Indian Maoists

Women have been considered a crucial part of the Naxalite movement because the Moaists aim at eliminating not only the class differences but also gender disparity. However one needs to critically look at the struggle to find whether it really works as an idealistic model catering to equality or is it just another alternate patriarchal structure upholding the supremacy of one gender over the other.

The Indian Government has repeatedly described Maoist guerillas as the ‘biggest security threat to the country’, and Bastar in central India as the headquarters of the Maoists. This book examines what these labels have meant for some of India’s poorest citizens living through armed conflict, starting from 2005 when a government sponsored vigilante movement killed hundreds and drove thousands of villagers into camps to 2015-16 when nearly 200,000 paramilitary forces are slated to move in. It is not coincidental that Bastar has some of India’s biggest mineral reserves.

Based on extensive field visits, court testimonies, government documents, and an active participant role in the events that she writes about, Sundar tracks Indian democracy over a decade, chronicling the responses of political parties, the media, human rights activists  and the judiciary to the ongoing crisis.

As the title suggests, this book is about the plight of Adivasis (= Tribals) in the context of current Maoist upheaval in some parts of east-central India, especially some regions of Dandakaranya forests that span across the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. Reportedly, there are thousands of Maoist guerrillas armed with sophisticated weapons confronting a vast array of paramilitary forces assembled by the government of India (GOI). The offensive action of the government is (unofficially) code-named  Operation Green Hunt  (OGH). Caught in the cross-fire are millions of poor, marginalised and historically isolated Adivasis. Already hundreds of Adivasis have lost their lives in the armed conflict, thousands are in jail mostly on fake charges, several hundred villages have been looted and burned, lakhs have fled from their homes, hundreds of schools have closed down, and malnutrition has reached sub-Saharan dimensions. It is a matter of sinister irony that Maoist guns were needed for the government to wake up to formidable  developmental challenges  in the Adivasi areas. But no proposal for development carries any meaning when the Adivasis are caught in a war. Since the basic thrust of the book is to articulate the urgent humanitarian cause of saving Adivasi lives, it is to be viewed as a political work, primarily.

This paper explores the Naxalite insurgency in India in terms of causal mechanisms that lead to the intensification of rural civil conflict by focusing specifically on grievance, mobilisation and government responses to rebellion. Realist theory is inadequate when analysing the causal factors of complex insurgencies and the mechanisms leading to their continuation. This case illustrates some aspects of intra-state conflict in a very large country, in terms of geography and population, and how the rebels have mobilised grievances at local level. New Delhi has addressed the conflict as both a development and a security challenge, and consequently has oscillated between repression and concession in its responses. This approach has resulted neither in reduction of grievances through adequate rural development, nor in consistent armed response to the Naxalite threat. Without a comprehensive and clear set of state responses, the violence is likely to continue.

This multi-methods thesis presents the hypothesis that revolutionary conflicts in federal democracies have unique characteristics that are distinguishable from other types of civil wars. To test this hypothesis, I examined how India’s federal framework and natural resource extraction policies
influenced local and national dimensions of the long-running Maoist conflict in central India. The relationship between mining, conflict and development was studied to explore how governments, insurgent groups, non-state actors and citizens acted in revolutionary conflict. I found that decentralization of political power to local elites encouraged policies that favored their personal gain, negatively affecting social cohesion, land rights and development schemes. This also encouraged companies in the conflict zone to use conflict-related loopholes within India’s federal democratic structures for corporate gain. Political prioritization of mining interests bolstered Maoist support in terms of ideological backing, funding, and recruitment, and increased violence and conflict intensity.
Grievances were rooted in the vertical inequalities that pro-mining policies created, and the Maoists capitalized on how mining activities exacerbated horizontal inequalities against Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe communities. The five articles that constitute this thesis assess these conflict dynamics from the micro- to macro- levels of analysis.

