‘Il est bon de savoir quelque chose des mœurs de divers peuples…’: Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes

“Il est bon de savoir quelque chose des mœurs de divers peuples…”: Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes Raffaele Carbone Exposing coutume and the function of reason in Montaigne Both Montaigne and Descartes correlate the concepts of coutume and raison when they contemplate the question of customs differing from European ones, and claim that the habits of other countries are not without reason. We intend to examine a number of passages in the works of Montaigne and Descartes that deal with the issue and, primarily, Chapter I, 23 of the Essais: [C] Les loix de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de nature, naissent de la coustume: chacun ayant en veneration interne les opinions et mœurs approuvées et receuës autour de luy, ne s’en peut desprendre sans remors, ny s’y appliquer sans applaudissement. […] [A] Mais le principal effet de sa puissance, c’est de nous saisir et empieter de telle sorte, qu’à peine soit-il en nous de nous r’avoir de sa prinse et de r’entrer en nous, pour discourir et raisonner de ses ordonnances. […] Et les communes imaginations, que nous trouvons en credit autour de nous, et infuses en nostre ame par la semence de nos peres, il semble que ce soyent les generalles et naturelles. [C] Par où il advient que ce qui est hors de gonds de coustume, on le croid hors des gonds de raison: Dieu sçait combien desraisonnablement, le plus souvent (I, 23, 115-116 C, A). [B] J’estime qu’il ne tombe en l’imagination humaine aucune fantasie si forcenée, qui ne rencontre l’exemple de quelque usage public, et par consequent que nostre discours n’estaie et ne fonde (I, 23, 111 B)1. Montaigne’s reflection on custom is complex and amphibological. Firstly, when one reads the entire chapter, one observes that Montaigne includes various phenomena in the notion of coutume: in using this term he is referring to individual habits as well as to group customs and, moreover, to habits –––––––––– 1 Montaigne had initially written “raison”, but then crossed out this word and replaced it with “discours”. Montaigne Studies, vol. XXV (2013) 120 Raffaele Carbone already acquired, as well as to the process of acquisition (l’accoutumance) itself, up to the point at which coutume and loi2 become interchangeable. Secondly, he emphasizes the power of coutume: custom is a violent and treacherous governess who only gradually reveals her raging, tyrannical face, bending men to her will (I, 23, 109 A; I, 36 225-226 A). Once one finds oneself in her clutches, one is incapable of returning to one’s senses to discuss or philosophize over her prescriptions: one tends to believe, that is, that the habits and customs of the community of which one is, oneself, a member and which has been formed and consolidated over time around those very traditions, are universally valid, and that anything that falls outside of the rules of that coutume is irrational. On the one hand, therefore, coutume is a force for cohesion in human groups, the common ground on which men meet and discover their cultural affiliations, as suggested by Montaigne in a passage from the “Apologie de Raimond Sebond”, which discusses religion (cf. II, 12, 445 A, B)3. On the other hand, although it is useful to abide by the customs of one’s own country, given that one must live in the world and make use of it as one finds it (III, 10, 1012 B; cf. also I, 23, 118 A), a careful study of the nature of coutume will bring to light its geographical dimension as well as its radical historicity, and will reveal that the force with which it imposes itself upon a society has been consolidated with the passage of time: Qui voudra se desfaire de ce violent prejudice de la coustume, il trouvera plusieurs choses receues d’une resolution indubitable, qui n’ont appuy qu’en la barbe chenue et rides de l’usage qui les accompaigne; mais, ce masque arraché, rapportant les choses à la verité et à la raison, il sentira son jugement comme tout bouleversé, et remis pourtant en bien plus seur estat (I, 23, 117 A). Here, Montaigne evokes truth and reason as parameters that allow common opinions to be put to the test4. If we compare this passage with other considerations in Chapter I, 23, we may conclude that it is the task of reason5 –––––––––– 2 Cf. A. Tarrête, “‘De la coutume…’ (I, 23) et ‘Des Cannibales’ (I, 31): l’écriture paradoxale et ses enjeux”, in Montaigne et l’intelligence du monde moderne. Essais, livre I, ed. B. Roger-Vasselin (Paris, PUF, 2010), p. 98-114, in particular p. 100. On the number of meanings of the concept of coutume (habit, social role, conventions, common law, established norms) cf. B. Matamoro, “Montaigne, moderno y trasmoderno”, Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, n° 509 (1992), p. 15-32, in particular p. 19. See also U. Langer, “Montaigne’s Customs”, Montaigne Studies, vol. IV, n° 1-2 (1992), p. 81-96, D. L. Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 157-171. 3 On the function of coutume for preserving the political stability of society cf. E. A. Johnson, Knowledge and Society. A Social Epistemology of Montaigne’s Essais (Charlottesville: Rookwood Press, Inc., 1994), p. 56; N. O. Keohane, “Montaigne’s individualism”, Political Theory, vol. V, n° 3, p. 363-390, in particular p. 373. 4 On this subject, cf. also II, 12, 539 A. 5 Over the course of the 16th century, according to the Dictionnaire de la langue française du XVIe siècle, we find the acceptance of “méthode, procédé, manière, moyen” among Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes 121 to guide us towards the authentic side of things that are hidden by practice (I, 23, 116 A), to defuse the presumed apodicticity of idées reçues and supposed coextensivity of habit and nature, to root out, behind the ordinary perception of our socio-environmental situation, the historicity of coutume. Truth and reason also demonstrate to us the prevalent practical functionality of habit in terms of the organization of society and the regulation of individual behaviour. This operation to demystify coutume6 certainly undermines our perception of the context in which we live, but opens up the possibility of a more concrete judgement which, by viewing our customs not as a natural norm, but as a collection of historically consolidated practices, positions them alongside the others, thereby dulling their claims of universal and natural validity. Reason appears to be a function allowing us to reflect on our traditions, on their genealogy, to compare them with those of other communities, other peoples and cultures and thereby to recognize their partiality and relativity; in this way we realize that every community can use the notions of “barbarian” or “savage” to describe the customs, beliefs and behaviour of other communities (cf. I, 31, 205 A). It is, however, true that, in a post-1588 addition to “De la præsumption”, Montaigne compares human reason to a double-edged sword and declares it to be dangerous: “La raison humaine est une glaive double et dangereux. Et en la main mesme de Socrates, son plus intime et plus familier amy, voyez à quants de bouts c’est un baston” (I, 17, 654 C)7. And yet, that same Socrates appears in the chapter “De l’institution des enfans”, in which the Athenian philosopher is portrayed as a man who is not tied to his home country, but who considers the whole world to be his city (I, 26, 157 A). A little later on, Montaigne writes: Ce grand monde, que les uns multiplient encore comme especes soubs en genre, c’est le miroüer où il nous faut regarder pour nous connoistre de bon biais. Somme, je veux que ce soit le livre de mon escholier. Tant d’humeurs, de sectes, de jugemens, d’opinions, de loix et de coustumes nous apprennent à juger sainement des nostres, et apprennent nostre jugement à reconnoistre son imperfection et sa naturelle foiblesse: qui n’est pas un legier apprentissage (I, 26, 157-158 A). If knowledge of other customs teaches us to judge our own more wisely, –––––––––– the meanings of “raison”, which do not, however, erase the previous meanings of: “propos, paroles”, “message”. Cf. E. Huguet, Dictionnaire de la langue française du XVIe siècle (1925-1967), vol. VI (Paris: Didier, 1965), p. 324. Cf. also A. J. Greimas, T. M. Keane, Dictionnaire du moyen français. La Renaissance (Paris: Larousse-Bordas/HER, 2001), p. 526. 6 Cf. N. Panichi, Montaigne (Rome: Carocci, 2010), p. 268-273, which throws light upon the work to reveal coutume as an original source concerning the universality of nature and the role of reason. 7 Elsewhere, when expounding a plan of education for gentlemen, Montaigne expressly recommends reason as a guide: “Que sa conscience et sa vertu reluisent en son parler, et n’ayent que la raison pour guide” (I, 26, 155 A, C). 