Framing Effects

Framing studies remain a powerful line of research in political communication. However, in recent years, coinciding with the emergence of social media, theoretical and operational advances have been detected, as well as a significant reorientation of its research agenda. The interaction between media and platforms such as Twitter or Facebook has built a clearly hybrid communica- tive environment and profoundly transformed the organization of public debate. This is the case, especially, with processes such as the setting of the public agenda or the construction of interpretive frames. Based on a systematic review of the international reference literature (2011–2021), this article analyses the influence of social media on the evolution of framing studies. Moreover, specifically, the beginning of a new stage of digital development is contextualized, and a triple research impact is explored. The main contributions of the text are that it (1) identifies advances in the theoretical and empirical organization of these studies; (2) explores its reorientation of content towards a greater balance between the analysis of media and political frames; and (3) reviews the recent experimental development of effects studies. Finally, the main challenges for future research in this field are detailed.

Denial of responsibility as a mode of dissonance reduction and the conditions under which it is likely to occur were explored in 3 experiments. Two experiments tested and supported the hypothesis that following a counterattitudinal behavior, participants prefer the mode of reduction made available to them first, regardless of whether it is attitude change, trivialization, or denial of responsibility. The 3rd experiment tested and supported the hypothesis that denial of responsibility reduces the negative affective state induced by dissonance. The mechanism of denial of responsibility in dissonance reduction is discussed.

In the Theory of Rational Decision Making the psychological aspects are set aside. This contribution seeks to point out the relevance of psychology into economic decisions. The essay treats the \framing of decisions", which is a pillar of
Kahneman's behavioral theory.
Framing must be considered a special case of the more general phenomenon of dependency from the representation. The best-known risky  choice-framing problem, i.e. the \Asian Disease Problem", is shown where an essential aspect of rationality: invariance, is violated. In addition, the contribution explains Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory and illustrates their value function.
Finally, it discusses the reversals of preference in framing and framing of contingen-
cies. The framing manipulation is viewed as a public tool for inuencing the decision
maker's private framing of the problem in terms of gains or losses, which determines the decision maker's evaluation of the options. In conclusion, the psychology of choice is relevant both for the descriptive question of how decisions are made and for the normative question of how decisions ought to be made.

Grâce à l’émergence du gros plan, le visage a trouvé au cinéma un pouvoir expressif inédit, un lieu d’expérimentation et de représentation privilégié. Le cinéma classique, dont l’échelle de plans et les codes narratifs sont entièrement structurés par cette "unité expressive", a forgé un véritable langage du visage. Mais si la fonction identificatoire et immersive du gros plan s’est banalisée au point de devenir la pierre de touche émotionnelle du film, le cadrage du visage a une histoire très riche, révélant un face-à-face entre la caméra et la physionomie bien plus surprenant et varié que l’on ne pourrait l’imaginer. Nous envisageons ici les théories et pratiques du gros plan développées en amont et en marge de sa codification narrative classique: des "portraits vivants" aux "films à expressions faciales"; des "vignettes" de protogénérique aux "plans emblématiques" ; en passant par la réception critique des premiers gros plans (taxés de "monstrueux", "minimalistes" ou "révolutionnaires"), et jusqu’à leur interdiction –mêlée d’adoration.

Investigating the reliability of moral intuitions is not only one of the hot topics in moral psychology but also of high importance for philosophical questions. In a recent study, the influence of framing on people's intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of moral scenarios was investigated to assess the validity of some crucial assumptions of moral intuitionism. While it was found that people's intuitions about moral relevance were not affected by framing effects, the findings were not fully satisfying news for moral intuitionism since a worrisome proportion of participants disagreed with the purportedly self-evident moral relevance statements. In this paper, I propose a potential alternative explanation for the low agreement rate that would be lessor rather not at all-worrisome for moral intuitionism, namely that the problematic results might be due to experimental pragmatics. To test this hypothesis, I rerun two experiments with especially low agreement rates and applied some simple measures to block unintended pragmatic considerations. This resulted in significantly higher agreement rates with the purportedly self-evident moral relevance statements than in the original. Indeed, the agreement rates were at such a high level that the findings of my study provide good news for moral intuitionism.

With complete information, choice of one option over another conveys prefer-ence. Yet when search is incomplete, this is not necessarily the case. It may in-stead reflect unawareness that a superior alternative was available. To separate these phenomena, we consider ...

I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated.

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.