Terrorism finance has aptly been termed as the lifeblood of terrorism. Yet, this remains one of the most under researched facets of terrorism. This limitation is even more apparent in the Indian context, despite the fact that the country has faced the scrouge of terrorism and insurgency for over five decades. Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance, is the first book on the subject in an Indian context. The book contextualises the concept of terrorism finance to local realities based on distinct peculiarities as related to India. It documents the sources, transfer mechanisms and employment of funds for supporting organisational structures and acts of terrorism. The book also analyses two case studies to highlight in detail the methods employed for external and internal funding. The challenges associated with terrorism finance are further related to contributing factors which have aggravated the threat.

A SWOT analysis of existing sources, challenges and approach to terrorism finance is employed to suggest a strategy for countering the financing of terrorism. The strategy recommends measures at the policy planning level to curb the threat at the source of terror funding, transfer stage and during distribution of finances. The book further suggests organisational changes to improve the approach to terrorism finance without undertaking major restructuring of the existing setup.

राज्य-हिंसा पर विचार करने से पहले हम मुख्यरूप से हिंसा की तीन स्थितियों की कल्पना कर राज्य की भूमिका का स्थापन करने का प्रयास करते हैं। पहला, कुछ व्यक्तियों का समूह उनके निवास-स्थल के नजदीक लग रहे परमाणु संयंत्र के खिलाफ शांतिपूर्ण प्रतिरोध कर रहा है, क्योंकि इस परमाणु संयंत्र से होने वाले रेडियोएक्टिव खतरे उनके सुरक्षित जीवन-यापन के विरूद्ध गंभीर खतरा उत्पन्न कर सकते हैं। राज्य की पुलिस ने उस जनसमूह के खिलाफ लाठीचार्ज किया और लोग गंभीर रूप से घायल हो गए है। दूसरा, बहुसंख्यक वर्ग के लोग सांप्रदायिक उन्माद में अल्पसंख्यक वर्ग के खिलाफ हथियार लेकर सड़कों पर उतर गए हैं और बड़ी मात्रा में अल्पसंख्यक वर्ग के लोगों की हत्या कर रहे हैं और राज्य की मशीनरी अल्पसंख्यकों को सुरक्षा प्रदान करने में अनिच्छुक और उदासीन दिखाई पड़ रही है। तीसरा, राज्य में निवास करने वाले किसी खास वर्ग या जाति समूह को उनके मानवाधिकारों से योजनाबद्ध तरीके से वंचित किया जा रहा है तथा दैनिक जीवन की आधारभूत जरूरतों को उनकी पहुँच से दूर रखा जा रहा है, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप वह जाति-समूह मानव-विकास सूचकांक के सभी पैमानों में पिछड़ रहा है और उनकी औसत जीवन-प्रत्याशा राष्ट्रीय औसत जीवन-प्रत्याशा से बेहद नीचे है।

The Naxalite movement, inspired by Mao Tse-tung thought, erupted in India in May 1967 in the form of peasant occupation of landlords' land in the Naxalbari bloc of the West Bengal state. Within months, the influence of the movement spread to rural areas of many other states in India. This culminated in another split in India's communist movement with the launch of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in April 1969. The movement caught the imagination of idealistic youth and students in many urban areas. The Indian state managed to crush the movement militarily by the mid 1970s. However, it soon resurfaced and developed such a strong base among the tribal communities in India that in 2006, the Indian prime minister characterised it as India's single biggest internal security threat. It stands in limbo at the moment – it does not have the capability to overthrow the Indian state but has a sufficient military and social base to resist the state's attempts to crush it.

The CPN, founded in 1949, illustrates perfectly the bonds that tie Nepal to the outside world. The fact that its founders were at first members of the CPI or that the Jhapa Uprising was greatly inspired by the revolution in Naxalbary is one of the many signs of the influence of the Communist Movement in India over its Nepalese counterpart. The CPN was also shaped by the many changes that affected the International Communist Movement. Though many splits of the CPN were due to internal disputes, others (such as the split during the Third Congress of the CPN in 1962) were the direct consequence of disagreements within the Socialist bloc.
The Nepalese Maoist Movement was thus largely influenced by the regional and international Communist Movement

"Opposing the neoliberal rhetoric of a shining middle-class India, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) has, since 2004, called for a New Democratic Revolution. Indian Maoists dismiss parliamentary democracy as a sham insofar as it fails to address the concerns and aspirations of the majority of its citizens, nearly four-fifths of whom live below two dollars a day. In their party programme, Maoists characterize the postcolonial Indian state as ‘reactionary’ and ‘autocratic’ and seek a ‘worker-peasant alliance’ to overthrow ‘imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism’ via an armed revolutionary struggle. The CPI (Maoist) politburo, which constitutes its ideological leadership, is thus supported by an underground People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The party’s long-term objective is to establish a ‘people’s democratic state under the leadership of the proletariat’ that will ‘guarantee real democracy for the vast majority of people while exercising dictatorship over a tiny minority of exploiters’.

