2003), 23.
203
49
the Council. This entails that the Council does not have the authority, to direct the Secretariat to
deliver a factual record on a particular enforcement failure, unless a Submitter first raises this
issue and the Secretariat delivers the same opinion in a recommendation to the Council.
Further, the Council has on several occasions either limited or redefined the scope of the factual
records from general failures to isolated incidents that were not the main focus of the
submissions.212A good example is the Migratory Birds submission213where the Submitters allege
that the United States Government failed to effectively enforce Section 703 of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. par. 703-712, which prohibits the killing of migratory birds
without a permit.214 The Secretariat recommended that a factual record be drafted concerning the
United States' alleged failure on a nationwide basis to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA). 215 The Secretariat's recommendation provides no indication at all that the factual
record should be limited to two isolated instances of alleged failures to effectively enforce the
MBTA. However, the Council's resolution limited the factual record to two isolated instances of
alleged failures. 216 The submitters emphasized the alleged "systemic" failure to enforce and
devoted a single paragraph to these two instances in their submission just to illustrate the wider
failures. The United States did not even mention the two alleged examples in its response, and
the Secretariat devoted little attention to them in its recommendation and focused on the general
failure.217
As a result of the Council's limitations on the scope of factual records and other limitations they
have imposed on the process, the SEM process has not lived up to its potential.218 This infers that
CEC in its present status does not have the autonomy, the authority nor the organizational
212
Gifuni, L. The CEC Council's Discretionary Decision Making under Article 15 of the NAAEC and its Legality at
International Law, June 14th, 2011 (pp. 24-25). See especially CEC Secretariat Report on The Death of Migratory
Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1994-95).
213
See Migratory Birds Submission (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB, 1999), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf
214
Available at: http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentID=2370&SiteNodeID=250
215
Markell, D., & Knox, J. (Eds.). (2003). Greening NAFTA: The North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Law and Politics. 280.
216
Ebbesson, J., Okowa, P., N. (2009). Environmental Law and Justice in Context. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 221.
217
Ibid.
218
Boardman, R. (2006). The International Politics of Bird Conservation: Biodiversity, Regionalism and Global
Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 73.
50
structure needed to initiate reports, gather information or enforce environmental actions
219
,
limiting its ability to comply with its mandate of promotion of environmental law enforcement.
As demonstrated earlier, the NAAEC does not require a government that is the subject of a
factual record to take any action or respond in any other way following its publication. For this
reason and for the limitations that may be imposed on the process, factual records are not a
particularly promising means to hold the parties accountable for weak enforcement of
environmental laws. In 2012, the Council adopted measures that "call for Parties to follow up on
concluded submissions with information on any new developments and actions taken regarding
matters raised in such submissions."220
3.4.3.2 The Governments Sanctions Process
Part V (Articles 22-36) of the NAAEC explicitly targets systemic or widespread failures to
effectively enforce environmental laws in the NAFTA countries and establishes party-to-party
dispute resolution. 221 A Party initiates this process by requesting consultation to determine
whether another Party is engaging in a “persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its
environmental law,” 222 defined as “a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction
beginning after the date of entry into force of this agreement.”223
When these consultations fail to resolve the matter and the dispute concerns trade between the
Parties, the Council may upon a two-thirds vote convene an arbitral panel to prepare a report
with recommendations for better enforcement. 224 Panelists are chosen from a roster for this
temporary assignment; in other words, they are not permanent judges. They may be chosen for
their "expertise or experience in environmental law or its enforcement," or for other expertise.225
There is no requirement that a panel adjudicating an environmental dispute have panelists with
219
Markell & Knox, supra note 214, at 286.
CEC, CEC Ministerial Statement 2012, online at:
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=25241&SiteNodeID=219&BL_ExpandID=
221
Johnson &Beaulieu, Supra note 158, at 149.
222
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 22.
223
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 45 (1).
224
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 24 (1).
225
Charnovitz, S. (1994). NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation,
Trade Policy, and American Treaty Making, The Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ, 8: 257, p.7.
220
51
environmental expertise.
226
The panel is not permitted to seek information from outside experts
unless the disputing parties agree. 227
If the panel finds a persistent failure to enforce environmental law by a Party, the disputing
Parties may agree on a “mutually satisfactory action plan, which normally shall conform to the
determinations and recommendations of the panel.”228 If the Parties cannot agree on a plan or
there is disagreement over implementation of a plan, any disputing Party may request the panel
to reconvene, which may impose a plan on the Parties.229 If the panel concludes that a Party is
not fully implementing the plan, it may impose a monetary enforcement penalty not to exceed
.007% of total trade between the Parties in accordance with Annex 34 of NAAEC. If a Party fails
to pay, the other Party in the dispute may suspend NAFTA benefits in an amount not to exceed
the monetary assessment.230 Article 3 of Annex 34 states that after a party pays the penalty to
C C, the Council expends the money “to improve or enhance the environment or environmental
law enforcement in the Party complained against.” So instead of paying compensation to the
complaining Party who incurred damages as a result of the other Party's failure to enforce its
environmental laws, the complained against Party ultimately receives the penalty money. This is
an extraordinary deviation from prevailing approaches to punishment. It seems that these
penalties are intended to be more like symbolic fines.
In addition, Article 45.1 of NAAEC states that a determination of ineffective enforcement shall
not be made when there is a "reasonable exercise" of investigatory, prosecutorial, or regulatory
discretion, or when there have been "bona fide decisions to allocate resources" to enforcement of
higher priority environmental matters." 231 This means that to succeed in an environmental
dispute under Part V, a Party is expected to satisfy these circumscribed definitions in establishing
its case and fending off defenses. It would also have to show that the alleged failure to
effectively enforce environmental law pertains to goods traded in the North America or produced
by export-competing industries as per Article 24.
226
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 25.2 (a).
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 30.
228
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 33.
229
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 34.
230
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 36 (1).
231
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 45(1).
227
52
I conclude this part with two general remarks. The NAAEC adopts a narrow approach to
environmental protection by specifically excluding laws whose "primary purpose" is to manage
the commercial harvesting or exploitation of natural resources. 232Hence, it is uncertain whether
major environmental issues such as energy extraction and surface mining or coastal fishing, are
included or excluded.
Part V dispute settlement process has become a moot and impotent mechanism233 especially that
no single dispute was initiated by NAAEC parties to date234. Many procedural issues such as
how to determine an enforcement failure in light of the limited information provided by the
parties that would only present "convictions" 235 , who bears the burden of proof,
public
submissions such as amicus briefs or public observation of the dispute settlement process.
Twenty years have passed and the parties have not yet adopted model rules of procedure for Part
V as required under Article 28236.
Simply put, the NAFTA governments wanted to have an agreement that would lead to increased
investment with barely any constraints and they did conclude provisions to that effect. They also
wanted to reinforce the free investment with an effective enforcement mechanism and they did
so in NAFTA chapter 11 by waiving their sovereign immunity so as to allow foreign investors to
seek monetary awards for breach of the NAFTA’s investor protections through binding
arbitration.237 Only if they wanted to protect environment as well, they would have taken the
necessary measures to attain that.
The opening up of national markets for foreign investments would certainly urge governments to
attempt to impose new requirements on business operations in order to serve environmental ends.
They would then face a challenge under NAFTA Chapter 11 for measures “tantamount to
expropriation” of a foreign corporation’s potential profits. The result is a threatened erosion of
232
NAAEC, supra note 135, Article 45 (2) (b).
Charnovitz, supra note 224, at 8.
234
Laursen, F. (Ed.) (2010).Comparative Regional Integration Europe and Beyond. Farnham, Surrey [England:
Ashgate Publishing], 247.
235
The NAAEC states that the panel "shall base its report on the submissions and arguments of the Parties ...."
236
McRae, D. M. (Ed.) (2011) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 35, Vancouver, BC: UBC
press, 360.
237
NAFTA, supra note 25, Articles 1115-1138.
233
53
sovereignty, as foreign private corporations are able to override the will of democratically
elected governments. The accusation of expropriation is merely an example of the instruments
that investors can use to lodge claims against domestic law as facilitated under Chapter 11
mechanism. Overview of Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism is covered in the following
chapter.
