Far Right

The rise of far-right parties in many parts of the world threatens the work of human rights and social justice NGOs. That far-right messaging and movements are polarizing political debates is clear; there is less clarity about the affective appeals and cognitive frames deployed to engineer this polarization. This report was commissioned to examine the ways in which varying narratives and tropes of masculinity and femininity have both shaped and been used by the far-right in its mobilization of support and polarization of debate. It follows the academic literature in identifying ethnonationalism as the unifying ideology of a heterogeneous political tendency that can be collectively referred to as the “far- right”. The use of the descriptor “far-right” also serves to designate those parties and formations which have engineered the entry of extremism into the mainstream, by rejecting both the traditional center-right establishment in politics and the violent extremism of openly anti-democratic groups and individuals. The nativism and authoritarianism of the far-right should be regarded as a “pathological normalcy” and a “radicalisation of mainstream values.” The analyses and recommendations presented in this report are based on a review of the available a​n​g​l​o​p​h​o​n​e literature on the far-right, as referred to above. This was supplemented with a review of recent documentation of Oxfam’s work on gender justice and its programming with men and boys in particular, and key informant interviews with Oxfam staff involved with gender programming to identify their concerns about the rise of the far-right, and what this might mean for Oxfam’s work on issues of masculinities.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

In this chapter I provide a reflective account of my doctoral research on the electoral rise and fall of the British National Party (BNP)-a party with its ideological and organizational origins in neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. In doing so, I will offer an account of the dialectical interplay of theory, method and data. Moreover, I will throw light on the way in which my research design evolved during the course of this study, thus demonstrating the ways in which it, and the decisions taken once in 'the field', were shaped by my personal biography and sociological training, as well as a range of other institutional, political, cultural and ethical factors. In doing so, I will draw attention to the significance of whiteness and class when negotiating the contours of the local 'communicative community' (Hewitt, 2005) through three overlapping periods of data collection on my journey towards a political ethnographic study of the BNP in the outer-East London Borough of Barking and Dagenham. I then conclude with a discussion which addresses a criticism that I (and others) have faced while presenting their work in this area: namely, that there is no place for ethnographic academic research involving the far right. Drawing on Back's (2002) concept of 'active listening', I will suggest that there is an important role for anti-racist, anti-fascist activist-scholarship in a field largely dominated by white people, and often susceptible to the pitfalls of 'white logic' and 'white methods' (see Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva, 2008).

This book explores how the populist far right forces have managed to push the entire political discourse to the right by hijacking the immigration debate in Europe. Their constant provocation and management of controversies and crises around Muslim immigration have successfully turned immigration from a labor issue into a cultural threat to the nation that subsequently shifted the terrain for political struggle from economy (i.e., class struggle) to culture (i.e., cultural struggle) and have brought left and right together around “core values.” The move to the right has been facilitated by endless chains of moral panics and controversies around Islam and Muslim immigrants’ cultural and religious practices, which have been presented as a threat to “common achievements” in such a way that political parties were forced to respond continually to ever fresh scandals and intentional provocations.

Dall’osservazione dello spazio urbano della città di Roma, effettuato fra gennaio 2011 e giugno 2012, sono stati censiti e documentati 247 graffiti. Ciò che viene presentato in questo saggio è una prima analisi tematica del materiale raccolto. A questa centrale riflessione se ne accompagnano altre incentrate sul contributo che lo studio del graffitismo, osservato e documentato nello spazio urbano e linguistico della capitale italiana, può offrire relativamente a tematiche quali, per esempio, il rapporto diamesico fra lingua scritta e parlata, l’analisi delle varietà giovanili, le interferenze del dialetto e la creazione di neologismi.

