Confucian Relationism and Global Ethics
East Asian Comparative
Literature and Culture
Series Editors
Wiebke Denecke (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Satoru Hashimoto (Johns Hopkins University)
Zhang Longxi (City University of Hong Kong)
Editorial Board
Alexander Beecroft (University of South Carolina, USA)
Xiaomei Chen (University of California, Davis, USA)
Joshua Fogel (York University, Canada)
Matthew Fraleigh (Brandeis University, USA)
Michael Gibbs Hill (College of William and Mary, USA)
Karen Thornber (Harvard University, USA)
Barbara Wall (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
Sixiang Wang (University of California, Los Angeles, USA)
volume 13
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/eacl
Confucian Relationism and
Global Ethics
Alternative Models of Ethics and Axiology in
Times of Global Crises
By
Jana S. Rošker
leiden | boston
The author acknowledges the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) in the
framework of the research core funding Asian Languages and Cultures (P6-0243, starting year 2019)
and in the scope of the research project N6-0161 Humanism in Intercultural Perspective: Europe and
China (starting year 2020).
The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at https://catalog.loc.gov
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/
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isbn 978-90-04-54626-4 (e-book)
Copyright 2023 by Jana S. Rošker. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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Contents
Prologue: The Year of the Metal Rat, the Curse of the Bat and the
Search for a New Ethos 1
1
Methodological Introduction 7
1
Beyond East and West 9
2
Global Crises in Transcultural Perspective 11
3
Mutual Learning: Frames of Reference, Discursive Translations and
the Method of Sublation 13
4
Political and Philosophical Discourses: Confucianism and
Ruism 18
5
On Our Way to Global Ethics: A Transcultural Interpretation of
Ethics and Morality 21
2
Freedom, Responsibility and the Relationship between the Individual
and Society 27
1
The Thesis of Immanent Authoritarianism 27
2
Individualism: Universal, Collectivist and Communitarian 34
3
Relationism and Confucian “Role Ethics” 41
4
Personhood and the Question of Individual Uniqueness 49
3
Confucian Humanism and Democracy 56
1
Humaneness (ren) and Humanness (ren xing) 58
2
The Deontological Character of Confucian Ethics and the
Foundations of the Confucian Model of Democracy 64
3
Confucian Humanism 69
4
Subjectivity, Control, and Digital Technology 74
1
Problems of Isolation and Digital Tracking Measures 74
2
Interpersonal Responsibility and the Origins of the Social Credit
System 77
3
Digital Technologies as a New Universalism 84
4
Cosmotechnology in the Mirror of Technological Plurality 90
5
Ontology of Digital Objects and Structural Ontoepistemology 102
6
The Agony of Enlightenment Values and Two Types of
Inhumanity 113
7
Intimacy, Privacy and Isolation 118
vi
5
Contents
Restructuring the Axiology of Global Ethics: On a Winding Path from
Transcultural to Global Ethics 132
1
Backgrounds 133
2
First Steps 137
3
Sublating Relationism 141
Epilogue: The New Politeia, the Land of Rusting Arms, and the
Deliverance from Dark Times 148
Glossary of Chinese Terms 153
Sources and Literature 159
Index 178
Prologue
The Year of the Metal Rat, the Curse of the Bat and
the Search for a New Ethos
The current crises, such as severe environmental disasters, unequal distribution of resources, viral pandemics, etc., are global problems that cannot be
fully solved within the narrow framework of individual countries or nationstates.1 They must also be addressed within the larger framework of global
cooperation and solidarity. Such strategies require the development of genuine intercultural dialogue, i.e., dialogue that goes beyond the currently fashionable terminologies and can lead to a truly equal transcultural exchange of
knowledge and ideas. In this endeavor, this book focuses on the traditional
Chinese ethic of relationism, which has spread to many other regions of the
Sinic area in the course of historical developments. Since the geopolitical term
Sinic is of crucial importance in this book, it has to be explained in the very
beginning of the text, in which it will appear many times. The name “Sinic”
refers to societies that have historically been heavily influenced by Chinese
script and culture, especially by Confucian (or Ruist) thought and Chan (Zen)
Buddhism. These are East Asian countries, but also some Southeast Asian
regions, such as Vietnam and Singapore.
The work aims to examine the specific features of this ethics based on classical Confucian ethics and philosophy, and explore its possible contribution to
the axiology of a new global ethics.
Undoubtedly, such a global perspective is of great importance for the development of all scientific and academic disciplines of our time. This is especially
true for the humanities, which have hitherto developed in a fragmentary manner, within the framework of individual discourses isolated from one another,
often confined to the framework of particular histories of ideas and languages.
Therefore, we need to promote the transcultural exchange of knowledge and
ideas, which is more important than ever in today’s globalized world and in
1 This does not mean, of course, that nation-states should be abolished and a world government established. The nation-state mechanisms that enable us to legislate our actions under
democratic self-determination and to put them into practice through appropriate administrative structures are still important. However, as long as we also think in terms of borders,
which means that we do not give due consideration to the humanity of those who live outside our borders, we are on the wrong path.
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_002
2
Prologue
a time of widespread crises. As the central crises and problems of our time
manifest themselves on a global scale, a globalization of epistemology is also
necessary, since such crises and problems can only be solved through informed
and up-to-date scholarship that takes into account the issues of equality and
justice of all cultures and peoples while meeting the demands of our time.
Importantly, this globalization of scientific discourse must not be based on
standardization rooted (as it has been) in the economic-political supremacy
of those regions that have established the current centres of global power and
dominance, but on equality that is different from sameness because it is based
on cultural, linguistic, and axiological diversity.
My wish to write this book was born in the year 2020, in the time of the
initial spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a Sinologist I could not let go of
the fact that the novel coronavirus, which leads to a respiratory illness with a
high level of contagiousness and mortality, first appeared in China, and thus in
the cultural-linguistic area which represents the core of my personal and professional interests, and therefore the fundamental focus of my academic work.
If we count time according to the Chinese cyclical yearbook, which is composed of the symbolic twelve animal signs, then the pandemic occurred in the
time of the Gengzi, that is, in the year of the Metal Rat, which comes around
every sixty years (Ouyang 2020, 3). I myself came into the world in the time of
the last Gengzi, that is, in the year of the same symbolic sign that came around
again after six decades. And the moment it came again, this metal rat brought
us—via its cousin, the bat—a new coronavirus.
Now this does not seem surprising in the light of traditional Chinese superstition, for stories of natural disasters are already found in the ancient book
The Classic of Mother Earth (Dimu jing). And indeed, in China, the years when
the Metal Rat ruled were often marked by fatal, large-scale disasters whose
consequences were influential and far-reaching (ibid.). Even if we take only
the period of the last two centuries, the picture is not too pretty. The first Metal
Rat of the 19th century, in 1840, showed its importance by bringing about the
beginning of the Opium Wars. Sixty years later, in 1900, an army of colonizers marched into China, under the grand name of Eight-Nation Alliance (Ba
guo lianjun). The next Metal Rat, in 1960, brought the country a series of natural disasters, and the last one which appeared in 2020, created the virus that
exploded into a global pandemic, endangering all of humanity.
For me, as a researcher working in the field of Chinese philosophy and ethics, this situation raises many questions, primarily related to the causes of this
global crisis and the conditions that produced it. The fact that the causes of the
outbreak of the epidemic in the megacity of Wuhan were presumably related
The Year of the Metal Rat
3
to inadequate hygiene in a food market where live (and also wild) animals
were traded has not only triggered a wave of indignation among the (mainly
Western) public about the “primitivism” and “low level of culture” of the population of Wuhan, but also an unprecedented rise in Sinophobia and new
racisms associated with thoughtless prejudice and ignorance of the more complex factors that define any culture and the individuals who live and function
within it. Essentialist views and the generalized perception of the “Other” as
the bearer of certain characteristics have resurfaced in Western societies and
were expressed in new forms of racialized xenophobia (Martel 2020).
As the cases of COVID-19 spread on a global scale and showed their pandemic dimensions, the measures for stemming its spread in China and other
Sinic regions were in the initial stage more effective than in most Western countries. (Kelly 2020, 2–3; Escobar 2020, 3). In this context, however, it must be
emphasized—once again—that we can never think in terms of explicit binary
categories of East and West as absolute and coherently structured concepts. In
later stages of the pandemic’s spread, particularly since the second half of 2021,
the virus was relatively effectively controlled in New Zealand and Australia,
while several Sinic countries (e.g., Japan) experienced new and severe outbreaks of the disease. The book, of course, does not focus on such a black-andwhite dualistic approach, but rather on issues related to the role and function of
Confucian relationism in shaping specific forms of social solidarity and cooperation. This function of Confucian ethics, as we shall see, was reflected, among
other things, in the general attitude of the Sinic people toward the epidemic
and its impact on their societies, but also in numerous other situations that
proved imperative for the functioning of the societies as such.
First of all, there is clear evidence that in Sinic societies, especially those
often referred to as “softer” East Asian democracies, (such as Taiwan or South
Korea, for instance), the Confucian relational ethic and its underlying understanding of the complementary and interdependent relationship between the
individual and society is still influential and plays an important role in large
segments of the population (see, e.g., Li Zehou 2010, 2016b, Rošker 2012, Li
Chenyang 2014, Nuyen 2009, Rosemont 2015, Gao 2019, Li and Tian 2020, etc.).
On the other hand, recent studies on measures to contain the spread of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Sinic societies (e.g., Delakorda-Kawashima 2022, Kang
2022, Rošker 2021b) and previous research on group behavior during natural
disasters in these societies (e.g. Ryang 2003, Slater and Veselič 2014, Yotsui et
al. 2015, etc.) have clearly shown that in Sinic areas where the traditional Confucian relational ethic is still preserved, such as in South Korea and Taiwan,
people were more easily (and more spontaneously) mobilized for actions of
4
Prologue
mutual aid and cooperation than in areas where this tradition has been largely
replaced either by autocratic political structures (e.g., PR China and North
Korea) or by different forms of modern individualism (e.g., Japan or Singapore). This book thus starts from a well-researched theoretical background
that points to the sustainability of patterns of cooperation and solidarity based
on relationism.2
Even though this is not a book on the COVID-19 pandemic, its explosive
spread in 2020 and 2021 has—once again—clearly shown that one of the most
effective tools in the fight against such diseases, taken by governments of all
countries, is precisely interpersonal solidarity—which must also involve a certain degree of self-discipline. This has certainly played a role in the fact that,
as mentioned earlier, the strategies employed by East Asian or Sinic societies
to control and even eliminate the spread of the novel coronavirus have been
both relatively successful and efficient. In this study, I assume that the reasons
for this specific, socially habituated type of efficient cooperation are not primarily related to different political systems and social orders, but rather to traditional ethical systems that emerged and prevailed in areas historically under
the influence of Confucian ethics, which prescribed—and to some extent still
prescribes—certain culturally conditioned patterns of interaction for large
segments of the population.
In order to identify the specific, culturally conditioned features of Confucian relationism, which will represent the main object of study in the present book, it will also be contrasted with individualism-based social orders
and models of individualistically defined ethics. Such a contrastive views can
offer new possibilities for gaining a deeper insight into the general factors
that determine the understanding of the relationship between the individual
and society. Therefore, in addition, this type of analysis can provide us with
an efficient differentiation tool for the theoretical selection of positive actions
as well as the elimination or modification of those strategies that prove to
2 Similar to many other elements of traditional Confucianism, the relational ethic has been
better preserved in those Sinic societies based on democratic systems that are not characterized by the rule of the one-party system, because the latter tend to lead to autocratic political
orders. This is due to the fact that the social network of relationism cannot be controlled by a
central political power apparatus. Even though the autocratic governments of PR China and
North Korea, for example, often try to ideologically abuse the Sinic philosophical tradition
and present political Ruism as the ideological basis of their policies, these ideologies have
nothing to do with the original Confucian ethics. For a longer and more detailed explanation
of how these ideological mechanisms work, see Rošker 2013. For the historical account and
the main bases of the separation between Confucian philosophy and Ruist state doctrine, see
also section 1.4 of this book.
The Year of the Metal Rat
5
be insufficient. Such a theoretical framework not only provides a good basis
for further research, but also, and more importantly, can give us an effective
method for putting such transcultural knowledge into practice, especially in
the fields of legislation and education.
I will attempt to illuminate the issues raised above, which are related to the
cultural imprint of the dominant Sinic and, in particular, Confucian ethical
system, from different, closely related perspectives. First, I will develop the
central issues related to global ethics that arise from recent events. In doing
so, I will focus on the various models of relations between the individual and
the community. Second, I will critically examine and refute the unfounded thesis of immanent authoritarianism that supposedly forms a basis of East Asian
societies (especially those that share the intellectual heritage of Confucian
ethics). Based on such insights, I will develop questions related to mechanisms
of social control that arise from the social networks in which the Confucian
individual self-understanding, i.e., the so-called “relational self” is embedded.
I will also try to connect the results of the comparative analysis of different ethical models with the different culturally conditioned views of the Other
and with the question of different types of humanism. On this basis, the next
chapter will examine the ideational foundations of the Self and subjectivity in
the Chinese and Sinic traditions on the one hand and in European intellectual
history on the other. In these contexts, I will explore issues related to the concept and protection of privacy as well as personal freedom and autonomy in
the face of new technologies of digital control. Here, the book will shed light on
the function of mass data and digital technologies, but also on specific cosmotechnological foundations of such control mechanisms.
On the basis of these backgrounds, and rooted in the assumption that
the renewal of global ethics is a basic prerequisite for building crisis resolution strategies, this book aims to offer innovative possibilities for the revival
of transcultural axiology by integrating the crucial teachings of the so-called
Confucian relationism into the framework of global ethics. On such grounds,
it can hopefully provide certain new paradigms for academic discourses on
global ethics. This can certainly not be done by replacing the currently prevailing basic values with other, different values, but rather through a reordering of
the set of fundamental beliefs, underlying the system of so-called global ethics.
This could lead us to a proposal of a new axiology that is more culturally sensitive, pluralist, and inclusive, and therefore better adapted to today’s highly
globalized world. This book represents one of the first steps on our way to
achieving this goal: in its concluding chapter, it proposes some possible ways of
restructuring the value system and order that define the current global axiology, which is still largely based on the basic premises of so-called foundational
6
Prologue
individualism.3 In this way, it can provide us with a link between the findings
of contemporary cross-cultural comparisons and the currently most topical
tasks of global humanities and transcultural moral philosophy, which seeks
for new groundworks for a global ethos, suitable for today’s globalized world.
In this way, I sincerely hope that the various contents of this book can serve as
pieces of the mosaic in the process of formulating and birthing a new global
ethics for the third millennium.
This is the final goal of the present study; but first, let us return to its beginning. If this text is to end by giving us the conceptual beginnings for a new ethics, a global ethics that emerges from cross-cultural dialogues and is based on
a transcultural social and moral philosophy, then we must first ask ourselves
what are actually the methodological foundations for the approaches used in
this book.
3 This formulation was first proposed by Henry Rosemont (2015, 34), and in this book, I adopt
it as a composite term for theories that, in their assessment of the relationship between
the individual and society, proceed primarily (or even exclusively) from the position of
the abstract and isolated individual, who therefore forms their basis. Such theories tend to
describe, analyse, and evaluate individuals—psychologically, politically and morally—in
isolation from others. Most scholars of Confucian ethics and philosophy (e.g., Ames 2019, 6)
believe that such approaches easily lead to benefits for a few and marginalise the possibility
of achieving distributive justice for the many.
Chapter 1
Methodological Introduction
This book starts from a critical interpretation of the ethical model of the
so-called relationism, which was shaped primarily in various historical developmental currents of the original Confucian philosophy and ethics. In this
type of relational ethics, each individual’s identity is constituted by his or her
relationships with others. In such framework, the present book discovers and
identifies those fundamental principles of Confucian relationism that can generate the creation of new forms of solidarity and cooperation that are urgently
needed in today’s globalized world.
Thus, one of the initial goals is to reveal the connection between the instrumental elements of the Confucian relational ethics on the one side, and collaborative social norms that have prevailed in Sinic, especially Sinophone
societies, on the other. On this basis, we will try to discover and identify those
basic tenets of Confucian ethics that are important for today’s globalized world
and can meet the highly complex requirements for the creation of sensible and
effective crises solution strategies.
In recent years, much research has been done on ethical models that have
developed historically in Confucian cultural traditions, but without exploring
how they can be integrated into a global axiological context that is still dominated by the (pre)modern values of the Western Enlightenment and its moral
paradigms based on the individual. In the final part of this book, therefore, I
hope to fill this knowledge gap by incorporating into the axiological framework of global ethics some exemplary paradigms and principles of the Confucian ethical model of relationism that have developed historically in Chinese
ethical traditions and to some extent still influence personal and social interactions in the Sinophone and partly also in the wider Sinic space.
As mentioned in the very beginning of this introduction, the primary motive
for writing this book was the desire to gain a general and universal assistance
from the various culturally conditioned experiences that were obtained during
the COVID-19 crisis and to acquire a common knowledge about the cultural
backgrounds of the various methods, procedures, and measures that were used
to deal with the crisis. Similar to this pandemic, most of the other important crises we are confronted with in today’s world, are global and interrelated. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, they must be addressed through global cooperation,
solidarity, and dialogue between different cultures and geopolitical regions.
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_003
8
chapter 1
Over time, we got used to the “new normal” brought to us by the pandemics
COVID-19. Gradually, the problems associated with the pandemic lost much of
their priority and pervasive importance in our lives. In their place came new
crises that we face at the beginning of the third decade of the third millennium. Ecological catastrophes, the threat of a new world war, the rise of new
totalitarian regimes—all this shows that we as humanity live in a period when
we must recognize that it is high time to change our way of life and create new
forms of interpersonal and political interaction. Therefore, this book starts
from the conviction that developments in the global economy must be guided
by a new global ethos. Precisely because today’s crises are global and cannot be
fully resolved within the boundaries of individual nation-states, we must seek
new ways to develop new forms of sharing knowledge and ideas across the
boundaries of individual geopolitical regions and cultural traditions.1
The aim of this book is to bring concrete alternative models of relational
ethics, developed in the context of Confucian traditions, into the current global
ethics debate. These models have not yet been comprehensively presented to
Western readers or integrated into the framework of global discourses on ethics and morality. Confucian relational ethics, or “relationism” for short, refers
to a traditional ethical model in which an individual’s identity is constituted
through relationships with others. I believe that this model can serve as an
important foundation for global solidarity and cooperation, which must be
at the heart of our new shared ethos. But integrating Confucian relationalism
into the scope of currently prevailing axiology requires genuine transcultural
dialogue. Such dialogues are urgently needed in today’s world: Economic and
technological power is shifting to Asia, whether or not the Western people
understand how its societies work. But if we continue to adopt an ignorant
and careless attitude toward East Asian traditions, we run the risk of finding
ourselves in a world system whose deep foundations we do not understand.
This is all the more true for my broader homeland, Europe, which is in itself
made up of different regions with different historical traditions, religions, and
languages. Can “Europe” as a cultural idea really be thought of in the context of global dynamics without adopting a world philosophical and ethical
perspective?
1 Moreover, the global perspective is of great importance for the development of all scientific
and academic disciplines of our time. This is especially true for the humanities, which have
hitherto developed in a fragmentary way, within the framework of individual discourses isolated from each other, and often limited to the frameworks of particular histories of ideas and
languages.
Methodological Introduction
9
With this book, I hope to offer such new perspectives for understanding
alternative social structures and ways of life, as well as certain paradigms for a
possible new ethos suitable for our globalized world.
1
Beyond East and West
This book contains several contrasting views of societies that have emerged
over the course of various cultural traditions. In this context, the book aims to
compare certain social paradigms, phenomena, and practices typical of contemporary Western societies with those observed in contemporary China and
the wider East Asian (or Sinic) region. Although these phenomena, events,
and practices are often associated with the traditional ideologies, beliefs, and
philosophies of the respective traditions, such contrasts cannot be considered
generalizations that are essentially associated with “Western” or “Eastern” cultures. These contrastive comparisons serve only as particular, discrete insights
into certain concrete differences that shape our shared reality today. In this
context, I cannot help but emphasize that I do not see the concept of culture
in a static, essentialist way, as a kind of ideational substance that can directly
influence the formation of cultural identities of communities, societies, and
individuals. In this book, I use the term culture as a category based on the fact
that different communities that form and develop in different temporal and
spatial contexts form different cosmologies and language systems. I consider
any kind of comparison and mutual interaction of such categories or systems
as a process of transcultural sublation, that is, a process that transcends the
orthodox static formulation of culture and thus opens up the possibilities for
the formation of new, transculturally conditioned horizons for theorizing content that originally belonged to separate systems or categories.
In this book, the concept of crisis is also not seen in the orthodox sense, that
is, merely as a problematic situation. Rather, I assume that crisis as a social
phenomenon is not always something purely negative, but something that can
also stimulate us to reflect on our entrenched views of reality, our everyday
actions, and especially on the way we perceive ourselves and our own positioning within the world. A crisis is always something that more or less directly disrupts the usual course of our being and acting. It is a situation that shows us in
the most immediate way what a powerful role inertia plays in our lives. It is in
critical situations that we are much more inclined to understand how little we
actually think in our daily lives about why we are alive, and why we live as we
do. In the habitual flow of life and the everyday turning of our world, we rarely
ask ourselves if perhaps there is something wrong with that flow and if our
10
chapter 1
own way of living and being might be challenged. The inertia of our everyday
patterns of thinking, feeling and acting has a greater power than we are usually
willing to admit. Alarming reports about global warming, the crumbling of the
balance between nature and society born of the never-ending pursuit of profit
by capitalist systems, and the glaring but always overlooked irrationality and
injustice of the current world order, are capable of shocking us, but only ever
for a moment.
Yet every crisis confronts us with the dangers of such thoughtless and unreflective lives, dominated by inertia and governed by entrenched patterns of
social and personal thought and behavior. Precisely by making us aware of
these dangers, a crisis also represents a new hope, especially the hope of an
opportunity for positive change. In crisis situations, we are forced to see reality
from a different perspective, one that actually takes into account the negative
factors of the given moment and, at the same time, a perspective that seeks the
right solutions. The deeper and harder the crisis, the more complex and daring
are the considerations in search of the solutions to it.
This double image is very well expressed in the Chinese word for crisis: the
etymological meaning of the term weiji is composed of two syllables or characters, the first of which means danger and the second opportunity. Therefore,
the main aim of this book is to find the possibility of a way out from beneath
the dark clouds under which we as human beings now find ourselves. This aim
is also connected with trying to point out and outline the ideas for a possible
new global ethics. Such an ethic is perhaps the only one that could enable or
bring about—as a moral basis for new legislations—a new way of bringing
about change that focuses not only on the effects but also on the causes of the
current crisis, which is itself probably just another in the long series of global
catastrophes that will continue to challenge us.
Therefore, and in the context of the global nature of such crises, intercultural dialogue is more important than ever. In the present work, I therefore
attempt to construct a dialogue between two cultural spheres that have grown
out of very different historical, linguistic, political and socio-economic developments, namely between the spheres of Western cultures and societies on the
one, and societies, that were historically influenced by Confucian ideas and
ethics, on the other side. Of fundamental importance here will be the analysis
of the intellectual traditions of the latter, since these are still largely unknown
in the Euro-American societies. As we shall see, the main focus will be on
the ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of Confucianism, which
forms the central part of the common intellectual heritage of China, and to a
certain degree, also the entire the Sinic area. Of course, as a Sinologist, I will
focus primarily on the core ideas of the Chinese Confucian traditions, which I
Methodological Introduction
11
will also try to illuminate from the broader perspective of classical philosophical discourses, especially Daoism and Sinicized Buddhism. However, the purpose of the book is not simply to establish an intercultural dialogue, which
is merely the starting point for conversations among all of us who live in the
same world. The main aim of the book is to create transcultural postulates of a
new global ethics, which is not only possible but—as the current situation has
shown—urgently necessary.
2
Global Crises in Transcultural Perspective
How can the problems of global crisis situations be addressed in a most efficient, and, at the same time, most sensible way? In this endeavor, we shall
apply the transcultural approach. As a sinologist who is working on Chinese
intellectual history, I will focus on the Chinese experience in this context, and
in particular, as the title of this book suggests, on Confucian philosophy and
ethics. But before turning to the investigation of its basic tents, let us begin
this methodological introduction with a differentiation between the terms
cross-cultural, intercultural and transcultural. Cross-cultural studies refer to
different cultures or comparison between them in a very general sense, of
crossing the boundaries of one culture and entering into discourses shaped
by another. Interculturality is a more specific type of communication or
interaction between different intellectual, linguistic and cognitive traditions,
where the differences in cultures and the corresponding linguistic structures
have a decisive influence on the formation of meaning. In this sense, intercultural interactions certainly involve the process of transferring meanings,
implications and connotations between different cultures (Ongun 2016). In
recent years, traditional comparisons between different societies have often
been criticized and many of the methods used in such discourses have been
repeatedly questioned, especially when dealing with ideas and ideologies that
originated in different cultures and were shaped by different languages and
patterns of knowledge. Such approaches to histories, worldviews, and social
realities are necessarily intercultural in the sense of interactions between different cultures.
Nevertheless, numerous current scholars (e.g., Welsch 1999) criticize the
very notion of cross- or interculturality with its problematic embedding in
a static and one-dimensional understanding of cultures as fixed “realms,”
“spheres,” or “islands.” In such a view, the very idea of culture is defined by a
separatist, essentialistic and isolating character. Therefore, many contemporary scholars argue instead for a transcultural approach, because the prefix
12
chapter 1
“trans-” contained in the notion of transculturality suggests that it is capable
of transcending the boundaries and limits of a fixed and static notion of culture. In this sense, it suggests “the possibility of overcoming the fragmentation
and separation of different cultures and philosophies” (Silius 2021, 275), thus
creating a more comprehensive and enriching access to ideas, beliefs, values,
and philosophies. At the same time, this suffix indicates that in the process of
transcultural encounters, the cultures involved are also transformed in some
way. The transcultural understanding of cultures provides us with a multidimensional perspective and an inclusive rather than an exclusive and isolated
approach (Ongun 2016). Transcultural studies are a long-standing discourse,
but due to its inherently dynamic nature, it includes and rests on constantly
changing and evolving paradigms. (Rošker 2021a, 13).
In this way, transcultural approaches to the study of intercultural phenomena help us overcome obsolete, static, and fixed concepts of culture. This of
course does not mean that there is no culture. Culture still represents something real, like language, for example. Both of these are about dynamic, historically grown and constantly changing entities without fixed delineations.
This is why the ontological basis of the concepts of culture, does not necessarily refer to the metaphysics of some abstract substantial being. The concept
of culture in this book is dealt with as something that is based on a metaphysics of relations.2 In this context, culture cannot be seen as only an immobile or
stable setting of values, concepts, and beliefs that are ‘stored’ inside people but
rather as patterns of meaning and connotations materialized in actual practices, everyday lives, and social institutions (see Komatsu et al. 2019, 2).
In this book, I will be using both terms, those of interculturality and transculturality. Even though the line between them is blurred, since their meaning
often overlaps and they both refer to a complex semantic network, I mostly use
the former when referring to concrete interactions between different cultures
and their diverse elements, and I use the latter when speaking of the goals and
results and at the same time about the fundamental paradigms of such interactions. Transcultural language then speaks about how we see ourselves in the
Other. Such a reciprocal view of the different entities of the self is expressed in
many phenomenologies of very different intellectual traditions, from the traditional African concept of ubuntu, through the Confucian value of humaneness
(ren), to the contemporary Western theories, which are based on Heidegger’s
idea of the Being-with (Mitsein).
2 In this context, I am referring to the relationships between certain elements that make up
what we commonly call culture: specific historical developments, various religions and other
belief systems, linguistic structures, philosophies, ideologies, geopolitical areas, and so on.
Methodological Introduction
13
We will examine such connotations of the co-existing of people as members
of humanity and their possible contributions to global ethics in the section on
different culturally accustomed aspects of ethics and morality. But before that,
we need to find solutions for a series of unsolved questions about the methodology of transcultural studies, and especially about methods of intercultural
interaction, that can be used to form the premises of these new ethics.
3
Mutual Learning: Frames of Reference, Discursive Translations and
the Method of Sublation
Since global crises can be solved only through global cooperation and solidarity, it would be necessary and useful to listen to “foreign” traditions and evaluate
their experience and knowledge in the light of current needs. This is especially
important for Western countries. At the beginning of the pandemics COVID-19,
when the measures taken by the East Asian countries (historically strongly influenced by Confucian ethics) were quite successful and effective, many scholars
began to urgently propose such transcultural learning: “The U.S. and Europe
should learn as soon as possible from the East Asian approaches that could save
many more lives in the West and the rest of the world.” (Sachs 2021, 93)
However, the Western countries have now had more than two years to learn
from the East Asian region, but by and large, they have not done so. The mainstream media also completely failed to draw any useful lessons from the evident gap in performance between the two regions:
The leading business daily in the United States is the Wall Street Journal.
The Journal’s editorial board completely disregarded the evidence from
the Asia-Pacific throughout 2020. In the course of dozens of editorials,
the Wall Street Journal editorial board utterly overlooked the lower mortality rates in the Asia-Pacific and consistently failed to inquire how those
low rates could be achieved in the US. (Ibid., 99)
But what are the reasons for the fact that there was so little learning during
the pandemic period? The lockdowns should have been followed by a massive scale-up of intensive Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI s)3 in order
3 The most common NPI s are tight border controls, quarantining of arriving passengers, high
rates of face-mask use; physical distancing; and public health surveillance systems engaged
in widespread testing, contact tracing, and quarantining (or home isolation) of infected individuals (Sachs 2021, 93).
14
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to keep incidence low. However, this has never happened. It is indeed puzzling that the Western world persisted in their failures in spite of the solid and
increasing evidence of the successes of the Sinic region.
The North Atlantic countries demonstrated a persistent inability or
unwillingness to learn from the Asia-Pacific experience. Part of this
reflected a persistent conceptual failure in the US and some of the
European countries; specifically, the belief that the pandemic could not
be controlled through NPI s, short of locking down the economy. Since
political leaders were loath to close the economy, they essentially gave up
on the idea of controlling the pandemic. (Ibid., 103–4)
The reasons for this “persistent inability or unwillingness” of Western countries to learn from the countries of the Sinic area are manifold and are certainly related to the still present relics of the Orientalist mentality, the belief
in axiological and moral superiority of the Western civilization, political and
economic strategies in international relations, but also to some less visible and
very fundamental paradigmatic differences in the way of perceiving and communicating the world. These differences are linked to conceptual and semantic frames of reference pertaining to and stemming from different cosmologies
and symbolic systems belonging to different discrete cultures.
One of the reasons why Chinese thought deserves special attention from
a Western perspective is that, through the reception and transformation of
European sources (which the Chinese region was actually forced to do two
centuries ago), it has accumulated a transcultural potential that philosophy
in Europe has yet to gradually develop. There is a great imbalance in Sinic
knowledge of about European cultures and vice versa. The ignorance of EuroAmericans is part of the remnants of the Western (post)colonial heritage.
Indeed, the global power relations that currently exist continue to manifest
themselves in the dominance of the West in epistemological, scientific, and
ideational interactions and exchanges with East Asia and the Global South.
Although the majority of technological and economic power is shifting
from Western to Asian regions, and although their rapid global rise has created
new challenges for the United States, the EU, and individual European governments, the “East-West” dialogue is still dominated by the axiological, intellectual, and operational conceptualizations of Western traditions. The reason
for the continued dominance of the West in this basic paradigm of exchange
is related to the fact that modernization, which provided the epistemological and scientific foundations for today’s global system, was “exported” from
Europe to the rest of the world, including the Sinic regions. This process also
Methodological Introduction
15
entailed a “modernization” (i.e., “Westernization”) of knowledge and created
an asymmetrical relationship between the two sides, in which European indifference to Asia and Asian interest in Europe were anything but balanced. This
has led to a problematic gap in European knowledge of non-Western, including Sinic, regions and their intellectual histories. This gap needs to be closed,
as it has an unfavorable impact on the work of European political, economic,
legal, and educational institutions.
But beyond these external and historical difficulties, many of the obstacles
to transcultural dialogue are purely conceptual. Everyone is influenced and
developed by their social and cultural environment. We have all been shaped
in different but always specific symbolic and linguistic worlds. Throughout
history, human beings have created innumerable and diverse forms of knowledge, connected to the world and to fellow human beings in different ways and
through different relationships. At this symbolic and epistemological level, cultures can also be seen as specific networks of semantic understanding of the
world. These networks represent frames of reference that provide all human
communities with a common semantic basis for shaping meanings, establishing communication, and founding social institutions. We are all always part
of a particular, culturally conditioned framework of reference. Therefore, our
understanding and processing of any object we are confronted with and want
to recognize is always embedded in a network of concepts, ideas and categories with different meanings that determine not only the connotation of each
concept but also their mutual relations.
The differences that can be found between such frames of reference are,
of course, not limited to those originating in different cultures. They can also
occur in the same culture and within the same language. Feng Yaoming (1989,
291–2) reminds us here of the well-known example of the relation between
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories: because they represent different referential
frameworks, the functions and semantic connotations of the same terms used
in them are also different, even though they both belong to physics and are
written in the same language. In such cases, we can speak—as Thomas Kuhn
did—of paradigmatic shifts, which are fundamental epistemological changes
that alter and transform the prevailing mode of how people perceive and
understand the world:
Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall
into new relationships one with the other. The inevitable result is what
we must call, though the term is not quite right, a misunderstanding
between the two competing schools … Consider, for another example,
the men who called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed that the
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earth moved. They were not either just wrong or quite wrong. Part of
what they meant by ‘earth’ was fixed position. Their earth, at least, could
not be moved. Correspondingly, Copernicus’ innovation was not simply
to move the earth. Rather, it was a whole new way of regarding the problems of physics and astronomy, one that necessarily changed the meaning of both ‘earth’ and ‘motion.’ (Kuhn 1996, 149)
However, as Feng Yaoming has shown (1989, 292), such paradigmatic frames
also regulate the historically evolved symbolic patterns of perception and
interpretation of each individual culture, and in his view the referential frames
of different cultures can vary to an extent that can lead to the mutual incommensurability of two concrete cultural spheres. I do not entirely agree with
such assumptions, for I think that cultures can nevertheless be compared and
translated into each other, provided that these “translations” and dialogues are
based on a thorough reflection of the differences that determine their respective frames.
So, when we compare phenomena, objects and entities coming from different
cultural-linguistic regions, we should bear in mind that each of them is always
implanted in a concrete semantic and conceptual referential framework shaped
in the historical and developmental process of the cultural space to which it
belongs. This means that they are all products of different historical, sociopolitical and economic developments and that they are expressed in different
languages, which may influence the way they are perceived and interpreted.
The defining role that the frame of reference plays does not pertain only
to the meaning of certain ideas, but also to their mutual relationships. It is
thus a comprehensive tool, used to filter perceptions and create meaning.
In this intercultural philosophical discussion, we must take into account the
fact that different frames of reference can lead to different descriptions and
interpretations—and hence, different understanding and sensing of the same
objective reality. This is also the reason why intercultural research sometimes
causes more misunderstandings, instead of eliminating or at least lessening
them. The larger the structural, semantic and axiological differences between
two languages and cultures, the more likely it is that such misunderstandings
will arise.
This also applies to various models of ethical thought, which are the focus of
our interest in the present study; they are always theoretical systems, formed
and created within a particular conceptual network embedded in a particular
referential framework, which is tightly linked to a specific historical development. And even if we could ignore the particularities and discrete structures
of economics, politics, and the modes of social relations prevalent in these
Methodological Introduction
17
historical processes, we would still face the following problem: Since individual concepts cannot simply be transferred from one sociocultural context to
another, such a transfer would be even less likely for complex networks consisting of many such concepts and their mutual multiple relations.
Thus, we cannot simply implement a model developed in a particular
cultural-linguistic or conceptual context into another. This could also be one of
the reasons why it is difficult for Western countries to learn certain behaviors
that could be useful for pandemic containment from the cultures that belong
to the Sinic space.
How can we then overcome the danger of incommensurability pointed out
by Feng Yaoming (1989, 292)? Numerous scholars have attempted to surpass
this difficulty through a variety of methods, ranging from the concept of fusion
(Chakrabarti & Weber 2016) to notions such as integrative (Kim 1995) or metacultural (Dreamson 2019) theory. I have discussed most of these approaches in
greater detail elsewhere (e.g., Rošker 2021a).
Above all, knowledge of the specific frame of reference that has emerged in
the historical development of Chinese philosophy is of paramount importance
in order to interpret certain concepts and transfer them into the framework
of global philosophy. In this context, the methods of discursive translations
are of utmost importance. For translations are necessarily also interpretations
of the multiple connotations of concepts and categories embedded in different semantic and referential networks. Moreover, translations of different
logical systems that belong to different semantic frameworks, different linguistic structures and different methodological paradigms, can never be limited
to merely translating one language into another. They must also involve the
“translation” or transposition of different discourses, as well as interpretations
of individual textual and linguistic structures, categories, concepts, and evaluation criteria that differ according to the corresponding sociocultural contexts.
Such translations are a fundamental tool for our mutual intercultural understanding. The purpose of this book, however, is not limited to introducing Confucian relationism to Western readers. Its central aim is also to bring its basic
tenets into the framework of globally prevailing axiology and to overcome its
current fixation on individualistic ethical concepts stemming from the European Enlightenment.
For the purposes of this book, therefore, I will use a new method based
on transcultural analysis and pluralistic dialectics, which I tentatively call
the “sublation method.” Although the term “sublation” (German: Aufhebung)
derives from Hegelian thought and might be problematic for this reason, it can
prove to be a constructive and useful tool for dealing with thoughts and ideas
from different cultures. It encompasses all three concepts that are central to
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any process of creating something new from the interactions between two or
more different objects or phenomena. In this basic philosophical sense, it can
refer to all three meanings of Hegel’s term, namely, elevation, elimination, and
preservation.
Thus, in describing the differences between individual-based ethics, on
the one hand, and Confucian relationism, on the other, we can try to preserve
those elements of both that seem to be useful and significant for human development. We can try to eliminate those that are harmful (or simply useless) and
raise our view to a new, “higher” level, creating a qualitatively different model
of interpersonal ethics by creatively combining the factors obtained in the process. The workings of such a transcultural sublation method, applied to the
process of integrating Confucian relationism into the framework of the global
ethics debate, are presented in the final chapter of this book.
4
Political and Philosophical Discourses: Confucianism and Ruism
This book will focus primarily on analyzing Chinese (and to some extent, the
broader Sinic) relational ethics (i.e., relationism), and examining their wider,
transcultural applicability. This ethical model was established in the scope of
original Confucianism.
Some scholars prefer to refer to Confucianism by the term Ruism, which is
a phonetic translation of the Chinese term Ruxue 儒學. Literally translated, it
means “the teachings of the scholars” and mainly refers to the most influential
philosophical current that originated in China and later spread throughout the
Sinic region. The terms Confucianism and Ruism can be used to denote various
currents or discourses that developed in the historical processes that followed
the pre-Qin period in which the original Confucian teachings were established.
In my view, the term Ruism primarily implies the institutionalized state doctrine and rigid, formally structured normative ethics based on autocratic hierarchies; in other words, it refers to the political ideology that emerged based
on heavily modified Confucian teachings during the first reform of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty. In my view, the term Confucianism, first introduced
by Jesuit missionaries, refers more to the underlying traditional philosophies
and systems of specific relational ethics. Therefore, I have decided to use the
term Confucianism when talking about the philosophical currents developed
on the basis of Confucius’ teachings, and to use the term Ruism only when
referring explicitly to the state doctrine and the various practices and ideologies shaped and established by its institutional foundation (such as the official
state examination system, the strict formalization of normative ethics, etc.).
Methodological Introduction
19
With this decision, I have necessarily taken a concrete position in the academic debates that are currently going on about which of the two English terms
(Confucianism or Ruism) is more appropriate. Although the term “Confucianism” already has a relatively long-standing name recognition in the West, numerous experts on Chinese intellectual history and philosophy argue for the change
from “Confucianism” to “Ruism” with different, often convincing, arguments.
David Elstein, for example, has repeatedly used the term “Ruism,” (Elstein 2015a,
2015b), and Robert Eno argued for such a practice as early as 30 years ago in his
book The Confucian Creation of Heaven. In 2016, Bin Song also made a strong
argument for changing “Confucianism” to “Ruism.” (Song 2016 and 2019).
However, in our agenda, I make some different arguments for the use of
Confucianism and Ruism respectively, related to the necessary distinction
between proto-democratic ethics on the one hand and the state doctrine on
the other. In this agenda, I argue for the general use of both terms, Confucianism and Ruism, respectively, and suggest that the latter term should refer to
national ideologies and political theory, and the former to conceptual philosophical paradigms. In this way, I also aim to maintain the distinction between
the two Chinese terms ruxue 儒學 and rujiao 儒教 , both of which have previously been translated with the single term Confucianism, although their
individual connotations are quite different. The political teachings that were
established during the first reform of Confucianism, and developed to a state
ideology, enhanced by institutionalization, can thus be denoted by the term
rujiao 儒教 and translated with Ruism, while the term ruxue 儒學 or Confucianism still refers to the philosophical contents of the Confucian discourse.
These two concepts—and the distinction between them—were developed in
the course of the Chinese intellectual history, which usually divides the development of Confucian (or Ruist) teachings into three phases or stages.
According to many Chinese scholars, (e.g., Li Zehou), it was Confucius who
(following the footsteps of the Duke of Zhou) made this breakthrough in the
axial age around 500 BC, thereby shaping the foundation of Chinese philosophy (Li Zehou 2016: 159). He emphasized “humaneness (ren 仁)” and “rituality
(li 禮)” to re-interpret and remold the ancient shamanistic rituals and mystic
experiences, establishing at the same time the theoretical framework of “pragmatic rationality” that could replace a more advanced, or, in Li’s own words,
“real religion” (Li, Zehou 1999a: 3). This period lasted approximately until the
beginning of the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BC), i.e., until the first unification of
China under the rule of the emperor Qin Shi Huangdi. Its main representatives
were Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.
