Marxism and Ecology

Le scénario "zéro émissions nettes" de l'Agence Internationale de l'Energie marque un tournant dans le discours de cette organisation. Les multinationales de l'énergie fossile ne s'attendaient pas à un plan aussi radical, notamment l'arrêt de toute prospection dès 2021. Ce rapport confirme un tournant plus large au niveau des classes dominantes. Ceci dit, le mouvement pour le climat ne doit pas s'y tromper: "zéro émissions nettes" ne signifie pas "zéro émissions". Selon le projet de l'AIE, un cinquième de l'énergie finale en 2050 sera toujours d'origine fossile. Le scénario est basé non seulement sur des investissements massifs dans le solaire et l'éolien (sous forme de grands parcs), mais aussi sur la multiplication des grands barrages, le doublement de l'énergie nucléaire, la mise en oeuvre à grande échelle de la CCS et des cultures de biomasse énergétique, sans compter les promesses de "l'hydrogène vert". 55% des technologies nécessaires à ce projet de capitalisme vert au-delà de 2030 n'existent qu'au stade de la démonstration ou du prototype. Bien qu'il soit présenté comme permettant d'éviter un dépassement temporaire du 1,5°C de réchauffement, le plan de l'AIE conforme au contraire que ce dépassement ne peut être évité sans rupture avec le tout au marché néolibéral et le productivisme capitaliste.

The critique of political economy is not an obsolete endeavor. As a historical and social science, it studies the global relations that emerge with the development of capitalism and their contingent processes. As a critical approach to power, it analyses capital accumulation, its dynamics and crises, with the purpose of —in Karl Marx´s own words— launching " the most terrible missile that has yet been hurled at the heads of the bourgeoisie ". This latter aim may be disputable; however, its potentialities and its consequences for political organization and practice remain still far from exhausted The work of Karl Marx (1818-1883) engages critically and scientifically with these and other contemporary issues, but leaves open the question of the future of bourgeois society. On the second centenary of Marx's birth, the Department of Political Science and Administration, of the Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU), in collaboration with the consolidated research group Parte Hartuz and Betiko Foundation, is organizing an international conference devoted to the study and discussion of the reception of Karl Marx´s work and its influence on the theory of revolution.

Contemporary environmental threats inspire the formation of new global communities and relationships: networks that both transcend nations and local environmental interactions and forge novel assemblages of human and non-human collaborations in a bid to “reset their modes of being” (Scott 2013:864). The Millennium Seed Bank Partnership (MSBP), for example, is the largest ex situ plant conservation project in the world and brings together partners from over 80 countries in an endeavor to conserve seeds from rare, wild plant species. As the potential use of the wild plant becomes increasingly central to the conservation relationship at the MSBP and implicated within a wider discourse on the neoliberalization of conservation, this paper explores how the term “use” may in fact encompass a nascent desire to reframe the human-plant relationship. By critically evaluating the values and intentions behind the quest for novel plant-uses by those who work within the MSBP, this paper examines the implications of seed-saving within a contemporary conservation institution. For those involved, rather than objectifying and creating a utilitarian relationship with nature, the concept of use is indicative of an aspiration to foster intimate, reciprocal relationships with their non-human counterparts, operating within an ontology in which humans and plants are interdependent. This paper argues that at a time when sustaining ontological diversity is key to ensuring cultural resilience and adaptation to environmental challenges, it is vital that ethnobiologists engage not only with traditional models, but also explore what innovative, intentional relationships with nature may be emerging from within conservation.

Perhaps the negotiators of the Paris climate agreement just don’t care whether the gap between the INDCs and 1.5 to 2°C can be closed, in whole or in part. But it is more likely that they do care—the most intelligent of them certainly do—because too much warming would make their system unmanageable. But in a capitalist framework negative emissions technologies (NET) appear to offer the only possible way out. I bring evidence that geoengineering is the specter that haunts the text adopted by COP21 and gives it meaning. Indeed, no mention of emissions peaks, rate reductions, or decarbonisation is necessary. From now on, all of these concepts depend on the potential of NET, which will be addressed at some future date. The fact that the Agreement does not mention “energy transition” is not a regrettable lapse in generally good text, but proof by omission that the negotiators have chosen to bet on geoengineering instead of confronting fossil capital.

Synopsis and critical implication of Capital volume I. Updated version, to match the actual speech I made of it Friday, Oct. 9. I go through the gist of the theoretical side of Capital I and end by stating basically what we should walk away from the book thinking.

Tulisan ini bermaksud mengupas permasalahan panas antara Warga Rembang VS Semen Indonesia dan menjadi Term of Refference yang disampaikan pada Diskusi Akbar #RembugRembang pada 11 April 2015 di Hall Utama Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik, Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta.

