Schriften zur Phänomenologie und Anthropologie, 2022
This book confronts a topic largely neglected in research on phantasy: the relationship between ... more This book confronts a topic largely neglected in research on phantasy: the relationship between fictional events and the emotions of the subject having a phantasy experience. What is the nature of an emotional response to fiction? Are emotions indifferent to the existence of what causes them? How do fictional emotions relate to their real counterparts? The volume gathers ten innovative essays tackling these questions from a phenomenological perspective.
Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that th... more Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that they have a unique epistemic and emotional perspective on the experienced objects and situations. The same object can be seen from many different points of view, an event can awaken different emotional reactions in different individuals, and our position-takings can in part be mediated by our belonging to some social or cultural groups. All these phenomena can be described by referring to the metaphor of perspective. Assuming that there are different, and irreducible, perspectives we can take on the experienced world, and on others as experiencing the same world, the phenomenon of mutual understanding can consistently be understood in terms of perspectival flexibility. This edited volume investigates the different processes in which perspectival flexibility occurs in social life and particularly focuses on the constitutive role of imagination in such processes. It includes original works in philosophy and psychopathology showing how perspectival flexibility and social cognition are grounded on the interplay of direct perception and imagination.
In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl... more In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl extensively discusses experiences of joy (Freude). By considering Husserl’s examples related to joy not as mere illustrations, but as a guiding thread for the identification of experiential structures, this article shows how these examples are not only significant for the general theory of intentionality of affective and emotional non-objectifying acts, but also provide valuable insights into the specific phenomenon of joy itself. Specifically, the article demonstrates how the distinction between joy, sensory pleasure, and liking provides insights into the intentional structure of joy as a responsive affect. On the basis of these distinctions, the article raises the normative question about the appropriateness of affective and emotional responses. It argues that the appropriateness of joy should be assessed from two perspectives: in relation to the value that justifies an affective response and in relation to a personal motivational nexus. From the former perspective, joy can be normatively assessed. However, when only considering the latter perspective, joy cannot be assessed according to objective normative standards. Finally, building on these findings, the article explores how the phenomenology of joy and motivation may be connected to the specific experience of depth and discusses the role of joy for a phenomenological investigation of the personal self.
Both the commonsensical and the philosophical understanding of curiosity as the desire to know di... more Both the commonsensical and the philosophical understanding of curiosity as the desire to know display similar ambiguities. In philosophy, such ambiguities have further repercussions, inasmuch as inquiries into curiosity, in addition to being a field of philosophical research in itself, also have meta-theoretical implications concerning the idea of philosophy one embraces. This holds true for Edmund Husserl's discussion of curiosity: his phenomenological analysis of curiosity as an object of inquiry is crucially connected with a specific meta-theoretical understanding of philosophy as an exploratory endeavor. This article analyses the relevance of the phenomenological analyses of curiosity against the background of the discussion of a polarization in the appreciation of the role of curiosity for philosophy and of the tasks Husserl assigns to philosophy. It focuses on how Husserl's appraisal of curiosity in philosophy is tied to his concrete analyses of the intentional structure of ordinary curiosity. Crucial for this appraisal and for its meta-theoretical implications is the analysis of the relation between curiosity and the basic structure of intentionality as tendency.
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considere... more According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all s... more This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all speaking is a form of acting, it aims to shed light on the nature of fictional, and particularly literary, speech acts. To this aim, relevant input can be found in (a) the discussion of the ontological status of fictional entities and of their constitution and in (b) the inquiry into the interaction between author and receiver of a fictional work. Based on the critical assessment of different approaches in the debate on speech-act theory and literary fiction, the article first clarifies why the study of the performative character of fictional language cannot be reduced to either the discussion of the status of singular speech acts in the fiction or the inquiry into the pretend or unserious nature of fictional speech acts formulated by an author. While referring to Roman Ingarden’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s, and Wolfgang Iser’s work, it subsequently argues that such a performative character shou...
SummaryThe aim of this article is to develop a phenomenological analysis of pretense. In differen... more SummaryThe aim of this article is to develop a phenomenological analysis of pretense. In different forms of pretense, something we take to be fictive is somehow transposed into a context that we experience as real. Due to this ‘transposition’, the context itself, under certain respects, becomes unreal or fictional. When we ‘live’ in a pretense context, we bracket or conceal what we take for real. Departing from both meta-representational and simulationist approaches, the phenomenological interpretation of pretense is developed based, on the one hand, on the analysis of the role of perceptual and, on the other hand, on the inquiry into the central moments making up the sociality of pretense. In relation to the intersubjective/social nature of pretense and to reassessment of the relation between ‘being’ and ‘appearing’, which result from the analysis of the role of perceptual, different forms of perspectival flexibility that are actualized in pretense will be discussed.