Depuis quelques années, le vote d'extrême droite progresse dans de nombreux pays européens. Si dans certains d'entre eux, il s'agit d'une manifestation récente, dans d'autres pays, l'extrême droite a connu un enracinement certain. Ainsi, en Belgique, en France ou en Autriche, les partis d'extrême droite font désormais partie de l'échiquier politique. Ces formations influencent profondément les débats politiques et pèsent sur les orientations gouvernementales. Cela est particulièrement vrai sur des thèmes tels que l'identité nationale, la sécurité intérieure, les politiques sociales, l'intégration des étrangers et les flux migratoires. Le présent ouvrage aborde l'extrême droite en France et en Belgique de manière comparative, ce qui constitue sa principale originalité. En effet, cinq sujets identiques guident les analyses réalisées respectivement sur le Front national en France, le Vlaams Blok en Flandre et le Front national dans la partie francophone de la Belgique. La première question a trait aux étapes de la formation de ces partis, à leur identité politique, à leur organisation et leur personnel politique et, enfin, à leur enracinement progressif. Le deuxième sujet, qui est très souvent oublié mais qui nous renseigne sur leur filiation idéologique, porte sur leur programme économique et social. Le troisième thème concerne l'électorat des partis d'extrême droite et vise à donner une analyse nuancée, capable de restituer l'hétérogénéité des groupes qui votent pour les partis d'extrême droite. Le quatrième champ analyse des effets de la progression des partis d'extrême droite sur les autres formations politiques. Enfin, la cinquième problématique évoque la situation de deux villes sous l'emprise des partis d'extrême droite, Toulon à l'heure du Front National et Anvers à portée de main du Vlaams Blok. Ces deux monographies nous montrent aussi ce que signifie ou peut signifier l'administration de la collectivité par des partis d'extrême droite.

L’élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2007 et le scrutin législatif qui l’a suivie ont été une terrible désillusion pour Jean-Marie Le Pen et le Front national (FN). Après avoir dominé l’agenda politique et médiatique durant les années quatre-vingt-dix et créé une secousse inédite dans le système politique lors des élections présidentielles de 2002, le FN était ramené à une expression électorale et un poids politique extrêmement modestes. Ce résultat, en phase avec le mouvement de déclin observé dans les années 2000, est confirmé au scrutin municipal de 2008 où l’extrême droite française est évanescente. D’aucuns évoquent alors la fin sans gloire de Jean-Marie Le Pen et de son parti.

A la veille des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012, la présentation et le regard sont pourtant tout autres. En janvier 2011, Marine Le Pen a « hérité » de la présidence du parti ; trente-neuf ans après l’accession de son père à cette même présidence. Le Front national a opéré une percée aux élections cantonales du printemps 2011 et les enquêtes d’opinion créditent Marine Le Pen de scores oscillant entre 15 et 20% des intentions de vote pour le premier tour de la présidentielle.

Après le pain noir, le pain blanc ? Les choses sont indubitablement plus nuancées. Dans un environnement européen où l’extrême droite a (re)trouvé des couleurs dans certains Etats, une nouvelle analyse approfondie du phénomène frontiste s’imposait, tant il est vrai que le déclin politico-électoral de la deuxième moitié des années 2000 avait asséché les recherches consacrées au Front national.

L’ouvrage, qui rassemble des contributions de spécialistes réputés de l’extrême droite française, retrace et analyse tour à tour l’histoire du Front national, les rapports du FN à l’extrême droite européenne, le modèle organisationnel et militant du parti, ses axes idéologiques et programmatiques, de même que son implantation électorale et la question des alliances politico-électorales. Enfin, trois zones de force du Front national, dissemblables dans leur profil, sont très finement observées : le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, l’Alsace et Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur.

This paper discusses the history of the acronym A.C.A.B. in the Italian language. It examines the mechanisms that have brought the acronym from the streets to literature and the role of the Skinhead and football Ultras sub-cultures in the language contact between English and Italian.