Fishing share systems that distribute ‘fishing surplus’ among crew are widespread in global fisheries. One recent analysis identifies the New England ‘lay’ share system as a form of ‘non-capitalism’ because of the way that surpluses are shared (St Martin 2007). Through ethnographic, historical and economic analysis of Scottish commercial nephrops trawler fisheries, this paper demonstrates that fishing share systems are adaptable to the exploitation of labour. While share systems seem to have their origins in shared ownership of fishing boats and gear, it is the present lack of this link in Scotland that has created the conditions for labour itself to become a commodity and share systems to function as a variable and casual wage. This paper argues that the dependence of the fishery on commodity production and its reliance on labour as a commodity makes it fully capitalist, even in the presence of a share system, and explores the social and ecological consequences of the development of these more conventionally capitalist class relations.

Abstract:

The most sophisticated philosophical defence of Marx’s theory of history – G.A. Cohen’s – deploys functional explanations in a manner that accords explanatory primacy to technological development. In contrast, an anarchist theory can be developed that accords explanatory primacy to the state. It is, however, possible to develop a theory of history that accords explanatory primacy neither to the development of technology nor to the state but which nevertheless possesses the explanatory power of both the Marxist and the anarchist theories. Such a theory can also provide the foundations for a radical environmentalist political theory.

Tradicionalmente, el marxismo se enfoco en la contradiccion capital-trabajo y no atendio a la relacion capital-naturaleza mas que fragmentaria y aisladamente. Sin embargo, la acelerada expansion de la formacion social capitalista a escala planetaria en las ultimas decadas intensifica y renueva los procesos de apropiacion privada y mercantilizacion de la naturaleza que Marx ubicara en una etapa originaria del capitalismo. El desenvolvimiento de dichos procesos hace necesario nutrir al marxismo con una perspectiva ecologica que habilite la incorporacion de nuevas herramientas teoricas. El presente articulo tiene como objetivo realizar un estado del arte del marxismo ecologico, para lo cual se describiran y clasificaran sus principales contribuciones al entendimiento de la relacion capitalnaturaleza. Asimismo, se propone recuperar criticamente algunos conceptos fundamentales de la obra de Marx y Engels, teniendo en cuenta tanto los aspectos mas sugerentes como los mas controversiales e...

La Conférence de Glasgow (COP26) aurait dû en priorité: 1°) concrétiser la promesse des pays « développés » de verser au Fonds vert pour le climat, à partir de 2020, au moins cent milliards de dollars par an pour aider le Sud global à relever le défi climatique1; 2°) forcer ces mêmes pays à intervenir financièrement pour couvrir les énormes « pertes et dommages » causés par le réchauffement, en particulier dans les « pays les moins avancés » et les petits états insulaires; 3°) « rehausser les ambitions » climatiques des gouvernements pour concrétiser l'objectif de la COP21 (Paris, 2015): « maintenir la hausse de température bien au-dessous de 2°C tout en continuant les efforts pour ne pas dépasser 1,5°C par rapport à la période préindustrielle ». Le bilan est sans appel: sur le papier, Glasgow clarifie l'objectif ambigu de Paris en le radicalisant (1,5°C est dorénavant l'objectif) et évoque la responsabilité des combustibles fossiles; mais en pratique, la Conférence n'a rien conçu pour arrêter la catastrophe. « Pas en avant dans la bonne direction », ont dit certains. Au contraire: obnubilés par la relance néolibérale post-covid et par leurs rivalités géostratégiques, les maîtres du monde ont décidé: 1°) de reporter la promesse des cent milliards pour le Fonds vert; 2°) de dire niet à la compensation des « pertes et dommages »; 3°) de laisser le champ presque totalement libre aux énergies fossiles ; 4°) de considérer la stabilisation du climat comme un marché de « compensations carbone » et de technologies ; 5°) de doter ce marché d'un mécanisme global d'échange de « droits de polluer »; 6°) last but not least, de confier la gestion de ce marché à la finance… c'està-dire aux riches… dont les investissements et le mode de vie sont la cause fondamentale du réchauffement.Du point de vue du capital, il est faux de dire que la COP26 est du blablabla. C’est plutôt une monstrueuse apothéose de néolibéralisme. Ce sommet a fait un pas en avant significatif sur la voie de marchandisation totale de la Terre, de ses écosystèmes et de ses habitant.e.s. Au profit de la finance,  sur le dos de la nature et des peuples.

No artigo, busca-se elaborar uma crítica ontológica à concepção de estado estacio nário, tal como avançada por um dos principais expoentes da Economia Ecológica, Herman Daly. Para isso, serão confrontados também outros aspectos centrais dessa importante corrente de pensamento ambiental, como o de escala ótima, crescimento antieconômico, crescimento qualitativo e a ideia de mundo cheio. Isso permitirá demonstrar que, a despeito de seus pontos de partida ra-zoavelmente distintos, Economia Ecológica e Economia Ambiental comparti-lham uma mesma ontologia e, por isso, projetam uma imagem em quase tudo semelhante do que seria, ou deveria ser, uma sociedade sustentável.