What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognit... more What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognition? This article relates the phenomenological theory of body memory, movement observation theory from dance, and psychological conceptual and empirical work on body feedback. Kinesthetic body feedback means efferent feedback from the body’s peripheral movements to the higher cortical functions, such as the systematic effects of the adoption of certain gestures or postures on the memory for life events. Meaning of movements is stored in the body in relation to our learning history –ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. Based on the phenomenological theory of body memory, we hypothesize that specific movement qualities will have a differential impact on affect and cognition. In accordance with our hypotheses, our results suggest that strong movements are related to more fighting affect and more negative memory recall, whereas light movements – just as a non-movement control condition – are...
What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognit... more What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognition? This article relates the phenomenological theory of body memory, movement observation theory from dance, and psychological conceptual and empirical work on body feedback. Kinesthetic body feedback means efferent feedback from the body’s peripheral movements to the higher cortical functions, such as the systematic effects of the adoption of certain gestures or postures on the memory for life events. Meaning of movements is stored in the body in relation to our learning history –ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. Based on the phenomenological theory of body memory, we hypothesize that specific movement qualities will have a differential impact on affect and cognition. In accordance with our hypotheses, our results suggest that strong movements are related to more fighting affect and more negative memory recall, whereas light movements – just as a non-movement control condition – are...
Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has-in... more Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has-in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value-explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.
Pretense, and notably non-deceptive pretense like pretend play, is an important topic of research... more Pretense, and notably non-deceptive pretense like pretend play, is an important topic of research in developmental psychology. Notably, in the last decades, studies in this field have concentrated on how children become engaged in pretend play from very early on, generally around 18 months of age; on how they apparently understand others and their intentions in pretense contexts even before passing the false-belief task (Leslie 1987; Lillard 1993, 2004; Perner 1991; Perner et al. 2004); and on how social competences, including the awareness of normativity in social contexts (Rakoczy 2006, 2008; Rakoczy et al. 2006), develop in pretend play. In recent years, the analysis of pretense has also been addressed by philosophers coming from different traditions. Besides being interested in the cognitive underpinnings of pretense (Carruthers 2006; Currie 1990, 1998; Jarrold et al. 1994; Nichols and Stich 2000), in its creative nature (Carruthers 2007, 2011; Picciuto and Carruthers 2014), and in the role that different mental capacities play in pretense,1 philosophers, like psychologists, have been focusing on how understanding pretense and consistently engaging in pretense activities relate to social cognition. Thus, it comes as no surprise that pretense has also progressively become one of the central topics in the interdisciplinary theory of mind-debate on mutual understanding and social cognition. Apart from some exceptions (e.g., Fuchs 2013), however, the inquiry into pretense seems to have been rather neglected by contemporary researchers in phenomenology, who are active in the debate on social cognition. This is probably due to the argumentative strategy in the controversy between current phenomenologists and simulationists: whereas the latter suggest that imagination is constitutive for our knowledge of others, and therefore, also pay attention to imaginative contexts like pretense,2 the former tend to deny that imagination has such a constitutive role for mutual understanding,3 and therefore, also pay less attention to those activities, like pretense, in which imagination is so prominently involved. Yet, I believe that phenomenology has a strong methodological and conceptual potential for the investigation of pretense and may also shed new light on the relation between pretense and social cognition.
This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formati... more This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formation of meaning. To this aim, the theory of embodied meaning put forward by experientialism and the phenomenological account of Typoi and typological constitution are comparatively considered. First the difficulties in the experientialist theory of embodied meaning are discussed. Second Husserl’s phenomenology of typological apprehension is presented as offering a more appropriate account of the genesis of meaning in relation to implicit body memory. Third it is argued that the refined conceptual background in contemporary cognitive linguistics opens up the field for a fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive linguistics regarding the constitution of meaning.
