Menachem Begin

Starting in the 1930s, but especially during the Second World War, the intelligence agencies of Britain and the Jewish Agency for Palestine had a complicated relationship. They often worked together to fight common threats, such as Arab rebels and Nazi Germany. Jewish terrorists presented another common threat during the Second World War, when the Jewish Agency cooperated with Britain, in the hopes of political rewards in the postwar settlement. British Intelligence, unable to penetrate the Jewish terrorist organizations, Irgun and Lehi, relied on the cooperation of the Jewish Agency to maintain security. This dependency and the strengthening of the underground Haganah, weakened the grip of British authority in Palestine, and made the Jewish community, the Yishuv, increasingly powerful. By 1945, when Britain did not fulfil the expectations of the Yishuv to lift immigration restrictions on Jews to Palestine, its dominant figure, David Ben-Gurion, launched a secret war against British policy. Intelligence failed to understand and react effectively to this development because it relied on its liaison with the Jewish Agency, now secretly hostile, to interpret the political and security situation in Palestine. In a classic problem of net assessment, British officials overestimated their own strength and resolve, and underestimated that of the Yishuv. British intelligence failed to accurately assess Jewish threats or intentions in Palestine from 1944 to 1946. These mistakes in intelligence contributed to failures of policy, which destroyed British policy in the Palestine Mandate, and opened the door to the creation of the state of Israel.

What is the relationship between Mizrahi feminism and Israeli ultranationalism? What is the relevance of gender justice activism to the 2014 Gaza War and Israel’s foreign policy?

Wrapped in the Flag of Israel Second Edition examines neoliberal bureaucracy in the Global South using feminist critical race theories. It interrogates the relationship between the State of Israel and its Mizrahi single mothers who are at the forefront of Mizrahi feminism. It also presents a model of bureaucracy as divine cosmology that preempts the agency of disenfranchised Mizrahim who are Israel’s demographic majority. Mizrahi protests fall flat when the Israel-Palestine conflict dominates the headlines. While most studies of neoliberal bureaucracy employ a Foucauldian or Marxian lens, this book illustrates how Israeli bureaucracy draws on a theological essence that fuses religion, gender, and race into the foundations of citizenship. It sets out to understand why Mizrahi mothers remain loyal to a state that injures them though its bureaucratic system.

The extensive Afterword to the Second Edition connects intra-Jewish racial and gendered dynamics to the 2014 Gaza War. It tracks sequences that began with social protest and ended with elections that bolstered Israel’s political right. In between came bloodletting between the IDF, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel’s neighboring Arab states. The 2014 Gaza War was a watershed, but not only in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Under the smokescreen of war, Israel accelerated neoliberal economic reform. The first victims of this restructuring were Mizrahi single mothers. Palestinians, however, would pay the highest price for Israel’s Mizrahi-Ashkenazi rift.

http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/rDC7iHtZb6j7gI44CRDt/full
This article examines the interaction between official memory and popular memory through the case study of Olei Hagardom – Jewish underground fighters executed by the British in Mandatory Palestine. Studies of collective memory usually maintain that the ruling elite, with its control of state resources, dominates collective memory formation. However, the case of Olei Hargardom demonstrates the potentially limited power of institutional commemoration and exclusion in a democratic society. David Ben-Gurion and his government's attempt to exclude these right-wing heroes from the national pantheon had limited impact. Menachem Begin's persistent, partisan political efforts to include them were only partially successful. Ultimately, Olei Hargardom became entrenched in Israeli collective memory as a result of apolitical literary works, popular culture, and the establishment of a site of memory by spontaneous, grassroots efforts.

Meine Sicht als unabhängiger Christ.
Inhaltsverzeichnis:
1. Zionismus und Antizionismus.
  a) Politischer Zionismus.
  b) Neo-Zionismus.
  c) Religiöser Zionismus kabbalistischer Tradition: Osteuropäischer Chabad-Chassidismus schlägt orthodoxen Antizionismus der talmudischen Tradition („Drei Eide“).
  1. Exkurs: Talmudisch-kabbalistische Auserwählungsreligion und Anti-Nonsemitismus.
2. „Evangelikal“.
  a) Historisch-evangelikales Christentum.
  b) Evangelikaler Zionismus und seine Abkehr vom reformatorischen Erbe.
  2. Exkurs: Wie der Staat Israel die Aufklärung seiner Kriegsverbrechen von 1948 behindert – eine Chronologie.
Fazit.
Nachtrag.
(2020-10-20)