In the article, we seek to elaborate an ontological critique of the concept of steady-state, as advanced by one of the main exponents of the Ecological Economy, Herman Daly. For this, other central aspects of this important current of environmental thought will also be confronted, such as optimal scale, uneconomic growth, qualitative growth and the idea of a full world. This will demonstrate that, despite their reasonably distinct starting points, Ecological Economics and Environmental Economics share a common ontology and therefore project an image of what a sustainable society would or should be that is similar in almost everything.

The growth dynamic of capital and the inaction of its political representatives have literally brought us to the brink. What should be done to avoid tipping over it? That is the question to ask. First, it is imperative to answer this objectively, without subjectively limiting ourselves, that is, without being confused by what is or is not feasible within the capitalist political, economic, social and ideological context, which distorts everything and stands reality on its head. Secondly we must see what is to be done to make possible what is necessary, what obstacles must be overcome, how much time may be needed, with what consequences, and how to confront them. To proceed in the converse direction, starting from the “capitalist possible” in order to determine what “must” be done (in reality, what capital allows) is to posit that the historical and social laws of profit must prevail over the physical laws of the Earth’s climate. This is absolute methodological nonsense.
Objectively, it is indisputable that blocking the growing disaster requires a very radical anticapitalist plan, completely reorienting production, exchanges, relations with the “global South” and the worldview. The main difficulty is not technical but social, and therefore political: the necessary alternative cannot be organized from above. It requires imperatively a powerful mobilization at the base, a generalized responsibility. Let’s dare to say it: we need a global self-management revolution to democratically address, at all levels, the combined social and environmental crises. However, there is a chasm between this urgent anticapitalist alternative and the level of consciousness of the majority of society. How is it to be overcome, to be bridged, at the earliest possibility? That is THE strategic problem to be resolved. It will not be overcome by proposing alternatives at a discount. It can only be overcome through the development of social mobilization. This development is indeed the lever to advance the level of consciousness on a mass scale.
Will it work? Nobody can guarantee it. The situation presents some analogies with the one that existed before the First World War, which Lenin characterized as an “objectively revolutionary situation.” The subjective factor was totally unable to prevent the butchery of 1914-18, but from that butchery there arose the Russian revolution  — which was suffocated from outside and strangled from within. A century later, a similar question is posed, on an even more disturbing scale: how far will humanity have to sink into the trenches of climate catastrophe before finally turning against capitalism to rid itself of this criminal system once and for all? Will the revolution — the irruption of the masses on the scene where their fate is at issue — meet the challenge? Will capitalism, on the contrary, maintain its bewitching power?
These questions are unanswered. They remind us of Gramsci, and his famous quote about combining the pessimism of the mind with the optimism of the will. That optimism is a categorical imperative, because we are certain of only one thing: the outcome of the race between the disaster and consciousness of the disaster depends on the re-emergence on a mass scale of an emancipatory project capable of overcoming the terrible threats to humanity posed by productivist folly.

After this COP24, one thing should be crystal clear: there is nothing, absolutely nothing to expect from the governments, from the United Nations, from the Talanoa Dialogue, from the “High Ambi-tion Coalition” and so on. We must abandon radically any illusion about the possibility of convinc-ing all those responsible for the chaos, whoever they are, of the benefits they would incur by “taking leadership” to “raise ambitions” by piloting a “just transition” towards “sustainable development” and so on. They want nothing to do with it, period. All this blah-blah, all this stage management, has one purpose: to put people to sleep, neutralize their thinking, paralyze their organizations. This is the spider’s strategy. To collaborate is to throw oneself into the web.

The 3E Collective held the first Ecosocialist Education Convergence (ECOEC) in May 2018 outside the Baltic city of Rostock, Germany. Events included structured lectures, discussions, infrastructure projects, excursions to local activist projects, and self- managed activities. The ECOEC had two primary goals. First, the programme was intended to improve the political consciousness of participants, develop new practical skills (e.g. building a windmill), and raise motivation for the struggles to come through revolutionary education. Second, this programme was convened to begin developing a European network based on the principles of ecosocialism. Participants travelled from many countries, including Germany, Italy, Greece, the United States, Spain, Canada, Slovenia, Estonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Costa Rica and Kurdistan.
This document highlights some of the key points and issues that arose from our collective thinking over this experience. In the first section, we highlight what ECOEC means. We then focus on what radical education means to us. The third section explores the conceptual framing of discovery, engagement, and transformation. Fourth, we discuss the relationship between social movements, academia and research. And, finally, we highlight some tensions that arose during ECOEC, especially those regarding the transition from theory to practice.