Husserl und die klassische deutsche Philosophie, 2014
Die Unterscheidung von Asthetik ist ein zentraler Punkt in Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. ... more Die Unterscheidung von Asthetik ist ein zentraler Punkt in Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. Wie andere Aspekte dieser Auseinandersetzung beweist er sowohl die Nahe als auch die Distanz zwischen beiden Denkern. Dies lasst sich deutlich aus Husserls eigenen Texten entnehmen. Einerseits schatzt Husserl namlich diese Unterscheidung als eine der „gewaltigen Entdeckungen“ Kants (Hua VII, S. 404; vgl. auch Hua V, S. 30). Andererseits aber kritisiert er sie aufgrund ihrer Voraussetzungen und Implikationen. Als Voraussetzung der kantischen Unterscheidung von Asthetik und Analytik zahlt laut Husserl insbesondere die Lehre der Vermogen des Gemuts; als Implikationen zahlen der schroffe Gegensatz zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand und der Mangel an angemessenen Betrachtungen der konstitutiven Leistungen, die schon auf der sinnlichen Ebene stattfinden (Hua VII, S. 420 ff.).1 Husserls Einwand ist folglich eng mit seiner allgemeinen Anthropologismus-Kritik verbunden und richtet sich in erster Linie gegen die Annahme der Vermogen des menschlichen Gemuts als Grundlage fur die Unterscheidung der Quellen aller Erkenntnis. Dieser Annahme gemas entsprechen der Anschauung und dem Begriff jeweils die Vermogen der Sinnlichkeit und des Verstandes (vgl. KrV, B 74–88/A 50–64). Somit erweisen sich die vermeintlichen apriorischen Gesetze der Erkenntnis in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als nur fur das menschliche Subjekt gultig (und nicht z. B. fur Gott) (Hua VII, S. 397; 357 ff.).2 Und das kollidiert deutlich mit Husserls Begriff des Apriori. Denn letzterer definiert die Wesensgesetze, die prinzipiell fur jedes mogliche und auch nur denkbare Subjekt gultig sein mussen.3 Damit verbunden ist der Einwand gegen die scharfe Trennung von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, so wie derjenige gegen die darin implizierte Mangelhaftigkeit in Kants Theorie der Sinnlichkeit: Da Sinnlichkeit aufgrund jener Trennung jeder Synthesis entbehrt, konne Kants Transzendentale Asthetik nicht als eine selbststandige Theorie der Wahrnehmung betrachtet werden.
In this chapter, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality are furt... more In this chapter, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality are further discussed in relation to the constitution of the spatio-temporal thing. The stratification in this context can be traced back to the foundational relationship between the constitution of res temporalis and of res extensa. The analogies concern specific aspects of the constitution of the spatial and the temporal thing. It is argued that such an inquiry is based upon an abstracting procedure that aims at isolating, for the sake of description, the spatial dimension from the temporal dimension. The outcomes of the present chapter further emphasize the limits of a mere analogical and parallel account of spatial and temporal constitution. First, the claim that we can properly consider temporal objects apart from their spatial localization is questioned. Secondly, it is argued that the constitution of the spatial thing implies temporal syntheses, so that, whenever abstracting from temporality, we can only provide an incomplete description of spatial constitution. Thirdly, the abstracting procedure does not allow us to account for the constitution of tridimensional space. For, being based upon movement, this constitution requires both spatiality and temporality.
Schriften zur Phänomenologie und Anthropologie, 2022
This book confronts a topic largely neglected in research on phantasy: the relationship between ... more This book confronts a topic largely neglected in research on phantasy: the relationship between fictional events and the emotions of the subject having a phantasy experience. What is the nature of an emotional response to fiction? Are emotions indifferent to the existence of what causes them? How do fictional emotions relate to their real counterparts? The volume gathers ten innovative essays tackling these questions from a phenomenological perspective.
Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that th... more Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that they have a unique epistemic and emotional perspective on the experienced objects and situations. The same object can be seen from many different points of view, an event can awaken different emotional reactions in different individuals, and our position-takings can in part be mediated by our belonging to some social or cultural groups. All these phenomena can be described by referring to the metaphor of perspective. Assuming that there are different, and irreducible, perspectives we can take on the experienced world, and on others as experiencing the same world, the phenomenon of mutual understanding can consistently be understood in terms of perspectival flexibility. This edited volume investigates the different processes in which perspectival flexibility occurs in social life and particularly focuses on the constitutive role of imagination in such processes. It includes original works in philosophy and psychopathology showing how perspectival flexibility and social cognition are grounded on the interplay of direct perception and imagination.
In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl... more In the texts collected in the second volume of the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl extensively discusses experiences of joy (Freude). By considering Husserl’s examples related to joy not as mere illustrations, but as a guiding thread for the identification of experiential structures, this article shows how these examples are not only significant for the general theory of intentionality of affective and emotional non-objectifying acts, but also provide valuable insights into the specific phenomenon of joy itself. Specifically, the article demonstrates how the distinction between joy, sensory pleasure, and liking provides insights into the intentional structure of joy as a responsive affect. On the basis of these distinctions, the article raises the normative question about the appropriateness of affective and emotional responses. It argues that the appropriateness of joy should be assessed from two perspectives: in relation to the value that justifies an affective response and in relation to a personal motivational nexus. From the former perspective, joy can be normatively assessed. However, when only considering the latter perspective, joy cannot be assessed according to objective normative standards. Finally, building on these findings, the article explores how the phenomenology of joy and motivation may be connected to the specific experience of depth and discusses the role of joy for a phenomenological investigation of the personal self.
