Hannah Arendt

I describe both the German Aristotelian revival and the Anglo-Saxon virtue-ethics approach and argue that there are some reasons why the Grotian dismissal of Aristotelian practical rationality had finally to be overcome. I suggest that such reasons in turn depend on deeper changes in the structure of the building of  modern philosophy, first among them those carried by the critique of Cartesian foundationalism staged by such odd bed-fellows as Peirce, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Heidegger, adding quasi-Thomists such as Anscombe and Geach. This may account for the apparently unexpected normative turn which took place in the same years (shortly after or before 1958) in two different and comparatively insulated contexts such as Germany and  the Anglo-Saxon world.

Resumo Uma reflexão crítica sobre os caminhos e descaminhos das tecnologias contemporâneas se impõe com cada vez mais força na atualidade. Não se pode mais falar das dimensões "social" e "política" apenas se referindo à interação intersubjetiva; é preciso focar igualmente na interação humana com os aparatos técnicos. Tendo como pano de fundo a crescente digitalização da vida, acompanhada de processos de captação e armazenamento massivos de dados por parte de diferentes mecanismos e instâncias, gostaria de abordar, neste artigo, uma série de análises sobre os impactos do big data nos campos da economia, da política e da subjetividade a fim de colocar a seguinte questão: em que medida esse novo fenômeno não altera a configuração dos espaços de socialização e subjetivação, notadamente a esfera privada, de sorte a gerar um impacto na própria estruturação das democracias modernas? Tal questão se impõe na medida em que a antropologia política da modernidade é baseada, predominantemente, em uma noção substancial de sujeito autônomo, que possui na esfera privada um espaço fundamental de atividade e vivência cujo acesso lhe é privilegiado. Sendo assim, o objetivo do artigo é o de iniciar uma discussão sobre até que ponto as bases da antropologia política da modernidade não estariam sendo solapadas a partir de uma "mudança estrutural da esfera privada", uma vez que o acesso privilegiado do indivíduo a determinados dados privados poderia ser suplantado pelo

Retracing the steps of London's history through the lenses and medium of its body of waters -  this paper investigate the roles of waterways, canals and docklands as essential aspects of the making for the city we know now. Through artist intervention examples, fictional narrative, discourses around political philosophy and capitalism, the paper aim to give a better understanding of how the current system influences our life in the city and our attitude towards it. While getting closer to the present, it also questions the role of citizenship and the urge in activating public spaces connected to the element of water. Almost a manifesto, the paper contain a suggestion for a performative civil disobedience that can create the space to imagine an alternative to the seemingly inescapable passivity of the 'flaneur'.

Resumo: Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) é conhecida como sendo uma pensadora da política. Nesse sentido, pode-se questionar no que ela poderia contribuir para a reflexão em outras áreas, por exemplo, a jurídica, posto que ela não teorizou explicitamente a lei, a justiça, o direito, entre outros temas desta área. Arendt, ao investigar as origens dos Sistemas Totalitários, o Nazista, em especial, percebeu que a Constituição de Weimar (1919) não foi revogada nem respeitada, e os resultados disso são bastante conhecidos. Entretanto, esse momento histórico não está isolado no tempo e no espaço. A hipótese a ser desenvolvida, então, é a de que os precedentes encontram-se na Modernidade (séc. XVII), na qual os conceitos de pessoa tem relação com o de humano e de sua dignidade. Abstract: Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) is known as a political thinker. For this reason, is possible to discuss her contribution to the debate in other areas of knowledge. For example, her thought has influenced law studies, even she has not specifically theorized about law, rights and justice, among other law subjects. In her investigation about the origins of Totalitarian system, Arendt realized that the Weimar Constitution (1919) was not revoked or respected by the Nazism. However, the totalitarianism was not an event situated in a particularly time and space. The paper argues that the precedents, which enable the totalitarianism to take place, are in Modernity (XVII century), when the concept of person relates to humanity and dignity.