A Marx természetfelfogására vonatkozó szakmai-szakfilozófiai diskurzusban régóta (majdnem három évtizede: az 1990-es évek eleje óta) konszenzus van arról, hogy Marxnak igenis volt mondanivalója ökológiai, környezetvédelmi kérdésekben, mégpedig nagyon is sok mondanivalója volt ezen a téren. Arról van szó, hogy a Marx filozófiájára vonatkozó frissebb kutatások szerint Marxnak nem egyszerűen voltak megállapításai, észrevételei környezetvédelmi, környezetetikai kérdésekben, hanem kiforrott és koherens ökológiai, ökopolitikai elmélettel rendelkezett.
Azonban ez az értelmezés – mely (nézetem szerint) sikeresen cáfolta azt a korábbi nézetet, amely szerint Marxnak nem volt ökológiája, és a természetre pusztán technokrata módon, kiaknázható és kiaknázandó erőforrások puszta gyűjteményeként tekintett –, szigorúan véve pusztán egy emberközpontú ökológiát engedett meg. Vagyis környezetvédelemre – ezen Marx-interpretáció szerint – az emberiség túlélése és hosszútávú prosperálása szempontjából volna szükség. Noha Marxnál kétségkívül sok olyan megállapítással és gondolatmenettel találkozunk, melyek arról szólnak, hogyan idegeníti el tőlünk a kapitalizmus a természetet, hogyan zsákmányolja ki a Földet, a természet „önértékére” vonatkozó kijelentés mégis csak elvétve bukkan fel nála. Ezért néhányan kifejezetten azt állították, hogy Marx tagadta a természet önértékét (Kovel 2007). Ami nem igaz: több olyan kijelentéssel is találkozunk Marxnál, de különösen Engelsnél (és mindenekelőtt az idős Engelsnél), amelyek a természet önértékét állítják. Ezen kijelentések sporadikus, elszórt volta miatt azonban a Marx ökológiájával foglalkozó szerzők egy része inkább azt a stratégiát választotta, hogy azt állítsák: Marx meghaladta instrumentális érték és önérték, illetve emberközpontú és természetközpontú szemlélet szembeállítását, (Burkett & Foster 2016).
A jelen előadásban egy természet-, pontosabban életközpontú ökoszocialista perspektívát szeretnék felvázolni; amiben némileg más stratégiát választok, mint Burkett és Foster. Szerintem instrumentális érték és önérték, emberközpontú vagy természetközpontú szemlélet szembenállása nem haladható meg olyan módon, mint azt ők állítják, itt szívósabb ellentétekről van szó, melyek – nézetem szerint – nem egyszerűen a kapitalista társadalmi rendben, hanem inkább magukban a dolgok természetében vannak megalapozva, (Holmes Rolston III nyomán [Rolston 2005]). Inkább Marxot szeretném közelíteni a biocentrikus, illetve mélyökológiai filozófiai felfogásokhoz; a Marxnál és Engelsnél megtalálható, kétségkívül szerény számú, de azért ténylegesen meglévő megnyilatkozás alapján.
Az ökoszocializmusnak egy olyan, a mélyökológiára nyitott változatát szeretném felvázolni, mely egyfelől nem törli el a különbségeket, bizonyosfajta rétegződést, szintekből álló szerkezetet foglal magában, a lényekben rejlő tudatosság, illetve öntudat világosságának fokozatai szerint, másfelől azonban a földi élőközösséget úgy kezeli, mint egyetlen nagy globális közösséget, melynek határai túlnyúlnak az emberi társadalom határain, oly módon, hogy az magában foglaljon minden élőlényt és különös populációt. Olyan, egyfelől marxista, másfelől életfilozófiai, életfenomenológiai keretrendszer kidolgozására szeretnék javaslatot tenni, mely képes sikeresen és koherensen egyesíteni az ember- és természetközpontú, illetve az individualisztikus és holisztikus ökológiai elméletek és öko-etikák, valamint öko-politikák legelőnyösebb (vagy legalábbis általam legelőnyösebbnek vélt) vonásait.

‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’: teoria elaborata da Massimo Morigi afferente al ‘Repubblicanesimo Geopolitico’, al ‘Repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Neo-repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Marxismo’ e al ‘Neo-marxismo’. Pur condividendo la critica di Karl Marx all’individualismo metodologico dell’economia classica (in specie la critica ad Adam Smith e David Ricardo, individualismo metodologico che poi sarà in seguito trasmesso anche all’economia neoclassica o marginalismo), la ‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’ rovescia la teoria del plusvalore di Karl Marx, affermando che il rapporto sociale che va sotto il nome di ‘capitalismo’ non opera una sottrazione del valore del lavoro erogato dal lavoratore a vantaggio del capitale ma, invece, una distruzione del valore di questo lavoro, distruzione del valore che si evidenzia sul “libero mercato” dove s’incontrano – entrambi formalmente liberi – gli operai (decisori omega-strategici), che apportano su questo mercato un lavoro svalutato (distrutto quindi nel suo valore) originatosi proprio dalla libertà di questo mercato (ossia dalla sua mancanza di regole) e i datori di lavoro capitalisti (decisori alfa-strategici) che così possono avvalersi di questo valore-lavoro effettivamente svalutato (o, meglio, distrutto).

La presente tesis se enmarca dentro del área de la Ecología Política, un área de estudios relativamente novedoso en el cual confluyen diversas disciplinas. Su propósito es estudiar la relación entre la sociedad y la naturaleza: tanto la forma en la cual el hombre se apropia y utiliza su entorno natural, como las representaciones e ideologías que prevalecen en dicho vínculo. Esa relación se establece en el marco de determinadas relaciones sociales de producción y reproducción. Bajo la formación social capitalista el intercambio con el mundo natural se funda preponderantemente en la apropiación privada y en la mercantilización del mismo. Por esa razón, consideramos necesario partir desde las categorías del Marxismo Ecológico, teoría que añade una segunda contradicción del capitalismo: no sólo la relación contradictoria entre capital-trabajo sobre la cual se centró el marxismo tradicional, sino también la relación capital-naturaleza.
El tema de estudio se refiere a la reforma estructural del sector de hidrocarburos en Argentina operada desde fines de la década del ochenta del siglo pasado. Al cabo de pocos años, el sector fue totalmente desregulado y la empresa estatal Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) fue privatizada en sucesivas etapas.
En los numerosos estudios sobre la transformación de la actividad petrolera y gasífera ha predominado el análisis de los aspectos económicos, políticos, laborales y sociales. Valiéndonos de los mismos, proponemos adicionalmente una perspectiva ecológico-política desde la cual analizar el modo en que se produjo la transición de la concepción del petróleo y gas como “recursos estratégicos” hacia su consideración como simples mercancías exportables o commodities. La primera acepción formaba parte del acervo de la ideología del nacionalismo petrolero, cuyos orígenes se remontan al descubrimiento del primer yacimiento de Comodoro Rivadavia en 1907 y a la creación de YPF en 1922. El predominio de aquella ideología se correspondía con un determinado régimen de acumulación capitalista a escala nacional, denominado industrialización por sustitución de importaciones, y una forma de Estado interventor, que controlaba la actividad a través de YPF.
A partir de la dictadura cívico-militar de 1976, ese régimen fue desmontado a favor de un patrón de valorización financiera y primarización de la economía, marcando el inicio de la hegemonía neoliberal a nivel nacional como parte de un proceso mundial liderado por EEUU y el capital financiero. La doctrina del neoliberalismo se había constituido en la salida de la crisis de sobreacumulación de mediados de los setenta a través de un conjunto de mecanismos de “acumulación por desposesión” (Harvey, 2003). En Argentina no se consolidó en toda su dimensión hasta 1989, cuando asumió la presidencia Carlos Menem y se viabilizó la conformación de un bloque social de poder integrado por acreedores externos y grupos económicos locales, liderados por la fracción financiera del capital.
En lo que atañe al sector en estudio, la consolidación del régimen neoliberal significó el desplazamiento definitivo del nacionalismo petrolero. Desde el Estado se operó el pasaje discursivo hacia la mercantilización del petróleo y gas: fueron despojados de todo sesgo estratégico en función de la libre apropiación y comercialización en manos del capital petrolero.
Por tanto, el objetivo general es comprender de qué manera se realizó la transformación de la concepción predominante de los hidrocarburos durante la desregulación y privatización de la actividad petrolera. A tal fin, utilizaremos fundamentalmente una metodología cualitativa con el respaldo de otras investigaciones de tipo cuantitativas que dieron cuenta de aquella transformación (Kozulj y Bravo, 1993; Mansilla, 2007). En términos específicos, serán indagadas tanto las representaciones de los principales actores políticos y privados, así como la relación establecida entre el Estado y el capital. A su vez, serán identificadas y analizadas las valoraciones alternativas de actores opositores con el fin de evaluar el grado de conflictividad en el proceso de imposición de la representación mercantil. En un escenario de marcada debilidad política de la oposición y de decisiva complicidad del Sindicato Unido de Petroleros del Estado (SUPE), se toman en cuenta especialmente los casos de nuevos actores sindicales y sociales: la Federación de Trabajadores de la Energía de la República Argentina (FeTERA) y la Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados de Salta (UTD).
El período de estudio seleccionado comienza en 1989 con la presidencia de Carlos Menem y finaliza con la crisis económica y política de diciembre de 2001 que derivó en la renuncia de Fernando De la Rúa. La trayectoria histórica previa de la explotación petrolera en Argentina es abordada brevemente con el fin de describir la etapa del monopolio estatal y del predominio del nacionalismo petrolero. En cambio, la etapa abierta con la crisis de 2001, que configuró una nueva situación económica y política, será estudiada en la tesis de doctorado.

