HOUSE P
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SHINZO ABE AND
JAPAN-CHINA SECURITY
RELATIONS
Irritants & Legacies
DR. SUDEEP KUMAR
R
Indian Council
of World Affairs
PE
P
RU
SA
SHINZO ABE AND
JAPAN-CHINA
SECURITY RELATIONS
Irritants & Legacies
DR. SUDEEP KUMAR
R
Indian Council
of World Affairs
HOUSE P
A
PE
P
RU
Indian Council
of World Affairs
The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) was established in
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Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations:
Irritants &Legacies
First Published, April 2023
© Indian Council of World Affairs
ISBN: 978-93-83445-78-3
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CONTENTS
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Abe’s Indo-Pacific Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
History-Textbook & Yasukuni Shrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Core Contentions: South China Sea, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands . . . . . 18
The Taiwan Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Japan-China Security Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Rise of China and Japan’s Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
China–North Korea Strategic Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Trump Factor in Japan-China Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Abe’s China Policy in nutshell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
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ABSTRACT
The paper examines Japan-China security relations during
the second administration of former Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe from 2012. This was also the year when Chinese
President Xi Jinping came into power. For the Abe-Xi Era (2012-20),
no comprehensive assessment is available regarding the evolving
Chinese grand strategy and Japan’s strategic responses within
the larger policy framework of Trump’s East Asia policy. The rise
of these two strong Asian political leaders of world’s second and
third largest economies initiated a series of backchannel efforts to
normalise their contemporary bilateral relations. As a result, at the
2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Beijing, their
‘quiet diplomacy’ facilitated the brief meeting of both leaders. On
Xi’s official invitation, Abe visited Beijing again in 2018 in pursuit
of a major breakthrough in bilateral relations. This period saw Abe
proactively involved in diplomatic manoeuvrings to safeguard
major bilateral and regional issues such as the ‘bilateral history
problem’, ‘core contentious issues’, ‘rise of China’, and ‘nuclearcapable North Korean missile program’ and so on. On the other
hand, China’s rising economic and military power emboldened
Xi to decide the future direction of bilateral relations vis-à-vis
Japan and the United States. This period was also to see American
President Donald Trump (2017-2021) and his transactional policies
further complicating the multilayered Japan-China security
relationship. The strategic competition between China and the
United States led to a paradigm shift where Japan, as the defence
ally of the United States, was adapting to the evolving Chinese
grand strategy in the multi-polar Indo-Pacific. Japan wanted to
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remain a ‘tier-1’ power and planned hike in the defence budget,
rapid military modernisation, and increasing joint military training
in the region. It seems that Japan’s strategic response to the rise of
China during this period faced a crucial question, i.e. whether to
kowtow to Xi’s building a community of common destiny. In this
backdrop, this paper analyses the continuity and changes in Abe’s
security policy towards Xi-led China and possible implications for
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Keywords: Shinzo Abe, Xi Jinping,Japan, China, Indo-Pacific
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BACKGROUND
Japan and China normalised their diplomatic ties on 29
September 1972. In the 1970s, their dominant political dynamics
were guided by the common threats of the Soviet Union. Events
like the textbook controversy in 1982, Japanese Prime Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985,
the Kokaryo incident in 1987 and the Tiananmen incident in 1989
revealed intergovernmental frictions and simmering antipathy
in Japan-China relations. The 1990s were mostly marked by
territorial disputes regarding Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In a setback
to diplomatic ties, the official visit of Japanese Prime Ministers
Hashimoto Ryutaro and Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine
and the dispute of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands led to the suspension
of the official visits of state delegations between 2002 and 2006.
Since then, there was a growing apprehension that their maritime
disputes could lead to military clashes and conflicting political
interactions. These key events and developments however were in
line with their 50 years of normalisation in bilateral ties that had
been full of ebbs and flows (Yinan 2022).
d
The current chapter of synergising of their bilateral relations is
believed to start with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit
to Beijing in December 2018. This is when Abe and Xi discussed
economic cooperation and opportunities for building joint
infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. During this official visit
though Abe had also raised Japanese concerns about Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, human rights and several Japanese citizens’
detention on espionage charges. But Abe’s China Policy also
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As regards to China’s fragile relations with Japan,
Chinese nationalism has been one of the main factors
in serving the political legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party by invoking a siege mentality on the
collective psyche especially of the Chinese youth.
witnessed rather restrained public criticism of Chinese maritime
assertiveness and human rights violations while fostering
dialogue on common concerns, including trade and investments
(Tobias 2020).
Due to the US-China strategic competition and slowing down of
China’s economic growth, China found itself encircled with many
social, economic and political problems like urban–rural income
inequalities, ageing population, declining demography, COVID
pandemic, all of which resulted in decline of the political legitimacy
under Xi Jinping. This coincided with China’s education curriculum
emphasising the achievements of the 4000-year-old history of the
Chinese civilisation, and the shame of the ‘Century of Humiliation’
as an attempt to divert the attention of the Chinese public from the
growing economic problems towards nationalism for maintaining
national unity. The underlying message was that it is only the
Chinese Communist Party which can govern China, and any friction
between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people will
lead to chaos and anarchy.
As regards to China’s fragile relations with Japan, Chinese
nationalism has been one of the main factors in serving the political
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party by invoking a siege
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mentality on the collective psyche especially of the Chinese youth.
The educational curriculum still emphasised ongoing external
security threats and the painful history of the Sino-Japanese War
of 1895, the Boxer Rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937.
China used the successive visits of the Japanese Prime Ministers
to the Yasukuni Shrine to honour their fallen heroes in the Second
World War as a political tool to whip-up strategic mistrust in the
Chinese people’s perception. The Chinese one-party state controls
mainstream media and censors alternative media outlets and has
been responsible for the Chinese people’s opinion about Japan (Tan
and Szanto 2016).