The CPI (Maoist) is active mostly in eastern and central India, where human development levels rank among the lowest in the world, forest cover and rugged terrain facilitate guerrilla tactics and protracted low-intensity insurgency, and tribal and lower caste groups are preponderant. According to the Indian prime minister, Maoist rebels pose the greatest internal security threat to India since independence. In reality, however, Maoist cadres are estimated to be anywhere between 10,000 and 40,000 in a country of nearly 1.2 billion people, though this number does not include sympathizers and non-combatants. These thinly-spread cadres are concentrated chiefly in what journalists, policymakers, and scholars call the Red Corridor, running from the Nepalese border through the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh. In these areas, regular elections are held, state and non-governmental organizations routinely participate in rural development, and state police and forest officials coexist with armed rebels and their rural supporters. Since 2005-06, the state has deployed paramilitaries to supplement state police forces in combating Maoist guerillas, which has intensified state-sponsored violence and led to widespread human rights abuses, yet it has been incapable of establishing anything akin to a monopoly of legitimate violence. Shared sovereignty is thus the norm, not the exception, as in other insurgent zones in India such as Kashmir and the northeastern frontier. This state of affairs also suggests that the everyday realities of Indian Maoism are somewhat different from its ideological self-image as a vanguardist revolutionary movement."

India’s remarkable economic development in the last 30 years has earned it the rank of the fastest growing democracy in the world. However, three major issues in the country have threatened its advancement on the international scene, its development and its national unity. These are: the Jammu and Kashmir conflict (as old as independent India itself), the separatist movements in the North Eastern states ( which date back to the early 1950s) and the Naxalite insurgency (which started in West Bengal in the late 1960s). The latter insurgency is the focus of this paper.

This chapter seeks to explore changing forms of Maoist mobilization in the plains of northern Telangana from the 1970s onwards. Bringing to view mutually constitutive relations between Maoist mobilization, the state and agrarian change, this chapter challenges the dominant view of the decline and collapse of the Maoists in northern Telangana.I argue that prevailing scholarly accounts leave unexplored patterns of mobilization and demobilization that are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the Telangana case. Presenting empirical material in the form of oral historical narratives, I show that the disintegration of landlordism in the region profoundly affected the Maoist movement and gave shape to subsequent developments. This chapter thus seeks to show the value of centering regionally specific processes of state formation and agrarian political economies in analyses of Maoist trajectories in India.

This article explores the way in which the Indian state and the incipient Maoist state in central India mimic while repudiating each other.  As against theories of sovereignty which see it either as authored from below (contract theory) or scripted from above (domination), or irrelevant to the extent that subject and state are co-constituted by regimes of power (cf. Foucault), I argue that in civil war, the display and practical exercise of statehood and sovereignty is critical. However, this is primarily aimed not at putative citizens but at the enemy. I look at the way in which the Indian state impersonates guerilla tactics in order to fight the Maoists, and the way in which the Maoists mimic state practices of governmentality. Each side identifies its own ‘citizens’ through uniforms, lists of people killed, and inscribes its ‘territory’ with memorials to its martyrs.  For the presumed citizens of these mimetic states, however, it is precisely these markers of identity and legibility which make them more vulnerable. Membership of parallel regimes holds out both promise and precarity.

