Papers by Tommi Vehkavaara
Biosemiotics, 2017
By Tommi Vehkavaara & Alexei Sharov.
Abstract. We argue that constructive approaches in epistem... more By Tommi Vehkavaara & Alexei Sharov.
Abstract. We argue that constructive approaches in epistemology and systems science, which are focused on normativity, knowledge, and communication of organisms and emphasize the primacy of activity, self-construction, and niche-construction in the cognitive agents, fit naturally to the both methodology and theory of biosemiotics. In particular, constructive view was already present in the works of the major precursors of biosemiotics: von Uexküll and Bateson, and to some extent Peirce. Biosemiotics has a chance to function as a mediating field in the theoretical integration of semiotics with its construction-related sister disciplines (e.g., second order cybernetics, autopoiesis, constructivism, enactivism, and interactivism) because of its explicit assumption of the semiotic nature of life and agency and its objectified “first person” view to biosemiotic agents that nevertheless avoids the agnostic attitude towards reality.
Link to the full paper: http://rdcu.be/uXQJ .
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Biosemiotics, 2015
Life has semiotic nature; and as life forms differ in their complexity, functionality, and adapta... more Life has semiotic nature; and as life forms differ in their complexity, functionality, and adaptability, we assume that forms of semiosis also vary accordingly. Here we propose a criterion to distinguish between the primitive kind of semiosis, which we call "protosemiosis" (following Prodi) from the advanced kind of semiosis, or "eusemiosis". In protosemiosis, agents associate signs directly with actions without considering objects, whereas in eusemiosis, agents associate signs with objects and only then possibly with actions. Protosemiosis started from the origin of life, and eusemiosis started when evolving agents acquired the ability to track and classify objects. Eusemiosis is qualitatively different from protosemiosis because it can not be reduced to a small number of specific signaling pathways. Proto-signs can be classified into proto-icons that signal via single specific interaction, proto-indexes that combine several functions, and proto-symbols that are...
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In: A More Developed Sign. Interpreting the Work of Jesper Hoffmeyer. (Eds. Donald Favareau, Paul Cobley, Kalevi Kull) Tartu University Press, 2012
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Journal of Biosemiotics 1(2)/2005. Reprinted in Biosemiotics Research Trends, (ed. Marcello Barbieri), Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge (NY) 2007, 2006
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ISBS Open Peer Review and Commentary Forum, 2007
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Introduction to Biosemiotics (ed. Marcello Barbieri), 2007
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Sign Systems Studies , 2003
In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphicse... more In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphicsemiotic concepts. This can be justified if we can show that living systems as self-maintaining far fromequilibrium systems create and update some kind of representation about the conditions of their self-maintenance. The point of view is the one of semiotic realism where signs and representations are consideredas real and objective natural phenomena without any reference to the specifically human interpreter. It isargued that the most basic concept of representation must be forward looking and that both Charles Peirce’sand Jacob von Uexküll’s concepts of sign assume an unnecessarily complex semiotic agent. The simplest representative systems do not have phenomenal objects or Umwelts at all. Instead, the minimal concept of representation and the source of normativity that is needed in its interpretation can be based on Mark Bickhard’s interactivism. The initial normativity or natural self-interest is based on the ‘utility-concept’ of function: anything that contributes to the maintenance of a far from equilibrium system is functional to that system — every self-maintaining far from equilibrium system has a minimal natural self-interest to serve that function, it is its existential precondition. Minimal interactive representation emerges when such systems become able to switch appropriately between two or more means of maintaining themselves. At the level of such representations, a potentiality to detect an error may develop although no objects of representation for the system are provided. Phenomenal objects emerge in systems that are more complex. If a system creates aset of ongoingly updated ’situation image’ and can detect temporal invariances in the updating process, these invariances constitute objects for the system itself. Within them, a representative system gets an
Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed.