The geopolitical imperatives of Abe’s proactive policies, on the other
hand, were to check and balance China’s security threats with the
deepening security alignment of the United States while engaging
China without jeopardising the economic security interests of Japan.
Abe wanted to stabilise diplomatic relations and deepen economic
cooperation to restrain China’s encroachment in Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands and the artificial island building in the South China Sea.
Moreover, Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy outreaches in cyber-security,
green energy, digital technology and economic security domains
were meant to build a multipolar Indo-Pacific region. Abe was
quite critical of Xi’s authoritarian security legislation in Hong Kong,
human rights violations in Xinjiang, increased aerial incursion and
fire drills in Taiwan’s air defence zone, the COVID pandemic and
noncooperation with the World Health Organisation. Abe played a
decisive role in building all parties’ consensus in Japanese politics
against China’s human rights violations and democratic upheaval,
which was significant compared with Japanese apathy at the time
of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.
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Abe played a decisive role in building all parties’
consensus in Japanese politics against China’s human
rights violations and democratic upheaval, which was
significant compared with Japanese apathy at the
time of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.
China’s tactical détente with Japan might have been a pretext for
the groundwork regarding Chinese law enforcement in the Japanadministered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This is because China’s
militarisation of the artificial islands in the South China Sea
could be a coercive attempt to assert effective control of contested
sovereignty. (Singh and Yamamoto 2015) Xi had also begun to tinker
with the other most important irritant of Japan-China relationship
i.e. China’s Taiwan policy that moved from ‘peaceful reunification’
to ‘forceful reunification’(Kawashima 2022). Xi’s possible forceful
enunciations on the likely use of force in unification of Taiwan has
its security implications for the freedom of navigation in the IndoPacific.The forceful reunification of Taiwan with China was seen as
possible legacy of Xi but he needed to silence his opposing within
the Communist Party.
China’s alleged role in spreading COVID-19 across the world
raised and added to Japanese scepticism towards China-led
world order in light of its rapid military modernisation and
technological advancement to reclaim its centerstage in world
Xi’s possible forceful enunciations on the likely use of
force in unification of Taiwan has its security implications
for the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.
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politics. Furthermore, China’s strategic usage of the economic
interdependence of global and regional supply chains had already
raised the alarm for the diversification of Japanese trade baskets
and enhanced economic insecurity. To make sense of the Japanese
security policy of these years, one needs to also look at Abe’s IndoPacific strategy within the broader framework of the United StatesChina strategic competition (Torri, Mocci and Boni 2021).
ABE’S INDO-PACIFIC INITIATIVES
During the second Abe administration (2012–2020), Japan
witnessed major security reforms, which would have far-reaching
implications domestically and internationally. The reason behind
these reforms was to build Japan as a ‘tier-1 power’ and play agendamaking roles in global political and economic decision making. This
began with Abe setting up the ‘National Security Council’ with an
‘Economic-Security’ unit towards building supply-chain resilience
that was as significant as the direction of the China-United
States strategic competition that had moved from geopolitics to
geoeconomics. Later this as to see Shinzo Abe launching JapanIndia-Australia trilateral Supply China Resilience Initiative.
Given the history of problems and geographical proximity as
also their widening sphere of influence, Abe sought to deal with
Given the history of problems and geographical proximity as
also their widening sphere of influence, Abe sought to deal
with China from a position of strength by building a national
military to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
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China from a position of strength by building a national military
to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Abe’s economic
diplomacy was aimed at creating a coalition for the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (FOIP), revamping of Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Partnership for
Quality Infrastructure (PQI) and Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)
to preserve the “rule-based order” with like-minded partners. One
might ask as to what extent Abe successfully built institutions
and projected Japanese power in the Indo-Pacific region, given
that Japanese dual-use civil–military engagement capabilities are
comparatively weaker than the Chinese civil-military capabilities.
Xi’s geoeconomic push, on the other hand,aimed to obtain China
a great power status with the help of a dual-use civil–military
fusion strategy of critical technologies, infrastructures and existing
supply-chain mechanisms to their advantage. Against these
backdrops, Japanese security reforms only pursued a minimum
power-projection capabilities; witnessing geopolitical and
geoeconomic challenges in coordination with the United States and
other regional powers as a rule-making nation to ensure the FOIP
(Koshino and Ward 2022).
This period was to also witness rise of pro-independence
Democratic Progress Party in Taiwan changing dynamics for China’s
regional Asia-Pacific policies. This was to make Taiwan emerge as
a major irritant in the evolving narratives around the Indo-Pacific
geopolitics. Professor Yang Bojiang of Beijing-based Chinese
Academy of Social Science believes that the future trajectories
of Japan-China relations lie in the Taiwan issue and common
economic interests. There is a need to discuss the Taiwan issue
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under the four political documents, namely the China-Japan Joint
Statement of 1972, the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship of
1978, the China-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998 and a Joint Statement
on Advancing Strategic and Mutually Beneficial Ties of 2008, to deepen
economic engagements while resolving differences for normalising
bilateral relations (Bojiang 2022).
So, at end of Abe’s longest tenure as prime minister of Japan they
still had several unsettled issues that required building a stable
and constructive relationship to realise a shared vision for building
peace and prosperity in the region (Miki 2022). To manage their
conflicts and differences and to deepen their multi-domain
exchanges and cooperation, both Japan and China still needed
to follow these aforementioned ‘four political documents’ and a
series of other important consensusunderstandings built over the
past 50 years for the mutual benefit of their people, region and the
world (Huaxia 2022). As, Kong Xuanyou, the Chinese Ambassador
to Japan, mentions both the ‘History problem’ and the ‘Taiwan
issue’ should not be allowed to overstep to avoid the fluctuation
in diplomatic ties. Therefore, it is important to abide by the four
political documents in a comprehensive way (Xuanyou 2022). But
recent years have seen Taiwan emerging as China’s core interest,
and Japan must not help the United States to use Taiwan in
itscontain China policy (Sheng 2022).