122 Raffaele Carbone then we may legitimately believe that it is possible to follow the customs of our own communities in a way that is neither uncritical nor passive, and the possibility of such critical adherence is even greater when we observe more closely the customs of times and places far removed from our own, thereby at least toning down any prejudices we may have. Alongside the idea that one can liberate oneself from coutume, Montaigne, at least in terms of personal choices and orientations, and one’s own convictions regarding education, brings up the dimension of travel, a projection towards human diversity, as an educational-formative practice, as well as a curious, broad-minded and empathic disposition towards the customs of other human communities (cf. for example, III, 9, 948 B)8. An open-minded attitude, capable of looking beyond the confines of habit and tradition, and a propensity to learn about and experience new customs, new differences, new forms of human relations, will counterbalance the strength of coutume, which unites men around a self-defining nucleus made up of beliefs, rituals and behavioural norms that have settled and set over the course of centuries. This tension between the flexible approval of those customs identifying the community to which we belong, and an openness towards other coutumes, along with the knowledge that our particular customs are not universally valid, but have the same validity as others, allows, without disrupting the basis of human aggregation, the continual improvement of every single individual and of those societies which, under the apparently monochromic mantle of custom, hide, in turn, tensions, contrasts and mergings (cf. for example II, 16, 629 A). Let us now look at another passage of great interest, l’incipit from “Des Cannibales”. Quand le Roy Pyrrhus passa en Italie, apres qu’il eut reconneu l’ordonnance de l’armée que les Romains luy envoyoient au devant: Je ne sçay, dit-il, quels barbares sont ceux-ci (car les Grecs appelloyent ainsi toutes les nations estrangieres), mais la disposition de cette armée que je voy, n’est aucunement barbare. […] Voilà comment il se faut garder de s’atacher aux opinions vulgaires, et les faut juger par la voye de la raison, non par la voix commune (I, 31, 202 A). Here, Montaigne is showing us the procedures that we should follow when we are confronted with cultural differences, and demonstrating how to assess the common opinions according to which peoples and customs are judged. It is a question of building a judgement that will allow us to examine our vulgar convictions concerning other cultures, by using reason to defuse the force of the “voix commune”, the parroted phrases, the “it is said that…”. The reference to the “voye de la raison” requires intellectual effort: one must abandon all easy recourse to common opinions, to widespread rumours, and try not to be influenced by hearsay or by the prejudices in vogue within our own cultural borders, but to make use of rational, factual procedure instead, in –––––––––– 8 Cf. also Journal de voyage, ed. F. Garavini (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 145, 153. Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes 123 order to assess, at the same time, said current ideas (regarding other cultures) and the customs of others with whom we come into contact9. The “voye de la raison”, therefore, does not seem, in the chapter “Des cannibales”, to appeal to a uniform, universal reason, capable of resolving the problems and dilemmas of our world, but refers to a method, a procedure, a motion of taking a step back from our opinions and our customs: it means attempting to understand the genesis of the so-called cultural prejudices which allow us to observe others with knowledge of the historical and constructed nature of both the labels we use to file peoples with beliefs and customs different from our own, and of the bipolar categories we use to group the variety of human experiences (normal/monstrous, barbaric/civilized, and so on). In other words, the “voye de la raison” is that intellectual operation with which we throw light on the genealogy of cultural prejudices and of the notions with which we determine the boundaries between ourselves and others, as well as on the historicity of the mechanisms operating therein. Furthermore, in “Des Cannibales” once more, Montaigne again considers reason or, to be precise, the rules of reason, in that they are principles that allow us to judge the barbarity of actions or customs, irrespective of their latitude10, while the reference to “raison universelle et naturelle”, in a post-1588 addition to “D’un enfant monstrueux”, evokes the possibility of a comprehensive