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Sign Systems Studies, 2002
Any attempt to develop biosemiotics either towards a new biolo-gical ground theory or ... more Any attempt to develop biosemiotics either towards a new biolo-gical ground theory or towards a metaphysics of living nature necessitates some kind of naturalization of its semiotic concepts. Instead of standard physicalistic naturalism, a certain kind of semiotic naturalism is pursued here. The naturalized concepts are defined as referring only to the objects of our external experience. When the semiotic concepts are applied to natural pheno-mena in biosemiotics, there is a risk of falling into anthropomorphic errors if the semiotic concepts remain mentalistic. It is suggested that there really is an anthropomorphic error or “hidden prototype fallacy” arising from Peirce’s prototype for semiosis: the research process of an experimental scientist. The fallacy lies in the concept of the object of representation — it is questionable whether there are any objects of representation for bacteria and whether the DNA-signs have any objects. The conclusion is that Peircean semiotic concepts are naturalizable but only if they are based on some more primitive concept of representation. The causal origins of representations are not relevant, only their anticipative consequences (i.e. meaning).
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Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization (eds. Georg L. Farre & Tarkko Oksala) Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica. Mathematics, Computing and Management in Engineering Series No. 91, Espoo 1998, Jan 1, 1998
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Diagrams by Tommi Vehkavaara
A construction of the Peirce's general conception of (rational) habit-change(s) due to semiosis (... more A construction of the Peirce's general conception of (rational) habit-change(s) due to semiosis (sign-process) (guided by the truth about the object of sign)
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Papers in Finnish by Tommi Vehkavaara
Filosofisia tutkielmia – Philosophical Studies in honorem Leila Haaparanta, 2004
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Niin & näin 2/2001, pp. 27-33
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Niin & näin 1/2002, ss.87-90. , 2002
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Niin & näin 3/2002, 2002
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Explanatory Connections – Electronic essays dedicated to Matti Sintonen, 2001
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Niin & näin 4/1997, 1997
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Papers by Tommi Vehkavaara
Abstract. We argue that constructive approaches in epistemology and systems science, which are focused on normativity, knowledge, and communication of organisms and emphasize the primacy of activity, self-construction, and niche-construction in the cognitive agents, fit naturally to the both methodology and theory of biosemiotics. In particular, constructive view was already present in the works of the major precursors of biosemiotics: von Uexküll and Bateson, and to some extent Peirce. Biosemiotics has a chance to function as a mediating field in the theoretical integration of semiotics with its construction-related sister disciplines (e.g., second order cybernetics, autopoiesis, constructivism, enactivism, and interactivism) because of its explicit assumption of the semiotic nature of life and agency and its objectified “first person” view to biosemiotic agents that nevertheless avoids the agnostic attitude towards reality.
Link to the full paper: http://rdcu.be/uXQJ .
Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed.
Diagrams by Tommi Vehkavaara
A Finnish version with explanations in Tieteen termipankki:
http://tieteentermipankki.fi/wiki/Filosofia:pragmatismin_maksiimi
http://tieteentermipankki.fi/mediawiki/images/f/fa/Pragmatismin_maksiimi_kuva.pdf
Papers in Finnish by Tommi Vehkavaara
Abstract. We argue that constructive approaches in epistemology and systems science, which are focused on normativity, knowledge, and communication of organisms and emphasize the primacy of activity, self-construction, and niche-construction in the cognitive agents, fit naturally to the both methodology and theory of biosemiotics. In particular, constructive view was already present in the works of the major precursors of biosemiotics: von Uexküll and Bateson, and to some extent Peirce. Biosemiotics has a chance to function as a mediating field in the theoretical integration of semiotics with its construction-related sister disciplines (e.g., second order cybernetics, autopoiesis, constructivism, enactivism, and interactivism) because of its explicit assumption of the semiotic nature of life and agency and its objectified “first person” view to biosemiotic agents that nevertheless avoids the agnostic attitude towards reality.
Link to the full paper: http://rdcu.be/uXQJ .
Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed.
A Finnish version with explanations in Tieteen termipankki:
http://tieteentermipankki.fi/wiki/Filosofia:pragmatismin_maksiimi
http://tieteentermipankki.fi/mediawiki/images/f/fa/Pragmatismin_maksiimi_kuva.pdf
Habits play more than one role in biology. 1. habits of interpretation must be distinguished from 2. habits action, although a controlled action usually involves also some kind of sign-interpretations. Moreover, 3. existing habits (no matter whether of action or interpretation) have a tendency to become recognized by other agents and become to function as signs for them (Hoffmeyer’s semethic interaction). 4. In Peirce’s semiotic theory, the habits may also be produced in semiotic processes – habits of interpretation are flexible regularities that are designed to be modifiable by the feed-forward loop in the process of interpretation – when a sign is interpreted according to a habit of interpretation, this process may specify, strengthen, or modify this acting habit – or substitute it through a creation of a new habit.