Chapter Four
Dispute Resolution Mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 11
Critical Nature of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
4.1 Introduction
We have discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation the extensive combination of rights and
remedies provided to foreign investors under Chapter 11 of NAFTA and analyzed the relevant
articles in some detail. These investor protections have been invoked repeatedly to challenge new
environmental laws, or applications of existing laws, that adversely affect foreign investors or
investments. 238
The link between these investor protections and their use to challenge
environmental laws and regulations is the investor-state dispute settlement process which is the
focus of this chapter.
It is a strikingly broad and aggressive process that gives investors the right to directly challenge
host governments on any type of public welfare or public policy measure 239 that might impact on
the establishment, operation, management or control of a company. This chapter provides an
overview of the scope and significance of the investor-state process. It starts with an outline of
the ISDS main rules of procedure, and then will move to discuss some cases that demonstrate the
reach of Chapter 11 mechanism into critical areas of public policy making in relation to
environmental matters and finally will examine some of concerns that have been raised in
relation to it supported by relevant cases.
4.2 Fundamental Rules of Procedure
Pursuant to Article 1120 of NAFTA, a disputing investor may submit a claim to arbitration under
one of the three arbitration centers that are established to accommodate disputes between an
238
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001: Report together with additional and dissenting views (to
accompany H.R. 3005) (including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). (2001). Washington, D.C.:
U.S. G.P.O, 78.
239
Berg, A. (Ed.) (2003). International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions. The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 409.
54
55
investor and a state. They are referenced in Chapter 11 as one of the three facilities that an
investor must choose from when initiating an arbitration claim. 240 These centers are the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), to which both national
parties must belong for an investor of one state to sue the host state; the ICSID Additional
facility, which allows its use when only the Party of an investor or the host state is a party to its
rules; and the United Nations Centre For International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), created within
the United Nations system. Each has its own rules of procedure which are applied once the
facility is chosen by the investor, unless they are modified in the text of NAFTA itself.
These systems are all roughly similar, and all drawn from a traditional commercial arbitration
model241 which proves that for the most part, the system in question was intended to handle cases
involving specific contractual disputes between governments and corporate contractors and not
to adjudicate broad questions of public policy and the appropriate use of governmental
regulatory authority.242
The central aspect of this system is the automatic right of foreign investors to initiate direct
actions, either on their own behalf or on behalf of an enterprise243, against host governments
alleging that a NAFTA government breached one of the substantive rules which constitute the
obligations described above in Chapter Two. This unfettered right to initiate a proceeding has its
authority in Articles 1116 and 1117 as it explains that investors are only required to show loss or
damage resulting from the alleged breach.
There are also some procedural steps such as Article 1118244 that imposes an obligation on both
Parties to first attempt to settle the claim through negotiation or consultation and the minimum
time periods before an arbitration can be initiated. Also, in submitting a claim under Article
1120, the investor must consent to the arbitration procedure, and must waive their right to initiate
240
NAFTA, supra note 25, Article 1120 (1).
Mann, H., & von Moltke, K. Protecting Investor Rights and the Public Good: Assessing NAFTA’s Chapter 11, p.
19. Available at: http://www.iisd.org/trade/ILSDWorkshop
242
Antonio Parra, "Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Investment Treaties," in
ICSID News, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 2000; David Waskow, Friends of the Earth, Interview with Antonio Parra,
Deputy-Secretary General, ICSID, Jul. 6, 2001.
243
NAFTA, supra note 25, Articles 1116 - 1117.
244
Investor- State arbitration provisions are covered under articles 1115 to 1138 of NAFTA.
241
56
or pursue any administrative or judicial process involving the same claim. These conditions
should be met by investors but none of them seems like it could negate the right to initiate an
action.245
Procedural issues like the constitution of tribunal and selection of members are governed by the
procedures drawn from a combination of Articles 1123-1125, and the rules of procedure of the
three different arbitral bodies adopted by Chapter 11 to support an arbitration. At a minimum, the
investor initiating the challenge selects one of the arbitrators, doing so on the basis of known
views or orientations that would tend to support its position.246 Unlike commercial arbitration
where money is usually the central issue, it is not common to have such a bias process in areas
where important public policy issues are at the heart of a dispute. 247 From the investors'
perspective, only their operations and profits are at stake while public interest is of no
importance.
One might think that the presumption behind the development of this approach is that foreign
investors wouldn’t receive just and unbiased treatment in domestic courts of a developing
country when hearing a claim which involves a government action. As a result, an alternative
legal process is put in place in response to investment promotion and investor security demands.
However, this brings into question two points. The first is that whether the transparent judicial
system in countries like Canada and the US are conceived of in the same way as developing
countries' courts system and hence an alternative legal process is needed. It is unquestionable
that relevant academic literature has always asserted that judiciaries in developing countries
frequently fall far short of developed countries' standards.248 I assume that these standards call
for their security and justice systems to be more effective, responsive and accountable. It seems
that little attention was paid to that when addressing investors’ concerns explained above. The
second is that while an alternative system should have been innovated for the above reasons of
non-transparency and injustice, a system that is largely devoid of any procedural or public
245
NAFTA, supra note 25, Article 1121 (1).
Clarkson, S., & Wood, S. (2010). A Perilous Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian Law and Governance.
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 94.
247
Grinspun & Shamsie, supra note 60, at 301.
248
Dam, K. W. (2006). The Judiciary and Economic Development. (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 287), p.4.
246
57
interest safeguards established in the judicial systems of developed, and many developing,
countries to ensure a proper balance between private rights and public interest, was created.
By this, foreign investors are allowed to circumvent traditional methods of complaining about
laws and regulations and the safeguards they provide to all litigants.249 This is attained by giving
them direct access to private arbitral tribunals made up of for-profit arbitrators rather than full
time judges, where investors have legal standing to seek regulatory relief or monetary
compensation for government policies or actions that investors believe violate their rights under
NAFTA. Compensation can be awarded in unlimited amounts of taxpayer dollars from the
treasury of the offending state250 even though it has gone around the country's domestic court
system and laws to obtain such an award.
4.3 Case Law
In this section, we will discuss two cases that show the unprecedented reach of Chapter 11
mechanism into critical areas of public policy making in relation to environmental matters. The
Ethyl case illustrates well the practical impact of the unfettered ability to pursue a singular
private interest at the international level.
The history of the company goes back to 1922 when Ethyl started to produce tetraethyl lead, the
additive used to make leaded gasoline, to enhance auto engine performance. 251 Shortly after
production started, many of the workers at its New Jersey plant began hallucinating and
experiencing acute convulsions and eventually five of the workers died.252 Many years later, the
U.S. federal government took action to eliminate lead from gasoline and developed in the 1950s
a new gasoline additive called methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) 253 , a
249
Frakes, V., L., In the Driver's Seat: NAFTA's Chapter 11 as a Judicial Vehicle for the Expansion of Investor
Rights, 1 Bus. L. Brief (AM. U.) 49 (2005), 50.
250
Hussain, A. (2010). The impacts of NAFTA on North America: Challenges outside the Box. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 95.
251
Needleman, H., Landrigan, P. “Toxins at the Pump,” New York Times, Mar. 13, 1996.
252
Ibid.
253
Davis, J., “Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese-Tricarbonyl: Health Risk Uncertainties and Research Directions,”
Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 106, Supplement 1, Feb. 1998, at 191.
58
known human neurotoxin
254
. As indicated in Chapter Two, a concentrated form of MMT is
produced in the United States, and then imported into Canada by the Ethyl subsidiary there,
Ethyl Canada, where it is diluted at a plant in Ontario and sold to Canadian gasoline refiners.255
It is worth noting that in 1977, MMT was banned from use in unleaded gasoline by California,
which has its own state-level Clean Air Law, and then by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) due to environmental and public health concerns until an adverse domestic court
ruling in 1995.
256
So in 1997, the Canadian Parliament imposed a ban in April 1997 on the
import and inter-provincial transport of MMT for a number of reasons, most important of which
is the concern about the potential health effects of exposing workers and drivers to airborne
manganese particles via MMT.257 Canadian officials were concerned that MMT could undermine
the Canadian government’s efforts to control air pollution, and could contribute to the build-up
of greenhouse gases that contribute to global warning.258
While the prospective ban was being debated in the Canadian Parliament, Ethyl Corporation
notified the government of Canada that it would file a claim for compensation under NAFTA’s
investment chapter if restrictions were placed on MMT. 259 The Parliament disregarded these
threats and passed the ban a year later in April 1997260and on the same month Ethyl filed the
claim for compensation at $250 million in damages261.In addition to Ethyl's arguments based on
Articles 1102 and 1106 of NAFTA covered under Chapter Two, Ethyl argued that the Canadian
MMT ban amounted to a NAFTA-forbidden indirect expropriation of its assets as defined in
NAFTA Article 1110. 262
Landrigan, P., “MMT, Déjà Vu and National Security,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol. 39, Issue
4, Mar. 2001, at 434-5.