The ‘History problem and Taiwan’ issues define the criss-cross
of the continuity and changes in Japan-China security relations
during the second administration of the Abe era, which witnessed
his significant rolesin shaping the political ideologies, historical
issues, and proactive leadership. China remained Japan’s the largest
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China remained Japan’s the largest trading partner
but also its biggest security anxiety.
trading partner but also its biggest security anxiety. Contemporary
diplomatic interlocutors of these two countries have a great deal
to learn from this period that saw bilateral relations become
increasingly strained due to the rise of China followed by its military
modernisation and assertive political discourse and cyber-strikes.
The geographical proximity, historical resentment, territorial
conflict, the United States–Japan security alliance and stationed
American military bases in Japan only further complicated the
Japan-China dynamics, which carries enormous potential to impact
the peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific rim.
HISTORY-TEXTBOOK & YASUKUNI SHRINE
One of the main reasons behind the ‘History problem’ in ChinaJapan relations is that there is no consensus on weaving common
narratives about the Second World War and its painful memories
on both sides. There has also been no willingness to write History
textbooks based on comparing notes, popular perceptions and
understanding towards each other. It is the emotional dimension of
the legacy of the war, and the lack of proper closure between Japan
and China that makes it the core of their discord. The Yasukuni
issue is an example how both nations have remained trapped in
the memories of war and political ideologies. Furthermore, with
the Rise of China economically and militarily, Japan has become
concerned about the Chinese security threats. At the same time,
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There has also been no willingness to write History textbooks
based on comparing notes, popular perceptions and understanding
towards each other. It is the emotional dimension of the
legacy of the war, and the lack of proper closure between
Japan and China that makes it the core of their discord.
for China, the reconciliation of the ‘History problem’ remains
interlinked with the security threats concerns and cannot be dealt
with separately. In other words, the ‘History problem’ and more
recently the ‘China challenge’ are essential preconditions for
building peace, prosperity and stability in the region(MOFA 2010).
Contrary to the popular narratives on the Pearl Harbour and the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, China considers the ‘History
problem’ starting from the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and
continuing into the Sino-Japanese War of 1937. Chinese Communist
Party has used anti-Japanese sentiments to nurture nationalism
in New China since the leadership of Mao Zedong. The ‘History
problem’ between Japan and China has, as a result, remained the
victim of the differences in political ideologies and subjective
interpretations to serve the political expediencies of the respective
government on both sides. Thus, it is still a distant dream to work
towards building a common narrative on the Yasukuni issue and
History textbooks (Hoshino and Satoh 2012).
The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine which was established in
1869. In post-war Japan (1947 onwards), this relic became a private
religious shrine in Tokyo. However, China objects to the visit of
Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine because it is a symbol of
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pre-war militarist Japan, and there is an element of continuity in
the conservative mindset of Japanese politicians. Even today, there
is a separation between the state and religion, where the Emperor
does not hold political power. Against this backdrop, the visit of the
Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine does not reflect the pre-war
state mentality and patriotic education of those times (Takahashi
2007). The Japanese official’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is also
about regaining the source of national identity, which was lost in
the post-war reform period (Dore 1997).
The post-war 1947 Constitution drafted by the United States
and Japan–United States Security Treaty coexist and continue to
compete against each other in the Japanese political debates. Postwar Japan chose to be a pacifist nation in accordance with Article 9
of the 1947 Constitution (Satoh 2010) but it lately wants to reinvent
and revitalise itself in light of the rise of China. On the contrary,
China has used the ‘History problem’, including the textbook issue,
the Yasukuni issue and the Nanjing massacre, to push Japan into
defensive mode over the years (Emmott 2009).
Another political reason behind the Chinese protests against the
visit of the Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine is that the souls
of 2.5 million fallen Japanese soldiers are enshrined as divine spirits
here starting from the Boshin Civil War (1868–1869) to the Second
World War (1939–1945). China has strategically used the history
China has used the ‘History problem’, including the textbook
issue, the Yasukuni issue and the Nanjing massacre, to
push Japan into defensive mode over the years
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The ‘History problem’ from perspective of Japan’s
domestic politics is crucial because it tests the leadership
capabilities, leaving no room for conciliatory tones
and diplomatic niceties in bilateral relations.
card to make it a Japanese weakness, so the Yasukuni shrine and
textbook issues remain a fundamental problem in bilateral relations
(Nye 2005). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had visited the Yasukuni
Shrine on 26 December 2013. His visit to the Yasukuni Shrine
was seen as a statement against the alleged external meddling
in Japan’s internal affairs and to respect its Shinto customs and
traditions to honour the fallen soldiers of Japan. For Shinzo Abe,
the Yasukuni visit was meant to serve domestic political interests
rather than diplomatic signalling to the neighbours (Watanabe and
Wakamiya 2006).
The ‘History problem’ from perspective of Japan’s domestic politics
is crucial because it tests the leadership capabilities, leaving no room
for conciliatory tones and diplomatic niceties in bilateral relations.
Japan-China relationship is not an exception to this proposition.
For example, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013
and after China’s newly anointed President Xi Jinping responded
against this visit by Abe in the strongest possible way, it resulted
in creating a brief period of stalemate in their diplomatic relations.
Even its alliance partner, the United States, continues to request for
a careful management of the ‘History problem’ asking both sides
to avoid the further deterioration of fragile Japan-China relations.
As a result, the refrainment of the Japanese cabinet minister’s visit
to the Yasukuni Shrine, excluding the one of December 2016, has
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opened the diplomatic channel to normalise their bilateral relations
(Koide 2018).