point of view, a vision of nature as a whole, which invalidates the very notion of monstrosity and of difference (II, 30, 713 C). Reasonableness of coutumes and “mature reason” in Descartes At the beginning of Discours de la méthode Descartes writes that “le bon sens ou la raison”, that is, “la puissance de bien juger, et distinguer le vrai du faux”, is, by nature, equal in all men (“est naturellement égale en tous les hommes”) despite differences of opinion (“et ainsi que la diversité de nos opinions ne vient pas de cela que les uns sont plus raisonnables que les autres, mais seulement de ce que nous conduisons nos pensées par diverses voies, et ne considérons pas les mêmes choses”)11. In Discours de la méthode – unlike the Regualæ, in which the Latin ratio is close to its mathematical sense12 – reason –––––––––– 9 The fact that Montaigne wants to highlight how the “voye de la raison” allows us to examine “opinions vulgaires” also emerges from a comparison with the text from the Essais of 1580. It is not a question of using reason to express judgement on things, as we read in the first version, but of weighing up common opinions. (cf. Essais de M. Montaigne, ed. Ph. Desan, Fasano-Chicago, Schena Editore-Montaigne Studies, 2002, p. 84). 10 “Nous les [les cannibales] pouvons donq bien appeller barbares, eu esgard aux regles de la raison, mais non pas eu esgard à nous, qui les surpassons en toute sorte de barbarie” (I, 31, 210 A). On the use of reason in this chapter cf. C. Lévi-Strauss, Histoire de lynx, in Id. Œuvres (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), p. 1447. 11 Discours de la méthode et Essais (AT, VI, 2). 12 In the 3rd Regula, moreover, mention is made of the “sola rationis luce” (AT, X, 368). On reason, see above all Regula I (AT, X, 361). 124 Raffaele Carbone comes into play in an active dimension, as the ability to discern and to judge13. Intending to show how he has attempted to steer his reasoning, Descartes demonstrates his intellectual journey and, above all, draws on his rhetoricoliterary education. Within the framework of this narration, the following passage needs to be highlighted: Il est bon de savoir quelque chose des mœurs de divers peuples, afin de juger des nôtres plus sainement, et que nous ne pensions pas que tout ce qui est contre nos modes soit ridicule, et contre raison, ainsi qu’ont coutume de faire ceux qui n’ont rien vu. Mais lorsqu’on emploie trop de temps à voyager, on devient enfin étranger en son pays; et lorsqu’on est trop curieux des choses qui se pratiquent aux siècles passés, on demeure ordinairement fort ignorant de celles qui se pratiquent en celui-ci (AT, VI, 6)14. These are considerations in which one can, we believe, find echoes of Montaigne15, at least in the first part of the text quoted above. We have said that, for Montaigne, customs that differ from our own cannot simply be filed as barbaric, savage or contrary to reason, and even if they may be criticized on the basis of the rules of reason, said rules are not the prerogative of the western observer; we may likewise recall the importance that the Bordeaux writer accords to travel, to the knowledge and practice of customs different from our own, as a means of loosening the knot binding us to our customs. An individual’s education unlocks its greatest potential when said individual opens himself up to the diversity of other lives and opinions and samples humanity’s rich variety of form (cf. III, 9, 973-974 B, C). Going back to the Cartesian passage quoted above, the second part softens the considerations found in the first: it is good to get to know the customs of other peoples and cultures to break down – as in Montaigne – our rigid bipolarizations; likewise, it is useful to have notions of what happened in times past. However, we must avoid the risk of becoming foreigners in our own homeland and ignoring what is going –––––––––– 13 Cf. J.-R. Armogathe, “Sémantèse de ratio/raison dans le corpus cartésien”, in M. Fattori and M. L. Bianchi (ed.), Ratio (Florence: Olschki, 1994), p. 403-413, in particular p. 408. Cf. also R. Michéa, “Les variations de la raison au XVIIe siècle. Essai sur la valeur du langage employé en histoire littéraire”, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, vol. CXXVI, n° 9-10 (1938), p. 183-201, on Descartes p. 189-190. 