According to the widely accepted view, the second stage of Confucianism
started around 100 BC (during the Han dynasty). The main characteristic of
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this stage lies, on the one hand, in the shaping of an all-encompassing scheme
of the whole universe, including body and spirit, matter and idea, natural and
social worlds, as well as politics and morals. On the other hand, this second
phase of the development of Confucianism was also of utmost importance in
the political sense, because in this period, it was modified and became an ideology which can be called political Confucianism, or Ruism. Thus, this new,
Ruist system gradually became the new state doctrine that was later on reinforced by the introduction of the state examination system, which guaranteed
successful candidates the achievement of political power. Until 1903, this system remained the main institutional pillar of what can be called Ruism. In this
second phase, which was marked by the work of Dong Zhongshu, the original
Confucian teachings were also mostly interpreted through the work of Xunzi,
who was one of the two most influential formal successors of Confucius, and
who is often considered as a kind of a bridge connecting Confucianism and
Legalism, and the most important pioneer of Ruist state ideology.
The third stage of this ideational system began around 1200 AD (during the
Song dynasty). At this stage, original Confucian teachings assimilated many
elements of Daoism, and, even more importantly, of the originally Indian Buddhism. In this period, the so-called Neo-Confucian school and its main proponent Zhu Xi constructed a complex system of moral metaphysics that had
a great impact on the whole of society over seven hundred years and that is
still being developed further by the intellectual stream of Modern New Confucianism (Xiandai xin ruxue 現代新儒學). In this third developmental phase,
original Confucian teachings were mainly interpreted and explained through
the lens of Mencius’, who was doubtless the “softer,” more idealistic and less
rationalist follower of Confucius.
Thus, we have to differentiate between the two streams of interpreting
original Confucian teachings, namely the one most clearly explicated in
the so-called Guliang commentaries on the Confucius’ Spring and Autumn
Annales, and the other one contained in the works of the Gongyang interpretation, and even more so in the work Mencius. But in addition, we also have
to distinguish their respective orientations and attitudes toward politics and
societies, because both of these ideational systems have, until the present day,
maintained their different influences in the entire Sinophone world. While the
first one, which we call Ruism, became the foundation not only of the institutionalized Confucian state doctrine, but also of the rigid normative ethics,
which is characterized by strict vertical hierarchy, gerontocracy, discrimination
of various marginalized groups, including women, social unification and the
suppression of individual autonomy, the second one (i.e. Confucianism) manifests itself in the dynamic and changeable framework of constant reopening
Methodological Introduction
21
of diverse philosophical questions, valuation of social diversity and negation
of dogmatisms and autocratic rules. Therefore, the problem of a “Confucian
combination” of autocracy and freedom, ossification and flexibility, dogmatism and openness can be explained by the fact that this discourse cannot be
seen as a monolithic and static ideological building, but rather as an inherently
diversified discourse, containing different, partly even mutually contradictive
paradigms that have manifested themselves in an ethics of dynamic and multifarious relations and philosophy of diversity on the one hand, and state doctrine or normative ethics on the other. In this context, it is important to see
that these two currents are rooted in different classical streams of thought.
Thus, an undifferentiated homogeneous view of “Confucianism” as the
institutional basis of a monolithic civilization may obscure our view of the
specific features of both Chinese modernization and contemporary Chinese
societies. To avoid such generalizations and misunderstandings, I will refer to
relational ethics as the ethics of Confucianism and to the normative hierarchy that formed the foundations of traditional state doctrine as Ruism. My use
of the term Ruism is therefore limited to institutionalized state doctrine and
hierarchical ideology, although both currents were developed from the original ancient teachings collected and elaborated by Confucius.
5
On Our Way to Global Ethics: A Transcultural Interpretation of
Ethics and Morality
Nonetheless, within this framework, it is important to examine the relationship between the various forms of normative ethics prevalent in Western societies and those still influenced by Confucian relationism through the lens of
their particular mechanisms and means of social control over the individual.
Of course, such forms of ethics are always closely tied to moral assumptions
and are themselves-at least in part-culturally conditioned. But to understand
the subtle nuances and historical conditions of specific cultural definitions, we
must first explain the sense in which we use the terms morality and ethics in
the context of this book. The various definitions of moral philosophy and ethical systems are indeed very confusing. In everyday usage, as well as in numerous instances in academia, these two terms are often used interchangeably
or alternately, or even as if they were synonyms.4 As I have shown elsewhere
(2020, 53–85), this problem can be encountered in both cultural regions under
4 These manifold uses were explained in great detail in chapter 4 of my book on Li Zehou’s
ethics, see Rošker 2020, 53–85.
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research. The differences between the various connotations and understandings of ēthos and mos are as varied as those found in the prevailing interpretations of Chinese characters that roughly express the same thing, namely daode
道德 and lunli 倫理.
Based on the differences and similarities between Western and Chinese
connotations and interpretations of the concepts of ethics and morality (cf.
ibid.), I will attempt to provide a transcultural conceptualization of the two
key concepts of moral philosophy, as they form the basis of the global ethics
that is the focus of our interest. I will do so by drawing in part on the conceptualization of the contemporary Chinese philosopher Li Zehou (e.g., 2016b),
who provided a very reasonable transcultural conceptualization of ethics in
his theoretical synthesis of several systems originating in Europe and China,
although he never used the term “transcultural” as such.
The distinction that defines this formulation is not only different from all
the multiple definitions that exist simultaneously in contemporary China and
other regions of the Sinic area, but also from the majority of the established
and most common contemporary Western interpretations, which built on an
increasingly sophisticated view of conceptual analyses and introduced numerous different, innovative approaches to understanding ethics and morality into
this debate.
Li’s interpretation is, at first sight, not so different from Hegel’s distinction
between the German terms “Moralität” and “Sittlichkeit,” the former referring
to universal laws of morality, the latter to ethical principles characteristic of a
particular community. However, such a distinction is too one-sided and mechanistic for our purposes, as it does not give sufficient weight to the autonomy
of the human subject. Juergen Habermas, in his analysis of Hegel’s philosophy,
also points out that Hegel (in comparison to Kant) had a “sharper eye” for the
“phenomenon of successful coexistence” (Habermas 2019, 42ff), since for him
the unifying force of state organization constituted a powerful social bond that
should be able to hold together individuals who are increasingly isolated from
each other and from society as a whole in the dynamic development of early
capitalism.
As is well known is Western sociology, Habermas wished to upgrade the ethical and moral aspects of critical theory with certain elements of American
pragmatism, which brought him to the introduction of an additional difference between the two terms. Habermas tried to reformulate Kant’s ethics by
basing moral norms on communication; he called this new ethical paradigm
“discourse ethics” (Habermas 1989, 38). For him, ethics is connected to finding
one’s own happiness and welfare within one’s own private lifestyle. This means
that, according to Habermas, ethics helps us to live a good and quality life,
Methodological Introduction
23
while morality is linked to the interests of others and to our own deonotological limits (Gordon 2017, 3).
It should also be taken into account, however, that ethical problems within
“discourse ethics” always remain limited to a particular biographical context,
since within the framework of such ethics it is only a question of how one’s
life should be shaped within a particular cultural community. In this context,
Habermas discusses issues of practical morality which, in his view, require a
stepping back from all the seemingly self-evident features of concrete morality
to which we are accustomed, and also a distancing from those contexts of life
with which one’s identity is inextricably linked (Habermas 1991, 113). Therefore,
Habermas believes that when we ask what is good for us, we also use practical
reason (Habermas 1991a, 149). Such approaches are not based on the Marxian paradigm of the material base, which in the view of many contemporary
Chinese theoreticians—including Li Zehou—have a strong influence on the
ethical conditions of human societies. In this context Li writes:
Globalization can evolve in a more rational way. It can adapt to different
cultures and beliefs. It can accept differences and remain based on consensuses, while also preserving the tension between differences. In this
sense the relationship between two cultures is no longer a simple passive
opposition, since social existence furnishes consensus with a powerful
material base. In my opinion, this base is precisely what Habermas is
missing, since he is only discussing agreements and rational discussions.
These only represent academic ideals, which cannot be realized without
the material base. (Li & Tong 2012, 169)5
In the context of such critiques, it becomes clear that most contemporary and
classical definitions of ethics and morality are missing an important aspect;
what this lack means becomes clear in the following quotation from Li Zehou’s
moral philosophy:
I, myself, distinguish between ethics and morality very strictly. Ethics is
external, a system or order, made up of concrete ideas: and because of
that, it is relative and can change in line with different periods in time.
Even though many aspects of this system can be preserved, their content,
5 全球化可以向更加合理的方向發展，並且適應不同的文化和宗教。也就是說可
以既有差異又有共識，保持兩者之間有張力，並不是消極地對立，社會存在從
而給共識以一個非常強大的物質基礎。我覺得哈貝馬斯就是沒有這個基礎，他
就單單講協商，講商談理性，那隻是書齋理想，沒有這個物質基礎就不可能。
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like for example the concepts of the “loyal ruler” or “respecting rites”
differ in different situations. Morality on the other hand is something
internal. It represents the mental formations of people. In my view this
is the categorical imperative of which Kant spoke. Actually, it is a mental
form. In other words: what cultivates us is ethics with its diverse systems
and limitations. On the other hand, all people possess inner spiritual formations which are absolute. From the point of view of history, these are
the products of practices which first manifest themselves in individuals
through education. Within human beings, these formations are cultivated through education in the broadest sense, through guidance, perfection, and influence. When we teach children from an early age not to
take other people’s cookies, not to lie, not to insult other people, we are
cultivating their morality. (Ibid., 172)6
This can be seen as an upgrade of Kant, or rather a step away from him, in
the sense that no human characteristic—including inborn mental forms—are
perfectly a priori, since they represent the results of historical developments
and socialization. In this context, ethics is a system that is established in accordance with external conceptions of good and evil. It is also a system which
practices and reproduces these external axiological conceptions in individuals
and societies. This means that ethics, which is always relative in the sense that
it is based on different concrete historical experiences, is constantly building
ever new mental forms of ethical substance7 and depositing them in the consciousness of people. However, it is also important to know that this ethical
substance as such is a form of absolute ethics. In this way what is relative is
constituted as absolute. Thus this is what Li calls “the process of transformation of the empirical into the transcendental,” which is an evolutional process
that takes place over centuries (see Rošker 2020b, 182–97). In these processes
6 我把伦理（ethics）和道德（moral）做一种较严格的明确区分。伦理是外在的，
制度、秩序或者说具体的观念，因此是相对的，不同时代有不同的变化。虽然
会有继承的一面，但是有变化的，比如说”忠君”、”守节”的含义都有不同。内在
的是”道德”，是人类的心理结构，我认为就是康德讲的绝对命令。它实际上是一
种心理形式。也就是说，即伦理、制度、秩序所培养出来的人们所具有的心理
结构是绝对性的。从历史来讲是通过实践，从个体来讲就是经过教育。广义的
教育即对人从小就有的教导、培养、影响，等等，比如从小教小孩子不要抢别
人的糖果，不讲谎话，不要欺辱别人，等等，这培养的就是道德。
7 The term “ethical substance” (lunli benti) is borrowed from Li Zehou’s philosophy in which it
manifests as free will. It represents a part of “cultural-psychological formation” (wenhua xinli
jiegou 文化心理結構), functioning within human consciousness. For a detailed explanation
see Rošker 2018a, 47ff, and 2020b, 169–182.
Methodological Introduction
25
principles are always derived from rites. Morality on the other hand is made up
of the formal structure of the internal mental conception, in which feelings are
determined by the principles of reason.8
In such a transcultural-analytic system, ethics is represented by external
institutions, standards, norms, decrees, and customs. Morality, on the other
hand, is tied to mental traits and patterns of behavior that conform to these
institutions, standards, norms, and laws.
Such an understanding of ethics and morality differs from most other traditional and modern philosophical approaches. For example, even though Hegel
distinguished between ethics and morality, he did not see the great importance
of morality as a specific kind of individual mental forms. Rather, he saw it as
a set of abstract universal principles (ibid., 1108). In the transcultural model,
however, both ethics and morality are equally products of history, which is
situational, as their development depends on the specifics of particular eras,
cultures, and societies. Therefore, ethics and morality are always determined
by concrete historical conditions. On the other hand, history is also accumulative. Its progressive nature means that the progress of material life is always
followed by the progress of ethics and morality. Thus, Li Zehou emphasizes
that the sedimentation of certain common notions of good and evil with their
corresponding sentiments always emerges in the course of history and the
socialization of human beings. Therefore, as human beings, we have or acquire
common ethical criteria and norms (ibid., 1135). These three essential levels
of history, namely its situational, progressive and accumulative aspects, are
always linked to the relative character of ethics. On the other hand, of course,
we must not regard this relativity as a form of universally valid truth, and it is
always more important to maintain a critical view of ethical relativism, and
most contemporary theorists of ethics do not see the point of this kind of differentiation. On the other hand, we must admit that this is particularly difficult if we also take into account the mutual inseparability of political and
individual action.
It is all the more important to make it clear in this introductory chapter
on ethics and its understanding that in this book the difference between ethics and morality is understood essentially as the difference between human
inwardness on the one hand and the world in which we live on the other.
8 Li explains this relationship in more detail: “Ritual regulations are based of the conditions of
concrete situations that are always connected to wishes and feelings; in the next phase ritual
regulations produce reason. In communities, rites (ethics) grow from feeling (as a form of
common situation), while in individuals reason rules over feelings” (Li Zehou 2016b, 1076).
26
chapter 1
The difference is between the inner and outer levels of human consciousness. While the former is connected with morality, the latter manifests itself in
interpersonal ethics. The concrete social content of ethics changes over time,
while the forms and structures of morality in human consciousness are universal, eternal, and thus absolute as an immutable fact of humanity. Therefore, we
can say that ethics refers to social processes, institutions, laws and regulations.
What constitutes them are external norms and regulations that require individuals to perform certain actions and prohibit others. Morality, on the other
hand, is a uniquely human capacity that manifests itself in the mental formations of man, and represents an extremely important and unique value that
conditions the existence and preservation of humanity and also its evolution,
which transcends the laws of causality and develops beyond time and space.
Inner psychological or mental formations that constitute morality contain
rational capacities of free will that are the driving force of our actions. On the
other hand, such formations also contain human emotions, which act as an
auxiliary force. Therefore, such mental structures are defined by both rational properties and sensuality as such. At the same time, moral forms always
influence the formation of ethical rules and thus human actions in the external world and consequently in different communities, societies and cultures.
We are all red under the skin, no matter what color it is or what languages we
speak.
Chapter 2
Freedom, Responsibility and the Relationship
between the Individual and Society
In spring 2020, as the pandemic progressed, the Sinic societies (i.e., the ones
that were historically influenced by Confucian relationism) were apparently
more efficient at containing the spread than societies in the geopolitical realms
of Europe and the United States. Of course, this efficiency was most evident in
the early stages of the pandemic, and the respective differences between East
and West were much less apparent in later stages of the disease. Nevertheless,
it is interesting to observe the reactions to this initial success as interpreted
by the majority of the Western media at the time. Many authors attributed
the social reasons for the high level of cooperation required for this to a general sense of obedience and collectivism (Escobar 2020b, 3), which is supposedly related to the autocratic organization of traditional Sinic societies and is
part of the common political thought tradition of East Asian societies based
on “Confucianism” (see, e.g., Han 2020a, 4; Oviedo 2020, 4; Escobar 2020a, 2).
However, such a position is superficial and generalizing, especially considering
that the most effective measures against the spread of coronavirus have been
taken in those East Asian countries that are not autocratic but have a democratic social order, such as Taiwan or South Korea.
In order to refute such superficial and unfounded assumptions, which are
not only based on popular prejudices but also feed and reinforce them, we will
first take a closer (and more substantiated) look at the thesis of alleged Asian
authoritarianism.
1
The Thesis of Immanent Authoritarianism
Let us, then, examine the background and underpinnings of such widespread
claims about the reasons for the effectiveness of anti-coronavirus measures
in East Asia described above. In the next part of this chapter, I will attempt to
show why such claims represent a latently Eurocentric and Orientalist position.
Some scholars, like the contemporary Berlin-based philosopher of Korean
descent Byung-Chul Han, see the reasons for the faster establishment of measures to stop the spread of the pandemic in East Asia in the autocratic traditions of this region. Han writes:
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_004
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chapter 2
What advantages in the fight against the pandemic, compared to Europe,
can we find in the Asian system? Asian countries like Japan, Korea, China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have an authoritarian mindset, originating from their cultural tradition (Confucianism). People are less rebellious and more obedient than in Europe. (Han 2020, 2)
As indicated above, such claims are populist, generalizing, and without academically verifiable evidence. To begin with, the thesis of the alleged “all-around
obedience” of people throughout the Sinic region, as compared to Europe and
America, where people are supposed to be more critical and less compliant (as
the above statement implicitly implies), is completely unfounded and unscientific. Instead, it is based on the widespread assumption that the teachings of
Confucius represent a conservative normative ethic which advocates gerontocracy and the suppression of the individual for the good of the state. Few of
the people who blindly advocate such theses actually have any real knowledge
of the subject under discussion, and few of them are aware that the ethics of
these teachings, which we denote as original Confucianism, was extremely
progressive and critical of the social attitudes of the time for the era in which
it arose.
The Confucian ethical system, which is based on the premise of humaneness (ren), is defined by its tendency to educate people and to raise the younger
generations so as to make out of them respectable and learned, but also critical and autonomous adults. In Confucius’ Analects we find many segments
which undoubtedly argue for the type of education, such as: “Learning without
thought is empty; thought without learning is perilous” (Lunyu s.d., Wei zheng,
15).1
A similar spirit springs from Confucian commentaries on Confucius’ classic
The Spring and Autumn Annals, which often advocate critical and autonomous
decision-making:
If the ruler says something is right, then everyone says it is right. And if he
claims something is wrong, then everyone will claim the same thing. But
that’s like watering down an already watery soup with more water—who
would want to eat it? Or as if the instruments in an orchestra all played
the same musical line—who would want to hear it? Such sameness is not
good. (Chunqiu Zuo zhuan s.d., Shao Gong ershi nian, 2)2
1 學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆 。
2 君所謂可，據亦曰可，君所謂否，據亦曰否，若以水濟水，誰能食之，若琴瑟
之專壹，誰能聽之，同之不可也如是。
AQ1 the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
29
Even Xunzi, one of Confucius’s most famous successors, who was otherwise
known as an advocate for a “harder” version of the pragmatic-rational Confucianism, unequivocally points out that the people have a right to throw an
unsuitable, immoral and despotic ruler off the throne: “The ruler is like a boat,
the people are like water. The water can carry the boat, but can also overturn
it” (Xunzi s.d., Wang zhi, 5).3
On the other hand, during the period of East Asian modernization in China,
Confucianism, the system known in the Western world as “Confucianism,” was
considered an outdated dogma that oppressed individuals and did not allow
for their free and autonomous choices. In this context, of course, Confucianism was seen as the complete opposite of modernization “imported” from
the West, whose basic premises were based on the autonomy and freedom of
the individual subject and on his critical and innovative thinking and action.
During the period of East Asian “enlightenment,” Confucianism was seen as a
reactionary enemy of all forward-looking people who were trying to lead East
Asia on the path to the formation of modern societies based on equality and
democracy. Of course, despite its proto-democratic Confucian roots , the Ruist
system was most prevalent in this pre-modern era in the form of a dogmatic
normative ethic steeped in gerontocracy and advocating scholastic models of
education for the young, who were expected to uncritically adopt the dogmas
of the ruling elites through exclusive memorization. As such, this form of Confucianism also oppressed youth, women, and marginalized social groups.
But we must be careful here not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. First, we must once again remember the previously discussed difference
between Confucian philosophy-ethical discourses (Ru xue) on the one hand,
and Ruist state doctrine or dogmatic normative ethics (Ru jiao) on the other.
As mentioned earlier, Confucianism in the pre-Qin period4 was a progressive
ethic that sharply criticized the concept of hereditary monarchy and advocated instead a proto-republican system in which the rulers would be elected
primarily on the basis of their wisdom and moral maturity. This meritocratic
system was based on the cultivation of one’s personality and the discovery of
the autonomous moral self within one’s own mind. Its ideational foundation
was based on the concepts of empathic humaneness (ren) and situational
3 君者、舟也，庶人者、水也；水則載舟，水則覆舟。
4 The Pre-Qin Period 先秦時代 is a technical term referring to the period of the Eastern Zhou
Dynasty (東周, 770-221 BCE), and in particular to its second part, namely the Warring States
Period (戰國, 403-221 BCE), which is considered the epoch of the first flowering of classical
Chinese philosophy; in Western literature it is sometimes called “The Golden Age of Chinese
Philosophy.”
30
chapter 2
rightness or appropriateness (yi). At the same time, this was an ethic based on
diversity. The harmony that the original Confucian stood for was the harmony
of pluralism, not an equalizing alignment of all individuals in a society.5 Of
course, this diversity also meant that society was structurally ordered according to the Ruist design, which involved a normative arrangement of relationships or roles for individuals in a society. Although in institutionalized official
Ruist state discourse, the prevailing view is that society is strictly hierarchically
ordered, this is not at all true in original Confucian philosophy. In this context, let us examine the Confucian theory of the “five relations” (wu lun) in
more detail. Indeed, the political theory of original Confucianism was based
on these five relations, which originate in the family and have a paradigmatic
character for all relationships within the wider community, including the state.
Confucius’ successor Mencius defined these relationships as follows:
Father and son should love one another and the relationship between the
ruler and their subject should be defined by appropriateness. Between
husband and wife there should be difference. Between old and young,
there should be a proper order, and between friends, trustworthiness.
(Mengzi s.d., Teng Wen Gong I, 4) 6
Hierarchy in the sense of prioritizing the decisions of a superior can only be
seen in the relationship between a ruler and a subject, and between members
of the older and younger generations. In the first case, the nature of the relationship itself is hierarchical, meaning that the ruler is naturally a superior of
his subjects. But, especially in Confucianism, this does not necessarily mean
that the latter must be absolutely obedient to the former; on the contrary, the
Confucian definition of this relationship requires the ruler to be proper and
responsible to his subjects. In fact, the real authority, in the sense of hierarchical primacy, is present in the relationship between members of the older and
younger generations, such a relationship being defined by the requirement
of proper order (xu) based on the sequence or order of priorities in decisionmaking. Here we have the only type of relationship within the framework of
Confucian relational ethics in which one of the two opposing poles has absolute
5 In the Analects of Confucius we repeatedly come across statements which unequivocally
advocate the principle of such diversity. “Cultured people stand for mutual harmonization
and are against equalization, while uneducated savages know only of egalitarianism and
nothing of harmony between people” (君子和而不同，小人同而不和。Lunyu s.d., Zi Lu,
23).
6 父子有親，君臣有義，夫婦有別，長幼有序，朋友有信。
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
31
authority and priority in decision-making, although even in this case the older
generation shares responsibility for the welfare of the younger. On the other
hand, this is undoubtedly an element from which gerontocracy later emerged
as one of the most problematic elements of Sinic social systems; however, we
must also not overlook the fact that even this view was quite progressive for
the time in which Confucian teachings emerged; we must not forget that in a
semi-agrarian society of that time, the practices of killing and neglecting the
elderly still existed.
During the period of the first unification of China under the auspices of the
Qin Dynasty (221 BCE), Confucianism was, like most other intellectual currents
of the pre-Qin period, banned. The only permitted thought in this totalitarian,
but luckily short-lived dynasty, was the ideology of legalism (fa jia), a Machiavellian political doctrine that served the interests of the absolute ruler and
was based on repressive legislation and control over individuals and all social
groups.
It was only after the defeat of the Qin under the rule of the new Han Dynasty
(206 BCE–220 CE), that the classical schools of philosophy were rehabilitated.
As we have seen in the section on Confucianism and Confucianism, this period
has witnessed the establishment of a new state doctrine.7 The court ideologist
Dong Zhongshu used Confucianism as the basis of this new system of ideas,
and at the same time managed to covertly incorporate a number of repressive
and despotic Legalist elements into it. Thus, a new autocratic state doctrine of
“Ruism” was formed from the originally democratic Confucianism. The Legalist elements of totalitarianism and oppression of the state over the individual are latently present in China to this day. Such Legalistic elements, which
were thus seen as integral parts of the original teachings, include, for example,
procedures such as the method of collective responsibility8 or the principle of
denunciation.
7 As we have already mentioned in the section on Ruism and Confucianism, these processes
can be divided into three phases or stages, characterized by three reforms that determine
the changes in social functions and the position of the teachings of Confucius in Chinese
history. The first reform began in the second stage, i.e., the Han Dynasty period, when the
teachings were commented on, developed, and reinterpreted. During this first reform, the
original Confucianism was greatly modified and transformed into what we call “Ruist state
doctrine.” This first reform was followed by two others, both of which together constitute the
third stage in the development of these doctrines: The second Confucian reform emerged
during the period of so-called Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, while the
third occurred on the threshold of the 20th century, when a new current of so-called Modern
New Confucianism emerged in China.
8 The method of collective responsibility means that for an offense or a crime not only the individual offender was punished, but also his whole family or the whole clan to which he belonged.
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chapter 2
If we try in a very short (and somewhat generalizing) way to review the basic
differences between Ruist doctrine and Confucian thought, we can say that the
former represented an institutionalized form of state doctrine, while the latter
signified a philosophy or a deontological ethics, based on the autonomy of the
individual.
Ruism received its institutionalized basis as a state doctrine primarily with
the introduction of civil service examinations, which thereafter formed the
intellectual basis of civil service until their abolition in 1905. The material
that had to be learned in order to attain an official position (and thus political
power) consisted mostly of the Confucian classics. The system of examinations, however, was completely at odds with the basic principles of Confucianism, as it required candidates to simply memorize the material (without
the contemplation desired by Confucius), along with internalizing the formal
rules of writing reports and essays. The clearest difference between Ruist doctrine and Confucian philosophy, however, is the fact that state doctrine also
included (explicitly unnamed) Legalist methods of control and oppression.
Through such use (or rather misuse) of the original Confucian ethics, the five
paradigmatic relationships then actually developed a rigorous hierarchical
character. This was expressed not only within the bureaucratic institutions of
the state, but also in the strict normative social ethics that formed and spread
among the people on the basis of this new doctrine. This Ruist doctrine—
both in its institutional and popular forms—certainly posed an obstacle to
East Asian modernization through its dogmatism and conservatism, although
different regions solved this problem in different ways. Also, the majority of
today’s repressive measures as applied by the various states in the Sinic, i.e.,
traditionally Confucian, regions are still based on Legalist elements that were
incorporated into Confucianism. This applies to arranged marriages, which are
still widespread (especially in rural areas), but also to the modern digitalized
“social responsibility system,” which was introduced on a trial basis in China
back in 2015 and came into general effect on January 1, 2020.
This, then, is the “Confucianism” that Byung-Chul Han discusses as the main
reason for the effectiveness of anti-coronavirus measures in East Asia. This
view, which actually refers to Confucianism, may apply in part to the PRC, in
some respects to Singapore, and almost certainly to North Korea, although we
do not know much about the actual situation there. The fact is that the PRC has
used digital surveillance of its population in the fight against the pandemic.
Its digital control was certainly accompanied by a paternalistic attitude of the
state authorities towards the population, intimidation and sometimes even
open repression.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
33
However, this is by no means the only reason for that initial success of
anti-coronavirus measures in East Asia. The governments of different “soft”
East Asian democracies, for example Taiwan, South Korea and post-colonial
Hong Kong, used no repressive measures in dealing with the pandemic, but
were still extremely successful in limiting the spread. When explaining their
success, the state representatives pointed out to quick reaction times in the
early stages of the epidemic, transparent, continued and practically directed
information campaigns about the spread of the disease, excellent health systems and very good systems of organization and coordination of the population, which also saw in the epidemic a common problem that could only be
solved by society as a whole, and not exclusively by individuals.
This view of social phenomena is typical of the original Confucian relationism, because, first, dynamic and relatively close interpersonal relationships
at the local level allow for more rapid mobilization and cooperation of broad
segments of the population; second, the basic virtue of Confucian humaneness (ren) underlying the corresponding relational systems is a form of social
empathy and thus an excellent basis for personal and social solidarity.
In addition to hierarchical and gerontocratic elements and possible constraints of the community on the individual, which are typical of Ruist discourses,
Confucian ethics, on which many principles for ordering interpersonal relationships are still based today, contains many elements that have nothing to do with
oppression and totalitarianism. The relational ethic and understanding of the
individual based on the complementary and mutually inseparable relationship
between society and the people who are part of it has survived in East Asia to this
day. (see e.g., Li Zehou 2010, 2016b, Rošker 2012, Li Chenyang 2014, Nuyen 2009,
Rosemont 2015, Gao 2019, Li and Tian 2020, etc.) In this framework, the human
self is an inseparable part of an organic whole that every individual person forms
together with the society to which it belongs and into which it grows. Therefore,
we can refute the thesis of the immanently authoritarian organization of Sinic
societies, as advocated, for example, in some classic works of European Orientalism (see, for example, Wittvogel), and offer instead a better grounded and more
realistic picture of Confucian-based ethical and political systems.
For a better understanding of the differentiations described above, we will
in the following take a brief look at the basic characteristics of such ethical
systems that are based on discourses of the original Confucianism and can be
grouped under the umbrella category of social or ethical relationism or relationality (guanxizhuyi 關係主義, cf. Li 2016).
But before that, let us take a brief look at some differently structured relations between the individual and society.
34
2
chapter 2
Individualism: Universal, Collectivist and Communitarian
One of the main differences between the ethical systems that developed
and prevailed on the eve of modernization in Western cultures, on the one
hand, and Confucian ethics, on the other, lies in their specific understanding
of the relation between the individual and the community. Western models
are mostly (with the exception of communitarianism, which will be briefly
described later) shaped by individualism, which emerged and developed as a
social paradigm in Europe on the eve of modernization as part of the adaptation to the new social, economic, and political conditions associated with this
process (e.g., Li 2013, 4).
The foundations of such developments, however, were laid much earlier in
European history, for the idea of “people as individuals” represented the central
pillar of the idea of a free society of equal individuals as early as ancient Greece.
Later, this idea developed under the influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition,
which held that all human beings are equal before God (Li 2016a, 1080). In
subsequent eras, the concept gradually developed as a segment of economic,
political, social, and philosophical theories that advocated the autonomy and
independence of individuals. In its broadest sense, individualism is a form of
social organization within which the individual is the central and primary position and in which anything that opposes or impedes individual development
is explicitly negative. In the prevailing Euro-American philosophical systems
(which were often not even compatible with each other) individualism has
expressed itself in different ways. In axiology, the term refers to those political and social philosophies that emphasize the central moral, ethical, political,
and social value of the individual. The theoretical work reflecting on the latter
manifests itself in the principles of pure reason, which include the conceptualization of an absolute, “transcendental” self or the notion of atomized, isolated
individuals who are independent of their fellow human beings.
Many modern theorists of Confucian philosophy (e.g., Li 2016a, 1080)
emphasize that while systems of virtue ethics have emerged in both the
so-called Aristotelian and Confucian discourses, they cannot usually be compared with each other because they are very different from each other. While
the first type is a system rooted in the idea of the free and abstract individual,
the second type is based on a network of relationships or connections and can
therefore be called “relational virtue ethics” (guanxizhuyide meide lunli 關係
主義的美德倫理) (Li & Liu 2014, 209). This fundamental difference can give
us a deeper insight into the considerable differences between ethical systems
that prevailed within the respective types of cultural philosophical discourses
in question, not only in terms of understanding the relationship between the
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
35
individual and society, but also concerning connections between reason and
emotion.
Confucian relational ethics assumes a socially constituted (self-)understanding of the person. This basic feature underlying Confucian ethical thought is
profoundly different from systems based on an individualistic understanding
of the human subject. Such an understanding of the Self underlies all ideologies of individualism and their corresponding social systems. In order to better
understand the specific features of Confucian relationism, we need to understand how it differs from individualism in the sense described above. Therefore, we will first take a closer look at the main types of social systems based on
the individualistic view of people and their communities.
For a better understanding of the functioning of ethical systems, which in
this book, as described above, are considered as external, normative systems
for ordering interpersonal relations, we need to further clarify the meaning of
the different models of relations between the individual and society. Since our
main objective in this context is to grasp the basic character of the social structures prevailing in East Asian and most Sinitic regions, we must first take a
closer look at the three central, individualism-based models of social order prevailing in the intellectual and social traditions of Euro-American, namely universalism, collectivism and communitarianism. All of these systems (including
their subsystems and various politically, culturally and ideologically differently
colored versions) derive from the primary role of the Self as an individual. This
is one of the fundamental differences that separates such systems from the
historically developed Chinese (especially Confucian) systems of relationism
as a social order in which the individual and society are in a complementary
relationship. There are many such models, and they differ quite widely from
one another.
In this section, we will first examine several different social paradigms that
have in common that they are all based on the idea of the individual and contain corresponding ideological and value-related connotations.
Individualism, as we know, is the ideational basis of modernization, which
first emerged in Western societies. Since the individualist view starts from different theoretical foundations, this book proceeds from their common basis,
which is founded on the assumption that individuals are distinct from one
another and can be described, analyzed, and evaluated largely, if not exclusively, in isolation. In this context, individuals are ultimately the fundamental
objects of value, respect, and dignity. Despite the significant differences among
some of them, we shall denote all these views as variants of foundational
individualism, which is based on the doctrine that individuals can exist independently of their relationships to other persons, and that social collectives are
36
chapter 2
nothing more than aggregates of individuals. Such views are based on the idea
of an isolated, abstract individual Self, which—in this framework- is seen as
the foundation and highest value of humanity. Individualism thus represents a
system that emphasizes the role, interests, and rights of the individual in relation to society (Lukes 2020, 1–3). In the ideal societal representation of such a
view, i.e., in a democratic society, the fundamental rights of the individual are
constrained by the fundamental rights of his or her fellow people. The ideological basis of Western humanist democracies is therefore the qualitatively
definable and stable concept of justice that applies to all, since in this model
all people are understood to be equal in principle.9 While in East Asia the idea
that justice and parity among people can be established by a normative, universally applicable set of rules applicable to all situations seems never to have
really taken hold, the pre-modern and modern European intellectual tradition
tended to achieve a just order in societies through agreements, conventions
and laws. This is particularly evident in dealing with the concept of individual
rights, which is as alien to the Chinese tradition of thought as the unconditional adherence to collectivized considerations and duties (Rošker 2005, 211).
The important point here is simply that in this individualistic design, the
idea of human rights is seen as a universal and generally valid value that can
be measured with uniform criteria. In fact, they are a legal concept that often
does not take into account the specifics of the situation at stake. The criteria or
concrete definitions of human rights are still largely determined on the basis of
the Western value system. Thus, the emphasis in human rights discourse since
1948, i.e. since the recognition of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has
been on the preservation and protection of civil and political rights, for which
many Western countries could boast, and less on the preservation and protection of social and economic rights, which formed the basis for such rights
in, for instance, the post-socialist countries. Hence, the Universal Declaration
one-dimensionally emphasizes individual human rights without thoroughly
considering the importance of the rights of particular social units, groups, families and communities. Nevertheless, I must point out that this does not at all
mean that we should not be critical of those autocratic governments that use
9 This generalizing concept of the principle of equality of all people is alien to Confucian ethical systems, since they are based on a model whose fundamental paradigm is relationships
within the family, which is not seen as a unit, consisting of relationships between equal
people with equal rights and duties. The basis of this inequality is not, of course, relations
between the sexes, but primarily those between parents and children, or between different
generations. But I will write more about this later.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
37
and abuse such critiques of the concept of human rights in their activities to
oppress individuals and marginalized groups.10
In social systems where individualism prevails, individual human rights
are in most cases more protected than those of groups or communities. Individualism is the ideational and ideological model of such social systems in
which, within the relationship between the individual and society, the former is the more fundamental, the more important, and the more positively
valued.11 Among many advantages associated with the protection, autonomy
and freedom of individuals (especially male), these systems also bring numerous problems, including the lack of skills and opportunities for participation,
the increase of egocentrism, the lack of mutual solidarity, social alienation,
over-relativization of values, loneliness and so on.
Nevertheless, individualistic social systems are defended by a number of
very influential modern theorists of liberalism (or so-called liberal democracy), such as John Rawls in his famous work A Theory of Justice.
As mentioned above, individualism defines and conditions the beginning
and development of the Western type of modernization. But in the broader
context of individual-based systems, that is, systems built on the idea of an
isolated individual Self, there are several different social models in which the
relationship between the individual and society is defined in different ways.
Therefore, in the following we will briefly introduce some of these systems or
10
11
China is often mentioned in this context, sometimes also Singaporean politicians and
their very problematic concept of so-called “Asian values” (see Rošker 2016).
Unrestricted freedom of movement, for example, is one of the basic human freedoms,
in part and precisely because Western countries are in a position where they can afford
to guarantee such freedoms to their citizens. When it comes to freedom in the opposite
direction, to the free entry of, say, people from the Global South into a Western state, the
state has the right to close its borders without anyone being able to accuse it of violating
human rights. At the same time, the focus within the concept of human rights is on individual rights, while the rights of individual social groups are left out. The exception is the
right to national sovereignty under the doctrine of national self-determination, and this
is the only collective right that has gained recognition in this discourse. Marginalized
communities that would need more rights than other independent individuals within
individual states include, for example, women, the elderly, minority groups of indigenous
people, members of non-Western cultures, and members of the LGBTQ+ community who
are at the bottom of the social ladder even in countries not accused of human rights violations. This individualizing perspective of human rights deprives discriminated groups of
the basis of any political action, the subject of which is not the individual but the group.
Thus, it is not surprising that a variety of rights that are fundamental to members of many
non-Western cultures do not fall within the scope of what is defined as human rights.
Among them, for example, is the right of the individual to grow old and die among his or
her loved ones, and not in a designated institution (Rošker 2005, 213).
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ideas based on individualism, namely universalism, collectivism and communitarianism, which can be placed in a contrastive relation to the social model
of relationism.
All social systems based on abstract and generalized understanding of the
individual and presupposing such an order in which all are equal, are actually
derived from universalistic assumptions. Universalism is an idea diametrically
opposed to relativism and advocates the assumption that there are universal
facts that can be uncovered and utilized. The term universalism denotes a view
based on the assertion that all the diversity and complexity of reality can be
summed up in unified and universal principles or laws. It follows, of course,
that all ideas, ideals, rights, and duties must in principle apply equally to all
human beings. In moral philosophy, this term also refers to any theory whose
validity is not limited to particular individuals or traditional cultures but is
completely independent of time and space. This idea is in tension with that of
cultural relativism and led to the establishment and development of a number
of ethical theories, such as, for instance, utilitarianism, Kant’s deontological
ethics, and the discourse ethics of Juergen Habermas. We will deal with a kind
of universalist ethics underlying the new digital technologies in one of the following chapters, where the problem of subjectivity and digital control will be
discussed.
In the narrower context of ethical theories, universalism refers to systems
that are supposed to be valid for all individuals within a given community.
Such ethical thinking is especially prevalent in the recent Euro-American
intellectual tradition, since universalism is, among other things, the basis of
Enlightenment-influenced conceptualizations of human nature. Such a view
is the foundation for the concept of human rights, both natural and social—in
the sense of individual and collective rights. It is therefore not surprising that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also based on such a perception
of individuals.
The term collectivism is usually seen as the antithesis of individualism.
Proceeding from such a framework, many people believe that collectivism is
essentially an autocratic or even totalitarian social system, as it supposedly
does not take into account or value individual life. In a common view, such
“collectivism” is typical of Sinic societies, which are often seen by Westerners
as products of authoritarian and despotic traditions. In fact, just the opposite
is true, for collectivism is a system that also proceeds from the notion of an
individual, who’s Self and existence are constituted in isolation from his or her
fellow people. Hence, collectivism is in fact a form of individualism, and one in
which all individuals are seen as being equal.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
39
In a common view,12 the collectivist social orders refer to the mechanistic
systems of a group or society in which individuals are dehumanized, being
related to each other only in the pragmatic sense of enabling the most efficient
forms of production or for the benefit of the whole social system as such. In
this context, the position and work of individuals are defined by their subordination to the system as well as by their isolation from other individuals,
since in a collectivist system people are only connected to each other by functions and objects and not by their personalities. In this sense, they are not only
“equal,” but practically the “same.”13 In such a system, individuals are a part
of the faceless crowd; comparable to small individual wheels, which function
mechanistically within a grand, all-encompassing machine. Hannah Arendt
described this system, which is possible only as a unit that is made up of individuals who are robbed of their concrete identities, in the following way:
12
13
It should be emphasized here that this “common view” is a product of the onedimensional and populist anti-socialist and anti-communist propaganda in the Western
media, based on the relevant ideologies. Such views are based on an extremely reductive
understanding of collectivism, based mainly on the Stalinist (or extremely simplified)
version of dialectical materialism. The main intention of introducing collectivism as a
type of social order in this book is simply to clarify the all-too-common conflation of
collectivist and relationalist societies, which leads to the widespread but nevertheless
erroneous assumption that Confucian societies are collectivist. In this context, therefore, it has been particularly important to show that collectivism is a system based on
the individualistic constitution of the human self, whereas social relationism is rooted
in a different conception of the self, namely one in which members of social groups are
not separate but fundamentally contextualized and intimately connected. For reasons
of space limitations, serious studies of collectivism cannot be included in this book, but
it must at least be mentioned that they also elaborate such forms of collective order in
which the personal freedom and dignity of all individuals is highly valued and in which
the relations between them are based on mutual respect and empathy. In such (usually
horizontal) forms of collectivism, the personal development of the individual is closely
linked to the well-being of all people living in a community. Similar conceptions of collectivism can already be found, for example, in the writings of 19th century anarchist collectivists such as Peter Kropotkin (1972) or the early 20th century democratic Marxist Leon
Trotsky (1965). For a more recent sophisticated elaborations and distinctions between
vertical and horizontal collectivism, see Singelis et al. (1995), Komarraju & Cokley (2008),
Engel-Di Mauro (2020), etc. Triandis & Gelfand (2012) and Markus & Kitayama (2010) also
contributed to the critical literature on this topic by challenging one-dimensional models
of the alleged dichotomy of collectivism vs. individualism.
We can find a good illustration of these issues in Hannah Arendt’s differentiation between
the notions of “sameness” and “equality” (Arendt 1998, 213). This system of equality, which
is actually based on sameness, comes in the European culture from the basic design of the
Christian teaching, within which we are all equal (and simultaneously totally the same)
before God and death (ibid., 235).