Both the commonsensical and the philosophical understanding of curiosity as the desire to know di... more Both the commonsensical and the philosophical understanding of curiosity as the desire to know display similar ambiguities. In philosophy, such ambiguities have further repercussions, inasmuch as inquiries into curiosity, in addition to being a field of philosophical research in itself, also have meta-theoretical implications concerning the idea of philosophy one embraces. This holds true for Edmund Husserl's discussion of curiosity: his phenomenological analysis of curiosity as an object of inquiry is crucially connected with a specific meta-theoretical understanding of philosophy as an exploratory endeavor. This article analyses the relevance of the phenomenological analyses of curiosity against the background of the discussion of a polarization in the appreciation of the role of curiosity for philosophy and of the tasks Husserl assigns to philosophy. It focuses on how Husserl's appraisal of curiosity in philosophy is tied to his concrete analyses of the intentional structure of ordinary curiosity. Crucial for this appraisal and for its meta-theoretical implications is the analysis of the relation between curiosity and the basic structure of intentionality as tendency.
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considere... more According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all s... more This paper focuses on the performative character of fictional language. While assuming that all speaking is a form of acting, it aims to shed light on the nature of fictional, and particularly literary, speech acts. To this aim, relevant input can be found in (a) the discussion of the ontological status of fictional entities and of their constitution and in (b) the inquiry into the interaction between author and receiver of a fictional work. Based on the critical assessment of different approaches in the debate on speech-act theory and literary fiction, the article first clarifies why the study of the performative character of fictional language cannot be reduced to either the discussion of the status of singular speech acts in the fiction or the inquiry into the pretend or unserious nature of fictional speech acts formulated by an author. While referring to Roman Ingarden’s, Jean-Paul Sartre’s, and Wolfgang Iser’s work, it subsequently argues that such a performative character shou...
SummaryThe aim of this article is to develop a phenomenological analysis of pretense. In differen... more SummaryThe aim of this article is to develop a phenomenological analysis of pretense. In different forms of pretense, something we take to be fictive is somehow transposed into a context that we experience as real. Due to this ‘transposition’, the context itself, under certain respects, becomes unreal or fictional. When we ‘live’ in a pretense context, we bracket or conceal what we take for real. Departing from both meta-representational and simulationist approaches, the phenomenological interpretation of pretense is developed based, on the one hand, on the analysis of the role of perceptual and, on the other hand, on the inquiry into the central moments making up the sociality of pretense. In relation to the intersubjective/social nature of pretense and to reassessment of the relation between ‘being’ and ‘appearing’, which result from the analysis of the role of perceptual, different forms of perspectival flexibility that are actualized in pretense will be discussed.
What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognit... more What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognition? This article relates the phenomenological theory of body memory, movement observation theory from dance, and psychological conceptual and empirical work on body feedback. Kinesthetic body feedback means efferent feedback from the body’s peripheral movements to the higher cortical functions, such as the systematic effects of the adoption of certain gestures or postures on the memory for life events. Meaning of movements is stored in the body in relation to our learning history –ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. Based on the phenomenological theory of body memory, we hypothesize that specific movement qualities will have a differential impact on affect and cognition. In accordance with our hypotheses, our results suggest that strong movements are related to more fighting affect and more negative memory recall, whereas light movements – just as a non-movement control condition – are...
What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognit... more What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognition? This article relates the phenomenological theory of body memory, movement observation theory from dance, and psychological conceptual and empirical work on body feedback. Kinesthetic body feedback means efferent feedback from the body’s peripheral movements to the higher cortical functions, such as the systematic effects of the adoption of certain gestures or postures on the memory for life events. Meaning of movements is stored in the body in relation to our learning history –ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. Based on the phenomenological theory of body memory, we hypothesize that specific movement qualities will have a differential impact on affect and cognition. In accordance with our hypotheses, our results suggest that strong movements are related to more fighting affect and more negative memory recall, whereas light movements – just as a non-movement control condition – are...
Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has-in... more Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has-in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value-explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.