New technologies in communications and networking have shaped the way political movements can be mobilised and coordinated in important ways. Recent uprisings have shown dramatically how a people can communicate its cause effectively beyond borders, through online social
networking channels and mobile phone technologies. Hannah Arendt, as an eminent scholar of power and politics in the modern era, offers a relevant lens with which to theoretically examine the implications and uses of online social networks and their impact on politics as praxis. This article creates an account of how Arendt might have evaluated virtual social networks in the context of their potency to create power, spaces and possibilities for political action. With an Arendtian lens the article examines whether these virtual means of ‘shared appearances’ facilitate or frustrate efforts in the formation of political power and the creation of new beginnings. Based on a contemporary reading of her writings, the article concludes that Arendt’s own assessment of online social networks, as spheres for political action, would likely have been very critical.

The author analyzes and draws some implications of the conceptions of the revolution in Arendt and Sartre. The text outlines some data to highlight how both thinkers are based on similar philosophical sources, particularly phenomenology and philosophy of the early Heidegger; then specifically discusses his ideas about revolution.

O filósofo germano coreano Byung-Chul Han reclama de nossa vida atual. Ele diz que propagamos a ideia de diferença, mas que esta nada é senão uma faceta da igualdade. Somos todos diferentes, mas iguais nessa diferença. Nenhum de nós, ele diz, é singular. Para exemplificar essa distinção entre o diferente e o singular, ele lembra de uma compreensão a respeito de Sócrates como aquele que era o atopos 1 , ou seja, um tipo de estranho, alguém sem lugar, um estrangeiro. Digo eu, até: um alienígena. A singularidade de Sócrates, anunciada por Alcibíades em O Banquete, o fazia um personagem bem além do simples diferente. É interessante notar essa observação de Han quanto a Sócrates como atopos, que pode ser colhida em vários filósofos, em Barthes ou em Agamben. Não é difícil considerarmos a individualidade como uma noção que tem como base a diferença, e que se aperfeiçoa ainda mais com a singularidade. Sendo assim, Sócrates seria moderno ou, mais que isso, um ideal de modernidade ainda não realizado. Todavia, o que primeiro aprendemos quando estudamos as distinções entre antigos e modernos, é sobre a noção de indivíduo. Esta é, sempre, uma noção característica da modernidade. Nossa literatura filosófica, apoiada nos helenistas, não cansa de nos dizer que Sócrates foi, antes de tudo, um exemplar do homem antigo grego. Como assim? Por que o singular par excellence não seria também o indivíduo em seu mais aperfeiçoado grau conceitual? Uma das características fundamentais da semântica moderna é a de nomear uma faculdade familiar para nós, modernos: a vontade. Temos um nome para uma faculdade do querer e do não querer; uma faculdade que só conhecemos como uma força que quer e, para deixar se mostrar como um querer, se apresenta imediatamente como nos deixando saber o que é um não querer. Essa faculdade é o que chamamos de vontade. A semântica grega nunca descreveu o homem grego usando um tal termo. Por isso mesmo, nunca descreveu um indivíduo como nós descrevemos o indivíduo – o indivíduo moderno que, enfim, não raro tomamos como sendo o que é de fato indivíduo. Se deixamos de lado essa discussão sobre as descrições do que viemos a denominar vontade, e que não encontra correspondência na descrição que os gregos faziam de si mesmos como indivíduos, é dificil entendermos os antigos e quem foi o filósofo Sócrates. É útil aqui recordar a faculdade da vontade, como ela aparece para um filósofo moderno. Podemos recorrer a Descartes. Para nós, modernos, é bem fácil entender a explicação do erro, 1 Han, Byung-Chul. La expulsión de lo distinto (Pensamiento Herder) (Spanish Edition) (Locais do Kindle 287). Herder Editorial. Edição do Kindle.