On May 3, 2017, the police picked up Hadiyam Hadma,1 a former village headman and human rights activist, near his village. Initially, the police denied holding him in their custody, forcing his wife to file a writ of habeas corpus in the Chhattisgarh High Court. The police then held a press conference in which Hadma was made to " confess " to participating in an attack by cadres of the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Maoist) (henceforth the Maoists)2 on security forces a few weeks earlier, in which twenty-five government paramilitary soldiers had been killed. Hadma was taken to the High Court under heavy police escort. After he had been hung upside down for days, blindfolded, and shot at, it was scarcely surprising that he told the Court he had voluntarily " surrendered " and come to the police for protection. Hadma is now in indefinite police custody. Like Hadma, hundreds of ordinary villagers across central India caught up in the conflict between the state and Maoists have been shown as having " surrendered. " Despite repeated reports in the media exposing the surrenders as fake,3 the practice goes on. Staged surrenders help the police avoid opprobrium for mass arrests, fudge the rehabilitation money offered under the state's surrender policy, adopt carrot and stick policies with villagers to induce compliance (they are told they can go home after surrendering so long as they cooperate with the police), and divide insurgent village communities. If " surrenders " are the seemingly benign face of counterinsurgency, democracy plays the same role at a larger level, where the " choice " exercised in an election is used to delegitimize other kinds of non-electoral choices, including which political party or ideology to support and how to live. This article examines the aporias of democracy, drawing on Derrida's aporias of justice.4 For Derrida, legal indeterminacy constitutes the aporetic aspect of justice: once a case is decided it either revalidates the existing rule, or establishes a new rule, but at the moment of deciding or delivering justice it is neither just nor unjust. Going further back, just as in its founding moment law is neither legal nor illegal for Derrida, democracy in its founding moment is neither democratic nor undemocratic, especially insofar as it also brings together and binds the entity in whose name it rules.5 The same paradox underlies state violence, law, and democracy, starting with Hobbes's argument that the state's monopoly on violence is legitimate because it enables people to live in security, and thus enables democracy; it underlies as well Benjamin's distinction between law making and law preserving violence.6 It is in moments when it claims to represent the ruled that the political system most

The Naxalite movement has influenced Indian cinema since the 1970s in different forms and degree. It has also left some valuable imprints on the cinema. A number of films in different languages have been made on themes of Naxalite movement directly or indirectly. Last year, Naxalite movement has completed50 years. In this context the researchers took at the four Telugu films i.e. Sindhooram (1997), Encounter (1997), Kubusam(2002), and Virodhi(2011).In an appreciation of how a Psychological approach to the story can highlight the dynamics of emotional cinematic experience, this study presents a critical analysis of these four films.

Hebrew introduction to Partha Chatterjee's classic book, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. Translated by Ruth Ramot and Roni Amir. Ra’anana: Open University of Israel Press, 2021, 9-48 [in Hebrew].

בפתח המהדורה המחודשת
לאומנותם של המוכפפים: פרתה צ׳טרג׳י על לאומיות בעולם פוסטקולוניאלי
https://sheilta.apps.openu.ac.il/pls/dlamdal/lamda.main

Maoism has become a challenge for India’s internal security. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) is known as a party organisation for this foremost challenge. Now CPI (Maoist) has estimated 10,000 to 12,000 well-trained cadres which constitute guerrilla army and more than 50,000 members of several wings such as political, cultural and jan militia, ect. An organisation with such a big number of cadres demands huge money. This article deals with the following questions: How much is the annual turnover or budget of CPI (Maoist)? What are the basic sources to accumulate this money? How and where is this money spent?

The paper looks at the attempts by relatives of Maoist insurgents in India killed by the police to commerate their dead in the form of obelisk-shaped monuments. This attempt at "historicization" is compared to "official" history's - including the author's own - methodological paradigms, suggesting that an ongoing history is ever in the process of being inaccessible to the professional historian.

There has been much research on why Maoist conflict occurred, what is the root causes of its persistence, and what could be effective antidote of Maoist violence, but because of multifarious reasons and lack of lucid understanding about Maoist conflict no one theory can claim that it thoroughly propounds the recurrence of this decades-old violence phenomenon. This part of chapter deals with theoretical perspectives which are basically foundations in our studying of Maoist violence. ‘The government of India uses several strategies and paradigms to tackle insurgencies and armed conflicts. The dominant strategy is based on the security paradigm, which consists of maintaining the status quo and putting down insurgencies with the use of the force to regain control and establish law and order along with development projects and welfare schemes like employment generation, lone waivers’  and attractive surrender policy. After brief discussion on various theoretical foundations that underpin our understanding of India’s biggest security challenge – the Maoist violence – I will discover the gaps and propose an alternative in broader contextualisation of human security perspective.

