Pastoral conflict in Kenya:
Transforming mimetic violence to
mimetic blessings between Turkana
and Pokot communities
Ryan Triche*
Abstract
Livestock raiding has been a source of conlict amongst and between pastoral
societies in Africa for hundreds of years. However, more recently, these raids
have become more violent and have triggered much more organised retaliations.
Many times raids themselves are perceived as motivated by ethnic dimensions.
The following paper looks at tensions and conlict between Turkana and Pokot
communities in rural Kenya. The paper irst traces the historical context of cattle
rustling and livestock raiding between pastoral communities within Kenya.
It then identiies contemporary factors driving exacerbated tensions: access to
resources, proiteering, and weapons proliferation. The paper further explores
the systemic nature of the conlict through analysing livestock raiding as a
conlict spiral dictated by negative reciprocal actions. The spiral is ultimately
maintained due to mimetic violence structures that are in place. It then offers
prescriptions and potential solutions to the conlict, which are centred on
transcending the relationship from mimetic violence to mimetic peace and
reconciliation. Ultimately, by empowering local pastoral communities in the
*
Ryan Triche is an African regional specialist focusing on governance, conflict mediation,
human rights, and the responsibility to protect. He is currently undertaking graduate
studies at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy in New Jersey, where he is
concentrating in post-conflict reconstruction and sustainability. He received his B.A. from
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2013.
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form of multi-ethnic coalitions, and promoting broad-based interest groups,
cultural transcendence can reverse the conlict spiral into a relationship of
mutual reciprocity and mimetic peace.
Introduction
While the terms ‘cattle rustling’ or ‘livestock raiding’ may conjure up images of a
grand, romanticised period of American history and the Wild West, today these
terms have a much more imminent, destructive, and abhorrent connotation to
pastoralist societies within Kenya. The practice of cattle rustling has been a part
of pastoralist society in Kenya for generations; however, in recent years, livestock
theft has become increasingly violent and infused with more dangerous weapons
(Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:7). Perhaps the biggest testimony
to the escalating violence of livestock conlict is the event which occurred in
Suguta Valley, Samburu District, in November 2012, when forty-two Kenyan
police oficers were killed in conlict with suspected rustlers (Greiner 2013:216).
In such a turbulent region, where small, internal conlicts can quickly expand to
state and regional strife, it is important to understand the history, context, and
driving causes behind pastoralist clashes.
This paper explores the context of pastoralist clashes in Kenya by focusing on the
situation between two ethnic groups which are oftentimes involved in violent
conlict with one another along their respective land borders: the Turkana and
Pokot peoples. The rest of this piece is divided into three main sections. The irst
explores the historical context of livestock raiding within Kenya, spanning from
pre-colonialism and continuing through independence. The second section
analyses developments as well as previous attempts at peacemaking. Finally,
by identifying several issues of contention between the parties, I offer several
potential solutions which could alleviate the situation, manage ongoing conlict,
and ultimately restore peace to these communities and rural Kenya as a whole.
Historical evolution: From rungus to AK-47s
Pastoralist communities in East Africa have traditionally been built upon
nomadic peoples, migrating along with their respective herds in search of
lands to graze. Pastoralist communities are often credited with the increased
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movement of people southward throughout African history (Iliffe 1995:16).
It is noted that on many occasions, pastoral warfare and cattle rustling served
mainly as a tool for resource and land expansion by these societies. There were
often institutions in place to curb widespread violence. Typical weapons were
rungus, wooden clubs commonly found in East Africa, and bows. There were
also laws of conlict declared by clan and community elders which prohibited
phenomena such as violence against women and children, and contained peace
mechanisms. During early periods, these conlicts were often seen as a form of
redistribution and balancing of wealth between communities, in which one
community would take cattle from another when they were short on livestock,
and vice-versa; it was reciprocal in nature (PRAGYA n.d.).