255
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent, UNCITRAL, 10 September 1996, at 4.
256
In 1995, Ethyl won a lawsuit against the U.S. EPA that forced the EPA to lift its restrictions on MMT and it
became available for use in conventional unleaded gasoline. National Round Table on the Environment and the
conomy, “Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT Case Study,” 1999, at 8, cited Apr. 24, 2001.
257
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, supra note 104, at 24.
258
Ibid.
259
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Volume 28, 1999-2000, 413.
260
Murphy, supra note 81.
261
Ethyl Corporation v Government of Canada, supra note 84, "Relief Sought and Damages Claimed".
262
Ethyl Corporation v Government of Canada, supra note 82, paras. 20-24.
254
59
I gather from the above that while Canada was being threatened by initiating an arbitration claim
against it, the Canadian Parliament did not give in to this pressure and still passed the ban.
Canada acted in this way, despite having inconclusive results of health effects studies263; because
it did not want to repeat the devastating health and environmental problems caused by leaded
gasoline and chose to take a precautionary measure to protect the public health. Despite of that
Ethyl was able to initiate and run its litigation, and the case ended with an out of court settlement
whereby the legislation it opposed was withdrawn, and Canada paid damages of $13 million US
Dollars for the period the legislation was in force264. It also issued a statement for thyl’s use in
advertising, declaring that “current scientific information” did not demonstrate MMT’s toxicity
nor that MMT impairs functioning of automotive diagnostic systems.265
In Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada266, Canada
banned the import of lindane-based seed treatments 267 for canola on environment and health
grounds and the question was whether the government of Canada should pay compensation to a
United States agricultural pesticide manufacturer for this ban.
268
Crompton US, the
manufacturer, argued that the ban forces its Canadian subsidiary to buy local substitutes, and
thus is in effect a local purchasing requirement.269 This might lead us to think that the ban was in
fact motivated by a desire to benefit the domestic producers of substitute products and by a
politically charged conflict between Canada and US, as alleged by Chemtura.270It is worth noting
here that the production and agricultural use of lindane was banned under the Stockholm
Convention on persistent organic pollutant in 2009 as it has been classified as a persistent
organic pollutant and a neurotoxin and US was ironically one of the numerous countries that
banned its use locally.271
263
Markell & Knox, supra note 214, at 182.
Murphy, supra note 81.
265
Government of Canada “Statement on MMT,” Jul. 20, 1998, on file with Public Citizen.
266
Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2008-1,
Notice of Intent filed on 6 November 2001, UNCITRAL Rules.
267
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), animal studies have demonstrated that lindane can
cause liver cancer when ingested by mice. The EPA considers lindane a possible human carcinogen, regulates
lindane products under six separate statutes and has restricted most uses since 1983.
268
Kulick, A. (2012). Global Public Interest in International Investment Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press. pp. 255-257.
269
Oxford Journals, Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011), Volume 21, Issue 1, pp. 537-541.
270
Second Notice of Arbitration, 10 February 2005, supra note 252, paras. 35 - 41.
271
"UN: Treaty expanded by 9 more dangerous chemicals", Eliane Engeler, Associated Press 2009-05-09.
264
60
So at the time when Canada moved to implement a similar ban within its territory and protect the
public health, US alleged that Canada has substantially deprived Chemtura of its investment. The
company claimed compensation for the losses attributed to the ban pursuant to articles1102
(National Treatment), 1103 (MFN), 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), 1106 (Performance
Requirements) and 1110 (expropriation). 272 Chemtura claimed that it was being treated
differently, in violation of NAFTA article 1102, than its Canadian competitors, because they
produce low-cost, lindane substitutes in Canada and would not be as affected by the change in
policy. 273As well, pursuant to article 1103, the company alleged that it received less favourable
treatment than similar investors.274Further, Chemtura contented that it did not receive, as Article
1105 states, “treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.” 275 Chemtura also claimed that the government of
Canada is instituting a NAFTA-illegal “performance requirement” in violation of NAFTA
Article 1106 that negatively impacts Chemtura but helps Canadian companies that produce
276
substitutes.
Finally, Chemtura charged that the Canadian government, by banning the use of
lindane after July 1, 2001, has “expropriated” the company’s property in violation of NAFTA
Article 1110. 277 Based on these allegations, Chemtura demanded $100 million in damages from
the Canadian government to compensate for these NAFTA violations.278
The NAFTA tribunal found that Canada acted within its state police powers when it banned
lindane's use as a pesticide taking into consideration its worldwide treatment. 279 The tribunal
noted that "it was not its task to determine whether certain uses of lindane were dangerous … the
rule of Chapter 11 tribunal is not to second-guess the correctness of the science-based-decision
making of highly specialized national regulatory agencies."280 The tribunal added, however, that
"it could not ignore the fact that lindane has raised increasingly serious concerns both in other
countries, and at the international level since the 1970s."281 Further, the Tribunal found no facts
272
Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, Claimant's Memorial, 2 June 2008, supra note 252, pp. 3-4.
Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Notice of Intent, 6 November 2001, supra note 252, at 7.
274
Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, Claimant's Memorial, 2 June 2008, supra note 252, para. 494.
275
Ibid, para. 365.
276
Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Notice of Intent, 6 November 2001, supra note 252, at 10.
277
Ibid.
278
Ibid, para. 49.
279
Chemtura Corporation v Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 2010, supra note 252, para. 266.
280
Ibid, para. 134.
281
Ibid, para. 135.
273
61
in the conduct of the Respondent that would even come close to the type of treatment required
for a breach of the FET standard. 282 It was ruled that the review process conducted by the
Canadian Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PRMA) was thorough, fact intensive, and
inclusive of Chemtura’s concerns. The decision to ban lindane was neither hasty nor arbitrary
and was based on widely accepted data recognizing lindane as a dangerous chemical.283 Even
though Canada was successful, a significant amount of resources had to be expended to defend
against a challenge to a decision with a significant public purpose taken by a democratically
elected government. Chemtura was ordered to cover the entire cost of the arbitration, however it
was found responsible for only 50% of Canada’s associated legal costs not related to the direct
operation of the tribunal. 284
4.4 Reasons to Purge ISDS from NAFTA
As explained above, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism was ultimately designed to
provide aggrieved investors with a forum that would take their disputes out of the domestic
sphere of the state which, in investors' eyes, was seen as an important guarantee to have their
claims adjudicated through a swift, flexible and neutral process.
However, the actual functioning of this mechanism under NAFTA has led to concerns about
systemic deficiencies in the regime to the extent that it was even criticized by NAFTA
supporters. This mechanism lacks any domestic safeguards including an appeal process, and a
standing roster of neutral judges. The said deficiencies have surely been well documented in
literature and need only be summarized here in a manner that serves the purpose of the present
dissertation.
ISDS procedures under NAFTA create a special privileged status for nobody but investors. The
critical character of the ISDS can be found in its rules and procedures – being a closed and
unaccountable process. It is hard to conclude that the advent of NAFTA brought about domestic
282
Ibid, para. 236.
Ibid, paras. 150-153.
284
Ibid, part V "Decision".
283
62
environmental and health laws being undermined, better treatment for foreign investors, and
opening the states' treasury to new demands from them.
4.4.1 Legitimacy– Are foreign investors allowed to Evade Legal
liability?
Although ISDS system has sparked serious criticism and undoubtedly these critical voices vary
in the specific points they raise285, they have fueled a considerable amount of literature implying
that there is a "legitimacy crisis" in investment arbitration.286 From a State's perspective, ISDS is
a necessary means of attracting foreign direct investment – especially developing countries.