This paper tries to understand the transition of Nepali Civil war and Naxalite movement during the time Maoists were entering into mainstream politics in Nepal. What symbols Nepali Maoists and Naxalites attacked. How the Indian government was dealing with –then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s words – with its ‘greatest internal security threat’.

Bapaaditya Paul was a news reporter associated with an English news daily at Kolkata, India. Upon knowing about the prime leader and activist behind the Naxalite/Maoist movement in India located in the Naxalbari region of West Bengal Province in India, he became well interested to compose his biography. The present work is a authored biography of Kanu Sanyal.

The present paper is a review of this work.

Jhadha Ghati attack, cadres of the Communist Party of India­Maoist (CPI­Maoist) killed at least 25 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and injured another six in an ambush at Kalapattar in the Burkapal area of the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh on April 24, 2017. According to details available, an estimated 200­300 Maoists attacked the CRPF personnel who were out to provide protection for road construction work in the area. Though the CRPF claimed that "a considerable number of Maoists are believed to have been eliminated (in retaliatory action by CRPF men) as the tell­tale sign indicate from the ground," only one body of a Maoist fighter was recovered, in the night of April 27, " just 500 metres away from the spot where the gun battle had taken place ". The body was recovered during search operations in the area. The Maoists had also looted at least 21 weapons, ammunition and 22 bullet proof jackets from the possession of the slain CRPF personnel. On June 29, 2010, 27 personnel of the CRPF, including Assistant Commandant Jatin Gulati, were killed in a CPI­Maoist ambush in Narayanpur District of Chhattisgarh. The attack took place near a hilly stretch known as the Jhadha Ghati, three kilometres from the CRPF's Dhudhai base camp. However, the Maoist's worst ever attack targeting the SFs was at the Tarmetla village near Chintalnad in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh, on April 6, 2010, in which 75 CRPF personnel and one State Policeman were killed. Significantly, this area now falls under the Sukma District after the bifurcation of Dantewada. Among other recent major attacks in Sukma, the Maoists had killed 12 CRPF personnel and injured another four when they ambushed a road opening party in the forests near Kottacheru village under the Bhejji Police Station on March 11, 2017. The troops were part of a road clearing party that has been securing an under­construction road between Bhejji and Kottacheru. Maoists looted arms and ammunition from the slain CRPF personnel. According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Sukma has accounted for at least 45 Maoist­ related deaths (four civilians, 38 SF personnel, three Maoists) during the current year so far (data till April 30, 2017). Out of 30 districts across six states from where such fatalities have been reported in 2017, Sukma recorded the highest number of killings at 45. Narayanpur District stands at a distant second with 17 fatalities (three civilians, one trooper, 13 Maoists) followed by 13 fatalities each in Bijapur (two civilians, four SF personnel, seven Maoists) and Dantewada (two civilians, two SF personnel, nine Maoists), all Districts of Chhattisgarh. Since January 16, 2012, the day Sukma was carved out of Dantewada as a separate District, a total of 1,947 fatalities (including 698 civilians, 482 SF personnel, 767 Maoists) have been reported from 82 Districts across 12 states (data till April 30, 2017). Out of these, Sukma alone has accounted for a total of 254 Maoist­related deaths (58 civilians, 123 SF personnel, 73 Maoists), i.e. 13.04 per cent of total fatalities, the highest for any single District in the country, followed by Bijapur (Chhattisgarh), 218; Gadchiroli (Maharashtra), 159; and Malkangiri (Odisha), 141. These were the only four Districts where fatalities reached into triple figures over this period. More worryingly, Sukma alone has accounted for 25.51 per cent of total SF fatalities during this period (123 out of a total of 482). Bijapur with 49 SF fatalities stands at a distant second. Though, the SFs have secured a positive SF:Maoist kill ratio of 1:1.59 across India, in Sukma it favours the Maoists, at 1.68:1. Out of the 37 Districts in the country from where fatalities in both these categories were reported, the kill ratio was in favour of the SFs in 18, was at par in four, and favoured the Maoists in the remaining 15. There were another 25 Districts from where only Maoist fatalities were reported. Four Districts recorded only SF fatalities. These numbers clearly suggest that Sukma, located in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, the epicenter of Maoist violence in the country, is the final bastion for the Maoists. The District occupies an area of 5635.79 square kilometres, with a population of 250,159 (Census 2011), and shares its borders with the Maoist­infested Bastar, Bijapur and Dantewada Districts of Chhattisgarh to the north and west; the Malkangiri District of Odisha to the east; and the Khammam District of Telangana to the South. Some 3,500 square kilometres of Sukma, more than 75 per cent of its total area, are under forest cover. The forest cover, terrain and location of the District have given the Maoists a sustained advantage in their campaigns to establish disruptive dominance and evade action by SFs.