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au Danemark, le parti populaire danois, le parti national slovaque, le Mouvement social italien-Alliance nationale, la Ligue du nord, les Republikaner, le NPD et la DVU en Allemagne, la Liste Pim Fortuyn et le parti de la Liberté aux Pays-Bas, Ataka en Bulgarie, le parti populaire de la Grande Roumanie, le Vlaams Belang et le Front national en Belgique, l’Union démocratique du Centre en Suisse, LAOS en Grèce… Au surplus, un fait politique nouveau s’est imposé ces dernières années : outre la progression électorale et politique observée par nombre de ces partis, plusieurs formations d’extrême droite ont accédé aux responsabilités gouvernementales ou ont soutenu des gouvernements de l’extérieur. Par-delà les riches travaux consacrés aux développements des partis d’extrême droite, il s’imposait donc d’analyser les conditions et les conséquences de cette nouvelle donne. Tel est l’angle d’approche de cet ouvrage, qui réunit des contributions des meilleurs spécialistes de la question. La réflexion porte sur la vie et les choix internes de ces partis. Souhaitent-ils accéder au pouvoir ? Cette question suscite-t-elle des débats difficiles ? Observe-t-on un processus de modération quand ces formations rentrent au gouvernement ? Les militants endossent-ils ce choix ? Le parti est-il sanctionné ou conforté aux élections suivantes ?... Mais elle se fixe aussi sur les dimensions extérieures à ces formations. Les thèmes portés par les partis d’extrême droite percolent-ils chez les partis démocratiques ? L’apport de l’extrême droite est-il marquant sur certains thèmes qui lui sont chers ? Embrasser l’extrême droite est-ce mieux l’étouffer ? ... A partir d’études de cas et d’approches comparées, l’ouvrage fournit des réponses inédites à ces questions contemporaines.

This paper analyzes the role of far right in the Ukrainian politics during the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas. The issue of the involvement of Ukrainian far right organizations in the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas have been politicized and polarized. Russian and separatist politicians and the media often presented the “Euromaidan” as a “fascist coup” and the Maidan government as a “fascist junta.” In contrast, the governments and the mainstream media in Western countries tended to present the role of the far right in the “Euromaidan” and in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically in the conflict in Donbas, as marginal. Previous academic studies generally reached similar conclusions. They focused on numerical strength and electoral support for the far right parties and ignored other aspects of influence of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi parties, specifically their role in the political violence, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas. However, the number of academic studies of the contemporary far right in Ukraine is generally limited.
            The research question is as follows: What is the role of the far right in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan”? This study analyzes the involvement of specific Ukrainian radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations in the “Euromaidan,” the Odesa massacre, and the war in Donbas, their performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and the 2015 local elections in Ukraine. The analysis focuses on major Ukrainian far right organizations, such as Svoboda (Freedom), the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly, the White Hammer, the UNA-UNSO, Bratstvo, and C14, and paramilitary formations or special police and National Guard units organized and controlled to various extent by them, such as the Azov regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. It uses various sources of data, such as online recordings of live broadcasts and videos of the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas, official database of court decisions in Ukraine concerning investigations of the involvement of the far right in major cases of political violence, video recordings of the Maidan massacre trial, information posted on websites and social media groups of far right organizations, and media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages.
            The study shows that the far right organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters, the post-Maidan governments, and in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. However, the analysis also shows that the far right organizations and football ultras played a key role during violent attacks, such as attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the parliament of Ukraine in January and on February 18, 2014. There is also various evidence of the Right Sector involvement in a violent attack of the Berkut police during its highly publicized dispersal of protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda and smaller organizations had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police on February 18-20, 2014. The study demonstrates that the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly/ Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of football ultras were involved in the Odesa massacre on May 2, 2014. This paper also shows that the far right organizations and their volunteer battalions and paramilitary units had a significant role in the civil war in Donbas but a comparably minor role in fighting with several regular Russian military units during direct military interventions by Russia in August 2014 and February 2015. Major implications of this study for the Ukrainian politics and the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine are discussed in the conclusion. This paper implies that the far right has significant but not dominant role in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan.” But far right organizations and their armed units had a key role in major cases of political violence during and after the “Euromaidan,” and they attained ability to overthrow by force the government of the one of the largest European countries.