To what extent can inherited traditions of political thought accommodate or enable the identification and assessment of contemporary animal politics?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LFgO_ycbek

Activism around animal issues is becoming an increasing sight in the public political sphere, both domestically and internationally. In Australia, animal protection organisations (Animals Australia) and political parties (the Animal Justice Party) have been working since at least the 1980s to put animal welfare issues on the political agenda, while the last few years have seen numerous incidents of “vegan activists” protesting outside farms, marching by city restaurants and campaigning in supermarket aisles. These and other demonstrations have come in the wake of numerous media reports on various forms of animal cruelty related to equine sports, pet-breeding, factory farming, and live animal exports, among many other examples.

Meanwhile, the “question of the animal” has become a major theme in theoretically and philosophically informed research, to the point that some scholars have taken to speaking of “the animal turn” in humanities inquiry. Setting out to identify and dispel the “anthropocentric” prejudice that pervades humanities thinking, such work rejects the mechanistic view of animality inherited from Descartes; the reductionism inherent in the use of a singular noun to identify an uncountable diversity of species and individuals; and an ongoing presumption of human exceptionalism which places human practices and concerns at the centre of inquiry, and marginalises any concern for animal interests. 

Against this background, this investigation reflects on the political implications of the increasing attention given, both in intellectual inquiry and in public debate, to animals and issues related to the treatment of animals. Taking online video sharing as a case study, it offers a reinterpretation of the political possibilities inherent in the online public sphere that suggests, in turn, that the “question of the animal” may demand a reassessment of conventional frameworks for engaging animals as a political problem.

Dr Robert Briggs is Senior Lecturer in the School of Media, Creative Arts & Social Inquiry and a founding member of the Centre for Culture and Technology. He is author of the forthcoming book THE ANIMAL-TO-COME: ZOOPOLITICS IN DECONSTRUCTION (Edinburgh University Press, 2021), and has published extensively on poststructuralist thought in relation to questions of ethics, culture and technology.

In een opiniestuk pleit Patrick Loobuyck ervoor dat hij zonder schaamte wil vliegen in tijden van klimaatcrisis. Te vaak, aldus de auteur, verzakken ecologische discussies in moreel vingerwijzen en het aanpraten van een slecht geweten. Zo'n individueel gedrag kan nooit de oplossing zijn, want is te kleinschalig en ineffectief. Hij pleit er dus voor dat we allemaal collectief realiseren dat we individuen zijn. Volgens Loobuyck moeten we eerder inspelen op wat hij, in navolging van de filosoof John Rawls, de basisstructuren van onze maatschappij noemt. Niet stoppen met vliegen, maar een CO2-taks. We moeten naar een maatschappij waarin mensen, ondanks hun persoonlijke voorkeuren, toch het goede doen omdat de juiste incentives en structuren aanwezig zijn. Een louter individueel perspectief is inderdaad niet de oplossing. Loobuyck is in die boodschap noch nieuw noch alleen, en je vindt het in uitgewerkte varianten ook in het werk van diverse auteurs, gaande van Naomi Klein, Ludo De Witte tot Matthias Lievens en Anneleen Kenis. De klimaatcrisis speelt op wereldschaal en een keer minder douchen of eens de trein nemen in plaats van het vliegtuig lost het probleem niet op. We hebben veel sympathie voor dit punt, maar vrezen dat dit uitmondt in een te sterke tegenstelling tussen het individuele en het collectieve-iets wat in de analyse van Klein, De Witte, Lievens en Kenis niet het geval is. Daarom is het nuttig een aantal spanningen en problemen op tafel te leggen en een pleidooi te houden om, geïnspireerd door de klimaatcrisis, een filosofische analyse uit te werken van een concept dat hierbij vaak gebezigd, maar zelden onderzocht wordt, namelijk dat van activisme.

The Exceptional State is an exercise in comparative politics. The course is intended to clarify the meaning and uniquely political form of (some) modern societies. To this end, we contrast two exceptional state forms, namely liberal-democratic and totatalitarian regimes; understood here, respectively, as societies in which the fallibilistic character of knowledge and the associated indeterminacy of the social is celebrated, and societies that treat the individual as always-already constituted, and which seek to occupy the ‘place of power’ (Lefort) in such a way that power law and knowledge becomes an effect of a master narrative.