Following independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly
violent conlict with one another, and the spread of modern weapon technology
contributed to more deadly conlicts. Many African scholars pinpoint as a cause
of these recurring conlicts the fact that colonial administrators were pushing
these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for
farmland (Murunga and Nasong’o 2007; Kanyinga 2009). These communities
now found themselves clamouring for new territories in strange lands, where
they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and
Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting ‘transhumance
forms of pastoralism’ in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for
themselves, but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (Kenya Human Rights
Commission 2010:11). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the
communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the
rustling of livestock thus increased.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a trend of democratisation sweep across
the African continent. A change occurred in the nature of East African cattle
rustling – the raids became commercialised. Previously, stolen livestock had
been utilised for bride wealth or redistribution of herds; however, beginning in
this era, livestock raiding became incentivised for monetary gain and organised
crime syndicates arose (Greiner 2013:220). Similarly, during this period,
clashes between communities became increasingly politicised. The democratic
movement that had swept across much of Africa had caused a response by the
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party-in-power at the time to turn to Majimboism, a form of federal regionalism
which disguised ethnic mobilisation and party support under territorial claims
(Greiner 2013:221–222). The previously localised raids and clashes were now
often seen as blossoming into full-scale ethnic conlicts. A conlict spiral of
cattle rustling became embedded in which one ethnic group would respond to
another’s raids with their own, in an endless conlict spiral.
Contextualising the conlict
The parties involved
The Turkana people number roughly 800 000 within Kenya, occupying about
twenty-four territorial sections. They constitute around 2 percent of the entire
population (African Studies Center n.d.). Being pastoralists, their primary
commodities are livestock, including cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They
thus rely heavily on following the rains and tend to migrate around temporary
camps or villages within a somewhat ixed area. It is important to note that
oftentimes the herdsmen also migrate to other territories with permission
of the Turkana hosts concerned. Age is a key factor in the organisational
structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure
of leadership, with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing
trade defence. Authority is generally decentralised, and while there are clan
leaders, small communities generally decide collectively on actions to take.
For defence purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village warriors and
their age-mates (Mathew and Boyd 2014:59). It is important to note that although
there has historically been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly this
role has become voluntary for purposes of raiding, and is generally a large-scale
community effort.
The Pokot community is organised in similar fashion to the Turkana. Pokot
society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organised around a clan entity
living in a village-style setting. They are pastoralists similar to the Turkana
community, and thus rely heavily on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age
is an important organisational structure and a generational top-down approach
is manifested in many aspects. However, scholars such as Michael Bollig
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(2000) note the evolution of lineage in economic matters. Issues such as trade
(including livestock) have deviated from this organisational structure and are
now characterised as decentralised, and more individualised—an outcropping
of a free market society. No one individual seems to dominate authority, and
actors are generally free to decide their own affairs (Bollig 2000:358–359). This
trend seems to parallel what is seen within the Turkana community.
Multi-dimensional factors of conlict: Proiteering, resources, and
small arms
Recently, scholars and other external actors have begun to identify access to
resources as a legitimate issue of dispute between the two communities and
pastoral societies as a whole (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010; Cheserek
et al. 2012; Boone 2013; Gleditsch 2013). The region in which the Turkana and
the Pokot reside is semi-arid, receiving little overall rainfall. Thus, the groups
must jostle for access to limited watering holes that are available to graze their
cattle. Quantitative analysis actually suggests that violent raids increase during
rainy seasons, as actors compete over newly discovered aquifers. Data over time
indicate that the frequency of raids and their level of violence increase with
rainy seasons and recede with drought-like conditions (Witsenburg and Adano
2009:520). These results support the notion that pastoralist communities ind
themselves in disputes over limited availability of resources with which to graze
their cattle and support their own well-being. Perhaps even more alarming is
the discovery of oil deposits in the Turkana region close to the border of the
Pokot community. Both regions laid claim to the deposits, and another point of
conlict about access to limited resources is therefore identifying itself (PRAGYA
n.d.:30). Oil could prove proitable to the community which takes advantage
of land-leasing arrangements, and thus there is a lot at stake for both Turkana
and Pokot.
A signiicant issue which has led to further deterioration of stability within the
pastoralist region has been the inlux of modern weaponry. Most of the illegal
weaponry originates from border areas of Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It then
reaches these pastoralist communities often through criminal gangs, and this
further fuels the regional violence (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2010:26).