My doctoral dissertation examines the experiences of the Italian volunteers in the Waffen-SS troops using in-depth interviews with former volunteers as the main primary source. This phenomenon, even if significant in size (depending on the source, some 15 000-20 000 Italian men volunteered in the Waffen-SS), has been hitherto largely unknown to historical research. The available literature on the Italian volunteers, mainly written by military history enthusiast journalists and methodologically weak, concentrates mainly on the combat operations and military organization, and offers a rather stereotypical profile of the volunteers.

My dissertation does not aim to reconstruct the military history of the different divisions of the Waffen-SS in which Italian volunteers operated but instead to examine the subjective, private and intimate experience of the volunteers in order to understand the motivations, attitudes, beliefs and cultural and family background, as well as their political ideas. The main objective of my doctoral dissertation is to discover the ideological precepts of the volunteers’ political credo. As the last phase of fascism and its ideology, often defined as the “Germanisation” or “Nazification” of fascism, is still the object of wide academic debate, a better understanding of the volunteers’ ideology also contributes to deepening overall knowledge of the nature of this last phase.

The theoretical frame of my dissertation lies in oral history, in particular in the postmodernist approach to oral history, through which I reconstruct the volunteers’ ideology. In-depth interviews with former volunteers are the main primary source, but multiple data collection methods have been adopted. Phone interviews and correspondence with the volunteers have also been considered as primary sources. In addition to interviews and correspondence, family archives consisting of diaries, correspondence with the volunteers’ relatives and photographic material have also been collected and examined. An ethnographic observation of the volunteers’ domestic spaces has been conducted during the in-depth interviews, and photo self-elicitation techniques have been used in cases where the volunteers were willing to share their photographs.

An exhaustive portrait of the ideological structure of the volunteers has been obtained, as well as of the cultural and social origins of the values that contributed to the rise and adoption of this ideology. Further, the volunteers’ motivations to enlist have been clearly reconstructed, together with their cultural, political, social and military backgrounds. The results of the research are particularly relevant both for comprehension of the Italian phenomenon of volunteering in the Waffen-SS and for the reconstruction of the ideological dynamics of the last phase of fascism. The volunteers’ political and ideological system, which can be defined as the Italian SS-fascist ideology, disagrees strongly with the vaguely described ideological profile offered by previous studies that describe volunteers as generically “super-fascist”. The research also offers the opportunity for a deeper understanding of the final fascist ideological trajectory, currently defined, not without a certain level of approximation, as the “Germanisation” or “Nazification” of fascist ideology.

The paper examines the connections between Russia and far-right political parties in Europe. It argues
that these close relationships are based both on ideology and strategy. The European far right sees in Russian
President Vladimir Putin the model of a strong, conservative leader who defends traditional values and
opposes the decadent West. Since most far-right parties are at the same time against European integration
and anti-American, they also see a close relationship with Russia as a necessary foothold in order to
achieve the gradual disassociation of their countries from Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Kremlin, for its part,
views these parties as possibly being useful for the achievement of its own objectives. Thus, it is interested
in gathering them under its wing.

In this context, in recent years far-right parties all over Europe have established cordial relations with
Moscow. Far-right leaders pay regular visits to Russia, have meetings with Russian officials and often
appear on state-owned Russian media. The fact that they are discussants with the Kremlin boosts their
credibility at home and improves their image. At the same time, they are often invited to monitor electoral
procedures in disputed territories, thus offering some sort of credibility and international recognition for the
results of ballots. The secessionist referendum which was held in Crimea in March 2014 is the latest example
of this trend. More generally, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has offered a great opportunity
for the expression of the pro-Russian sentiments of most European far-right parties. These organisations
see Putin’s policy as tangible proof of his resolve to impose his will on his opponents and to mark the reemergence
of Russian power at the international level. From the Kremlin’s point of view, these parties can
also help Moscow to expand its geopolitical influence. Even if Putin does not manage to see parties with
pro-Russian leanings forming governments, he can still hope that their growing influence will exert considerable
pressure on EU governments, especially as far as relations with Russia are concerned.

