Journal articles by Charles Kirchofer
Israel has long used cumulative deterrence-by-denial to deter aggression from state and non-state... more Israel has long used cumulative deterrence-by-denial to deter aggression from state and non-state actors alike. To achieve this, it has combined other measures, including deterrence-by-punishment and compellence, both at the tactical level. It has also compelled actors it can attack directly to clamp down on non-state actors more difficult to target in what is commonly known as " indirect deterrence. " Israel's relative success in this suggests that cumulative deterrence may be used as a conflict management tool that can encourage conditions for finding more permanent political solutions to long-term confrontations. Israel's case also demonstrates the usefulness of a consistent, long-term strategy for managing non-state threats. Finally, it suggests that conflicts may be managed for extended periods with mostly military means, though such means can only assist in laying the groundwork for conflict resolution. The US and its allies could benefit from the judicious application of Israel's deterrence lessons as they seek ways to manage conflicts that appear intractable or too costly to attempt to resolve today.
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There is little consensus among scholars on whether targeted killings of members of terrorist and... more There is little consensus among scholars on whether targeted killings of members of terrorist and militant groups work, though some have argued that they do, at least under certain circumstances. Most of the work so far has focused on the ability of targeted killings to disrupt targeted groups’ ability to function. In many cases, work has centered on whether they work and not addressed how they work if they do. There has been insufficient study of the coercive effects of targeted killings and these studies have often produced mixed results, with violence sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing after targeted strikes. This article argues that the focus on disruption and a failure to differentiate between deterrence and compellence and properly to account for the timing of attacks may be at least partly to blame for the mixed record observed from the use of targeted killings. It asserts that targeted killings are inherently compellent and can therefore only be used to change a status quo and potentially establish new “rules of the game.” They cannot be used to deter (i.e. to maintain current rules). Taking this into account could shed new light on discussions of the appropriateness of targeted killings in given situations and their effectiveness overall.
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At its core, deterrence is a mechanism that allows a defender to bring the interests of an attack... more At its core, deterrence is a mechanism that allows a defender to bring the interests of an attacker or would-be attacker in line with its own. The idea of Israel aligning its interests with Hamas may seem odd, but as Thomas Schelling pointed out in 1960, deterrence and coercive diplomacy are possible only when the parties in question share some interests. For example, both Israel and Hamas seek to survive and Hamas aspires to maintain its control over Gaza and remain politically relevant. Israel can threaten to harm those interests if Hamas attacks. The effect of such threats is that if Hamas wishes to protect the factors upon which its survival and political relevancy depend, it must abandon or devalue others, such as its interest in attacking Israel. Deterrence and coercive diplomacy are tools for making “agreements work when trust and good faith are lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of contract.”1 Throughout the history of Israel's confrontation with Hamas, alignments of interests have led to periods of calm. Many of these have been depressingly short, however. A divergence of interests between Israel, Hamas, and/or the PLO was always to blame for flare-ups, and some ways this may be avoidable will be suggested here, particularly since Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007.
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Newspaper and hosted blog articles by Charles Kirchofer
Today’s shooting attack presents Israel with three choices. None of them is likely to lead to imm... more Today’s shooting attack presents Israel with three choices. None of them is likely to lead to immediate relief from violence, but only one of them doesn’t risk following the terrorists’ playbook.
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For the first time in a decade, the idea of generalised strikes, riots, protests, and violence es... more For the first time in a decade, the idea of generalised strikes, riots, protests, and violence escalating to “intifada” proportions looks entirely plausible. Escalation by Israel, and Hamas in Gaza, looks likely
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Contribution (on the Madrid train bombings) to an article on 20 world-changing terror attacks.
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If the kidnapping of three Israeli teens was not planned centrally by Hamas, Israel's response to... more If the kidnapping of three Israeli teens was not planned centrally by Hamas, Israel's response to it risks unnecessary escalation.
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Book Reviews by Charles Kirchofer
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Talks by Charles Kirchofer
Talk at a Medsin short course in global health on migration and health at King's College London's... more Talk at a Medsin short course in global health on migration and health at King's College London's medical school. It discusses how the divisions within Syria society have long existed and were exacerbated by its history in the 20th century, including under French mandatory rule an an unstable initial period of independence following WWII.
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Spoke with intelligence analysts at the US Joint Analysis Center at RAF Molesworth about Israel's... more Spoke with intelligence analysts at the US Joint Analysis Center at RAF Molesworth about Israel's most recent war in Gaza and its prospects for future deterrence of Hamas, along with a discussion of ways out of the crisis.