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Thus, cattle rustling becomes proitable for these illegal arms traders, and leads
to an extension of conlict throughout the region. The interconnected nature of
Turkana-Pokot conlict can clearly be exhibited with the nature of proiteering
through illegal weapons. As the conlict has evolved over time from small-scale
conlicts fought with basic clubs and bows and arrows to more retaliatory, fullscale assaults undertaken with advanced small arms, the conlict spiral has
become more and more evident between these communities. If a herdsman
purchases illegal arms to protect his livestock, opposing factions will do the same,
fearing his actions are aggressive in nature. I ind striking similarities between
the build-up of arms of pastoralist communities and the nature of Soviet-US
relations in the past. The main difference is that these actions lead to physical
violence between pastoralist communities, thus a ‘hot’ war.
The underlying issue of reciprocity: Mimetic violence
Though factors driving pastoral conlict within Kenya have long been identiied,
sustainable peacemaking has been absent, and continues to appear distant from
the contemporary situation. I argue that the main impediment to peacemaking is
the notion of reciprocity, in this case negative reciprocity. There remains within
the conlict an embedded situation of negative responses to negative actions.
Each response builds upon the last, and a conlict spiral erupts. What began
simply as a cultural raiding practice has blossomed into increased armament,
contestation over resources, and ultimately violence itself.
Historically, pastoral communities within East Africa operated on communal
grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for
several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing had to be made between
nomadic peoples and other communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements
were born in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during
certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighbouring regions (Ngaido
2005:[1]). In fact, reciprocity was the key mechanism which enabled collective
action in traditional societies. However, with the onset of colonial land policies
and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies,
reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee
of reciprocity. Similarly, cattle were previously a cornerstone of reciprocal
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relationships in pastoral societies. Cattle would be traded for bridewealth, which
would strengthen kinship and communal bonds because of future interactions;
however, the commercialisation of livestock has eroded potential reciprocal
arrangements involving cattle. Cattle raided for markets cannot be entered back
into a reciprocal market (Krätli and Swift 1999:9).
The conlict situation in pastoral Kenya today revolves around the notion
of negative reciprocity. Turkana and Pokot societies respond negatively to
one another’s actions – violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided
throughout the history of East African pastoral societies. However, these
raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were
customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small
in number, and generally characterised by little violence. However, as rules
began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated
in intensity (Krätli and Swift 1999). Victims responded with raids of increased
intensity, and the conlict spiral was born. Krätli and Swift (1999:21–22) note:
Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group’s perception that the
raiding practices of the other group have become ‘excessive’, a fuzzy
and subjective notion which may change according to a number of
variables….Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and
economic routines are disrupted. Such escalation can be interrupted
only when both parties feel that the balance of power has been
re-established, that is when the peace process is not seen as a sign of
weakness of one of the parties…
Clearly, group perception has been co-opted by the effects of livestock raiding.
Each group perceives the other’s actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at
cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What
is essentially a inancial conlict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention
between Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conlict spiral.
According to the Structural Change Model (Pruitt et al. 2003), any refraining
from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear
that failing to respond will invite further encroachment and aggression (Pruitt
et al. 2003:97).
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In this model, the emphasis is on the transformative effect that the actions of
one party have on another within a conlict. Of particular emphasis in this
case are the psychological and group change effects that the Structural Change
Model elicits within its application. The Model notes four emotions speciic
to psychological changes: blame, anger, fear, and image threats. While these
emotions can indeed cause a condition to deteriorate, they are not permanent
structures. Rather, these emotions are temporary and only exist so long as the
Model is applicable and present. These emotions often have a negative effect on
groups by reducing caution, diminishing empathy, creating the perception that
relations are a zero-sum game, and ultimately making it easier to scapegoat the
other through reduced communication and negative perceptions.
Both studied communities have indeed undergone psychological changes.
Blame and anger are typical community mobilisers for an aggressive response.
Each community tends to become polarised around emotional responses to
livestock raiding, which they see as a direct attack on their economic wellbeing, their security, and ultimately their community. However, fear is also
an emotional factor driving conlict escalation. When raiding communities
increase their armaments, nearby communities respond with a reciprocal
increase in the capacity of their own weapons. This act of defence is seen by
the initial party as an act of aggression, and thus a security dilemma is born.
Finally, hostile perceptions of the other continue to erode the situation in rural
Kenya. Each community identiies the actions of the other as stemming from
some innate, negative identity trait of that party. These perceptions are what
shifted the conlict from individual levels to communal levels. One act of greed
by a raider or group of raiders becomes equated to communal aggression.
The victims respond by coalescing their own community members around the
notion of ethnic identity. The situation is reciprocated continuously with each
instance of livestock raiding.