Despite this fact, there have been some contemporary withdrawals of some Latin-American
states from investment treaties and the ICSID Convention.287
While from investors' perspective, ISDS works as an incentive for them to resist attempts to
work out reasonable settlements288 with the prospect that any domestic court orders or damages
could be evaded using NAFTA – a privilege that is not allowed to national investors. The
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America 289 is a manifest
application of the mentioned scenario. The Mississippi jury trial in O'Keefe v. Loewen Group,
Inc,
290
resulted in a $500million damage award against the Vancouver-based funeral
conglomerate. 291 Loewen Group sought damages for the alleged injuries arising out of the
285
Waibel, M. (2010). The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality. Alphen Aan Den, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 49-50. See also: Dimsey, M. (2008). The Resolution of International
Investment Disputes: Challenges and Solutions. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 99.
286
See Brower, C., and Schill, S., ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment
Law?’ (2009 9 Chi JIL 471.
287
In January 2012, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela denounced the ICSID Convention, available at:
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announ
cementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100. Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID
Convention as of 3 November 2007. See ‘Bolivia Denounces ICSID Convention’ 46 ILM 973 (2007 . On 12 June
2009, cuador’s Congress voted to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. On 30 April 2008, Venezuela
communicated to the Netherlands its intention to terminate the Dutch-Venezuelan BIT as of 1 November 2008, see
LE
Peterson
(ed.),
Investment
Arbitration
Reporter
(16
May
2008),
available
at
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091001_93.
288
See O CD, “Government perspectives on investor-state dispute settlement: a progress report”, Freedom of
Investment Roundtable, 14 December 2012, 9. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/foi.htm.
289
Supra note 71.
290
O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Circ. Ct. 1st Jud.Dist., Hinds County 1995).
291
Supra note 85, at 451.
63
litigation that took place in Mississippi state courts
292
and so it filed a claim under the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules and requested damages in excess of $600 million.293
Loewen alleged violations of three provisions of NAFTA - the anti-discrimination principles set
forth in Article 1102, the minimum standard of treatment required under Article 1105, and the
prohibition against uncompensated expropriation set forth in Article 1110.294 On June 26, 2003,
the tribunal dismissed the claims against the United States in their entirety ruling that "they
found nothing in NAFTA to justify the exercise by this Tribunal of an appellate function parallel
to that which belongs to the courts of the host nation".295 However, looking into the Tribunal's
award it appears that it actually examined the trial and verdict and established that they cannot be
squared with minimum standards of fair international law and fair and equitable treatment.296
This opens the door for characterizing the failure by a nation to provide adequate means of
remedy for a judicial wrong as an international wrong making it a legitimate target of a corporate
suit under NAFTA. It has not even placed any limits on what types of court decisions could be
open to challenge.297
4.4.2 Transparency – Public Disputes, Private Tribunals
To date, information disclosed about Chapter 11 arbitrations has been minimal298, and this lack
of disclosure can extend to the final awards of arbitral panels. Despite not covered by this paper,
the legal analysis of the procedural rules in NAFTA and in the other arbitration forums that can
be used under Chapter 11 reveal that transparency is absolutely absent. 299 The level of secrecy
292
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Investment Law: A Changing
Landscape, 2005, Paris: OECD, p. 16.
293
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, supra note 71, Loewen Corp.'s First Memorial on Merits 18 October 1999,
para. 263.
294
William S. Dodge, "Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States. ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/98/3 and Mondev
International Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2." The American Journal of International Law,
January, 2004 98 A.J.I.L. 155.
295
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, supra note 71, Award 26 June 2003, para. 242.
296
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, supra note 71, Award 26 June 2003, para. 137.
297
Lee, L., "Reading the Seattle Manifesto: In Search of A Theory" December 2003. New York University Law
Review, Vol 78:2305, at 2324.
298
Smeureanu, I. (2011). Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration. Alphen Aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 107.
299
For details, see Asean Studies Center (2010), the Global Economic Crisis, Implications for ASEAN, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Report No. 10, 121 ff.
64
that extends on all sides of the initiation and conduct of investor-state disputes raises additional
concerns concerning the overall nature and appropriateness of this process. 300 The lack of
transparency was even labeled by one of Canada’s leading newspapers as “NAFTA’s Cone of
Silence”, and as "NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret" by another American newspaper. 301 On the
contrary, in a national court system there is a minimum level of transparency and accountability
brought on by the public pleadings where governments are sometimes parties to litigation. This
lack of transparency contributes to a significant loss of democratic legitimacy as there is only
little factual knowledge of the case available to the public, eliminating any democratic checks
and balances.
Since an array of public interest regulations have been challenged as violating NAFTA, the
public must have a stake in disputes between investors and states especially that it is their tax
dollars that may one day be awarded to a an investor that is demanding millions in
compensation. Despite this compelling rationale, the process in ICSID and UNCITRAL has
traditionally been confidential, closed and unaccountable one, logically to protect the
commercial interests in mind. For instance, in Methanex v. US,302 a California law phasing out a
gasoline additive, namely MTBE, found to be contaminating the water table and posing health
risks to humans.303 Canada-based Methanex sued the United States for $1 billion alleging that
California's ban constitutes a violation of NAFTA. 304 While this ban must have been issued by
virtue of a new law which was created over several years using an open process and which the
citizens of the state must have supported at the time, those citizens have no formal role in the
case filed under NAFTA, cannot be party to it, and are not even entitled to have access to case
documents or proceedings or decisions produced in the course of the arbitration.
300
Berg, A. (2011). Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 43-44.
301
Van Duzer, J., Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency and
Amicus
Curiae
Participation,
(2007)
52
McGill
L.J.
681,
p.
684.
Available
at:
http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/81686-52.4.VanDuzer.pdf
302
Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award 3 August 2005.
303
Schill, S. (2010). International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 258.
304
Sancin, V. (ed.). International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges: Papers presented at
the First Contemporary Challenges of International Environmental Law Conference, Ljubljana: GV Zalozba, June
28-29, 2012, p. 501.
65
At a minimum, ICSID has a website
305
that provides an enhanced research tool which should
include case details pertaining to pending and concluded cases administered by ICSID while
UNCITRAL does not provide even this basic information. 306 Moving to awards, neither
institution is permitted to release information about final awards without the consent of both
parties.307 ICSID often posts information about final awards on its website, but UNCITRAL does
not. Also, ICSID Additional Facility rules state that “the deliberations of the Tribunal shall take
place in private and remain secret”.308 Even other arbitration institutions, such as the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce which often administer their cases
in accordance with UNCITRAL Rules do not have a comprehensive public register pertaining to
pending and concluded cases, thus expectedly only minimal information is available to the public
about cases. More notoriously, investors opt for closed hearings under the ICSID or UNCITRAL
Rules particularly in cases concerning public policy.
Further, submission of amicus curiae briefs by NGOs is a topic that NAFTA is silent on309,
leaving it to be governed by the rules of the arbitral bodies. Normally, this procedure would
require that the NGOs have access to sufficient accurate information on the case to make such
submissions in an informed manner. Consequently, this would collide with the secretive process
of an arbitration claim under the investor-state mechanism.
Looking at NAFTA rules in this regard, it allows experts to be appointed by a tribunal at the
request of a disputing party or on their own initiative unless both disputing parties disapprove.310
This provision is quite specific to environmental issues, and is also limited to experts giving
factual or scientific information and subject to terms and conditions as the disputing parties may
305
See:
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=ViewAllCases
306
Caron, D., & Caplan, L. (ed.) (2012). The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 68.
307
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Oct. 14, 1966. Article 48 reads in part “the Centre shall not publish
the award without the consent of the parties.” United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), Arbitration Rules, General Assembly Resolution 31/98, Article 32 (5).ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, Article 53.
308
Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility Rules), Article 23.
309
Trakman, L., & Ranieri, N. (2013).Regionalism in International Investment Law. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 296.
310
NAFTA, supra note 25, Article 1133.
66
agree.