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Conference Presentations by Charles Kirchofer
Has Israel attempted to deter Hamas? Are there signs that it has worked? How does Israel manage c... more Has Israel attempted to deter Hamas? Are there signs that it has worked? How does Israel manage contradictions
between deterrence and other approaches? Would a settlement leading to a two-state solution undermine deterrence and lead to violence?
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There has been much discussion of states deterring terrorists, but to terrorists deter states? A ... more There has been much discussion of states deterring terrorists, but to terrorists deter states? A discussion on the beginning of research, before it took a different course.
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Other by Charles Kirchofer
This thesis aimed to discover if non-recognition helps to pave the way for the use of harsher mea... more This thesis aimed to discover if non-recognition helps to pave the way for the use of harsher measures, in this case comprehensive economic sanctions and/or armed intervention (henceforth termed intervention”). To find out, interactions between the United States and other countries from 1945 through the middle of 2010 were studied using a mixture of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in chapter II, followed by comparative case studies in chapters III through V. In addition to recognition, other conditions possibly contributing to intervention decisions were also studied in an attempt to determine which, if any, were important factors in explaining the decision by the United States Government to intervene against a given foreign state or territory. The QCA did not find any connection between recognition and intervention. The QCA did suggest that whether or not a country was a democracy and whether it had good relations with the United States were important factors. Recognition wa...
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All attacks by Hamas on Israelis up through 2014. Includes attacks on military targets except for... more All attacks by Hamas on Israelis up through 2014. Includes attacks on military targets except for during Israeli invasions of Gaza (which I do not class as "terror" attacks). For the full database in .odb (OpenOffice) format, please visit www.hamasterrordatabase.com . NOTE: Use the incident ID to find the source(s) in the separate "source" file. Sorry for the inconvenience.
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Papers by Charles Kirchofer
Defence Studies, 2015
Page 1. International Aviation and Terrorism Evolving threats, evolving security John Harrison Po... more Page 1. International Aviation and Terrorism Evolving threats, evolving security John Harrison Political Violence Page 2. International Aviation and Terrorism This book examines terrorism's impact on the international aviation ...
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Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Sep 2, 2015
At its core, deterrence is a mechanism that allows a defender to bring the interests of an attack... more At its core, deterrence is a mechanism that allows a defender to bring the interests of an attacker or would-be attacker in line with its own. The idea of Israel aligning its interests with Hamas may seem odd, but as Thomas Schelling pointed out in 1960, deterrence and coercive diplomacy are possible only when the parties in question share some interests. For example, both Israel and Hamas seek to survive and Hamas aspires to maintain its control over Gaza and remain politically relevant. Israel can threaten to harm those interests if Hamas attacks. The effect of such threats is that if Hamas wishes to protect the factors upon which its survival and political relevancy depend, it must abandon or devalue others, such as its interest in attacking Israel. Deterrence and coercive diplomacy are tools for making “agreements work when trust and good faith are lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of contract.” Throughout the history of Israel’s confrontation with Hamas, alignments of interests have led to periods of calm. Many of these have been depressingly short, however. A divergence of interests between Israel, Hamas, and/or the PLO was always to blame for flare-ups, and some ways this may be avoidable will be suggested here, particularly since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007.
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Deterrence has played a large role in Israel’s management of its conflict with Hamas throughout t... more Deterrence has played a large role in Israel’s management of its conflict with Hamas throughout three distinct periods (1987-2000, 2000-2007, 2007-present). To accomplish deterrence against an actor that has varied in form across distinct periods with different political contexts, it has utilized myriad forms of deterrence, some of which are not part of the everyday deterrence vocabulary elsewhere. After initial instability, each of the three distinct periods has so far featured extended periods of calm following Israeli tactical shifts and the establishment of new deterrence relationships. The shifts between periods themselves, however, have led relatively stable deterrence relationships previously established to collapse or become irrelevant. Explaining these shifts and illuminating the operation of deterrence during each of these periods is an integral part of the first aim of this thesis and is a primary focus of its body chapters. Israel’s myriad tactical successes have not thu...
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Journal articles by Charles Kirchofer
Newspaper and hosted blog articles by Charles Kirchofer
Book Reviews by Charles Kirchofer
Talks by Charles Kirchofer
Conference Presentations by Charles Kirchofer
between deterrence and other approaches? Would a settlement leading to a two-state solution undermine deterrence and lead to violence?
Other by Charles Kirchofer
Papers by Charles Kirchofer
between deterrence and other approaches? Would a settlement leading to a two-state solution undermine deterrence and lead to violence?