While previous scholars tended to identify the factors contributing to pastoral
conlict as related to proiteering, access to resources, and small arms proliferation,
I state instead that these are symptoms of a much larger Structural Change
Model of conlict. This situation within the conlict has essentially embedded
negative reciprocity as a norm. Communal actions are gauged by exogenous
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factors rather than internal decisions. These actions have consequences of their
own which contribute to similar effects on the receiving end. One community’s
hostile actions are mimicked on the receiving end, in a never-ending cycle.
Within situations of these communal patterns of violence, in which negative
reciprocity changes the structure of beliefs and perceptions of the others, the
situation can, and must, be further deined. René Girard delves into the topic
of violence throughout humankind. He notes that what was once unanimous
violence (erupting for a cause of desire which spent itself) can, over time, lead
to the same desire of the victim group. Thus, rather than a desire as the root
cause of conlict and competition, the cause becomes the violence itself, which
paradoxically, is not a rational desire (Girard and Gregory 2005:160-162).
In this instance, I will implement the term mimetic violence as it its the mould of
Girard’s theory. While cattle rustling between communities originally occurred
out of wants and desires to simply increase resources through illicit means, the
reciprocal actions have continued to transform. Armed responses to incursions
are no longer driven for a reciprocal desire for cattle, but rather for a mimetic
desire of ‘violence begetting violence’. Any actions of the other groups in these
cases are viewed with a biased lens that is often inluenced by the notion of
mimetic violence. Understanding the nature of mimetic violence is vital in order
to implement prescriptions; however, so too are understanding past attempts at
mediation to identify what factors, if any, can be applied within the framework
of the Structural Change Model relating to mimetic violence.
Past attempts at peacemaking
Previous peacemaking efforts have been concentrated on the surface factors
driving the conlict between Turkana and Pokot communities, which I argue
are actually symptoms of a much more systemic conlict model. One attempt
at peacemaking focused on the communities themselves. The focus was placed
within pastoral communities to forbid raided livestock from being retained by
the actors conducting the raid. Furthermore, women stolen during raids could
not be taken on as brides of the raiders (Krätli and Swift 1999:32). On one hand,
the approach was successful in that it was effective in removing the raiders from
physical ownership incentives of raiding. The grassroots approach provided
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local agency in which cattle rustlers were much more likely to obey their own
group’s instructions than to endure exogenously imposed sanctions. On the
other hand, however, the project led to unforeseen consequences. Raided cattle
were allowed to be given to elders or sold for weapons. Essentially, what occurred
was the militarisation of raiding in which village elders became patrons of raids;
they would support large-scale assaults for beneits. Furthermore, raiders sold
cattle that were raided on the market and purchased weapons for themselves
to conduct future raids. Thus, I argue that because the effort failed to remedy
the systemic nature of cattle rustling, alleviating one factor of conlict shifted
resources to others.
Another peacemaking effort aimed speciically at community solutions to
Turkana conlicts enjoyed some successes. However again, Grahn and Akabwai
(2005:21-22) note that communal solutions are not effective at solving systemic
problems within a conlict.
Peacemaking efforts at the macro-level have encountered problems as well.
One author explains that state-led peacemaking initiatives often fail due to
corruption, lack of legitimacy, low resources, and ultimately institutional
weakness. In a government in which ethnic politics are deeply embedded, attempts
at mediating ethnic conlict disputes tend to exacerbate social tensions (Mahmoud
2011:159-161). Groups see government action as a continuation of ethnic biases
and thus respond to mediation attempts in the same way as they do livestock raids
– by polarising defence along their own communal identity.
Attempts at reducing access to small arms have often similarly failed in the
past. Kenya itself has a regionally strong stance against small arms proliferation.
These weapons are largely outlawed within the state. However, the local
incentive to maintain weapons trade exists due to pastoral conlict. Thus,
weapons are purchased from neighbouring states with more lenient weapons
policies. The Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) has
already sponsored the destruction of over 100 000 small weapons (Lamb and
Dye 2009:79). The effectiveness of such projects is often questioned, however.
High costs of undertaking such large efforts mean that the destruction of
weapons themselves is often dependent upon external sources of funding. In
this situation, the government is not a stakeholder and thus has little incentive
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to partake. Scholars note the continuing spiral of an inlux of illicit arms and the
ensuing destruction (Lamb and Dye 2009; UN Ofice for Disarmament Affairs
2011; Mkutu 2008).