311
The arbitration bodies also provide for the use of expert witnesses if required by a
tribunal, or as required by a party. 312 The Rules of Arbitration of the UNCITRAL forum, for
example, allow the tribunal to determine if a party may submit additional written materials
beyond the statements of claim and defence set out in the Rules. They also allow the tribunal to
seek any other expert reports in writing as they deem necessary. 313 The ICSID and ICSID
Additional Facility rules include a reference to the pleadings and submissions of the disputing
parties, without setting any limitations on what might be included. 314
Decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case315 serves as a commendable
model that is worthy of adoption. The AB Decision states that "we consider that the attaching of
a brief or other material to the submission of either appellant or appellee, no matter how or where
such material may have originated, renders that material at least prima facie an integral part of
that participant's submission."316 This is a precedent that should be used to entitle tribunals to
receive amicus briefs on their own authority, or alternatively allows the parties to append NGO
briefs or submissions to their own pleadings and submissions. 317 Based on the provisions of
NAFTA and arbitral bodies discussed above, there does not appear to be any obstacle to adopting
the same process for Chapter 11 disputes. This should, of course, be preceded by securing the
right to access litigation materials by anyone other than the disputing parties as well as to the oral
hearings.
This lack of transparency, as identified above, has been an enticing avenue for investors to abuse.
Investors may bring multiple318 or frivolous319 claims at the same time before different tribunals
311
Ibid.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Articles 27, 22, 15(2), The ICSID Arbitration Rules (Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings), Articles. 34-36; ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules (Schedule C), Articles. 4143.
313
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Articles 22, 27.
314
The ICSID Arbitration Rules (Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings), Articles 31, 32, 34; ICSID
Additional Facility Arbitration Rules (Schedule C), Articles 38, 39, 41.
315
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” Appellate Body Report, AB-1998-4,
October 1998.
316
Ibid, para 89.
317
Ibid, concluded from paras. 90-91.
318
McLachlan, C. (2009). Lis Pendens in International Litigation. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers,197
319
UNCTAD, Investor-state Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007). New York: United
Nations Publications, 82.
312
67
and for the same set of facts constituting the breach and most importantly against the same
respondent state as long as the public opinion is not involved due to the traditional rules and
procedures of ISDS. As explained earlier in Chapter Two, it remains that under Chapter 11, each
holding company in a long chain of ownership could file its own separate claim against the host
State for the same treaty breach. Nothing would prevent, for example, shareholders holding a
very small percentage of the total numbers of shares320 or whose investments are indirectly made
through multiple layers of intermediate corporations from pursuing their own claims or a
shareholder from filing a claim as an individual and another one under the corporation in which
he invested.321
A clear non-NAFTA example of this theoretical possibility is the CME/Lauder v. Czech
Republic 322 where Lauder, a US national – and the controlling shareholder in an investment
made in CME in Czech Republic323 – brought arbitration under the US – Czech Republic BIT in
accordance with UNCITRAL Rules. 324Six months later, CME itself started its own proceeding
before a different arbitral tribunal under the Netherlands –Czech Republic BIT. Both claims
arose from the same facts and the result was two contradictory awards.325 However, if we assume
that both awards were issued in favor of the investors, it would have been a potential path for
double recovery by Mr. Lauder to be paid by one Respondent state.
There are other more striking examples where filing parallel claims, in the above mentioned
private investment forums, can be driven by political motives and ideologies under the pressure
of transnational economic sectors with a view to dismantling a State's national sovereignty,
especially developing countries, which will eventually face the prospect of having to pay billions
to disgruntled successful claimants. Regrettably, those politically motivated cases are looming
large in light of the darkness caused by the lack of transparency and openness of the ISDS
mechanism and they can proceed for years without the public being aware of them.
320
Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanosdel Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No.ARB/09/1, Seperate Opinion by Dr. Kamal Hossein on Jurisdiction.21 December 2012, para 26.
321
Ibid.
322
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award 14 March 2003.
323
Herdegen, supra note 306, at 156.
324
Ibid.
325
Ibid.
68
So given the public interest in the cases, the public deserves to have access to the case documents
public and to proceedings allowed in any domestic court. Some would contend that this flies in
the face of the essence of the protection bestowed by ISDS mechanism, but transparency might
be the price to be paid for the privilege of using the ISDS.
4.4.3 Review of Arbitral Awards
Where a defeated Party is dissatisfied with the arbitral tribunal’s award, it must be provided with
equitable remedies for rectification of awards, such as annulment or appeal. Review of arbitral
awards, whatever the form of review is, is a guarantee designed to preserve the interests of the
Parties. Unlike in the realm of trade disputes, there is no such unified appellate body326 to ensure
the consistency of how international investment law and its instruments are interpreted and
applied.
Any given panel is expressly not bound by the interpretation of NAFTA provisions adopted or
by precedents laid down by another tribunal, but can set out a different and even completely
opposing view in its award. 327 This entails dissimilar legal interpretations of identical treaty
provisions, let alone, issuing several awards, addressing the same facts, with diverging
conclusions. Two issues amplify this concern. The first is that investment tribunals often
adjudicate public policy issues and important questions of law which cannot be perceived
without a possibility of effective review. The second one is the legal fact that some challenges
may not even be known to the public under the applicable procedural rules and so final awards
may not be disclosed to the public, who may include members of a subsequent panel.
We will touch on the possible ways of revising an award according to the rules of the three
arbitration bodies included in NAFTA Chapter 11. Starting with the ICSID, it provides for
annulment of ICSID awards by an ad hoc Annulment Committees
326
328
and thus preventing
Schott, J. (1996). The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead. Washington, DC: Institute for International
Economics, 5.
327
This is clearly stipulated in Article 1136(1) of NAFTA.
328
Articles 50-52 of ICSID. It is worth noting that this annulment process is not equivalent to an appeal on the merits
of an arbitration panel decision, as one now has in the WTO process.
69
domestic courts from reviewing any of its awards
329
. Annulment of ICSID awards is confined to
five specific grounds as provided by Article 52 of the ICSID Convention that do not involve
merit-based grounds. This accentuates the deliberate desire of ICSID drafters to have final
awards that are governed by ICSID provisions only330. An ICSID annulment committee may find
itself unable to annul or correct an award, even after having identified “manifest errors of
law”.331
Moving to revision of awards under ICSID Additional Facility and UNCITRAL Rules, they both
give a prominent role to national courts under national arbitration laws and the New York
Convention provisions. 332 ICSID Additional Facility rules apply to certain categories of
proceedings between States and nationals of other States that fall outside the scope of the ICSID
Convention.
333
It is clear that the ICSID Additional Facility was created to extend the
availability of ICSID arbitration to certain types of proceedings – that still involve investment
disputes in some cases 334 regardless the parties are signatories to the Convention or not.
Moreover, The Additional Facility is not a separate institution as the same secretary serves both
of the ICSID and its Additional Facility 335 . Despite of that, the provisions of the ICSID
Convention, including provisions on recognition and enforcement of awards, do not apply to the
Additional Facility proceedings although many of the guiding principles are similar as per article
3 of the Rules. Accordingly, awards of the ICSID Additional Facility are subject to the
supervisory jurisdiction of national courts of the country where arbitration is held 336 . This
explains the requirement in Article 19 that proceedings be held only in States parties to the New
329
Sasse, J. (2011). An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Springer Science & Business Media, 61.
ICSID post-award remedy involves "annulment" excluding errors of law or fact as opposed to "appeal" which
might result in the modification by requiring a tribunal to modify its mistakes or substituting an appellate body
decision for that of the first tribunal.
331
See CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the
ad hoc Committee on the application for annulment, 25 September 2007, paras. 97, 127, 136, 150, 157-159. Article
52(1) of the ICSID Convention enumerates the following grounds for annulment: (a) improper constitution of the
arbitral Tribunal; (b) manifest excess of power by the arbitral Tribunal; (c) corruption of a member of the arbitral
Tribunal; (d) serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) absence of a statement of reasons in the
arbitral award.
332
Article 1136 of NAFTA and Article V (1) (e) of New York Convention.
333
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Article 2.
334
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Article 2 (a).
335
Reed, L., & Paulsson, J., Blackaby, N. (2004). Guide to ICSID Arbitration. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 18.
336
NAFTA, supra note 25, Article 1136.
330
70
York Convention and also means that awards will be subject to the reasons for non-enforcement
listed in Article V of the New York Convention.
As for UNCITRAL, it should first be noted that some procedural aspects of UNCITRAL rules
for the arbitration proceedings are quite similar to those of ICSID337, similarity of the selection of
arbitrators rules is an example. However, and as previously mentioned, UNCITRAL does not
collect or compile a record of basic information about pending and concluded cases. Further, the
UNCITRAL rules do not provide for the right of appeal within its own system as there is in
ICSID. That being said, arbitration process under UNCITRAL Rules could theoretically be less
transparent than under the ICSID rules. This is reflected in UNCITRAL Article 32(2) which
provides that the "award .... shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to
carry out the award without delay".