Als der Bundessicherheitsrat unter Kanzler Helmut Schmidt im Frühjahr 1982 neue Politische Grundsätze für den Rüstungsexport verabschiedete, wurde eine geheime Protokollnote angenommen, die als Israel-Klausel firmierte. Sie gab vor, dass bei Entscheidungen zur Waffenausfuhr "auch die geschichtliche Verantwortung der Deutschen gegenüber dem jüdischen Volk berücksichtigt wird". Hintergrund war der Wunsch Saudi-Arabiens, Hunderte Leopard 2-Panzer zu erwerben, der in Bonn eine monatelange Kontroverse ausgelöst und zu einer tiefen Krise der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen geführt hatte. Hubert Leber untersucht den Panzer-Streit von 1981/82 erstmals auf Basis deutscher wie israelischer Regierungsakten und verknüpft dabei Internationale Geschichte mit vergangenheitspolitischen Perspektiven. Das Verantwortungspostulat, das sich die Bundesregierung auf Initiative von Außenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher zu eigen machte, markierte eine Zäsur für die Bonner Israel-Politik. Galt im Umgang mit dem jüdischen Staat bis dahin eine Art Verjährungsparadigma, so wurde die Erinnerung an den Holocaust zu Beginn der 1980er Jahre als dauerhaft wirksamer Faktor deutschen Regierungshandelns anerkannt.

* * *

Arms Exports and Holocaust Remembrance.
Saudi Arabia, Leopard 2 Tanks and the Secret Israel Clause of 1982 – a Paradigm Shift

When the Federal Security Council passed new political principles for arms exports under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in spring 1982, a secret protocol note was adopted, which became known as the Israel Clause. It stated that decisions about arms exports should "also take into account the historical responsibility of the Germans towards the Jewish People". The background was that Saudi Arabia wished to purchase hundreds of Leopard 2 tanks, which had led to months of controversy in Bonn and a deep crisis in German-Israeli relations. For the first time Hubert Leber investigates the 1981/82 tank dispute on the basis of both German and Israeli government files while connecting international relations with the politics of the past. This postulated responsibility, which the German government approved on the initiative of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, marked a caesura in Bonn's Israel policy. While until then a sort of statute of limitations paradigm applied in relation to the Jewish state, the memory of the Holocaust was recognised as a permanently operative factor in German governance in the early 1980s.

• Ma 70 éve, 1948. június 22-én zárult le Izrael Állam születésének egyik legfájdalmasabb, azóta is ritkán emlegetett incidense a Tel Aviv Beach-en, amikor a zsidó állam függetlenségéért küzdő harcosok támadtak egymásra egy véres, halálos áldozatokat követelő összecsapásban. Külön pikantériája a történetnek, hogy két későbbi legendás miniszterelnök, Menahem Begin és Jichák Rabin voltak az testvérharc egymással szembenálló katonai parancsnokai. Izrael állam születését nem csak a máig meghatározó arab-izraeli szembenállás és konfliktus kísérte, hanem egy kevéssé ismert jelenség is: a zsidó-zsidó, cionista-cionista belháború, mely alkalmanként emberéleteket is követelt. A politikai okokból való testvérgyilkosságoknak sajnos " hagyománya " van Izraelben: gondoljunk csak Jacob Israel de Haan, Kasztner Rezső vagy Jichak Rabin meggyilkolására. Ezek azonban egyének elleni merényletek voltak, nem pedig komplett csoportok közötti összecsapások. Éppen 70 éve, 1948. június 21-22-én azonban a frissen megalakult Izraeli Véderő (IDF) kénytelen volt tüzet nyitni saját embereire. Az eset Altalena-incidens néven vonult be Izrael történelmébe, s története dióhéjban a következő: a jobboldali cionisták a '48-as honvédő háború alatt fegyvereket próbáltak csempészni az országba, mely akcióban David Ben-Gurion veszélyt látott az ország demokratikus jellegére. A fegyverszállító hajóra – mely

This article discusses the causes and processes that drove Menachem Begin and his Gahal party into the Israeli cabinet during the three-week waiting period preceding the June 1967 war (or Six Day War as it is commonly known). A close examination of Begin’s behaviour reveals a calculated political move aimed at exploiting deep processes within the Israeli political establishment in general, and its right-wing factions in particular. This sheds fresh light on a number of key events preceding the war, notably Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s surrender of the defence portfolio to Moshe Dayan, as well as on the deeper processes that led within a decade to the Likud’s (Gahal’s successor) rise to power, for the first time in Israel’s history.