Previous attempts have all fallen short on their mandate to instil sustainable
peacemaking efforts. I argue that these attempts have failed due to the fact that
they focus on symptoms of negative reciprocity rather than trying to interrupt
the conlict spiral. Similarly, initiatives have often focused only on one track of
diplomacy, such as the local or state level. By narrowing the scope to one track,
the negative pull of the conlict model simply gains traction in other areas which
are not being focused upon. These past attempts seem to point to the need to
instil both multi-track diplomacy initiatives as well as some sort of peacemaking
which involves reducing negative reciprocity.
Integrative solutions and mimetic blessing
Pruitt et al. (2003) offer several types of integrative solutions, two of which I
ind are directly applicable to the conlict situation between Turkana and Pokot
communities. Pastoral conlict in Kenya indeed maintains conlict symptoms
due to access to resources. One posited solution is ‘expanding the pie’ (Pruitt
et al. 2003:194). In this scenario, the total access to resources to both parties is
increased. If access to a consistent water supply, grazing lands, or oil revenues
were increased, contention over resources would diminish as a conlict driver.
I thus posit that there must be local capacity-building efforts to improve
local infrastructure as well as reach revenue-sharing agreements between the
governments over newly discovered oil sources. These revenues must be shared
not only with the government of Kenya, but between pastoral communities
themselves. By implementing these reciprocal institutional arrangements,
mimetic blessings can return to govern pastoral society as was previously the
norm before colonisation.
While the recognition of communal land rights in the 2010 Constitution of
Kenya was a step in the right direction, there is yet to be seen any legal respect
for practical reciprocity. Past colonial and early independence allocations
of land cannot be undone. However, both the government and pastoralist
communities themselves must evolve in order to balance communal access to
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resources with respect to physical land boundaries and revenue points. I suggest
that communal lands and pastoral grazing spots must be oficially demarcated
by the government in order to form a quantiiable and measurable regional
territory. Communal grazing lands would enable the continuation of a pastoral
lifestyle while reducing issues of contention along cross-border raids and cattle
rustling. Thus, any instances of livestock raiding would no longer be viewed as
an ethnic, group-based conlict, but rather as an individual property violation.
Judicial courts would be more able to provide effective remedies and arbitration.
These remedies would similarly apply to disputes over resources. Claims to
access could successfully be justiied through the judicial system. I also argue
that arbitration should entertain the idea of implementing proit sharing
of resources between the communities in dispute. The exact share would be
determined through legal procedures.
As Wily (2011:752-753) criticises, legal mechanisms are useless when they are not
enforced in practice. Turkana and Pokot communities themselves must force the
hand of the government in recognising legal access to communal lands. I posit
that in order to successfully push for rule of law, these communities themselves
must coalesce around unions based on non-sociological variables. For instance,
Turkana and Pokot businessmen could form a coalition or interest group around
cattle herding, agricultural trade, or any number of relevant markets. These
unions have the added beneit of requiring levels of reconciliation and mimetic
blessings in order for individuals to effectively engage with one another across
social boundaries. As has been evidenced countless times in democratic, marketbased economies – money talks. While elites may be able to ignore pressure from
broad ethnic communities with varying interests – communities in conlict with
one another – they cannot ignore the inluence of a concentrated lobbying group
with a signiicant amount of market share. Just as Kameri-Mbote (2013:2) notes
the need to provide local communities with tools to manage a legal framework,
I argue a bottom-up approach of dissemination of legal information and
advocacy could provide local agency. NGOs could prove paramount in providing
agency as well as facilitating the cessation of mimetic violence through mutual
blessings and increased interconnectedness.
Paired with this solution is that of ‘cost cutting’. Here, parties concede on
issues when costs in doing so are reduced, often due to compensation (Pruitt
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et al. 2003:197). I argue that Turkana and Pokot members can agree to install
mutual land-sharing arrangements during set periods in return for more
internal enforcement against cattle raiding. Though land sharing may incur
costs for original communities grazing herds at these locations, overall costs
are reduced because internal sanctions decrease cattle raiding, and thus costs
to defend against raids lower the cost of grazing in general. One study found
that in pastoral societies, internal sanctioning against raid violators is essentially
a public good. When sanctions and enforcement are initiated from within a
community, societal costs of ‘shirking’ on norms are increased (Mathew and
Boyd 2014:61-64). Cattle raiders not only face economic costs but social costs
such as loss of bridewealth and communal respect. Thus, internal sanctions are
a notion which I argue should be implemented in order to increase the cost of
livestock raiding and reduce the cost of positive reciprocity.