However, the only way of having an award set aside under UNCITRAL is attainable when
seeking to enforce an award in accordance with Article IV of the New York Convention. The
burden of proof of the existence of one or more of the grounds listed in Article V of the New
York Convention then shifts to the party against whom the enforcement is sought338. Article V(1)
enumerates certain procedural deficiencies according to which the enforcement of the award may
be refused while Article V (2) provides two grounds which allows the enforcing court to
examine the subject matter of the dispute and the substance of the award in deciding where there
are valid grounds to refuse enforcement.
This is a system that lacks a reasonable and objective justification; how can we envisage that
awards rendered in traditional commercial arbitration are open to appeal on different grounds
and exercised by national courts while awards in disputes involving issues of public interest are
blindly considered free from defects with no right to appeal on the merits?
337
Leathley, C., (2007). International Dispute Resolution in Latin America: An Institutional Overview. Alphen aan
den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 33.
338
Hanessian, G., Newman, L. (2009). International Arbitration Checklists: Second Edition. New York, US: Juris
Publishing, Inc, 200.
71
By way of conclusion on this point, I point out some loopholes that arise when attempting to
theoretically assess the actual functioning of the ICSID mechanism. First, given that Mexico is
not a party to the ICSID Convention339, ordinary ICSID arbitration under the ICSID Convention
is thus not an option between Mexico and Canadian or American investors on the one hand and
between Mexican investors and US or Canada on the other hand. According to NAFTA, they can
only be filed under ICSID Additional Facility or the UNCITRAL Rules. This does not cope with
the general impression expressed in literature that ICSID system is self-contained and
delocalized as one of the advantages of investment arbitration is to be governed by international
standards and procedures rather than these of the host state and its domestic courts. The abovementioned presumption is one case where Canadian and American investors (who are signatories
to the ICSID Convention) will be deprived of the ICSID privileges. This means that NAFTA has
fallen short of achieving one of its Chapter 11 objectives by providing no legal security for
international investments made in the region and eventually resorting to international
commercial arbitration i.e. UNCITRAL or to mechanisms that render awards equated with
ordinary international commercial arbitration awards i.e. ICSID Additional Facility.
Second, investment disputes should be treated differently and adjudicated in private tribunals
that render final binding awards – a notion has that has been developing as far back as the late
1960s with the establishment of ICSID and certainly an objective that Chapter 11 of NAFTA
intended to serve and achieve by resorting to ICSID. Peculiarly, NAFTA provides aggrieved
investors with two alternative practicable avenues where investment disputes based on bilateral
investment treaties may be decided through international commercial arbitration proceedings,
namely: UNCITRAL Rules (originally designed for international commercial arbitration
disputes) and ICSID Additional Facility (a system that does not appertain to ICSID by any
means, rather, is at least partially subject to an international commercial arbitration instrument
i.e. New York Convention.)
Lastly, it has been argued that ICSID in its current form has achieved a certain level of
uniformity which should be extended at the review level by creating an Additional Annulment
339
Available at:
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language
=English
72
Facility that could be used as an adjunct to whatever arbitration rules are applicable.
340
For the
given reasons above, I argue that the ad hoc annulment committee of ICSID is surrounded by
several drawbacks that are sufficient to deprive its member countries from the legitimately
expected protection for their investments under NAFTA and standing in sharp contrast to what is
found in the Parties’ domestic systems of justice. Perhaps the proposal should be the other way
around by extending the jurisdiction of national courts to ICSID awards too to achieve fairness,
consistency and uniformity.
4.4.4 Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators
As explained earlier, whether the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules are chosen, an investment arbitral
tribunal will have three members: one chosen by the investor, one chosen by the state and a third
one to be the presiding arbitrator that is mutually agreed upon by the Parties and which is a good
reason to lead to bias and potential conflict of interest.
Barristers, professors, retired judges are frequently appointed as arbitrators and conceivably an
individual may act as an arbitrator in one case and as a lawyer defending a respondent or a
claimant in another. This fact is also problematic as they may ‘consciously or unconsciously’
issue decisions as arbitrators that will foster their client’s interests in another case. 341 The
panelists themselves are not selected from a permanent consistent record of arbitrators342 and
certainly disputants are notionally tempted to choose arbitrators whose jurisprudence and views
support their positions. On the other hand, arbitrators themselves might be interested in being reappointed in prospective cases for how they are rewarded for their services; compared to court
judges for instance. Establishing a permanent roster of arbitrators would at least guarantee
neutrality, transparency and consistency of the process and issued awards. It is crucial to
understand whether investor-state arbitral tribunals are sufficiently equipped to assess and make
340
Idea proposed by Jan Paulsson, in the Investment Committee's consultation with BIAC, TUAC, and NGOs in
December 2004.
341
Buergenthal, T., ‘The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law’
(2006) 22 Arbitration International 495, P. 498.
342
Cosbey, A. (2002 . NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the nvironment. Discussion Paper for the C C‘s Public Workshop
on NAFTA‘s. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 7.
73
decisions taken by States in highly sensitive environmental matters especially in cases when
conclusive scientific evidence is lacking.
The cumulative impact of these factors is important from an environmental perspective as they
all lead to the anarchic ability of investors to obtain compensation or damages for new
environmental measures adopted by a NAFTA party. This ability is corroborated by the main
features of investor-state dispute mechanism as illustrated above leading to forcing governments
to pay money to defend its right to protect the environment. This constitutes a significant
deviation from the Polluter Pays principle, an international environmental law custom that is
defined by OECD and greatly supported by many countries.
CONCLUSION
Are the NAFTA and its environmental side agreement (NAAEC) up to dealing with the
immediate looming environmental challenges that have become clearer in the past twenty years?
Do they provide the adequate policy space for NAFTA governments to lead a transition to
become nations that give priority to the environment protection even at the risk of curbing
economic growth? The evidence is scant that they are.
The NAFTA thrust the United States, Canada, and Mexico into a realm of new rules that have
liberalized trade and investment by rolling back different obstacles. This liberalization covers a
wide range of areas including trade in goods and services, government procurement and foreign
investment. NAFTA was a landmark trade agreement in terms of linking trade and environment.
Significance of NAFTA in this regard is driven by the inclusion of environmental provisions
through a side agreement, and establishing the CEC which fostered an unprecedented level of trinational environmental diplomacy and cooperation among parties to the agreement. These
achievements have been positive, but limited.
Chapter 11, in particular, provides investors with rights and protections unprecedented in a
multilateral trade agreement. The investor now possesses an increased set of rights relative to
domestic law that could prove to be highly problematic by encouraging investor to override
carefully planned environmental government regulation. For instance, investors may challenge
any governmental measures claiming that such laws were “tantamount to expropriation,” or that
they were in violation of the “minimum standards of treatment” accorded to foreign investors
under NAFTA. As arbitral tribunals vary in their adjudication of cases involving environmental
measures under Chapter 11, governments are doomed to pay the price every time a claim is filed.
One case may result in the reverse of an environmental law if investor's claims are accepted such
as Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, and another one may result in the dismissal of
investor's claims against environmental regulations as the tribunal did in Chemtura Corporation
v. Government of Canada. To put it simply, as long as governments say "no" to environmentally
destructive practices, it will have to pay whether for compensating investors if it is found to be in
74
75
violation of investor protections or the legal costs of defending its government policies from
corporate attack.
Contributing to this situation is the fact that Chapter 11 offers adjudicative bodies that in many
cases grant more leniency than domestic courts of NAFTA countries. Even though Chapter 11
has been praised by some as a model after which future trade agreements should form dispute
resolution systems, it is haunted by inconsistency in its application and the ability of investors to
exploit the system to secure broader rights than intended by the drafters of NAFTA. There is a
visible trend of favoring foreign investors by NAFTA tribunals over host country governments,
which can be easily demonstrated through the decisions in cases like Ethyl Corporation v.
Government of Canada and S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada. Also, in Chemtura
Corporation v. Government of Canada and despite the ruling was in Canada's favor, the decision
did not secure the power of the state regulatory system vis-à-vis the investor.
