Review of Robert L. Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonising Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya, 1945-1963

Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonising Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya, 1945-1963. By Robert L. Tignor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. viii-419. $55/£35 (ISBN 0-691-01584-8). In this welcome contribution to the growing literature on the economic underpinnings of African decolonization, Robert Tignor offers an original and challenging interpretation that offers little comfort either to dependency theorists or to champions of the metropolitan `transfer of power' model. His comparative study examines three important African examples, although the greater part of the book is devoted to discussion of Egypt, a ®eld in which the author is an established authority. Addressing an old question from a new perspective, Tignor seeks to evaluate the role of nationalist groups, the changing metropolitan outlook and the wider background of shifting international relations. Specifically, he aims to establish the extent to which business interests contributed to decolonization, the relationship between business and nationalist movements and the degree to which nationalist elites exercised influence over the business sector. He argues that in all three cases, nationalist movements were influential in shaping relations between the state and both business and expatriate capital, and that the very different post-independence political economies that resulted were the product of nationalist pressure. Tignor's basic conclusion is that economic considerations were not uppermost in the minds of metropolitan policy-makers, and that expatriate business was not, after all, decisive in shaping the outcome of decolonization in any of these three cases. Whether business voiced its concern at imperial policy (as in the Egyptian case) or whether it adapted to the changing political climate made little difference in practice. Thus, for example, when British property in Egypt was threatened by violence early in 1952, wider political and strategic considerations argued against the use of readily available British military force. By the same token, imperial calculations that resulted in the Suez fiasco in 1956 were apparently untroubled by concern for the likely commercial consequences of military intervention. Post-Suez Egyptian nationalism was sympathetic neither to expatriate nor indigenous business, as is shown by the extensive nationalization programme that ensued, a policy inspired by both the left and right-wing traditions within the nationalist movement. In Nigeria, meanwhile, expatriate business viewed political developments with unease, but similarly failed to affect the course of decolonization. The colonial state, whose relations with British firms had at times been strained in the past, increasingly distanced itself from business organisations as political devolution gathered pace. Confronted by the entrenchment of state commodity marketing, the statist aspirations of regional governments and the loss of their traditional political voice in colonial legislatures, together with gathering fears for Nigeria's political stability, British firms maintained their role, albeit a diminishing one, within an increasingly politicised economic climate in which the trend was towards further nationalization and Africanisation of enterprises. In Kenya, too, the role of British business was marginal to decolonization. Having survived the upheaval of Mau Mau, the state successfully protected the interests of many expatriate businesses, while being forced to abandon some of its post-war interventionism. Kenya's independence settlement required the soothing of traditional nationalist discontent over land alienation. The Africanisation of prime land in the White Highlands immediately prior to independence was promoted by the state and settler interests despite protests from firms in the modernised sectors of the economy who feared the effects land transfers would have on foreign investors' confidence. The author affirms that in all three countries examined nationalist movements on the whole succeeded in achieving their long-standing economic goals, and in so doing lends fresh support to nationalist interpretations of decolonization at the expense of rival metropolitan and international perspectives. He specifically refutes the allegation that United States interests, either business or governmental, played a significant role in decolonization; even in Egypt, where US business was well-established, Washington's policy, like London's, was shaped primarily by geopolitical, not commercial, considerations. Tignor makes a persuasive, elegant and lucidly expressed argument. He displays an impressive familiarity with a wide range of government and business records, which form the greater part of the evidence employed He is equally comfortable with the voluminous secondary literature on this subject. Despite a few small editorial slips (including references to Reginald ‘Maulding’), and the more serious, and regrettable, absence of a full bibliography, this book is stimulating and provocative. Its findings deserve to be considered seriously and tested against an even wider range of examples of African decolonization. L. J. BUTLER University of Luton