The path for the Likud's establishment in the fall of 1973 was a weighty reference point for right-wing emergence in the State of Israel. The initiative to expand Gahal originated from different sources from within the Israeli political establishment, of both Liberal party and Herut's internal opposition party lines. Menachem Begin however was reserved from 1966-1973 to establish a broad right-of-center party. The paper showcases the various initiatives and examines the reasons behind Begin's indifferent response to them and illustrates the course that Ariel Sharon took in order to expand Gahal, with full awareness of the objection that Begin and his party had and the strenuous negotiations that eventually and laboriously gave rise to the Likud.
The establishment of the Likud party is portrayed on the one hand as an attempt to build on the possibility of a regime change in Israel while on the other hand narrow down the Menachem Begin's and the Herut movement's impact on the joint-ticket party. The paper lays out the internal processes from within the Herut movement that kept its dominance on the Likud, in contrast with the intentions of its partners. Turning  Herut into a thriving politically-engaging platform made it a dominant force in the newly-created party and played a significant contributory role in drawing up similar definitions for the "Likud" and the "Herut movement" for the next years to come.
המאמר מנתח את הדרך להקמת הליכוד בסתיו 1973 כנקודת ציון משמעותית בתהליך צבירת הכוח של הימין במדינת ישראל. היוזמה להרחיב את גח"ל הגיעה מגורמים שונים במערכת הפוליטית בישראל, משורות המפלגה הליברלית ומהאופוזיציה הפנימית בתנועת החרות. דווקא מנחם בגין הוא שהסתייג לאורך השנים 1966-1973 מהקמת מפלגת מרכז-ימין רחבה. המאמר מציג את היוזמות השונות ומנתח את הסיבות לתגובה האדישה של בגין להן. מוצגת הדרך בה אריאל שרון בחר לקדם את הרחבת גח"ל, מתוך מודעות להתנגדות של בגין ושל תנועתו ואת המשא ומתן הקשה, רצוף המשברים, שבסופו, בקושי רב, הוקם הליכוד.
הקמת הליכוד מוצגת במאמר כניסיון מצד אחד לחזק את האפשרות של חילופי שלטון בישראל ומצד שני לצמצם את השפעתם של מנחם בגין ותנועת החרות על המפלגה המשותפת. נפרסים התהליכים הפנימיים בתוך תנועת החרות שהביאו לכך שהיא הצליחה לשמור על מעמדה הדומיננטי ב'ליכוד', בניגוד לכוונת השותפות שלה. הפיכת 'חרות' לזירת מעורבות ופעילות פוליטית תוססת היא שהפכו אותה לגורם הדומיננטי במפלגה החדשה ותרמו ליצירת מידה רבה של זהות בין 'חרות' לבין המושג 'ליכוד' בשנים הבאות.

This article discusses the causes and processes that drove Menachem Begin and his Gahal party into the Israeli cabinet during the three-week waiting period preceding the June 1967 war (or Six Day War as it is commonly known). A close examination of Begin’s behaviour reveals a calculated political move aimed at exploiting deep processes within the Israeli political establishment in general, and its right-wing factions in particular. This sheds fresh light on a number of key events preceding the war, notably Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s surrender of the defence portfolio to Moshe Dayan, as well as on the deeper processes that led within a decade to the Likud’s (Gahal’s successor) rise to power, for the first time in Israel’s history.