В този очерк ние не разкриваме целия многостранен и динамичен феномен на новите доброволчески части от 2014 г. Вместо това ще се фокусираме само върху предисторията и някои аспекти на възникването на един особен и малко девиантен пример за общия феномен на доброволците, а именно върху ранната история на едно от найзнаменитите от тези подразделения – полк „Азов”. Нещо повече, миналото на тази структура се разглежда тук само от гледна точка на политическите, а не на военните науки, т.е. като разновидност на негражданското общество, а не на военните сили на Украйна. С други думи, тук ще се концентрираме върху определени особености на създаването на „Азов”, а не върху бойните действия и военните заслуги или възможни провали на това подразделение. Последните представляват още потрудни за изследване сюжети, за които ние не сме в състояние да дадем обоснована оценка. Не толкова самата известност, колкото причината за западното медийно внимание към „Азов” – а именно ексцентричните политически възгледи на създателите на подразделенито – станаха и за нас повод за кратко разглеждане на спецификата на неговата предистория, идеология, ръковод ство и създаване. Неонацистките, както ще покажем подолу, тенденции в тази сега вече сравнително голяма военна част представлява проблем в няколко отношения наведнъж. Някогашните явно фашистски възгледи на решаващи командири на полка поставят под въпрос както сегашната военна дейност, която може би в други отношения заслужава уважение, така и следвоенното бъдеще на „Азов”. Неотдавнашното политическо издигане и влизането във Върховната Рада на двама ръководители на „Азов”, имали преди откровено расистски изказвания – Андрей Билецки и Игор Мосийчук (който обаче в момента е вече разследван за корупция) – се явява като особено скандално развитие.

El presente estudio tiene como fin analizar el esquema ideológico propuesto en "El manifiesto de la Alt-Right (Derecha Alternativa)", ensayo publicado originalmente en inglés por Milo Yiannopoulos y Allum Bokhari en la web Breitbart, y traducido al castellano por la web El Manifiesto. La importancia del citado ensayo radica en que es uno de los textos ideológicos más importantes de los últimos tiempos, al esquematizar una forma de pensar que están adoptando cada vez más jóvenes en los Estados Unidos.

La metodología utilizada se enfocó en el concepto de ‘esquema ideológico del discurso’, propuesto por el lingüista holandés Teun van Dijk. A partir de estos postulados teóricos, se estudió cómo se compone la ideología de la derecha alternativa mediante el discurso que maneja el citado ensayo. Aspectos como la identidad, las relaciones con otros grupos de poder y los recursos disponibles fueron desarrollados a lo largo de esta investigación.

Los resultados obtenidos describen, mediante diferentes dimensiones de estudio, cuáles son las características de los simpatizantes de la derecha alternativa. Como dimensiones principales, se tiene: identidad, actividades, objetivos, normas/valores, posición y recursos.

Los resultados permitieron concluir que la derecha alternativa es un grupo de gente descontenta que aspira a defender la cultura occidental mediante actividades poco usuales, como el humor negro y el acoso político. Además, la derecha alternativa practica valores tradicionales y se relaciona con grupos afines, mediante métodos de organización que contrarresten al establishment.

“This is not a story about art, but about fascism.”  (The Baffler, writer Megan Nolan cites an Antifa voice)
I would put it differently; LD50 is not a story simply about art nor solely about fascism, but specifically about the resurgence of fascism as a cultural force. Were this phenomenon truly restricted to a small project space in Dalston, we wouldn't be discussing it: a great deal of the art being exhibited currently could be said to embody, albeit semi-consciously, ideological principles that truck with NRx's cyber-libertarian views.