This paper explored how frames influence people’s evaluation of others’ probabilistic predictions in light of the outcomes of binary events. Most probabilistic predictions (e.g., “there is a 75% chance that Denver will win the Super Bowl”) can be partitioned into two components: A qualitative component that describes the predicted outcome (“Denver will win the Super Bowl”), and a quantitative component that represents the chance of the outcome occurring (“75% chance”). Various logically equivalent variations of a single prediction can be created through different combinations of these components and their logical or numerical complements (e.g., “25% chance that Denver will lose the Super Bowl”, “75% chance that Seattle will lose the Super Bowl”). Based on the outcome of the predicted event, these logically equivalent predictions can be categorized into two classes: Congruently framed predictions, in which the qualitative component matches the outcome, and incongruently framed predictions, in which it does not. Although the two classes of predictions are logically equivalent, we hypothesize that people would judge congruently framed predictions to be more accurate. The paper tested this hypothesis in seven experiments and found supporting evidence across a number of domains and experimental manipulations, and even when the congruently framed prediction was logically inferior. It also found that this effect held even for subjects who saw both congruently framed and incongruently framed versions of a prediction and judged the two to be logically equivalent.

Metaphors are an integral part of human communication and interlocutors seem to use them unconsciously to refer to various ideas, objects and issues in life. Research has shown that we refer to these domains with metaphors because we comprehend these domains more easily through metaphorical language. When people are asked to think about economic and sociopolitical matters, it seems that specific metaphors affect their reasoning differently. Thibodeau & Boroditsky's (2011) study indicated that when crime is conceptually viewed as a 'beast', then people tend to solve criminality by means of law enforcement, whereas if crime is presented as a 'virus', people opt for social reform policies. This paper seeks to replicate the previously mentioned study, in order to investigate whether the metaphorical framing effect found in the original study also applies in the Greek context. The current experiment recruited 97 participants (67 females and 30 males) who were administered two online questionnaires. The participants were Greek native speakers and citizens of Greece belonging to various age groups and educational backgrounds. The findings of the current study go against the original experiment and the reasons behind the different results are explained. In particular, this research offers a possible explanation that the major factor that influenced the participants' reasoning is pertinent to the consequences and the sociopolitical handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

It is becoming increasingly evident that current patterns of consumption are not sustainable in the long term. Clearly, the need to persuade consumers to adopt more sustainable lifestyles has never been more urgent. Tbe present research contributes to our understanding of the effects of message framing by considering the potential moderating influence of consumer concern about global climate change within the context of sustainable consumption. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the US consumer's level of concern for the message-specific issues moderates the strength of the framing effect; effects are larger when concern about climate change is low. In addition, when concern is low, more negative framing and a prevention focus have more favorable persuasive effects. The implications of these findings for consumer welfare and public policy are discussed.

In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’ content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed.

Framing refers to the deliberate transformation and reconfiguration of human relations through forms of communication that go beyond the transmission of information between sender and receiver. The concept of framing is used to analyze changes in the modes of social interaction and discourse introduced by layers of meta-communication that provide a new interpretative context and establish a focus in the organization of social relations. These shifts in the mode of communication can be studied with regard to religious practice and discourse.

Divergence levels of engagement, understanding and pro-environmental acting very widely. Several streams of research taking interest environmental psychology, studying relations between attitudes and pro-environmental behaviors, have explored different ways to assess intentions to behave. Lack of convergence between the fields of decision theory, organization theory, psychology and sociology hindered advancement that was made over the years. Scholars have demonstrated a mitigated impact of awareness and consequence-based campaigns. Others have successfully demonstrated key differences between individuals such as time perspectives and pro-social orientations. Other scholars have studied differences in behaviors by not only studying individual antecedents and values, but also the social setting in which they evolve. There is no bridge between individual differences literature and models addressing individuals embedded in their social settings. Moreover, current literature has not accounted for decision making research in organization theory and psychology that could inform these specific decision processes. We suggest that perception of control is directly linked to social setting and perceived collective efficacy. Moreover, we argue that access to resources, both intangible and tangible are connected to social context. Bridging streams of research addressing individual differences and individuals in social settings is vital to broadening our understanding of PEB, will allow for a more unified understanding of constructs, and will be useful in informing PEB policy.