CORE CONTENTIONS:
SOUTH CHINA SEA, SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS
To better understand the core bilateral conflicts between
Japan and China, one needs to have a brief background of
China’s evolving position on the South China Sea, Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan issues. In the pre-cold war period,
China was contented with the Japanese foreign policy orientation,
commonly known as the Fukuda doctrine, that aimed to become
a mercantilist nation by departing from the pre-war militarist
nation. The Fukuda doctrine relied primarily on trade, investment,
infrastructure development and official developmental assistance
to increase its influence abroad. China, on the other hand, began to
strengthen its economic and territorial security while using antiJapan sentiments in educational curriculum to divert anti-Chinese
Communist Party’s sentiments towards anti-Japan protests
domestically. Deng Xiaoping led economic reform, and opening up
resulted in the migration of workers to the special economic zones
of the coastal cities and the transition from an agriculture-based
society to an industry-based society for increasing the volumes
d
China, on the other hand, began to strengthen its economic
and territorial security while using anti-Japan sentiments in
educational curriculum to divert anti-Chinese Communist
Party’s sentiments towards anti-Japan protests domestically.
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of export-based trade for the developed nations. This made the
sea lines of communication significant, which connects Chinese
ports with overseas markets. Since then, there was a Chinese push
to pursue its maritime claims of Japan-administered Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, on its contested islands of the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait all getting included in its core interests, which
are non-negotiable and may see China use force to defend them
(Tan and Szanto 2016).
At the beginning of the second decade of this century, China was
to announce an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone,
which included Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. This plan
was released in November 2013, just after the closing of the Third
Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.
In other words, China unilaterally violated international law under
which Japan has freedom of flight over the East China Sea and
threatened to use emergency retaliation by its armed forces. It was
a move to garner support within the Chinese Military Commission.
In response, the Japanese Diet enacted the cabinet decision on 1
July 2014 not to jeopardise the neighbouring countries’ territorial
sovereignty and security interests, including China. It appeared that
the Xi administration was taken on board vis-à-vis the Japanese
security legislation as the Chinese side restrained themselves
from commenting on the issue at that time. Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe also changed the interpretation of the Japanese constitution
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also changed the interpretation of
the Japanese constitution via security legislation to exercise the
right to collective self-defence around Japanese territories
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via security legislation to exercise the right to collective selfdefence around Japanese territories keeping in mind the Chinese
assertiveness in the Japan-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
contested islands of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
The Abe administration was to become increasingly alarmed
about the Chinese construction of artificial islands in the South
China sea but especially about China’s deep-sea gas fields near the
Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China
Sea. Consequently, the Japanese Diet passed two bills related to
security legislation to increase the number of emergency powers
of Self Defence Forces in contested maritime waters (Kokubun,
et al. 2017). China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and
the construction of artificial islands infringe on international law.
China had also defied the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in
favour of the Philippines on 29 October 2015, which China declared
null and void with no binding effect. Instead, China included the
South China Sea as its national core interest. For Japan, the South
China Sea has been important for carrying its exports to the world;
thus, the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is essential
to counter Chinese security threats (Koshino and Ward 2022). In the
meantime, China is likely to continue its maritime incursions in the
South China Sea, East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. But it would
be largely for the grey-zone maritime activities to avoid the possible
For Japan, the South China Sea has been important for carrying
its exports to the world; thus, the freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea is essential to counter Chinese security threats
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confrontation between the Japanese coast guard and Chinese coast
guards and militia (Samuels 2019).
THE TAIWAN ISSUE
Historically, Japan had defeated Qing China in 1894 and
Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the provision of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki. Taiwan (then known as the Republic of Formosa
between 23rd May 1895 and 21st October 1895) became part of
the Japanese empirefrom 1895 to 1945 (ROC 2023). Following the
defeat of Japan in the Second World War and under the Postdam
Declaration, Japan handed over the jurisdiction of Taiwan to the
Republic of China government in 1945. The Republic of China,
under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek between 1945 and
1949, exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan. However, in 1949, after
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China under the
leadership of Mao Zedong, the Republic of China government
moved to Taiwan and continued ruling the Republic of China
on Taiwan.
d
Furthermore, this Republic of China had become the founding
member of the United Nations Security Council on 24 October
1945. Mao led the People’s Republic of China then was in isolation
for many decades and was recognised as real China by much of the
world led by powerful United States and its Western friends and
allied nations. On 25 October 1971, Mao’s diplomatic success led
to the replacement of the Republic of China with People’s Republic
of China (PRC) as the real successor state at the United Nations
including getting a permanent seat at the Security Council. This has
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China continues to consider growing Japan–Taiwan relations
a threat to its security and strategic interests.
also resulted the normalisation of diplomatic ties between PRC and
Japan and the United States.
Nevertheless, China continues to consider growing Japan–Taiwan
relations a threat to its security and strategic interests. Although
there are no formal intergovernmental diplomatic relations
between Japan and Taiwan, China observes the contact between
their officials with mistrust due to the Taiwanese claims to state
or diplomatic autonomy. The Xi administration though continues
to vouch for strategic patience on the Taiwan issue, but Taiwan
remains an issue that can disrupt the Japan-China diplomatic ties.
For example, in April 2021, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister,
Wu Jianghao, summoned the Japanese Ambassador to China and
condemned former Prime Minister Abe’s statements on the Taiwan
issue (Xinhua 2022). In his last few years, Abe has been quite
consistent in raising concerns against China’s possible forceful
reunification of Taiwan and the linkages of Japanese security with
the Taiwan issue.
The geographical proximity between Taiwan and the nearest
Japanese habitat island Ishigakijima is just 200 miles which
explains their related security interests vis-a-vis mainland China.
The Xi administration though continues to vouch for strategic
patience on the Taiwan issue, but Taiwan remains an issue
that can disrupt the Japan-China diplomatic ties.
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China believes that the real instigator is the
United States in East Asia because Japan is still
playing second fiddle to the United States.