Constructed largely through a critical engagement with Claude Lefort, the course presents a particular reading of the liberal-democratic state form in which the ‘place of power’ is said to be empty, and acknowledged openly as such, and in which the markers of certitude once derived from a master narrative or Truth (god, history, etc.) are displaced. Importantly, this reading locates the individual subject within a web of inherently subversive social relations, a ‘political form’ (Lefort) at odds with both the ancien régime and (to varying degrees) actually existing liberalism in modern capitalist societies. This makes possible a politics of open-ended discovery and socio-political contestation, which is contrasted with the type of ‘anti-political politics’ and state form that emerged in twentieth century totalitarian regimes.

This reading of the democratic revolution and its political possibilities is not taken as given, and students are expected to engage critically with it.

The Hobbesian social contract is effectively a repudiation of politics. And the story of humanity that it tells is that of alienation. The multitude left politics behind in the state of nature, demarcating it as the power and domain of the Sovereign, as they surrendered their political capacities—their wills and judgments—to constitute the commonwealth. What they got in return is the guarantee to safely pursue the necessities of life. Thus, the politics of the modern state applied to subjects has always been the administration and care of mere life. This interpretation of Hobbes depends on a Hegelian and Arendtian reading of Hobbes.

published as:
“Leaving politics behind: An Arendtian and Hegelian reading of Hobbes,” in Φιλοσοφια (Philosophia), Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP), Quezon City: Ample Press; Issue 1, Jan-June 2012

Etienne Balibar se réfère à l’idée arendtienne de la citoyenneté pour montrer que la démocratie se construit nécessairement au travers d’une aporie. D’une part, la démocratie évoque l’idéal isonomique de l’égalité pour fonder la communauté ; d’autre part, elle inscrit la différence dans l’éventualité d’une contestation permanente des principes unificateurs. Ce que je propose, c’est de contribuer à développer le dialogue entre E. Balibar et Hannah Arendt en m’interrogeant sur la possibilité d’aller au-delà de l’horizon de la violence. Le concept d’agon qu’Arendt utilise pour qualifier le vivre ensemble isonomique n’est pas la concurrence entre artisans, ni le conflit entre ennemis, mais renvoie plutôt à l’institution d’un monde commun grâce aux différences. L’agir agonistique comprend le risque de se distinguer, d’être en désaccord, de se différer, non seulement par rapport aux autres mais aussi par rapport a soi-même. Il faudrait alors définir la violence comme une force qui agit sur l’agon, c’est-à-dire, sur la capacité de « devenir-autre ». C’est justement ceci qu’aussi bien la loi que la notion moderne de droits oblitère.

This paper examines a field ridden with palpable and tangible silence: migrant inclusion within the Maltese post-secondary educational system. Focusing on the theme of difference and otherness, this paper studies whether inclusive practices inform migrant student experiences within Maltese post-secondary education. Employing a qualitative approach, I attempt to provide insights on the way migrant learner experiences are shaped and constructed within Maltese post-secondary education. Furthermore, this analysis engages with the political and educational theories of the philosopher Hannah Arendt to argue that what needs to be reimagined are forms of extra-territoriality, focusing on the needs of an intercultural educational ambience that places the vicissitudes not as a crisis but an opportunity for an emergent pedagogy.