Desde que la teoría del framing se incorporó a los estudios de la comunicación, su utilización por parte de los investigadores se ha incrementado de forma constante, tanto para estudiar la presencia de los encuadres dentro del proceso comunicativo en su conjunto, como sobre todo en las partes que lo conforman. En este artículo se realiza un repaso de la evolución de la teoría en la disciplina, prestando especial atención a algunos aspectos relevantes. En concreto, se recuperan las principales propuestas de tipologías de encuadres existentes, y se revisa el debate sostenido acerca de la visualización del framing como un programa o proyecto de investigación, y de los campos de su estudio. Además, en el texto se revisa la lógica de la investigación en los tres principales campos de estudio de la teoría: construcción de los encuadres, presencia de encuadres noticiosos en los mensajes, y efectos que el framing tiene sobre la audiencia, haciendo una revisión de los acercamientos metodológicos seguidos en cada una de esas líneas de trabajo.

Geleneksel İktisat ana varsayımının tersine bireylerin her koşulda rasyonel olmadığı, bilişsel önyargılar nedeniyle tercihlerin değişkenlik gösterdiği birçok çalışma ile kanıtlanmıştır. Bu kanıtlardan biri olan
Çerçeveleme Etkisi, olayların veya durumların sunuluş şeklinin değiştirilmesiyle bireylerin kararlarında meydana gelen değişimi gösteren etkidir. Davranışsal yaklaşımda medyadan pazarlamaya kadar birçok alanda kullanılan bu etki, bireylerin sahip olduğu deneyimler, duygusal değişimler, yanlılık durumları gibi faktörlerden dolayı her zaman kendini göstermeyebilmektedir. Bu çalışma yapay zeka uygulama senaryolarıyla oluşturulan Çerçevelemelerin etkisinin toplumsal anlamda hassasiyet teşkil eden “işsizlik” olgusuyla sınanması üzerine kurulmuştur. Çevrimiçi anket yöntemiyle elde edilen veriler 250’si kadın, 230’u erkek olmak üzere 480 kişiden toplanmış ve Bağımsız Örneklem t Testi ile analiz edilmiştir. Analiz sonuçları göstermektedir ki, pozitif ve negatif risk çerçevelemeleri ile istatistiki olarak anlamlı sonuç veren Çerçeveleme Etkisi, aynı sorulara işsizlik olgusu yerleştirildiğinde ortadan kaybolmaktadır. Bununla birlikte kontrol ve deney gruplarında, çerçeveler arasındaki farkın “işsizlik” değişkeninin eklenmesinden kaynaklanıp kaynaklanmadığı konusunda daha net bir bakış açısı sunabilmek adına, ifadeler pozitif ve negatif çerçeveler şeklinde yeniden analize tabi tutulmuştur. Buradan elde edilen nihai sonuç ise farklılaşmayı engelleyen asıl unsurun “işsizlik” değişkeni ile ilgili olduğudur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çerçeveleme Etkisi, İşsizlik, Yapay Zeka

The public receives a great deal of its public health information from the media, which has the ability to deliver such information and to affect public perceptions about issues. The study presented here examines the media’s mediating role in a recent marketing campaign with possible health implications. The baby carrots cam- paign targeted children and teenagers, advertising baby carrots
as junk food. The campaign received much attention from media sources, and coverage of the campaign moved across a range of me- dia from traditional outlets to digital news sources, mostly without putting a critical eye to the campaign or how relevant health issues were addressed. A census study of print and online media content over a four-month period beginning just before the campaign’s launch revealed the media relied heavily on campaign sources to frame the advertisements as positive and effective in generating buzz. Media coverage of the campaign offered little commentary from independent sources, such as message-design or public health experts, and limited input from the general public, thus present- ing an imbalanced perspective. Blogs were more critical, framing the campaign as negative and non-effective. However, this study revealed that neither the media nor blogs raised relevant health issues such as the potential health benefits of eating more carrots. While the campaign’s marketers may have succeeded in promoting baby carrots ephemerally through the media, journalists and other media sources may have missed an opportunity to promote a more lasting public health discussion.

Frames-discursive structures that make dimensions of a situation more or less salient-are understood to influence how people understand novel technologies. As technological agents are increasingly integrated into society, it becomes important to discover how native understandings (i.e., individual frames) of social robots are associated with how they are characterized by media, technology developers, and even the agents themselves (i.e., produced frames). Moreover, these individual and produced frames may influence the ways in which people see social robots as legitimate and trustworthy agents-especially in the face of (im)moral behavior. This three-study investigation begins to address this knowledge gap by 1) identifying individually held frames for explaining an android's (im)moral behavior, and experimentally testing how produced frames prime judgments about an android's morally ambiguous behavior in 2) mediated representations and 3) face-to-face exposures. Results indicate that people rely on discernible ground rules to explain social robot behaviors; these frames induced only limited effects on responsibility judgments of that robot's morally ambiguous behavior. Evidence also suggests that technophobia-induced reactance may move people to reject a produced frame in favor of a divergent individual frame.