מלחמת שלום הגליל היא אחת המלחמות השנויות במחלוקת בחברה הישראלית. הנרטיב הרווח קובע ששר הביטחון אריאל שרון הונה את ראש הממשלה מנחם בגין ואת הממשלה כולה. מנחם בגין והממשלה אישרו פעולה מצומצמת שנועדה להרחיק את הארגונים הפלסטיניים כארבעים קילומטר מן הגבול, אך לשר הביטחון היו תכניות אחרות אשר נועדו להנהיג סדר חדש בארץ הארזים. בלי לנסות ולהצדיק את מעשיו של שרון או לזַכּוֹת אותו על מהלכיו במלחמה, נרטיב זה עושה עוול לראש הממשלה דאז מנחם בגין. הוא מעניק משקל רב לשרון ודוחק את בגין אל קרן זווית כשחקן שולי. אך לבגין היה תפקיד גדול ומשמעותי יותר. במאמר זה אני מבקש לטעון כי מבחינת המדיניות הלבנונית של מנחם בגין, מלחמת שלום הגליל הייתה ידועה מראש. הטענה המרכזית במאמר זה היא שמרגע שמנחם בגין עלה לשלטון ב=1977 החלה מעין ספירה לאחור לפעולה נרחבת ומקיפה בלבנון. תחת מנהיגותו של בגין התערבה ישראל בנעשה בלבנון יותר ויותר, מדרום המדינה ועד מרכזה. המעשים, ההחלטות וההצהרות של בגין וממשלותיו בשנים שקדמו למלחמת שלום הגליל סללו את הדרך למלחמה.
The Peace for Galilee War which began in 1982 is one of the most controversial events in Israeli history. The prevailing narrative states that it was a war of deception, in which Defense Minister Ariel Sharon misled Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the rest of the government. While Begin and the government approved a small-scale operation that was meant to push the Palestinian organizations to 40 kilometers north of the Israeli border, Sharon had more grandiose plans aimed at creating a new order in Lebanon. Without trying to vindicate Sharon for his actions during the war, this narrative attributes Begin with far too small a role.
This article claims that as part of Begin’s Lebanese policy, the Peace for Galilee War was conceptualized well in advance. It will show that from the moment Begin became prime minister in 1977, a countdown began toward a full-scale operation in Lebanon. Under Begin’s leadership, Israel’s involvement in Lebanon increased from year to year. The culmination was the Peace for Galilee War.

Die Nachricht, dass Frankreich moderne Panzerabwehrraketen an Syrien liefere, sorgte 1978 für Unruhe in Israel. Produziert wurden die Flugkörper im Rahmen einer deutsch-französischen Rüstungskooperation. Daher forderte Israel von der Bundesregierung, das Waffengeschäft zu unterbinden. Es kam zu einem monatelangen Konflikt zwischen Bonn und Jerusalem, den Hubert Leber erstmals anhand von Archivquellen aus beiden Ländern untersucht. Die Analyse bietet Einsichten zur normativen Entwicklung der deutschen Rüstungsexport- und Israel-Politik. Nach außen gab sich die Regierung Schmidt/Genscher machtlos. Tatsächlich aber verzichtete sie darauf, eine Veto-Option auszuschöpfen, die sie sich intern gegen Exporte aus Partnerländern der Rüstungskooperation vorbehalten hatte. Zu den Folgen gehörte, dass israelische Soldaten im Libanonkrieg 1982 durch deutsche Militärtechnik verletzt oder getötet wurden.

*  *  *

The German-Israeli Missile Dispute of 1978. How did the Social-Liberal Government Deal with Co-Produced Armaments Exports?

The news that France would deliver modern anti-tank missiles to Syria led to disquiet in Israel in 1978. The missiles were being produced within the context of German-French armaments cooperation. Therefore, Israel demanded that the West German government prevent the weapons deal. Months of conflict between Bonn and Jerusalem followed, which Hubert Leber investigates here using archival sources from both countries for the first time. The analysis offers insights into the normative development of German armaments exports and Israel policy. The Schmidt/Genscher government outwardly proclaimed its impotence. In fact, it decided not to use an internally preserved veto option regarding exports from armaments cooperation partner countries. One of the consequences was that Israeli soldiers were injured or killed by German military technology during the Lebanon War of 1982.

This article demonstrates how the process that eventually led to the founding of the Likud party in the fall of 1973, alongside the goal of creating an effective alternative to the Labor movement, was actually a failed attempt to diminish the influence of Begin and Herut within the Likud. Herut’s new and old partners wished to effect—through the creation of the Likud—a change in the identity and character of the alternative party. Contrary to expectations, Herut revealed itself to be an open and dynamic movement for an ever-growing sector of the public. The Herut movement became the key axis of the Likud, in light of demographic, cultural, social, and economic processes, which fashioned within Likud an alloy that symbolized the rise of a new Israeli identity. The article examines the internal processes within Herut that enabled it to retain its dominance even after the formation of the Likud.

This paper aims to shed further light on the response of Israeli society to the rise of the Black Panthers in 1971 by examining the attitude adopted by Menachem Begin and Gahal to the emerging Mizrahi protest movement. After discussing in detail Begin’s response to the Black Panthers’ protest, this paper analyses the factors that contributed to the divide between the Panthers and Israel’s leading opposition party at that time, and the criticism levelled by party members against its leadership concerning its inaction regarding the Black Panthers’ protest. Whereas right-wing Zionist research has hitherto focused on Begin’s political and security-related outlook and activities, the affair being discussed may shift the limelight onto the socio-economic attitudes of Begin and his party.