The notion of post-truth politics has been insufficiently conceptualized, leaving its empirical viability questionable. As a response to this uncertainty, I seek to elaborate a concept of post-truth politics by comparing facts to public infrastructure, which I understand in an Arendtian fashion: as a condition that both limits and enables opinionated debate. I put forward an understanding of post-truth as a two-sided process brought about by mutually dependent structural factors contributing to the irrelevance of factual truths and a particular political style labelled careless speech. I place post-truth in a historical context and seek to distinguish it, particularly, from Harry Frankfurt’s ‘bullshit’. Bullshit works within the mindset of carefully crafted advertisement-speak. Careless speech seeks to create confusion and bring democratic debate to a halt. I also explicate some key economic, cultural, and media-related factors that contribute to the emergence of post-truth politics. The third section discusses effective practices of conveying truth in the public sphere. I critically analyze fact-checking, (Foucauldian) fearless speech (parrhesia) and storytelling, contrasting them to ‘careless speech’, and emphasize the need to address political structures in addition to more epistemologically-oriented solutions. I conclude with reflections on the economic-cultural background to factual infrastructure’s disrepair, and highlight some future lines of inquiry in IR and Political Science.

Guided by the hopeful possibilities of birth, breath and beginning that Hannah Arendt and Luce Irigaray variously articulate, this paper examines the lullaby as an expressive form that emerges (in a variety of contexts as distinct as medieval Christendom and contemporary art) as narrative between natality and mortality. With narrative understood as praxis according to Arendt’s schema, and articulated in what Irigaray might designate as an interval between two different sexuate subjects, the lullaby (and the voice that sings it) is found to be a telling of what it is to be human, and a hopeful reminder of our capacity both for self-affection and -preservation, and for meeting and nurturing others in their difference.

Resumo: Este artigo discute, a partir da obra de Hannah Arendt, a produção contemporânea de Fake news nas mídias sociais. O artigo mostra como a obra de Arendt traz questões de pesquisa relevantes para compreensão das fake news enquanto arma política. Para isso, partiu-se dos ensaios Verdade e Política (1967) e A mentira na política (1969) para se pensar a produção sistemática de notícias falsas e seus usos políticos. Argumenta-se aqui que a disseminação de Fake news, na medida em que nega ou altera discursivamente a realidade dos fatos para moldá-los a crenças ideológicas, compromete o funcionamento das mídias sociais enquanto espaço público. Palavras-chave: Fake news; Redes Sociais; Política; Hannah Arendt; Pós-Verdade Truth, politics and fake news: considerations on Hannah Arendt's works
Abstract: This paper discusses, from the work of Hannah Arendt, the contemporary production of Fake news in social media. It shows how Arent's works brings important issues to understanding the fake news while political weapon today. The text uses the essays Truth and politics (1967) and The lie on Politics (1969) to analize systematic production of fake news and its political uses. It is argued here that the dissemination of Fake news, insofar as it denies or alters discursively the reality of facts to shape ideological beliefs, compromises the performance of the social media as a public space.

The concept of public space has a long history and very different meanings. In particular, the conceptions of political theory and philosophy differ from those heralded by urban planners and sociologists, fueling some confusion about the ‘public space’ applications. In this contribution, this complexity is put under tension with the type of planetary urbanization we were used to before the arrival of the covid19. We will end with a reflection on the possible effects that the pandemic has on the city and on its public space.

Perhaps the most often criticized element of Hannah Arendt's political theory is her insistence on the necessity of constructing and maintaining rigid boundaries between various activities of the human condition. Less often, however, is the attempt undertaken to determine the philosophical motivation stimulating this project of distinction. This article will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which Arendt's imperative is rooted in a certain misreading of the Marxian dialectic. The first part of the article will outline the contours of Arendt's erroneous interpretation of Marx's understanding of labour, demonstrating the degree to which the latter breaks down the tripartite structure of the vita activa. The second part of the article will read Arendt's affirmation of distinction as being a response to what Arendt will take to be the problems of the dialectic, specifically the dialectic's allegedly necessary positing of conceptual contingency and logical necessity. Finally, the third part of the article will demonstrate, through an examination of two key passages in the work of Marx, the extent to which Marx himself was just as concerned with overcoming the type of homogeneous and abstract universalism rejected by Arendt. The ground will thus be provided for the overcoming of the necessity of Arendtian distinction, and perhaps also for a more fruitful engagement between the Marxian and Arendtian theoretical problematics.