Pretense, and notably non-deceptive pretense like pretend play, is an important topic of research... more Pretense, and notably non-deceptive pretense like pretend play, is an important topic of research in developmental psychology. Notably, in the last decades, studies in this field have concentrated on how children become engaged in pretend play from very early on, generally around 18 months of age; on how they apparently understand others and their intentions in pretense contexts even before passing the false-belief task (Leslie 1987; Lillard 1993, 2004; Perner 1991; Perner et al. 2004); and on how social competences, including the awareness of normativity in social contexts (Rakoczy 2006, 2008; Rakoczy et al. 2006), develop in pretend play. In recent years, the analysis of pretense has also been addressed by philosophers coming from different traditions. Besides being interested in the cognitive underpinnings of pretense (Carruthers 2006; Currie 1990, 1998; Jarrold et al. 1994; Nichols and Stich 2000), in its creative nature (Carruthers 2007, 2011; Picciuto and Carruthers 2014), and in the role that different mental capacities play in pretense,1 philosophers, like psychologists, have been focusing on how understanding pretense and consistently engaging in pretense activities relate to social cognition. Thus, it comes as no surprise that pretense has also progressively become one of the central topics in the interdisciplinary theory of mind-debate on mutual understanding and social cognition. Apart from some exceptions (e.g., Fuchs 2013), however, the inquiry into pretense seems to have been rather neglected by contemporary researchers in phenomenology, who are active in the debate on social cognition. This is probably due to the argumentative strategy in the controversy between current phenomenologists and simulationists: whereas the latter suggest that imagination is constitutive for our knowledge of others, and therefore, also pay attention to imaginative contexts like pretense,2 the former tend to deny that imagination has such a constitutive role for mutual understanding,3 and therefore, also pay less attention to those activities, like pretense, in which imagination is so prominently involved. Yet, I believe that phenomenology has a strong methodological and conceptual potential for the investigation of pretense and may also shed new light on the relation between pretense and social cognition.
This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formati... more This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formation of meaning. To this aim, the theory of embodied meaning put forward by experientialism and the phenomenological account of Typoi and typological constitution are comparatively considered. First the difficulties in the experientialist theory of embodied meaning are discussed. Second Husserl’s phenomenology of typological apprehension is presented as offering a more appropriate account of the genesis of meaning in relation to implicit body memory. Third it is argued that the refined conceptual background in contemporary cognitive linguistics opens up the field for a fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive linguistics regarding the constitution of meaning.
Husserl und die klassische deutsche Philosophie, 2014
Die Unterscheidung von Asthetik ist ein zentraler Punkt in Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. ... more Die Unterscheidung von Asthetik ist ein zentraler Punkt in Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Kant. Wie andere Aspekte dieser Auseinandersetzung beweist er sowohl die Nahe als auch die Distanz zwischen beiden Denkern. Dies lasst sich deutlich aus Husserls eigenen Texten entnehmen. Einerseits schatzt Husserl namlich diese Unterscheidung als eine der „gewaltigen Entdeckungen“ Kants (Hua VII, S. 404; vgl. auch Hua V, S. 30). Andererseits aber kritisiert er sie aufgrund ihrer Voraussetzungen und Implikationen. Als Voraussetzung der kantischen Unterscheidung von Asthetik und Analytik zahlt laut Husserl insbesondere die Lehre der Vermogen des Gemuts; als Implikationen zahlen der schroffe Gegensatz zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand und der Mangel an angemessenen Betrachtungen der konstitutiven Leistungen, die schon auf der sinnlichen Ebene stattfinden (Hua VII, S. 420 ff.).1 Husserls Einwand ist folglich eng mit seiner allgemeinen Anthropologismus-Kritik verbunden und richtet sich in erster Linie gegen die Annahme der Vermogen des menschlichen Gemuts als Grundlage fur die Unterscheidung der Quellen aller Erkenntnis. Dieser Annahme gemas entsprechen der Anschauung und dem Begriff jeweils die Vermogen der Sinnlichkeit und des Verstandes (vgl. KrV, B 74–88/A 50–64). Somit erweisen sich die vermeintlichen apriorischen Gesetze der Erkenntnis in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als nur fur das menschliche Subjekt gultig (und nicht z. B. fur Gott) (Hua VII, S. 397; 357 ff.).2 Und das kollidiert deutlich mit Husserls Begriff des Apriori. Denn letzterer definiert die Wesensgesetze, die prinzipiell fur jedes mogliche und auch nur denkbare Subjekt gultig sein mussen.3 Damit verbunden ist der Einwand gegen die scharfe Trennung von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, so wie derjenige gegen die darin implizierte Mangelhaftigkeit in Kants Theorie der Sinnlichkeit: Da Sinnlichkeit aufgrund jener Trennung jeder Synthesis entbehrt, konne Kants Transzendentale Asthetik nicht als eine selbststandige Theorie der Wahrnehmung betrachtet werden.