This article seeks to add another dimension to the growing and extensive research on right-wing Zionism, by returning to an era when the Likud was first created. I will examine the major difference between processes that have led to the two key landmarks in the formative years of the Right in Israel: the establishment of Gahal in April 1965 and the founding of the Likud in August–September of 1973. While Gahal's establishment was a product of a prolonged, determined, patient and conscious effort on the part of Menachem Begin, the establishment of the Likud was, to a considerable degree, forced upon him. Those who were interested in expanding Gahal and creating an alignment of centre-right parties were actually the factors outside Herut, while Herut's more veteran leadership disapproved of these attempts. Within the Herut Movement, the voices that called for the creation of a broad political alignment were those that came from Herut's ‘internal opposition’, which revolved around Ezer Weizman. The article analyses the reasons behind Begin's reservations about a continued right-wing merger, examines the negotiation process and sheds light on the oscillation in Menachem Begin's ideology and politics between the fundamental and the pragmatic poles.

This article examines the linkage between the Herut movement and the Mizrahi protest
in Israel, describing and analyzing the changes in the relations between Mizrahi Jews
and Herut Party leader Menachem Begin, as well as Begin’s attempts to adapt the Herut
movement to the demographic changes in Israeli society. It considers the confrontation
between Herut and the Israeli Labor Party, Mapai, during the Mizrahi protests in the
Wadi Salib neighborhood in Haifa (July 1959), and examines Begin’s policy as leader
of Gahal (Herut-Liberal Party) during the rise of the Israeli Black Panthers in 1971–72.
Having learned the lesson from the Wadi Salib protests, when Mapai connected Herut to
the riots, Begin refrained from supporting the Black Panthers in both word and deed,
despite the pressure to do so from members of his party. He thus succeeded in
positioning Gahal within the borders of legitimate Zionist political groups, creating its
image as a party that formed part of the regime and shunned extremism

The romantic, nineteenth-century image of the Bedouin as fierce, independent nomads on camelback racing across an endless desert persists in the West. Yet since the era of Ottoman rule, the Mzeina Bedouin of the South Sinai desert have lived under foreign occupation. For the last forty years Bedouin land has been a political football, tossed back and forth between Israel and Egypt at least five times.

LINK: http://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/sadna/1.3143391

"What Can the (48-66) Military Government Teach us about the Occupation (1967 - ????) ?"

Hebrew essay for the "Social History Workshop" - a blog featured in Haaretz's on-line Hebrew edition. Here I criticize the scholarly tendency to view Israeli history as a *linear* succession of military rule over a civilian Palestinian populous.

שובו של הזאב הגדול

שמו של ז׳בוטינסקי שב ועולה באחרונה בשיח הציבורי, בעיקר בשירות נסיכי ליכוד בדימוס וחוגיהם שמבקשים למצב עצמם כממשיכיו הלגיטימיים הבלעדיים והמנושלים, ואנשי מרכז-שמאל ציוני שבמסגרת קרב מאסף פוליטי מאמצים אותו כחלופה ימנית ״שפויה״. אולם סקירה של כתבי ז׳בוטינסקי שפורסמו מחדש לצד ספרות מחקר עכשווית מעמידה בספק את התפיסה הרווחת כי מייסד הציונות הרוויזיוניסטית היה דמוקרט ליברלי. נסיכי הליכוד ואנשי המרכז הפוליטי אכן ממשיכים את מורשתו, אלא שזו מהדהדת את מורשת האימפריאליזם הליברלי בן המאה התשע-עשרה. בכך היא אינה מספקת חלופה לפרקטיקות ולאידיאולוגיות ניהול הכיבוש של הימין הלאומני, אלא משקפת אותן

During the 1960s, the Haaretz newspaper was a staunch supporter of the key political decisions made by Menachem Begin, thus playing a significant role in reinforcing his legitimacy and that of his Herut movement. On the one hand, this support was motivated by the desire to transform Israel’s socialist economy into a freer and less government-controlled market. On the other hand, it stemmed from the aspiration to democratise Israel’s political life. This symbiosis began to emerge in the early 1960s and was sustained over a lengthy period of time, thus underscoring the role played by Israeli bourgeois-liberal circles in the Zionist Right’s path to power.