So, for Tokyo, it is crucial to prevent the fait accompli problem of
democratic Taiwan, that remains vulnerable to China’s forceful
reunification of Taiwan. Therefore, China’s aggressive military
postures and increasing entries of fighter jets and bomber aircraft
in Taiwan’s air defence identification zone have the propensity
to destabilise even the larger Indo-Pacific region. For this reason,
the Taiwan issue assumes immense significance in bilateral ties
between Japan and China (Ben & Hisako 2021). China has also been
closely following the US-Japan security alignment and coordination
over the Taiwan issue, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and human
rights in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Nonetheless, China
believes that the real instigator is the United States in East Asia
because Japan is still playing second fiddle to the United States.
The shifting geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, the ongoing strategic
competition between China and the United States and the rising
tension in Japan-China relations underscore their changing
bilateral dynamics vis-à-vis Taiwan. China has also been concerned
about the growing Japan–Taiwan–United States triangular
engagements and their consequences for the Taiwan’s future; this
is perhaps why the Xi administration is trying to mend its bilateral
relations with Japan. In his latest research paper, Professor Yang
Bojiang, a Japanese expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Science,
argues that Japan primarily uses the United States–Japan Security
Treaty to strengthen its involvement in Taiwan. The Sino-Japanese
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China has also been concerned about the growing Japan–Taiwan–
United States triangular engagements and their consequences
for the Taiwan’s future; this is perhaps why the Xi administration
is trying to mend its bilateral relations with Japan.
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978 and subsequent diplomatic
documents do not mention the United States–Japan Security Treaty
and its role in Taiwan. Therefore, Japan is increasingly finding
ways to strengthen its involvement in Taiwan and minimise its
implications for Japanese strategic and security interests (Bojiang
2022). More recent debates of Taiwan Policy Act in US Congress
and House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan
has made Beijing all the more concerned about Japan potentially
exploiting this growing brinkmanship between the United States
and China.
JAPAN-CHINA SECURITY DYNAMICS
Since the normalisation of their diplomatic relations since
1972, the main aim of Japan-China relations was to keep
away political and ideological differences from the deepening
economic and political relations. However, Japan-China relations
have remained devoid of the balance of power politics, and with
the rise of China and the paradigm shift in the United State’s
China policy, both Chinese and Japanese foreign policy choices
and diplomatic tools have become circumscribed in directing
their bilateral relations. Especially the lack of mutual trust in the
complex bilateral ties has reduced their convergences of interests,
d
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Xi’s Japan policy was focused on four main methods: antiJapanese propaganda, pressurise Japanese ruling politicians,
luring Keidanren - the Japanese business community, and making
contacts with key Japanese officials and their family members.
which is also detrimental to regional peace and stability (Hoshino
and Satoh 2012).
Before the Japan-China summit meeting on 10 November 2014, on
the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in
Beijing, Xi’s Japan policy was focused on four main methods: antiJapanese propaganda, pressurise Japanese ruling politicians, luring
Keidanren - the Japanese business community, and making contacts
with key Japanese officials and their family members. On 22 April
2015, Abe and Xi met on the sidelines of the 60th anniversary of
the Asian–African Conference held in Bandung. Xi insisted on
the ‘History problem’ as a precondition in normalising bilateral
relations. However, Abe proposed mutual interest-based building
of bilateral relationships to promote mutual understanding,
deepen economic interests, maintain status-quo and set up
communication mechanisms in the East China Sea, and finally
work towards peaceful and stable regional order. On 29 April 2015,
Abe gave a speech to the US Congress in which he mentioned “deep
repentance” and “deep remorse” regarding Japan’s History problem.
Furthermore, on 14 August 2015, Abe issued an official statement
in which Abe mentioned apology (owabi), aggression (shinryaku),
colonial rule (shokuminchishihai) and remorse (hansei) related to
Japan’s History problem. It seemed that Abe was sincerely seeking
a new start in bilateral relations with China. On the contrary, Xi’s
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The most pressing challenge for Abe’s security policy
was to keep Japan as tier-1 power in the region.
response to Abe’s statement was restrained, which proved that
China did not want to lose its History card to put Japan in defensive
mode (Kokubun, et al. 2017).
The most pressing challenge for Abe’s security policy was to keep
Japan as tier-1 power in the region. To address this security dilemma,
he had launched a holistic package of diplomatic, economic and
security policies related to the following four initiatives to shape the
rule of law in the liberal international order.He increased spending
towards trade liberalisation as a strategy to project Japanese geoeconomic power, for example, the revamping of Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) that was formerly
known as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Also, Japan signed an
Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union to resist
Trump’s protectionism and promotion of free trade and possible
membership of the European Union into the CPTPP by 2019. His
second initiative was towards normalising bilateral relations with
China, which would act as mutual insurance against Trump’s tariff
war. Maintaining the ‘status quo’ in core contentious issues such as
the South China Sea, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the Taiwan issue
is a key to downplaying China’s usage of the ‘History card’ against
Japan. His third initiative was the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)
strategy for building connectivity and trade, promoting “the rule
of law” and “freedom of navigation” in the Indo-Pacific region. In
other words, the real agenda of the FOIP for the United States is to
resist the temptation of joining the G2 world order with China. His
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
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fourth initiative was to bolster independent policy in the foreign
and security policy domain, for example, the passage of security
legislation and the reinterpretation of its constitution to exercise
collective self-defence for maintaining peace and stability in the
Indo-Pacific region (Ikenberry 2020). Let’s look at some of the
salient features of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s contributions to
resolving Japan’s China challenge.