The vague language of major NAFTA provisions leaving a wide range of interpretations open to
arbitrators and the somewhat closed nature of the process contributes to public distrust in these
tribunals deliberating over important issues brought forth by investors in their claims against host
governments. This is exacerbated by the absence of effective review or appeal processes. As a
result, prior tribunal decisions carry little weight in the eyes of the international community and
future tribunals are not pressured to follow their decisions.
This evolution of investor state arbitration has led to significant implications. By threatening to
initiate a NAFTA suit before the law was even passed and by circumventing domestic avenues
for challenging a law or regulation, as in the Ethyl case, is considered a blatant attempt to
intimidate a legislative body from taking action. Canada agreed to settle the case by any way
before the final NAFTA tribunal ruling in an effort to avoid a large damage award. The NAFTA
tribunal’s decision to accept the claim and allow it to proceed constitutes a significant and
potentially dangerous new limit on the exercise of basic government functions. Governments
must maintain the ability to regulate because of environmental or public health concerns without
having to pay a corporation for the right to exercise its normal function.
76
A continuous record of similar threats of challenges against environmental measures using
Chapter 11 will have a negative effect on prospective public interest policies and innovations in
public policy being considered by governments and will often result in governments
preemptively conceding and changing a policy to avoid a trade challenge.
NAFTA is a model that brings along irrevocable damages to the environment by establishing a
system that is biased towards the interests of investors at the expense of the public interest. This
pattern of cases is likely to continue under the current rules of NAFTA if no amendments are
adopted. Repairing NAFTA’s ability to enhance environmental sustainability throughout North
America and to tackle trade-related environmental issues in the region will require
comprehensive changes throughout the treaty. This needs a regime that gives all three
governments the policy space to regulate environmental matters within its borders.
Bibliography
Books
Gallagher, K. P. (2004). Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond.
Stanford University Press.
Brookhart, L. (1993). Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North
American Free-Trade Agreement. Washington, DC: U.S. International Trade Commission.
Miller, C. (2003). Atlas of US and Canadian Environmental History. New York: Routledge.
Meredith, G., Kose, M., & M. Towe, C. (2004). How Has NAFTA Affected the Mexican
Economy? Review and Evidence. International Monetary Fund, Vol 4-59.
Hufbauer, G., C., (2005). NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. Peterson Institute.
US International Trade Commission (2009).The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import
Restraints, 6th Report. DIANE Publishing, Chapter 3 US Trade Policy since 1934.
Kenton, L., V., (Ed.) (2005). Manufacturing Output, Productivity and Employment Implications.
Nova Science Publishers.
Clinton, B. (1997), Study on the Operation and Effects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, DIANE Publishing.
Glick, L., A., (2008). Guide to United States Customs and Trade Laws after the Customs
Modernization Act (Third Ed.). Kluwer Law International.
US International Trade Administration (1993). North American Free Trade Agreement:
Opportunities for U.S. Industries: NAFTA Industry Sector Reports, The Administration.
Rosenberg, J. (1995). Encyclopaedia of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the New
American Community, and Latin-American trade. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Zechner, C. (2002). Expanding NAFTA: Economic Effects on Chile of Free Trade with the
United States (International Economics 1 . M nster: Lit.
Hufbauer, G., & Schott, J. (1993). NAFTA: An Assessment (Rev. ed.). Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Low P., Baldwin R. (2009). Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading
System, Cambridge University Press.
77
78
MacDonald, L. (2000). Free Trade Risks and Rewards. Montreal: Published for the McGill
Institute for the Study of Canada by McGill-Queen's University Press.
Schaffer, R., Agusti, F., Dhooge, L. (2014). International Business Law and Its Environment,
Cengage Learning.
Bishop, R., Crawford, J., & Reisman, W. (2005). Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials,
and Commentary. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Gailly, B. (2010). Developing Innovative Organizations: A Roadmap to Boost Your Innovation
Potential. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Condon, B. (2002). NAFTA, WTO, and Global Business Strategy: How AIDs, Trade, and
Terrorism Affect Our Economic Future. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books.
Barbour, E. (2010). Trade Law: An Introduction to Selected International Agreements and US
Laws. CRS Report for Congress, DIANE Publishing.
Ryan, M. (1998). Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual
Property. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Stamatoudi, I. (2010). Copyright Enforcement and the Internet (Information Law Series ed., Vol.
21). Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Wallach, L., & Sforza, M. (1999). The WTO: Five Years of Reasons to Resist Corporate
Globalization (A Seven Stories Press 1st Ed.). New York: Seven Stories Press
Perdikis, N., & Read, R. (2005). The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent
Trade Disputes between the European Union and the United States. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Bogdandy, A., Mavroidis, P., Meny, Y. (2002). European Integration and International Coordination: Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann. The
Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Salacuse, J. (2010). The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grinspun, R., & Shamsie, Y. (2007). Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North
America, and the Corporate Agenda. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Murphy, S. (2002). United States Practice in International Law: Volume 1, 1999-2001.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nanda, V., & Pring, G. (2012). International Environmental Law and Policy for the 21st
Century: 2nd Revised Edition. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
79
Bjorklund, A., & Fortier, L. (2014). Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy,
2012-2013. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, USA.
Mann, H., & Moltke, K. (1999). NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the
Impacts of the Investor-state Process on the Environment. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International
Institute for Sustainable Development.
Newcombe, A., & Paradell, L. (2009). Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of
Treatment. Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
Rovine, A. (2008). Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The
Fordham Papers 2007 (Vol. 1). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Vadi, V. (2014). Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Graubart, J. (2008). Legalizing Transnational Activism: The Struggle to Gain Social Change
from NAFTA's Citizen Petitions. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Hernandez, O. (2008). Policy Change and Environmental Governance at the U.S.-Mexico
Border: The Creation and Development of the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission/North American Development Bank. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest.
Steinberg, R. (2002). The Greening of Trade Law: International Trade Organizations and
Environmental Issues. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Rubin, S., & Alexander, D. (Eds.). (1996). NAFTA and the Environment (NAFTA Law and
Policy Series, Vol. 3). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Johnson. P. M., Beaulieu. A. (1996). The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and
Implementing the New Continental Law. Island Press.
McKinney, J. (2000). Created from NAFTA: The Structure, Function, and Significance of the
Treaty's Related Institutions. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Black, B., Hassenzahl, D., & Stephens, J., Gift, N., & Weisel, G., (Eds.). (2013). Climate
Change: An Encyclopaedia of Science and History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
Clarkson, S. (2008). Does North America Exist?: Governing the Continent after NAFTA and
9/11. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Le Prestre. G. P., Stoett. J. P. (2006). Bilateral Eco-politics: Continuity and Change in Canadian
American Environmental Relations Global Environmental Governance Series. Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd.
80
Zepeda, E., Wise, T. A., & Gallagher, K. P. (2009). Rethinking Trade Policy for Development:
Lessons From Mexico under NAFTA, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Gerrard, M., & Foster, S. (Eds.). (2008). The Law of Environmental Justice Theories and
Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks. Chicago: Section of Environment, Energy, and
Resources, American Bar Association.
Markell, D., & Knox, J. (Eds.). (2003). Greening NAFTA: The North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Law and Politics.
Ebbesson, J., Okowa, P., N. (2009). Environmental Law and Justice in Context. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Boardman, R. (2006). The International Politics of Bird Conservation: Biodiversity, Regionalism
and Global Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Berg, A. (Ed.) (2003). International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary
Questions. The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
McRae, D. M. (Ed.) (2011) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 35,
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Clarkson, S., & Wood, S. (2010). A Perilous Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian Law and
Governance. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Hussain, A. (2010). The impacts of NAFTA on North America: Challenges outside the Box.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kulick, A. (2012). Global Public Interest in International Investment Law. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Waibel, M. (2010). The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality.
Alphen Aan Den, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Dimsey, M. (2008). The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: Challenges and
Solutions. Utrecht, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing.
Smeureanu, I. (2011). Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration. Alphen Aan den
Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Berg, A. (2011). Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times. Alphen aan den Rijn, the
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Schill, S. (2010). International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
81
Caron, D., & Caplan, L. (ed.) (2012). The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary,
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Trakman, L., & Ranieri, N. (2013). Regionalism in International Investment Law. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
McLachlan, C. (2009). Lis Pendens in International Litigation. Leiden, the Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Schott, J. (1996). The world Trading System: Challenges Ahead. Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics.