Clovers und Bassins tiefschürfende Studien über den Eurasismus, Gumiljow und den Neo-Eurasismus verdeutlichen einen Teil des historisch-ideellen Hintergrunds der Rechtswende des Putin-Regimes nach der Orangen Revolution in der Ukraine von 2004. Laruelles und Shekhovtsovs Werke beschreiben detailliert verschiedene Ausdrucksformen, Mechanismen und Auswirkungen dieser folgenreichen Transmutation. Die Befunde und Bedeutung dieser vier Bücher illustrieren, dass im Rahmen der Analyse des Geisteslebens, der Parteipolitik, des öffentlichen Diskurses und der Außenpolitik Russlands die Rechtsextremismusforschung keine politikwissenschaftliche Nischenaktivität mehr darstellt. Vielmehr ist der zeitgenössische russische Ultranationalismus zu einem zentralen Gegenstand der Erforschung postsowjetischer Innenpolitik und internationaler Beziehungen geworden.

Die Freiwilligenbataillone stellen eine Graswurzelreaktion der ukrainischen Gesellschaft auf die verdeckte russische Invasion der Ukraine dar. Während der Großteil dieser Einheiten als spezifisch kriegsbedingte Spielarten des Dritten Sektors der postrevolutionären Ukraine betrachtet werden können, gibt es einige Freiwilligenverbände, die auch Züge „unziviler Gesellschaft“ tragen. Das Bataillon Azov, inzwischen zum Nationalgarderegiment aufgewertet, ist im Lichte seiner dubiosen Vorgeschichte sowie faschistischen Führungsriege und Symbolik ein letztlich untypischer ukrainischer Freiwilligenverband.

""Debates about the relationship and boundary between mainstream and extremist (sometimes referred to as radical or violent) activism historically emerge in response to violent incidents, where defenders of a cause will attempt to differentiate between the two in order to maintain their legitimacy and critics will attempt to make links between them in order to delegitimize the movement. This is necessary in the case of the former and possible in the case of the latter because of both popular opposition and distaste for ‘extremism’ (however defined) and because of the overlap between the ideologies and objectives of mainstream movements and so-called extremist ones, even if they differ in terms of tactics. While a movement’s ideology does come into play in the definition of extremism, its application is usually reserved for those movements or activists that, while sharing an ideology or objectives with mainstream ones, reject legitimate democratic methods in favor of violence. While this analytical distinction and boundary is applied to many movements, perhaps the clearest application is the anti-abortion movement in the United States, which includes: elected officials, members of the Republican Party, the Christian Right, church groups and citizen activists, as well as more militant direct action organizations, terrorists and elements of the extreme right. The distinction and relationship between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘extreme’ anti-abortion activism has become more significant in the first decade of the 21st century as America has not only waged a war against terrorism, but the stigma of terrorism that had become attached to the anti-abortion movement in the 1990s has been obscured as anti-abortion activism reached the White House and political power under President George W. Bush and the ascendant Christian Right. Yet, anti-abortion violence returned soon after Bush left office and Barack Obama entered it as the murder of Dr. George Tiller, one of the few doctors to perform so-called ‘late-term abortions,’ by activist Scott Roeder in Wichita, Kansas on May 31 2009 clearly illustrated.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on extremist or violence anti-abortion activism, and where it fits in to wider literature on the anti-abortion or pro-life movement, the Christian Right and other forms or sectors of the right, as well as terrorism. This is followed by an overview and examination of the different sectors of the anti-abortion movement, including the mainstream, militant direct action organizations such as Operation Rescue, the Pro-Life Action Network and Lambs of Christ, and extremist ones that advocate or perpetuate violence such as the American Coalition of Life Activists, Missionaries of the Preborn and the Army of God, websites such as the Nuremburg Files and so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as Rev. Mike Bray, Rev. Paul Hill, John Salvi, James Kopp, Eric Rudolph and Scott Roeder. This includes an overview and examination of the theological and textual sources and material used to advocate and justify violent activism, and the history of anti-abortion extremism and violence in the post-Roe v. Wade context from 1973 to the present. Through these sections, the chapter interrogates the relationships between extremist and violent anti-abortion violence, the mainstream anti-abortion movement, wider mainstream Christian Right and extreme right. It also examines responses to these activists and anti-abortion violence by the government and the mainstream anti-abortion movement. Significantly, the chapter looks at whether the mainstream anti-abortion movement provides support for more extreme elements activists or disassociates itself from these elements as it is frequently called upon to do, and whether it can or should be held responsible for perpetrators of violence who share a common cause. Finally, the chapter examines how anti-abortion extremism and violence are understood in relation in post-9/11 America.