At a macro-level, the proliferation of illicit small arms in Kenya is both a
product of porous borders and of market incentives. While at irst the task may
seem monumental, reducing the costs of arms regulation is indeed achievable
through both communal and state cooperation. I irst conclude that Kenyan law
enforcement can no longer be absent from the region. The police must increase
their presence within rural pastoral grazing lands as well as along the borders
between neighbouring states, especially Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda.
While allocating funding to this mammoth task may initially seem daunting,
evidence indicates that indeed it is actually less costly in the long-run to harden
borders and increase the costs of illegal arms trade than continuously destroying
armaments and dealing with the aftermath of deadly pastoral rivalries (Mkutu
2008). Along with a physical police presence, I contend for a strict training
regimen for border oficers in order to ensure that the rule of law and respect for
individual rights are respected.
The least costly means of addressing illegal arms proliferation within pastoral
communities of Kenya is simply to dis-incentivise the trade altogether. The fact
that Kenya’s strict weapons policy is so unusual in the region creates market
mechanisms in which illegal arms are smuggled into the nation. High demand
drives high prices, and smugglers are more willing to risk their livelihoods
to transport and propagate arms. Here, I propose regional integration and
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participation in small arms limitations. Kenya’s policy towards arms sets a
precedent for neighbouring states. However, unless these nations adopt similar
policies, arms trade will only increase the more Kenya solidiies its position. East
Africa must harmonise a policy framework aimed at reducing illegal small arms.
The African Union and East African Community, I argue, could provide viable
forums from which to launch these initiatives. A uniform regional approach to
dissuading illicit arms trade is necessary in order to effectively diminish market
incentives for trade to begin with. The local effects would be a decrease in
violent conlicts between pastoral communities. Even if all other factors remain
constant, conlict between Turkana and Pokot societies will be less organised,
more slow to develop, and ultimately less deadly.
For both internal sanctioning and external arms agreements to be effective,
overarching cooperation must be facilitated at irst through ushering in a
norm of mutual reciprocity. A local community’s decision to sanction cattle
rustlers internally is only legitimate if that community expects neighbouring
communities to do the same. The historical lack of authority and accountability
of the Kenyan government within pastoral regions has infused a sense of
impunity to livestock raiders. By simply increasing the presence of authority
within rural communities, the government can signal a reversal in trends,
garnering legitimacy in the perceptions of locals and commencing a new trend
of mutual reciprocity in that the government will protect livestock in return
for local communities also dis-incentivising raiding. Again, this relationship is
mutually beneicial – costs are reduced at both a communal level and the state
level. Finally, for regional cost-reduction of arms control to occur, states must
signal to one another the legitimate intentions of their stance on weapons trade.
Kenya’s dificulty has arisen because illegal weapons trade is more proitable
due to the vacuum created. There is no system of reciprocity in the region, and
neighbouring states have done little to harmonise arms control. It seems as if
mutual relationships must be built from the communal level so as to bypass
governments and instil a cross-border relationship. By bridging gaps locally,
these communities can inluence domestic policies to fall in line with the
aspirations of regional communities as a whole. Cooperation must stem from
community-based cooperation, reconciliation, and ultimately a cultural shift
away from past mimetic violence.
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Many anthropologists and sociologists note the dificulties present when local
communities undergo cultural shifts (Lee 2004; Bobo 1988; Moreland and Levine
1982)). Oftentimes, a schism erupts between younger and older generations.
Intra-group conlict can occur, especially when pressures of cultural norm shifts
are exogenous. The external pressure of these norms is felt within the pastoralist
communities themselves. With such a powerful external force, a solution must
come from within.