14 On coutume and on the need to get to know and to meditate on the customs of other peoples, we can also consider the role of P. Charron as a possible mediator between Montaigne and Descartes. He suggests observing the laws and the customs of one’s country and obeying magistrates and superiors, “le tout d’en esprit et d’une façon noble et genereuse, non servile, pedantesque, superstitieuse”. It should be noted, however, that he adds: “ne s’offensant cependant ny condemnant legierement les autres loix et coustumes estrangeres, mais jugeant et examinant librement et sainement les unes et les autres, comme a esté dit, et n’obligeant son jugement et sa creance qu’à la raison”. Cf. De la sagesse, ed. B. de Negroni (Paris: Fayard, 1986), p. 496-497. 15 On Montaigne and Descartes, cf. D. Arbib, “Le moi cartésien comme troisième livre. Note sur Montaigne et la première partie du Discours de la méthode”, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, n° 2 (2012), p. 161-180. Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes 125 on there. The second part of the passage might be read, therefore, as an answer to, or an amplification of, Montaigne’s assertions. In any case, this text would seem to confirm that reason is not the prerogative of one single human community or of just a few: the ways and the customs of others are not ridiculous or contrary to reason simply because they are different to our own, and they are, therefore, not to be belittled, or undervalued, and clearly have their own legitimacy and plausibility, are rationally justifiable and comprehensible, once placed within their own context. Furthermore, in this practical sphere, in which contact with other customs and forms of conduct are considered, Descartes recognizes that reason, the ability to discern and to judge, to connect ideas and to argue in favour of one particular action or another, has a certain plasticity and a variety of modulations that cannot be reduced to one single declination. One final point concerning this first group of texts: in the first lines of the Discours, Descartes represents reason as “la puissance de bien juger, et distinguer le vrai du faux”: one can, on closer reading, identify the puissance of reason in contrast to the Montaignian puissance of custom. Man has the potential to discern and to judge and this seems to prevail over diversity of opinions and habits, both in the sense that the practical operating space of reason is plural, as has been pointed out, and in the sense that reason is a skill, a universal endowment, declinable in various ways, which transcends geographical confines and historical periods. If we read other passages in the first part of the Discours de la méthode, our impressions seem to be confirmed. Descartes sticks to his proposal to examine nothing outside of himself or the great book of the world, an intention that led him to travel, as soon as he was able, in order to shake off the shackles binding him to his teachers, resolved to “à m’éprouver moi-même dans les rencontres que la fortune me proposait” (AT, VI, 9). These reflections – which are also Montaignian in flavour – give credence to the idea that Descartes was caught up in the trends and the concerns of his own time, with which he shared a desire to travel and to gain direct experience of the world16. Further on, in the second part, we read: et depuis, en voyageant, ayant reconnu que tous ceux qui ont des sentiments fort contraires aux nôtres, ne sont pas, pour cela, barbares ni sauvages, mais que plusieurs usent, autant ou plus que nous, de raison; et ayant considéré combien un même homme, avec son même esprit, étant nourri dès son enfance entre des Français ou des Allemands, devient différent de ce qu’il serait, s’il avait toujours vécu entre des Chinois ou des Cannibales; et comment, jusques aux modes de nos habits, la même chose qui nous a plu il [y] a dix ans, et qui nous plaira peut-être encore avant dix-ans, nous semble maintenant extravagante et ridicule: en sorte que c’est bien plus la coutume et l’exemple qui nous persuadent, qu’aucune connaissance certaine, et que néanmoins la pluralité des voix n’est pas une preuve qui vaille rien pour les –––––––––– 16 Cf. F. Alquié, La Découverte métaphysique de l’homme chez Descartes (Paris: PUF, 2000), p. 30. 