This thesis is inline with Political Ecology, a relatively novel area of study where various disciplines come together. Its aim is to study the relationship between society and nature: not only the way in which man appropiates and uses his natural environment, but the representations and ideologies that prevail in such bond. That relationship establishes in the framework of certain social relations of production and reproduction. Under capitalist social formation the exchange with natural world is predominantly based on private appropriation and commodification. For this reason, we start from the categories of Ecological Marxism, a theory which adds an extra contradiction of capitalism: not only the contradictory relationship between capital – labour on which traditional marxism was focused, but also the relationship capital – nature.
The concern of this work refers to the structural reform of hydrocarbon sector in Argentina brought about from late eighties of the last century. After a few years, the sector was completely deregulated and the state-owned company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) was privatized in successive stages. The numerous studies of oil and gas activities have focused on the analysis of economical, political, labour and social aspects. Making use of those studies, we additionally propose an ecological and political perspective to analyze the transition from the concept of oil and gas considered as “strategic resources” to them considered as simple exportable goods or commodities. The first meaning was part of ideological tradition of oil nationalism originated with the discovery of the first oilfield in Comodoro Rivadavia in 1907 and the setting up of YPF in 1922. The predominance of that ideology corresponded with a particular regime of national capitalist accumulation called import substitution industrialization, and an interventionist state that controlled the activity through YPF.
From the civil – military dictatorship started in 1976, that regime was dismantled in favour of a financial valorization pattern and primarization of the economy, setting the beginning of neoliberal hegemony in the country as part of a global process led by USA and financial capital. Neoliberal doctrine had been formed in the exit of the overaccumulation crisis of mid seventies through a group of mechanisms of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003). However, neoliberalism wasn’t consolidated completely in Argentina until Carlos Menem Presidency in 1989 and the setting-up of a social bloc of power formed of external creditors and local economic groups, led by the financial fraction of capital.
Regarding the concern of this study, the consolidation of neoliberal regime meant the definitive displacement of oil nationalism. The State operated the discursive passage towards the commodification of oil and gas: they were stripped of all strategic slant according to free appropriation and marketing in the hands of oil capital.
Therefore, the general aim is to understand the changes of predominant conception of hydrocarbons during deregulation and privatization of oil activity. With that purpose, we will use a qualitative methodology with the support of other quantitative researches which explained that transformation (Kozulj y Bravo, 1993; Mansilla, 2007). We will specifically investigate the representation of the main political actors and private actors as well as the relationship between State and capital. Moreover, we will indentify and analyze alternative valuation of opponent actors to assess the levels of conflict in the process of imposition of the mercantile representation. In a scenario marked by political weakness of oponents and decisive complicity of the Sindicato Unido de Petroleros del Estado (SUPE), we specifically consider the cases of new labour union and social actors: the Federación de Trabajadores de la Energía de la República Argentina (FeTERA) and the Unión de Trabajadores Desocupados de Salta (UTD).
The period of this study starts in 1989 with Carlos Menem presidency and concludes with the economic and political crisis in December 2001 that resulted in the resignation of Fernando De la Rúa. The previous historical path of oil exploitation in Argentina is briefly dealt to describe the stage of State monopoly and oil nationalism predominance. On the other hand, the period opened with 2001 crisis, that formed a new economic and political situation, will be studied in the doctorate thesis.

As a trip to the supermarket will bear out, food prices are on the rise. We know the implications of higher food costs for ourselves and especially for the poor, but what about for capitalism itself? In part two of an extended interview, radical scholar Jason W. Moore argues that capitalism is running out of cheap nature -- including food and labor -- to exploit, with serious consequences for the system itself.