This paper deals with right-wing Zionist freedom-fi ghter and subsequent Israeli PM Menachem
Begin’s career as head of the Betar youth movement in Poland, prisoner in Soviet Russia and
underground leader in Palestine. Particular rumours and charges regarding Begin’s life are paid
special attention: namely the accusations of Begin having distorted the memory of the Holocaust,
or having supported either Communism, terrorism or Fascism. The study concludes that most
accusations against Begin were politically motivated and had little resemblance to historical
facts. However, some of the rumours explored here were, in fact, spread by Begin’s numerous
supporters. The study is based on previously largely untapped archival material from the United
Kingdom and Israel.

In the beginning of the 1930s, a strong desire awakened amongst the maximalist faction of the Revisionist movement for the appearance of a 'gallows hero' — a Jew who would be executed by the British authorities and thereby change the course of the Zionist movement from one that aimed at constructing the foundations of a future state into a movement of national liberation. In the summer of 1938, Shlomo Ben-Yosef, a member of the Revisionist movement, was executed, and so became the movement's first gallows martyr. Fierce debate ensued within the movement over the formulation of the Shlomo Ben-Yosef legend and it was through this conflict that ideological differences within the Zionist Right became manifest. At this stage, the radicals on the Zionist Right increased in strength and wished to place the gallows legend at the center of the movement's consciousness. It was their aim to utilize it in displacing the myth of the defensive Trumpledor, who had become, in their ...

The 1967 Six-Day War was a turning point for the Middle East. No longer fighting for its survival, Israel became an occupying power on the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula to the banks of the Suez Canal. Egyptian policy under Gamal Abdel Nasser was the retake the conquered territory in the Sinai by initiating a War of Attrition of raids against Israeli forces. Israel responded with escalating force with air raids deep into Egypt. The United Nations passed Resolution 242 calling for Israel to withdraw from the conquered territories and sent a peace mission under the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Janning. But Nasser responded with the so-called three-no’s at the Khartoum conference calling for no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and no peace. Israel on its side was unwilling for withdraw from the conquered territories as a condition for negotiations.

After the sudden death of Nasser from a heart attack in September 1970, Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. Sadat at first followed the same policy as Nasser’s, that is, attempting to restore Egypt’s prestige by trying to reverse militarily the outcome of the 1967 War. He approached the Soviet Union for military aid, which resulted in the United States reluctantly promising arms to Israel to maintain a balance of power. President Richard Nixon’s advisor for National Security, Henry Kissinger, made no attempt to disguise the fact that the primary interest of the United States in the Middle East was to check the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. This was consistent with the general assumption of American foreign policy during the Cold War that the spread of Communism was of primary importance. This thinking resulted repeatedly in the United States allowing anti-Communist ideology to mask the underlying cause of self-determination that the United States championed up until World War Two.

But when at a Summit Conference in Moscow the Soviet Union agreed  with the United States that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was more important than resolving the Middle East problem, Sadat demanded that the Soviet advisors depart from Egypt. In October 1973 Sadat launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai on the Jewish High Holiday of Yom Kippur in conjunction with a Syrian attack in the Galilee. The so-called Yom Kippur War backfired on Sadat: Israeli forces counterattacked and crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt. The failure of this military action convinced Sadat to negotiate a separate peace. At first Israel was unwilling to withdraw from its conquered territory in the Sinai despite the United Nations Resolution 242. When Jimmy Carter became President, he made it a priority to mediate an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The irony is that it was Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who himself was a former terrorist as leader of the Irgun, who signed the Camp David Accords in March 1979. This is of note in light of the fact that Israel later refused to negotiate with the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat, on the grounds that he had been a terrorist. Nevertheless, the Camp David Accord established the precedent of land for peace: in exchange for peace, Egypt was able to regain the Sinai Peninsula. There are those that say Sadat lost the war, but achieved what he wanted, that is, the Sinai. However, he became viewed as a traitor to the Arab cause, and for this he was assassinated by radical Islamists in October 1981. Today, the issue of the occupied territories (the Golan Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem) remains unresolved, and rather than anti-Communism, it is the War on Terrorism that blinds the United States to the underlying issue of self-determination.