Girard himself illustrates mimesis with a pessimistic view. For him, mimetic
violence exists as a long-term response to the natural desires which contribute
to unanimous violence. I ind a fault with the fact that a natural response can
lead to the paradox of these desires being replaced simply with the desire of
violence or vengeance. I thus offer that indeed there exists an ability to transcend
the conlict and implement mimetic blessing. Imitation of violence drives the
conlict spiral to reach this mimetic pinnacle, but if instead of violence, actors
imitated and reciprocated rational behaviour and good intentions, the cycle
can indeed be broken. Furthermore, when mimesis of rationality replaces
mimesis of violence, conlict itself is no longer a desire of communities. It is
thus less likely that isolated violent behaviour would be perceived as an attack
of identity. I therefore draw emphasis on this possibility, and focus on the actual
transcendence of mimetic violence and the shift to mimetic blessing.
How could the transformation of mimetic violence to mimetic blessings be
facilitated in the context of pastoral communities who have such a long and
contentious history? Elizabeth Cole notes that history education and a pedagogy
that takes history seriously are vital in order to promote progressive learning of
the past. She explains:
What is critical here is not only the effect that these approaches to history
can have on the formation of actively engaged, critically thinking citizens,
but what they can offer to post-conlict settings where the history of the
recent conlict is simply too sensitive and politically dificult to discuss
openly… (Cole 2012:237).
Cole and others offer education as a way to bridge a gap from the past to
current generations and to successfully construct progressive and mutual
reciprocity between contentious groups. Education regarding cultural history
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can tread lightly where the government and oficial mediation cannot. Bekerman
and Zembylas (2014:57) note that in conlict settings, teachers must move away
from the epistemological setting induced by the state and into a more critical,
ontological perspective. The state and nationhood, they argue, pre-determine the
identity of instruction teachers take. Grassroots approaches successfully enshrine
shifting critical assessments to peace education, and can enable education to shift
away from an identity created by the state (Lahai and Ware 2013).
While Cole explained that educational approaches and history teachings are
vital to reconciling and transcending conlicts between communities, I wish to
take her recommendations one step further. In a developing multi-ethnic nation
such as Kenya, which lacks funding for educational reform and overhauls, and
also has a history of a politically polarising ethnic force, attempting to implement
a new practice could prove ineffective or even disastrous. An education policy
focusing on negative emotions and ‘ethnic tragedies’ could prove destructive
to the tensions between Pokot and Turkana communities. An ethnic-based
education policy without proper institutions or plans in place can degrade
already tense emotions between various groups. This ethnic pedagogy is deemed
by scholars to have contributed to a large part of Balkanisation and ensuing
violence in Assam, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Lange 2011).
There must be implementation of multi-track diplomacy in order to increase
the capacity of the state to both enforce rule of law and increase local access
to remedies. A multi-faceted coalition would ensure that dissemination of
information and education policies are balanced. I suggest providing local
NGOs with state-sponsored resources to disseminate information to local
communities and elders. Still, the state has the largest potential for capacity to
oversee access to resources and aid in curbing weapons proliferation. For this
reason, the state is still a stakeholder and thus must serve a role in this coalition
of reconciliation. Finally, I assert that these grassroots organisations should
provide classroom instructors. Local schools could offer optional classes related
to ethnic history which emphasise the connections and relationships shared by
all pastoralist communities. Where the government fails to transcend ethnic
boundaries in mediating conlict resolution, empowered local organisations can
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combine with education in order to bridge social gaps and promote mediation,
reconciliation, and ultimately a peaceful and respectful pastoral environment.
Can empowering local organisations in such a way actually alleviate systemic
ethnic politicisation in Kenya? By conditioning the allocation of resources to
multi-ethnic coalitions and NGOs which respect ethnic diversity, donors begin
to set a bottom-up precedent of interest-based coalitions formed around ethnic
unions and based upon participation rather than contention. The ultimate goal of
conditioning aid to groups who promote these values is to create an environment
in which multi-ethnic coalitions of unity, paired with interest-group participation
in policy advocacy, become the norm. By institutionalising broad, cross-cultural
relationships, mutual reciprocity is introduced into the system, which also has
the effect of dis-incentivising violence. As Boehmke and Bowen (2010:667-668)
note, interest-based advocacy correlates with an increase of democratic values.
Bienen and Herbst (1996:27-28) also support this analysis regarding Africa and
note a decrease in ethnic politics and rent-seeking. By providing agency to local
organisations, not only can ethnic tensions between pastoral communities be
reduced, but also the systemic ethnic politicisation in Kenya itself. The catalyst in
this case is the transformative nature that local cooperation can have in promoting
mutual reciprocity and ultimately mimetic blessings.