Maoist Violence is a major problem being faced by the police in several districts of India. While different ways of tackling the problem are being discussed and experimented at various levels in different geographical areas, it seems proper to document and thus share my experience in dealing with the problem as the Superintendent of Police in Rohtas between the years 2008 to 2011.

Ref. Article : http://www.thehindu.com/…/tech-tonic-for…/article8108144.ece Though there can never be a generalisation when it comes to any society or culture, yet based on my ethnographic film work on Gonds of Bastar and current on going independent anthropological research work in various areas of Bastar, I would like to mention few points, that I feel have not been closely observed in the article mentioned above. The article mentions Gondi language as the lingua Franca of the Maoist Movement. Perhaps the majority of Maoists are Gondi language speakers however to stereotype that Gond adivasis are Maoist supporters on the basis on common spoken language is unethical. As they say ignorance is what creates ethnocentrism and language is a big factor that results in this hegemony. In order to understand that why even a handful of indigenous people have this linguistic affinity towards the Maoists one must first understand what is the existence of Gondi language. a) Gondi language whose correct anthropological or linguistic description is the language of the Koya or Koitoor race of the Central India and surrounding areas. The language finds its existence since the pre Indus Valley Civilization. During the British Colonial period when Scheduled Tribes act was being introduced Gondi language did not get constitutional recognition in spite of being the lingua franca of more number of speakers than any other regional language. This was partly to ensure dominion of working language English and later emerging national language Hindi. Since the Gonds have had historical importance in raising their voices against the East India Company and Feudal lords, it became essential to paralyse their sociocultural growth and one such attempt was to not give their language any recognition in the upcoming schedules since independence. b) Moving forward in time now even in the 8th schedule the Gondi language has no mention in spite of being the spoken language of some 3 million indigenous people whereas Sanskrit that has merely 14000 speakers has made its place in the schedule amongst other dominant state or regional languages. One may seem to wonder what may be the reason for ignoring such widely spoken Gondi language in the 8th schedule. Is the obvious reason for this exclusion the opposition by Gond tribes towards the sanskritization of their society and culture, particularly language ? Considering the high rate of acculturation of the Gond society and culture, especially in the areas closer to the city, resulting in the depletion of its language or being over shadowed by the national or state or regional language has resulted in some involuntary measures by few members of the Gond society in some areas to preserve their language. As the Gond language is mostly oral in nature and Gondi folk and religious lore plus oral literature is descriptive of its ancient traditions and customs, sometimes the cultural performances by Maoists in Gondi language becomes attractive to its native speakers. It is obvious if similar recognition and importance was given to the language by the government then there would not have been any inclination towards the Maoist group. We must also not ignore that this bent of villagers or adivasis towards Maoism or Naxalism is primarily because of the threat posed to them by such groups. In reality the tribes face a catch 22 situation where in they are under harm from both the police plus government on one side and communist guerrilla groups on the other side. In such a situation their desperate attempt to save their sociocultural attributes like language becomes their first priority.