It is important to notice that “habit” is here used in two different senses – in its 1st, 2nd, and 3rd roles, “habit” is a mere occurring disposition, tendency, or regularity. Only the 4th sense of “habit” provides a stronger and more proper concept of habit as a regularity that has certain appropriate origin in an earlier semiosis. Peirce makes this distinction explicitly but uses the term “habit” inconsistently in both of these senses. Hoffmeyer’s notion that habit formation is the core of semiosis is not wrong but perhaps a bit exaggeration that may lead to fallacies that are comparable to adaptationist fallacies. Not all habits are due to semiosis and not all sign action have influence to habits (Peirce). In biosemiotics, it is more difficult to detect whether the habit of interpretation is in itself also semiotically produced than in ordinary human semiosis. This is especially so, if our focus is in evolutionary processes – what we usually can observe are mere regularities (habits in 1st, 2nd, and 3rd senses) and their possible functionality, which may seduce us to assume a priori that they have always semiotic origins.
Another difficulty is inherited from the initial idea of CS which was to integrate cognitive sciences and the humanities, “with the ultimate aim of providing new insights into the realm of human signification” (Zlatev 2012). Now as this has been further extended to cover also non-human signification, we may ask whether the study of non-human signification and its theoretical concepts should somehow be subordinate to the study of human cognition or rather be considered per se, independently on its implications to human signification. If our object of study are those forms of cognition that are shared by humans and non-human agents without language faculty, there is a risk that the choices and definitions of the preferred theoretical concepts of CS are ill-advisably linguistically or humanistically biased (especially because many of the leading cognitive semioticians are linguists or have linguistic background).
One way to proceed in both of these problems is to look beyond the mere abstract definitions of our concepts to the perceptions or intuitions, from which the defined concepts of sign and meaning are derived, how these derivations are executed, and what kind of “essential features” they are supposed to preserve. For the help of this meta-semiotical question, I will recall C.S. Peirce’s notion of concept formation: all the elements of concepts are originated from perception/intuition:
“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action;” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
In this formulation of Pragmatism (that it is!), the meaning of an (intellectual) concept is found by considering the possible “exit gate”, but the content is inherited from the perceptual/intuitive origin. The role of origin is not to justify or warrant the abstracted concept or its possible applications – quite the contrary – there is no guarantee that the abstracted concept will after all be applicable to describe the common sense prototype from which it was derived. Origin does not in principle limit its applicability to completely different kind of phenomena either. But the inspection of the intuitive origin and the derivation of the concept may teach us what kind of concept it is, what kind of hidden structure it has, i.e. what kind of implicit elements, relations, etc. its derivation requires and are not abstracted away.
As there are several concepts of sign that have been applied in CS, they can be compared with respect to their derivation. Happily, three concepts of sign have clear and explicit derivations: Saussure’s structural-linguistic sign, Sonesson‘s phenomenologically derived concept of sign, and Peirce’s logical sign. All of them can be found collaterally useful concepts for CS, but having their own restrictions due to their origins and derivation.
Saussure’s prototype of sign, in turn, was meant to be a vehicle of (linguistic) communication of mental ideas and its derivation led to the abstracted concept lacking the referential content. Initial idea of meanings is that they are internal states of individual mind. Although Sonesson’s derivation of his concept of sign is more phenomenological than structuralistic, his starting point intuition seems to be not very far from Saussure’s one – sign consists minimally of the union of expression and content. Instead of communication, Sonesson’s derivation starts from the core phenomenon of CS, perception resulting a hierarchy of “meanings” of which only the most complex one deserves to be called as sign. The vague idea of linguistic sign and meaning seems nevertheless to constrain the derivation to some extent, which is not problematic per se, unless it is claimed that such concept of sign is somehow privileged in CS (or the only “true” concept of sign).