On the book Extremism in America:

“A first-rate survey of the various strands of domestic extremism, from far left to far right, that are increasingly convulsing our country. A must-read for students, scholars, officials, and others entering this important field.”—Mark Potok, Southern Poverty Law Center

“With contributions on areas ranging from anti-abortion extremism to modern anarchism and black nationalism, this is a fascinating study of an often neglected and vital area of American politics.”—Martin Durham, author of White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics

The American Republic was born in revolt against the British crown, and ever since, political extremism has had a long tradition in the United States. To some observers, the continued presence of extremist groups?and the escalation of their activities?portends the fragmentation of the country, while others believe such is the way American pluralism works. The word extremism often carries negative connotations, yet in 1964 Barry Goldwater famously said, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”
         
Extremism in America is a sweeping overview and assessment of the various brands of bigotry, prejudice, zealotry, dogmatism, and partisanship found in the United States, including the extreme right, the antiglobalization movement, Black Nationalism, Chicano separatism, militant Islam, Jewish extremism, eco-extremism, the radical antiabortion movement, and extremist terrorism. Many of these forms of single-minded intolerance are repressed by both the state and society at large, but others receive significant support from their constituencies and enjoy a level of respectability in some quarters of the mainstream. The essays in this volume, written by area specialists, examine the relationship between these movements and the larger society, dissect the arguments of contemporary American anarchist activists, look at recent trends in political extremism, and suggest how and why such arguments resonate with a considerable number of people.
"

This paper contextualizes a brief moment in the development of Russian right-wing intellectualism in a volatile transition period of the Putin System. It briefly introduces three new far right circles the appearance of which, it is argued, signified a novel stage in the development of the Russian extreme right within the peculiar conditions of Russia’s post-Soviet neopatrimonial regime. The paper focuses on the personae of Aleksandr Dugin – one of post-Soviet Russia’s most prominent fascist ideologues and the prime proponent of “neo-Eurasianism.” The paper also briefly touches upon the significance of the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine for the radicalization of Putin’s authoritarian rule and its resulting rapprochement with the Russian extreme right.

Like Weimar Germany, contemporary Russia is home to fascist actors and widespread nationalism. But unlike interwar Germany, the party system in post-Soviet Russia is heavily manipulated and civil society remains underdeveloped. This means that fascists have not had a chance to use elections or to penetrate civil society in order to build up political support. The continuing presence of a resolutely authoritarian, yet non-fascist “national leader” (Vladimir Putin) keeps the country from becoming a liberal democracy but it also, for now, makes it less likely that the regime will become fascist.

The international study of fascism has, over the last 25 years, experienced considerable consolidation. Inspired by influential theoretical publications of Roger D. Griffin and others, a new sub-discipline, “comparative fascist studies,” has emerged that proceeds from a largely common conceptualization of fascism. It explicitly includes and particularly promotes the cross-cultural, as well as inter-epochal investigation into ultra-nationalisms outside Central and Western Europe after the year 1945. The concepts, approaches and hypotheses of this new sub-discipline are well-suited to be applied to the study of inter-war and post-Soviet right-wing radicalism in Eastern Europe. However, before comprehensive classification and informative comparison becomes possible, the putative fascist phenomena of Eastern Europe need more thorough descriptive analysis, field research, and empirical investigation by researchers, in the region.