Rise of China and Japan’s Security Dilemma
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had identified the challenges from
the rise of China, its implications for Japanese security and the
acknowledgement of common economic interests as both a threat
and an opportunity for their bilateral relations. His China policy
aimed to balance and coordinate Japanese policymaking in the
economic and security domain to reposition Japan to preserve the
“rule-based order” to supplement the United States-led security
architecture in East Asia. Abe tried to use a geo-economic strategy
vis-à-vis China in exploring common economic interests to
safeguard its security interests. Since China is Japan’s largest trade
partner, it is imperative to project Japanese geo-economic power to
preserve the liberal international order, which has also transformed
the bilateral dynamics in this process. Abe’s economic reform, for
His China policy aimed to balance and coordinate Japanese
policymaking in the economic and security domain to reposition
Japan to preserve the “rule-based order” to supplement
the United States-led security architecture in East Asia.
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example, led to the growth of domestic tourism and provided
stimulus to local economies of cities and prefectures; however,
Japan-China economic relations became asymmetric.
China needs Japanese technology and know-how and seeks to
lure Japanese Keidanren, or the Japanese business federation,
in exchange for access to the Chinese market to lobby against its
government’s antagonistic China policy. Simultaneously, China
has also been investing in defencemodernisation and dual-use
civil–military technologies such as quantum computing, robotics,
big data, genomes and artificial intelligence (Koshino and Ward
2022), which has further heightened Japanese apprehensions. To
address the Japanese Security dilemma domestically, Abe was to
introduce three security legislations, namely “State Secrets Law”
in December 2013, the limited constitutionality of “Collective
Self-Defence” in July 2014 and “Peace and Security Legislation” of
September 2015. In 2018, Japan and the United States also agreed
to new security guidelines for improved management of security
threats (Koide 2018).
China’s rapid military modernisation, technological advancement
programme and the strategic competition between the United
States and China also had security implications for Abe’s Japan.
Xi-led China had been building a closed and surveillance-driven
society internally. China was also seen as involved in gaining its
China’s rapid military modernisation, technological advancement
programme and the strategic competition between the United
States and China also had security implications for Abe’s Japan.
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digital sphere of influence in Southeast Asia with the help of its
created networks, logistics and data for exercising greater political
control. Japan faced tough choices regarding China’s aggressive
military postures towards its neighbours on one side while seeking
cooperation on non-traditional security threats such as climate
change, non-proliferation, and terrorism. China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) was seen pushing developing nations into the
debt trap and failing to provide fair competition or ensure quality
infrastructure or to address the region’s environmental and human
rights concerns (Ikenberry 2020).
China–North Korea Strategic Alignment
For China, the North Korean nuclear missile program and its forced
abductions of Japanese nationals are often seen as China’s strategic
assets to manage Japan-North Korea relations. However, the United
States is a main security provider in East Asia, which has pushed
Japan into build its military and to further deepen its alignment in
the United States-Japan security alliance to balance overall power
asymmetries vis-à-vis the rise of China (Koide 2018). In this North
Korea’s nuclear arsenal and especially its incessant missiles test
— with some of these landing in Sea of Japan — have made Japan
conscious of North Korea’s close links with Beijing which have
serious security implications for Japan.
United States is a main security provider in East Asia, which
has pushed Japan into build its military and to further deepen
its alignment in the United States-Japan security alliance to
balance overall power asymmetries vis-à-vis the rise of China.
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For the last two decades, North Korea’s nuclear missile programme
hasemerged as a threat to Japan’s security. In addition, both
China and North Korea share common historical resentments
due to the Japanese colonisation of China’s Manchuria and the
Korean Peninsula in the early 1930s. As regards North Korea, Japan
has traditionally made the following policy choices to address
its strategic concerns towards the denuclearisation of North
Korea: strengthening its security alliance with the United States,
deepening economic cooperation with China and Russia to exert
influence on North Korea, building defence cooperation with South
Korea and exploring ways to deal with North Korea bilaterally. As for
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he chose the ‘first choice’ to strengthen
its security alliance with the United States and enforce the United
Nations sanctions to denuclearise North Korea (Koide 2018).
North Korea, meanwhile, has been reluctant to cap its missile and
nuclear capabilities as a de facto nuclear state. In addition, China–
North Korea strategic alignment has the propensity to create a rift
in the “extended nuclear deterrence” of the United States to ensure
Japanese security. This strategic alignment aims to disengage the
United States and expose Japan to North Korea’s nuclear weapons,
As regards North Korea, Japan has traditionally made the
following policy choices to address its strategic concerns
towards the denuclearisation of North Korea: strengthening its
security alliance with the United States, deepening economic
cooperation with China and Russia to exert influence on
North Korea, building defence cooperation with South Korea
and exploring ways to deal with North Korea bilaterally.
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such as nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles. Japan
is a signatory to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, which binds Japan not to develop its nuclear weapons.
Also, the North Korean nuclear crisis can have repercussions for the
global non-proliferation regime. Against these backdrops, Japan’s
security dilemma has been to change its anti-nuclear posture or
continue with its non-nuclear identity with the reliance on the
extended credible nuclear deterrence of the United States (Ikenberry
2020). To deal with North Korean contingencies, Chinese maritime
incursions in neighbouring seas, and Russian assertiveness in the
region, Japan faces an arduous task of building capabilities in the
cyber and space domain (Samuels 2019).
Trump Factor in Japan-China Relations
The US President Donald Trump (January 2017-January 2021) made
a paradigm shift in the United States global leaders including its
East Asian policy. President Trump’s trade and tariff wars with
China saw him ask China to cut its trade deficit. But he also asked
Japan to hike payment for the stationed American troops in Japan.
With the acceleration of the China-United States tensions, President
Xi Jinping began to improve trade and investment opportunities
with Japan and began working for a possible China–Japan–Korea
trilateral free trade agreement; China–Japan Economic Talks
This strategic alignment aims to disengage the United States
and expose Japan to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, such
as nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles.
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took place in April 2018. In May 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
visited Tokyo to participate in China–Japan–South Korean Trilateral
Summit to promote free trade, the currency swap agreement, the
BRI, the expansion of Chinese Bonds and the relaxation of import
restrictions on Japanese food items. For Abe, it was a diplomatic
breakthrough to improve economic relations, which could exert
influence on the North Korean missile crisis and the pending
Japanese abductions issues, but it did not happen (Koide 2018).