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It is indeed in the nature of laboring to bring men together in the form of
a labor gang where any number of individuals “labor together as though
they were one,” and in this sense togetherness may permeate laboring
even more intimately than any other activity. But this “collective nature
of labor,” far from establishing a recognizable, identifiable reality for each
member of the labor gang, requires on the contrary the actual loss of all
awareness of individuality and identity. (Arendt 1998, 213)
The equality of all members of a collective is actually a form of conformism
based on the somatic experience of common labor, where “the biological
rhythm of labor unites the group of laborers to the point that each may feel
that he is no longer an individual, but actually one with all others” (ibid., 214).
Of course, this is precisely why certain systems of collectivism actually lend
themselves well to autocratic, dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes, as they
allow for effective centralized leadership and control over all individuals in
society. Therefore, in the context of European modernization, which emphasizes human autonomy and freedom, it is sometimes difficult to understand
that collectivism is actually the most typical system that emerges from the
most emblematic forms of individualism, in which the relationship between
the individual and society is such that all individuals are equal.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there are many other models in which
the relationship between the individual and society or social community is
understood in a way that takes the individual as the starting point. Communitarianism, for example, is based on the belief that each person’s social identity
is shaped and established by their relationships with others living in the same
community as a whole, with the role of the individual being less important. In
a broader sense, it is a system of interactions between people within a community that is located in the same geographic space and shares a common history.
Proponents of communitarianism (such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor) are critical of extreme individualism and any kind of
politics that would threaten the balance of the community. They also oppose
viewing the individual as atomized and emphasize that people who are well
integrated into the community think more rationally and act more responsibly
than isolated individuals. At the same time, however, they warn against excessive social pressure that could stifle individual freedom.
Both individualism and collectivism are alien to the Confucian traditions,
which are largely based on Confucianism. Communitarianism, which advocates a more balanced relationship between the individual and the community,
is certainly closer to traditional views of these relationships and interactions.
It is not surprising, then, that many contemporary East Asian theorists hold
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
41
it in high esteem, although many others also warn that it could be dangerous
for East Asia because the region has also experienced—among many other
traditions—a rich and influential history of autocratic Legalism.14 And, as we
shall see later, it would be difficult to introduce Western-style communitarianism to China without major social transformations for other reasons as well.
These are more related to differences in the basic constitutions of the human
subject or the (self-)understanding of the individual within the two traditions
in question.
Before addressing the specific features of the Confucian model of relational
ethics, we will first focus on defining the fundamental differences between the
self-understanding based on individualism and that based on relationism. This
analysis will build on our basic knowledge of the differences between individualistically defined systems of universalism, collectivism, and communitarianism. Clarifying such differences will help us better understand relationism as
a system of complementary relations between the individual and society. This
concerns fundamental differences between individualism and relationism:
while the former is based on the idea of the isolated individual, such an idea is
absent in the latter, since relationism, as we shall see later, manifests itself as a
system of mutual co-dependence based on the primacy or priority of the role
of the community.
3
Relationism and Confucian “Role Ethics”
The lack of differentiation between the various types of individualism-based
models of the relations between the individual and society that have prevailed
in the Euro-American tradition, and the lack of knowledge about the common
features of these models, has had far-reaching consequences. Among other
things, it has led (and continues to lead) to numerous misunderstandings and
misinterpretations when trying to understand and classify East Asian social
and political systems. What these models have in common, of course, is the
14
Legalism is a Machiavellian philosophical school or political theory that developed in
China in the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE and exclusively defended and safeguarded the
interests of the absolute ruler. In establishing a new state doctrine, the court ideologues of
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) fused it with the original egalitarian Confucianism in
the framework of institutionalized Ruism, which later prevailed in this new, rather rigid
form in most East Asian regions. In Legalism we find many totalitarian elements involving
the coercion of the individual to serve the alleged interests of the community, expressed
through collective responsibility, denunciations, and other forms of social pressure.
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fundamental difference that separates their structural frameworks from the
social paradigm of individualism.
The Confucian model of ethics that traditionally prevailed in China and to
some degree in the entire Sinic region, and which is in the focus of this book,
is based on the primary role of the community. Its basic premise is that no one
can survive (or even come into existence!) without others, that is, that society is the existential condition of the individual. In this context, we should
emphasize from the outset the fact that the Chinese (or Confucian) model
of the relationship between the primary community and the secondary individual is neither a kind of collectivist, nor a kind of communitarian model of
social interactions.
We will start our outline proceeding from the relationship between the individual and society and illustrate the characteristics of a model in which this
relationship is not based on individualism but emphasizes the role of society
or community.
If we start from the question of why the measures to contain the spread of
coronavirus were (at least initially) relatively more effective in Sinic than in
Euro-American regions, and if we are interested in whether this is related to
specific Confucian models of ethics and the (self-)understanding of the individual in relation to society or community, it is first necessary to clarify those
key concepts of these ethical systems that define the correlative understanding between the individual and society and enable the existence and (inter)
action of the individual within the framework of Confucian role ethics15 or
so-called relationism.
But if we start from the hypothesis that the efficiency of the measures
against the coronavirus is linked to the traditional relational ethics prevailing
in Sinic societies, we must also ask ourselves whether the internal organization
of a society whose order is based on such an ethic is not also responsible for
the low value attached to individual freedom, intimacy and privacy. Indeed, a
low value placed on these values might facilitate social control of individuals
and certain social groups. Therefore, we will address these issues in more detail
in later parts of this book.
As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of anti-coronavirus measures in
Confucian societies has usually been interpreted as the result of an inherent
autocracy, which is said to be primarily the legacy of Ruist hierarchical models of society. In order to shed light on some inherent problems of this thesis,
15
The notion and theoretical conceptualization of Confucian role ethics was created and
developed by Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames (see Rosemont & Ames 2016, and Ames
2020).
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
43
we will focus on the basic features of traditional social orders in societies that
were traditionally influenced by these discourses. Again, we will proceed from
the basic structure of the relationship between the individual and society. As
we will see, these traditional relational social orders belong to paradigms of
interpersonal and political relations that are fundamentally different from
individualist models in which the individual plays the main role. Indeed, in
individualism, the interests of the individual are also primary in an axiological
sense, as opposed to those of the community, which are considered secondary. In the Confucian relational model, this relationship is complementary and
based on the fundamental position of society, without which there would be
no individuals at all.
Another fundamental difference between the Western individualist model
and the Confucian relational system is that in the individualist model, the individuals who make up the primary part of the relationship between society and
the individual are considered equal, whereas Confucian relationism are based
on a clear distinction between individuals who are different.
Relational social orders are structured as webs of relationships that connect
individuals who perceive themselves not as isolated and independent entities
but as so-called relational selves. This means that the life and social roles of
people in such systems are mutually interconnected and that their identities
are to a large extent defined by their social relations. Within such a framework, the Self was always necessarily part of concrete situations; in Confucian
culture, social positions were usually closely tied to Confucian traditions, in
which conceptualizations of persons were usually centered on relationships.
Of course, this also means that all of the individual’s intentions, choices, successes, and failures must be understood in the context of his or her interactions
with other people (Lai 2018, 64). As Paul D’Ambrosio (2016, 720) points out, we
can therefore see classical Confucianism as a form of moral interpretation of
relationships as the fundamental components of human life and morality. In
societies and cultures influenced by such a system of ethics, it is only within
the framework of such relationality that people can experience what it means
to be a human being endowed with morality, the values of humanity, and the
analogical attitude towards one’s life and one’s social and natural environment.
Both Chinese and Sinological theorists usually interpret the Confucian
model of the “five relations” described in the previous parts of this chapter as
the foundations of interpersonal relations, ethical order, and mutual responsibility that is rationalized but also includes human emotions (Li 2016a, 1097).
These basic relationships roughly define the way interpersonal interactions
take place, as within the network each individual is assigned certain tasks and
behaviors. In Confucian societies, this model can often be seen as a nexus of
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basic interpersonal relationships within a civil society, as it encompasses family relationships as well as relationships among friends and colleagues, political and other social relationships. On the other hand, this also reflects the
Confucian emphasis on the family as the basic cell of the state, as three of the
five of these model relationships have their origins in the family community.
This basic organization of the five relationships is not only a description of
our social relations, but also includes a set of concretely prescribed norms of
behavior that order social interactions within such models, as each of the relationships included therein is tied to specific virtues (Wang 2016, 194).
The central role in these morally defined interactions is occupied by the
virtue of filial piety (xiao). This virtue, which is the constitutive element of
children’s love for their parents and grandparents, is one of the cardinal virtues
of Confucian ethics. In concrete contexts, it usually means the fulfilment of a
child’s duty to his or her parents. In the context of Confucianism, filial piety is
important primarily because the relationship between children and parents
provides the earliest social environment in which a child learns to understand normativity within relationships and to respond appropriately (Lai 2016,
121). Thus, these virtues are initially formed within the family, that is, within
boundaries that define an individual’s duties and responsibilities. These are
established on the basis of different relationships between individual family
members. Therefore, it is important for Confucian moral epistemology that
family love is a priority and takes precedence over all other kinds of love.16 In a
broader social context, this principle implies the priority of what is close over
what is distant. Fan Ruiping ‘s research (Fan 2010, xii) has shown that the Confucian emphasis on filial piety is closely related to the position that it is in the
family that the foundations of virtuous living and morality are to be learned.
The existential dependence of young children on their parents and the emotional dependence of the latter on the former are said to establish the human
disposition to love. Therefore, for Confucians, love between parents and children is at the same time the foundation of the basic human virtue of humanity
(ren). The latter, in turn, is central to any society of peace and prosperity, since
it is based on mutual aid, trust, and solidarity.
We can thus assert that Confucianism is an ethical system based on the
moral interpretation of relationships as the fundamental constituents of
16
Here again we can observe one of the fundamental differences between Confucianism
and Christianity that shapes the basic ideologies of the Euro-American cultural area,
since before the Christian God all people are accorded equal love. For an excellent comparative analysis of these differences and their ethical implications, see Huang 2002,
204–229.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
45
human life and morality. Morality is then rooted in harmonious interactions
between different people defined by different social roles. Li Zehou called this
model of society and social ethics, which is not based on individualism but
rather on social roles and relationships, “relationism” (guanxizhuyi). Many theorists believe that such an understanding of reality is more correct and realistic than social theories based on the ideas of the abstract individual, since in
the real world there is no such thing as an individual in the sense of an isolated
and “pure” Self, separate from all interpersonal intentions, feelings, and relationships, since no one can survive without others. That is why Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames wrote:
It increasingly seemed to us that describing the proper performances of
persons in their various roles and the appropriate attitude expressed in
such roles in their relationship to others with whom they are engaged
… conform to our everyday experience much better than those abstract
accounts reflected in the writings of the heroes of Western moral philosophy, past and present. (Rosemont & Ames 2016, 9)
It is therefore not strange that numerous Chinese researchers are critically
reexamining Western discourses and believe them to have a one-dimensional
emphasis on individual autonomy and the idea of free choice. Such paradigms
are in the end always based on the assumption that individuals can be separated and abstracted from social contexts, relationships, even from such elements of the human condition that are of actual vital importance for human
life, such as, for example, the ability and the need for interpersonal relationships and mutual care (Fan 2010, 13). Compared to such models, Confucian
relationism is a model of relational being. In this context Li Zehou writes:
That people are raised and cared for by their families and communities
leaves them with duties and responsibilities to this relationality and even
their “kind” (humankind). People do not belong to themselves alone. The
very first passage of the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao jing) tells us that as our
bodies are received from our parents, we are not allowed to harm them.
If even harming one’s body is denounced, how could suicide possibly be
allowed. (Li 2016b, 1131)
In relationalist social systems the individual is not supposed to act as an independent moral agent, separate from their fellow people (Lai 2008, 6). That is
why judgements about the individual are never defined in relation to an idealized standard of an independent Self. In this kind of understanding of the
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Self, it is the actual relationships and environments that define individual
values, thoughts, motivations, behaviors and actions in the first place. Moreover, relationships are in this context always marked by mutuality and reciprocal complementarity: “A good teacher and a good student can only emerge
together, and your welfare and the welfare of your neighbor are coterminous
and mutually entailing” (Rosemont & Ames 2016, 12). Even though relationism
contains unequal positions—since the ruler is an authority to the subject, like
the mother is to the daughter and so on—both parties who are involved in
a specific relation are complementary and equal to one another, both in the
metaphysical and the moral sense, since together they form a part of the social
whole, which is made up of those interpersonal relations.
This view of social composition is especially important in times of crises, because such periods doubtless reinforce the need for cooperation that
bridges the gap between the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand and
her socio-relational Self on the other. It also poses a challenge to the artificially
established dichotomies between the Self and the Other or between the specific and the general, the particular and the universal. This understanding is
rooted in the paradigm of contrastive complementarity, as the unrepeatability
of the individual can be measured not only by his or her individual achievements, but also by their social influence. And the latter, in turn, can be measured by an individual’s position within his contextual environment and by
their relations with other individuals (Lai 2008, 88). From the perspective of
ethics, such a relationalist network has several important implications, especially in comparison to frames that postulate the independent stability of an
individual.
This kind of ethics does not derive from the concept of normative justice, but
from a tendency towards social harmony (he),17 which appears in the relational
network of interactions between individuals, whose individual identities—as
we shall see later in the description of individuation—are perceived as harmonies of different combinations of the unique, particular characteristics of
each of them. The network of relationships is dynamic and diverse, since no
individual in it forms a fixed specific identity or entity. Each individual in it
is the bearer of numerous roles which are interwoven and complement and
perfect each other. Thus, I myself am, say, a mother, but also a daughter; I am a
teacher, but also a researcher, which means that I learn from the work of others. I am also a consumer, a singer, a driver, a citizen, a worker, etc. Analogously,
17
Of course this concept of social harmony should not be mistaken for the kind of ideological misused concept of harmony that manifests itself in the patriotic propaganda of the
leadership of China. For a more detailed description of those issues, see Rošker 2019.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
47
my relationships with people are multi-layered and changeable. Therefore, in
the network of relationality, I am never simply a fixed and unchanging entity,
defined by my role within the network.
As we have indicated before, Confucian relationism also contains a special
type of virtue ethics,18 though the latter is not based on the concept of the
isolated individual, but rather defined by relations, or relationships, which are
in their inner essence emotional. But many other authors point out that it is
rational and even necessary in visions of social systems to include, cultivate
and socialize emotions, since these are rooted in biological instincts that need
to be directed into mechanisms of mutual help (see Li 2016a, 1097).
Another characteristic of relationism, which is important for crisis situations, is the factor of inequality of younger and older persons, which is certainly connected to the inequality of what is near and what is further away, of
external and internal persons,19 and so on. Confucianism emphasizes familial
relationships in which people are automatically unequal. That is why relationism contains both rational order and emotional identification within the conditions that are always concrete, unrepeatable and connected to sensations
and feelings. In this context, concrete obligations, responsibilities and actions
differ for every individual according to the concrete, changeable situation in
which they are located.
As mentioned already, relationism begins in the relational individual self
and is rooted in the family, developed outwards to the wider community
and the natural environments in which people live. The ancient Confucian
Mencius described this structure of society as follows: “The basis of the world
is the state, the basis of the state is the family and the basis of the family is the
individual” (Mengzi s.d., Li Lou I: 5). 20
The historical importance of the social system based on family clans is,
of course, closely connected with the general importance of interpersonal
18
19
20
It is here worth pointing out that all three types of ethics, which are seen as the basic categories of this discipline, namely virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics,
are categories that were established in the context of Western philosophy. Because transferring concepts and categories from one historical-cultural area to another is a problematic procedure, tied to different culturally conditioned frames of reference, we have to
take into account the fact that none of the above three categorizations are wholly suitable
for defining or describing the basic nature of Confucian ethics, which at the same time
certainly also belongs to the field of deontological ethics (cf. for example Lee 2017, 94).
The concepts of the “external” and the “internal” in this context refer to positions of persons, which are “inside” or “outside” certain social groups to which the subject, who is
connected to these people, belongs.
天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。
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relations. Thus, concrete relationships between different people formed a
social network, which in time became a social-historical paradigm that was
not limited to a simply regulated sequence of pairs but assumed the socially
and ethically important function of the basic element of systematized social
interactions.
This discrepancy between the emphasis on the relationism, on the one
hand, and individualism, on the other, can be seen as the basic difference
between two types of ethics, which prevailed in Confucian and Western societies, respectively. The important foundation from which these differences
emerge can be seen in the fact that the former is based on the combination of
reason and feelings, while the latter is mostly connected to rational prescriptions. Besides, relationism is in no way a system that would wholly negate the
individual or the significance of the individual. However, compared to liberalism it does not perceive the individual as primary and superior when compared to society.
Of course, even relationism does not represent the perfect and best possible system of social organization, since it contains numerous errors, dangers,
and problems. Individualism, theoretically based on the equality of all people,
allows—at least on a formal level—a general respect for all people and their
points of view. Relationism, which is hierarchy-based to its very foundations,
could never produce the kind of discourse ethics21 proposed by Habermas. The
second important problem of relationism is evident in its tendency to harmonize individual situations on the basis of pre-existing achievements and values, but also on the basis of existing power relations. Even though relationism
emphasizes flexibility and contextual dynamics, its hierarchical structure is
inherently conservative in the sense that it hardly allows for innovations that
might challenge the framework of existing ideas and social interactions. This
danger is also related to the predominant role of emotions that connect people within the relationalist system and that often constitute an obstacle to the
undisturbed functioning of laws, regulations and sanctions. Thus, it could be
said that relationism’s greatest benefits are also its greatest risks. Moreover,
due to globalization, traditional relationism is disintegrating in China and also
21
Discourse ethics is a theory whose central criterion is discourse (cf. Habermas 1991). This
means that the correctness or rationality of ethical assumptions (prescriptive claims) in
it is tested by means of discourse, which is formed on the basis of rational arguments. Discourse ethics contains a cognitive meta-ethics, since the community of all participants
in the discourse can (ideally) determine what is right. Discourse ethics differs from individualistic ethics in that its results are obtained through the process of intersubjective
interactions. Therefore, it is suitable for solving problems that go beyond the sphere of
the individual, such as problems that arise in politics and the global economy.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
49
in other Sinic societies, and therefore there is a growing need in many East
Asian populations to change the system and adapt it to the conditions of the
contemporary world.
In the context of seeking durable solutions to crises, it is nevertheless
important to note that the basic framework of relationality and its associated values may well offer alternative possibilities or methods and ways of
approaching a model of a more caring society, in the sense of a community
based on an awareness and recognition of our responsibility and obligation to
care for each other, as well as an awareness of our human vulnerability and our
inherent interdependence.
4
Personhood and the Question of Individual Uniqueness
In their historical development, especially since the time of the Enlightenment, traditional European social and political theories were based on the
notion of the individual conceived as an independent subject. In contrast to
such a conception, traditional Chinese Confucian societies were based on an
organic-holistic perception of reality. According to such an understanding,
individuals are conceptualized as organic, living parts of the cosmic whole,
containing in their essence the whole of nature and all social formations. This
way of conceptualizing reality gives the individual a strong sense of identification with everything in the external world. The self-understanding of the
individual in the context of such a conception of reality never proceeds from
the idea of the individual separated from the cosmic and social whole. From a
sociological point of view, the individual “person” forms an organic whole with
his or her narrower (family) and wider (state) social environment. This way of
understanding is, of course, closely related to the forms of concrete social organization in traditional Chinese society, as well as to ideological perceptions
of the corresponding social orders. As we shall see, the conceptualization of
the person in this view of the relationship between the individual and society
differs markedly from that which prevailed in pre-modern Europe and later in
the United States as well.
As we have seen, this organic-universalist view is closely connected to the
relational nature of Confucian social structures, but at the same time to the
concept of self-realization of the individual and the cultivation of personhood
(xiu shen 修身) that leads to it. Self-cultivation is a Confucian concept that represents the process of moral maturation or formation of the individual, which
is based on Confucian deontology and follows a tendency toward moral autonomy. The key to this is the Mencian formation of personhood, since, according
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to Mencius, the mind of each person contains innate, inherent forms of the
“four sprouts of goodness” that atrophy if not developed by the individual
through the process of cultivating their personality.
We might say that the (self-)understanding of the individual within this
organic-universalist model resembles the process that C. G. Jung calls “individuation” (Jung 1976, 301, 402, 433). Individuation is a form of self-realization
in the sense that each person is perceived as a unique, totally exceptional, and
unrepeatable combination of individual qualities that are in themselves universal. The general conditions and the particular elements of each individual
are, moreover, in a mutually complementary relationship.
Jung emphasizes that individuation—as opposed to individualism as a
deliberate emphasis on and praise of the particular qualities of the individual
as opposed to collective aspects and obligations—is a better and more perfect
method of living for individuals within a community. The processes of individuation allow for a more efficient society as a whole because they are based on
the consideration of the particular qualities of the individual, which are not
negated in the process of individuation but, on the contrary, developed and
strengthened. In such a context, individual personalities can by no means be
understood as something alienated from their own essential and constituent
parts, but as a particular amalgamation or combination of those functions and
faculties which in themselves have a universal character. Every human face
has a nose, two eyes, etc., but the form, color, shape, and combination of these
universal factors in every human face are variable, and it is this variability that
makes possible the individual characteristics of a human being. Individuation, then, can only be understood as a psychological developmental process
that produces the individual with certain defining characteristics, or, in other
words, makes each person the very specific being that he/she is. Through such
processes a person does not become an individual in the established sense
of that word, but merely realizes that particular characteristic, which means
that individuation, as mentioned earlier, is as different from egocentrism or
individualism as night is from day. Since the human individual is a living whole
made up only of universal factors, it is also fully embedded in the community and is not in contradiction with it. What is opposed to the individual as
an integral personality is precisely the individualistic emphasis on his or her
particular qualities. In contrast to individuation, individualism manifests itself
through egocentrism and selfishness, which emphasizes the ways in which
a person is different in comparison to everyone else, rather than the ways in
which he or she is connected to their fellow human beings. The goal of individuation is, on the one hand, “nothing less than the liberation of the self from
the false sheaths of persona” and, on the other, the suggestive power of the
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
51
collective unconscious (see, e.g., Jung 1976, 303). Compared to individualism
or collectivism, individuation is a process of working towards a better life. The
latter is understood here as a process of the joint action of all the factors that
determine the relationship between the individual and the community (Jung
1953, 561–3).22
Such individuation-based social structures include Confucian role ethics
and the system of social relationism, which were introduced in the previous
section.
Compared to the Western image of the individual as an independent, isolated Self entering into concrete, separate social relationships, the individual
in the context of Confucian role ethic is defined by the specific relationships
with various people, with whom he or she is connected in different types of
relationships. Each of these relationships requires the individual to behave in
a particular way or normatively prescribes a particular “role” that the individual does not play or act out but lives within the relationship. In such an ethic,
people are identified with a composite of roles that they live because they
cannot abstract their lives from their relationships with their fellow human
beings.23 Such an understanding is prevalent in societies where most people
believe that the community is primary and more important than the individual, since the individuals can only establish themselves through their social
relationships and cannot exist without them.
The role of the individual is viewed similarly by representatives of Western communitarianism. Their critique is directed against the liberalist ethics
of Rawls, which assumes that the primary interests of each person lie in the
shaping, realization, and preservation of his or her personal life plans and
interests. Proponents of communitarianism emphasize that Rawls overlooked
or negated the fact that our selves are defined and established by various interpersonal bonds within the community (e.g., familial, generational, collegial,
etc.) that gradually become a part of our personal identity and would be very
difficult to renounce. This insight led to a position according to which policy
should not be limited to guaranteeing the conditions under which individuals can assert their rights to autonomous choices but should at the same time
preserve and nurture various communal ties that are fundamental to our own
well-being and respect (Bell 2020, 5–6).
22
23
Individuation forms the basis of many forms of Confucian social systems, with the exception of collectivism, which in East Asia general developed only in times of autocratic and
totalitarian regimes.
This understanding derives from process ontology, in which there are no property-bearing
substances and in which all existence is dynamic and relational (Elstein 2015b, 242).
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As an example of this, we can point to Taylor’s critique of liberal individualism. In his influential essay Atomism (1985), Taylor disputes the value of the
liberal position in which people are supposed to be self-sufficient even outside
of a community (Taylor 1985, 295). Here Taylor summarises Aristotle’s famous
critique of individual self-sufficiency (autarkeia), according to which people
are social or political animals because no one can be self-sufficient outside the
polis (ibid., 189).24 So how does the traditional Confucian model of relationism and role ethics differ fundamentally from Western communitarianism? To
answer this question more easily, let us first examine the concept of individuality in more detail.
David Hall and Roger Ames (1998, 25) point out that the concept of individuality has two meanings. The first denotes the concrete, unitary, indivisible
entity which, if it possesses the right properties, can be included in a particular
class. As an element (or member) of a particular species or class, this “individuality” is replaceable and interchangeable. Hannah Arendt describes this
individuality as that which is antithetical to any kind of plurality. This concept
of individuality represents the fundamental level of a human being, as an individual belonging to this category is merely the product of his or her own effort
to survive. As Arendt writes:
To be sure, he too lives in the presence of and together with others, but
this togetherness has none of the distinctive marks of true plurality. It
does not consist in the purposeful combination of different skills and
callings as in the case of workmanship (let alone in the relationships
between unique persons) but exists in the multiplication of specimens
which are fundamentally all alike because they are what they are as mere
living organisms. (Arendt 1998, 212)
This solitude of any living thing struggling to survive is usually overlooked in
Western literature, and the reason for this is to be found in the fact that the
concrete organization of labor, necessary for survival, and the social conditions
which accompany it, require the simultaneous presence of a large number of
24
Of course, such a critique of liberal individualism is overdrawn, since within its theories
individuals are mostly bound to the community and committed—despite their own individual autonomy—to the shared values of individual freedom and diversity. Rawls himself, in the 3rd volume of A Theory of Justice, pointed out the importance of psychological
and social factors, without which the basis for liberal individuals committed to justice
would not even be possible. But such Western debates are not central to the topic of this
text, so we will not explore them in greater detail here.
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
53
people engaged in a particular task. Therefore, it seems as if there would be no
barriers between them (ibid.).
These individuals have no face, no particular, concrete personhood or
identity. And yet it is precisely this concept of interchangeable, unitary individuality that forms the basis for the equality of all before the law, for the establishment of the concept of universal human rights, for equality of opportunity,
and so on. This is the most generalized kind of equality, not pluralistic equality.25 However, as Hall and Ames (1998, 25) point out, it is precisely this kind of
understanding of the individual that provides the basis on which it is possible
to form the ideas of autonomy, equal rights, free will and similar concepts. This
kind of Self belongs in the realm of the one-dimensional empirical Self, or, in
Chinese terminology, in the realm of the “external king (waiwang 外王).”26
Hall and Ames also point out, however, that the notion of individual or individuality can be linked to notions of uniqueness and unrepeatability that are
not linked to membership or affiliation with a particular species or class. What
is at stake here is not the principle of sameness but the principle of axiological
equality. Hall and Ames emphasize that it is precisely such an understanding
of the individual that is the key to a better understanding of the Confucian
conceptualization of personhood.
This may seem somewhat paradoxical at first glance, since the essentialist
(and false) perception of Chinese (and most other Sinic) societies as a collective uniting faceless individuals with no important distinguishing characteristics is very common in the West. But the Confucian view of the individual is
based on the ideal of achieving a morally pure self, formed through the processes of cultivating personhood (xiu shen) and internalizing the Confucian
cardinal virtues. The question that necessarily arises here is whether such a
moral self is universal and whether it allows the space for various individual
particularities. Any detailed analysis, however, quickly reveals that such an
ideal-typical moral self is a category that necessarily includes the diversity and
specific characteristics of the individuals within it. In many works of the original Confucian sources, the diversity of individuals is explicitly defined as a
25
26
This kind of equality is in fact a sameness, which is best expressed in collectivism. Actual
equality in the sense of integral equal valuation of all people is very different from sameness and is only possible on the basis of a pluralistic conceptualization of human beings
in which individuals are by no means all the same. It is also worth pointing out Arendt’s
differentiation between the two concepts (cf. Arendt 1998, 213).
This is the second part of the traditional Chinese distinction between the transcendental
subject and the empirical self (Kupke 2012, 1), which usually manifested itself in the Confucian tradition as the problem of the relation between the “inner sage and the external
ruler (neisheng waiwang 內聖外王).”
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positive and desirable characteristic (see, for example, Chun qiu Zuo zhuan s.d.,
Shao Gong, Shaogong ershi nian, 1; Shen jian, Za yan shang, 17).
These features of the Chinese understanding of the self or personhood are
rooted in the same Chinese philosophy of life on which the pre-Confucian
classic The Book of Changes is based. Within this paradigmatic framework,
everything that exists is diverse and each separate entity is different. This, of
course, also refers to each separate Self, including individuals who have internalized virtues through the cultivation of personhood and are considered
moral Selves. According to Fang Dongmei, this diversity of the Confucian self
is of value in itself (Fang 2004, 259).
We must also be aware of the fact that each of these moral Selves, possessing
unique individualities, is “unrepeatable” in a typically Chinese, i.e., relational,
sense, since what constantly (co-)creates their uniqueness are the relationships and connections they continuously establish with the external world.
As we have already seen in the previous section, relationism is in no way
comparable to collectivism, even though in this system society is at least as
important as the individual. These different ways of conceptualizing the
relationship between “Self” and “society” have important consequences for
understanding how communities function in different cultures and how they
respond to different crises. Empirical studies in cultural and environmental
psychology suggest that the interdependent, relational Self tends to care more
about others and better control their own desires and behavior in favor of collective social benefit (Silova et al. 2021, 3). The independent Self, on the other
hand, is based on the assumption that “the individual comes before society”
and therefore emphasizes individual autonomy and self-preservation. The
independent Self therefore tends to exhibit values and attitudes that undermine collective efforts to solve problems of public interest (ibid.).
Although the independent self has traditionally been a major cornerstone of
Western civilization and further promoted as the key to achieving modernity
from Descartes onward, its era of unthinking valorization may now need to be
brought to a close. To do so, we need to begin to recognize that self-construal
manifests concretely in wider social arrangements and these arrangements, in
turn, constitute the underlying driver of our current social trajectory. As such,
rearticulating western Modernity’s dominant concept of Self (i.e., independent Self) might be necessary to effect a departure from the present catastrophe trajectory and move—collectively—towards sustainability (Komatsu et al
2019, 11).
In the course of studying reactions of different populations to the COVID-19
pandemics, a large-scale comparison by the British polling institute YouGov
(Sachs 2021, 96) also showed that the Sinic population—due to social norms
the Relationship BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
55
and a better scientific understanding of the pandemic—showed a significantly higher willingness to engage in health-preserving behavior than people
in Euro-American regions. Both factors, namely the belief in the importance
and positive function of social norms and the emphasis on critical education,
can also be linked to elementary Confucian values.
In several European and other Western countries, on the other hand, there
have been public protests against even the most basic public health measures,
such as the wearing of face masks, with agitators rejecting the mask requirement in the name of ‘freedom’ (ibid.). However, these people seem to have
forgotten that one of the most elementary principles of classical liberal political theories is that the right to liberty and freedom stops at the limit of potential harm to other people in society. In his famous and highly influential essay,
On Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote, “The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1998, 14).
In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, for instance, Mill would certainly
approve of the government’s request to wear face masks. And so would Confucius: While, as we saw in previous sections, Confucian relationism is in no
way comparable to the so-called “collectivism,” the Confucian Moral Self may
well be compared to a free individual acting in accordance with such elementary liberal values.
Chapter 3
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
As the Italian philosopher and writer Nuccio Ordine points out (2015, 4), the
fundamental problem of the twenty-first century is a humanistic one—we are
trying to get rid of man! And as a counterbalance to a world without man,
Ordine offers an ancient prescription: “Not less, more humanity will save
the world” (Šček 2021, 3). But a world without human beings, guided by an
entrepreneurial and anti-humanist ideology, is also reflected in the contemporary education system, which is the only one that could offer the younger
generations (those on whom this world is actually supposed to be based) not
only knowledge, but also qualitative insight into the meaning of freedom and
autonomy. But of course, the aim of teaching and study programmes is not to
create free people, but to “sell degrees to customers who buy degrees. The logic
of enterprise does not produce cultured citizens, but professional experts for
the labour market” (ibid., 5). The entrepreneurial logic does not need historical memory, nor intellectual exchanges that go beyond the narrow confines of
national and utilitarian economic interests and therefore make a person truly
human. But it is precisely the loss of memory and of the possibility of intercultural dialogues that is a dangerous phenomenon, which sooner or later—
unless we humans decide otherwise—will deal humanism a final, fatal blow.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the greatest contribution of Renaissance
humanism was precisely to rescue Europe’s ancient past from oblivion and to
integrate it into the foundations of the new age and modernity.
However, this book starts from the premise—among other issues—that the
traditional European concept of humanism in its current form is outdated and
therefore can no longer serve as a conceptual basis for modern, technologically and socially highly differentiated and globalized societies. At the threshold of the third millennium, the underlying idea of the autonomous subject,
which took shape in 17th-century Europe in the development of Enlightenment thought, is also outdated; the free will of the individual is no longer
grounded today in the ethical maxims that emerged during the Enlightenment. In the highly differentiated social and technological contexts of modern
societies, these can no longer serve as reliable criteria for the realization of
moral imperatives. This endangers both the moral and political autonomy of
modern man, which also means that traditional humanism—regardless of its
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_005
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
57
concrete orientation or ideological basis—is no longer a suitable discourse
that could provide an axiological framework for human action and the meaning of human existence.
The supposed universality of human rights, grounded in the Enlightenment
conceptualization of the subject based on the notion of universal necessity,
has proven to be unrealistic, porous, and insufficient to deal with the precarious problems of an ecological, political, and social nature that are emerging
in the globalized world in the face of economic, technological, ethical, and
political developments at the end of the second millennium.
On the other hand, the ideas of subjectivity and humanism are among the
central axiological foundations of modernization and constitute an important part of the European heritage of ideas on which the intellectual, legal and
ideological paradigms of modern social systems are still based.
Thus, there is a danger that even those aspects of humanism, autonomy,
and the free subject that have proven to be absolutely positive and progressive
in the course of historical development will be lost in the flood of neoliberal
discourses that, because of the increasing prevalence of the concept of the
subject, all the more easily place the material laws of market development
above the integrity and dignity of man as an individual who, by virtue of his/
her being, is embedded in a social community and in his/her natural environment (Dirlik 2003, 276–7). Both humanism and its underlying autonomy of
the subject are axiological prerequisites for the maintenance, improvement,
and development of egalitarian social systems based on a balanced relationship between humans and nature. Indeed, egalitarian social systems based on
a structure of social justice and ecological awareness are the basic conditions
that make this kind of integrity and quality of human life possible (Böhme
2008, 22–26). Therefore, the concepts that maintain and develop such integrity
and quality need to be revitalized, updated, and adapted to the needs of our
time. In today’s globalised world, they must be placed in a fruitful relational,
dialogical, and dialectical relationship with similar and related heritages of
non-European cultures.
In this context, I will now focus on analyses and interpretations of the traditional Chinese concept of the self and specifically Chinese forms of concepts
of autonomy; on this basis, I will examine the specifics of the various Chinese
models of humanism. Relevant in this context, then, are alternative concepts of
the self or personality that are related or comparable to the European idea of the
subject. These are concepts that do not originate in the European tradition of
ideas but are the result of different but equally fruitful and relevant discourses.
Therefore, in this book, I will highlight the basic parameters that comprise
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specifically Chinese views on the concepts of subject and autonomy, based on
the paradigm of traditional Chinese humanism, i.e., humanness (ren 仁).1
1
Humaneness (ren) and Humanness (ren xing 人性)
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the classical Confucian concept of
humaneness ren, which we have mentioned several times in the previous parts
of this book. As demonstrated earlier, it represents the basis of Confucian ethics and the foundation of the classical Confucian worldview in general. The
character that this word represents is composed of two radicals;2 the first represents a human being and the second the number two, which also indicates
equality-based plurality. Originally, the meaning of the character is related to
humans and plurality; it can be interpreted as a premise according to which
humans can only exist in dual or plural; no individual can exist on his or her
own, no one can survive in isolation from others; everyone is necessarily and
existentially connected to their fellow human beings. No person is an island.
Ren, then, is humaneness, which in its essence is also reciprocity; many refer to
it as the basis of the Confucian version of humanism. Vincent Shen, one of the
best-known contemporary scholars of Confucianism, defines it as
a fundamental concept of Confucianism and of Confucian sociopolitical
ethics. In proposing this concept, Confucius seems to have been responding to conditions of social turmoil. His aim was to revitalize the ancient
social order of the Zhouli by investing it with a transcendental meaning.
Ren can be construed as an ethical virtue, as the summation of all ethical
virtues, and as a universalizing capacity within human nature—a realization of goodness. (Shen 2003, 643)
In Confucian sources, ren is usually described as the reciprocal connection between the Self of the individual and her fellow human beings, which
1 But since we live in a globalized world, it is not surprising that the above-mentioned problems of the “elimination of humans and humanism” from the public sphere are not only manifested in Europe and the so-called West, but also in the conceptual cradle of this Confucian
humanness, namely China and the whole of East Asia.
2 This term is used in sinology to describe the smallest, irreducible elements of Chinese characters, the strokes (or sets of strokes) which cannot be broken down into smaller, simpler
parts; there are, according to most classifications, 214 such radicals, and each of them has a
well-defined meaning, which in most cases also affects the meaning of the whole character
of which it is a part.
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
59
includes both nature and heaven (tian) as symbols of the transcendent dimensions of life. Ren is the manifestation of human subjectivity and “responsibility” in the fundamental sense of being able to respond to one’s fellow human
beings through “sincere moral consciousness” (ibid.). In the Chinese tradition,
this concept was understood as the intersubjective basis of any socially and
ethically meaningful life. Ren was understood as something innate and inherent in the heart-mind of every human being, even though we cannot equate
it with a priori forms, but rather—if we stay with Kant—with the categorical
imperative. According to Confucian Analects, it is something that is inherent
in every human being as such, but can only unfold as moral potential if the
human being consciously chooses it (or acts according to its premises) (cf.
Lunyu s.d., Shu Er, 30).3
In later decades, the term ren became increasingly associated with the term
yi, which contains a number of semantic connotations linked to the tendency
toward and realization of balanced righteousness, appropriateness, and harmonious interaction. In the Confucian classics, dating from around 300 years
BCE and written on bamboo sticks excavated in the Guodian tombs near Jingmen in present-day Hubei province, ren and yi are described as the internal
and external factors that make moral action possible (see Guodian Chumo zhujian s.d., Liu de, 3).4 Thus, they could be said to recall morality and ethics in the
transcultural sense in which the terms are used in this book. However, in the
Confucian Book of Rites humaneness (ren) is the basis from which situational
appropriateness (yi) emerges (Li ji s.d., Li Yun, 29).5 If we also consider the analogy to ethics (as a system of external normative prescriptions) and morality,
then it would have to follow that Confucius believed that morality is the precondition of ethics; the internal comes before the external in this context; only
the internalization or internal awareness of the meaning of morality enables
people to actually (and sincerely) act according to ethical prescriptions.
There is no doubt that these two concepts are closely related, and in Chinese tradition the construct renyi is used as a synonym for Confucian ethics as
such. Ren and yi always act complementarily and complete each other.
The basis on which humaneness is formed, according to Confucius, is the
love or piety of a child towards their parents or elder relatives, xiao (Lunyu s.d.,
Xue’er, 2).6 The concept of filial respect for elders, filial love or piety, certainly
belongs to the realm of virtuous behavior and action in concrete everyday
3
4
5
6
仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。
仁，内也。义，外也。
仁者，義之本也。
孝弟也者，其為仁之本與！
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life. This means that in the original Confucianism, morality is something that
is formed internally in people, based on experiences gained in the external,
empirical world, from the very dispositions of interpersonal relations. Also in
the thought of Mencius, one of the most influential successors of Confucius,
we can thoroughly observe that according to him the concept of humaneness
(ren), as one of the virtues corresponding to the “four sprouts” of goodness,7
is something that most certainly belongs to the innate universal forms of the
human mind,8 while he also considered familial feelings as part (or basis) of
humaneness; Mencius directly asserts in this context that love among relatives
is the expression of humaneness (Mengzi s.d., Ji Xin I, 15).9 Similar to Confucius, then, Mencius also believed that the sense of humaneness springs from
the love of kinship, which can spread outward, similar to a kind of concentric
circles, to one’s community, society, and the state. According to him, the individual is the basis of the family. The family, then, is the basis of the state, which
is the basis of the entire world (ibid., Li Lou I, 5).10
However, according to some later, especially Neo-Confucian interpretations, it is the other way around; humaneness is supposed to be the basis for
filial piety and respect towards parents and other older family members (cf. Li
2017, 59).11 Within the philosophy developed by Neo-Confucians of the Song
dynasty (960–1279), the original relationship between ren and yi was reversed,
as in their view the inherent moral forms of humaneness (ren) enabled the
emergence and development of empirical virtues, such as filial piety or respect
for elders. This view of the relationship between experience and reason, within
which the transcendental forms are primary while the empirical world and the
practice of moral maxims in it are only secondary, was later adopted by the
majority of Modern New Confucians, that is, by the current that established
itself in China on the eve of the twentieth century and developed in the second half of the same, especially in Taiwan and to some extent in Hong Kong.
7
8
9
10
11
Each of the four abovementioned Mencian sprouts is rooted in a feeling. These four feelings, i.e. compassion (ceyinzhi xin 惻隱之心), shame (xiuwuzhi xin 羞惡之心), respect
(cirangzhi xin) 辭讓之心, and the ability to approve and disapprove (shifeizhi xin 是非
之心), may be cultivated into their corresponding virtues of humaneness (ren 仁), rituality (li 禮), harmonious appropriateness or rightness (yi 義), and wisdom (zhi 智) (see
Mengzi s.d., Gongsun Chou I, 6).
Let us remember, for example, the quotation from the previous sub-chapter (Mengzi s.d.,
Ji Xin I, 15), which discusses the inborn moral knowledge that every human is supposed
to possess.
親親，仁也。
天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。
仁為孝之本。
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
61
Numerous contemporary theorists, however, reject this relationship between
empiricism and apriorism and rely on classical Confucianism rather than on
its later reformed forms, which include the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and
Ming dynasties.