Federations promise to provide autonomous,
representative governance that is flexible
enough to overcome potential internal
conflict resulting from the dual stresses of
governing diverse populations and power
overreach. India is the world’s biggest
federation but also hosts the most violent
revolution in modern history against a
federal state. Since 2004, 150,000 people
have been killed or displaced in the war
between the Communist Party of India-
Maoist and India’s government. Conflict
management efforts led not to resolution but
catastrophe across Andhra Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as state
responses contradicted each other and the
centre’s efforts. The differences illustrated
how institutional mechanisms of
decentralisation create, sustain and
otherwise alter internal revolutionary
conflicts that cross subunit boundaries.
Three unique characteristics come into play
when federal governments tackle
revolutionary conflict: picking from subunit
actions like policy buffets, exacerbation of
state–subunit fissures and empowerment of
local elites who put political self-interest
above conflict resolution.

The anthropologists and sociologists in India who claim to go deeper into the social and cultural reality of caste, social stratification and peasant society, are found to be equally uninterested in carrying out research on Maoist activism which has been emerging as one of the most significant challenges to feudal land relations and state sponsored usurpation of natural resources by the corporates in rural India for the last three to four decades. The unconcern of the anthropologists to study this anti-state movement on the ground has become more paradoxical by the fact that the foci of Maoist activism are mainly concentrated in regions dominated by populations classified by the state and the anthropologists as “tribes”. To put the matter more bluntly, anthropologists in India are studying cultures and ideologies of tribes but not Maoism and the tribal populations influenced and/or affected by Maoist activism and ideology. There are however exceptions but contemporary mainstream anthropologists in India still seem to be unaware and/or uninterested about the theoretical and field-level works done by the researchers in this area. This kind of intellectual avoidance of burning issues of the country by the anthropologists is not new; these have their colonial genesis which was very often carried over in the post-colonial period. Tribes, for most of the anthropologists, remained a sample of ethnological curiosity, at best a part of the great Indian civilization, at worst the lowest stage in the story of human societal evolution. Whenever any anthropologist made an attempt to put the tribes in the context of the contemporary whirlpool of  political economy the efforts were either ignored or forgotten. The same story is repeated in the case of the recent Maoist activism. I will narrate this story in some detail in this paper and give some examples from the exceptional works done by the anthropologists and non-anthropologists which have a bearing on the study of  the tribals in India in the contemporary context.

西藏是一個古老王國，不僅其宗教和神秘性，它的歷史很大程度上遭到中共官方刻意隱蔽。 本書駁斥了一些關於西藏宗教和歷史的錯誤觀點。自古以來西藏王國從未是中國的一部分，也未曾失去其國家地位。反而，當時的中原地區確是蒙古大元帝國和大清帝國不可分割的一部分。一般認為西藏是其鄰近帝國不可分割的一部分，都是源自於中原的「普天之下，莫非王土」的古老論述。中國堅稱繼承蒙古和滿清「遺產」的說辭，是沒有任何根據的。將併吞中原地區的諸外邦大帝國納入到「中原王朝」的概念下，新中國編造了一整個虛假的中國王朝歷史。所以，將西藏納入中華人民共和國是不合法的。西藏就是一個被佔領的國家。 本書涵蓋了古代到現代的西藏建國歷史、封建制度和社會主義時期的藏人生活、西藏被強制納入中華人民共和國、被壓制的民族解放運動、文化大革命、以及隨後的改革開放等。這些事件的許多圖片和數據都是第一次公開發表。 這本書在俄羅斯造成了極大迴響，引起了學術界和政治界的重視。 商品特色： 本書戳破中國堅稱繼承蒙古和滿清「遺產」的謊言，由蘇俄學者揭露了被中共官方刻意隱蔽的西藏歷史，新中國編造了一整個虛假的中國王朝歷史，西藏就是一個被佔領的國家。

The human race has been brought to a standstill as governments around the world struggle to beat a microscopic peril: COVID-19. And while healthcare systems are overwhelmed by the daily increase in cases, and scientists are working around the clock to find a vaccine, State and non-State actors alike have taken upon themselves to politicize the pandemic, as counterproductive and costly as that is. Taking control of the narrative has unfortunately become a priority, as it is instrumental in shaping the future of a State in a post-pandemic world.