Sasse, J. (2011). An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Springer Science &
Business Media.
Reed, L., & Paulsson, J., Blackaby, N. (2004). Guide to ICSID Arbitration. The Hague: Kluwer
Law International.
Leathley, C., (2007). International Dispute Resolution in Latin America: An Institutional
Overview. Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Hanessian, G., Newman, L. (2009). International Arbitration Checklists: Second Edition. New
York, US: Juris Publishing, Inc.
Journals
Grandbois, M., & Bouchard, M. C. A. (2011). Public Participation in Transnational Law: Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters in North American Treaties. Macquarie J. Int'l & Comp.
Envtl. L., 7(1).
The Free Trade Areas of the Americas: Expanding Hemispheric Trade. Economic Perspectives
(An Electronic Journal of the US Department of State 2002),Vol 7(3).
Moore, M. O., & Suranovic, S. M. (1994). Welfare Effects of Introducing Antidumping
Procedures in a Trade-Liberalizing Country. Journal of Economic Integration, 9 (2), June 1994.
Melder, F. E. (1940). The Economics of Trade Barriers. Indiana Law Journal, Vol 16(2).
Coe Jr, J. J. (2003). Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of
Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods. Vand. J. Transnat'l L., 36.
Matiation S. (2014). Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free Trade
Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 J. Int'l L. 451, 452.
Vandevelde, K. J. (2010). Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, A.NYUJ Int'l L. &
Pol., 43:43.
82
US Trade Law and Trade Policy. Economic Perspectives (An Electronic Journal of the US
Department of State June 1997), Vol 2(3).
Kantor, M., "At Long Last, A Trade Pact to Be Proud Of," Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1993.
Knox, J. H., & Markell, D. L. Evaluating Citizen Petition Procedures: Lessons from an Analysis
of the NAFTA Environmental Commission. Texas International Law Journal, 47(3):505.
Wilson, J. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and North American Migratory Bird
Conservation: the Potential of the NAAEC Citizen Submission Procedure, Journal of
International Wildlife Law & Policy. V. 6 (3) (Sept. – December 2003).
Charnovitz, S. (1994). NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental
Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty making, The Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ, 8: 257.
Laursen, F. (Ed.) (2010). Comparative Regional Integration Europe and Beyond. Farnham,
Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing.
Needleman, H., Landrigan, P. “Toxins at the Pump,” New York Times, Mar. 13, 1996.
Landrigan, P., “MMT, Déjà Vu and National Security,” American Journal of Industrial
Medicine, Vol. 39, Issue 4, Mar. 2001.
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Volume 28, 1999-2000.
Oxford Journals, Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2011), Volume 21, Issue 1.
Brower, C., and Schill, S., ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?’ (2009 9 Chi JIL 471.
William S. Dodge, "Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States. ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/98/3 and
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2." The American
Journal of International Law, January, 2004, 98 A.J.I.L.155.
Lee, L., "Reading the Seattle Manifesto: In Search of A Theory" December 2003. New York
University Law Review, Vol 78:2305.
VanDuzer, J., (2007). Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration
Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation. 52 McGill L.J. 681, p. 684. Available
at: http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/81686-52.4.VanDuzer.pdf
Internet Sources
The US-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement, signed at Johnson City, Texas, on 16
January 1965. Text available at: http://www.stewartlaw.com/Content/Documents/HR%20%20United%20States-Canada%20Automotive%20Products%20Agreement.pdf.
83
World Trade Organization (WTO), Regional Trade Agreement Database, available at
http://www.wto.org; and Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org.
"México, Proyecciones de Población". Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO). Retrieved
2013-09-09. Available at: http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Proyecciones_Datos.
Weiler., J., H., H. & Cho., S. (2006). The Law of Regional Economic Integration in the
American
Hemisphere:
Unit
XV
Government
Procurement.
Available
at:
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/courses/nafta/docs/NAFTA_UnitXV_GovProc_2006.pdf.
Canada-US
Agreement
on
Government
Procurement,
available
at:
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgovvendreaugouvusa/procurementmarches/agreeme
nt-accord.aspx?lang=eng
Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration (Non-Confidential) (8 November 2012), online: Foreign Affairs and International
Trade
Canada
<www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/lone-01.pdf>
Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration,
(September 6 2013) <http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1607>
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib., Nov. 13, 2000) (partial
award). Available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf
WTO Appellate Body Report on European Community Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
Available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf
Haefner. S., Parts of the Whole: Critiquing and Repairing Free Trade under NAFTA, available
at: http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2005/hafner2005.pdf
Migratory Birds Submission (CEC, A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB,
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf
1999),
available
at:
CEC,
CEC
Ministerial
Statement
2012,
online
at:
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=25241&SiteNodeID=219&BL_ExpandI
D=
Mann, H., & von Moltke, K. Protecting Investor Rights and the Public Good: Assessing
NAFTA’s Chapter 11. Available at: http://www.iisd.org/trade/ILSDWorkshop.
O CD, “Government Perspectives on Investor-state Dispute Settlement: A Progress Report”,
Freedom of Investment Round table, 14 December 2012. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/foi.htm.
84
Other Sources
North American Free Trade Agreement, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289.
States General Accounting Office (GAO , “North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment
of Major Issues, Volume 2,” Report to the Congress, September 1993.
McManis, C. R. (1998). Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental
Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, The. Wash. ULQ, 76: 255.
Charnovitz, S., "NAFTA: An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions", Environmental Law
Reporter (vol. 23, February 1993).
The Measure of International Law: Effectiveness, Fairness and Validity: Proceedings of the 31st
Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 24-26, 2002.
The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Singh, K. (2003). Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO: Issues and Illusions, Manila:
Asia-Pacific Research Network Public Interest Research Centre.
Johnson, L. Mobil v. Canada – Ratcheting Down the Scope of Treaty Reservations. Investment
Policy Hub, UNCTAD, 10 September 2013.
Bendayan, R., Valasek, M. Requiring Foreign Investors to Spend Specific Amounts in R&D
Violates NAFTA Chapter 11: Decision on Liability in Mobil v Canada. Publications by Norton
Rose, March 2013.
A budgetary and Economic Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Washington,
DC: Congressional Budget Office, July 1993.
Tiemann, M., “NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives,” Congressional Research
Service. (March 1, 2000).
Wold. C. (2008), Evaluating NAFTA and The Commission for Environmental Cooperation:
Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agreements, Saint Louis
University Public Law Review Vol. XXVIII:201.
Announcement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements on Labor and the Environment, Statement
by Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. trade representative, August 13, 1993.
Gifuni, L. The CEC Council's Discretionary Decision Making under Article 15 of the NAAEC
and its Legality at International Law, June 14th, 2011. See especially CEC Secretariat Report on
The Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1994-95).
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001: Report together with additional and
dissenting views (to accompany H.R. 3005) (including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget
Office). (2001). Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.
85
Parra, A., "Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated under Investment
Treaties," in ICSID News, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 2000; Waskow, D., Friends of the Earth,
Interview with Antonio Parra, Deputy-Secretary General, ICSID, Jul. 6, 2001.
Dam, K. W. (2006). The Judiciary and Economic Development. (John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 287).
Frakes, V., L., In the Driver's Seat: NAFTA's Chapter 11 as a Judicial Vehicle for the Expansion
of Investor Rights, 1 Bus. L. Brief (AM. U.) 49 (2005).
Davis, J., “Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese-Tricarbonyl: Health Risk Uncertainties and
Research Directions,” nvironmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 106, Supplement 1, Feb. 1998.
"UN: Treaty Expanded by 9 more Dangerous Chemicals", Eliane Engeler, Associated Press
2009-05-09.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International
A Changing Landscape, 2005, Paris: OECD.
Investment
Law:
Asean Studies Center (2010), the Global Economic Crisis, Implications for ASEAN, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Report No. 10.
Sancin, V. (ed.). International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges:
Papers presented at the First Contemporary Challenges of International Environmental Law
Conference, Ljubljana: GV Zalozba, June 28-29, 2012.
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” Appellate Body
Report, AB-1998-4, October 1998.
UNCTAD, Investor-state Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rule making(2007).
New York: United Nations Publications.
Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Seperate Opinion by Dr. Kamal Hossein on
Jurisdiction. 21 December 2012.