Among the latter is Li Zehou, who, however, sees the relation between a priori forms and empirical action differently from most modern theorists. In this
context, for a better understanding of the nature or constitution of humaneness as the inherent form of morality arising from the empirical experience of
love between parents and their children, we will turn again to his philosophy,
since in his theories we find one of the best demonstrations of the differences
between traditional Chinese and post Enlightenment Western philosophy.
According to him, the formation of transcendental forms in human consciousness is closely related to morality, which for him is a product of internal norms.
However, these norms are fundamentally different from the external ones, i.e.,
ethical standards. In this framework, morality is a mental configuration inherent in individual consciousness that influences people’s behavior and actions.
For Li, Kant’s philosophy is the theory of psychology of apriority, since it presupposes that human beings are human by virtue of their internal, i.e., mental,
structures. Li Zehou largely agrees with Kant on this, but diverges from him
at the point where he speaks of the “transformation of the empirical into the
transcendental (jingyan bian xianyan 經驗變先驗, see Li 2016a, 29).”12 For him,
these internal structures are not entirely a priori (in the sense of a fixed and
unchanging innate formation), as they are determined by dynamic social and
historical factors. Therefore, he uses a different, more universal and semantically less determined notion of “capacities of humanness (renxing nengli 人性
能力, see ibid., 87).” In this configuration, morality within human consciousness is part of what he calls “cultural-psychological formation (wenhua xinli
jiegou 文化心理結構, see Li and Liu 2020, 38).” Li explains the reasons for this
reconceptualization through a contrastive analysis of his own theory in comparison with Kant’s transcendental philosophy (Rošker 2020b, 210).
First, he shows that Kant’s practical reason is what every person uses unconsciously (Li 2016a, 89). Kant’s universal laws are rooted in the Self and closely
related to inner free will, i.e., the human intention to perform good deeds.
Within this framework, it is enough to follow universal laws; these automatically put us on the path that leads away from utilitarian tendencies and shows
us how to peacefully accept life and death, overcome the mechanisms of cause
and effect, and transcend the sphere of space and time. Human beings are
12
For an exhaustive explanation of this process in English, see Li 2016b, 1117.
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human precisely because they possess these inner mental structures. Therefore, according to Li Zehou, morality is the substantial root of human existence
(benti cunzai 本體存在, ibid.).
Whereas Kant sees morality as something rooted in the concept of a priori
practical reason, Li sees it as based on the aforementioned capacity of humanness (renxing nengli), which in turn is conditioned by the condensation of
reason (lixing ningju 理性凝聚, see Li 2016b, 1107).13 Unlike Kant’s practical
reason, Li’s concept of pragmatic reason (shiyong lixing 實用理性, see Li 2008)
is not a priori, but arises and develops in accordance with the dynamic and
changing stream of history. So we can say that the difference between Kant
and Li is that the former regards this capacity as a priori reason, which in itself
has no connection with experience. But for Li it is perfectly clear that reason is
also a product of experience, having been formed in the infinitely long process
of human history. Human experience gradually accumulated in the human
mind, in which it solidified, and turned into mental sediments in the form of
human reason. Like inner feelings, however, the mental structures of thought
are products shaped by culture. Even if they appear as something a priori from
the point of view of the individual, they too have been shaped as such in the
process of sedimentation of humanity’s experiences. The basic feature of such
processes lies in the absolute domination of reason over actions arising from
desires and over the desires themselves. Reason thus always controls feelings in
these processes. In the earliest stages of development (for example, in humanoid primates and infants), the process of condensing reason evolves with the
help of external pressures and learning. In such evolutionary learning models,
we must follow certain ethical norms and demands until we reach an inner
moral awareness, bringing moral ideas and feelings into consciousness. In the
context of experiences that arise within a particular concrete space and time,
this capacity of being human is transcendental. Because of its objective and
universal character, on the other hand, it allows us to find within ourselves the
sense of belonging to the human community, independent of the empirical
conditions that shape an individual’s life. This capacity of being human, which
is expressed in the mental structures of all human beings, is a unique value that
is extremely important for the continued existence and further development
13
In Li Zehou’s theory of sedimentation, which is a metaphor for the accumulation of
experience in humans and its transformation into a priori forms, the notion of condensation of reason marks the stage at which accumulated experience “solidifies” into forms
or structures of reason that can then be passed on from one generation to the next. Of
course, such innate forms are not then fixed and unchanging forever, for the process of
human evolution is ongoing and dynamic; in this process any form can be reshaped and
changed.
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
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of the human being, who, because of it, can transcend both space and time, as
well as the mechanisms of cause and effect.
In the Chinese tradition, this process of becoming aware of or incorporating morality was developed by means of self-cultivation, i.e., a method that in
principle enables the individual to reach a higher level of moral perfection.
In this context, an important role is played by the concept of virtuous potential (de 德), which allows a person to transcend the limits of their individual
life. This concept is also a part of the capacity of humanness (renxing nengli);
its great importance lies in its ability to establish the moral spirit, which then
continuously preserves the substance (or roots) of being specifically human.
In this sense, we can compare the capacity of humanness to Kant’s categorical
imperative.
Li Zehou thus held that Kant’s moral philosophy, if only because it reveals
this fundamental feature of human moral practice, cannot in any way be compared to any form of utilitarian or consequentialist ethics based on the idea of
“the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” At the same time,
Li points out that Kant’s categorical imperative can in no way be confused with
external ethical norms or social demands:
Precisely because people, including Kant himself, did not see that which
he named “categorical imperative” as a kind of capacity of humanness in
a sense of a mental formation, but have instead entangled it with external
ethical norms, social orders, discussing both aspects together as if they
were a unity, this model has led to numerous weaknesses of “formalism,”
which is separated from concrete reality. (Li 2016a, 89)14
Again, it is important to see that ethics as a system of external norms is the
product of historical development. Because of differences in time, space, and
environment, ethics (in this external dimension) is always relative. Cultural
anthropology has also confirmed that ethics as a system of external norms
changes according to epoch and social system. Li’s model of history is not relativistic, however, and the same is true of his ethics. Both are absolute for him,
as they contain both the external environment and the internal meaning. In
his view, both the human inwardness and the external norms are the result of
the infinite accumulation and sedimentation of such objective “history.” These
historical processes therefore have far-reaching consequences: The common
14
正因為包括康德本人在內, 都沒有把康德稱之為 “絕對律令” 的道德特 徵看作人
性能力或心理形式, 而把它與外在的倫理規範, 社會秩序糾纏 一起, 混為一談, 便
出現了許多脫離實際的所謂 “形式主義” 的弱點。
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or universal mental formations that emerge in the process of sedimentation
provide the basis for interpersonal empathy, which appears in Confucian traditions as the central Confucian virtue of humaneness (ren).
2
The Deontological Character of Confucian Ethics and the
Foundations of the Confucian Model of Democracy
Similar to Kant, Confucian moral philosophy is admittedly not based on consequentialism, but on a priori assumptions and a kind of categorical imperative,
which in the Chinese tradition is characterized by the term Way of Heaven
(Tian dao 天道). Internalizing the maxims derived from this imperative leads
one to become aware of one’s moral and ethical obligations and, consequently,
to fulfil them. A sound and thorough exposition of the deontological character of Confucian ethics, which is also the basis of specifically Confucian
democracy and Chinese Confucian humanism, can be found in the works of
Lee Ming-huei, who is one of the most internationally renowned exponents of
contemporary Modern Confucianism. This contemporary Taiwanese philosopher is considered one of the most insightful successors of the greatest giant
among the second generation of Modern Confucians, Mou Zongsan.
In his interpretation of Mou’s synthesis of Kant and Confucius Lee Minghuei proceeds from an analysis of a number of criticisms which have come
from the pens of various modern theorists in regard to this connection. Being
deeply aware of the problems that necessarily arise in any kind of crosscultural comparison of different philosophical systems, he understands them
as coming from different philosophical traditions. It is also important to note
that they are written in different languages and based on different conceptual
schemes.
To this end, Lee first introduces Feng Yaoming’s (1989) notion of conceptual
relativism as a suitable tool for mutual or interactive translations of different
philosophical systems, emphasizing its central claim that there are no two
philosophical systems that are absolutely compatible with each other, and that
such systems must therefore always be mutually adapted. Lee, however, sees
Feng’s conceptual relativism as a rather rhetorical concept that is not really
based on any actual content. And similar things can be said, in Lee’s view, for
the whole of Feng’s critique derived from it (Lee 2017, 19).
In grounding his own philosophical work, Lee also proceeds from his own
personal evaluation and development of Mou’s use of the aforementioned
traditional category of inner sage and outer ruler (neisheng waiwang), which
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
65
was part of the latter’s dual ontological structure of immanent transcendence.15
Mou saw this binary category as a tool for distinguishing between the empirical
self and the transcendental subject. Lee Ming-huei extended and reinterpreted
it as part of the Hegelian framework of distinguishing between the concepts of
morals or ethical life on the one hand, and morality16 on the other. While the
latter concept refers to inner values, the former refers to interpersonal ethical
relations.
In this sense, the field called the “external ruler” in Confucianism is comparable to Hegel’s concept of morals or ethical life. For Hegel, morality cannot
end in the Self; it must necessarily extend to include morals, just as the Confucian “inner sage” must extend to include the “external ruler” (Lee 2010, 244).
Lee points out the importance of the latter concept and, building on it,
sketches a new alternative model of modernized Confucian political thought
by attempting to retrieve and improve the theory of the development of
democracy from Confucianism (Lee 1991, 7). In his view, although the Western
system of liberalism provides the central theoretical foundation for democracy, a transculturally enriched communitarian paradigm, such as Confucian
political philosophy could provide, could also contribute in many ways to new,
alternative forms of democracy. In this sense, we can see intellectualized “academic Confucianism” as a kind of second development of traditional Confucianism, which can be understood as a form of Confucian “external rulership”
(Lee 2010, 246). For him, the Confucian spirit is not something that is only
appropriate to traditional Chinese political institutions, as it cannot be fully
realized in any way within them either. From this perspective, the category of
“inner sage and external ruler” can actually be seen as one of the most important, if not the most important, features of Confucianism.
In Lee’s opinion, the concept of the inner sage is much better manifested in
democracy (and science) than in the traditional Chinese political system. Here
he goes a step further and claims that the democratic political system represents the inner demand of Chinese cultural development; this very assumption forms the basis for his thesis that the contemporary transformation of
Confucianism is in its essence a self-transformation (Huang 2003, 157).
All this clearly indicates that Lee did not simply adopt essentialist elements of
Mou’s philosophy but built on them and developed them further. If we analyze
15
16
For a more detailed explanation of this concept, which is of central importance for the
understanding of traditional Chinese philosophy, but is quite controversial from the perspective of Western philosophy, see Rošker 2016b, chapter 6.1.
Sittlichkeit and Moralität.
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Lee’s philosophical system, we can clearly see that his work was not simply a
bulwark for Mou’s theory: therefore, it would be inappropriate to see Lee only
as a successor to Mou in the twenty-first century (Elstein 2021, 498). Rather, the
opposite is true: it is clearly a continuation of Modern Confucianism through a
construction of a new theoretical basis for Chinese Confucian modernization.
For example, David Elstein (ibid.) clearly shows that Lee Ming-huei’s theoretical
work in the field of political philosophy borrows from Mou’s system, but Lee
develops it with his own very innovative model of a modernized Confucianism.
Lee Ming-huei thus builds his political philosophy on the Confucian idea
of personhood, which is rooted in the metaphysical conception of human
being as subject. In this sense, Lee also revalues Kant’s theory by re-examining
both the communitarian and liberal conceptualizations of democracy. Among
other things, this review is closely linked to the idea of Confucianism as an
important segment of Chinese, and partly also of Sinic cultural identity. In his
view, democracy as such, while not necessarily inherent in Confucianism, is
nevertheless indirectly and potentially contained within this system of ideas.
More importantly, it can be seen that Confucian ideals cannot be fully realized in any other way than precisely in democratic social systems. Within this
framework, Lee’s upgrade of Kantian ethics is clearer and more transparent
than that of Mou Zongsan (ibid.).
On the other hand, Lee also emphasizes the transhistorical nature of the
moral self, even as he still distinguishes it from the Western conception of the
isolated, atomistic self. In this context, Lee emphasizes the importance of Confucian humaneness (ren 仁), which he analyzes primarily through how it is situated within the Mencian theory of inherent morality (renyi neizai 仁義內在),
which itself is comparable to Kantian apriorism (see, e.g., Lee 1994, 109; 2018,
37–8). Lee Ming-huei also emphasizes that the basis of interpersonal relations
in Confucianism is always moral subjectivity, which—despite the relational
interdependence of all members in a society—also implies the importance of
the inner moral independence of the individual (Lee 1991, 52).
Lee Ming-huei also explains that both Mencius and Kant similarly criticize
the reduction of ethical premises to the sphere of theoretical reason alone,
which can only effect instrumental rationality and does not contain the meaning of axiological rationality of values. Lee grounds his synthesis of Kant and
Mencius by emphasizing the importance of the moral Self:
If we do not determine norms and values by the moral Self as the ultimate criterion and appeal only to theoretical reason, we are easily guided
by our inclinations or prejudices of which we may not even be aware.
This is the basis of all ideological doctrines. (Lee 1995, 16)
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
67
On this basis Lee also connects Mencius’ supposition about the potential tendencies of goodness that, for him, are present in humanness (renxing xiang
shan),17 with Kant’s concept of free (good) will. In this he sees the central link
between Confucianism and German idealism (Elstein 2015a, 98). Analogously,
it should be possible to in many ways compare the Confucian notion of the
original heart-mind (ben xin) to Kant’s practical reason. In Lee’s view both
philosophies represent a system of moral principles that serve as the basis of
a certain form of democracy, namely the kind that connects moral and political spheres without completely assimilating one with the other. Lee describes
their mutual relationship with the Buddhist phrase, expressing that two entities “are not identical, but also not mutually separate” (Lee 2005, 60).
However, according to Lee there are also differences between Mencius
and Kant. In his view, Mencian ethics surpassed Kant’s practical philosophy
regarding the question of what is required for autonomy. While Kant strictly
differentiated between reason and emotion, Mencius believed that both can
represent a basis for autonomous action. In this regard, Lee points out that
Mencian ethics was also autonomous, in spite of the fact that it also included
emotions. What makes an ethics autonomous is thus not connected to the
question whether its actions arise from rational or emotional motivations.
What is important is that it has to be determined a priori, by universal intentions and without any external influences.
According to Kant, the categorical imperative does not pertain to any purpose, for it is pure law, and hence absolutely formal (Kant 2002, 31 [Ak4:414]).
In Kant’s system, virtues are derivative of the categorical imperative (ibid., 53
[Ak 4:436]). In Mengzi, however, there is no law in the sense of a categorical
imperative. Instead, the work proposes practical actions in accordance with
humaneness and appropriateness. Hence, Mencius’ ethics seems to lack formal
laws. It is clear, on the other hand, that autonomous ethics has to be formal.
Therefore, Lee Ming-huei demonstrates (2018, 56) that even though Mencius
never clearly formulated a categorical imperative in a strict Kantian sense, his
ethics is not based upon hypothetical imperatives, for it is neither guided by
purposes nor by concrete goals. The Mencian goodness is always based upon
moral principles; it is never defined by external issues.
Lee argues that even though the formal principles of Mencius differ from
those of Kant, they still represent a type of formally based ethics of autonomy.
17
According to Lee Ming-huei, we should not understand Mencius’ concept of xing 性 as
human nature, since it does not necessarily contain everything that is typically human.
For Li, this Mencian concept means rather a kind of “rational” or “ideal” nature (Lee 2005,
46–7).
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For Lee, the main difference between the two types of formal ethics lies in
the fact that according to Kant the moral subject had to be strictly free of any
emotions or sentiments, whereas Mencius does not propose such a separation
between reason and sentiment. Lee Ming-huei has convincingly argued that
an autonomy based ethics does not necessarily require an absolute elimination of emotion, for its crucial requirement is that the moral subject has to
be the only and sole determiner of a person’s actions, without being dependent on any kind of external influences (2013, 39). In order to prove this supposition, Lee cites and analyses (2018, 50–51) the famous passage in Mengzi
(s.d., Gongsun Chou I, 6), which describes the unconditioned urge to save a
child who falls into a well, an impulse that is necessarily felt by every human
being who witnesses such a situation. On such grounds there is no condition
that would allow one to formulate a hypothetical imperative. Lee concludes:
“Only a categorical imperative can express this moral demand” (Lee 2018, 52).
Hence, he determines that even though Kant and Mencius perceived the moral
subject in different ways, both of them constructed a system of autonomous
ethics. Such an ethical conception is the basis for democratic politics (Elstein
2015a, 104).
Relational ethics, as we saw above, is deontological ethics. In moral life,
duty is of paramount importance. And even more complicated is the fact that
such a life is full of self-control, for one must overcome (almost) all immediate
instincts and desires. In relational social systems, as we have seen, the individual is not supposed to act as an independent moral agent, separate from his
fellows (Lai 2008, 6). But all this may not be as bad as it seems at first sight.
On the other hand, in relationalism, judgments about the individual are
(almost) never defined in terms of an idealized standard of an independent
Self. In such an understanding of the Self, it is the actual relationships and environments that define individual values, thoughts, motivations, behaviours, and
actions in the first place. Moreover, in relationalism, relationships are always
characterized by multiplicity, mutuality, and complementarity.
Ideally, not even the “unequal positions” that form the core of social ethics
in all Confucian teachings, nor the strict hierarchy in which these positions are
embedded, are as terrible as one is inclined to think. For somehow it is clear,
for example, that the differences between a baby and his parent automatically
lead to unequal positions. Over the course of a lifetime, of course, that position
can change completely. Even though relationism contains unequal positions—
both parties involved in a given relation are complementary and equal to each
other, both in the metaphysical and moral sense, since together they form a
part of the social whole that consists of these interpersonal relations.
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
3
69
Confucian Humanism
Lee Ming-huei believes that Mou Zongsan is a member of the second generation of the Modern Confucian stream of thought who certainly and absolutely
deserves special philosophical attention, particularly with regard to his hermeneutical reconstruction of classical Confucianism (Lee 2017, 14). In Lee’s
view, he was one of the pioneers of intercultural comparative philosophy. In
contrast to the usual way of comparing philosophies from different traditions,
where the process begins in the West and then moves to China, Mou started
with Confucianism and then compared it to Kant (ibid.). This feature also
bears significance regarding the nature of humanism, which lies at the center
of Confucian philosophical discourses (Lee 2013, 14).
In his German book Konfuzianischer Humanismus – Transkulturelle Kontexte (Confucian Humanism – Transcultural Contexts), Lee deals with the question of differences and similarities between the European and Chinese types
of humanism. When dealing with prospects and possibilities of establishing
a new global ethics for the 3rd millennia—an issue, which, among others,
doubtless belongs to the main Modern Confucian endeavors—it is extremely
important to analyze and compare the ontological and axiological positions
prescribed by the different ideational traditions and intellectual histories of
different cultures. Already at the beginning of the “Foreword,” Lee observes
that a discursive translation of the very term “humanism” is anything but an
easy task. As he writes:
The same as the terms “Philosophy” and “Religion,” the term Humanism
has been perceived in China in the course of its confrontation with the
West. However, even in the West, the notion appears relatively late,
namely in a book by Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, which was published in 1808. (Lee 2013, 9)
He also discusses the Chinese notions of renwenzhuyi 人文主義, which gradually prevailed as the most common translation of the Western term humanism,
pointing out that in the Chinese tradition it was primarily used in the function
of one part of a binary category,18 originally possessing the connotation of a
18
Binary categories can be seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional
Chinese philosophy. They represent a kind of duality that seeks to attain the most real
(possible) state of actuality through relativity, expressed in the relation between two
oppositional notions, such as yin-yang 陰陽 (shadow and light), ben-mo 本末 (root and
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complementary opposition to the term tianwenzhuyi 天文主義. This binary
category originally implied the mutually complementary interaction between
the cosmic (tianwen 天文) and the human (renwen 人文) order.19
As already mentioned, Mou regarded Confucianism as a “humanistic religion,” in contrast to his colleague Xu Fuguan, for whom it was without any religious dimensions, but still possessed a humanistic spirit. Xu thus constructed
the development of the entire pre-Qin intellectual history as a process of gradual the “humanization” of primitive religious consciousness that originated in
the Shang Dynasty (ibid.). He even emphasized that “the essence of Confucianism lies in its substituting humanistic spirit for religious consciousness”
(Lee 2017, 36). In principle, Lee agrees with Mou Zongsan’s implicit critique
of such a “headless humanism” (ibid., 37). Lee Ming-huei points out that the
explanatory power of Xu’s model is fairly limited, for it does not offer any clarification of the world and its origin as such.20 This would imply that in Lee’s
view Xu has only dealt with the question of humanism on the level of intellectual history, without taking into consideration the philosophical dimension of
the problem under research. In this context, Lee reproaches Xu with overlooking the fact that throughout the later developmental history of Confucianism
the relation between Heaven and humanity was at the center of interest, not
only as a kind of moral psychology, but also as a philosophical system, which
offered a coherent explanation of the ultimate reality of the cosmos. He thus
emphasizes that such an explanation “goes beyond the scope of any ‘headless
humanism’” (ibid.).
As already mentioned, Lee proceeded from a comparison of such a view of
Confucian humanism with the Western notion, understanding the latter not as
a particular school of thought, but rather as a spiritual orientation that follows
19
20
branches), ti-yong 體用 (substance and function) and so on (see Rošker 2012, 274–5). This
means that every object, every phenomenon can be analyzed in terms of its forms, its
contents or properties through the lens of two opposing ideas or poles (also see Rošker
2019, 337).
In this context, Lee also mentions two other notions that were also sporadically used to
express the Western notion of humanism, i.e. rendaozhuyi 人道主義 and renbenzhuyi 人
本主義. Precisely because renwenzhuyi 人文主義 is originally a part of a binary category,
and not an independent notion, I think that these two terms would be more appropriate.
However, in the Sinophone region the term renwenzhuyi has been well-established for a
long time.
Many contemporary Confucian scholars would not agree with such a harsh view of Xu
Fuguan’s work and his contribution to modern theoretical discourses. Huang Chun-chieh,
for instance, often emphasizes (e.g. Huang 2011, 31) that Xu and Mou followed different
methodological paths, and therefore the results of their respective works are different:
however, there are mutually complementary and can certainly enrich one another.
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
71
human awareness and places the human being at the forefront (Lee 2013, 10).
He points out that in European history it arose twice into the center of cultural, political and ideational concerns: the first time during the Renaissance,
and the second during the epoch of German Humanism, i.e., in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries. Both times it was connected with a certain revival
of Ancient Greek philosophy that on the other side, was seen as a negation of
Christianity, which dominated and prevailed in European thought throughout
the entire medieval period (ibid., 11). Despite this important ideational aspect,
Lee points out that “from a historical view, humanism and Christianity were
not entirely contradicting one another” (ibid.).
Being a representative and simultaneously a surmounter of the European
Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant could, in Lee’s view, not be counted among
representatives of this type of “classical” humanism. However, due to his ideas
of moral autonomy, of human beings as ends in themselves, and of moral religion (ibid., 10), he must be seen as a predecessor of the new, second wave of
this ideational current. And since in the West, as well as in China itself, Confucianism has often been seen as a certain type of humanism (see Huang 2010,
9, 11–12), Lee agrees with his precursor Mou Zongsan that it is precisely Kant’s
philosophy which can provide a solid link between Chinese and European
humanism (ibid., 19).
According to Lee Ming-huei, both systems are rooted in a deontological ethics (Lee 2017, 94), and based on human autonomy and inner freedom. While
Mou Zongsan has never explicitly defined Confucian ethics as one of the deontological type, Lee proves that it is a kind of deontology in several of his writings, especially in his interpretations (e.g., 2013, 21–41; 2017, 95) of the famous
dialogue between Confucius and his disciple Zai Wo (Lunyu s.d., 17.21). He
believes this passage of the Analects shows that Confucius strictly advocated
an ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik), which is a type of deontology (Lee
2017, 96).21
This leads him to the conviction that the role of Confucianism is to represent a constant way and ideals for humankind, but also, on the other hand,
to maintain the ability to be critical of the times and society. Such a critical
foundation is certainly a necessary precondition of any human mind who acts
autonomously. Therefore, Lee’s own philosophy is always tightly linked to the
question of humanism. It is thus by no means coincidental that his work often
21
This view is still controversial. It can easily be misunderstood, especially by Western readers with little knowledge of classical Chinese philosophy (see e.g. Fox 2017). But there are
also some influential contemporary Chinese philosophers who advocated similar views,
even though they have explained them differently (e.g. Li 1994, 469).
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inspires readers to ponder upon the question of what it really means to be
human (Jones 2017, x), and in which way our subjectivity is linked to our past,
present and future. For him, Confucian humanism is not based on any ideology, nor any kind of a state religion (Angle 2016, 218), but rather constitutes “a
main resource for cultural Bildung, that is, for education, formation, and cultivation of self and society” (Lee 2017, 1).
Lee thoroughly shows that contemporary Confucian scholarship has in many
ways surpassed Mou Zongsan’s synthesis of Confucianism and Kant, as we find
a number of innovative aspects in his own theory. Not only has he succeeded
in combining Confucian philosophy with the latest theories of the transformation of apriorism, new models of democratic political systems, and new forms
of transculturally defined humanism; he also illuminates a number of innovative and important elements of such syntheses by developing and establishing
a solid theoretical basis for a new understanding of classical Confucian moral
philosophical discourses. On this basis, he showed that the development of
contemporary systems of ethics cannot be separated from contemporary theories of cultural, political, and social criticism (Angle 2016, 218).
Of course, this innovative character of Lee’s theories is certainly connected—
among other things—with his broad and deep knowledge of German, especially Kantian, philosophy. On the other hand, he devoted himself for a long
time and with great dedication to the study of East Asian, especially Korean,
Confucianism, which gave him insight into a number of new views and methods that he incorporated into his own theories. Dealing with such sources,
however, must always be based on an in-depth and comprehensive knowledge
of Chinese Neo-Confucian thought.
Lee Ming-huei’s reinterpretations of the many such sources and concepts
offer his readership powerful and precise arguments and a number of methodological innovations (ibid., 219). Of particular interest in this framework are
those approaches that draw on the attitude of the Neo-Confucian philosophers
to Mencius, and the synthesis of their theories with many of the central concepts and categories of Kant’s philosophy. Stephen Angle calls these methods
“rooted global philosophy.” Here we should also mention Lee’s important role
as a promoter of European, especially German, sinology, the results of which
are often little known in Anglophone academic circles in the field of Chinese
studies.
Lee is also important as one of the best (if not the very best) explicators
of Mou Zongsan’s “Confucianization” of Kant. This characteristic is certainly
connected to another important contribution of his work, for he is also wellknown for developing a new methodology of hermeneutics, which is rooted
in philosophical creativity (Lee 2017, 24–5) rather than in philological or
Confucian Humanism and Democracy
73
historical research. As such, Lee’s theory surpasses a “comparative science of
philosophy” (Ogrizek 2020, 76), and is—per-se—an independent and critical
philosophy.22
In the last decade or so, several mainland scholars who have also been working on different forms of the Confucian revival have reproached Lee Minghuei for focusing too exclusively on merely academic and theoretical aspects
of Confucianism. However, one of his major endeavours is to open up and
develop a new form of Modern Confucian theoretical research which he calls
“intellectualized Confucianism,” and which would proceed and evolve through
a continuous dialogue with contemporary global philosophy, especially in
the field of ethics. In such a new academic agenda, Confucianism could, in
Lee’s view, “develop a modern system of ethics as well as a theoretical basis
for cultural, political, and social criticism” (ibid., 8). In this sense, Lee’s work
also provides a strong basis and support for Western research into the critical
aspects of Confucian discourses. As Geir Sigurðsson (2017, 131) points out, it is
still widely unknown that practically all types of thinking regarded in the West
as “critical” are also present in Confucianism. On the other hand, it developed
and proposed several types of critical thinking that tend to be neglected by
contemporary Western scholarship.
All these new approaches that we find in the work of Lee Ming-huei and Li
Zehou, but also in the work of many other lesser-known Chinese and Taiwanese theorists, can undoubtedly open up new possibilities for us to construct
new global philosophical ethics, which we currently need more than ever.
Becoming acquainted with and sensitive to other models of understanding
human beings and humanity can serve as a hope for the possibility of establishing a real interpersonal solidarity and interpersonal cooperation that transcends the limits of an essentialist perception of cultures. Therefore, insight
into these models, which is only possible on the basis of free and ideologically unencumbered transcultural exchanges and interactions, should be an
important part of strategies to overcome the manifold crises and challenges
that in all likelihood await us in the near future.
22
However, this does not imply that Lee has completely neglected or even denied the
importance of historical researchers. On the contrary, he takes it into account and applies
it in many of his works, often combining in his methodology the approaches of textualism
and contextualism, for he is fully aware that “we must strive to seek a dynamic balance
between them in order to avoid being either illogical or impractical” (Huang 2013, 4).
Chapter 4
Subjectivity, Control, and Digital Technology
On this basis, let us return to our previous question, that of the alleged absolute obedience and uncritical attitude of the Chinese (and East Asian) people
toward their governments and leaders. This alleged obedience is said to be due
to the autocratic traditions of this region, particularly the common “Confucian” (but actually Ruist) heritage, which supposedly does not allow for critical
thinking or individual freedom (Park 2020, 5). In this typically Western view of
East Asian cultures, the old relics of Orientalism established through a Eurocentric lens are still evident.
We can certainly anticipate relationism as the system which, in its essence,
makes cooperation and solidarity more possible than systems based on the
idea of the atomized and isolated and supposedly “independent” individual.
In this system, cooperation in solidarity can be achieved without autocratic
and paternalistic leadership and without totalitarian systems that would command people to behave in this way while sanctioning other behaviors.1
In the context of reports on the containment of the epidemic in the Sinic
culture, the problem most often highlighted is that of digital control of individuals, based on databases of personal data, which allows rapid and efficient
control of those infected, their appropriate treatment and isolation. These are
measures that cannot be implemented in a similar way in Western societies for
the time being, not only because of the legal requirements for the protection of
personal data, but also because of the corresponding attitudes of their citizens,
who would most likely resist most such actions.
1
Problems of Isolation and Digital Tracking Measures
It turned out that the majority of East Asian people were convinced that society
should achieve freedom for the community as a whole by individuals giving up—
at least in part—their private, individual liberties (Bauer 2020, 8). Byun HyunGyoun, the creator of the South Korean tracking system, asked in this context:
1 The experiences gained in the COVID-19, for instance, have clearly showed that the measures
taken in the more autocratic nations of the Sinic region were less effective than in those that
belong to East Asian liberal democracies. In this context, the most frequently cited countries
in empirical studies and reports are Taiwan and South Korea.
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_006
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What is more important? Preserving the private sphere or preserving life?
In the fight against epidemics, we always have to give up certain freedoms. Germans decided to preserve their private sphere, but then had to
give up the freedom of leaving their apartments. (Byun in Bauer 2020, 9)
The enactment of compulsory “social distancing” and strict isolation measures
was backed up in many European states not only with fines and similar disciplinary measures, but also with restrictions that in some cases came close
to violating the constitutional order. Particularly problematic were such measures that imposed curfews, closed not only inter-state but also local borders
between different regions of the same state, or banned gatherings of large
numbers of people, even if they wanted to exercise the fundamental right
of democratic societies by protesting the political decisions of their governments. Many people were concerned that traditional Enlightenment values—
such as freedom and autonomy—would succumb in this way to the pressures
of new “corona dictatorships,”2 a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly
problematic, especially in some Central and East European countries (Buras
2020). Nonetheless, many Europeans expressed concern about the supposedly autocratic methods of digital control that are spreading in the wake of
anti-pandemic measures in the Sinic regions, but also in many other areas of
Asia and Russia. The above arguments about the “totalitarian nature” of Sinic
societies have been constantly repeated. More than a year after the beginning
of the pandemic, there was still a debate in Western countries about whether
this specific geopolitical region “with a long autocratic tradition” still exerts an
influence on the collectivist spirit of its populations and whether it reinforces
the existing tendency towards obedience and submission to authority.
Top of mind has been whether authoritarian regimes have an edge over
democracies, because they can mandate top-down measures like lockdowns and digital tracking of infected people’s movements and contacts.
Indeed, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi proclaimed “Only in China and
only under the leadership of President Xi can there be such effective measures to put this sudden and fast-spreading epidemic under control.” But
the latest information from Our World in Data, which shows the doubling
rate of cases by country, indicates that the type of regime is less important than it might seem. Both the top and bottom performers in COVID19 containment span the spectrum from autocratic to democratic. It’s
2 This term has been used frequently in the Western media, see, for example, BBC News 2020.
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true that China is effectively flattening the curve, but so is South Korea,
a vibrant democracy. Other democracies—the U.S., Spain, Italy, and
France, are faring less well. (Huang, Sun & Sui 2020)
During the 2020–2022 pandemics, lockdowns were among the most common
disease containment measures in both East and West. But unlike most Western
societies, Sinic—and especially Sinophone—countries also relied heavily on
the mass use of digital applications to combat the pandemic. In various publications, the East Asian authors ask themselves whether COVID-19 might not
be a signal for a general reflection on how we can achieve a balance between
privacy on the one hand and the public sphere on the other (ibid.).3
The emphasis on the protection of privacy in the process of combating the
pandemic, as we were experiencing in the Euro-American area, obviously concerns not only the choices of the populations of Western countries, but also the
relevant legislation, since a number of measures that could be implemented in
East Asia could not be realized in Europe, as they would violate many legal
provisions on the protection of personal data.4 Moreover, in this context, it was
most important to assure the population that such data would be deleted from
digital databases after the end of the pandemic.
Digital control applications, which are part of the pandemic containment
measures in many Sinic countries, usually work as follows: When a particular
person tests positive, their phone number is sent to the local police station,
which sends a digital application to collect all the data about the infected person to the Center for Personal Data Collection. The cell phone data shows the
locations where the person has been in the last few days. The objects in these
places are disinfected by the crisis center staff, who also contact all the people
who have been in these places at these times; they can use bank data from
credit and other payment cards to do this, showing who has paid bills in the
same restaurants and other places as the infected person, or who has used the
3 At the time of pandemics, a number of Western countries have also begun to develop digital
applications that, on the one hand, allow the tracking of contacts, but on the other hand,
preserve the anonymity of users and limit the amount of data collected.
4 In Confucian societies, large databases often contain a combination of data from many different sources, e.g. banks, medical and automotive databases, security cameras, etc., through
the kind of procedures that are strictly forbidden in EU and US countries. On the other hand,
the critical awareness of the population of Euro-American regions on this issue is not much
higher than that of the population of East Asian countries, considering how generous people are when they enter their personal data on the websites of various social networks and
online applications. In most European countries, public health systems also hold data on all
physical and biological characteristics of individuals, as well as digital records of their entire
medical history with diagnoses and treatments.
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same bus routes. In this way, an attempt is made to obtain as complete a list as
possible of people who have been in contact with, or at least near, the infected
person. These people are then contacted by the medical center, which calls
them in for tests and at the same time sends them into self-isolation.
With all the heated discussions around the complex issues of digital control of individuals in times of crisis measures that confront us with moral and
ethical dilemmas about what is more important, human life and safety or individual liberty, it is good to also reflect on how technologies of digital control—
like any other technology—can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. It is the humanities, with their axiological systems, that bear the greatest
responsibility for good outcomes in this context. The only guarantee that digital control technologies will be used in ways that help preserve human life
and, in the long run, also protect fundamental human rights and freedoms, is
firm and stable but also flexible legislation and ethics that protect the values
of interpersonal responsibility, solidarity and cooperation and the basic liberty
and dignity of every person.
2
Interpersonal Responsibility and the Origins of the Social Credit
System
As we saw in the chapter on relationism, the concept of reciprocal responsibility has traditionally been foregrounded in most Confucian cultures as an
ethical framework that encourages individuals to cooperate with their fellow
human beings and institutions for the good of society as a whole. The tendency
to internalize such responsibilities is tied to the specifically Confucian structure
of the relationship between individual and community. It is important to note,
however, that even in the pre-modern period the functioning of the system of
social responsibility was also linked to social control, which was based not only
on the various levels of the state and its legislative and executive institutions
but was rooted even more deeply in the civic communities themselves. Such
control, the concrete manifestations of which we still find in China today in the
form of the notorious digitally controlled “social credit system” (shehui xinyong
tixi 社會信用體系), was already made possible by the traditional power structure based on the model of the family and its hierarchical structures, which
was particularly noticeable in Confucian ideologies.
Not only many Orientalist and Eurocentric theorists, such as the author of
Oriental Despotism (Wittvogel 1957),5 but also those who take in their analy5 The latent but pervasive Orientalism of Karl A. Wittvogel was proven by a critical examination of his work, which clearly showed that many of his theses are invalid and the result of
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ses into account human and cultural, and not just ideological and utilitarian
factors—often warn of the inherent connection between despotism and hierarchical, authority-based structures of familial relationships and corresponding norms (see, e.g., Arendt 1958, 26–27). This is of course true, although we
must additionally point out that even in the broader community defined by
what Hannah Arendt calls the public sphere, which is the social network of
autonomous and free-thinking individuals, relations between individuals
cannot be based on the realization of the principle of equality. Equality can
only be realized at the level of moral or axiological equality, not in the sense
of equal evaluation of deeds, practices and works of individuals. The model of
equality presented in the ideologies of liberal democracies is therefore hypocritical in its essence.
Incidentally, the ideal of privacy or intimacy as a sphere protected from outside interference by other people or society as a whole took shape in Europe
only on the threshold of the eighteenth century as a rebellious reaction against
“what we would today call the conformism inherent in every society” (ibid.,
39). Members of any social order are expected to behave in a certain way,
prescribed by a myriad of different principles and rules that always serve to
“normalize” people and their ways of acting. In this framework, the peculiarity
of the so-called6 pre-modern societies is only that—with the aim of achieving such “normalization”—they tended to establish systems that eliminated
ideological beliefs about the superiority and universality of European standards of social
order. For example, Manuel Sarkisyanz (2000) clearly shows that Wittvogel’s thesis of the
monocausality of hydraulic factors for the formation of a centralist state is unproven. The
same applies to his thesis that terror and tyranny are constitutive elements of what he calls
hydraulic regimes, which are also said to have arisen through the necessary instrumentalization of religions by rulers, and to his notion of the “consumption optimum” of Oriental rulers
and the corresponding exploitation of the people. Sarkisyanz thoroughly demonstrates that
Wittvogel’s misinterpretations result from the absolutization of structural (i.e. systemic-institutional) factors and the simultaneous neglect of cultural determinants as politically relevant elements. For this reason, he overlooked a number of other important factors that were
equally relevant in determining political structures in such societies, such as an efficient limitation of power through moral-ethical norms or politically influential historiographical elements, which included, for example, imaginaries of ethically perfect communities and social
models of the so-called ancient kings, which often led to the establishment of essential elements of welfare states and communities. Wittvogel’s utilitarian approach with exclusively
instrumental-rational categories of analysis has thus proven inadequate and ideologically
suspect.
6 The compound adjective “so-called” is used here because I want to point out that a strict
dividing line between modernity and tradition (or pre-modernity) is a theoretical construct
that merely separates social or historical categories that do not fully correspond to the social
realities they denote.
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or abolished all spontaneous or exceptional individual achievements (ibid.,
40). Modernization, however, can also be defined—having left behind the
semi-feudal structures of the eighteenth century and the class categories of the
nineteenth—by the rise of the so-called “mass society,” in which various social
groups are absorbed into the social whole in much the same way that individuals were absorbed into traditional families. When we read Arendt’s descriptions of such societies, we cannot help but thing of contemporary China:
With the rise of mass society the realm of the social has finally, after
several centuries of development, reached the point where it embraces
and controls all members of a given community equally and with equal
strength. But society equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of
equality in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of
the fact that society has conquered the public realm, and that distinction
and difference have become private matters of the individual. (Ibid., 41)
But even though today’s liberal democracies claim to uphold the perpetuated
Enlightenment principles of autonomy, human dignity, and equality, their
inherent control of the population is not fundamentally different from the pervasive and manifest control described above. The equality of people in social
groups within liberal systems is far from equality among peers. It is more reminiscent of the equality of members of the same household who are largely
subject to the despotic rule of the head of the family, except that in a society
the natural strength of common interest and unanimous opinion is enforced
by the sheer numbers on which the rule of so-called “common interest” and
“unanimous opinion” actually rests. According to Arendt, this last stage in particular is defined precisely by this new form of conformism (ibid., 40).
On the basis of such considerations, it could perhaps be argued that conformism of the individual is latent in liberal societies, while it is manifest in
Sinic societies with a long tradition of combining relationist and Legalist elements. Such conformism, at least in China, has a very long history, tied to traditional mechanisms of social control.
Thus, if we want to understand the manifold manifestations of contemporary social control based on huge databases, as can be observed in China, we
should first briefly look back into history. Against this background, it becomes
clearer how the political and social structures came into being that made it
possible for such control over society to take hold so quickly and unproblematically. It is quite clear that such a shift of control mechanisms from the material
to the virtual sphere is not only related to the development of the technology that made it possible, but is also conditioned by deeper, social-structural
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reasons related to the peculiarities of the historical development of Confucian
cultures and Chinese society in particular.
The control mechanisms that prevailed in traditional Chinese society constituted a system or network of formal and informal control instances, the
basic cell of which was the family and its organization, based on hierarchy and
supported by ideological control functions (Kempter Streib & Streib 1998, 207).
In their pure, ideal-typical form, such forms of strict and all-pervasive control
were based on certain elements of Legalist doctrine, which were integrated
into the new social ideology of Ruism in the course of the first reform of Confucian teachings in the period of Han Dynasty. Later, this “Confucian,” (but in
fact, Ruist), ideology prevailed in China in the form of a state doctrine consisting of a combination of Legalist legislation and Confucian ethical-moral prescriptions or guidelines. Such a normative ideology could function both at the
official formal level and at the informal level of local community structures.