"

This article seeks to add another dimension to the growing and extensive research on right-wing Zionism, by returning to an era when the Likud was first created. I will examine the major difference between processes that have led to the two key landmarks in the formative years of the Right in Israel: the establishment of Gahal in April 1965 and the founding of the Likud in August–September of 1973. While Gahal's establishment was a product of a prolonged, determined, patient and conscious effort on the part of Menachem Begin, the establishment of the Likud was, to a considerable degree, forced upon him. Those who were interested in expanding Gahal and creating an alignment of centre-right parties were actually the factors outside Herut, while Herut's more veteran leadership disapproved of these attempts. Within the Herut Movement, the voices that called for the creation of a broad political alignment were those that came from Herut's ‘internal opposition’, which revolved around Ezer Weizman. The article analyses the reasons behind Begin's reservations about a continued right-wing merger, examines the negotiation process and sheds light on the oscillation in Menachem Begin's ideology and politics between the fundamental and the pragmatic poles.

ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ: Az 1917-től 1948-ig fennállt palesztinai brit mandátum története csupán héber és angol nyelven rendelkezik gazdag szakirodalommal, magyarul egyedül Arthur Koestler Ígéret és beteljesedés című, publicisztika jellegű munkája érhető el. A szerző jelen tanulmá-nyában a brit adminisztráció és rendfenntartás technikai problémáiról, a rendre felmerülő etnikai konfliktusok és összecsapások kezeléséről, illetve a brit csapatokkal és irányítással legélesebben szemben álló jobboldali cionista milíciákról ír a holokauszt és az izraeli államiság közötti időszakban, 1944 és 1948 között. Eredményeit az érintett felek iratait gyűjtő londoni National Archives, a Wiener Library és a jeruzsálemi Jabotinsky Institute anyagára alapozza.

The prevalent image of the newspaper Ha‘aretz identifies it as articulating an elitist viewpoint, a moderate liberal approach, and being politically dovish and – therefore – located decisively and permanently in opposition to the positions of Menachem Begin and the political parties he led over the years (Herut, Gahal-Gush Herut Liberalim, and Likud). Historical reality, however, does not necessarily match this image.
Indeed, during Israel’s early years Gershom Schocken, editor of Ha‘aretz, saw himself, as did Menachem Begin and the Herut Movement, as representatives and leaders of ideological, social, and political streams that could provide an alternative to the rule of Mapai and the hegemony of the Labor Movement in Israel. At the same time, Schocken saw Ha‘aretz as a very important tool for instructing the public regarding mature political judgment, and vehemently objected to the ideology of the Herut Movement.
Nevertheless, the paths of the two institutions crossed during the 1960s. The article focuses on this fascinating moment in history, when a very important partnership developed between Ha‘aretz and its editor and the Herut Movement and its leader. The core theme is the change in views expressed by Gershom Schocken and his newspaper regarding whether Menachem Begin and his party could offer a fitting agenda for Israeli society, an alternative to that of the Labor hegemony. The discussion focuses on the second and third decades of Israel’s existence, during which this surprising alliance was first created, and then dissipated.

Siden palestinernes president Mahmoud Abbas forlot 2010-forhandlingene, har Israels statsminister gjentatte ganger invitert ham tilbake til forhandlingsbordet så lenge alle betingelser legges til side. Men «ingen betingelser» er slett ikke et nøytralt utgangspunkt for forhandlinger; det er en velutprøvd israelsk forhandlingsstrategi.

This paper aims to shed further light on the response of Israeli society to the rise of the Black Panthers in 1971 by examining the attitude adopted by Menachem Begin and Gahal to the emerging Mizrahi protest movement. After discussing in detail Begin’s response to the Black Panthers’ protest, this paper analyses the factors that contributed to the divide between the Panthers and Israel’s leading opposition party at that time, and the criticism levelled by party members against its leadership concerning its inaction regarding the Black Panthers’ protest. Whereas right-wing Zionist research has hitherto focused on Begin’s political and security-related outlook and activities, the affair being discussed may shift the limelight onto the socio-economic attitudes of Begin and his party.