Peirce’s concept of sign, in turn, was derived as a mean for representative cognition familiar to us in scientific or rational inquiry. Its peculiar character is normativity, criteria of logical goodness of cognition. The initial problem is how a rational inquirer interprets his/her (surprising) observations or perceptions (sign) in order to compose a truthful conception (interpretant, “Dicisign” of Stjernfelt 2014) about their real conditions (object). Although many Peircean semioticians, especially biosemioticians (like Stjernfelt), feel justified to abstract this concept further and apply it even to the metabolic processes of the most simple forms of life, the look to Peirce’s derivations of his logical sign shows that the basic triadic structure of sign is dependent on interpreter’s conscious interest on truth – a faculty that bacteria (and often also humans) certainly lack. This does not mean that Peirce’s concept would be completely inapplicable in biosemiotics, only that the constitutional requirements of the sign relation should be fulfilled in its application.
Besides these three intuitive origins, rational inquiry, communication of ideas, and meaningful perception, there is still (at least) one possible starting point. I have suggested (Vehkavaara 2006) that certain applications require differently derived concept of sign starting from the idea of intentional action. Any action that is more directed than blind compulsive reactions requires some kind of anticipation of the outcome of it. Such anticipation can be thought to be an internal sign which the actor uses as a mean to guide or constrain the results of action. The resulting practical or constructive concept of sign is a normative and dynamic sign but its triadic structure is different than the one of Peirce’s concept. Moreover, logical goodness (truth) is only one possible normative criterion for cognition. When an empirical study is made in CS, we should seriously consider which one(s) of these types of concepts (or perhaps some fifth one) have the best fit to model this cognitive phenomena under a study.
Some references:
Brandt, Per Aage (2004): Spaces, Domains and Meanings. Essays in Cognitive Semiotics. Bern: Peter Lang.
Deacon, T. W. (1997): The symbolic species: the Co-evolution of language and the brain. New York: W.W. Norton.
El-Hani Charbel, João Queiroz, Claus Emmeche (2009): Genes, information, and semiosis. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
Hoffmeyer Jesper, Frederik Stjernfelt (2016): The Great Chain of Semiosis. Investigating the Steps in the Evolution of Semiotic Competence. Biosemiotics 9(1)/2016: 7-29
Kull, K. (2009): Vegetative, animal, and cultural semiosis: the semiotic threshold zones. Cognitive Semiotics 4/2009: 8-27.
Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1935, 1958. Collected papers of C. S. Peirce. Vols. 1-6 (eds. Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss). Vols. 7-8 (ed. Arthur W. Burks). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Cited as CP.]
Peirce, Charles S. 1992, 1998. Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings. Vols. 1-2. (Ed. Nathan Hauser et al.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Cited as EP.]
Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916): Course in General Linguistics. (Transl. Roy Harris, 1983). Chicago & La Salle (Ill.): Open Court 1997
Stjernfelt Frederik (2007): Diagrammatology. Springer.
Stjernfelt Frederik (2014): Natural Propositions. Docent Press.
Sonesson Göran (2008): From the meaning of embodiment to the embodiment of meaning: A study in phenomenological semiotics. In Ziemke, Zlatev, Frank (eds.): Cognitive Linguistics Research, 35.1: Body, Language, and Mind, Volume 1: Embodiement. Mouton de Gruyter: 85-127.
Sonesson Göran (2009): New Consideradons on the Proper Study of Man — and, marginally, some other animals. Cognitive Semiotics 4/2009: 133-168.
Sonesson Göran (2012): The Foundation of Cognitive Semiotics in the Phenomenology of Signs and Meanings. Intellecta 58(2)/2012: 207-239.
Vehkavaara Tommi (2002): Why and how to naturalize semiotic concepts for biosemiotics. Sign Systems Studies 30(1)/2002: 293 313.
Vehkavaara Tommi (2006): Limitations on applying Peircean semeiotic. Biosemiotics as applied objective ethics and esthetics rather than semeiotic. Journal of Biosemiotics 1(2)/2006: 269-308.
Zlatev Jordan (2009): The Semiotic Hierarchy: Life, consciousness, signs and language. Cognitive Semiotics 4/2009: 169-200.
Zlatev Jordan (2012): Cognitive Semiotics: An emerging field for the transdisciplinary study of meaning. Public Journal of Semiotics IV(1)/2012: 2-24.