Trump’s East Asia Policy was based on his transactional approach
to foreign policy. Each interaction was a discrete deal that went
against the traditional foreign policy approach based on strategic
relationship building with Japan. He understood that China’s geoeconomic capabilities are linked to security issues and elucidated
further that trade deficits will have serious strategic and security
implications. Moreover, Trump’s East Asia Policy narrowed the
diplomatic space for policy coordination and negotiations with
Japan and weakened the overall relations with China (Ikenberry
2020). As a security provider, the United States wanted to hike
paymentfor the stationed Americantroops in Japan’s defence
budget, but Abe convinced him not to do so. Prime Minister Abe was
able to convince Trump to maintain the American bases and credible
extended nuclear deterrence to Japan (Samuels 2019). To preserve
the liberal international order, Abe used Trump’s China policies to
build his administration’s FOIP strategy and Quadrilateral Security
He understood that China’s geo-economic capabilities are
linked to security issues and elucidated further that trade
deficits will have serious strategic and security implications.
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To preserve the liberal international order, Abe used
Trump’s China policies to build his administration’s FOIP
strategy and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)
with India, Australia, the United States and Japan.
Dialogue (QUAD) with India, Australia, the United States and Japan
(Koshino and Ward 2022).
Trump wanted to apply higher tariffs on Chinese products for
distorted market practices to defend his industrial base in the United
States. He tried to accelerate the economic decoupling with China
through an export control mechanism for Chinese businesses in the
United States because the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist
Party is based on its economic development. China is still trying to
catch up in critical technologies with the developed nations; thus,
it depends on technology market access and deepening cooperation
with the United States and Japan. Shinzo Abe complimented
Trump’s China policy by incentivising Japanese companies to
diversify their trade portfolios. Furthermore, he promoted the PQI,
updated its data policy and ensured data governance through his
concept of DFFT and revamped the regional free trade agreement,
the CP-TPP. In partnership with India and Australia in September
2020, Japan also launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
(Torri, Mocci and Boni 2021).
Shinzo Abe complimented Trump’s China policy by incentivising
Japanese companies to diversify their trade portfolios.
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In the early days of the Abe administration, the United States
requested to cooperate in three possible areas such as Japan’s
participation in the CPTPP, the relocation of the Futenma base to the
Henoko base in Okinawa prefecture under the 1996 United States–
Japan agreement and the strengthening of security cooperation.
Chinese maritime incursions in the South China Sea and East China
Sea and North Korea’s nuclear missile development programme
further highlighted the significance of the United States–Japan
security alliance in the region. Abe met Trump more than 30 times to
strengthen their alliance system because Trump was more focused
towards ‘transactional diplomatic deals’ rather than ‘keeping
the burden of the alliance’ to lead the liberal international order.
Indeed, Shinzo Abe successfully engaged the Trump administration
to maintain strategic cooperation in many diplomatic and defencerelated areas (Koide 2018).
Trump Administration’s economic nationalism and ‘America’s
First’ policy over time had weakened its credibility as an alliance
partner and leader of the liberal international order. Abe knew that
without the American counterbalance to China, regional order
would open up to China-led authoritarian regional order. Therefore,
Abe wanted Japan to become a rule-making nation to buy time for
American leadership to ponder over their return to play leading
roles in regional and global governance. Article 2 of the United
Abe met Trump more than 30 times to strengthen their
alliance system because Trump was more focused towards
‘transactional diplomatic deals’ rather than ‘keeping the
burden of the alliance’ to lead the liberal international order.
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Abe knew that without the American counterbalance
to China, regional order would open up to Chinaled authoritarian regional order.
States–Japan security alliance mandates the coordination of their
economic policies to achieve their security interests in the region,
as Japan and the United States should also have defensive and
offensive capabilities respectively (Ikenberry 2020). But this sense
of Abe’s Japan fending for itself was to fundamentally change the
pace of ‘normalisation’ of Japan with his successor Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida lauding two important — security and defence
related — reports and planning to not just allow Japan’s defence
budget from their self-imposed limit of 1 per cent of gross domestic
product but achieve 2 per cent share by 2027 (Singh 2023).
ABE’S CHINA POLICY IN NUTSHELL
It is commonplace that Japan and China are ideologically
different powers, convergence of whose interests have waxed
and waned over the years. But both nations are in geographical
proximity and have an enduring long and shared history.China
is the largest economy in Asia and has been rapidly modernising
its military to catch up with the United States. Moreover, China
is a nuclear weapon state with permanent membership in the
United Nations Security Council that brings it enormous power
and influence. Japan is the second largest economy in Asia, and
exercises enormous economic influence along with the other G7
members inmoulding global agenda-setting on various issues,
d
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The Abe years saw United States-Japan security alliance
becoming critical to balance the asymmetries in power relations
vis-à-vis China, especially so in the Indo-Pacific region
including traditional and non-traditional threats. The Abe years
saw United States-Japan security alliance becoming critical to
balance the asymmetries in power relations vis-à-vis China,
especially so in the Indo-Pacific region (Hoshino and Satoh 2012).
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s proactive security policies for Japan
were guided by the following factors: the United States-Japan
security cooperation, the improvement of Japan-China relations
while maintaining the security alliance with the United States,
seeking denuclearisation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons
programme, the building of Japanese military capabilities to defend
itself and promotion of multilateral security agreements with
like-minded democratic nations including India that was to see a
complete transformation in Indo-Japanese relations. With the focus
on the China threat, Abe’s diplomatic outreach, from the balance
of power perspective, was aimed at balancing power relations in
the Indo-Pacific. But, he also explored the possibility of a summit
meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Abe met Xi in October
2018 despite the cold bilateral ties emanating from his visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 (Koide 2018).