In this chapter, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality are furt... more In this chapter, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality are further discussed in relation to the constitution of the spatio-temporal thing. The stratification in this context can be traced back to the foundational relationship between the constitution of res temporalis and of res extensa. The analogies concern specific aspects of the constitution of the spatial and the temporal thing. It is argued that such an inquiry is based upon an abstracting procedure that aims at isolating, for the sake of description, the spatial dimension from the temporal dimension. The outcomes of the present chapter further emphasize the limits of a mere analogical and parallel account of spatial and temporal constitution. First, the claim that we can properly consider temporal objects apart from their spatial localization is questioned. Secondly, it is argued that the constitution of the spatial thing implies temporal syntheses, so that, whenever abstracting from temporality, we can only provide an incomplete description of spatial constitution. Thirdly, the abstracting procedure does not allow us to account for the constitution of tridimensional space. For, being based upon movement, this constitution requires both spatiality and temporality.
In this chapter the specificity of the phenomenological approach to spatiality and temporality is... more In this chapter the specificity of the phenomenological approach to spatiality and temporality is discussed. In both respects, Husserl’s analyses aim to fulfill two basic tasks, namely: (1) to describe the a priori structure of spatial and temporal experience; and (2) to analyze the constitution of both lived and objective space and time. The analysis of Husserl’s texts shows how both parallelism and stratification characterize the phenomenological approach to the pivotal questions concerning the intuitiveness and the constitution of time and space. Through the discussion of the analogies between the phenomenology of spatiality and temporality, both the potentialities and the limits of such a parallel account are discussed. This critical discussion allows us to already introduce the necessary co-reference or interweaving of both dimensions.
In this final chapter, we summarize the state of the art concerning the research on body memory i... more In this final chapter, we summarize the state of the art concerning the research on body memory in phenomenology, in the cognitive sciences, and in embodied therapies. Thereby, we show the impact of the studies collected in this volume for the development of the research in these three fields. Firstly, we consider the contributions from the cognitive sciences and from embodied therapies from a phenomenological standpoint. Secondly, we show how the present volume contributes to the current debate on memory in the cognitive sciences. Thirdly, we discuss the relevance of body memory with selected populations from the perspective of embodied therapies. And finally, we conclude with the most important points of this book.
Our experience of many – if not most – situations, of other people, and of ourselves is shaped by... more Our experience of many – if not most – situations, of other people, and of ourselves is shaped by emotions. We greet someone with joy or surprise, we feel shame because of our casual outfit in an official meeting, we are annoyed if someone comes too close, we have a somewhat melancholic mood entering a cemetery, etc. In these and similar situations, emotions and feelings are typically not simple add-ons to an otherwise emotionally neutral experience. Rather, emotions make up our experience of that given situation. It is often through emotions that we become aware of what matters and what is more or less significant to us, as well as of what we are concerned and care about.
How emotions shape our experience is not always straightforward and clear. They stand out as particular kinds of experiences that overcome us: we do not decide to feel embarrassed or joyful in a certain situation, it rather happens to us to feel this way. But even when we feel passively arising emotions, we can and often do recognize and appreciate their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Some feelings may seem understandable. Sometimes it seems we shouldn’t enact and embody the feelings that accrue in us. Such an assessment is often understood as deriving from a form of cognitive reflection: we think about our emotional experience and find it more or less matching with our judgment. However, this cognitive and rationalizing assessment and ex-post evaluation does not seem to be the only way in which we appreciate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of our emotions. In fact, even while undergoing an emotional experience, we may develop feelings that tell us our immediate emotional response is inappropriate. Such a feeling of inappropriateness is indeed what gets us to reflect on our emotional experiences and their reasons or motives. Emotional experience itself, in other words, seems to bear a sui generis, non-cognitive reflexive structure in which a primal and weak sense of normativity is rooted.
Questions related to the normativity of emotions are of crucial importance in contemporary ethics. Unlike the strong normativity of imperatives, the normativity of emotions is weak to the extent that it relies on a felt sense of appropriateness, which is also culturally conditioned and which precedes explicit justification. The discussion of the relation between ethical demands and the weak normativity of emotions would profit from an inquiry into the briefly sketched primal structure of reflexivity in emotional experience. Are approval and disapproval of emotional experience cognitive in nature? And is the reflexivity of emotion grounded in cognitive activity? Or is it more accurate to understand approval and disapproval of emotional experience in purely affective terms? Should we, in the end, look for the sources of normativity within emotional life itself?