This essay builds out an argument for understanding the past five centuries as the Capitalocene, the “age of capital.” The present essay – the second of two parts – reconstructs the limits, opportunities, and crises of the capitalist world-ecology since the long 16th century. This reconstruction is pursued through the world-ecological reading of value-relations introduced in Part I. While Marxist political economy has taken value to be an economic phenomenon with systemic implications, I suggest value-relations as a systemic phenomenon with a pivotal economic moment. The accumulation of abstract social labor is possible only to the degree that unpaid work (human and extra-human) can be appropriated. The value-form (the commodity) and its substance (abstract social labor) depend upon value-relations that configure wage-labor with its necessarily more expansive conditions of reproduction: unpaid work. Elaborating an approach that seeks to translate the appropriation of work/energy into value, I argue for a conception of value-relations as co-produced through relations of exploitation (capital-labor) and appropriation (capital-unpaid work). This latter, accumulation by appropriation, is enabled by abstract social nature, the relational counterpoint to abstract social labor. If the substance of abstract social nature is the production of “real abstractions” of time (linear), space (flat), and nature (external), its historical expressions are found in the family of processes through which capitalists and state-machineries map, identify, quantify, measure, and code human and extra-human natures in service to capital accumulation. The historical conditions of “cheap nature” are found not only in the capital-labor relation but also in the production of knowledge-practices necessary to identify and to appropriate unpaid work. A frame-work that unifies the domains of human and extra-human activity in the making of the modern world may well prove useful in developing effective analytics and emancipatory politics as modernity unravels today.

... View all references). Not surprisingly, the most politically radical environmentalists have tended to adhere to some form of either eco-Marxism (for example, O'Connor 1998) oreco-anarchism (for example, Bookchin 19824. Bookchin, M. 1982. ...

La question Ouïgour est subitement devenue un enjeu de la lutte politique au sein de la gauche entre celles et ceux qui dénoncent le génocide du peuple Ouïgour et elles et ceux qui refusent de participer à une nouvelle guerre froide de l'impérialiste étasunien. Les couteaux sont tirés mais il est frappant que les deux camps ont un point commun: ils se taisent sur le fait que, si Pékin réprime les peuples musulmans du Xinjiang avec les méthodes employées par les Etats-Unis en Irak et par Israël en Palestine, c'est pour des raisons économiques et géostratégiques similaires. Il s'agit en effet d'accaparer les richesses, énergétiques notamment, de ce territoire. Au bénéfice des Hans, bien sûr, mais aussi au bénéfice des multinationales qui profitent des conditions de surexploitation dans l'atelier du monde capitaliste. On peut même aller plus loin, et dire que l'oppression des Ouïgours contribue à réduire le coût des « Green Deals » et autres formules de la transition vers le capitalisme vert en Occident.

Enclosed is one of two submissions to the 2018 World Ecology Research Network Conference in Helsinki. Included here is a short abstract, a longer abstract, and the full paper.

Ideological commitment to the concept of “free trade” has a long, violent, and oppressive history that turns largely on the profit-centered objectives of its beneficiaries. This, of course, is not news; it’s simply one point along the narrative trajectory of the Capitalocene, defining the “world” according to a logic whereby the value of everything is calculated according to its capacity for commodity exchange. Whether the American President finds favor with specific agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) matters only insofar as they advance his brand, “Make America Great Again!” Donald Trump isn’t really a different instantiation of the narratives that drive the Capitalocene; he’s just a particularly transparent, if unsightly one. I’ll argue that what Trump foreshadows is the transition between the Capitalocene and the Kleptocene, that is, between Capital as it still operates behind the thinning facade of “free trade” and the world whose vanishing shorelines, droughts, fires, species loss, and massive human migrations make unembellished theft combined with authoritarian rule the only remaining option for maintaining the levers of power. My aim is to tell a story about how, via recent incarnations of the mythologies of “Free Trade,” we arrived at the Kleptocene. I’ll look at three of “Free Trade’s” most recent iterations, TPP, the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). None signal anything new to the logic or trajectory of capital, but all exemplify the ways in which that conquest affects the metastasis of the planet, its ecological systems, and its inhabitants. What distinguishes TPP and company from their predecessors is the commitment to climate change denial and the psychotic level of cognitive dissonance that suffuses that commitment.

Dans un article mis en ligne sur son site, le militant québécois Marc Bonhomme me range dans la charrette de celles et ceux pour qui la menace climato-négationniste de Trump justifierait une union sacrée en défense de l'accord de Paris sur le climat. Marc Bonhomme écrit en effet ceci: « La levée de boucliers anti-Trump pour sauver l'Accord de Paris est quasi générale tant du côté des transnationales, y compris pétrolières, que des grands États pollueurs, sauf la Russie, qui l'ont ratifié en un temps record. S'y joint l'anticapitaliste Daniel Tanuro, connu pour son expertise eu égard à la question climatique. (Selon) Daniel Tanuro, 'si Trump passe à l'acte [de renier l'Accord], il s'agira d'un crime climatique majeur'. » (1) L'idée que je rejoindrais les multinationales et les grands Etats pollueurs dans une alliance interclassiste pour « sauver l'accord de Paris » n'a aucun fondement et est à l'opposé de mes convictions.