With the focus on the China threat, Abe’s diplomatic
outreach, from the balance of power perspective, was
aimed at balancing power relations in the Indo-Pacific.
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
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Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy becomes his enduring
legacies in globalisingthe ‘China challenge’ that
today binds several Indo-Pacific stakeholders.
It was an ardent task for Shinzo Abe to balance Japan’s relations
with China and the United States, especially so amid their strategic
competition during Trump era. Shinzo Abe’s tragic demise,
especially in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic created a strategic
vacuum in dealing with an assertive China under the leadership of
Xi Jinping who has since entered an unprecedented third term in the
apex office in China. There was of course also this sense of need to
mend their ties with reciprocity and ensure that ‘mutual interests’
are factored into bilateral negotiations (Hoshino and Satoh 2012).
Nonetheless, Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy becomes his enduring
legacies in globalisingthe ‘China challenge’ that today binds several
Indo-Pacific stakeholders. The only question remains how quickly
Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy would generate an alternative source
of strategic autonomy with or without the United States in the
Indo-Pacific region (Torri, Mocci and Boni 2021).
CONCLUSION
As the current world order remains in flux; the Asian Superpower
China continues to compete with Superpower United States
and this has become acute in the new Indo-Pacific theatre that
was first visualised by Abe. This is because Abe believed that Japan
could not afford to live under Chinese hegemony in East Asia and
his nuanced Indo-Pacific strategy was to uphold the freedom of
d
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Abe believed that Japan could not afford to live under Chinese
hegemony in East Asia and his nuanced Indo-Pacific strategy
was to uphold the freedom of navigation, democracy, and the
rule of law to preserve the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ region.
navigation, democracy, and the rule of law to preserve the ‘Free and
Open Indo-Pacific’ region. Abe had understood the need to focus
on the ‘China challenge’ in the defence and diplomatic spheres.
Although there was no fundamental breakthrough in Japan-China
relations, Abe tried to maintain economic engagement with China.
Still, he found it difficult to do so because of China’s increasing
defence budget, aggressive military postures, and economic might
to build its geopolitical and geo-economic influence in the region.
Indeed, Abe set the contours of Japan-China security relations
which continue to dominate their bilateral security dynamics and
even the regional dynamics of the United States-China strategic
competition and the narratives on their shared ‘China challenge’
in the Indo-Pacific region.
Abe’s imagination of FOIP was also to trigger creation of
Quadrilateral Security Framework of the United States-JapanAustralia-India, an informal grouping that focuses on building
infrastructure, climate change, resilience supply-chain of critical
Indeed, Abe set the contours of Japan-China security
relations which continue to dominate their bilateral security
dynamics and even the regional dynamics of the United
States-China strategic competition and the narratives on
their shared ‘China challenge’ in the Indo-Pacific region.
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
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technologies, cyber security, health security and partnerships in
space technology so far. But, Xi’s possible forceful enunciations
on the likely use of force in unification of Taiwan has its security
implications for the freedom of navigation have kept QUAD
together to possible counter Chinese aggression in the region.
To quite an extent, it seems that the Taiwan issue would decide
the future trajectories of Japan-China security relations. The
Taiwan issue today both triggered as also limits Japanese Prime
Minister Fumio Kishida’s diplomatic manoeuvring in Japan-China
security relations.
To summarise, this paper contends that study of Japan-China
security relations during Abe era shows that these will continue to
remain turbulent in the near future. Japan and India have a shared
perception of China’s challenge and China’s policies have serious
geo-strategic and geo-economic repercussions for Japan and
India. Both neighbouring countries are facing similar strategic and
security compulsions emanating from the rise of China. So Japan
is likely to continue making efforts to reduce its over dependence
on the American security blanket, strengthen its military and
build security cooperation with like-minded countries. Japan
and India are committed to ensuring freedom of navigation, the
rule of law and democratic values and securing multi-polarity in
the Indo-Pacific region. Under the Indo-Pacific calculus, India’s
strategic imperatives would be around deepening multilayered
Xi’s possible forceful enunciations on the likely use
of force in unification of Taiwan has its security
implications for the freedom of navigation.
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Japan and India are committed to ensuring freedom of
navigation, the rule of law and democratic values and
securing multi-polarity in the Indo-Pacific region.
security cooperation with Japan. Shinzo Abe put India into Japan’s
strategic horizon via pragmatic and proactive diplomatic ties
to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. But, it
remains to be seen whether post-Abe Japanese leadership will
continue to push the strategic directions of Japan-India bilateral
relations in rationalising Japan’s dependence on the United State
and at the same time redressing challenges flowing from an
aggressive Chinese military modernisation and its serious security
implications for Japan.
Shinzo Abe put India into Japan’s strategic horizon via
pragmatic and proactive diplomatic ties to maintain
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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Dr. Sudeep Kumar is a Research Fellow at the
Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
He is N3 certified Japanese speaker and can
negotiate texts in Mandarin. He specialises
in Japanese Politics & Foreign Policy, Chinese
Politics & Foreign Policy, and India’s diplomatic
engagements with China and Japan. Moreover, his
areas of interest include East Asian Studies, and
International Relations Theories (IRT): Western
and Non-Western Debate. He holds a PhD degree
in “Political Theory” from the Department of
Politics, East China Normal University, Shanghai
(September 2015 – July 2020). During his five years
of doctoral studies in Shanghai, he participated
in Track-II Dialogues with Chinese think tanks
organised by the Indian consulate in Shanghai.
Prior to this, he has received his MPhil degree
in “East Asian Studies”, and a Masters degree
in “Politics with specialisation in International
Relations” from the School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
(August 2010 – May 2015). He has presented
papers at national and international conferences
and has various publications to his name including
peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters,
and web publications. He can be reached at email:
sudeepkumar85@yahoo.com .
Shinzo Abe and Japan-China Security Relations
Irritants & Legacies
46
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