The aim of this workshop is to examine the intentional structures underlying these forms of reflexive weak normativity, which are intrinsic to the experience of emotions, as well as their ethical and social implications. Topics for contributions include, but are not limited to: the structure of emotional reflexivity, the specific kind of normativity of approval and disapproval, specific emotions that bring such weak normativity to the fore, the ethical relevance of this kind of reflexivity, the way in which such reflexivity contribute to shaping oneself and one’s interpersonal relationships, etc.
et al. – Ein Blog für phänomenologische Philosophie
Ab sofort ist ein neuer Blog online, zu find... more et al. – Ein Blog für phänomenologische Philosophie
et al. versteht sich als ein Forum, das Debatten und Ereignisse sowie Theorie und Praxis phänomenologischer Forschung sichtbar macht.
Unter den Menüpunkten Reflexion, Kooperation und Information finden sich alle wichtigen Informationen rund um die Disziplin. Neben einer Landkarte, einem Archiv der Porträts und allen Infos rund um Stellen, Neuerscheinungen oder Calls findet man auf et al. zudem (multimediale) Beiträge wie Videos, Audios und Texte. Schaut euch um, denn es ist schon einiges hochgeladen!
Unterstützt wird et al. unter anderem von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung (DGPF) und den Open Commons of Phenomenology (www.ophen.org).
Our experience of many – if not most – situations, of other people, and of ourselves is shaped by... more Our experience of many – if not most – situations, of other people, and of ourselves is shaped by emotions. We greet someone with joy or surprise, we feel shame because of our casual outfit in an official meeting, we are annoyed if someone comes too close, we have a somewhat melancholic mood entering a cemetery, etc. In these and similar situations, emotions and feelings are typically not simple add-ons to an otherwise emotionally neutral experience. Rather, emotions make up our experience of that given situation. It is often through emotions that we become aware of what matters and what is more or less significant to us, as well as of what we are concerned and care about.
How emotions shape our experience is not always straightforward and clear. They stand out as particular kinds of experiences that overcome us: we do not decide to feel embarrassed or joyful in a certain situation, it rather happens to us to feel this way. But even when we feel passively arising emotions, we can and often do recognize and appreciate their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Some feelings may seem understandable. Sometimes it seems we shouldn’t enact and embody the feelings that accrue in us. Such an assessment is often understood as deriving from a form of cognitive reflection: we think about our emotional experience and find it more or less matching with our judgment. However, this cognitive and rationalizing assessment and ex-post evaluation does not seem to be the only way in which we appreciate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of our emotions. In fact, even while undergoing an emotional experience, we may develop feelings that tell us our immediate emotional response is inappropriate. Such a feeling of inappropriateness is indeed what gets us to reflect on our emotional experiences and their reasons or motives. Emotional experience itself, in other words, seems to bear a sui generis, non-cognitive reflexive structure in which a primal and weak sense of normativity is rooted.
Questions related to the normativity of emotions are of crucial importance in contemporary ethics. Unlike the strong normativity of imperatives, the normativity of emotions is weak to the extent that it relies on a felt sense of appropriateness, which is also culturally conditioned and which precedes explicit justification. The discussion of the relation between ethical demands and the weak normativity of emotions would profit from an inquiry into the briefly sketched primal structure of reflexivity in emotional experience. Are approval and disapproval of emotional experience cognitive in nature? And is the reflexivity of emotion grounded in cognitive activity? Or is it more accurate to understand approval and disapproval of emotional experience in purely affective terms? Should we, in the end, look for the sources of normativity within emotional life itself?
The aim of this workshop is to examine the intentional structures underlying these forms of reflexive weak normativity, which are intrinsic to the experience of emotions, as well as their ethical and social implications. Topics for contributions include, but are not limited to: the structure of emotional reflexivity, the specific kind of normativity of approval and disapproval, specific emotions that bring such weak normativity to the fore, the ethical relevance of this kind of reflexivity, the way in which such reflexivity contribute to shaping oneself and one’s interpersonal relationships, etc.