126 Raffaele Carbone vérités un peu malaisées à découvrir, à cause qu’il est bien plus vraisemblable qu’un homme seul les ait rencontrées que tout un peuple: je ne pouvais choisir personne dont les opinions me semblassent devoir être préférées à celles des autres, et je me trouvai comme contraint d’entreprendre moimême de me conduire (AT, VI, 16)17. In this passage, we discover something of an undulation: on the one hand, the author recognizes the fact that, just because men feel differently and practice customs that are not the same as ours, this does not make them barbaric or savage; indeed, many of them even use their reason to a greater extent than we do; on the other hand, he maintains that example (or rather the way in which those who share our cultural space behave) as well as habit persuade us more than any level of knowledge. However, it should be noted that Descartes uses these reflections to bring to light the reasonings that prompted him to begin educating himself, and we must interpret them in the light of one of the author’s deepest desires: “j’avais toujours un extrême désir d’apprendre à distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux, pour voir clair en mes actions, et marcher avec assurance en cette vie” (AT, VI, 10). Other parts of the Discours de la méthode echo this intention: in the third part, where “morale par provision” is outlined, Descartes shows his perseverance in the type of occupation he has chosen, which consists of “employer toute ma vie à cultiver ma raison, et m’avancer, autant que je pourrais, en la connaissance de la vérité, suivant la méthode que je m’étais prescrite” (AT, VI, 27). Faced with a multiplicity of opinions and customs, the Cartesian answer in the Discours consists, therefore, of the following points: 1) not to declare opinions and customs which differ from one’s own to be irrational, insomuch as they have their own plausibility within the context to which they belong; 2) to recognize the difficulty inherent in approving one opinion rather than another; 3) in the light of the primary need – to find a fixed point of reference in life –, to embark alone on the search for truth (which, however, would not seem to invalidate the first point). There is, undoubtedly, a way to go, a task which involves nurturing reason and which requires a certain amount of time. This idea comes up in the Recherche de la vérité, in which we discover the guidelines and the fundamental themes of the Cartesian project: “je me suis proposé d’enseigner en cet ouvrage, et de mettre en évidence les véritables richesses de nos âmes, ouvrant à chacun les moyens de trouver en soi-même, et sans rien emprunter d’autrui, toute la science qui lui est nécessaire à la conduite de sa vie, et d’acquérir par après par son étude toutes les plus curieuses connaissances, que la raison des hommes est capable de posséder” (AT, X, 496). In the Principia philosophiae (I, 76), he then goes on to speak about “mature reason”: in those areas in which nothing is prescribed by faith, it is better for the philosopher not to assume the truth of anything of which he has never acknowledged the –––––––––– 17 In this regard Brunschvicg observes: “Et c’est bien dans le style des Essais que Descartes dégage la moralité de ses expériences”. L. Brunschvicg, Descartes et Pascal lecteurs de Montaigne (Paris: Pocket, 1995), p. 122. Customs and Reason in Montaigne and Descartes 127 truth; neither should he place trust in his senses, i.e. to the unconsidered judgements of his childhood (“inconsideratis infantiae suae judiciis”), rather than in mature reason (“quam maturae rationi”) (AT, VIII.1, 39). Certainly, we need to question the relationship between this mature reason in contrast to the prejudices of our childhood, which we find discussed in the Principia philosophiae, and that reason underlying those customs which are different from our own, mentioned in the Discours. In their own context, it was argued, customs different from ours are not irrational and, indeed, other people use their reason as much as, and even more than we do; here, in the Principia, there are no allusions to the customs of other cultures, but reference is made to the potential of reason, which has been cultivated and put into action as an ability to embark alone on the search for truth and on life itself, and to free ourselves of our prejudices, of hearsay and of what is passed down to us from others. It should also be noted that, in the third part of the Discours de la méthode and in the Letter to Elisabeth of Bohemia of 15th September 1645, the question of the coutume-raison connection manifests itself as the problem of choosing rules to be followed, as well as a model for a good life from which one can draw inspiration. If, in the Discours, it is about: obéir aux lois et aux coutumes de mon pays, retenant constamment la religion en laquelle Dieu m’a fait la grâce d’être instruit dès mon enfance, et me gouvernant, en