Formal varieties of control are based on legislation and are carried out by
formal institutions at all levels. Informal forms of control are based on morals
and are in the hands of informal social groups within the family, clan, neighborhood, work, and other forms of close communities (shequ 社区)7 in which
people live (Jiang 2013, 28–29). These two forms of control are usually exercised
in the combined form of so-called semi-formal arrangements (ibid.). Research
shows that this system has evolved over centuries in China; studies focusing
on recent history (e.g., the period of the Qing Dynasty or the period of the First
Republic) clearly show that the resolution of civil disputes in pre-modern times
was basically always in the hands of the local community and family members.
Only in cases where these disputes could not be successfully resolved in this
informal way was the matter referred to formal courts. The link between the
formal judicial institutions and social arbitration was formed by persons with
the title of Xiangbao, who had the informal function of ensuring stability in
the local community. These were a type of informal officials who received no
payment for their services but were volunteers upon whom local communities relied on and whose authority was confirmed by official state institutions.
Magistrates took the Xiangbaos and their work very seriously and took all their
information, comments and decisions into account, as they tended to find the
quickest and cheapest solutions to disputes (ibid., 29).
7 In the PRC, the controlling role of these shequ communities was much enhanced after the
so-called “neighborhood community building” in 1954. Their main function was “to ensure
local neighborhood monitoring. They were traditionally made up of “activist” residents, who
were not members of the Communist Party but who demonstrated dynamic support for
maintaining moral and political order in the neighborhood” (Audin 2015, 85).
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Similar to today’s system of social credit, the system of informal control of
Xiangbaos, often supported by groups of street overseers, had an eye on the
morals and behavior of individuals. The two systems also share similar mechanisms of propaganda; throughout Chinese history, the traditional system of
control was always based on state propaganda that monitored popular culture
and influenced it in such a way that it reinforced the current state ideology.
We find demonstrations of such control, for example, in countless instances
of various propagandistic forms of reinforcing the charisma of the ruler that
led to personality cults, in the constant emphasis on the so-called Mandate of
Heaven, in the combination or fusion of laws and popular customs or beliefs,
and in the incorporation of structures of family organization into the function of a controlling authority. Similar mechanisms are found in contemporary
China, where they often serve as the ideational basis of prevailing moral standards and ethical norms.
Similar to the pre-modern era, in which extensions of informal structures,
of which the family was the basic pattern, were evident in the formation of
clans, craft guilds, administrative bodies, and other “informal” institutions, in
modern society the network of controlling instances continues to be formed.
This allowed individuals to adapt to the immediate needs of the existing social
order and to better protect their own interests within it without having to deal
with problems of legal sanctions at every turn. This room for maneuver existed
outside the official rule of the state but was at the same time interwoven with
various moral, emotional and often utilitarian paradigms of relationism.
If we understand this combination or fusion of formal and informal control
mechanisms and instances, it will be easier for us to grasp the fact that in such
a system the power and reach of formal control is inversely proportional to the
extent and influence of informal social control exercised at various levels of
social organization. Certainly, this is true—at least to some degree—of contemporary China and its digital forms of control over individuals. What is most
surprising for Western observers is the fact that the introduction of the social
credit system is supported by the majority of the population at all levels, and
especially by educated people (Kostka 2019, 1565). A recent study conducted in
China by researchers at the Free University (FU) in Berlin found that as many
as 80% of Chinese informants strongly support the social credit system, while
the remaining 19% of respondents are undecided and only 1% oppose it (see
Hui 2019, 6).
The main reason for the establishment and maintenance of such social control has, of course, always been to secure the greatest possible social security
and stability. In assessing its effectiveness, however, it is not enough to consider only those techniques that, for the members of such a society, were based
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on fear of sanctions and submission to authority as a consequence of that fear;
we must also include the patterns of ideological manipulation that can lead to
people’s “voluntary” obedience (Kempter Streib & Streib 1998, 217). In order to
achieve a stable social order, these systems had to develop an interconnected
and multilayered network of ideological control based on the interconnection
or unification of the moral principles and ethical systems that prevailed within
the various social groups and classes. The power of the dynastic order in the
traditional Chinese empire was based on the interplay between official legislation on the one, and the institutions of civil society on the other hand.8
The description of ideological control set out above can provide us with
a useful hypothesis for defining the traditional Chinese (and to some extent
Sinic) pattern of social control. Of central importance is the fact that the degree
of state control is inversely proportional to the degree of informal control operating at different levels of social organization. Social stability is thus made possible in a system by a coherent and multi-layered interaction between state
ideology on the one hand and ethical values of informal social institutions on
the other. This hypothesis assumes that within such a system, the state is constantly striving to maintain the optimal level of stability and is constantly executing and modifying as needed the formal techniques of social control with
which it can adequately supplement the informal systems at any given time
(ibid.). Of course, this interaction works both ways: The greater the extent of
adopting the official ideology by informal systems of social control, the lesser
the need for overt administrative measures and ideological government control.
In Maoist China ideology also played a major role in mass mobilizations,
even if today it seems that it could no longer constitute a single, central instrument for maintaining social stability. And yet we could argue that the “system of social credits” of the digital control type is a form of technology that is
not only ideology-based but is itself a type of ideology. This system, which the
National Development and Reform Commission (Guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuan hui) has been preparing since 2014 and which has been in use throughout China since 2020, is closely related to axiological systems based on ruling
ideologies that emphasize the vital importance of social stability and patriotism. It is a digital system of all-encompassing control that employs the latest
8 One of the main reasons for the downfall of the dynastic monarchy was precisely the
breakdown of the stable equilibrium between the state and social institutions, caused by
the explosive (exponential) growth of the population on the one hand and the intrusion of
colonial powers and their capital on the other. In the nineteenth century, these two factors,
together with other related influences, led to a disintegration of the traditional forms of clan
and village communities or organizations that had contributed to the maintenance of such a
structural social equilibrium.
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technologies, including facial recognition and even technology that recognizes
the peculiarities of individual motor skills. It aims to assess the creditworthiness, reliability, and performance of individual citizens by ranking and evaluating their “moral integrity,” which is manifested in various behaviors, from the
frequency of visits to parents to trustworthiness, work habits, and adherence
to traffic rules. Moreover, the consequences of such evaluations are revealed in
the concrete punishments and rewards of the observed individual.
Surely digital technologies are about much more than merely a set of algorithms. Their attachment to ideologies is inherent, as the production and development of these technologies is predicated on the assumption that a selection
of digital systems, shaped by a small technical elite, can over time take on a
life of their own to the point where they not only complement but displace
humans. This assumed ability to displace human judgement through systems
created and implemented by a small technical or theoretical elite distanced
from real-world interactions is what links these contemporary ideologies to
the surviving ideological relicts of the so-called real socialism and its centrally
planned production. “ It is thus not all that surprising that the Chinese Communist Party would find AI to be a welcome technological formulation of its
own ideology” (Lanier & Weyl 2020).
However, it is somewhat more surprising that, at first glance, leading Western technology companies and governments have been quick to adopt a number of similar ideologies that relate to artificial intelligence as such. One of the
reasons for the rapid spread of such technologies is perhaps the loss of faith
in the institutions of liberal democracy, which—despite everything—are supposed to be based on the values of human freedom and dignity, and not just on
the worths of capital and profit. It is therefore no coincidence that today the
richest companies, individuals and regions are precisely those closest to the
most powerful computers for data collection. In this context, artificial intelligence may point to the death of the pluralistic visions of traditional liberal
democratic marketing (ibid.). It is increasingly clear that we need to rethink
profoundly and ask ourselves once again what role technology plays—and
should play—in people’s lives.
Moreover, the pandemic COVID-19 has clearly shown us that digital technologies and large databases can also be used autonomously and liberatingly, and
not only as a tool of all-pervasive centralist control, as China is striving for with
its system of social credits.
A very telling example of such a change in mentality and the function of
technology can be found in Taiwan. Almost half of the population on this
island voluntarily joined the state’s platform for organizing and sharing data
even before the pandemic began, allowing citizens to autonomously organize
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the use of data and demand services in exchange for it, to participate thoughtfully in public decision-making, and to vote in innovative ways on numerous
state issues.
Driven neither by pseudo-capitalism based on barter nor by state planning, Taiwan’s citizens have built a culture of agency over their technologies through civic participation and collective organization, something
we are starting to see emerge in Europe and the US through movements
like data cooperatives. (Ibid.)9
The third millennium, which has just begun and which will also witness the
accelerating trends of global warming, the deepening of the gap between rich
and poor, numerous wars, and a new pandemic, will be marked by the development of digital technologies. In the following chapters of this book, which
aims to explore the possibilities of global ethics from a transcultural perspective, we will therefore examine specific and particular features of traditional
Chinese perceptions of the functions and possibilities of technology as such,
as well as their ideational foundations, which certainly influence specific Confucian perceptions of digital objects.
This will, I hope, give us a better understanding of the cultural conditionality of differences and similarities in the global processes of digitalization and
their ontological foundations, so that we can pay more attention to both the
dangers and the opportunities that may be given to us in this area through
cross-cultural interactions. Let us first consider the actual relationship between
humans and digital technology from the perspective of intellectual history.
3
Digital Technologies as a New Universalism
The philosophy of technology, which began its systematic development in
Europe only on the threshold of the nineteenth century, opened up many
a hitherto unexplored question. Two centuries earlier, however, Descartes
had raised the questions of a philosophy of mechanics and established a
9 The tools which are derived from this approach have played a key role in the success of
Taiwan in controlling COVID-19, which is exceptional not only in Asia, but also globally. In
the initial phase, i.e. in the first two years of the pandemic there have on the island, which
has a population of more than 20 million, only some 600 cases of reported infections, even
though Taiwan is located right next to China, which in the first wave saw a huge number of
infections.
Subjectivity, Control, and Digital Technology
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mechanistic worldview, which also found its socio-political expression in
Hobbes’ Leviathan. Enlightenment philosophy emphasized that the mechanistic worldview was too deterministic and thus contradicted human freedom
a priori. On the other hand, it was Enlightenment philosophy that emphasized
the value of human reason and thus of science and technology. This dual function of technology, that it liberates people on the one hand and determines
them on the other, has—together with all the contradictions that followed
from it—defined classical philosophy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, until these contradictions were transferred to a higher, much
more complex level, where technology was no longer just a tool that is the
extension or externalization of human hands, limbs, and organs, but had
become something that also serves as an externalization of the human mind.10
Just as technology at the first, basic level had in many ways replaced the work
of physical limbs and organs, this new meta-technology explosively developed
and replaced certain aspects of the work of the human brain.
It is therefore no coincidence that the development and use of digital
technology and artificial intelligence have been closely linked to questions of
human freedom and autonomy from the very beginning.
The digitalization of the human world also brings with it the necessity for
each of us to be confronted with digital objects whose understanding requires
a redefinition, or at least a conceptual modification, of the ontology and ontological perception of reality. This problem is linked to the new, transculturally
grounded definition of technology. This is all the more important because of
the widening gap between the development of technology on the one hand
and its humanistic interpretation and evaluation on the other. Since the European Enlightenment movement, it has been stipulated that the humanities
and reason-based humanistic thinking should be the foundation of technology
(Hui 2017, 20). This has changed dramatically over the last century and many
now speak of the end of the elementary foundations of the humanities, that is,
the dissolution of Enlightenment thinking and its corresponding values (see,
for example, Kissinger 2018). Even with the use of the World Wide Web, we are
more focused on acquiring and directly using information than on contextualizing and conceptualizing it. The importance of data has long outgrown what
10
Of course, technology has always served as a means of transmitting and preserving certain
aspects of the human mind, for example memories and logical reasoning (see Li Zehou
2016), or even meaning as such (see, for example, Stiegler 2013; Lyotard 1991, 47). However, the difference between classical and information technologies lies precisely in the
original ontological insubstantiality of the latter, which means that we cannot encounter
them directly in a physical way, but exclusively in a way that belongs only to our minds.
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we often call wisdom. Action based on the use and sharing of data therefore
prevents or hinders any kind of introspection and reflection. Thus, in the process of confronting and interacting with data, the human self as an object of
one’s reflective consciousness gradually disappears.11 All this affects the gradual disappearance of “the strength required to develop and sustain convictions
that can be implemented only by traveling a lonely road, which is the essence
of creativity” (Kissinger 2018, 4). The place of reflection, which is the necessary
precondition of human autonomy, is being eroded even by the very demand
for speed, which is ubiquitous in the digital age with the use of the Internet
and its associated applications.
On the other hand, of course, we must not forget that these very possibilities also offer a number of valuable and entirely new prospects, which are
evident, among other things, in the development of artificial intelligence.
Although the term is somewhat misleading,12 the development of such technology opens up to us unimagined possibilities for solving numerous burning problems in the fields of medicine, ecology, sustainable development,
etc. However, Kissinger (ibid., 9) sees artificial intelligence as a threat to the
axiological development of humanity, since the development of artificial
intelligence also raises the prospect of transformations or changes in values that are decoupled by its influences and oriented only to mechanistic
assumptions of effectiveness, speed, the achievement of linear goals and
victories and superiority. Such consequentialist or even radical utilitarianism may, in his view, pose problems that are deeper and more complex than
they first appear, since they are not limited to individuals:
Through all human history, civilizations have created ways to explain the
world around them—in the Middle Ages, religion; in the Enlightenment,
reason; in the 19th century, history; in the 20th century, ideology. The most
difficult yet important question about the world into which we are headed
is this: What will become of human consciousness if its own explanatory
power is surpassed by AI, and societies are no longer able to interpret the
world they inhabit in terms that are meaningful to them? (Ibid.)
11
12
Henry Kissinger (2018, 4) therefore believes that many technophiles use the World Wide
Web all the time precisely to escape the loneliness that scares them.
Artificial intelligence is based on the structural dynamics of algorithms, which, of course,
far surpass the cognitive abilities of humans in their abilities to solve rational problems,
memorize, and compute; but, on the other hand, we cannot reduce human thought to
rational-mathematical operations that lead only to instrumental reason. “Artificial intelligence” is not intelligent precisely because it lacks the above-mentioned abilities of contextualization and conceptualization.
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Of course, many other questions arise here, such as who would be responsible in
this case for the possible errors of machines in the digitalized world, or whether
humans will even still be able to establish legislation that could order the activities of an artificial intelligence that far surpasses human intelligence in a rational sense. In attempting to solve these problems in the context of an artificial
intelligence that is based in its essence exclusively on an infinitely accelerated
sequence of selection of the best possibilities, there will no longer be room for
an ethics that places quality above quantity and meaning above linear progress.
Returning now to the question of the role and place of Enlightenment values based on the autonomy of the human self and its freedom and the responsibility that goes with it, we can note an interesting contrast: The technology
that gave rise to the World Wide Web, the digitalization of the world, and artificial intelligence is rooted in the Enlightenment and in the emphasis on human
reason that this very movement brought to the fore in the 17th and 18th centuries, overcoming the dogmatism of the scholastic conception of religion as
the bearer of the one single truth. On the other hand, this technology negated
the philosophy from which it emerged, and which cannot be reduced to mere
instrumental rationality.
We could argue that the values of the Enlightenment are in a kind of dialectical relationship with the technology that created them, since through it
they ultimately negate themselves (Hui 2019, 3). On the other hand, we must
not forget that it was precisely technology that made the universalization of
Enlightenment values possible, among other things, through the process of
colonization: “In this way, Enlightenment thinking led us down a long road to
globalization all the while being defeated by its own negation” (ibid.). Many
critical contemporaries see this as one of the most important starting points
for the intellectually and historically grounded appreciation of the postcolonial
critique of the West. For example, the theorist Yuk Hui from Hong Kong first
views the relationship between technology and the Enlightenment through
the prism of this universal power of new technologies, which, in his view, have
become the basis of the Enlightenment’s most important projects: “As technology assumes and even performs the role of Enlightenment thinking, the
medium ceases to be the carrier of meaning and instead becomes meaning
itself” (ibid.). In his view, modern technology, which initially represented only
the supporting structure of Enlightenment thought, has now itself become its
new main philosophy. Therefore, in his opinion, the Enlightenment is far from
complete. Nevertheless, we should point out once again that the philosophy of
the Enlightenment, despite all its enthusiasm for science (or precisely because
of it), was from the outset not merely a form of instrumental rationalism, but
focused on the human subject with the right and duty to decide about him- or
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herself and the world, a subject who is incalculable and thus free and responsible. If one follows the current of Hui’s thought, then, one can only partially
agree, because what the development of today’s technologies for the digitalization of the world and artificial intelligence is based on is not a substantively
defined and axiological core of the Enlightenment, but at best a formal methodology on which such a core is built—no matter how dynamic and explosive
these developments are.
Of course, it is true that Sinic societies far surpass others in terms of digital
innovation as well as automation in this day and age. But we should not forget that automation based on artificial intelligence is very different from automation of classical machines: The latter represents the automation of tools or
means of production. In this process, the goals of production were achieved
more quickly through the rationalization or mechanization of the tools used
to realize these purposes. Automation brought about by artificial intelligence
represents the automation of the very purposes or goals of the production processes. Artificial intelligence automates the goals of what it produces because
it always sets those goals for itself. For this very reason, its internal structure
is unstable. Its systems always operate in a continuous flow of their own
operations, in which they are always acquiring and simultaneously analyzing
new data, on the basis of which they then improve themselves. In these processes, artificial intelligence acquires numerous capabilities that we previously
believed were reserved for humans alone.
Despite the technological advantages of Sinic societies, however, we must
not forget that the very spread and universalization of technology and the
corresponding scientific method that made these advantages possible were
the result of a specifically Western form of modernization, which as such is
itself a kind of by-product of the ideas and movements of the Enlightenment.
For this reason, all the examples of modernization the world has seen have
been carried out according to the standards, rhythms, and metrics defined by
Euro-American history. This synchronization led to loss of orientation and relativization of cultures, identities and values. This, of course, is the ideal foundation for the rise of new fascisms, xenophobias, and racisms that we have
discussed in previous chapters of this book. Such reactionary ideologies and
doctrines of domination can, at first glance, offer suitable answers to the problems this kind of confusion raises, and in the unclear and turbulent oceans
of disorientation,13 they can offer seemingly safe havens of cultural identities
13
This is what Yuk Han is talking about with the pun “dis-orientation,” which for him means
on the one hand loss of orientation, and on the other hand the exclusion of the “Orient”
from the prevailing political ideologies of the “Occident” (e.g. Dunker 2020, 3).
Subjectivity, Control, and Digital Technology
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and new technological aesthetics (Hui 2019, 7). These are very attractive to the
lost, meaning-deprived, and alienated consumer of today’s world and its digitized technologies.
For this reason, and also because artificial intelligence will most likely play
an extremely important role in the future of humanity, it is all the more important that we begin to think about it differently and no longer consider it merely
as a kind of tool whose value is purely utilitarian. It is high time that we begin
to question the ontological foundations of digital technology and the virtual
reality that comes with it. Only in this way can we as human beings preserve
the foundations of mature autonomy, responsibility and freedom of choice.
This is, of course, one of the fundamental tasks of the global philosophy of the
third millennium. To achieve this, we will certainly have to rewrite the history
of human reason and its ties to the development of technology. New reflections on the various cultural histories can also help us a great deal, as they
confront us with the different methods of technological thought.
The dynamic image of different cultural-linguistic traditions is one in which
there is no place for cultural essentialisms or for static individual or group identities based on cultural substances. This image shows only that we humans
are formed in different but always concrete symbolic and linguistic worlds. On
such foundations we have produced throughout history a number of different
forms of knowledge, linked to the world and the earth in different ways and
through diverse, specific, multi-faceted relationships that cannot be measured
solely by the criteria of the linear progress of modern science and technology.
Only an understanding of the existence of such heterogeneity (as opposed to
the isolated contributions of individual “nations” and “cultures”) will allow us
to resolve the tensions between increasingly isolated social groups. This heterogeneity also includes the ontological dimension of the connection between
human existence and the various techniques of producing and reproducing
the conditions that define that existence. In this book I refer to this dimension of the human being and his or her relation to the artificially formed environment as cosmotechnology. Yuk Hui also derives his position from a similar,
culturally differentiated consideration of the relationship between humans
and technology, and in this context emphasizes that “rediscovering multiple
cosmotechnics is not to refuse artificial intelligence or machine learning, but
to reappropriate modern technology, to give other frames to the enframing
(Gestell) at the core of modern technology” (ibid., 8).
Reflections to which we have been forced by the global COVID-19 pandemic
can thus give us—by seeking global solutions within the particularity of the
multiple relations between nature and culture, technology and reality—new
answers to the questions of crisis as danger and as hope. Our next step will
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therefore be to focus on the question of different culturally conditioned cosmotechnologies and their impact on our attitude towards the world we live in.
The initial question here is whether there are indeed differences in the perception of digital control between Euro-American and Sinic space. This question
is related not only to the different socio-political systems in the regions under
study, but also to the general attitude of the people living there towards technologies as such and, in particular, towards digital technology and its possibilities
of overcoming human life, including the possibilities of controlling the individual and society. In order to answer such questions, we will first take a closer look
at the specifics of classical Chinese cosmotechnology, which—similar to other
forms of the relationship between humans and technology—certainly influences the attitudes of the contemporary population towards digital reality. We
will then attempt to place this specific cosmotechnology within the framework
of Western theories of the ontology of digital objects (namely schemas and systems of data and metadata). We will also compare these ontological theories
of technological plurality and diversity14 with the traditional Chinese model
of related structural and insubstantial onto-epistemology posited by Zhang
Dongsun, whose theory is based on the classical Chinese and Chan-Buddhist
foundations of understanding the world and reality.
4
Cosmotechnology in the Mirror of Technological Plurality
The term cosmotechnics was first used by Gilbert Simondon in his 1965 article
Culture et technique, which was later (2014) included in his book entitled Sur la
technique. However, Simondon only examined this term in the narrow context
of the development of European technology.
Thus, Yuk Hui attempts to develop and upgrade it through the prism of the
ontological plurality of the relationship between technology, man, and nature,
starting from the conceptualization of technology within the Chinese tradition of thought. In the following, I will critically present Hui’s theory and try to
use it as one of the methodological tools to make clear the differences between
various culturally conditioned perceptions of digital technologies.
14
Yuk Hui believes that understanding different culturally conditioned forms of cosmotechnology (or, as he himself calls them, cosmotechnics) is important because it can prevent a universalistic equalization of ideas (or ideologies) about the role and manner of
interaction between humans and technology. Such a paradigm of exploring the relationship between humans and technology, based on a culturally diverse approach, is called
technodiversity; it is an understanding based on technological diversity that allows for
multi-layered and pluralistic starting points for the study of such relationships.
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Here I will speak—in contrast to Hui—of cosmotechnology as a systemic
umbrella field and not only of individual cosmotechnics, since Hui, in my opinion, names this key term on the basis of a misunderstood difference between
these two concepts. Hui writes in the introductory remarks to his work The
Question Concerning Technology in China – An Essay in Cosmotechnics:
I make a distinction between the use of the words technics, techne, and
technology: technics refers to the general category of all forms of making
and practice; techne refers to the Greek conception of it, which Heidegger
understands as poiesis or bringing forth; and technology refers to a radical turn which took place during European modernity, and developed
in the direction of ever-increasing automation, leading consequently to
what Heidegger calls the Gestell. (Hui 2016, 4)
However, I cannot agree with such a definition of technology. The word is
used in most Indo-European languages in the sense of a scientific discipline
whose object is techniques (or technics), and not in the sense in which the
Hui understand it. Technology derives from the Greek words téchne and
lógos. While the former refers to techniques in the sense described by Hui,
logos means reason or logic. When used as an affix-logy, it always means the
field, discipline, or science of whatever comes before it as a suffix. Technology, then, is the systematic theory of techniques, not a “radical turn” of techniques that happened in the process of Western modernization.15
Yuk Hui attempts to position the concept of cosmotechnics within the theoretical explanation of the relationship between humans, nature (or the external world) and technology. The concept also definitely represents a theory, not
simply a category. This is true of both his concrete theoretical analyses and
to technological systems, such as the system of traditional Chinese medicine
(cf. Hui 2016, 18), which Hui highlights as one of the most typical examples
15
Yuk Hui was probably misled here by a bad or misleading translation of this word into
Chinese. Many dictionaries use the term jishu 技術 for both techniques (or engineering) and technology. In some other dictionaries, the word jishu 技術 is used to translate
techniques, while the translation for technology is keiji 科技. However, from the point of
view of the generally accepted convention of translating words ending in the affix “-logy,”
which translates the affix with the characters lun 論 (for example, renshilun 認識論 for
epistemology, cunyoulun 存有論 or bentilun 本體論 for ontology) or xue 學 (for example, xianxiangxue 現象學 for phenomenology or xinlixue 心理學 for psychology), the
term should rather be translated into Chinese as jishulun 技術論 or jishuxue 技術學.
In this case, Yuk Hui—as well as many other Chinese theorists—would find it easier to
understand it correctly.
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of Chinese cosmotechnics. One cannot simply speak of Chinese medicine as
a specific technique, as it is always also a set of interconnected techniques,
methods, and specific approaches to the human body and disease based on a
specific cosmology. Therefore, Chinese medicine is a kind of cosmotechnology
and not simply a kind of cosmotechnics.
Cosmotechnology, then, is a system based on the combination of the cosmic
and moral (or axiological) order in the acts of practicing and passing on techniques. In the history of humankind, many different systems of understanding or explaining the cosmos have evolved, as have many different techniques.
Therefore, there cannot be only one cosmotechnology (namely, the European
one), for there exist as many individual cosmotechnologies as there are symbolic orders of perceiving and understanding the cosmos. These orders are, of
course, culturally and linguistically conditioned. And, of course, the process
of applying techniques and designing their products is, as such, universal. The
question of the relationship between universality and the (culturally conditioned) particularity of techniques has long agitated the minds of innumerable
philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, linguists and scholars of social
sciences. In this framework, it is worth mentioning the French archeologist
and anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, who established the notion of technical tendencies arising from the relationship between the two. In his book
Environment and Techniques (Milieu et techniques, 1945), he tried to present
this relationship within the framework of the general theory of dynamic interactions, in which human communities behave as a kind of complete organisms
living in the environment defined by external (geography, climate) and internal (culture, tradition) factors. He named the natural and social environment
with the terms external and internal milieu (Leroi-Gourhan 1945, 333). In this
framework, the concept of technical tendencies represented a movement or
tendency that forms within the inner milieu and becomes the primary factor
influencing the functioning of the community in its natural environment.
Contemporary Chinese theorists have also devoted much attention to determining the relationship between the universal and culturally conditioned factors. One of the most important representatives of philosophical anthropology
is Li Zehou, who considered techniques, in the sense of the making and systematic application of tools (as well as the intergenerational transmission of
the corresponding techniques), as the basis of becoming human, and thus as
the decisive characteristic that distinguishes humans from (other) animals. Li
explained this connection with the concept of sedimentation (jidian 積澱),
which he used to describe the gradual accumulation of knowledge and experience in the human mind through millennia of evolutionary development (cf.
Li 2016a). For him, the process of sedimentation is divided into three levels:
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The most basic he calls the “sedimentation of the species (wuzhong jidian 物
種積澱),” which contains all the universal forms inherent in all human beings.
The second level is that of “cultural sedimentation (wenhua jidian 文化積澱),”
which consists of the specific forms of thought and linguistic and behavioral
patterns and techniques peculiar to people living in the same cultural environment. The third and highest level (as well as the narrowest, since this scheme
has a pyramidal structure) is that of “individual sedimentation (geti jidian 個
體積澱),” which co-creates our intimate value systems or worldviews, feelings,
habits, and specific forms of thinking and feeling about people as individuals
(Rošker 2018a, 33).
Technology as such, however, has evolved in the processes of producing
everything necessary for man’s existence and sustenance. Many theorists
believe that tools are extensions of human limbs or organs, and thus Li Zehou
speaks of human beings as beings for whom tools or techniques are a “universal necessity,” since humans represent “supra-biological beings” who could not
survive without all these extensions of their bodies (ibid., 28). Further similarities between the philosophical anthropology of Leroi-Gourhan and Li Zehou
can also be found in the fact that both see technology as a form of externalization of human memory (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 219 ff.; Li & Cauvel 2006, 3).
The culturally defined dimensions of technology are thus at the forefront of
the conceptualization of different cosmotechnologies as different externalizations of memory. This is the search for a new frame of reference for technology,
a new framing of its interpretations that will transcend both the ancient Greek
concept of techné (including its connotation of creation or poiesis) and Heidegger’s concept of the Gestell, which for him marked the essence of modern
technology (Heidegger 2000, 21). On the other hand, as a Sinologist, I will focus
on Chinese cosmotechnology. Within this framework, Yuk Hui has set himself
the task of systematically examining the ancient concepts of dao (the Way,
method, original principle) and qi (vessel, accessory, tool, device).16 This pair
of terms appears for the first time in the history of written Chinese together in
the ancient Book of Changes (Zhou Yi), where it is described as follows: “What
is above the forms we call method (dao), what is below them we call tool (qi).”17
16
17
In the oldest Chinese etymological dictionary, the Shuowen jiezi 说文解字 (Descriptions
of Writings and Explanations of Words), the word qi 器 is defined as a vessel. The vessel
had the meaning of the most basic tool, as it was used to store food, thus ensuring the
survival of communities even in times of crop failure and similar crises. In the Shuowen,
it is therefore described as something valuable, as it was a tool of such vital and elemental importance that it was guarded by dogs 器：皿也。象器之口，犬所以守之
(Shuowen jiezi s.d., 1436).
形而上者谓之道，形而下者谓之器。
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In the quest for Chinese cosmotechnology, then, Hui’s starting point is certainly correct and sensible, but his interpretation of this pair of terms and their
meaning is problematic, as he sees in them a kind of Cartesian dualism (Hui
2018, 2), which is certainly not true. Indeed, these two opposite poles have the
typical form of a binary category, which does not operate according to the principle of contradiction but rather to that of mutual complementarity.18 Even
though we have already explored the two models of dialectical oppositions
in the earlier parts of this book, I would like to reiterate here the theoretical
foundations of this distinction, since in this context it is situated in the concrete example of understanding the relationship between the basic principles
of human existence and technology. In this context, it is even more important
for understanding the given criticism of Hui’s theory.
Both cases represent a form or theoretical model of binarity in the sense of
a relation between two opposite poles. In Cartesian dualism, the two opposing poles stand in a mutually exclusive relationship, i.e., they are not only
opposed to each other, but are in mutual contradiction, which is best seen
in the construction of Hegel’s dialectic, within which they are usually interpreted as thesis and antithesis. Both dualism and the dialectic derived from
it are only possible on the basis of a static and unchanging understanding of
being, as formed within the paradigm of Parmenides, which at the same time
allows for the development of the basic principles of formal logic in terms of
the laws of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle. In the model of
complementarity-based dialectics, the opposite poles are in mutual opposition, existentially defined by codependency and at the same time enabling
their mutual completion. In this model, the opposing poles constitute two
sides of the same coin; their difference and mutual delimitation is the basic
condition for the existence of the whole of which they are essential parts. It is
also important to note at this point that this model does not produce a qualitatively separate synthesis of the two opposing poles that could exist as an
independent new entity, since synthesis is constantly present precisely in the
interaction between the two. Since this is a typical model based on process
philosophy, formal logic has no valid basis within its framework.
This has far-reaching consequences for understanding the specifically
Chinese relationship between technology and nature, and thus for the
Chinese system of cosmotechnology and science itself. The comparison
between the terms dao and qi and the ancient Greek terms techné and areté
is particularly problematic. While dao is said to be the superior and primary
18
For a detailed explanation of the differences between Cartesian dualisms and the model
of binary categories, see Rošker 2021a, 48ff.
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factor compared to qi, the ancient Greek worldview is said to be more instrumental and (at least from Aristotle onwards) to place more emphasis on the
importance of the means to achieve goals (Hui 2016, 89). The latter claim,
referring to ancient Greek philosophy, is undoubtedly correct, and in what
it describes we can observe the essence of what later, in the last two centuries of the previous millennium, shows itself to be the basis for Western-type
modernization, namely instrumental reason. Hannah Arendt therefore also
sees the origins of this in the tendencies that determined the development
of the ancient Greek relationship between action and production or manufacture, within which the first—already in Plato’s theories—was gradually
but consistently transformed into the second:
How persistent and successful the transformation of action into a mode
of making has been is easily attested by the whole terminology of political theory and political thought, which indeed makes it almost impossible to discuss these matters without using the category of means and
ends and thinking in terms of instrumentality … We are perhaps the
first generation which has become fully aware of the murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit that all
means, provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to
pursue something defined as an end. (Arendt 1998, 229)
But if we now build on this and look more closely at the part of Hui’s comparison that relates to the ancient Chinese understanding of technology and
its use, his interpretation quickly proves problematic. The core problem is the
aforementioned fact that Hui does not understand the difference between
Cartesian dualisms and binary categories. If we follow the assumption that the
relationship between method (dao) and device or tool (qi) is not a Cartesian
dualism, but—like most other conceptual pairs within the Chinese tradition
of ideas—belongs to the model of binary categories, then we will have a hard
time arguing that within the complementary correlativity of their mutual relationship, one of these opposite poles is indeed primary, even though methods
(dao) as such can be used in other places and in completely different activities
that are not tied to the device (qi). In this broader context, where it is an overarching category, method (dao) is certainly more fundamental. It is also true that
a device (qi) as a tool cannot function without the method (dao), since its use
is necessarily tied to it. But in the concrete model of their mutual relationship,
which is also the basis of their joint activity, the method cannot exist without
the device either. We must distinguish here, then, between method and device
as independent categories, on the one hand, and method and device as equal
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parts of the same complementary model, in which they are correlative and
interdependent, on the other. In the former case they can exist without each
other, but in the latter each of them depends on the other, opposite pole, and
neither of them is primary or a cause of the other.
In interpreting this pair of terms, then, we must continue to know that they
are both categories, not concepts. An important contemporary Chinese philosopher Zhang Dainan (1909–2004) has pointed out that we cannot understand
Chinese intellectual history without understanding these kinds of distinctions.
Zhang sees concepts as a form of naming concrete things and phenomena.
These designations may include other, more general entities as well as their
partial or narrower special properties, but they always refer to the concrete
meaning of the words. Categories, on the other hand, are only the formal, arbitrary tool for analyzing reality. In the ancient Chinese tradition, for example,
he finds them in the works of the philosopher Han Yu (768–824):
In Han Yu’s work The Original Way (Yuan Dao 原道) we find the theory of
categories (xuwei 虛位) and concepts (dingming 定名).19 Here he writes:
“Humanity (ren) and harmonious appropriateness (yi) are concepts (dingming), while the Way (dao) and virtue (de 德) are categories (xuwei).” The
so-called category (xuwei) is an empty box that we can fill with whatever
content we want. Confucians, Daoists, and Buddhists all spoke of the Way
(dao), but this term meant something different to the adherents of these
different traditions, which is why it is a category (xuwei). By comparison,
the terms humaneness (ren) and appropriateness (yi) have very distinct,
inherent meanings. While the Confucians propagated humaneness and
appropriateness, the Daoists were opposed to these two terms; they did
not advocate a different kind of humaneness and appropriateness at all.
Therefore, the terms humaneness (ren) and harmonious appropriateness
(yi) are concepts (dingming). Han Yu’s term xuwei is therefore close to the
Western term categories. (Zhang Dainian 2003, 118) 20
On this basis it is easier to understand that the term dao in the context of the
proto-philosophical classic The Book of Changes has no moral connotations
19
20
Zhang Dainan translated the classical terms dingming and xuwei into contemporary Chinese with the terms gainan (concept) and fanchou (category).
韩愈’原道’ 有虚位定名之说. ‘原道’ 云: ‘仁与义为定名, 道与德为虚位’. 所谓虚位
即是空格子, 可以添上不同的内容. 儒家, 道家, 佛教都讲道, 而其所谓道, 彼此意
义不同, 所以称为虚位. 至于仁义, 则有确定的内涵. 儒家宣扬仁义, 道家反对仁
义, 不可能提出另外一种仁义, 所以仁义是定名.韩愈所谓虚位, 比较接近于近代
所谓范畴.
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as attributed to it by Yuk Hui. Such a meaning was ascribed to the word dao
only much later, through Confucian commentaries on this work, and thus also
exclusively in the context of the Confucian view of the cosmos. Of course, we
must take into account here that such an understanding, within which the
universe is saturated with moral principles, had due to the dominant position
of Confucianism, already acquired a paradigmatic status in the early Middle
Ages. This moral component is particularly noticeable in the compound word
rendao 人道, which refers to the “Way of humankind” and describes human
ethical maxims.21 In the Book of Changes itself, which is much older, dao is seen
only in its most basic meaning of the Way, that is, the methods, principles and
modes of action.
The same is true of the descriptions of the relation between the words dao
and qi, that is, of those parts of the text which refer exclusively to techniques
in the sense of the relation between physical tools and immaterial methods of
their use. On the other hand, however, Hui equates the word dao, which in the
above quotation refers to that which is “above the forms,” with noumenon in
the Kantian sense (Hui 2017a, 8), but in the same breath (only slightly earlier)
criticizes the translation of the phrase xing’er shang xue (literally: above the
forms) with the term metaphysics (ibid.).22 Thus, such a comparison seems
21
22
The opposite pole to the word rendao 人道 is the term tiandao 天道 (literally, the dao
of Heaven or nature), a cosmological term characteristic of Daoist interpretations of the
category of dao. In later Confucian texts, e.g., the Analects, the word dao is used quite
frequently in the sense of “the right” way (or method), and this “rightness” has very clear
moral connotations. Whereas the word qi in the sense of “tool” or “device” is often used
in these sources in its adjectival function, meaning to master certain techniques or to
possess certain skills needed to perform certain kinds of tasks. A good example of such a
development of meaning can be found in the Zi Lu chapter of the above-mentioned work,
which states, “Exemplary persons are easy to serve but difficult to please. If we want to
please them in a way that is not morally appropriate, they will not be pleased. Exemplary
persons employ people according to their skills” (君子易事而難說也：說之不以道，
不說也；及其使人也，器之) (Lunyu s.d., Zi Lu, 25).
Here Yuk Hui explicitly demands that such an equation (of the expression “above the
forms,” i.e. “xing’er shang xue” and the term “metaphysics”) be abolished. Although I fully
agree that the translation is inadequate, I cannot defend his proposal. First, the term
metaphysics is often (mistakenly) interpreted in the West as the name of a discipline
that, according to its name, is supposed to be concerned with the transcendent sphere
that goes beyond the sphere of sensually perceptible (form-giving) reality. It is common
knowledge that Aristotle’s Metaphysics, whose title is the first instance of the use of this
term and from which the term derives its paradigmatic meaning, takes its name only from
the editorial note written in the 1st century CE. This is because the text’s first-century
compiler (most likely Andronicus of Rhodes) added the title “Metaphysics” to indicate
that the book was a collection of essays that followed Aristotle’s natural philosophy (i.e.,
“physics”) (see, e.g., Cohen in Reeve 2020, 1). The Chinese translation has exactly the same
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premature, especially if we bear in mind the dangers of misinterpretation that
we face if we do not take into account the different frames of reference, which
I warned against in the methodological introduction to this book. We must
therefore be careful in such places; from the mere fact that in a certain passage
in the Book of Changes dao is referred to as something above the forms, while
qi is referred to as something below the forms, we can by no means infer that
the former refers to the noumenon and the latter to the concrete objects or
phenomena.
This, of course, does not detract from the value of Hui’s original assumption
that the Book of Changes, as a central work of the earliest Chinese philosophy
of nature and life, implicitly asserts through such an explanation of the specific relationship of dao and qi that tools must necessarily follow the method
of application in their handling (Hui in Dunker 2020, 14). It is also important
to point out here that the method itself must also conform to the nature or
internal composition of the device or the tool; in the process philosophy of this
work, the opposite poles of the complementary binary categories always follow and complete one another. This represents a kind of relationship between
technology and human beings, in which the application of technique (qi) is
in harmony with method (dao). Dao in this context is method in the broadest
sense, for it can also be seen as a general philosophical guideline that shows us
the way out of chaos, the complex jungle of wild and untamed nature.
In his book The Question Concerning Technology in China (2016), Hui tries to
figure out the ways in which Chinese philosophy can help us think through the
supposed contradiction between tradition and modern technology. His rationale is to find a way out of the universalistic tendencies of technological singularity, which is the product of Western-style modernization, and globalization,
which is its result. According to Hui, this kind of technological singularity
would lead to apocalypse (Hui in Dunker 2020, 14). He wants to overcome this
dangerous tendency by introducing the so-called “techno-diversity” or technological multiplicity, which is based on different epistemological approaches
and paradigms of human attitudes towards technology and nature. This is represented in the triad of cosmic order, humans and technology, which is manifested in the concept of cosmotechnology. What Hui wanted to express in his
etymological meaning as the ancient Greek original. Of course, this does not mean that it
(or the modern meaning of the term metaphysics) overlaps with it in all related semantic
connotations. Nevertheless, xing’ershang xue is a term too well established in pre-modern, modern, and contemporary Chinese philosophy to simply “correct” it arbitrarily and
deliberately, to interchange it with any other, as this would lead to additional confusion
within comparative and transcultural philosophy.
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further explication of the traditional Chinese relationship between method
and device23 is, among other things, that the cosmos as such was seen in prevailing (i.e., especially Confucian) Chinese philosophy as a sphere saturated
with values. This axiological component, expressed in Chinese moral philosophy and ethics as well as in traditional Chinese aesthetics, has always prevented
the reduction of technology to its applicability in the sense of instrumentalization. With modernity, this view of the triad of humans, technology and cosmos changed fundamentally, conditioned by the (then necessary) adoption of
superior Western technology and the ideas on the basis of which it had been
developed.
However, taking into account the specifics of the crisis that China faced
at the time of the adoption of Western technology, another fact is important
here, and that is that the adoption occurred precisely at the time when there
was a crucial transition within the development of technology itself. Modern
technology, with new techniques such as various forms of radiation, electrical energy, and data transmission through immaterial waves, surpassed the
function of elongating human organs (and limbs) and externalizing human
memory that it had before.24
It was precisely the latter, that is, the externalization of memory, that had
the function of preserving and transmitting technical knowledge in the early
and simplest forms of technology, for which it was characteristic that they created and thus displayed objects that had not previously existed in nature. For
humans, technology has always been closely connected not only with their
being human and the discovery and development of themselves, but also with
the process of discovery and development of the world. As mentioned earlier,
the first form of discovery of reality in the Western intellectual tradition is tied
to the usefulness of the objects in it (Hui 2016, 89). In capitalist production
and reproduction, this utilitarianism was also applied to nature, which thus
23
24
In his book, Hui charts the evolution of the relationship between dao (method) and qi
(device) throughout Chinese intellectual history, focusing on three phases that he sees
as key to the development of this relationship and the changes therein: 1) the phase of
pre-Qin philosophy and the philosophy of Han Dynasty, 2) the phase of Neo-Confucian
philosophy, and 3) the phase of modern philosophy that emerged based on the adoption
of Western technology and thought.