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How emotions shape our experience is not always straightforward and clear. They stand out as particular kinds of experiences that overcome us: we do not decide to feel embarrassed or joyful in a certain situation, it rather happens to us to feel this way. But even when we feel passively arising emotions, we can and often do recognize and appreciate their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Some feelings may seem understandable. Sometimes it seems we shouldn’t enact and embody the feelings that accrue in us. Such an assessment is often understood as deriving from a form of cognitive reflection: we think about our emotional experience and find it more or less matching with our judgment. However, this cognitive and rationalizing assessment and ex-post evaluation does not seem to be the only way in which we appreciate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of our emotions. In fact, even while undergoing an emotional experience, we may develop feelings that tell us our immediate emotional response is inappropriate. Such a feeling of inappropriateness is indeed what gets us to reflect on our emotional experiences and their reasons or motives. Emotional experience itself, in other words, seems to bear a sui generis, non-cognitive reflexive structure in which a primal and weak sense of normativity is rooted.
Questions related to the normativity of emotions are of crucial importance in contemporary ethics. Unlike the strong normativity of imperatives, the normativity of emotions is weak to the extent that it relies on a felt sense of appropriateness, which is also culturally conditioned and which precedes explicit justification. The discussion of the relation between ethical demands and the weak normativity of emotions would profit from an inquiry into the briefly sketched primal structure of reflexivity in emotional experience. Are approval and disapproval of emotional experience cognitive in nature? And is the reflexivity of emotion grounded in cognitive activity? Or is it more accurate to understand approval and disapproval of emotional experience in purely affective terms? Should we, in the end, look for the sources of normativity within emotional life itself?
The aim of this workshop is to examine the intentional structures underlying these forms of reflexive weak normativity, which are intrinsic to the experience of emotions, as well as their ethical and social implications. Topics for contributions include, but are not limited to: the structure of emotional reflexivity, the specific kind of normativity of approval and disapproval, specific emotions that bring such weak normativity to the fore, the ethical relevance of this kind of reflexivity, the way in which such reflexivity contribute to shaping oneself and one’s interpersonal relationships, etc.
Ab sofort ist ein neuer Blog online, zu finden unter: www.et-al.ophen.org
et al. versteht sich als ein Forum, das Debatten und Ereignisse sowie Theorie und Praxis phänomenologischer Forschung sichtbar macht.
Unter den Menüpunkten Reflexion, Kooperation und Information finden sich alle wichtigen Informationen rund um die Disziplin. Neben einer Landkarte, einem Archiv der Porträts und allen Infos rund um Stellen, Neuerscheinungen oder Calls findet man auf et al. zudem (multimediale) Beiträge wie Videos, Audios und Texte. Schaut euch um, denn es ist schon einiges hochgeladen!
Unterstützt wird et al. unter anderem von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung (DGPF) und den Open Commons of Phenomenology (www.ophen.org).
Zu finden ist der Blog auch auf Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/phaenomenologie
How emotions shape our experience is not always straightforward and clear. They stand out as particular kinds of experiences that overcome us: we do not decide to feel embarrassed or joyful in a certain situation, it rather happens to us to feel this way. But even when we feel passively arising emotions, we can and often do recognize and appreciate their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Some feelings may seem understandable. Sometimes it seems we shouldn’t enact and embody the feelings that accrue in us. Such an assessment is often understood as deriving from a form of cognitive reflection: we think about our emotional experience and find it more or less matching with our judgment. However, this cognitive and rationalizing assessment and ex-post evaluation does not seem to be the only way in which we appreciate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of our emotions. In fact, even while undergoing an emotional experience, we may develop feelings that tell us our immediate emotional response is inappropriate. Such a feeling of inappropriateness is indeed what gets us to reflect on our emotional experiences and their reasons or motives. Emotional experience itself, in other words, seems to bear a sui generis, non-cognitive reflexive structure in which a primal and weak sense of normativity is rooted.
Questions related to the normativity of emotions are of crucial importance in contemporary ethics. Unlike the strong normativity of imperatives, the normativity of emotions is weak to the extent that it relies on a felt sense of appropriateness, which is also culturally conditioned and which precedes explicit justification. The discussion of the relation between ethical demands and the weak normativity of emotions would profit from an inquiry into the briefly sketched primal structure of reflexivity in emotional experience. Are approval and disapproval of emotional experience cognitive in nature? And is the reflexivity of emotion grounded in cognitive activity? Or is it more accurate to understand approval and disapproval of emotional experience in purely affective terms? Should we, in the end, look for the sources of normativity within emotional life itself?
The aim of this workshop is to examine the intentional structures underlying these forms of reflexive weak normativity, which are intrinsic to the experience of emotions, as well as their ethical and social implications. Topics for contributions include, but are not limited to: the structure of emotional reflexivity, the specific kind of normativity of approval and disapproval, specific emotions that bring such weak normativity to the fore, the ethical relevance of this kind of reflexivity, the way in which such reflexivity contribute to shaping oneself and one’s interpersonal relationships, etc.