The goal of the CICERO project is to develop and implement a counter-narrative communication campaign aimed at preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism, accompanied by a methodology for evaluating the campaign’s effectiveness.

The CICERO consortium will, at first, identify the target audiences that are considered particularly susceptible to extremist propaganda. The most prominent radicalisation narratives circulating across the EU will then be collected and analysed. The campaign will rely on both online and offline communication channels for disseminating a wide range of multimedia contents, produced by the consortium, to the different audiences.

Why did millions of people respond to the failures of neoliberal capitalism by voting in leaders that further undermine their existence? In this article, I combine the insights of the early Frankfurt School Critical Theory (Theodor W. Adorno) with the insights of psychoanalytic theory (Sigmund Freud) to show how economic factors interact with psychological factors in the rise of the far-right today. The propaganda techniques used by far-right leaders create conditions in masses that are akin to hypnoses. Such techniques induce regressions in far-right followers in which the unconscious predominates, and far-right leaders use to manipulate the masses. To further detail the theoretical framework, I analyze a Trump rally and an interview with a Trump follower.

This article reviews three strands in the scholarship on the populist radical right (PRR). It covers both political parties and extra-parliamentary mobilization in contemporary European democracies. After definitional issues and case selection, the authors first discuss demand-side approaches to the fortunes of the PRR. Subsequently, supply-side approaches are assessed, namely political opportunity explanations and internal supply-side factors, referring to leadership, organization and ideological positioning. Third, research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of these parties and movements is examined: do they constitute a corrective or a threat to democracy? The authors discuss the growing literature on the impact on established parties' policies, the policies themselves, and citizens' behaviour. The review concludes with future directions for theorizing and research.

At 9:02 on the morning of April 19th, 1995, a bomb went off at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The bomb not only killed over 160 people and injured more than 650, but it also shook the illusion held by many Americans of a nation safe from the political unrest and terrorism outside its borders (an illusion that would be shattered for good on 9/11). In the hours and days following the bombing, the media and law enforcement authorities focused on the Muslim terrorists they believed were responsible, including a Muslim Oklahoma City resident detained at Heathrow Airport in London. On April 20th, one day after bombing, another Oklahoma City resident, Iraqi refugee Suhair al-Mosawi, was attacked in his home as retaliation for the bombing. When Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols – two white, Christian, home-grown anti-government activists – were arrested, what became evident was that these were ‘American’ terrorists. In spite of the initial shock of the bombing and focus on Muslims, this was far from a new phenomenon. For many experts who had been researching and monitoring the extreme right, the bombing was the culmination of a fifteen-year trajectory of violence. In response to the bombing, hearings were held, anti-terror legislation was passed, arrests were made and numerous books written and films made about the phenomenon. Yet, following the events of 9/11, Oklahoma City and the domestic extreme right were pushed to the margins of history and memory, as terrorism and terrorists were redefined as Islamic or Islamist, and Christianity and patriotism were evoked in America’s defense.

Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror. This chapter looks at how domestic extreme right terrorism has been constructed, represented, evoked or ignored in the American political imagination in the post-civil rights era, with a particular focus on its changing status following the Oklahoma City bombing and 9/11.""

El objetivo del presente escrito es detectar contrapuntos entre la propaganda  alemana de Timón y las reflexiones filosófico políticas de José Vasconcelos. Para eso, ubicaremos a la revista en un contexto marcado por la apertura de México al exterior, de búsqueda de proyectos económicos e identitarios, de una diversificación de la esfera pública y de importantes transformaciones en los medios de comunicación.

A compendium giving brief and research based introductions to concepts associated with the far right, written by scholars from the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX). Edited by Anders Ravik Jupskås and Eviane Leidig.

My contributions (with co-authors) include the entries on racism and hate crime.