Reconciliation is vital to shifting the spiral among Turkana and Pokot
communities from mimetic violence to mimetic blessings. Scholars such as
Vamik Volkan (1998) argue that by reconciling differences between parties, all
the results of the violence cannot be undone, and that the situation cannot be
exactly the same as it was before the violence. Vern Redekop (2011), however,
asserts that pairing spiritual reconciliation with focusing on personal connections
may contribute to emergent creativity, which can indeed transform previous
relationships among parties. Similarly, the multitrack peacemaking initiatives I
posit, by pairing local and state-sponsored efforts, allow for the emergence of new
principles in reconciliation. New norms emerge from multitrack approaches of
reconciliation. Meta-requisites like implementing education to bridge cultural
gaps as well as internal enforcement mechanisms of justice promote emergent
creativity. The conlict spiral between the feuding pastoral communities is not
only terminated, it is transformed into a spiral of mimetic blessings. With these
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blessings in place, a positive peace can ultimately be reached, which can erode
negative reciprocity and transform the situation into one of mutual reciprocity
and blessings.
This analysis thus seeks to expand upon mimesis within the realm of conlict.
I have attempted to steer discussions away from the notion of the ‘inevitability’
of mimetic violence within a conlict spiral, and rather to raise questions as
to how these conlict situations can be changed into relationships of mimetic
blessing. Mimetic violence with its reciprocal behaviour that occurs not so
much for material desires or resources, but simply for the desire of vengeance
itself, has to be counteracted. How can the desire of violence and vengeance be
a rational response within any one society? Thus, this study aims to provide
evidence for the fact that not only is mimetic blessing possible within society,
but it can serve as a means to end conlict through a natural state of rationality.
The dehumanisation that occurs due to mimetic violence, alongside the other
psychological and group factors that drive pastoral conlict within Kenya, can
indeed be reversed when the conlict environment is transformed.
Conclusions and a way forward
The factors driving the pastoral conlict between the Pokot and Turkana
communities in Kenya are related to proiteering, small arms proliferation,
and access to resources. I have illustrated that these conlict drivers are
actually inherent symptoms of a much larger systemic nature to the conlict.
Livestock raiding between these communities is based on an age-old custom of
reciprocity. Whereas, long ago, reciprocity was a beneicial tool for maintaining
resources through institutions, the onset of colonial policies diminished access
to land and decreased incentives for land-sharing arrangements. The practice of
livestock raiding was transformed from a reciprocal tool of wealth distribution
to a reciprocal vice of proiteering. Negative reciprocity was oficially embedded
within the system and maintained through structural change in psychological
tendencies and perceptions of the ‘other’. A conlict spiral and security dilemma
developed in which raids dictated an escalated armed response along communal
identities. The situation continues today and is cyclical in nature.
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The solution advanced within this article is to implement multitrack
peacemaking efforts. Internal enforcement, cross-cultural cooperation, and
increased state accountability can contribute to a positive peace. Simultaneously,
cooperation is important at both a communal and a regional level. The
geopolitics of state cooperation in East Africa cannot be discounted. In order
for mutual relationships to occur, a bottom-up approach must evolve which
is driven by eroding the cycle of negative reciprocity and replacing it with a
transformative structure based upon healing, inclusiveness, learning from the
past, and overall cultural openness.
Education can be implemented as a tool to instil a sense of reconciliation. This
reconciliation itself, which may be brought forth by a coalition of grassroots as
well as state organisations, may lead to the emergence of creativity. Transcendence
between communities can occur as the result of new norms emerging which
fundamentally alter the conlict and become irreversible. Ultimately, emergent
creativity can transcend conlict norms and transform the situation from a conlict
spiral of negative reciprocity to a positive peace building upon mimetic blessings.
Increased cooperation between pastoral communities as well as increased state
capacity will raise the welfare of all the parties involved. Emergent creativity
paired with mutual reciprocity is paramount to constructing an environment
of mimetic peace and ultimately spearheading peacemaking efforts between
the Pokot and Turkana communities. With spiritual and cultural reconciliation,
these communities can arm themselves not with defensive mechanisms against
perceived aggression, but rather with tools of cohesion, understanding, and
ultimately a sustainable peace.
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