The most striking difference is perhaps the attitude towards the concept of sign and its applicability. Copenhagians wish to generalize the concept of sign and semiosis so that it could establish a connction between all kind of life processes and the common sense understanding of human sign use. Following Sebeok’s (and Deely’s) ideology of general semiotic, Copenhagians have assumed that Peirce’s highly abstract and complex logical semiotics together with his evolutionary metaphysics would be applicable in this task. The strategy of Lundians, in turn, has been to reserve the concept of sign to refer to the features and structures specific to human sign use and thus distinguishing it from the less complex meaning making that both humans and non-human life forms share. Zlatev (2009: 171) suggests that semiotics should rather be defined as the study of meaning making than the study of signs. This is underlined in Sonesson’s Husserlian-Piagetian analysis of “minimal properties” of sign (sign as a subjectively differentiated double asymmetry between the expression and content) together with the description of cognitively less demanding levels with meanings that are not signs (Sonesson 2012: 225-6).
Both Sonesson (2008) and Zlatev (2009) have understandably criticized such widening of the scope of the concept of sign that has been common in biosemiotics. Such critique has not been absent in biosemiotic circles either – among some others, I have about 15 years demanded more specified use of semiotic terminology in biosemiotics (Vehkavaara 2002, 2003, 2006). The biosemiotic discourse has been too unspecified, vague, or metaphoric when applying the concept of sign and its assumed triadic structure. Especially the concept of the object of sign and the semiotic agent (mind or self) have not found satisfactory real correspondents in many cases. For instance, if a gene is a sign what would be its object and to whom it would be a sign? My provisional conclusion have so far been that Peirce’s logical concept of sign or semiosis cannot, after all, be consistently applied to the genes or even the processes like bacterial chemotaxis, without more or less dogmatically adopted metaphysical commitments. The genuine sign action presumes the possibility of such a self-control where some kind of consciousness is operative. This is also concluded by Peirce in the same paragraph, where he “heartily granted” that the acceptance of (false) hypothesis that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon has nevertheless “done good service to science” (CP 5.493). As a solution I have suggested that biosemiotics should, in addition, look for some other, differently defined and derived (non-logical) concepts of sign for the cases where Peirce’s logical concept is not applicable. But such a suggestion does not solve the dispute whether the use of the term “sign” should be limited to contexts that Lundians demand.
One way proceed is to look beyond the mere definitions to the perceptions or intuitions, from which the defined concept of sign is derived, how this derivation is executed, and what kind of ‘essential features’ it is supposed to preserve. Then we can see that biosemiotics and cognitive semiotics have somewhat different needs – biosemiotics certainly deals with cognitive processes of organisms (etc.) with internal meanings, but such meanings would remain epiphenomenal without an assumption that they are somehow also guiding the development and behavior of their carriers – i.e. biosemiotics must contain also a theory of action, a goal-directed or (self-)normative action. Thus, we get (at least) two starting point intuitions: 1. cognitive one, where sign mediated cognition is contrasted to direct perception (here Peircean logical sign may apply), and 2. the constructive or practical one, where composed sign is functioning as an anticipation, plan, or normative criterion of future action. The cognitive sign only represents its object and the goodness of the interpretation is dependent on the object. that functions as a normative criterion from which it conveys information to its interpreter. The constructive sign, instead, is used to create or realize its content and is thus non-representational in the sense that the reality of its content is dependent on the ‘interpretation’ of the sign (and not vice versa). So far I have found no better term as sign for such an internal element that guides the transformation of a semiotic system from a one state to some other, hopefully more satisfactory one.
Peircean semiotics is most clearly applicable to such cognitive processes that construct or modify some kind of internal model of the life-world of a semiotic agent (Umwelt). Such semiotic agent must in principle be capable of self-reflection and intentional self-modification of these processes, even if these abilities were not (or even never) actually used. However, humans seem to have meaningful cognitive processes that are non-representational (in a sense of having content without referring to any determinable object) and which do not directly modify any internal model of the world but the world itself. Moreover, many biosemiotic agents do not seem to have at all any updatable internal model of the world while still being capable of self-functional world-construction.