One of the significant developments in the interdisciplinary field of judgment and decision making is the classification of environments as a function of (a) their capacity to enable people to learn from experience (kind environments vs. wicked environments) and (b) the consequences of having failed to understand and adapt to them (exacting environments vs. lenient environments). Based on the premise that 'environment' is a key geographical concept, I explore the usefulness of appropriating these classifications in geography and argue that they can stimulate normative work on the possible contours of a better world as well as illuminate in novel ways long-standing geographical concerns with the problematic of fairness. Les figures de l'environnement : ´ eléments de réflexion sur les bases envisageables d'un monde meilleur Parmi les innovations qui ont marqué la recherche interdisciplinaire sur le jugement et la décision, se trouve la classification des environnements définie en fonction : a) d'un mécanisme de base par lequel on peut tirer des enseignements de l'expérience (des environnements sains par opposition aux environnements hostiles) et b) des effets néfastes liés au fait que l'on n'a pasété en mesure de comprendre et de s'adapter (des environnements rigoureux par opposition aux environnements permissifs). En partant du principe selon lequel « l'environnement » est un concept central en géographie se pose la question de la pertinence de situer ces classifications dans une perspective géographique. Cetté etude fait valoir qu'elles peuvent en effet dynamiser les travaux afin de formuler des normes permettant d'´ etablir les bases envisageables d'un monde meilleur et de jeter un nouveí eclairage sur les enjeux géographiques autour de la problématique de l'´ equité. Mots clés : environnement, normativité, néolibéralisme, géographies de la moralité, apprentissage, ´ equité

Dans le sillage de la COP21, les médias ont rapporté des réactions des milieux d'affaire donnant l’impression que le patronat se contente de prendre acte des décisions de la COP. Cette impression est fausse. En réalité, l’accord de Paris a été cornaqué par les milieux d’affaires. Ce fut plus qu’un lobbying : une vraie co-élaboration avec les responsables politiques. Elle a été rendue possible par une convergence d’analyses au sein de cercles majoritaires du grand capital. Un rôle d'interface important a été joué par la "Global Commission on the Economy and Climate" co-présidée par Nicholas Stern dans la ligne de son rapport de 2006.

In the constant search for alternatives to development in an era of rampant global capitalism, Ecuador has become a kind of international lodestar held up by radical activists just about everywhere as a possible prototype for a nationally articulated anti-capitalist pathway. Based on the notion of ‘good living’ and the associated idea of the ‘rights of nature’, Ecuador is portrayed as the home of alternativeness in a way that Cuba was for some writers during the Cold War. This quest has long been led by local social movements representing people hurt by neo-liberal development, and its principal manifestations –natural resource extraction and rampant privatization of the public domain. Yet the election of a left-wing and anti-United States government under President Rafael Correa in 2007 (as in some other Latin American countries) ushered in a new ‘post neo-liberal’ era in which the state was both resurgent and itself highly critical of decades of neo-liberalism in the region on social and environmental grounds. A golden partnership of radical civil society and radical state seemed in the offing. This chapter examines how and why this golden partnership that held such national and international promise has failed to take root in Ecuador. First, and drawing on arguments made in political ecology and eco-socialism, we selectively highlight the sorts of international mainstream thinking on environment and development that has underpinned Northern-dominated international political economies affecting Ecuador and other Southern countries since the early 20th century, as well as radical critiques of such thinking that eventually found expression in the promotion of an alternative ‘good living’ movement. Then, the chapter examines the Ecuadorian case in detail, showing how ideas about society and nature there have fluctuated in light of these wider intellectual debates. We argue that a resurgent Ecuadorian state has ended up wrapping itself in a green and socially progressive image under post neo- liberalism the better to camouflage its advancement of a traditional programme of natural resource extraction presented as sustainable development – much to the disgust of radical civil society groups in the country. In the process, the question ‘whose good living’ has come to the fore as never before. In: Bryant, R. (ed.) Handbook of Political Ecology. Cheltenham, UK & Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar. (2015). Chapter 24, Pp. 332-344. ebook available: https://play.google.com/store/books/details/Raymond_L_Bryant_The_International_Handbook_of_Pol?id=X45HCgAAQBAJ

« This changes everything » est un livre fort, mais un livre sous tension. L’auteure le confesse dès les premières pages: « C’est le livre le plus difficile que j’ai jamais écrit, parce que la recherche m’a conduit à chercher des réponses radicales. Je n’ai aucun doute de leur nécessité, mais je questionne tous les jours leur faisabilité politique” (p. 26). De fait, Klein oscille entre une alternative anticapitaliste autogérée et décentralisée, de type écosocialiste et écoféministe (quoiqu’elle n’emploie pas ces termes), d’une part, et un projet de capitalisme vert régulé, basé sur une économie mixte relocalisée et imprégné d’une idéologie du soin et de la prudence, d’autre part.