This is a Last Lecture. Since I teach political theory, that means you are going to get a lecture in political theory. Hopefully, I can make it mostly painless. That it is a last lecture suggests that I am to frame the lecture as if it were the last one I ever give, a last gasp or a last will and testament. It also suggests that I am to give a lecture that lasts, not only one that will fill the better part of an hour but one that will stand the test of time. One that is memorable. One that makes me last after I am, at last, gone. Therefore, the purpose of this last lecture is, in essence, to save myself from death. That, I cannot do and will not attempt to do. Only one is reputed to have succeeded in such an endeavor. It is, then, a blasphemous thing you have asked me to do, and you should all be ashamed of yourselves for showing up to watch such impiety. But don't worry, I will, hopefully, save us all from sinning by simply, in essence repeating Matthew 25:16: "the last will be first, and the first will be last." This lecture is about Soren Kierkegaard's philosophy of repetition and a liberal arts education. Most people think about education in terms of the opposite of repetition, what Kierkegaard called recollection.

Çeviren: Murat Erşen
Fransız Felsefesi'nin doruklarından Jacques Derrida'dan bağışlamak, bağışlanamaz olan ve zaman aşımına uğramayan üzerine ufuk açıcı bir seminer. Affetmek, bağışlamak, af dilemek çağında; zaman aşımına uğramayan ve insanlığa karşı işlenen suçlar çağında çıkageliyor Bağışlamak. Derrida hayati soruları hayatımıza bırakıyor. Jankelevitch affetti mi, Heidegger affedilebilir mi?!

"Ölüm Almanya'dan Gelen Bir Ustadır"

"Ben Yahudi öldürmedim. Alman olarak doğmak benim ne kabahatim ne de meziyetim. Benden izin isteyen olmadı [böylece birden bizi artık terk etmeyecek o soru, bir bizin ve 'hangi biz'in mirasına, soykütüğüne, kollektifliğine dayalı suçluluk ya da bağışlama gibi devasa bir soru da sorulmuş oldu]. Nazi suçları konusunda tamamen masumum; ama bu beni pek teselli etmiyor. Vicdanım rahat değil […] ve utanç, acıma, tevekkül, hüzün, kuşku, isyan karışımı bir şeyler hissediyorum. Hâlâ uykularım kaçıyor.

Sıklıkla bütün gece uyanık kalıyorum ve düşünüyorum, hayal ediyorum. Yakamı sıyıramadığım kâbuslarım var. ANNE FRANK'ı, AUSCHWITZ'i, TODESFUGE'yi ve NUIT ET BROUILLARD'ı düşünüyorum "Der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland." [Ölüm Almanya'dan gelen bir ustadır.]"

É possível obter um conceito de Autoridade que esclareça como autoridade e poder interagem no Direito? O problema se justifica na necessidade de categorias para avaliar fenômenos jurídicos e políticos. Utilizamos da obra de Hannah Arendt como marco teórico, por sua abordagem diferenciada da questão. Partimos da revisão bibliográfica da obra arendtiana e das suas fontes, encontrando conceitos-chave e perspectivas renovadas sobre autoridade como parte de um sistema jurídico-político. A hipótese confirmada é que a autoridade coloca manutenção e modificação da ordem em harmonia, vinculando passado e futuro pela tradição, enquanto aumento da comunidade política vinculado ao momento constituinte fundador.