I will argue that instead of trying to generalize the Peircean logical concept of sign, it is more reasonable to search for other, perhaps less rich, concepts of sign and meaning. Peirce’s idea of three normative sciences gives one starting point. For Peirce, logic was the third one of the three theoretical philosophical normative sciences, “the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought. Especially practics the second normative science is here in interest – a science of self-controlled conduct, which should in generally be conceptually independent on logic. For Peirce, practics was needed for more deep self-control of thought than what is possible at purely logical level. In Peirce’s own few descriptions of the subject matter of practics, the logical signs are indeed in use when human action is self-controlledly guided – before the action is actually executed, a series of little inquiries (thought-experiments) are employed to anticipate and evaluate the possible effects of the plan of the action. The positive content of the practics is nevertheless in its normative characters – not in its means or degree of self-control – whether the result of action really correspond the expectation or desired effect or not. From this expectation or the ‘idea’ that is tried to ‘materialize’ in the action can be abstracted another kind of concept of sign that mediates transition of one state of the agent to another one. Such concept of practical sign might be needed for semiotic modelling of perceptual processes, creative interpretation, or any practical purpose-oriented action beside of the logical concept of sign. The main difference to logical sign is that practical sign is not referring or representing any object (or such reference is irrelevant), while still being triadic, dynamic, and normative.
Besides anthropomorphic errors, another problem may be that the biosemiotic concepts are used so vaguely so that no operationalization of them is possible. Especially the term “semiosis” is commonly attributed to various presumably biosemiotic cases without any specification about which kind of sign is in process and how the concept is applied in the case. Without such specifications it is not clear, for instance, how the semiotic consequences of the sign in case relate to its non-semiotic effects. However, there have been several attempts – from 1991 on – to specify the sign or sign-process in biological phenomena starting from more or less Peircean inspired ideas (or terms), but there are also other pitfalls that we have been prone to fall on. When developing semiotic models to biosemiotic cases we should take care that
1. the used semiotic concepts are carefully derived and adjusted to the case,
2. we do not merely decorate the standard biological description with epiphenomenal topping,
3. the elements of the sign under transformation or interpretation are detectable, differentiable, or identifiable for the biosemiotic agent in case (and not only for us), and
4. all the elements of the sign are necessary in the description of the phenomena, i.e. that they are irreducible.
I will shortly present some such attempts (Hoffmeyer & Emmeche 1991, Sharov 1998, Vehkavaara 1998, Hoffmeyer 1998, Queiros, Emmeche, El-Hani 2006). Although everyone of these can be criticized as being unsatisfactory in some respects, it is important that more attempts (hopefully better and better) are made. Biosemiotic modeling appears as more demanding task than it may look in the surface. I will examine more closely Thomas Short’s (2007) supposedly general conception of sign-interpretation and his biosemiotic application of it (a hungry bear tearing up logs and eating grubs exposed). In Short’s example we will see that there are in fact two different kinds of signs involved together, a cognitive sign (with the concept of object) and a more primitive action guiding sign that has no proper object for the semiotic agent.
Sciences that Peirce called theoretical have truth as their ultimate purpose of inquiry, as their ultimate criterion of success. Truth alone is nevertheless not enough, but truths sought should also increase our knowledge. During the course of inquiry, inquirer’s understanding about the phenomenon should grow, resulting eventually in a maximally informative conception, the full meaning of which would be clear. This is the motivation for the pragmatist concept of meaning, to make our ideas clear.
In the maxim of pragmatism, the meaning of a conception is quite famously defined in terms of possible future events. From such a definition, it results that the origin of a conception has no relevance to its meaning and gives no guarantee for its applicability. The ‘foundation’ of a conception cannot justify it. In the light of this enlightenment, the full blown pragmatist may neglect the fact that the knowing the origin of the concepts is far from useless. The essential part of Peirce’s logic is the doctrine that we adopt cognitively all our concepts through perception. Without the awareness about the perceptual origin of the defined concept and the derivation of it from this origin, some hidden elements may become unconsciously smuggled in the structure of the concept. Without the proper exposition of the perceptual rootedness of our scientific ideas, they cannot become really clear to us.
The core idea of EE is to recognize the analogy between knowledge-acquisition or learning and evolutionary adaptation through natural selection. In Donald T. Campbell’s and Konrad Lorenz’s EE, an abstract "variation-selective-retention-and-reproduction" (VSRR) algorithm, abstracted from Darwin’s conception about natural selection, is seen appropriate to model all examples of increased fit between one system and another — all increasing fit between system and environment is seen as a sign of some kind of evolutionary learning process or evolutionary knowledge-acquisition. Such evolutionary learning is not restricted at the genetic level.