For an extremely rigorous analysis and interpretation of these two functions and their
role in the constitution of humanness, see Li Zehou 2016a. In the same work, the cultural
features of technological development in China are analyzed in detail, with Li focusing
on the group condensation of memory through the processes of specific types of rituality that accelerated and fortified mental sedimentations through which technology was
passed from older to younger generations.
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became alienated from itself. All its axiological components, including ethics
and aesthetics, became subordinated to the demands of application.
The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old
wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather
the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now,
namely, a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the
power station. (Heidegger 1979, 16)
This makes the Rhine now only a source of water, and its aesthetic value has
given way to the value of its usefulness.
In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that
reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that speaks out of
the two titles, “The Rhine” as dammed up into the power works, and “The
Rhine” as uttered out of the art work, in Hölderlin’s hymn by that name.
But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not?
Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry. (Ibid.)
It was only at this level that humans actually succeeded in subordinating
nature to themselves and in engaging in the mechanisms of such discovery
and development of the world, which served linear, ever-growing, capitaland profit-based, quantitatively measurable progress. With this turn, Western technology—or Western reflection on technology and its use—grew
out of its traditional role as an external means to achieve various ends and
established itself as a form of human existence. The hydroelectric power
plant, according to Heidegger, “enframes”25 the nature of the Rhine River.
That is, it placed the river in a new frame or configuration, through an order
for use that it continually restructures.
25
Heidegger uses for technology in this function of serving and at the same time reforming
human existence the term Gestell, which has the meaning of frame or scaffold; in German
it is a compound of the preposition -ge, which refers to something in common, and the
root -stell, which in the verbal form (stellen) means to put or to set up, while in related
compounds (for example, darstellen and herstellen) it means to present or to produce.
Ge-stell, for Heidegger, means a setting-up character of such set-ups, which establish people by challenging them to reveal reality as a form of something that is being processed.
This is a form of revealing that is part of the nature of modern technology, but is not in
itself technical (Heidegger 2000, 21).
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This form of modern (en)framing of technology—along with its products
and also technology itself in terms of a systematic theoretical reflection on
techniques—was adopted by the Chinese on the eve of the 20th century.26 This
utilitarian use of technology, imported into China in such an enframing, was
never thereafter softened by the counterweights of the concept of “nature,”
which in European intellectual history was seen as an isolated and independent opposition to human culture.
Only such a conceptualization of “nature” valid in the West made possible a
paternalistic “solving” and “protecting” that always mitigated the worst excesses
of utilitarian exploitation and environmental destruction and still forms the basis
of most ecological movements today. On such grounds, we can perhaps better
understand the extreme Chinese human violence over the environment that has
been exercised—and is still being exercised—in the name of fighting poverty
and achieving prosperity and progress since the beginning of the 20th century.
As noted above, modern developments have distanced technology itself
from the simple relationship between the end and the means to achieve it.
Thus, instead of seeing technology as a kind of extension of basic human tools,
Heidegger warns that modern technology also brings with it its own laws. For
him, the problem with modern technology lies not only in the fact that, unlike
traditional tools, it uses sources of energy that are external to humans and
their labor, but rather in its dominant character. Even though technology does
not take place outside of human agency, with modernization technical processes have to some extent become independent, reducing humans to producers who essentially only ensure that technology exists and thrives. Within this
new framework, human is no longer the basic framework, i.e., the Gestell that
“launches” the existence and development of technology—rather, this function
is taken over by technology itself. In the processes of modernization, human
26
As Eric S. Nelson points out in his book on Daoist philosophy, such a fixed (in relation to
humans) “external” concept of nature did not originally exist in China: “To avoid misidentification and conflation, it is necessary to recognize the extent to which modern Western ideological, meta-physical, and scientific ideas of nature are not the same as classical
Chinese understandings of the environing world. The English word “nature” arises from
the Latin word natura, that is derived from nasci (“to be born”). Sheng (life), as discussed
above, is linked with birth, growth, and generation. Daoist “nature” (insofar as this English
expression can be used to discuss early Daoist conceptions at all, a risk that we cannot
avoid here) is primarily a spontaneous, self-generative, and self-organizing autopoietic
relational “natural” reality (ziran 自然) that is interpreted between the poles of a fluid
anarchic chaos and a hierarchically fixed and structured order” (Nelson 2021, 10). The
Confucian thinkers also assumed a holistic triad of natural order linking man, heaven
(nature), and earth. Therefore, they “have everywhere and always realized that human
flourishing can only take place within the larger matrix of nature” (Berthrong 2003, 389).
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beings, who on the one hand ruled over nature and became its supreme masters, lost their previous function and their Selves, and became more and more
alienated from the world and its truth. However, this does not lead Heidegger
to hatred of technology and technological development (cf. Heidegger 1969,
12’03’’), but rather to a desire to understand and reflect on both (Heidegger
2000, 15) and to arrive at the transformed (and at the same time completely
new) discovery of the demand for human freedom hidden in the very essence
of technology. This is indeed the very “enframing” (Gestell) of the modern
world (ibid., 26).
Heidegger thus created a theoretically innovative and lucid foundation for
the modern philosophy of technology and the ontological basis of the paradigmatically altered use of energy sources. However, this philosophy has faced
new challenges in recent decades, as we are now dealing with immaterial, digitalized sources that require the establishment of new ontological theories.
5
Ontology of Digital Objects and Structural Onto-epistemology
The World Wide Web as a network of data has presented us with new challenges
related not only to the discovery, isolation and exploitation of techniques for
storing and using energy, but also to the existence of digital objects. These
are dynamic, relational units of data, embedded in networks, which Luciano
Floridi (2014, 97) calls infospheres. The concept of the digital object can help us
understand modern automated systems of online interactions. This is because
through the lens of digital objects we can redefine such systems
in a way that passes through the concepts of preindividual milieu, individuation, world, being-in-the-world, Zuhandenheit and its associated
milieu—which may in addition provide new resources with which to
interpret the notions of Gestell and Ereignis, through which Heidegger
explored the cybernetic age. (Stiegler 2016, viii)
Yuk Hui defines these as objects “that take shape on a screen or hide in the
backend of a computer program and consist of data and metadata governed
by structures or schemas” (Hui 2016a, 1). These give semantic and functional
meaning to the metadata (i.e., data about data): “In computer science, these
schemas are also called ontologies—a word that immediately evokes associations with philosophy” (ibid.).
In this way, digital objects provide a good basis for a new metaphysics and
ontology, or at least for an updating and extension of it (ibid., ix). Within such
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an understanding, a digital object then constitutes discursive relations on the
basis of which it is itself also interwoven; with such interconnectedness of itself,
it establishes its own existential relations (ibid., xi). A digital object belongs to
computers and is therefore by its very nature technical, but it cannot be limited
to technology alone. Hui’s understanding of digital objects even goes beyond
the questions about such objects as they are treated by application-oriented
computer technology, which usually reduces them to a set of representational
structures. In his reflections, Yuk Hui does not stop at engineering pragmatic
questions of digitality as a phenomenon but tries to understand its existential
status (Hui 2016a, 3). In doing so, he starts from assumptions similar to those
expressed in Quine’s slogan: “To be is to be the value of a variable” (ibid., 273,
fn. 73).
In the digital age, then, there is a burning necessity to question the being and
modes of existence of digital objects. Since they consist of relations and connections between data schemata, these objects are only concretized as such
through the materialization of these relations: “The genesis of digital objects
is the process of concretization and materialization, first of forms, second of
explicit relations and connections between objects” (ibid., 72). This gives a new
form or a new way of existing in the world, in which we are again confronted
with new questions: “We may want to ask, to what extent can we value this
philosophical trajectory of relations as we have outlined it?” (ibid., 142).
Here, then, we are concerned with the transformation of quantitative
structures of data into qualitative communicative-semantic or even axiological values. In this way it should be possible to overcome man’s alienation
from technology, which arises from not understanding these values:
The most powerful cause of alienation in the world of today is based
on misunderstanding of the machine. The alienation in question is not
caused by the machine but by a failure to come to an understanding of
the nature and essence of the machine, by the absence of the machine
from the world of meanings, and by its omission from the table of values
and concepts that are an integral part of culture. (Simodon 1980, 2)
Contemporary technological systems, driven by digital technology, have a tendency to lead to a homogeneous relationship between humans and technology. However, for this very reason, and because of the aforementioned need for
technodiversity, it is necessary and important for different cultures to reflect on
their own histories and ontologies within the framework of their own specific
languages and symbolic orders, because only in this way will they find ways
to accept and adopt digital technologies without disappearing and merging
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into a homogeneous, synchronized unit of a “global” and “generic” system of
acquiring knowledge and understanding about reality. Only in this way will
humanity be able to preserve, even in the global age of digital technologies,
the possibility of different attitudes to the world and different ways of seeing
and understanding new realities. And this, as we know, is the basis of human
freedom and autonomy.
In this respect, Chinese philosophy may also open up some new possibilities. Here we may recall the modern Chinese structuralist Zhang Dongsun,
who—partly under the influence of Chan Buddhism and its specific conception of reality based on the illusory character of the phenomenal world—
created a system of structural-relational onto-epistemology in which there is
no substance, since the world consists exclusively of relations.27 Such a relational nature of knowledge acquisition is at the same time the basic paradigm
of most Chinese epistemologies, which are based on the assumption of structural compatibility between the external world and human consciousness (see
Rošker 2018b).
Zhang Dongsun is undoubtedly one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the 20th century. Although he was—due to his criticism of the
Sinicization of Marxist ideologies and his role as a political dissident—
almost completely and unjustly forgotten for a while in the last decades of
the century, in recent years there has been a growing interest in his work
among Chinese theorists. Most contemporary theorists see Zhang Dongsun
‘s greatest contribution precisely in his role as one of the first modern Chinese philosophers to create their own theoretical system. Zhang’s philosophy is particularly significant in the field of epistemology (Jiang 2002, 57).
Besides, Zhang is indisputably the one who has assimilated the most Western thought, built the most comprehensive and coordinated system, and
exerted the greatest influence among Western-oriented Chinese philosophers.
Epistemology is the central part of Zhang’s philosophy, which began with a
pluralistic epistemology and culminated in a cultural epistemology (ibid.).
Zhang based his epistemological pluralism on a revision of Kant’s philosophy. He also used his own system of a pan-structuralist cosmology as a starting
point, in which we can also see the influence of Chan Buddhism, which formed
the basis of his worldview. Zhang Dongsun’s cultural epistemology, based on a
pluralist epistemology, is derived from the assumption of cultural conditioning
27
This part of the present chapter is based on the reworked summary of subchapter 21.3 of
my book Searching for the Way – Theories of Knowledge in Modern and Premoden China
(see Rošker 2006).
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or the culturally conditioned nature of knowledge.28 Another important
assumption of his epistemology is the neorealist position, according to which
the external world exists independently of our consciousness; whereby there is
no precise correlation between the phenomena of the external world and our
perception of them. This means, of course, that we can never perceive external
objects as they actually are.
We should know that what we commonly call “a thing,” is a colour that
we see, and a form that we touch. These are the “qualities” of a thing.
If we do not consider the qualities, then (for us) there are no things.
Things possess particular qualities, like colors, scents, etc., which
change according to the human senses; therefore, some people claim
that they do not belong to things ... There are also some other particular qualities, like the largeness, angularity or roundness of things.
These qualities are considered by some people as similar to those mentioned before, and therefore cannot define the original thing as such,
either. (Zhang 1929, 23–24)29
To explain his own view of the cosmic order and its relation to our consciousness, Zhang often used examples drawn from the discoveries of early 20th
century physics, such as the difference between our perception of a colour
and its “actual” substance, or light waves. He argued that colour was something other than light waves: while colour was the product of the interaction
between waves and our senses, waves belonged to the “objective” qualities
of being (Zhang 1995, 166). Zhang therefore divides reality into the “original
state of things (wude benxiang 物的本相)” and “things for us (women suowei
wu 我們所謂物)” (Liu 2002, Part 2, 866).
According to Zhang, the external cause for our sensation is not a substance,
but the order or structure of the external world. What is transmitted to us
through our sensory impressions is a modification of this external order (Jiang
2002, 59).
28
29
This aspect of his philosophy is still very relevant and valuable today, especially in the
field of methodology of transcultural research. His studies in cultural philosophy are
based on detailed comparative analyses of Chinese and European thought. Particularly
important here are his researches on the influence of the structure of language on different philosophical systems and on the connections between cultural differences and the
formal logical systems of different traditions.
須知, 我們普通所謂物, 即是我們所看見的是顏色, 所觸摸的是形樣.這些都是物
的 ‘性質’. 可見離了性質就沒有所謂物. 物有一類的性質如顏色與味道等, 是倚著
感覺的人的主觀而變的, 所以有人主張是不屬於物的本身...還有一類的性質如
大小與方圓, 有人亦說與前一類差不多, 不能即斷定事物的本相.
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As regards the external reality, we cannot know its internal nature
(essence), but we can recognize its relations. These relations form a relatively fixed structure. If we presuppose that the qualities of things do not
possess any inner nature (essence), and that things only exist as a structure, we have already recognized the external reality. (Zhang 1929, 32)30
In interpreting the basic structure of reality, he also referred to scientific discoveries regarding atoms and their most elementary structures, which transcend
the categorical boundary between particles of matter and non-substantial
electromagnetic waves. Here, his critique of substance was quite radical, and
he denied the real existence not only of the smallest particles of matter, but
also of quanta, electrons and even electromagnetic waves.
In fact, I do not believe that atoms really exist in the external world. We
should understand that the atomic theory in physics is the same as sensory theory in psychology. Both theories are based on the assumption that
the whole consists of the sum of its parts. I call advocates of such theories representatives of the mosaic theory of particularism. This /view/
can be compared to /the view of/ a pile of sand, in which each grain is
both a solid substance and an unchangeable entity. I personally do not
acknowledge any independent existence of so-called sensory impressions
in psychology; hence there is no reason to acknowledge the existence of
atoms as pieces of substance in physics. Since there is no need to talk
about atoms, why should we bother to divide them into electrons, or to
divide electrons into wave particles? In my view, all this merely expresses
the atomizing nature of external reality, and not the actual existence of
atoms as real things. Not only are there no atoms, but there are no electrons or wave particles either. All this merely means that the structure has
the possibility of forming certain entities. (Zhang 1995, 168–169)31
30
31
關於外物, 我們不能知其內性, 但能知其關係, 而此關係卻是一種比較固定的架
構. 若我們暫假定物質并無內性, 而只是架構, 則我們已可謂知道外物了。
其實我並不主張外界有如實存在的原子。須知之在物理學等於感覺論之在心
理學。他們都以為全體是由部分而推誠的。我名此為零屑論 (mosaic theory of
particularism) 派。好像一堆散沙, 每個沙粒是硬的實體, 是不變的單位。我們于
心理方面即不承有所謂感相的獨立存在, 則我們在物理方面當然亦用不著把原
子認為散屑的實質 (pieces of substance)。姑不論原子尚可分為電子, 電子尚可分
為 ‘波子’ (wave particle), 然而這些只可視為表示外界有原子性而已。須知所謂原
子性只是在構造 (structure) 上有 ‘原子的’ (atomic) 性質而已。並非說外界确有原
子其物。不但沒有原子, 並且亦沒有電子, 沒有波子。所有的只是外界的構造
上有分為若干單位的可能性罷了。
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Similarly, the discovery of the Theory of Relativity was important only in
terms of recognizing structural laws, and not in terms of recognising any new
essences in nature or the cosmos.
The discovery of the Theory of Relativity only provides some knowledge
about the structural modes of the external world; it does not provide us
with any knowledge about its content. (Ibid., 170)32
The denial of substance also refers to the sphere of ideas. As in Chan Buddhism, all that we perceive is not only empty in the sense of substantial
absence, but also illusory. Therefore, Zhang’s cosmology is neither materialistic, nor idealistic:
Pluralistic epistemology ... rejects ‘substance’ and is of the opinion that
the dualistic theories of idealism and materialism are completely wrong.
(Ibid., 214)33
In this respect, his approaches recall classical Chinese (especially Daoist and
Chan-Buddhist) cosmologies, but also certain recent Western ontological systems based on the Theory of Relativity and Quantum Theory.
The constitution of time and space is also structural. The Theory of
Relativity assumes that time and space are not absolute and unchangeable. On this basis, Zhang Dongsun developed his view that time and
space were also a kind of structure, and not a form of matter. (Liu 2002,
Part 2, 867)34
One reason for our inability to recognise the essence of external things “as
such” is thus to be found in the very nature of their existence; for Zhang, who
did not acknowledge the existence of substance, reality was a process of constant changes that manifests itself in the inter-relations of particular entities.
His cosmology is not metaphysical. In his view, this constituted another difference between Kantian philosophy and his own. In Kant, metaphysics is not
32
33
34
相對論出來以後只給了我們一些關於物理界的構造方式之知識, 而不關於其 ‘內
容’ (content) 。
“認識的多元論...勢必根本上否認 ‘本質’ (substance), 以為本體論上的唯心論唯物
論兩元論全是不對的。
時空的性質也說明了架構的性質. 相對論認為, 時空并不是絕對不變的, 張東蓀
由此也得出時空也是一種架構而非物質的存在形式的看法。
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abandoned, even though the priority given to epistemology radically alters its
role. Zhang’s revision of Kant is, in fact, limited to the Kantian theory of knowledge. In his ontology, the Chan-Buddhist impact is much stronger. In his early
youth, his reading of Buddhist sacred texts got him interested in philosophy.
Although he would criticize Buddhism severely later on, he always seemed to
have accepted much of Buddhist cosmology, especially certain ideas from the
Great Vehicle School (Mahayana) (Jiang 2002, 63).
If we reject the existence of substance, clearly the objects perceived by us
can not possess any “ontological status”:
Plural epistemology advocates the view that sense impressions are
non-being. Therefore, they are without a position in the ontological
sense; they do not possess any ‘ontological status.’ (Zhang 1995, 215)35
All beings exist in a process of constant change that manifests itself in a neverending modification of structural connections, and the growth and decline of
the qualities of the “essence” of particular entities. According to Zhang, our
consciousness can only recognize certain aspects of these manifest changes.
However, this refers not only to the level of our perception and comprehension; according to Zhang, the structured order of relations is all that really
exists in the cosmos. This structural order can be divided into the three basic
levels of matter (wu 物), life (sheng 生), and heart-mind (xin 心).
Zhang argued that all these structures are empty, for they possess neither
substance, nor its qualities. The level of material being (wu 物) is thus a merely
physical substantial phenomenality which cannot be equated with material
substance, but, at the most, with structural relations and the physical laws
which determine its existence. For him, “matter” is a general concept comprising a total domain of many specific concepts about physical properties. There
is nothing in matter itself which corresponds to our concept of matter. It is
not the colour, fragrance, sound or size that we perceive through our senses,
because they tend to be subjective. Therefore, by “matter” he understood an
object’s volume, density, or speed. Thus, in his view, matter becomes little
more than a set of physics formulas. Therefore, there are only physical laws,
but no matter (Jiang 2002, 64).
In other words: things are physical laws. But we should know that these
physical laws refer to relations (namely to the relations between a certain
35
認識的多元論把感相認為非存在者, 勢必謂感相在本體上無地位, 即沒有 ‘本體
的地位’ (ontological status)。
Subjectivity, Control, and Digital Technology
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thing and other things); they do not refer directly to things as such. In
other words: these physical laws refer to relations between things, and
not to their essence. Therefore, attributes such as quality, speed, inertia or
density are only different ways of expressing relations. (Zhang 1995, 215)36
For Zhang, life (or living) (sheng 生) is a category which includes everything,
included biological phenomena:
What is “life”? According to biological theories, differences between living and non-living entities can be summarized by four characteristics: 1.
community 2. organisation of work 3. growth ability and 4. adaptation
ability. These four items cannot be completely explained by physics and
chemistry. The physical and chemical treatment of inorganic things is
based upon measurement. If we try to grasp living beings solely by subjecting them to physical measurement, it is somehow not enough. Thus,
it is necessary to add some new concepts to the existing ones, for example, the concepts of ‘organicity,’ ‘developmentality,’ ‘autopoeticness,’ etc.
However, in addition to applying these new concepts, we can also continue to use the previous ones. In other words, we can say that these new
concepts actually organize the old ones. (Ibid., 216)37
Analogously, heart-mind (xin 心) is a category that belongs to the overall concept of living, but also contains psychological phenomena, which are different
from biological functions.
The same holds true for “mind.” The nature of mind differs from biological functions in certain respects. In other words: it is not enough to apply
concepts which explain living, in order to explain mind. Let us take the
36
37
或換言之, 即物是物理. 但須知這些物理都是由 ‘關係’ (即一物與他物的關係)而
見, 并不直接關於一個物的本身. 換言之, 即物理只講物的關係, 不講物的實質.
所以質量, 速率惰性, 密度等等都是表示關係的樣式之一種。
‘生’ 是甚麼呢? 据生物學家說, 生物有生命, 所以異于無生物之點有四: 第一是組
織; 弟二是職司; 弟三是生長的能力; 弟四是適應的能力. 對於這四點卻不能完全
用物理化學來解釋. 原來我們用物理化學來對付無機物亦不過對於它的一種測
量 (measurement). 我們拿了測量無生物的物理方法而測量生物必覺有 些不夠
用. 於是必須於解釋物質的概念以外, 再添一些新概念. 例如 ‘有機性’, ‘發展性’, ‘自
支性’, 等等. 就是密度, 速率, 質量, 惰性等以外須再加有這些. 不過這些新加的卻
可左右他些已有的, 換言之, 即已有的居然為新加的所支配了。
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notion of “consciousness” as an example. Consciousness is a unique feature, which can only be seized by applying some new concepts. (Ibid.)38
It is therefore better to replace “matter” with “psychic laws,” “life” with “biological principles” and “mind” with “psychology.” In other words, terms for substance as carriers of attributes should be replaced by terms for structures or
orders (Jiang 2002, 64).
He also uses the term “arrangement” to replace the term “structure.” Here,
as well, he emphasizes the non-substantiality of the cosmos. (Liu 2002,
Part 2, 867)39
Hence, Zhang’s cosmos does not imply any substance or essence; it exists
solely as a relational process of structural order. However, even this order
is not totally natural and objective, but also depends upon our cognitive
activities:
However, these structural forms as such do not entirely belong to external things as such ... From the viewpoint of essence, there are no external
things. But with respect to structure and form, most of the forms result
from the process of comprehension. In other words, they belong to the
domain of subjectivity. (Zhang 1995, 171)40
All external structures are manifested in our mind, that (re)-establishes them
in the process of forming structural patterns of thought and comprehension.
However, Zhang’s theory is not solipsistic, since the external reality for him is
not an exclusive product of our recognition:
At least some of these structural forms are not just a product of the laws
of our recognition. (Ibid.)41
38
39
40
41
至於 ‘心’ 亦是如此. 心的性質确有和生理作用不同的地方. 換言之, 即拿了解釋
生命的那些概念而用以解釋心意必是有些不夠用. 例如’覺’ (consciousness) 便是
一個有一無二的特征. 所以亦非加新概念不可。
他還用 ‘配列 ‘ (Arrangement) 代替 ‘架構 ‘ (Structure), 同樣是為了強調宇宙的非實
體性。
但這些構造方式固然不是完全屬於外物本身的 ... 以實質而言, 本來就沒有外物.
以構造與方式而言, 大部分的方式仍是屬於認識作用本身的, 換言之, 即屬於主
觀的。
這些構造方式... 其中至少有若干是不由于我們的認識立 法所造.
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The relation between the external world and our subjectivity is interactive and
correlative.
Our cosmos does not possess any essence; it is only a structure. Its constitution is not entirely natural, but inseparably connected with the function of our recognition. Without recognition we could get a glimpse of
the original image of this structure. But it still cannot completely seize
its essence. Therefore, we can still claim that the cosmos is a structure.
(Zhang 1995, 218)42
Zhang often compared his ontology to Chan Buddhist cosmology. What
he called “structure,” reminded him of the Buddhist concept of (necessary
or causal) connection (yinyuan 因緣), in which the cosmos was seen as a
complex network, consisting of innumerable, interdependent relations
that are linked and separated from one another in innumerable ways and
upon innumerable levels. He compares this to cosmic emptiness, which, as
in the Buddhist view, cannot be equated with “nothingness,” but only with
the absence of a substance, an unchangeable nature, or a self-contained,
self-sufficient being. Since cosmos only consists of relational connections, it
does not imply any independent, autonomous entity. This is also one of the
principal reasons why the existence of substance is impossible: the world is
a series of functional relations. In Buddhist cosmology, the world, which is
void in itself, is a universal, eternal and unchangeable law of causal relations
(yinyuan 因緣). Zhang Dongsun equated this law with the real objectivity of
being (Jiang 2002, 65).
He connected this essentially Buddhist worldview with the idea of evolution, which implies the appearance of new species, as well as a hierarchy
between lower and higher forms of being, with the higher forms controlling
the lower ones. Here, Zhang was probably influenced by the theory of the evolution of appearances, developed by C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) and Samuel Alexander (1859–1938) (ibid.). However, the new forms of being which
appeared in this context were, in his view, a product of structural, and not of
substantial changes.
Combining the Buddhist idea of non-substance with a similar theory
of evolution, Zhang held that the structures of the universe, although
42
我們這個宇宙並無本質, 只是一套架構. 這個架構的構成不是完全自然的, 而必
須有我們的認識作用參加其中. 因為我們不能拔開認識以窺這個架構的本來面
目. 然而亦決不十分大虧其本質. 所以仍可以說宇宙是個架構。
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empty, are in evolution, and new kinds of structure may emerge due to
changes in the combination of various structures. (Ibid.)
But evolution, of course, cannot be equated with change as such. According
to Zhang, evolution is a modification of simpler structures into more complex
ones, and a joining of partial entities into more universal ones. While these
structures still remain structures after their modification, they now differ from
their previous forms not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively.
Each formation as such is already something new ... If we reject this
essentialism, which functions with micro-particles, we naturally have to
acknowledge that every change creates something new; otherwise, we
could not speak about any changes at all. (Zhang 1995, 173–174)43
Zhang’s theory thus remains consistent, even though it denies substance,
while advocating the idea of evolution. His epistemology is also inextricably
linked to such an ontological basis, which is why his theory can be placed
in the realm of classical Chinese onto-epistemology. In this sense, Zhang
claims that we cannot know actual reality, but we can know its structural
order, which he calls external order (tiaoli 條理). For him, the relationship
between external reality and our perception of it is structurally conditioned
and constructed according to certain laws.
The structure of the external world and the structure of the human internal
world are complementary and compatible. This means that our perception of
the external is made possible on the basis of the structural compatibility of
mind and external reality. As mentioned earlier, this is also the basic premise of
the most influential classical Chinese epistemologies (Rošker 2018b, 161).
In this view people, or rather our minds (but also our biological bodies, as
these are inseparably tied together), are fundamentally structured in the same
way as the cosmos. However, this does not only imply homogeneity, which
would allow inference from objects of the external sphere to objects of the
internal sphere, as Bertrand Russell assumes in his structural epistemology, but
also a direct flow of data, which at the same time represents states of relational structures moving from one sphere to another. In his pan-structural
epistemology, based on the plurality of the cognitive process (Rošker 2006,
264–287), Zhang thoroughly shows how our minds are supposed to transform
43
每一個組織在本身必定就是一個新東西... 離開了這個微粒子的實質主義, 當然
使我們不能不承認凡是變化都是有所創新, 否則我們勢必根本上就不承認有變
化。
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such informational signals originating from what he calls the “external order”
into axiological and aesthetical values of our individual interior space through
a series of a priori forms. Since Zhang here, as mentioned earlier, takes as his
starting point not only the Chan Buddhist onto-epistemology but also a classical Chinese understanding of the cognitive process, it is important to see that
what is also at stake here is the compatibility of two relational structures, the
external and the internal, both of which can be seen as carriers of meaning and
axiological values. The basis of the prevailing Confucian ethics is the moral
core of the order of the universe, or what Zhang calls “external order.” The axiological foundations are, within this frame, already contained in the signals
themselves, which the forms of our minds only need to decode correctly.
6
The Agony of Enlightenment Values and Two Types of Inhumanity
Within this view, digital objects, as insubstantial data structures of relations
within their own infospheres, should also exist as systems that are directly and
organically compatible with our minds, not only in the sense of transmitting
information, but also in the sense of meaning and value. Similar to relational
ethics and Chan Buddhist onto-epistemology, which we introduced in the
previous subchapter using the example of Zhang Dongsun’s system, Chinese
cosmotechnology is also based on relationships, on a relational network of
innumerable connections between humans and technology, arising from a
binary relationship between dao and qi, i.e., between the immaterial method
and the physical device or tool.
One of the reasons, then, that people in Sinic societies are more inclined
to the digitalization of life and less suspicious of digital objects lies precisely
in the relational nature of the latter. This is not only because relationships
are central to Confucian ethics. They also form a foundation of traditional
onto-epistemologies, as we discussed in the previous section. One could argue
that they provide the basic modus vivendi that defines the fundamental symbolic order of traditional Confucian societies. This is, of course, an extremely
subtle factor, operating on a subconscious level. On the other hand, such a
relational foundation of life, which may link the ontologies of digital objects
to the mode of existence of the pure and unalienated humanity, can by no
means be the only reason for the general Chinese preference for information
technologies. Rather, this kind of inclination toward digital life forms is in all
likelihood also the result of a whole range of other factors.
One of these probably has much to do with the fact that in their specific
processes of modernization, Chinese (and to a certain degree, also Sinic)
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populations may not have fully internalized the culturally conditioned forms
of Enlightenment values on which modern science is based. This is not to say,
of course, that there is no positive appreciation of the ideas of freedom, autonomy, and rationality in China and, by analogy, in the minds of their people. I
merely wish to point out that such concepts (as we have seen in the second
half of the third chapter of this book) arose differently in the Confucian intellectual traditions, and that their ideational foundations are therefore different
from the paradigms on the basis of which they arose in European history, and
especially in the Age of Enlightenment.
As we will see, the digitalization of our lives requires many sacrifices from
us, since in the course of its development we will have to give up many values
and ideals of modernity, created on the basis of European Enlightenment and
given as a birthright to the majority of people born and socialized in European
societies. As digitalization is likely to take a much more important role in our
lives in the future, it would certainly be appropriate for people in Europe and
other regions of the so-called Western world to also engage with it in a different way and try to develop such conceptualizations of autonomy, freedom and
democracy that are compatible with it. With this goal in mind, it is certainly
a good idea to look beyond the narrow limits of Enlightenment conceptualizations of the subject and consider alternative forms of the human self and
personhood.
To this end, it is useful to recall the intellectual foundations of European
Enlightenment and modernization. Jean-François Lyotard, one of the pioneers
of the theorization of postmodernism, saw modernity not only as a new period
in history, conditioned by the explosive rise of industrialization and new technology, but also as the prevalence of a different perception of time (Lyotard
1991, 68); for him, modernization meant the way in which successive sequences
of moments are arranged in such a way that, unlike earlier periods, they contain a high degree of contingency. At the same time, however, and perhaps for
this very reason, the “grand narratives” or meta-narratives of the Enlightenment were reconstructed within the metaphysics of modernity, ranging from
Romanesque to classical German philosophy to Marxism, and in many ways
reminiscent of mythic narratives. The important common feature of all these
narratives is, of course, the kind of conception of time that leaves the future
open in the name of emancipation as the ultimate or highest goal of human
history. But they are also all based on the conviction that the flow of history
is something that can be thought. Lyotard sees one of the major differences
between traditional and modern narratives in their principal attitudes towards
society; while the former based their stance on rituality, the latter took a more
political stance in this sense (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is important to see that the
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ideals for which these meta-narratives of human liberation argue, and which
can supposedly be achieved at the end of this emancipatory development,
remain indeterminate and empty, even though the entire historical development that led to them is supposed to be comprehensible and understandable.
Of course, this also means that the highest goal or the final destination (in the
sense of the German notion of Bestimmung, which includes the connotation of
determination) can nevertheless not be fatally set or determined.
Both types of narratives, the mythical and traditional, as well as the modern meta-narratives, mark in the same way diachronic series of events which
should be able to be rationally ordered and explained. While in the narratives
of the first type this role is assumed by tradition, in the second type it has been
assigned to political philosophy or ideologies.
Admittedly, modernity nevertheless draws its legitimacy not from the past,
as traditional narrative forms do, but from the future, which, as we have seen,
is open. This gives it new possibilities with which its narratives can become
ever more complex. It is also clear that the project of human emancipation
itself can in no way be equated with a pre-programming of the future as such.
Lyotard points out here that “liberty is not security” (ibid.). The contingency
that the project of modernity entails is based on an indeterminate future, and
it is precisely this indeterminacy that conditions human freedom.
The digital age cannot, of course, abolish this contingency, even though it
brings us hitherto undreamed-of possibilities of programming. Here it becomes
clearer that digital objects, together with their own online infospheres into
which they are placed, belong to the realm of technology, which, as I have
mentioned several times, can be used in ways that are beneficial, responsible
and liberating, but also harmful to humanity. Thus, some philosophers of technology, such as Bernard Stiegler, see it as a double-edged sword, as described
by Derrida in his work Plato’s Pharmacy. Paraphrasing the core message of this
work, Stiegler writes that, much like the writing that underlies Plato’s and Derrida’s problematization of the pharmakon, technology is both “remedy” and
“poison” (Stiegler 2013, 10). Precisely for this reason, it is all the more important
that in the current times of social transformations and transitions, we create
new models of autonomous decision-making that meet the demands of the
digital age.
The explosive spread of digital technologies has unimagined consequences
for the Enlightenment concept of the subject, even in the epistemological
sense, since such technologies represent the externalization of knowledge
not only into tactile and physical objects, such as books, but also into virtual
infospheres of digital objects. Certainly, post-industrial technologies, the digitization of data, and computer science bring new forms of knowledge that
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replace the aforementioned meta-narratives of philosophy and science in
earlier periods, especially those that speak of emancipation and the freedom
of people as autonomous beings (Kos 1995, 15). In this sense, its mechanisms
have completely replaced the traditional notion of knowledge, which used to
be something that could only be acquired through education in the sense of
the German word Bildung or the Chinese term xiu shen mentioned earlier in
the sense of cultivating human personhood. Although knowledge cannot be
reduced to mere data, either now or in the future, even in the digital age, it is
certainly more easily transferable and immediately usable with such technologies. In this sense, Lyotard paints a rather bleak picture that certainly points
to the slow disappearance of the Enlightenment subject, as it no longer has a
function in the digital era:
The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context
of general transformation. It can fit into the new channels, and become
operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information.
We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that
is not translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the direction
of new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results
being translatable into computer language. The “producers” and users of
knowledge must now, and will have to, possess the means of translating
into these languages whatever they want to invent or learn. Research on
translating machines is already well advanced. Along with the hegemony
of computers comes a certain logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as “knowledge”
statements. (Lyotard 1984, 4)
This, of course, allows knowledge to be reduced to the function of commodities that can be traded. Digital technology enables a faster and easier market
exchange of knowledge, which is no longer measured by the criteria of values,
but by measures of worth. The production of knowledge itself is now directed
towards its sale, with its value measured according to the degree of its direct
usefulness. This way of appropriating, transmitting and valuing knowledge is,
of course, a threat to human autonomy, since it depends primarily on the laws
of the market rather than on the free choices of the people who produce and
receive knowledge. The decay of education in the aforementioned sense of
Bildung or xiu shen is also fatal to the capacities of the human mind and the
human ability to make value judgments. This has negative consequences not
only for personal morality and social ethics, but also in terms of the growing
possibilities for manipulation of the individual by the system or by the holders
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of political and economic power. This epistemological dimension is problematic everywhere, both in Sinic and Euro-American societies. Culturally conditioned differences between models of understanding the relationship between
people and digital technologies are more pronounced in other segments of
human existence.
As we have seen, digital systems are relationally structured networks, which
also allows in them an efficient centralization (and thus consolidated control)
of the data on the basis of which they were created. Humans are not simply
thrown into this world but are both objects and subjects of the information
and data with which they have been networked. In this digital reality, it is difficult to preserve the autonomous Self, which, in the role of the free subject,
is supposed to confront the outside world as the object of its own perception
and understanding. This simultaneous position of subjectivity and objectivity
presents us with the problem of the need for a fundamental redefinition of
one’s Self as a human being. Confucian cultures do not assume a fixed line
between subject and object in their perception of reality and the human being.
Rather, in Confucian traditions, the human being is seen as a being that has
organically grown into reality. The dilemma of such a fusion of subject and
object may therefore not exist at all in societies, traditionally influenced by
Confucianism, or may exist in a much milder form.
Starting from the cultural and philosophical transformations triggered by
the digital age in Euro-American cultures that are the closest and most direct
descendants of the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment and modernization, Lyotard has founded and developed the concept of the so-called inhuman. The French philosopher distinguishes between two forms of inhumanity
as follows:
What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman (that’s the first part)? And (second
part), what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind were to be inhabited by the
inhuman? Which would make two sorts of inhuman. It is indispensable
to keep them dissociated. The inhumanity of the system which is currently being consolidated under the name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely secret one of which the soul
is hostage. To believe, as happened to me, that the first can take over from
the second, give it expression, is a mistake. The system rather has the
consequence of causing the forgetting of what escapes it. But the anguish
is that of a mind haunted by a familiar and unknown guest which is agitating it, sending it delirious but also making it think—if one claims to
exclude it, if one doesn’t give it an outlet, one aggravates it. Discontent
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grows with this civilization, foreclosure along with information. (Lyotard
1991, 2)
In an interview with Anders Dunker, Yuk Hui points to the first form of Lyotard’s
inhumanity, which he describes as positive and which he explicitly associates
with the Chinese system of social credit:
Positive inhumanity captures us in rigid technological systems, like
we see in China with the social credit system. The positive inhuman is
one that is “more interior in myself than me”—for example, God for St.
Augustine. We humans carry something inhuman in us, which is irreducible to the human and which maintains the highest intimacy with us.
(Dunker 2020, 12)
Related to this is the third reason for the differences in comprehension and
acceptance of digitalization and its objects in the Western and in Confucian
cultures respectively. This is most likely to be found in the different perceptions, feelings and understandings of concepts associated with notions of privacy and intimacy. In what ways does the human self respond within different
linguistic and symbolic orders to new, hitherto unknown challenges of the
information age?
In what follows, I will attempt to illuminate the development of the concepts of intimacy, privacy, and publicity from a transcultural perspective. As
a starting point I will take the history of semantics in the Chinese and in the
European area. In the development of these concepts, we can locate a number
of theoretical indicators that reflect the structures of modern society, but at
the same time represent factors that retroactively influence the development
of the society in which they emerged and the transformations of these societies (Tang 2020, 1). Here I will start with the assumption of the close and complex connection between semantic and social structures.
7
Intimacy, Privacy and Isolation
Lyotard’s concept of the inhuman, which I briefly introduced in the previous
section, opens up the question of whether this idea does not also involve the
dissolution of human privacy, in the sense that what hitherto belonged only to
the individuals and constituted the essence of their identity could be shared
by them only if they wished it and only up to the point they chose. Because of
their relational and centralized character, the internalization of digital objects
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in the processes of knowledge acquisition also represents the internalization
of the digital system as the centralized authority of a new agenda of existence.
If in this way the external system actually invades our most private interiority
and becomes a part of us, it also means that we no longer have a home to which
we could retreat at any time and where we would not be afraid of heterogeneous invaders of our inner space. In other words, the hidden dwelling of our
minds, which used to be entirely ours, has become transparent spaces along
with their flip side, namely the basis of our ability to act autonomously in the
outside world. They are not completely open, for we can still close them, but
their walls have become glassy in the wake of the death of classical modernity.
It is therefore no coincidence that, according to Niklas Luhmann, the concepts of privacy and intimacy are also children of the Enlightenment movement, since they are said to have emerged in Europe from the seventeenth
century onwards on the basis of increasingly complex social differentiations
and to have developed through phases of idealization, paradoxisation and
finally to the phase of problematisation. This private intimacy of the individual involves a perfect experience of the Self that is not fully expressible or
transferable (Luhmann 1982, 17–18). It is precisely because of the impossibility
of the existence and formation of such privacy and intimacy (which, as we
have seen, is at the same time the basis of autonomous participation in society) that Luhmann sees pre-modern or traditional group-community systems
in a rather negative light, for he points out that what is characteristic of social
life in older, locally denser social systems are complex webs of relationships
“which disables the emergence of individuals, the existence of private lives,
and the escape into relations of two” (ibid., 37). All of this, of course, applies
to relational systems or webs of relationships in societies traditionally dominated by Confucianism. As we have seen in the previous parts of this chapter,
in regions that have been under the influence of Confucianism for a prolonged
period, there is a long tradition of local control emanating from the family and
broader clan structures, manifested in informal and semi-formal institutions
at the level of village and district communities. In such “premodern”44 communities, therefore, one cannot speak of intimacy or privacy in the modern
sense of these terms.
44
The term “premodern” is somewhat misleading, especially when applied to the social
structures of non-European or non-Western societies, since it latently implies that
“modernity,” which in fact and in concrete reality derives from European social and economic structures, is a necessary phase in the temporal division of historical developments, independent of the cultural origins and cultural diversity of social structures and
economic or political orders.
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The Western concept of intimacy derives from the Latin word intimus,
meaning “the furthest from the outside edge” or “the innermost part” (Glare
1983, 952). While this term has survived, for example, in my own (Slovenian)
language and also in many other European languages,45 in English, which is
a kind of lingua franca of academic terminology, it is mainly used as a word
expressing the closest connections between people or interpersonal relationships in which individuals share “their innermost parts” with their intimate
partners. The contemporary Chinese synonym for Western terms associated
with intimacy also refers exclusively to this interpersonal connotation.46 It
should also be noted that in English, unlike many other Indo-European languages, this term has lost its original meaning mentioned above, which refers
to individual human inwardness.