toute autre chose, suivant les opinions les plus modérées, et les plus éloignées de l’excès, qui fussent communément reçues en pratique par les mieux sensés de ceux avec lesquels j’aurais à vivre (AT, VI, 22-23); in the letter to Elizabeth, it is claimed that: il faut aussi examiner en particulier toutes les mœurs des lieux où nous vivons, pour savoir jusques où elles doivent être suivies. Et bien que nous ne puissions avoir des démonstrations certaines de tout, nous devons néanmoins prendre parti, et embrasser les opinions qui nous paraissent les plus vraisemblables, touchant toutes les choses qui viennent en usage, afin que, lorsqu’il est question d’agir, nous ne soyons jamais irrésolus (AT, IV, 295)18. An examination of this nature still requires skills of discernment and judgement and an ability to make comparisons: what seems to be involved here is reason dealt with from an ethico-practical viewpoint, in which one finds oneself assessing the extent to which the customs of the places in which one lives should be respected, especially if one has chosen to travel and to reside in places where the customs are different from those of the country in which one was born (but in another letter, dated May 1646, Descartes suggests to Elizabeth, again regarding the subject of civil life, on the practical plane of –––––––––– 18 Nevertheless, in his letter to Chanut dated 20th November 1647, Descartes writes: “il n’appartient qu’aux Souverains, ou à ceux qui sont autorisés par eux, de se mêler de régler les mœurs des autres” (AT, V, 87). On the connections between the individual and the state, society and the family, cf. also AT, IV, 293. 128 Raffaele Carbone human relationships, that “il vaut mieux se régler […] sur l’expérience que sur la raison, parce qu’on a rarement à traiter avec des personnes parfaitement raisonnables”, AT, IV, 412). What seems to be emerging here is that critical attitude towards customs that we find confirmed in Montaigne, along with an awareness of the difficulty in making choices, behaving in, and navigating inter-subjective contexts. On the basis of the mature reason spoken of in the Principia, and even if he does wish to adapt to the practices and traditions of the places in which he goes about his daily business, Descartes, over the years in question, stresses the urgent need to examine said customs critically and exhaustively, in order to understand the extent to which they should be followed, in the same way that – as has already been mentioned in a different context – he asserted the importance of examining one’s childhood prejudices (although in this case, where the truth was at stake, it was a matter of questioning them and then getting rid of them). If, in the Discours, Descartes explains that the opinions and customs of other people do not, just because they are different, run contrary to reason, in the latter texts quoted above, he brings up the need to understand the extent to which the customs of the place in which one lives should be embraced, and the extent to which they are based on reason. In the light of the passages examined, in Descartes we find the outline of a sort of practical reason which regulates communal life within various communities; the different customs express, therefore, different rational ways of organizing different human communities, or rather of managing internal inter-individual relationships, as well as the individual’s relationship with his space-environment. Nevertheless, the area of coutume remains a complex reality: within it, one flits between reason and experience and neither can be done away with entirely in life. Finally, Descartes asserts the idea of properly directed mature reason, which will allow us to recover our natural inclination that has been corrupted by our senses, by our childhood prejudices, and by other individuals (wet nurses, for example) (cf. the Recherche de la vérité, AT, X, 507-509). Acknowledging the distinction between knowing and acting, with the former requiring a great deal of critical restraint and a long examination of reasons and counter-reasons, and the latter requiring rapid choices (cf. the Secundae Responsiones, AT, VII, 149), he emphasizes the importance of effecting an in-depth examination regarding, in particular, the practical sphere of adhering to the customs of the community of which one is a member. Thus, in Descartes we find a necessity, an issue and a tension already seen in Montaigne. Università Federico II, Napoli – Université Panthéon-Sorbonne Paris 1