The selection theory or ‘Universal Darwinism’ is taken as a basic theoretical hypothesis of EE in three different senses: 1. all knowledge processes actually use VSRR-method, 2. they exploit various lower level VSRR-processes, and 3. they have been produced by some earlier lower-level VSRR-processes. I.e. mere selection theory does not suffice for EE, but it includes essentially a hierarchy theory of knowledge levels. In it, three different hierarchies are joined together: historical production hierarchy, entailment or embeddedness hierarchy, and control hierarchy (downward causation).
In spite of its apparently strong and restrictive theoretical basic statement, the deeper inspection shows that selection theory (with hierarchy theory) does not really form a testable scientific hypothesis. Even though it avoids optimality adaptationism, it still tends to produce ‘just so’ stories of adaptive origin of cognitive systems and implicit VSRR-subprocesses. If some particular knowledge process does not seem to use unmotivated (blind) variation in its seeking of satisfying solution, it is automatically assumed that this subsystem has been produced by some and it is using some hidden subprocess in a lower level. These are assumed a priori, for the sake of intelligibility, just like the bad manners of sociobiologists in their project of explaining everything by natural selection. As a consequence, selection theory can never be falsified — speculative assumptions about some hidden VSRR-process can always be made.
Even though such dogmatic Darwinism is rare and sometimes perhaps even too radically rejected in biosemiotics, biosemiotics is not safe in falling on similar type of error. Useful interpretative or code-processing habits of organisms and other biosemiotic systems are easily assumed likewise to have been ‘learned’ at some level but self-organization (co-development) and exaptation are possible origins as well.
While for EE, one source of this failure was a too dogmatic commitment to Universal Darwinism, in biosemiotics the strong intuitions of superiority and generality of semiotic point of view or pansemiotic ideas tend to have analogous consequences. Common source of confusions and errors for both is the vagueness in the basic ideas of knowledge or sign/representation in their application to biological systems and processes.
If we look upon Peirce’s two derivations (i.e. constructions) of the concept of sign as an irreducibly triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant, we can observe that the concept is a representational one and that the quest for truth (about the object of sign) is built in into the triadic structure of sign. This limits the application of Peirce’s concept of sign — its principal intended (though not necessarily sole) application is in the logic of rational inquiry. Moreover, it follows that not all thought is in signs, only self-controlled thought, a thought that controls itself.
Besides thoughts, we control also our conduct by thought. Peirce’s pre-logical normative science of Practics, seems to employ another, more general kind of thought-sign that need not be a representational one. Conduct is controlled when it is controlled by thought, but this controlling thought does not have to be in itself controlled (i.e. self-controlled). Such construable concept of non-representational sign does not need to have an object because it can seek also practical ends (external to it), and not necessarily just truth. Peircean representational sign would thus be a special case of such more general concept of sign like Peircean logic/semeiotic is a special case of Practics.
- Emotional meaning: the sum of the subjective feelings that a sign or other stimulus launches.
- Logical meaning: the sum of the logical consequences of a representation.
- Meaning in Batesonian information: that difference which is made by another difference.
- Subjective intentional meaning: the conscious intention of the utterer.
- Communicated meaning: the content that is encoded in the semantic structure of the utterance (independently on utterer's intentions)
- Pragmatic meaning 1: meaning as the actual use of the sign in communicative community
- Pragmatic meaning 2: the sum of the true effects of the sign on all of the emotional, reactional, habitual, and conceptual levels.
Their suitability and uses in different wings of biosemiotics are critically analysed. It is argued that it is useless to start with any epiphenomenal conception of meaning. Any 'meaning' can be meaningful only when it is selected freely but not randomly among alternative interpretations or actions, the selection being guided but not completely determined by some normative criteria. Special concern is given to Peircean pragmaticist maxim that defines one concept of logical meaning. It is not directly applicable in biosemiotics, but its extension, Practical meaning, in Peircean theoretical ethics, Practics, may be. It is studied whether the defined concept of Practical meaning would be applicable in biosemiotics, and if it is, how sufficient concept of meaning it offers to biosemiotics.