Chociaż termin "totalitaryzm" jest przedmiotem wieloletniej debaty akade-mickiej, w której niejednokrotnie był dyskredytowany, w krajach postsocjali-stycznych, które miały w pewnym okresie cierpieć pod tegoż "totalitaryzmu" jarzmem, wciąż potrafi wzbudzać spore emocje jako oręż polityczny (Conelly 2010). Celem artykułu jest pokazanie ograniczeń funkcjonalności tego terminu na bazie istniejących studiów krytycznych, jak również przykładów niespójno-ści koncepcji tych myślicieli, którzy go szczególnie afirmują i propagują. Za-sadniczym punktem wyjścia są tutaj znakomite analizy, które wykonali włoscy badacze-Domenico Losurdo (2004) i Enzo Traverso (2017). Ponadto w ni-niejszym artykule wykorzystano szereg innych studiów odwołujących się do badań historycznych, analiz politologicznych i społecznych, a także refleksji filozoficznej poświęconej "totalitaryzmowi". W pierwszej części została przed-stawiona geneza terminu "totalitaryzm" i zarysowany stan debaty akademickiej towarzyszącej jego konceptualizacji. W drugiej części została zakwestionowa-na słuszność esencjonalnego utożsamienia nazizmu z komunizmem. W trze-ciej przeanalizowano próby prezentacji marksizmu jako "ideologii totalitarnej" w zimnowojennej filozofii politycznej. W ostatniej zaś zostały podkreślone niektóre rasistowskie i imperialistyczne konotacje związane z koncepcją "to-talitaryzmu". Prowadzi to do konkluzji, gdzie pokazano główne kontrowersje "modelu totalitarnego".

In this paper I examine how Hobbes’ philosophy can be read from an Arendtian perspective. I argue that Arendt provided two different interpretations of Hobbes: one set down in The Origins of Totalitarianism, where Hobbes is depicted as the spokesman of the emerging bourgeoisie; and another that she developed later, scattered among various texts such as The Human Condition and Between Past and Future. I focus on this second interpretation and on her analysis of concepts such as common sense, authority and sovereignty. Firstly, I examine how she changes the meaning of common sense, and how this shift is linked to what Arendt understands by the expression “estrangement from the world.” Secondly, I explain how Hobbes redefined the concept of authority and how his notion of sovereignty deliberately conflated the dual concepts of authority and power.

Link: https://brill.com/abstract/journals/hobs/32/1/article-p71_71.xml

Further research on this topic can be read here:
https://www.academia.edu/30502447/Ph._D._Hannah_Arendt_on_the_question_of_authority_Concluding_Remarks_

Or here: https://www.academia.edu/31488906/Hannah_Arendt._Una_lectura_desde_la_autoridad_Tesis_doctoral_

La cuestión del método no ha constituido un tópico central en el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt. Sin embargo, a través de las respuestas a las críticas que suscitaron sus trabajos, es posible delinear una perspectiva metodológica peculiar que procede en un doble movimiento. Por un lado, desmantela ciertas concepciones epistemológicas tradicionales a través de la crítica de nociones como ciencia, causalidad y objetividad. Por otro lado, avanza en un abordaje metodológico que va más allá de la tradición alemana de la comprensión (Verstehen), sentando las bases de la doble hermenéutica y situando los asuntos humanos en la trama conceptual del acontecimiento, la narración discontinua y la cristalización. Su pensamiento contribuye así a esclarecer algunas problemáticas metodológicas de las ciencias históricas y sociales.

Der Wiener Philosoph und Politiktheoretiker Oliver Marchart legt mit »Conflictual Aesthetics – Artistic Activism and the Public Sphere« ein ergiebiges Konfliktkunstkonzept vor. Diese Ästhetik gilt nicht dem Schönen, Sinnlichen oder Ambivalenten, sondern den Dynamiken einer Politik der Positionierung. /// auf Skug MUSIKKULTUR – Upload 19.8.2020 /// https://skug.at/die-feindlichen-unterschiede/

I will consider some of the ethical and political implications
of Husserl’s observation that the earth is not perceivable in its wholeness by
any person or by any human perspective. I turn to the first photographs of the
earth from space taken from the Apollo missions, and the reactions to them,
as counterpoints to the Husserlian insight. Starting from Husserl’s claims
about our primordial relationship to the earth, and expanding on them using
insights from Heidegger and Arendt, I develop a critical phenomenological
analysis of our status as earthlings sharing our planetary home as the beginnings
of an ethics of the earth and politics of the world based on our limitations,
particularly in terms of our perspectival “seeing.”