Studies of framing effects have found that individuals are more likely to be risk-averse when scenarios are presented as gain-frames but are more likely to be risk-seeking when mathematically equivalent scenarios are presented as loss-frames (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) suggests that decisions are made through a verbatim-based process that works to maximize rewards and minimize risk through a cost/benefit analysis of the elements of the scenario (Reyna & Farley, 2006). FTT further proposes a second decision-making process, gist-based processing, which relies on intuition as opposed to analysis of elements of the scenario. One application of this approach is to examine how risk perception may differ for people who obtain leadership positions. FTT posits that gist-based processing is an advanced way of processing risk, and therefore is favored more often by expert decision makers (see Corbin et al., 2015 for a detailed description). In this study, student leaders of on-campus organizations completed a framing task that was designed as a spinner game and a DOSPERT scale to measure perception and likeliness of risk. Leaders, compared to non-leaders, were found to be more susceptible to standard framing effects and a stronger relationship between perception of risk and likeliness of risk was found, suggesting that leaders were more likely to respond to risk when risk is perceived. Overall, our results support the idea that gist-based decision making is a higher-level process of thinking that is used by mature decision makers such as leaders.

Using a risky-choice framing paradigm, we investigated (a) the extent to which psychopathic features shape behavioral responses to potential losses vs. potential gains and (b) how these relations bear on real-world economic decision-making in a community sample (N = 475). Associations among psycho-pathic features, risk-seeking, sensitivity to framing, and financial practices were also examined. Disinhibition manifested positive relations with risk-seeking and maladaptive financial practices, whereas boldness manifested positive relations with risk-seeking and adaptive financial practices. Individuals high in disinhibition and/or meanness were significantly less likely to endorse risk seeking in negative frames. Results provisionally suggest boundary conditions for framing effects; in particular, certain psychopathic traits may render individuals modestly less susceptible to framing or bias them towards risk-taking in positive frames.

The framing effect has far-reaching implications for our understanding of social psychology and intergroup behavior. In recent decades, the effect garnered considerable attention in the fields of psychology, political science, and communication studies. Whether the effect
is demonstrated by repetitious news stories or in voting behavior, framing matters. It matters for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons.

For decades, the framing effect has been a popular research topic in social psychology. A persuasive system could act in shaping the user behaviour towards sustainability, and thereby play a key role in social change. In this respect, understanding different framing effects in persuasive design is crucial, since individual framing and cognition on sustainability plays a major role in the success of persuasion. For dealing with a complex issue, such as achieving sustainability through behavioural change, persuasive design needs to reflect on the potentials of framing effects. In this paper, we have proposed a model of framing effects from which the principles of managing different framing effects of persuasive sustainability design were formulated. The principles were then shown in relations with different dimensions of sustainability and were also used to generate a design space for persuasive sustainability. The proposed model and principles are significant for realizing the effectiveness of different framing effects for the success of a persuasive sustainability.

Aims of the study. Previous research has shown that message persuasive- ness can depend on message framing. Through an experimental study, we in- vestigated the effects of messages promoting vegetable consumption on recipi- ents with different baseline intention to change their food choices. Persuasive messages were framed in terms of prefactual (“If… then”) gain or non-loss. Method. A sample of young adult participants (N = 94) completed a question- naire measuring their baseline intention to eat vegetables regularly. They were then presented with Facebook posts regarding the consequences of vegetable consumption. Posts were formulated as prefactuals and were focused either on the emotional positive outcomes that may be obtained through vegetable consumption (gain posts) or on the emotional negative outcomes that may be avoided through vegetable consumption (non-loss posts). After reading the posts, participants reported their attitude, anticipated regret and intention towards eating vegetables in the future. Results. According to their baseline intention to eat vegetables, participants were subdivided into three groups: nonintenders, want-but-cannot and intenders. Want-but-cannot participants (i.e., participants wanting to increase their vegetable consumption, but not feeling able to do so) reported more positive affective attitude, higher an- ticipated regret, and greater intention to eat vegetables after reading non-loss than gain posts. No differential effectiveness of gain and non-loss posts was found among intenders and nonintenders.  Conclusion.  Discussion focuses on the opportunity to vary the framing of persuasive messages on vegetable consumption according to receivers’ baseline intention to change their eating behaviour.
Keywords: Message framing, Behaviour change, Communication, Intention, Healthy eating behaviour

Full paper available open access: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221

Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is presented —or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing conditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However, it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it actually means. I survey how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context. I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical input.