This use of language is somewhat peculiar, since it seems to assume that people who are not in close relationship with others cannot have access to intimacy
in the sense of the “innermost” that individuals themselves guard and protect
from the free access of others. Such a use of language is certainly the result of the
semantic evolution that led from the concept of intimacy as the deepest inner
space of the individual to its present connotation, which refers to the closest
relationships between different people. It is thus the state of a very close relationship between people that can bring about a mutual disclosure of the intimate sphere of the inner space of those who are in such a relationship. As we
shall see a little later, the original meaning of the Latin word intimus has been at
least partially transferred to the concept of privacy in English, while in numerous other Indo-European languages there is still a sharp division between the
spheres of intimacy and privacy.47 In contrast to this development, in Slovenian
and in many other European languages the term intimacy is still preserved in the
sense of the sphere of intimacy of persons, which denotes something different
from the sphere of privacy and refers to what is hidden in the deepest layers of
a person’s inner space—and is thus closer to the original Latin meaning of the
term. These are the deepest layers of thoughts and feelings, but also information that we do not want to share with others. The intimate sphere is inviolable because this realm of being human is the one most closely associated with
45
46
47
For instance, in German, Spanish or French.
亲密关系。
Let me cite, for example, a differentiation that can be observed in German not only in the
social sciences but also in legal terminology: “In German there is no term, which would
completely correspond to the English phrase “the right to privacy,” that was introduced in
1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. … The phrase “private sphere” has in theory
multiple meanings. The English word “privacy” actually refers to the intimate sphere, that
is, the private sphere in the narrower sense, and sometimes also to a part of the social
sphere” (Zhao 2015, 61).
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human dignity (Philipp et al 2017, 4). This sphere includes activities in our sexual
relationships, entries in our diaries, our attitudes towards life and death, our personal inclinations and habits, and religious beliefs (Zhao 2015, 64).
In the processes of modernization, the original meaning of the Latin word
intimus was simultaneously transferred to the word privacy in English, and
to some extent in other Western languages. As Hannah Arendt writes, “We
call private today a sphere of intimacy whose beginnings we may be able to
trace back to late Roman [period]” (Arendt 1998, 38). The modern concept of
privacy, not intimacy, is still the word in English today that stands in sharpest, most diametrical opposition to the social sphere. On the other hand, the
most important function of the modern idea of privacy is that it protects the
sphere of intimacy (ibid.), even though the latter is a hyponym of the former
in English. Thus, many contemporary authors emphasize that the notions of
intimacy (in the sense of our closest, intimate relationships with people dear
to us) and of privacy are very closely related, and that without the preservation
of privacy, interpersonal intimacy is not possible at all (Gerstein 1978, 76).
In order to clarify the historical background of these semantic transformations, which undoubtedly have important political and psychological implications, let us first take a brief look at the evolution of the terms denoting the
private, intimate, and social spheres in European culture as presented by Hannah
Arendt. She emphasizes that the private sphere in ancient Greece was limited to
family communities and households, which were perceived as separate from the
public sphere. However, the meaning of both spheres narrows in pre-modern
times when the so-called social sphere is formed, which belongs to neither the
private nor the public sphere and is the seed of nation-states (Arendt 1998, 28).
In this sense, what is most important for the context of the present book
is the fact that, in the relationship between the private and the public (which
is also the political), freedom is possible only in the latter sphere, since the
private in ancient Greece served exclusively the needs of survival and all the
related determinations that define man’s “metabolism with nature” (ibid., 98).
The public or political sphere, known as the polis, differed from the private
in that it represented the community of “equals,” whereas the private sphere
within the family or household was based on a strictly hierarchical inequality
(ibid., 32). In this framework, the term privacy (idion), which literally means
“belonging to oneself,” acquired a slightly negative connotation, as it became
associated with the idea of being cut off from certain freedoms that were only
possible in the public sphere:48
48
Hannah Arendt also points here to the etymology of the English term “privacy,” which is
further connected to the word “deprived.”
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A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted
to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully human. We no longer think primarily of
deprivation when we use the word “privacy,” and this is partly due to the
enormous enrichment of the private sphere through modern individualism. (Ibid., 38)
Thus, it is probably no coincidence that the modern, i.e. individualized,
meaning of “privacy” as the antithesis of the social rather than the public
developed primarily as an idea to protect intimacy (ibid.): “The first articulate explorer and to an extent even theorist of intimacy was Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, who, characteristically enough, is the only great author still
frequently cited by his first name alone” (ibid., 39). Rousseau came to his
discovery through his rebelliousness, which was directed not primarily
against the oppression of people by the state, but against society with its
“unbearable perversion of the human heart, its intrusion upon an innermost
region in man which until then had needed no special protection” (ibid.).
For him, intimacy and sociality were two distinct subjective forms of human
existence. This form of intimacy discovered by the Romantics was directed
against the social sphere, or rather against what it necessarily leads to with
its pressure on the individual and its demands for compliance with standards and norms, namely conformism (ibid.). In this context, the intimacy of
the individual gradually became part of the modernized public sphere and
the close relationships within it:
Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard,
even the greatest forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the
thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses—lead an uncertain,
shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. (Ibid., 49)
Thus, everything that belongs to the individual is attributed to his or her public
sphere, in which everyone is responsible only for themselves and in which—
despite the equality of all members of society—it is still possible to shine with
one’s own uniqueness and unrepeatability.
But society equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality
in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact
that society has conquered the public realm, and that distinction and difference have become private matters of the individual. (Ibid., 41)
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The concept of privacy in the contemporary sense has been transferred to the
level of individuality in the West and eventually formed through processes of
modernization in Europe and the United States in the 20th century. Here it
is worth noting the incredibly influential article entitled The Right to Privacy,
published in 1890 in the journal Harvard Law Review by legal experts Samuel
D. Warren and Louis Brandeis. In it, the authors defined the concept of privacy
as “the right to be let alone” (Warren & Brandeis 1890, 193). The right to privacy
is one of the universal human rights and is protected in all liberal democracies.
At this point, it is worth recalling the difference between the word “privacy”
in English and the word “intimacy” in many other European languages. The
English word “privacy” covers the concepts covered in German, for instance,
by two words, namely intimate sphere and private sphere (Intimsphäre, Privatsphäre), where the sphere of intimacy denotes an even narrower (i.e., even
more internal) sphere than that referred to by the term privacy.
Modern digital technologies, admittedly, can cause a fundamental reduction or often even a complete loss of privacy, which is threatened not only
by devices such as surveillance cameras and facial and motion recognition
technology, but also by a range of useful and nowadays almost indispensable
digital products that facilitate everyday life, such as smartphones and bank
cards. It is often virtually impossible to escape such ubiquitous devices from
technological control. The sphere of privacy is often even more threatened by
virtual identities that people create in online networks and that are theoretically preserved for all time, surviving even the death of the individual who
brought them into being. It is therefore no coincidence that in the shadow
of online environments, the discourse on privacy has changed from the “right
to be left alone” to the “right to be forgotten” (see e.g., Santor 2014; Pagallo &
Durante 2014).
In the Euro-American cultural sphere, fears that their virtual identities will
become objects of heteronomous manipulation in the form of diverse digital objects over which individuals have no control have certainly become one
of the main reasons for resistance to any kind of centralized use of digital
technologies by the state. In the context of this book, we can start by asking
whether these fears are exaggerated compared to the real societal benefits
when it comes to limiting pandemics and other socially relevant disasters or
crises.
Many see a viable way out of this dilemma in the possibility of founding
digital cooperatives that are structured according to grassroots democratic
principles. In such associations, digital data belong to the cooperative members, who manage and use them for purposes that do not involve control of the
individual by the community, nor do they have the exclusive goal of making a
profit, but rather are guided by the aim of achieving transparent justice for all
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members. The beginnings of such cooperatives can be found in Europe and the
United States as well as throughout Asia and especially in the Sinic region or
East Asia, with the exception of North Korea and China, where, of course, the
politics of the strong arm and general control prevail.
The idea itself, as well as the concrete practice of digital cooperatives, is
probably most prevalent in Taiwan, which also has a minister without a portfolio for Digital Affairs. Minister Tang Feng (Audrey Tang),49 who contributed
in important ways to Taiwan’s unforeseen success in limiting and stopping the
spread of the epidemic by democratically disseminating digital technologies
for disease control and tracking accessible medical devices, emphasizes the
value of digitization in the context of the widest possible consensus among
the entire population; the measures she proposed were based solely on recommendations, as no one was forced to adopt the digital applications used in
the process. Nevertheless (or precisely because of this), they were voluntarily
used by a large majority of the Taiwanese population. This is why she sees
Taiwan’s successes in fighting the epidemic, where no general quarantine or
self-isolation had to be declared and where the majority of public businesses,
shops and even venues such as pubs and restaurants remained open throughout, as a result of the grassroots use of digital technologies. Tang stresses that
forced action is by no means an effective means of combating the epidemic:
“Any top-down coercion, whether from capitalists or the state, is equally bad”
(Audrey Tang in Kim 2020, 12).
In the case of Taiwan, one of the reasons for the acceptance of digital technologies in the fight against the epidemic is certainly the confidence of the
majority of the population in the state and their fellow citizens. In China, on
the other hand, with the wide acceptance and positive evaluation of the social
credit system based on digital control, we see an idea diametrically opposed to
that of mutual trust, or privacy protection. Moreover, the Chinese online social
network WeChat is more or less ubiquitous as it increasingly becomes an indispensable part of everyday life and communication, a way to access important
information and use public infrastructures, from public transport to libraries.
A number of recent studies show that there is a high degree of what might be
called the “privacy paradox” in China:
Users’ individual privacy attitudes and behaviour in practice suggest they
have a declined sense of their own freedom and right to privacy. A privacy paradox exists when users, while holding a high level of concerns,
49
Tang is a transgender person who was known as Tang Zonghan, or Atrijus Tang before her
gender transition.
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in reality do little to further the protection of their personal information
on WeChat. We argue that once a user has ingrained part of their social
engagement within the WeChat system, the incentive for them to remain
a part of the system outweighs their requirement to secure their privacy
online as their decision-making is largely based on a simple cost-benefit
analysis. The power and social capital yielded via WeChat is too valuable
to give up as WeChat is widely used not only for private conversations,
but also for study or work-related purposes. It further blurs the boundaries between the public, the professional and the private, which is a rather
unique case compared with other social media around the world. (Chen
& Cheung 2018, 1)
The omnipresent system of social credit, which for Westerners often evokes
associations with Orwell’s society of total control, since it is also directly linked
to rewards and punishments, is widely accepted in China, and its implementation has met with little domestic criticism.50 On the other hand, it is also
worth noting that since the mid-2020s, China has begun to pass a series of laws
designed to protect individuals’ right to privacy online. Of course, these laws,
which many experts believe are far too weak and carry only symbolic weight in
practice, will apply only to individuals and companies that trade in digital data,
not to the central government, which uses the ubiquitous system to digitally
monitor citizens’ “social credibility” (see Wu 2020).
Of course, in principal attitudes towards digital objects in China—and as a
tendency across the whole Sinic cultural-linguistic area—differ considerably
from Western ones, and this is among other things surely tied to different traditional perceptions of intimacy and privacy.
In classical Chinese we find no term corresponding to intimacy in the
original European sense. The closest we find is the term neizi (内自), which
means “the inner self.” However, we find this term predominantly in Confucian sources, where it takes on an intense moral connotation as a sphere that
must be constantly reexamined in the process of cultivating one’s personality
(neizi sheng 内自省); the situation is similar when it comes to the term jixin
(己心) which refers to an individual’s “own heart-mind.” This term is used in
Confucianism as something that must be self-controlled (keji 克己), whereas
50
As mentioned above, surveys show that the system is unconditionally accepted by up to
80% of people in China, while 19% of informants remain neutral and only 1% of respondents are against the introduction of this application for the purpose of social control
(Kostka 2019, 1573). It is interesting to note that acceptance is highest among the upper
middle and upper classes, the rich and the most highly educated (ibid., 1565).
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in Buddhism it is tied to the illusory nature of the Self and therefore practically
non-existent.
Nevertheless, a parallel could be drawn between the abovementioned original meaning of intimus (i.e., “that which is furthest from the edge” or “the innermost”) and the traditional Chinese word for the self or individual (shen 身). In
the holistic classical view of the relationship between human beings, society,
and the cosmos, this term was understood as the center, which expands in concentric circles to include first the family, then the state, society, and finally the
entire cosmos (Zhang 2016, 3). For example, let us examine Mencius’s image of
such a concentric order: ‘The basis of the cosmos is the state, the basis of the
state is the family, and the basis of the family is the individual’ (Mengzi s.d.,
Li Lou I, 5).51 This is expressed even more clearly than in Mencius’ quote in
Guanzi, who describes this concentric order in reverse sequence, saying “The
cosmos is the basis of the state, the state is the basis of the districts, the districts are the basis of the families, and the families are the basis of the individuals” (Guanzi s.d., Quan Xiu 9).52 If we are dealing with individuals who are not
“ordered” at their core, if their intimacy (i.e., that which is closest to the center,
the innermost) is in a chaotic state, we will have a hard time ordering the state
and politics (ibid.).53 In this sense, this most central element of the concentrically ordered society—even if it is “that which is furthest from the margin”—is
nevertheless not comparable to intimacy, since it is politicized, or at least the
object of the desires of those in power to be politicized, ordered, and consequently controlled. A tamed intimacy is admittedly no longer an intimacy, but
something else. In this sense, the term si (私), which is now translated into
English as privacy, might be closer to intimacy than any of the three previously
given terms.
This term is much more widespread in Chinese tradition, but it usually has
a negative connotation, since nowadays it is mostly used in constructed words
expressing selfishness or egoism (zisi 自私) and exclusive focus on one’s own
interests (zisi zili 自私自利), hiding something (of one’s own) from others (yinsi
隐私), smuggling (zousi 走私), and so on. Its etymological meaning comes from
a character composed of two radicals, the first of which (he 禾) represents the
ear or seedling of a rice plant and the second (si ㄙ) means privacy in the sense
51
52
53
天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。
天下者，國之本也；國者，鄉之本也；鄉者，家之本也；家者，人之本也；
人者，身之本也；身者，治之本也。
有身不治，奚待於人？
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of what one hides from others.54 According to the Guangyun dictionary from
the Song and Ming Dynasties, one could also infer that—because of the radical
he 禾 (rice plant)—the whole character si 私 also carries the meaning of privacy in the sense of private property, as it is meant to refer to those rice plants
that are not allowed to be harvested by others (and thus remain private property of the individual, see Guanyun s.d., Si, 1). Such a connotation of the word
si 私, which thus denotes private property, stands in sharp contrast to the word
public, gong (公), which has in its entire semantic-conceptual development
in China an almost exclusively positive meaning, since it is based on justice or
equal sharing55 and can denote both a just father, ancestor, or ruler, and the
old Confucian socialist idea in which everything under heaven is public and
the property of all.56
The other radical of the character si (私) (the one on the right) has the same
pronunciation as the whole character, namely si (ㄙ). This component of the
character si (私) carries connotations of inappropriate sexual relations and
debauchery, as defined in the oldest dictionary, the Shuowen jiezi, as jianxie 姦
衺, i.e., a word meaning betrayal and deceit, composed of two characters, one
signifying adultery and the other provocative dress.
Originally, then, the Chinese understood the concept of privacy as something associated with nefarious secrets. Even in formal dictionaries of legal
terms, the word translated as privacy in English, namely si 私, is defined as
yinsi 隐私 and described as a term denoting indecent behavior in public and
illicit sexual relations, as in prostitution and adultery, or even pedophilia or
rape (Cao 2005, II).
It is not uncommon, therefore, for most people to understand privacy as
something not to be talked about in public and not to be revealed. Therefore,
when their privacy is threatened and someone tries to invade their private
sphere, they tend to ignore it as long as it does not cross tolerable boundaries. As a result, they often resolve such issues themselves rather than in
a court of law. Moreover, the privacy protection system in China is still too
54
55
56
This radical (namely, si ㄙ) also occurs in the term comparable to the Western notion of
public, namely, the word gong 公. According to the dictionary Shuowen jiezi, gong, which
is composed of the radical si and a roof or something that covers everything (ba 八), represents the opposite of what is expressed by si. Here the authors cite Han Feizi, who writes
that the word gong 公 (i.e., public), meaning the equal division, is opposite (bei 背) to the
term si ㄙ (i.e., that which is hidden or forbidden to the public, see Shuowen jiezi s.d., 716).
The definition of this term in the Shuowen jiezi dictionary (Ba bu 516) is as follows: 公: 平
分也 (The public is evenly divided.).
天下為公 (Li ji s.d., Li Yun, 1).
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weak and incomplete. All of this is an obstacle to the establishment of an allencompassing and efficient protection system in this area (ibid.).
On the other hand, privacy was considered an important virtue even in classical Confucianism. In the Confucian Analects, for example, we can read, “Do
not look, do not listen, do not say, and do not do what is not in accordance with
ritual propriety” (Lunyu s.d., Yanyuan 1).57 In the original Confucianism, it was
important that everyone in private only cared about the things that concerned
themselves. Rumor mongering and malicious gossip were therefore considered immoral.
Many authors (e.g., Tang & Dong 2006; Jin 1994) emphasize other aspects
of traditional morality, pointing out that pre-modern China never developed
the concept of individual privacy because of relational ethics. Instead, privacy
was only important in the context of the family, which, as we have seen, was an
important and fundamental unit of social ethics.
Thus, the Chinese tend to define public and private in abstract ethical
terms, while the Westerners tend to define them in sociospatial terms.
Similarly, Liang (1987) argued that members within the Chinese family
are clearly differentiated from nonfamily members. Holding back family information from nonfamily members is considered a virtue in the
Chinese culture. On the other hand, holding back information from family members, especially from the family head, is considered a violation of
family tradition. Hence, privacy in China is not an issue for individuals
but an issue for the family. (Tang & Dong 2006, 289)
As discussed earlier, such a model of familial privacy is based on the ethic of
relationality or relationalism, and as we have seen in the previous parts of this
book, such relationalism is linked to the paradigm of society or community
in relation to the individual. It is therefore worth pausing to consider what
social distancing and isolation, which are two of the most important measures
for limiting the spread of the pandemic, mean in Sinic and in Euro-American
societies, respectively.
Psychologists and anthropologists usually believe that social distancing is
a major challenge for all people, with the consequences being worst for the
poor and those in precarious employment, for those who, despite the measures enacted, must continue to work in jobs that are important to society, and
for people who fear loneliness and/or are subject to domestic violence.
57
非禮勿視，非禮勿聽，非禮勿言，非禮勿動。
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Feelings of anxiety, loneliness and depression are present in the process of
isolation all over the world, even though they have different roots in different
cultures and manifest themselves in different forms.58
Donald Low, a behavioral economist at the Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology (HKUST), has written that social distancing, working from
home, and mandated minimization of social contact placed a significant cognitive and behavioral burden on people living in Hong Kong, and as a result,
work efficiency decreased as people tired more quickly (Zheng 2020, 2). Furthermore, as social distancing is an extreme measure and isolation can have
many negative consequences for mental health, it is important that people
remain in contact with others as much as possible even under these restrictive
conditions (ibid.).
Of course, this is by no means a peculiarity of Hong Kong or even of Sinic
space as a whole. The reactions to isolation are always the same, just as the
fear on which feelings of anxiety and depression are based are the same
everywhere. When it comes to fear, we are dealing with a universal reaction.
Whether someone is from Hong Kong or from Italy, their amygdala—the brain
center responsible for fear—is the same size. From an evolutionary point of
view, we are all the same in this psychological sense (ibid.).
We were also united by the isolation and suspension of normal life in the
face of the pandemic. First, we have all found ourselves globally in a position
of all-encompassing isolation from social life and thus from the public sphere.
Our privacy has become completely subjectivized, as digital contact does not
allow for closer formation and maintenance of interpersonal bonds, which
requires physical contact, whether through work or simply socializing. This
subjectification of the private can be amplified and multiplied in the home
and family, as our subjectivity can never grow beyond the narrow confines of
isolation to become something that could leave a lasting impression in the
public sphere.
In this way, our private sphere has become a prison that cannot replace
what happens outside of it and can never perceive the actual reality, which is
much more than the sum of individual aspects of life and digital images of our
fellow human beings. Even if, on a purely formal level, this situation seems to
be the same for most people, in reality it is not even close to being the same:
and I don’t just mean the different concrete positions that necessarily lead to
essential and often vital differences between the minority of those of us who
58
For more detailed information on the differences between ancient Chinese feelings
of “concerned consciousness” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識) and the anxiety that is widespread in modern Western societies, see Sernelj 2021.
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are privileged and for whom the pandemic and the corresponding isolation
pose no threat to their lives and existence, and the majority who are genuinely
in precarious positions: The lowest social classes, the majority of the population in economically underdeveloped countries, women and children who
are victims of violence in their own homes, the elderly, people with disabilities, those who work in the medical field, and so on. Moreover, everyone is left
alone with their own subjectivity, and this paralyzes us in our most intimate
human essence, which no longer has access to the “real world.” The latter can
only reveal itself to us if the objects in it can be seen, heard and felt by many
people from different perspectives, while the identity (or “being”) of these
objects does not change. The reality of our common world is then something
that can supposedly only be brought about by a kind of common (or equal)
“being” of all the people who live in it: for the vital basis of our life is rooted
precisely in the fact that, as members of the same community, whether local
or global, we speak of the same objects without being prevented from doing
so by the differences of our starting positions. If we lose this objectivity, if the
sameness of these objects can no longer be identified and defined, then nothing will be able to save our common human world, least of all the idea of a
supposed “common nature” of all human beings. The precondition for such
an understanding, paradoxical as it may sound, is precisely the diversity of our
individual lives and our unique and unrepeatable contributions to objective
reality. For the identity (or “being”) of each object, its permanent “sameness”
with itself, can only be preserved by being constantly reflected in the mirror of
human plurality. The destruction of these plural foundations of being human
can occur, as Hannah Arendt prophetically wrote more than half a century
ago, “under conditions of radical isolation, where no one can any longer agree
with another, as is usually the case in tyrannies” (Arendt 1998, 58). On the other
hand, this can also happen under mass hysteria, where people agree with each
other and where everyone extends and strengthens the positions of those close
to them instead of thinking for themselves.
In both cases, the person becomes completely private without even being
able to perceive what is being shown, presented, and spoken by others. In this
sense, it makes no difference whether the basic unit of this new privacy established within the pandemic’s ubiquitous “new normal” is the individual, the
family, or the household. In the general isolation that serves the measures to
limit the spread of the pandemic, everyone becomes more and more enclosed
in the narrow world of their own subjectivity, which draws its existence only
from their unique but solitary experiences. And such experiences are always
unique, both in the sense that they are unrepeatable and unambiguous. This
fact does not change in the slightest, even if the same experience is experienced
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countless times in the consciousness of countless people in countless different
ways (ibid.). This double-edged univocity of experience necessarily leads to
the end of the world of our common humanity, which cannot exist in univocal
conceptions of reality. To be human is always to be existentially dependent on
the plurality and diversity of all the different human perspectives.
Chapter 5
Restructuring the Axiology of Global Ethics: On a
Winding Path from Transcultural to Global Ethics
This concluding chapter will focus primarily on examining the broader, transcultural applicability of what we have called the Sinic Confucian relational
ethics. It addresses the question of how the relational ethical model could
be integrated into the value system of contemporary global ethics without
reproducing the still dominant normativity of Western epistemology and its
corresponding axiology. I suggest that this integration of relationism into the
general framework of global ethics could be done by applying the aforementioned method of transcultural philosophical sublation. Starting from different
frames of reference that define the basic tenets of modern Western and traditional Chinese axiology, I shall demonstrate the application of this method on
the example of different conceptions of the human self, which is a basis of any
ethical theory.
As we have seen, in this book I have argued for transcultural approaches
because, in contrast to the more general notions of cross-cultural and intercultural philosophies, they explicitly aim to overcome the traditional, i.e., static
and immobile, notion of culture. Within this framework, I propose to critically
modify traditional comparative methods, most of which are still based on
Western evaluation criteria and methods, and to develop them further through
certain new methodological approaches. Although at first glance it seems that
a global ethics should represent a kind of synthesis of the many different ethical systems that have emerged in the course of different cultural traditions and
histories, such a synthesis is not easy to achieve. One of the main reasons for
this difficulty lies in the fact that global ethics, as we saw in the first chapter, is
still dominated by Western axiological criteria.
Hence, in my endeavor to gradually integrate certain crucial elements of Confucian relationism into global axiology, I will rather use a new approach which I
tentatively call the method of transcultural sublation. Although the term “sublation,” like the term “synthesis,” is also part of the Hegelian lines of thought
and therefore could be problematic, it is much less invalidated. On the other
hand, it encompasses all three concepts that are crucial to any process of creating something new from the interactions between two or more different objects
or phenomena. In this philosophical sense, it has the three connotations of
arising, eliminating, and preserving. Moreover, the term “sublation,” as opposed
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_007
Restructuring the Axiology of Global Ethics
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to “synthesis,” refers to a process rather than a phase. For all these reasons, I
believe that a “philosophy of sublation” can better and more accurately denote
new forms of cross-cultural philosophizing than any kind of simple “synthesis.”
The sublation method is tightly linked to two other methods that are, in
my view, also important parts of transcultural discourses. The first is linked
to the awareness of the different culturally conditioned frameworks of reference, which have been introduced in earlier parts of this book. Indeed, different cultures produce different referential frameworks, which are, on the other
hand, linked to different methodologies applied in the process of perceiving,
understanding and interpreting reality. As we have seen, a referential framework in this sense can be defined as a relational structure of concepts, categories, terms, and ideas, as well as values, which are applied in the cognitive
processing of the objects of comprehension. It also includes paradigms and
perspectives that influence and define the comprehension and evaluation of
particular semantic elements within this structure, as well as the structure as a
whole. The knowledge of these frameworks enables scholars to apply in their
interpretations the method of so-called discursive translation, which is not
limited to a verbatim linguistic transfer, but must include the interpretation of
specific textual/speech structures, categories, concepts and values existing in
diverse socio-cultural contexts.
1
Backgrounds
In recent years, much research has been done on different ethical models that
have historically evolved in different cultural traditions, but without exploring
how they can be integrated into a global axiological context still dominated by
the (pre-)modern values of the Western Enlightenment and its paradigms of
individual-based morality.
In today’s world, however, these research agendas are of utmost importance
because as we have seen, it is becoming increasingly clear that current crises
are global problems which must be addressed within the larger framework of
global cooperation and solidarity. Thus, it is by no means coincidental that
debates about a new universal ethics are booming. The idea of a global ethics
that is supposed to function as an interculturally valid moral regulator of economic globalization is also currently enjoying much popularity. Against this
rich, but simultaneously limited research background, it is certainly worthwhile to investigate new possibilities of integrating Confucian ethical paradigms into the global ethics discourse. Although some solid research has been
done into this ethics (see below), a new paradigm of incorporating its crucial
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elements into a global scale of ethical regulations on an interpersonal as well
as broader social level has yet to be established.
The abovementioned lively interest in ethics and the search for binding standards for a global civil society also stands in sharp contrast to the erosion of
social cohesion, traditional norms and standards within local societies that can
currently be observed worldwide. The philosophical and political discourse on
universally valid ethical standards for a humane civil society is thus intended
to compensate for the moral and social disintegrations and aporias that have
de facto emerged in the structure of today’s post-industrial societies and in the
wake of a now global capitalism. Even though the economic rationality of the
global market economy has proven to be a powerful driver of social change and
dissolution in this process, it can only be understood as a means to achieve
higher-level goals of action and not as a goal or even an end in itself of human
existence. It is obvious that economic globalization—also from the perspective
of its actors—requires ethical regulation by superordinate horizons of meaning.
The theoretical search for global ethics thus ultimately arises from economic constraints, for the globalization of the economy, technology, and the
media automatically requires a globalization of ethics in the sense of a necessary minimum of common ethical norms. This raises the question of where
these norms or standards are to come from when economic-technological
interdependencies, in their pervasive utilitarian logic, have dissolved local
commitments and ways of life worldwide. In this sense, all references to the
common moral substance of all theories with universal claims remain limited
to the framework of global structures and relations of economic, political, and
axiological domination, and thus these theoretical discourses raise more questions than they can answer.
As we will see below, the application of the method of sublation aims—inter
alia—at overcoming such an impasse as the relationship between universal
and relativistic ethics, a construct that can be observed in numerous contemporary research results. In fact, both categories are rooted in the established
and still prevailing global power relations and their axiological implications.
These power relations continue to manifest themselves in the West’s dominance in epistemological, scientific, and ideational interactions and exchanges
with Eastern Asia and the Global South.
Indeed, we must realize that in the context of the current dynamics of
progress, we can hardly think about “Europe” without adopting a global philosophical and ethical perspective. Yet, although much research has been conducted in recent decades on various issues of traditional East Asian, especially
Confucian, ethics, only a few studies (e.g., Bell 2010; Elstein 2015a; Lee 2014)
have focused upon a possible reconstruction and renewal of some of their
Restructuring the Axiology of Global Ethics
135
basic principles in order to integrate them into a normative system suitable
for contemporary societies. A tendency of such reconstructions was clearly
visible since the dawn of the 20th century within the intellectual current of
New Confucianism (Xin Ruxue 新儒學), which was defined as the search for
a synthesis between Western and traditional East Asian thought in order to
develop a system of ideas and values capable of solving the social and political
problems of the modern, increasingly globalized world. Philosophers belonging to this school of thought have attempted to reconcile “Western” and “traditional Chinese” ethical norms and principles to create a theoretical model of
modernization that cannot be confused or equated with “Westernization.” On
such foundations, we need to build upon, develop, and upgrade the research
already conducted by the major proponents of this school of thought, which
was followed by a broader and more general development of the academic
field known as the Confucian (or Ruist) revival.
Li Zehou also posited a number of important theories on specific Confucian
ethical models and proposed several new, highly influential paradigms for interpreting classical Chinese ethical thought. For the main research agenda of the
present book, his elaborations and explanations of the notion of relationism
(guanxizhuyi 關係主義) are of crucial importance (see Li 1980; 1995; 2010).
A similar concept regarding classical Confucian ethics was proposed by
Heiner Roetz, particularly in his studies on Chinese ethics of the Axial Age, and
on the impact of its central tenets on Chinese and Sinic modernity (see Roetz
1993, 2017), and on the pragmatic character of Confucian ethics (see Roetz 2013).
His work on Axial Age ethics is particularly important in the transcultural perspective, especially because of his important critique of Jasper’s concept of the
Axial Age in relation to the historical and social conditions of the establishment of ancient Chinese ethics, while his work on Confucian pragmatism is
crucial for clarifying the question of the fundamental nature and social function of Confucian ethics and its possible transcultural connotations. Indeed,
the latter category of Roetz’s work serves as an important critique of the communitarian interpretation of Confucian ethics. According to Roetz, such an
interpretation is part of a counter-discourse to the European Enlightenment.
In his view, however, such explanations do not do justice to pragmatism’s
actual indebtedness to the Enlightenment. Therefore, these works propose a
specific approach that differs from the prevailing ways of thinking in the study
of classical Confucian ethics.
The most influential proponents of the opposite approach are David L. Hall
and Roger T. Ames (see especially Hall and Ames 1987; 1995; 1998; 2018). In
developing their “focus-field” model of the Confucian Self, they are more oriented toward pragmatic symbolic interactionism. Their model is based on the
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ars contextualis paradigm of Chinese philosophical thought, which in turn can
be productively contrasted with Western systems of “general ontology” and a
“science of universal principles.”
Both of the above approaches (i.e., Roetz’s along with Hall and Ames’) are
important and useful. In spite of their mutual differences, their respective basic
systems should not necessarily be viewed as controversial opposites, but rather
as complementary methods of analysis and interpretation. Both perspectives
on the above material can therefore constitute parts of the basic theoretical
framework of developing new models of global axiology, arguing—among
other issues—for the relevance of pragmatist doctrines to the ongoing project
of a critical modern “reconstruction” and not merely a restoration of classical Confucian ethics. Both approaches are important because they emphasize
that Confucianism, despite its ancient origins, is a living ethical tradition with
contemporary relevance. These aspects were also highlighted in the collection
of essays edited by Kam-por Yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously (2010).
Traditional Confucian ethics cannot be fully equated with any of the classical European ethical discourses, but on the other hand, it contains many of
their respective elements and can be seen as a combination of several such
disciplines—some scholars see it as closely related to deontological ethics
(e.g., Lee 2014), others to virtue ethics (e.g., Huang Yong 2016; 2020). As we
approach the goal of integrating Confucian relationism into the framework of
global axiology, we need to consider all of these aspects.
Proceeding from the relational character of the Confucian ethics, Roger T.
Ames and Henry Rosemont developed the concept of so-called role-ethics,
which is, as we have already observed, based on a careful analysis of classical Confucian moral philosophy and represents one of the most innovative
and productive contemporary interpretations of the elementary structure
and social connotations of Confucian ethics (e.g. Rosemont and Ames 2016).
Although developed only recently, these fundamental works have already
become classics in relation to the concept of role ethics and inspired many
other interpretations of certain aspects and consequences of this type of ethics. Within such a framework, the Confucian role ethics is seen as an attempt
to formulate a sui generis ethical system that gives this tradition its own voice.
Both scholars emphasize that this processual, holistic philosophy is based on
the primacy of relationality and therefore poses a challenge to the basic liberal
individualism that has defined people as discrete, autonomous, rational, free,
and often self-interested agents.
As mentioned above, further development of the comparative perspective
is also important. In this regard, three edited volumes containing research
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results from many eminent scholars should be mentioned, namely the special
issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy on the comparative origins of classical Chinese and Greek ethics (see Cheng Chung-ying 2002), and an important book on classical Confucian ethics and its comparison with discourses
based on the individual self and individual rights, with the title Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (Shun and Wong
2004). An important anthology dealing with comparisons between ancient
Confucian moral philosophy and ethics on the one hand and contemporary
Western ethics on the other is also the book Encountering China (Sandel and
D’Ambrosio 2018).
Since this book deals with China and partly some other neighboring societies, which were historically heavily influenced by certain elements of Chinese
culture, and especially by Confucianism, we also need to be familiar with the
historical and theoretical works that explored the process of spreading Confucian ethical thought and culture from China to other Sinic countries and
regions. There is a large amount of literature in this research area, and in this
regard, but in my work on this topic, I have mainly considered the works of the
few main Sinophone theorists in this field. In this context, I mainly proceed
from the theoretical concepts developed by Huang Chun-chieh in his transcultural Sinic methodology (see Huang Chun-chieh 2005; 2014; 2018) such as
the notions of “decontextualization,” “recontextualization,” and “glocal knowledge.” It was also important to look into the Confucian influence in the process of East Asian modernization. In this regard, Tu Wei-ming’s studies (e.g.,
1991, 1996), are of utmost importance. In this vast panorama of interregional
comparisons and interactions, we also have to mention the influential anthology titled The East Asian region: Confucian heritage and its modern adaptation,
which was edited by Gilbert Rozman and published in 2014.
2
First Steps
On the basis of this rich material that has already elaborated in many different
ways on several of the most important questions of Confucian ethics and its
relational models, we seem to be well-equipped enough to provide a critical
introduction of Confucian ethical thought into Western scholarship and, more
importantly, to incorporate it into discourses on new models of global ethics. However, these endeavors are far from reducing the complex relationship
between “universalist ethics” on the one hand and local “Confucian ethics” on
the other to some minimal moral standards, norms, or “values.” It seems much
more sensitive to discuss it from the perspective of alternative social structures
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and ways of life that resist the assimilationist tendencies of Western ethical
discourses by offering new forms of intellectual and life-world experience—
that is, a different ethos.
In this context, it is important to distinguish between the concepts of global
ethics on the one hand and universal ethics on the other. We must critically
question the project of a “universal” ethics, since it is inherently and (unnecessarily) unifying and slides into the search for some fundamental principles, values and virtues. In this regard, we need to find a way of deepening
and broadening transcultural approaches, which means building the foundations of a global ethics on more inclusive forms of human interactions, such
as Henry Rosemont’s (2015) proposal to apply the concept of “homoversal”
instead of “universal.”
The problematic nature of “universal ethics” is already evident in the contemporary conceptualization of the term “moral values” as such. It originated
in economics and was imported into moral philosophy only in the late 19th
century, and since today it can no longer be associated with a positive historical goal, its function is rather negative and destructive. It is limited to the incessant defense against the constant threat of paternalistic systems of meaning
based on the supposedly universal concepts of individual autonomy, freedom,
and self-determination, as well as on all other central rights developed as part
of the Western Enlightenment. On the other hand, this attitude has also led
to the dangers of radical ethical relativism, which at first glance is based on
principles of egalitarian diversity, but in reality—due to its fundamentally still
Eurocentric criteria—is misleading, discriminatory, and therefore problematic.
In the context of this book, the term global ethics is used in the sense of an
axiological framework that encompasses many aspects of various culturally
conditioned normative systems and is not limited to individual rights and freedoms. This, of course, implies elements drawn from different ethical systems
and principles, and cannot be limited to the tenets of Confucian relational ethics, which is the core interest of this book. A new global ethics should therefore
also take into account various globally valuable and ethical principles found
in Islamic, African, indigenous American, and other cultures that can benefit
contemporary globalized humanity.
Apart from the fact that the dominance of Western axiology is a relic of
the colonial and postcolonial period, which was developed in the course of
modernization along Western lines and has spread in this form to virtually all
regions of the world, one of the main reasons why the Confucian model of relational ethics has been systematically marginalized and misinterpreted so far is
the fact that it does not represent a system based on some “other moral values,”
but is rather rooted in a different ontology of human and social existence.
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I believe that Sinic ethical models could make an extremely valuable contribution to such a system of a new global ethics, which could better address the multiple cultural, socio-political, environmental, epistemological, and moral crises of
the contemporary world. A transcultural approach can critically and constructively challenge prevailing models of social structure based on individualism. In
the earlier parts of this book, I have already shown that traditional Confucian
ethical models are not based on collectivist social structures, as is widely assumed
in the West, but are rather rooted in relational ethics, which is based on the concept of an individual person whose identity is constituted by and emerges from
relationships with fellow human beings. In this context, it is important to refer to
the notion of “relational self” and introduce its significance to Western and global
scholarship.
The reasons for our stepping onto this path of integrating relationism into
the discourses on global ethics are tightly linked the general crises faced by
humanity in today’s globalized age. These various crises are, of course, interrelated. At the time of writing this book, not only the explosive spread of the
pandemic, but later on, also the Russian attack on Ukraine, have—each in
their own way—underscored the urgent need to develop methods and forms
of supranational collaborative models and problem-solving strategies. Among
other things, the pandemic alone has already demonstrated that one of the
most effective tools in the fight against such diseases, taken by governments
of all countries, is precisely interpersonal solidarity, which must also include a
certain degree of self-discipline. Such attitudes also play a significant role in all
pacifist endeavors to make an end to military conflicts, and they have certainly
played a role in the strategies used by Sinic societies to control, and in some
cases even eliminate, the spread of the coronavirus. And, as we have shown
in previous parts of this book, the effectiveness of the crises solution strategies cannot be primarily attributed to autocratic political orders, but rather to
interpersonal attitudes and interactions that are still influenced by traditional
relationism and the corresponding view of the complementary and interdependent relation between the individual and society. Although it is clear
that the autocratic systems of PR China and North Korea have used a range of
repressive measures in dealing with the pandemics, we do not have enough
reliable and transparent data on their effectiveness.1 On the other hand, the
governments of several “soft” Sinic democracies, such as Taiwan, South Korea,
post-colonial Hong Kong, and Singapore, have taken no such measures and yet
1 China’s response to Covid-19 has certainly saved lives, but this was done at great cost to
mental and physical health and wellbeing of its population. It is therefore more than understandable that China’s policy of zero Covid has had many critics inside and outside of China.
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have been very successful in containing the spread of the virus. It is therefore
safe to assume that the reasons for the above-mentioned discrepancy have less
to do with concrete current political orders than with traditional ethical systems that have emerged and prevail in the various cultural and linguistic areas
influenced by Confucianism.
Here, the contrastive analysis, which represents (as will be shown below)
the first segment of the sublation method, could prove itself as a useful tool.
Indeed, a contrasting view of the model of individualistically defined ethics on
the one hand and relational role ethics on the other may offer new opportunities to gain deeper insights into the general factors that determine the understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. Moreover, this
type of analysis can provide us with an efficient differentiation tool for the theoretical selection of positive factors and for the elimination or modification of
those strategies that prove to be insufficient. These operational tools will serve
us as valuation criteria for the creation of a theoretical framework that will
not only provide a good basis for further research, but, above all, an effective
method for putting this transcultural knowledge into practice, especially in the
fields of legislation and education.
In the next step, we must consider that the classical Confucian model of
the “relational self” is deeply embedded in traditional role-ethics, which is
the fundamental paradigm of Sinic ethical relationism. We need to remember
(see Rošker 2021) that such a model of social roles, which is informed by ethical normativity, shapes a relational network rooted in the specific, culturally
conditioned ideals of individual moral emotions on the one hand and social
empathy on the other. In this context, the specific features of Confucian models of hierarchy and their impact on existing patterns of social discrimination,
e.g., in relation to gender roles are also important.2
2 It is certain that the Confucian relational ethics involves hierarchies. Relational ethics has its
roots in family relationships based on structural inequality between parents and children.
Analogously, such a hierarchical structure is also projected onto the relationships between
superiors and their subjects in Ruist political philosophy. Theoretically, the structure of these
hierarchical models is based not on attitudes or expectations of absolute authority and corresponding obedience, but on the responsibility of superiors to their subordinates, for it is
modeled on the basic pattern of the parent-child relationship, in which the authority of the
former is based on experience and loving care, while the attitude of the latter is grounded in
natural dependence. But these are, of course, only the theoretical paradigms of Confucian
ethics. In later Ruist practice, especially during periods of autocratic regimes, they were (and
still are) frequently and continuously misused to legitimize absolutist rule. In this regard,
it is—once again!—important to consider and emphasize significant differences between
Confucian philosophical theory and Ruist political practice.