המאמר מנתח את הדרך להקמת הליכוד בסתיו 1973 כנקודת ציון משמעותית בתהליך צבירת הכוח של הימין במדינת ישראל. היוזמה להרחיב את גח"ל הגיעה מגורמים שונים במערכת הפוליטית בישראל, משורות המפלגה הליברלית ומהאופוזיציה הפנימית בתנועת החרות. דווקא מנחם בגין הוא שהסתייג לאורך השנים 1966-1973 מהקמת מפלגת מרכז-ימין רחבה. המאמר מציג את היוזמות השונות ומנתח את הסיבות לתגובה האדישה של בגין להן. מוצגת הדרך בה אריאל שרון בחר לקדם את הרחבת גח"ל, מתוך מודעות להתנגדות של בגין ושל תנועתו ואת המשא ומתן הקשה, רצוף המשברים, שבסופו, בקושי רב, הוקם הליכוד.
הקמת הליכוד מוצגת במאמר כניסיון מצד אחד לחזק את האפשרות של חילופי שלטון בישראל ומצד שני לצמצם את השפעתם של מנחם בגין ותנועת החרות על המפלגה המשותפת. נפרסים התהליכים הפנימיים בתוך תנועת החרות שהביאו לכך שהיא הצליחה לשמור על מעמדה הדומיננטי ב'ליכוד', בניגוד לכוונת השותפות שלה. הפיכת 'חרות' לזירת מעורבות ופעילות פוליטית תוססת היא שהפכו אותה לגורם הדומיננטי במפלגה החדשה ותרמו ליצירת מידה רבה של זהות בין 'חרות' לבין המושג 'ליכוד' בשנים הבאות.
The path for the Likud's establishment in the fall of 1973 was a weighty reference point for right-wing emergence in the State of Israel. The initiative to expand Gahal originated from different sources from within the Israeli political establishment, of both Liberal party and Herut's internal opposition party lines. Menachem Begin however was reserved from 1966-1973 to establish a broad right-of-center party. The paper showcases the various initiatives and examines the reasons behind Begin's indifferent response to them and illustrates the course that Ariel Sharon took in order to expand Gahal, with full awareness of the objection that Begin and his party had and the strenuous negotiations that eventually and laboriously gave rise to the Likud.
The establishment of the Likud party is portrayed on the one hand as an attempt to build on the possibility of a regime change in Israel while on the other hand narrow down the Menachem Begin's and the Herut movement's impact on the joint-ticket party. The paper lays out the internal processes from within the Herut movement that kept its dominance on the Likud, in contrast with the intentions of its partners. Turning  Herut into a thriving politically-engaging platform made it a dominant force in the newly-created party and played a significant contributory role in drawing up similar definitions for the "Likud" and the "Herut movement" for the next years to come.

On 19 November 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader to visit Israel officially when he met with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and spoke before the Knesset in Jerusalem about his views on how to achieve a comprehensive peace to the Arab–Israeli conflict, which included the full implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This paper, written during graduate school. writes that broadcasters can lay no small claim to having actμally catalyzed the entire event. This paper highlights the role that broadcasting played in this particular world event. It also relates this incident to other events of history where the mass media has played a pivotal role.

The prevalent image of the newspaper Ha‘aretz identifies it as articulating an elitist viewpoint, a moderate liberal approach, and being politically dovish and – therefore – located decisively and permanently in opposition to the positions of Menachem Begin and the political parties he led over the years (Herut, Gahal-Gush Herut Liberalim, and Likud). Historical reality, however, does not necessarily match this image.
Indeed, during Israel’s early years Gershom Schocken, editor of Ha‘aretz, saw himself, as did Menachem Begin and the Herut Movement, as representatives and leaders of ideological, social, and political streams that could provide an alternative to the rule of Mapai and the hegemony of the Labor Movement in Israel. At the same time, Schocken saw Ha‘aretz as a very important tool for instructing the public regarding mature political judgment, and vehemently objected to the ideology of the Herut Movement.
Nevertheless, the paths of the two institutions crossed during the 1960s. The article focuses on this fascinating moment in history, when a very important partnership developed between Ha‘aretz and its editor and the Herut Movement and its leader. The core theme is the change in views expressed by Gershom Schocken and his newspaper regarding whether Menachem Begin and his party could offer a fitting agenda for Israeli society, an alternative to that of the Labor hegemony. The discussion focuses on the second and third decades of Israel’s existence, during which this surprising alliance was first created, and then dissipated.

This article examines the interaction between official memory and popular memory through the case study of Olei Hagardom – Jewish underground fighters executed by the British in Mandatory Palestine. Studies of collective memory usually maintain that the ruling elite, with its control of state resources, dominates collective memory formation. However, the case of Olei Hargardom demonstrates the potentially limited power of institutional commemoration and exclusion in a democratic society. David Ben-Gurion and his government's attempt to exclude these right-wing heroes from the national pantheon had limited impact. Menachem Begin's persistent, partisan political efforts to include them were only partially successful. Ultimately, Olei Hargardom became entrenched in Israeli collective memory as a result of apolitical literary works, popular culture, and the establishment of a site of memory by spontaneous, grassroots efforts.