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Sublating traditional Confucian ethical models and integrating them into
global discourses also means shedding light on the current needs and demands
of contemporary societies in order to find new ways of understanding interpersonal and intercultural interactions that could help us develop new models of cooperation and solidarity as new strategies against current and future
global crises. These requirements are certainly linked to the urgent need to
resolve the bankruptcy of the current model of liberal democracy and its close
connection to the global economy, with its deeply unjust system of production
and reproduction of wealth and poverty, freedom and chains, war and peace.
3
Sublating Relationism
As we have seen, the traditional comparative methods have several shortcomings, concerning both their methodological and axiological principles.
Therefore, the model of comparison must be developed in the sense that it
overcomes these shortcomings and also the mere identification of similarities
and differences between the two comparanda.
After months (if not years) of heated debates, it seems high time for scholars working on transcultural philosophy to develop certain methodological
and theoretical innovations in this field of research. In this context, I propose
to elaborate and apply a new methodological paradigm that can be used in
transcultural philosophy and ethics. I tentatively refer to this paradigm as the
method of transcultural philosophical sublation. Here, this new method will
be applied in the concrete procedure of integrating traditional Confucian
relational ethics into current discourses and debates on the possibilities and
methods of developing new models of global ethics and their productive transformation in light of current global developments in the search for global solutions to global crises.
Problems related to contemporary global ethics are thus viewed through the
lens of transcultural philosophy in the narrower field of Chinese, particularly
Confucian studies. As we have seen, the methods employed in transcultural
approaches aim to “transcend,” that is, to surpass and overcome the rigid, isolating, and essentialist notion of culture (Silius 2020, 275). At the same time,
the suffix “trans-” also refers to the possibility of a transformation of the cultures under observation or comparison.
As already indicated, I will proceed here from the assumption that the ontology of culture is not based on an immutable substance, but on the relations
between different factors that constitute it as a category. Such an understanding is based on the fact that different communities, shaped and developed in
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the course of their respective historical and geopolitical developments, form
different cosmologies, language structures, and frames of reference. Transcultural research is therefore a process that goes beyond the orthodox, static
formulation of culture and thus opens up the possibility of creating new horizons for theorizing content that originally belonged to separate systems or
categories.
However, this does not mean that there are no different cultures. Different
cultures are still something real, just like different languages or grammatical
and cognition structures. They are all dynamic, constantly evolving and changing entities that form the ideational context of human life in individual communities and societies. The same is true for the highly contested concept of
cultural identity (see Jullien 2016; Heubel 2021). In our quest to integrate Sinic
ethical models into the framework of global ethics, one must also critically
question the prevailing argument that “a culture has no identity because it is
constantly changing” (Jullien 2016, 20). Instead, I subscribe to Fabian Heubel’s
idea that a culture can only change if and because it has identity(ies) and
constantly produces them (Heubel 2021). However, this does not mean that
identity is a “phantasm.” Rather, identities are ways of being, and denying their
existence is not only naïve, but can also lead to a dangerous denial of reality.
But my aim is not to limit transcultural philosophy to the level of such cultural identities, even if they are changeable and dynamic. I want to find out
in what way we can integrate Sinic relationism into the field of global ethics,
which I understand as a system of certain basic ethical standards that can connect and be shared by people from different cultures, religions, and nations
enabling them to face global crises in a constructive way. In doing so, I would
like to apply the methods recently developed within the framework of transcultural post-comparative philosophy (Kahteran and Weber 2021, 214), which
aims to overcome certain problems associated with traditional intercultural
comparisons.
Traditional comparisons are often seen as problematic, because they tend
to work with a unifying methodology and a single philosophical language,
which they then apply to culturally concrete and diverse material. In my view,
however, the core problem is much deeper and much more complex, because
the methodology in question is a system underlying one of the philosophies
being compared, namely the Western one. There is no third, “objective” methodology. Thus, the tertium comparationis in terms of the methodology chosen
and the axiological criteria for evaluating the two (or more) comparanda is
determined by one of them, and usually by the one belonging to the Western
philosophical discourses. On the basis of a thorough reflection and analysis of
such problems inherent in traditional cross-cultural comparative procedures,
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I have tried to develop a method of transcultural sublation that belongs to the
new models of transcultural philosophizing called postcomparative philosophies. Such methods aim to develop new forms of transcultural philosophizing
and to overcome the impasses of traditional comparative philosophy through
procedures of “conceptual comparison” instead of relying only on the “comparison of concepts.”
As I have explained elsewhere (2022), the transcultural sublation method
can be carried out in five steps:
– Step 1: Similarities—first we identify the similarities between the two
comparanda.
– Step 2: Differences—then we identify the differences between them by looking at the main paradigms of the frames of reference to which they belong.
– Step 3: Dialectic of eliminating and preserving—in the next step we eliminate certain aspects of the two comparanda and preserve certain other
elements.
– Step 4: Sublation—the process established in steps 1 to 3 leads us to a cognitive shift that is the prerequisite for the possibility of realizing step 5.
– Step 5: New insight—this new insight is the result of the shift accomplished
in step 4. This new insight may manifest itself in one or more new ideas,
propositions, or theses. (ibid.)
Unlike most other elaborations and developments of the comparative method,
and also unlike traditional dialectics, which follows more or less automatic
principles, the sublation method is not guided by a programmed process of
necessary change. It does not follow strict and unchanging regular principles.
While steps 1 and 2 are still relatively fixed, steps 3 and 4 are based on the
subjective decision of the person using the method. This creative subjectivity
allows for the emergence of additional, often unprecedented insights. Unlike
most methods that follow the strict principles of formal logic based on the laws
of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle, and rooted in the ontology
of being as substance, this method is based on the arbitrary decision made
by a subjective (and free) mind. Drawing on Ralph Weber’s conceptualization
of the “tertium” (Weber 2014), Vytis Silius explains the position (and implications) of such “free” subjectivity as follows:
What is important in this observation, is that if we keep in mind that this
“third”—the comparer—can never be neutral, we better embrace that
she is rather proactive, that is, that she intentionally directs her research.
It means that such a proactive researcher is not “comparing” two external
positions with respect to a neutral “third” position, but is really forging
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her own philosophical position. She might be drawing inspiration and
insight from the first two (in positive or negative manner), but in the
end—and most importantly—the outcome is a new and current (present) philosophical position. (Silius 2021, 268)
Here, of course, we are confronted with the old divide between the (natural)
sciences and the humanities. Although both are academic discourses that
must follow a coherent logic and certain principles, the former applies primarily a quantitative methodology, the latter a qualitative one.
Against this background, let us try to show in what way relationism could
be integrated into the axiological system of global ethics through a process
of sublation. Relationism is, of course, a broad category that includes various
elements. It is a social model, comparable to individualism. Although in our
attempt to integrate Confucian ethics into the framework of global ethical
discourse we might try to sublate individualism and relationism, and in this
way possibly arrive at a new, less rigid and more inclusive model of ethics suitable for today’s world, the two categories are simply too broad to be sublated
in their entirety and at once. Actually, individualism and relationism can be
seen as two different frameworks of reference, which also include different
semantic connotations of concepts and notions that constitute the respective
pattern or network of the two frameworks. Therefore, we must start from certain particular elements that make up these two systems, and then gradually
work our way to the extremely complex entities that make up relationism as
a totality of a social structure or system. In this essay, I begin by sublating two
different conceptions of personhood that underlie individualism and relativism, respectively.
1.
Similarities: The human Self as an individual person.
2. Differences: Self as abstract and independent individual vs. Self as relational and interdependent individual.
3. Dialectic of elimination and preservation: Elimination of independence,
preservation of interdependence. From this arises the problem of human
rights.
4. Sublation: Human rights are important and must be preserved, but there
is no necessary and direct connection between the types of social structures on the one hand and the types of institutional orders on the other.
5. New insight: The concept of human rights must be expanded to include
the rights of the interdependent relational Self.
Ad 1. Similarities: The human Self as an individual. In both systems, the importance of human beings is of central importance. They both proceed from
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human personhood as an individual Self. This is because the concept of personhood contains a general mode of self-reflection or self-understanding. In
this sense, the similarity is that both systems include specific conceptualizations of what is called the human Self, which can be defined by its ability to
turn inward and engage in self-reflection, by its ability to form interpersonal
relations with other human Selves, as well as by its executive function as an
agent that makes choices, exerts control, and engages in self-regulation. The
human Self as such always refers to an individual person. This is why it can be
stated that individualism, as well as relationism, both proceed from the notion
of the individual Self as regards the basic constitution of personhood.
Ad 2. Differences: Independent Self vs. relational Self. If we consider the
frame of reference of individualism and relationalism, respectively, we can
easily see the following differences in the conceptualization of the individual
human Self. In the two systems considered, the individual human Self can be
understood either as separate from other human beings (an isolated and independent individual) or as connected to them in a relational network that forms
communities and societies. In the first case, the individual’s identity is constituted by his or her pure self-reference (independent, isolated Self); in the
second case, it is constituted by the relationships that the individual lives in
society (relational Self). Let us briefly highlight the origins as well as the implications of these differences. The two systems are based on two possible ways
of relating the individual to society. The first proceeds from a dialectics based
upon a method, grounded in the strict Cartesian separation of res extensa and
res cogitans, which has been placed into a model of mutually exclusive opposites. In this model, the individual Self is viewed as being in contradiction with
society. In this view, the autonomy of the individual Self is possible only if it
can maintain its independence from society, whose actions are considered
heteronomous with respect to the Self. The second assumes a dialectic of correlative complementarity, in which the individual Self is in an interdependent
and mutually complementary relationship with the social network in which
it is embedded, that is, with the community and with society. In such a system, autonomy can only be achieved within this complementary relationship
between the individual and society. This does not mean that the individual Self
cannot be autonomous. Since the interests and concerns of the Self cannot be
separated from the interests and demands of its relational social networks, the
autonomy of the relational Self is also relational. As long as society is not something that is external to the individual Self, it is not considered a heteronomous
entity, i.e., as something external.
Ad 3. Dialectic of elimination and preservation: Independence vs. interdependence. Given these similarities and differences, we will retain the concept
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of the individual Self, which is central to both systems under consideration. On
the other hand, we eliminate from this concept the character of independence,
which is an important feature of the abstracted and isolated Self, and preserve
the concept of interdependence, which is a main condition of a relational Self.
In doing so, we start from the assumption that this independence is in fact an
illusion, because no individual can survive completely outside society. Therefore, abstract concepts may not be an appropriate basis for real life decisions
and actions. By taking away the very concept of independence from the individual, we have in effect eliminated the conceptual basis of modern Western
individualism, whose relationship with society is contractual, as if they were
partners in some kind of business relationship. In this context, we have actually eliminated this kind of individualism that underlies the constitution of
liberal democracy. On the other hand, relationism, based on the interdependence we have retained, represents a more realistic way of linking the individual and society, but one that can easily be abused for the interests of state
and government precisely because the individual is so closely embedded in the
social web. Relationism has often led to autocratic (or even totalitarian) social
orders precisely because of its possible embedding in networks of hierarchical
social structures. In theory, relationism has been associated with meritocratic
governments and political orders, but in practice they have never prevailed.
We are dealing here with a somewhat paradoxical situation: the unrealistic
conceptualization of the Self has led to the establishment of a real political
system, while the realistic conceptualization of the Self and society has never
been implemented in political practice. The abolition of independence and
the maintenance of interdependence may therefore lead to various problems
related to the issue of the protection of human rights. These problems arise
because of the issue of social control, which is inherently present in relationism: its existence and its possibly all-pervasive function can threaten two
important elements of human rights, namely human dignity (which manifest
itself in the withdrawal of intimacy and privacy) and individual integrity, that
can be threatened due to the high valuation of authorities.
Ad 4: Sublation: In the context of our goal, these problems can be solved
by sublating (and thus abandoning) the assumption of a necessary direct link
between social (or communal) networks on the one hand and institutional
orders on the other. Moreover, the third step of this sublation process has
shown that our choice between preservation and elimination must be linked to
our goal of establishing adequate first-order protection mechanisms, which—
in the context of a global ethics—must be taken into account before applying the principles of particular socio-political orders or regimes that might be
guided by the interests of particular institutions, social classes or economic
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considerations. In this context, we still start from the imperative of protecting
human rights, one of the most important social and ethical mechanisms in this
regard, whose consolidation has had (and should have in the future) a great
impact on education, legislation and many other crucial areas that regulate
social interactions. At present, however, the concept of human rights is closely
linked to the notion of the independent and atomic individual.
Ad 5: New insight. This sublation has led us to a new insight, a new understanding of the fact that the current concept of human rights—together with
the principles that guide their protection—is problematic. Since personhood,
which includes integrity and dignity as two of the central elements of any
autonomous individual Self, cannot necessarily be separated from its fellow
human beings, its protection (i.e., the protection of its physical life, dignity,
and integrity) need not necessarily be limited to individualism and its contractual connection between the individual and society. Ergo, the concept of
human rights, which is one of the central mechanisms for ensuring this protection, can no longer be limited to the rights of the individual as an independent
Self, but must be extended to the rights of the individual as a relational Self.
In this context, it should be emphasized that a personhood as an individual
Self can have a relational character without losing its autonomy, integrity, or
dignity. Since relationism consists of individual personhoods (although—or
more precisely because—their identities are constituted by the relationships
they live), it does not contradict the individual rights of the personhood and
does not necessarily constitute a heteronomous influence on individual personality. Therefore, their fundamental values can be integrated into the value
system of global ethics. As indicated at the beginning of this essay, there are
two main reasons why such an extension is necessary. First, we live in an era
of globalization, which at the same time means that we face global crises, i.e.,
crises that need to be solved through global cooperation. Therefore, we cannot
simply rely on the endless expansion of existing liberal political systems created by ideas and ideologies based on individualism but must strive to create
new types of democracy (or even better, politeia) that would be truly capable
of meeting our global (and globalized) needs. Second, such global cooperation (beyond the unequal structures of economic exploitation and the absolute obsession with material profit) can only be built on a solid foundation of
mutual transcultural learning and exchange of knowledge and ideas, including
patterns and models of ethical valuations, decisions and behavior.
Epilogue
The New Politeia, the Land of Rusting Arms, and
the Deliverance from Dark Times
The nature of social composition is especially important in times of crisis. Indeed, such times undoubtedly reinforce the need for cooperation that
bridges the gap between the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand
and her socio-relational Self on the other. It also poses a challenge to the artificially established dichotomies between the Self and the Other, or between the
specific and the general, the particular and the universal. This understanding
is rooted in the paradigm of contrastive complementarity, as the uniqueness
of individuals can be measured not only by their individual achievements but
also by their social influence. And the latter, in turn, can be measured by an
individual’s position within their contextual environment and their relationships with other individuals (Lai 2018, 88). From the perspective of ethics, such
a web of relationships has several important implications, especially when
compared to frameworks that postulate an individual’s independent stability.
The last time I was in Taipei before the pandemic outbreak, I was already
used to the fact that people often wore protective masks that covered their
mouths and noses. I thought they were wearing them to protect themselves
from the air pollution, which is quite strong in the city. But then I noticed that
some people also wore them indoors, like on the subway, in museums, movie
theatres, and even in restaurants. Then one day a colleague of mine, who I
often worked with in the library, also came to the archives wearing one of these
masks. I asked him why he wore them, since there was no air pollution in the
library. He replied that he had caught a cold and didn’t want to spread his flu
to all the other people in the library. There was no pandemic at the time, and
yet he realized that it is always better to live in a society where most people
are healthy and not suffering from any contagious diseases, even if they are
relatively harmless.
Both Confucian relationism and the corresponding role ethic represent a
system in which people internalize the insight that they cannot survive on
their own without their fellow human beings, and they therefore develop
a contextual self-awareness. In China and most Confucian cultures, such
self-consciousness is more realistic precisely because each person, by virtue
of their uniqueness, can actually understand the meaning and importance of
the social contexts in which they are embedded. From such basic premises, it
© Jana S. Rošker, 2023 | doi:10.1163/9789004546264_008
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is much easier to understand the concept and basic structure of relationism
and similar social systems rooted in the principles of original Confucianism.
Since such a foundation of models of family and social organization is rooted
in mutual empathy and humaneness, it can undoubtedly better ensure the
maintenance of group solidarity and responsibility.
But the story of my friend wearing the mask in the library because of a relatively harmless flu was still part of the old “normality.” Then, just a few months
after my last visit to Eastern Asia, the whole world was gripped by an explosive
spread of a viral disease that was no longer so harmless. The pandemic has, at
least for a moment, shaken many people around the globe out of their daily
routines rushing about in the post-industrial and digital world. For many others who do not live in the post-industrial age, it led to a further worsening of
their already unenviable situation.
In many semi-modern societies, such as my own, populists, nationalists and
autocrats were given the opportunity to strengthen their positions of power,
even if it was by unconstitutional means. After all, these were necessary measures. However, the civilian population of our country and many others around
the world will have to keep a watchful eye lest the “new normal” offered by
those in power become the normality of digital dictatorships, general alienation, lack of real interpersonal contact, growing poverty and control, and
more and more utilitarian measures that shape people’s destinies only in the
name of the state and the preservation of its GDP.
I believe that this is far from the only possibility for the post COVID era. I
believe that there are alternative futures, ones that may yet be the result of
deep reflection. And perhaps from some spark flickering in this momentary,
involuntary stalemate, a small flame will arise to replace the apathy of our
impotence with hope. Perhaps the time has indeed come to pause for a while,
to reflect on where we are going and what we are doing. We can ask, for example, to what extent we ourselves are also responsible for the outbreak of these
new global crises, such as pandemics, global warming, poverty, war, the ills of
neoliberalism, and many more.
If we perceive ourselves as isolated individuals and at the same time as
people who live and work outside the “dirty politics,” then of course we have
nothing to do with all these problems and are not responsible for any of them.
After all, these problems were not directly caused by any of us, even though we
contribute to their aggravation simply by living in a society and participating
in its economic-political system. We are not perpetrators, but helpless victims.
Such an understanding of our own position in society relieves us of the burden
of facing ethical dilemmas, as it relieves us of the responsibility and obligation
to seek answers to a series of uncomfortable questions.
150
Epilogue
However, if we look at ourselves from a point of view from which it is clear
that we are all part of humanity, then we are indeed partly responsible for all
these problems. Also, if we consider that just by being human we are part of
a particular society, culture, state and class, then we are actually automatically complicit in all these problems. But even with our ballot that we cast
(or don’t cast) for someone or something every few years, we have placed that
co-responsibility on the shoulders of those who seem to care the least about
all of this.
There is something wrong with this tragicomic system that we have
supposedly—along with our fellow citizens—autonomously chosen. Perhaps
the best way to solve this problem is to take a brief look at the intellectual history of our co-responsibility.
Aristotle distinguished between six forms of government, which he graded
according to two criteria: the first was numerical in nature and permitted
either the rule of one, the rule of the minority, or the rule of the majority overall. Each of these forms of rule could occur in either a good or a bad form. The
good rule of one over all was called monarchy. The bad version of the same
relationship was called tyranny. The bad rule of the minority over the majority
was called oligarchy, while the good form was called aristocracy. The bad version of majority rule was called democracy, while politeia was the good and
legitimate version. In ancient Greece, democracy was considered the worse
and illegitimate form of rule by the people because it represented the rule of
the poor and less educated masses, those who were guided primarily by the
desire for individual gain. For Aristotle, democracy was thus the distorted version of politeia (Aristotle 2014, IV, 1289a/30, 177). In this context, political decisions were made on the basis of numerical superiority, and there was no room
for structures of mature decision-making that would allow for the protection
of marginalized and deprived minorities from the domination of the homogeneous interests of the majority. Such democracy is based only on the power of
numbers and normative decision-making based on majority interests, whereas
politeia was ideally still seen as the rule of the majority, but the majority of
educated, reasonable, experienced and qualified citizens. Whereas democracy
is the rule of the demos in the sense of the uneducated majority, whose participants act only in their own individual and self-centred interest, the Politeia
anticipates the rule of the educated or cultured majority, composed of individuals who actually see their interdependence with others. In fact, however, the
social order of the politeia in ancient Greece was very similar to the system of
the ruling aristocracy, for access to education in antiquity was naturally limited
to the free representatives of the upper class.
The New Politeia
151
However, if we understand education and knowledge as a crucial social
good to which all people must have access, politeia in the present context
could actually mean a system of rule of all people in a society that grants all of
them education. Such a majority would be a majority of humaneness, similar
to that mutual empathy expressed in the basic Confucian virtue of ren 仁. In
both Confucianism and Aristotle’s teaching, education (in the sense of xiushen
or paideía) is the foundation on which people can make good decisions, starting from the interest in the good of the whole community, which is given more
priority than the interests of the individual in both discourses mentioned.
Perhaps such a new politeia would be a good basis for overcoming epidemics and solving many other crises we face today. Indeed, perhaps it is precisely
the very measures of social isolation that open our eyes to understand the
utopia of small and politically transparent local communities, as described by
Laozi as the “Small State with Few People (Xiaoguo guamin).” This is a local
community completely closed off from the outside world, where rust attacks
abandoned weapons and ships because no one wants to use them. It’s a community where people value simple things, but also things that are essential to
life, like good food and warm clothing. It is a village where people feel safe and
quiet in their homes and never in their lives visit the neighboring village, even
though it is close enough that you can hear roosters crowing and dogs barking
there (Laozi s.d., 80). Moreover, it would not be a bad thing if we could extract,
preserve, and develop from our recent experience of isolation and seclusion at
least those few qualities that Hannah Arendt summarizes in the term “splendid isolation” (Arendt 1998, 161). This kind of isolation is the prerequisite for
any kind of mastery, since every master must be alone with his or her “idea,”
i.e., the mental image of the thing to be created, at the beginning of creation.
This mastery, of course, refers only to the mastery of the “material,” which can
be both ideal and physical, and is in no way any kind of authority over people
in the form of political domination or personal manipulation.
And as we have seen in the previous parts of this book (cf. Kissinger 2018, 4),
the basic prerequisite for any kind of creativity that can lead to positive change
in our lives and the societies in which we live is that we be willing to walk the
path of solitude. Too often we are only with other people to run from ourselves
and hide from the potential of our own creativity. Often, we need others only
to have their voices drown out our own thoughts.
Perhaps from our common experience, which we have had—each in our
own way and within our own subjectivity—we will emerge as new human
beings on the threshold of the third decade of the third millennium. If that is
indeed the case, then we will finally be able to address to ourselves the end of
152
Epilogue
Brecht’s poem “To Those Who Follow in Our Wake,”1 which speaks of liberation
from the “dark time.”
But you, when at last the time comes
That man can aid his fellow man,
Should think upon us
With leniency.
1 Translated by Scott Horton in 2008.
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Chinese characters
Ba guo lianjun
Benti cunzai
Eight-Nation Alliance
Substantial root of human
existence
Ontology
Original heart-mind
Luxuriant Dew of the Spring
and Autumn Annals
Ontology
The Way, method, original
principle, first principle
Morality
Classic of the Way and
Virtuous Force
Theory of the notions of dao
and de (a chapter in Jia Yi’s
New Writings)
Virtuous potential, virtue
Classic of Mother Earth
Classical term for the word
concept
Binary categories
Legalism
Category
Concept, idea
Individual sedimentation
Public, the public
The Gongyang
commentaries
Relationism
Relational virtue ethics
National Development and
Reform Commission
Guliang commentaries
Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220
CE)
八國聯軍
本體存在
Bentilun
Ben xin
Chunqiu fanlu
Cunyoulun
Dao
Daode
Daode jing
Dao de shuo
De
Dimu jing
Dingming
Duili fanchou
Fa jia
Fanchou
Gainian
Geti jidian
Gong
Gongyang zhuan
Guanxizhuyi
Guanxizhuyide meide lunli
Guojia fazhan he gaige
weiyuan hui
Guliang zhuan
Han
本體論
本心
春秋繁露
存有論
道
道德
道德經
道德說
德
地母經
定名
對立範疇
法家
范畴
概念
個體積澱
公
公羊傳
關係主義
關係主義的美德倫理
國家發展和改革委員會
穀梁傳
漢
154
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Chinese characters
He
Huai Nanzi
Ji
Jidian
Jishu
Jishulun
Harmony
Master Huai Nan
Possibility, opportunity
Sedimentation
Technique
Technology (nonexistent
alternative term)
Technology (nonexistent
alternative term)
One’s own heart-mind
Universal love
Treason, deception
Transformation of the
empirical into the
transcendental
Technology
Self-control, control over
the self
First name - literally “Old
Master,” but also the title of a
work of the same name
Structure, structural
principle, law, principle
Rituality, ritual
Method of analysis of
structure and the generative
force
Condensation of reason
Interpersonal relationships,
ordering interpersonal
relationships, basic ethical
order
Ethics (a practical system
of ordering interpersonal
relationships)
Substance of ethics
Ethical thought
和
淮南子
機
積澱
技術
技術論
Jishuxue
Ji xin
Jian’ai
Jianxie
Jingyan bian xianyan
Keji
Ke ji
Laozi
Li
Li
Liqi
Lixing ningju
Lun
Lunli
Lunli benti
Lunli sixiang
技術學
己心
兼愛
姦衺
經驗變先驗
科技
克己
老子
理
禮
理氣
理性凝聚
倫
倫理
倫理本體
倫理思想
155
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Chinese characters
Lunlixue
Ethics, ethical theory (as
theory or discipline)
Textbook on Ethics
Ethical sections
Mencius
Discourse on names
(Chinese logic)
Inner sage and outer king
(inner moral self and outer
social activity)
Immanent transcendence
One’s inner space
Moral reexamination of the
self
Vessel, accessory, tool,
appliance
Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE)
Intimate relations, intimacy
The first emperor of the Qin
Dynasty
Exhaustive investigation of
principles
Humaneness, reciprocity,
empathy
The Way of humanity, dao of
humanity, ethical maxims
Epistemology
Human order
Humanism
Humanness
Capabilities of humanness
Tendency towards good,
present in humanness
Confucian ethics,
humaneness and situational
appropriateness
Ruism
倫理學
Lunlixue jiaoke shu
Lunlizhi ketiao
Mengzi
Mingxue
Neisheng waiwang
Neizai chaoyue
Neizi
Neizi sheng
Qi
Qin
Qinmi guanxi
Qin Shi Huangdi
Qiongli gewu
Ren
Ren dao
Renshilun
Renwen
Renwenzhuyi
Renxing
Renxing nengli
Renxing xiang shan
Renyi
Ru jiao
倫理教科書
倫理之科條
孟子
名學
內聖外王
內在超越
内自
内自省
器
秦
亲密关系
秦始皇帝
窮理格物
仁
人道
認識論
人文
人文主義
人性
人性能力
人性向善
仁義
儒教
156
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Chinese characters
Ru xue
Shehui xinyong tixi
Shen
Sheng
Confucianism
System of social credit
Self, individual
Living, life, birth, giving
birth, alive, producing
Neighborhood, local
community
Pragmatic reason
Interpretations of Texts and
Explications of Characters
Private, privacy
Four sprouts (of goodness)
Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE)
Heaven
The Way of Heaven (a kind
of Confucian categorical
imperative)
Heavenly mandate
Cosmic order
Universalism
External order
Outer ruler (empirical self)
Danger
Crisis
What we consider as things
Cultural sedimentation
Cultural-psychological
formation
Things, objects, matter
Five basic relationships
Original image of a thing
Sedimentation of the kind
Person with the informal
function of preserving
the stability of the local
community
Phenomenology
儒學
社會信用體系
身
生
Shequ
Shiyong lixing
Shuowen jiezi
Si
Si duan
Tang
Tian
Tian dao
Tian ming
Tianwen
Tianwenzhuyi
Tiaoli
Waiwang
Wei
Weiji
Women suowei wu
Wenhua jidian
Wenhua xinli jiegou
Wu
Wu lun
Wude benxiang
Wuzhong jidian
Xiangbao
Xianxiangxue
社區
實用理性
說文解字
私
四端
唐
天
天道
天命
天文
天文主義
條理
外王
危
危機
我們所謂物
文化積澱
文化心理結構
物
五倫
物的本相
物種積澱物種積澱
乡保
現象學
157
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Chinese characters
Xiao
Xiao jing
Xiaoguo guamin
Filial love or piety
Classic of Filial Piety
Little State with a Small
Population
Heart-mind, mind, heart
New Writings
Above forms
Metaphysics
Psychology
Method of analysis of the
relationship between spirit
and a priori forms
Cultivation of personhood,
self-cultivation
Deep metaphysics
Master Xun
Classical term for the word
category
Situational rightness,
appropriateness
One-world view
Hiding something of one’s
own from others, privacy
Necessary, causal connection
Cosmotechnics
Wisdom
History of Chinese Ethics
Methodological problems of
Chinese Philosophy
Book of Changes from the
Zhou Dynasty
Book of Rites from the Zhou
Dynasty
Neo-Confucian philosopher
Master
Nature, naturalness, being as
such, autopoetical existence,
spontaneity, authenticity
孝
孝經
小國寡民
Xin
Xin shu
Xingershang
Xingershang xue
Xinlixue
Xinxing
Xiu shen
Xuanxue
Xunzi
Xuwei
Yi
Yige shijieguan
Yinsi
Yinyuan
Yuzhou jishu
Zhi
Zhongguo lunlixue
Zhongguo zhexuede
fangfalun wenti
Zhou Yi
Zhouli
Zhu Xi
Zi
Ziran
心
新書
形而上
形而上學
心理學
心性
修身
玄學
荀子
虚位
義
一個世界觀
隐私
因緣
宇宙技術
智
中國倫理學史
中國哲學的方法論問題
周易
周禮
朱熹
子
自然
158
Glossary of Chinese Terms
Latin transcript of pinyin
Meaning
Zisi
Zisi zili
Egoism, selfishness
自私
Egoism, selfishness,
自私自利
exclusively taking into
account one’s own interests
Smuggling
走私
Zousi
Chinese characters
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Index
Ames, Roger 6n, 42n, 45–46, 52–53, 135–136
Arendt, Hannah 39, 39n13, 40, 52, 53n25,
78–79, 95, 121, 121n, 130, 151
Authoritarianism V, 5, 27–28, 33, 38, 75
Binary categories 3, 65, 69, 69n, 70, 70n19,
94, 94n, 95, 98, 153
Brecht, Bertolt 152
Categories 9, 15, 17, 33, 47n18, 52–53, 64, 65,
72, 78n5–6, 78n6, 79, 91, 95, 96, 96n19,
97n21, 106, 109, 133–135, 141–142, 144,
153, 157. See also Binary categories
Collectivism V, 27, 34–35, 38–39, 39n12,
40–42, 51, 51n22, 53n25, 54–55, 75, 139
Communitarianism V, 34–35, 38, 40–42,
51–52, 65–66, 135
Community 5, 9, 15, 22–23, 25n, 26, 30,
33–37, 37n11, 38, 38n12, 39, 39n12,
40–41, 41n, 42–45, 47, 48n, 49, 50–52,
52n, 54–55, 57, 60, 62, 74, 77–78, 78n5,
79, 80, 80n, 82n, 92, 93n16, 109, 119, 121,
123, 128, 130, 137, 141–142, 145, 151, 156
Concept 3, 5–6, 9, 12, 14–17, 19, 22, 24–25,
29, 34, 36, 36n, 37, 37n10–11, 38, 39n12,
42, 42n, 43, 46, 46n, 47, 47n18–19, 49,
52–53, 53n25, 54, 56–58, 58n1, 59–65,
65n15, 66–67, 67n, 68, 72, 77, 85, 68n12,
87, 90–93, 95–96, 96n19, 98, 101, 101n,
102–104, 108–111, 114–115, 117–121, 123,
127–128, 131–133, 135–139, 142–147, 149,
153
Confucianism V, 1, 4n, 5, 6n, 7–8, 10–12, 18–21,
27–31, 31n7, 32–34, 39n12, 40, 41n,
42–44, 44n, 47–49, 51n22, 53, 53n26,
54–56, 58, 58n1, 59–61, 64–70, 70n20,
71–74, 76n4, 77, 80, 84, 96–97, 97n21,
99, 99n23, 101n, 113–114, 117–119, 125,
127–128, 135–137, 140, 140n, 141, 148–149,
151, 155 -156. See also Confucian ethics,
Relational ethics, Relationism, Role
ethics)
Cosmotechnics 89–90, 90n, 91–92, 157
Cosmotechnology V, 5, 89–90, 90n, 91–94,
98, 113
COVID-19 2–4, 7–8, 13. 54–55, 74n, 75–76, 83,
84n, 89, 139n1, 149
Crisis, crises V, 1–2, 5, 7–11, 13, 46–47, 49,
54–55, 73, 76–77, 89, 93n16, 99, 123, 133,
139, 141–142, 147–149, 151, 156
Cultural-psychological formation 24n6,
61, 156
Danger 2, 10, 17, 41, 48, 56–57, 84, 89, 98,
138, 142
Daoism 11, 20, 96, 97n21, 101n, 107
Derrida, Jacques 115
Descartes, René 54, 84
Digital, digitality, digitalization 76, 76n4,
83–88, 90, 102–104, 113–119, 123–125,
129, 149
Digital application 76, 76n3–4, 86, 103,
124, 125n
Digital cooperative 84, 123–124
Digital objects V, 84–85, 90, 102–103, 113,
115, 118, 123, 125
Digital technology V, 5, 38, 74, 77,
83–85, 89–90, 103–104, 115–117,
123–124
Digital control, surveillance V, 5, 32, 38,
74–77, 81–83, 90, 123–124, 125n
Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 20, 31
Egocentrism 37, 50
Egoism 126, 157–158
Epistemology 2, 10, 14–15, 44, 91n, 98,
104–105, 107–108, 112, 115, 117, 132, 134,
139, 155
Onto-epistemology V, 90, 102, 104,
112–113
Ethics V–VI, 1–2, 4–5, 7–8, 13, 16–21, 21n,
22–24, 24n6–7, 25, 25n, 26, 33–35,
38, 43, 44n, 45–46, 47n18, 48, 48n,
51, 56–57, 59, 61–68, 72–73, 77, 78n5,
81–82, 87, 97, 99–100, 116, 128, 132–142,
144, 147–149, 154–155, 157
Relational ethics 3, 4n, 7–8, 18, 21, 30, 33–35,
41–42, 68, 113, 128, 132, 138–140, 140n,
141, 153. See also Confucian ethics,
Relationism
179
Index
Confucian ethics V, 1, 3–4, 4n, 5, 6n, 7–8,
10–11, 13, 21, 28–30, 32–35, 36n, 42, 42n,
43–44, 47n18, 51, 58–59, 64, 71, 80, 113,
132–139, 140n, 141, 144, 155. See also
Relational ethics, Relationism
Ruist ethics 18, 20, 29, 32, 80, 140n
Global V–VI, 1, 5–8, 10–11, 13, 18, 21–22, 69, 84,
132–134, 137–139, 141–142, 144, 146–147
Deontological ethics 32, 38, 47n18, 68,
71, 136
Discourse ethics 22–23, 38, 48, 48n
Virtue ethics 34, 47, 47n18, 136, 153
Role ethics V, 41–42, 42n, 51–52, 136,
140, 148
Fang Dongmei (Thomé Fang) 方東美 54
Feng Yaoming 馮耀明 15–17, 64
Filial piety, family reverence 44–45, 59–60,
156–157
Four sprouts 50, 60, 60n7, 156
Framework of reference, referential
framework V, 13–17, 47n18, 93, 98,
132–133, 142–145
Hall, David 52–53, 135–136
Han Dynasty (206 BC–220) 18–19, 31, 31n7,
41n, 80, 99n23, 153
Han Feizi 韓非子 127n54
Han Yu 韓愈 96
Harmony 30, 30n5, 45–46, 46n, 48, 59, 60n7,
96, 98, 153
Heart-mind 59, 67, 108–109, 125, 153–154, 157
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 17, 18, 22,
25, 65, 94, 132
Heidegger, Martin 12, 91, 93, 100, 100n, 101–102
Hobbes, Thomas 85
Hui, Yuk (Xu Yu) 許煜 81, 85, 87, 89–90,
90n, 91, 91n, 93–95, 97, 97n22, 98–99,
99n23, 102–103, 118
Humaneness V, 12, 19, 28–29, 33, 58–60,
60n7, 61, 64, 66–67, 96, 149, 151, 155
Humanism V, 5, 36, 56–58, 58n7, 64, 69–70,
70n19, 71–72, 85, 117, 155
Humanness V, 58, 58n1, 61–63, 67, 99n24, 155
Immanent transcendence 65, 155
Individualism V, 4, 6, 17, 34–37, 37n11, 38,
39n12, 40–43, 45, 48, 48n, 50–52, 52n,
122, 136, 139, 144–147
Individuation 46, 50–51, 51n, 102
Internal sage and external ruler 53n26,
64–65, 155
Intimacy V, 39n12, 40, 42, 78, 93, 118–120,
120n47, 121–123, 125–126, 130, 146, 155
Jung, Karl Gustav
50–51
Kissinger, Henry A. 85–86, 86n11, 151
Lee Ming-huei (Li Minghui) 47n18, 64–67,
67n, 68–70, 70n19, 71–73, 73n, 136
Legalism 20, 31–32, 41, 41n, 79–80, 153
Li Zehou 李澤厚 19, 21n, 22–24, 24n7, 25,
25n, 34, 43, 45, 47, 60, 61, 61n, 62, 62n,
63, 73, 85n, 92–93, 99n24, 135
Life, vitality 49, 52, 54, 58, 61, 98, 101n, 108,
109, 110, 113–121, 156
Luhmann, Niklas 119
Lyotard, Jean-François 114–118
Maoism 82
Master 97, 102, 151, 154, 157
Mengzi (Mencius) 孟子 19–20, 30, 47, 50,
60, 60n7, 60n8, 66–67, 67n, 68, 72,
126, 155
Metaphysics 12, 20, 46, 66, 68, 97, 97–98n22,
102, 107, 114, 157
Morality V, 8, 13, 21–26, 43–45, 59–63,
65–66, 116, 128, 133, 153
Nature 10, 20, 49, 57, 59, 89–91, 94, 97n21–
n22, 98–101, 101n, 102, 121, 157
One world view; 157
Ontology V, 10, 12, 51n23, 65, 69, 84–85, 85n,
89–90, 91n, 102–103, 107–108, 108n,
111–113, 136, 138, 141, 143, 153
Personality 29, 39, 50, 57, 81, 125, 147
Phenomenology 12, 91n, 156
Philosophy of technology 84, 87, 102, 115
Pragmatic reason 62, 156
Private, privacy V, 5, 42, 74–76, 78–79,
118–120, 120n47, 121, 121n, 122–130, 146,
156–157
Psychology 6n, 26, 50, 52n24, 54, 61, 70, 91n,
92, 106, 109–110, 121, 128–129, 157. See
also Cultural-psychological formation
180
Index
Public 13n, 54, 58n1, 76, 78–79, 84, 118, 121–
122, 125, 127, 127n54–55, 128–129, 153
Qin Dynasty (221–216 BC)
19, 31, 155
Racism 3, 88
Relationism V–VI, 1, 3–4, 4n, 5, 7–8, 17–18,
21, 27, 33, 35, 38, 39n12, 41—43, 45–48,
51–52, 54–55, 68, 74, 77, 79, 81, 132,
135–136, 139–142, 144–149, 153. See also
Relational ethics
Rituality 19, 25n, 60n7, 99n24, 114, 154
Rosemont, Henry 6n, 42n, 45–46, 136, 138
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 122
Ruism V, 4n, 18–21, 29–31, 31n7, 32–33, 41n,
42, 74, 80, 135, 140n, 155
Sedimentation 25, 62, 62n, 63–64, 92,
99n24, 154
Cultural sedimentation 93, 156
Individual sedimentation 93, 153
Sedimentation of species, of the kind 93, 156
Self 5, 12, 29, 33–38, 39n12, 43, 45–47, 50–51,
53, 53n26, 54–55, 57–58, 61, 65–66, 68,
72, 86–87, 114, 117–119, 125–126, 132, 135,
137, 139–140, 144–148, 155–156
Self-cultivation, cultivation of self,
personhood 49, 53–54, 63, 72, 116, 157
Skill 37, 52, 83, 97n21
Social credit system V, 77, 81–83, 118,
124–125, 155. See also Digital control,
surveillance
Social sphere 120n47, 121–122
Stiegler, Bernard 102, 115
Sublation V–VI, 9, 13, 17–18, 132–134, 140–141,
143–144, 146–147
Tang dynasty (618–907) 156
Tang Feng (Audrey Tang) 唐鳳 124, 124n
Tang Zonghan (Atrijus Tang) 唐宗漢 124n.
See also Tang Feng
Technical tendencies 92
Technics, technique 81–82, 89–91, 91n,
92–93, 97, 97n21, 98–99, 101–102, 154
Tehnodiverstiy 90n, 98, 103
Tehnological singularity 98
Technology V, 5, 8, 14, 56–57, 77, 79, 82–85,
85n, 86–90, 90n, 91, 91n, 93–95, 98–99,
99n23–24, 100, 100n, 101–103, 113–116,
118, 134, 154. See also Cosmotechnology,
Digital technology, Philosophy of
technology
Tool 4, 16–17, 64–65, 83, 84n, 85, 88–90,
92–93, 93n16, 95–97, 97n21, 98, 101, 113,
139–140, 155
Transcultural, transculturality V–VI, 5, 9,
11–14, 17–18, 21–22, 25, 59, 65, 69, 72,
84–85, 105, 118, 132–133, 135, 137, 142–143
Transcultural approach 11–12, 132,
138–139, 141
Transcultural dialogue 8, 15
Transcultural exchange of knowledge,
learning 1, 5, 13, 73, 140, 147
Transcultural philosophy 6, 98n22, 132,
141–143
Uniqueness, unique V, 26, 46, 49–50, 52–54,
62, 110, 122, 125, 130, 148
Universalism, universality, universal V,
22, 25–26, 34–36, 38, 41, 46, 49–50,
53, 57–58, 60–62, 64, 67, 78n5, 81, 84,
87–88, 90n, 92–93, 98, 111–112, 123, 129,
133–134, 136–138, 148, 154, 156
Vessel
Wisdom
93, 93n, 155
29, 60n7, 86, 157
Xiangbao 80–81, 156
Xu Yu (See Hui, Yuk) 許煜
Zhang Dainian 张岱年
96, 96n19
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