Papers by Manolis Simos
ICON: Journal of the International Committee for the History of Technology 27, no 1 (2022): 97-116, 2022
This article provides an intellectual history of artif icial intelligence in the electronic era o... more This article provides an intellectual history of artif icial intelligence in the electronic era of computing, that is, from the postwar decades to the present. We argue for the existence of two periods; a first period, defined by the discourse of a post-industrial society and an information age, and a second one, characterised by the discourse of a fourth industrial revolution. Discourses of a post-industrial society and a fourth industrial revolution are constitutively related to discourses of computer automation, which, in turn, are defined by artificial intelligence. This paper provides a canvas of an intellectual history of artificial intelligence in the electronic era through the examination of discourses of this period on computer automation.
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Παρατηρήσεις πάνω σε μια Γενεαλογία του Φόβου. Στο "Υπερβαίνοντας τον Φόβο", Παναγιώτης Πάγκαλος και Σταύρος Αλιφραγκής (επιμέλεια), Παναγιώτης Καλδής (πρόλογος), Citylab και Πανεπιστήμιο Δυτικής Αττικής, 2022
Η γενεαλογία, όπως αυτή εμφανίζεται στο έργο του Michel Foucault, μπορεί να κατανοηθεί ως ένα είδ... more Η γενεαλογία, όπως αυτή εμφανίζεται στο έργο του Michel Foucault, μπορεί να κατανοηθεί ως ένα είδος κριτικής, ιστορικής έρευνας, η οποία αμφισβητεί την υποστασιοποίηση πραγμάτων και εννοιών ως ανιστορικών οντοτήτων. Στο κείμενο αυτό διερευνάται η δυνατότητα μιας γενεαλογίας των συναισθημάτων και, ειδικότερα, του φόβου, και εξετάζεται ο τρόπος με τον οποίο αυτός συγκροτείται ιστορικά και κοινωνικά. Εξετάζεται η ιδέα ότι όχι μόνο οι εκφάνσεις και αναπαραστάσεις του φόβου, τα πράγματα που τον προκαλούν, και οι θεωρίες σχετικά με αυτόν διαφοροποιούνται από εποχή σε εποχή, αλλά ότι και το ίδιο το περιεχόμενο της εμπειρίας του φόβου είναι ιστορικά τόσο διαφορετικό ώστε να μην μπορεί να θεωρηθεί ότι διατηρεί διαχρονικά την ταυτότητά του.
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David Goodman and Matthew Clemente (eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity, and Technology, 2022
Narratives of the 19th century French ‘fantastique’, from Théophile Gauthier’s Avatar (1856) to G... more Narratives of the 19th century French ‘fantastique’, from Théophile Gauthier’s Avatar (1856) to Guy de Maupassant’s “Le Horla” (1887), can be understood in terms of a double characteristic: first, they attempt to renegotiate or, better, overcome the mind-body dualism in favour of a holistic view of the self, and, second, they offer avant la lettre literary explorations of the unconscious. Namely, concerning the latter, narratives involving automata, mesmerism, ghost apparitions, possessions, and variations of madness can be considered as attempts to circumscribe and talk about a region beyond—commonly understood and scientifically investigated—consciousness.
In this paper, I focus on Auguste de Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s last novel “L’Ève future” (1886) and his shorter contes that involve the constitutive presence of scientific ideas and technological configurations, like “Le secret de l’ancienne musique” (1878) and “Le secret de l’échafaud” (1883). Characteristically, in his novel, the inventor Thomas Edison appears to attempt to cure his friend’s, Lord Ewald’s, love for the singer Alicia Clary—whose uncanny disjunction between her beauty and her personality has haunted Ewald—by creating an automaton in which the physical appearance of Alicia would be combined with a matching intellect. In this context, Villiers’ imagery seems to meet Peter Sloterdijk’s insights. According to Sloterdijk, the constitutively efficient machine is the—always having been needed—extension of the constitutively imperfect human body. To the extent that the history of modernity can be conceived as a history of narcissistic traumas, of displacements of man’s privileged position in nature, the first three well-known traumas—Copernican heliocentrism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian unconscious—presuppose the conceptualization of the human in terms of machine.
In this paper, I explore a series of interrelated themes. First, I investigate whether this mechanized view of the self is embraced or approached critically, and the way the overcoming of the mind-body dualism is instantiated. Second, I explore the way in which unconscious elements appear irreducible to corporal and mechanical aspects of the self. Third, most importantly, I show that Villiers can be understood to pre-empt and be critical of a metaphysical, that is, ahistorical and hypostatised, conception of the unconscious. Namely, focusing on Villiers’ critique of technoscientific reductionism, and the narrative tropes he employs, I argue for a pragmatist version of an unconscious structure. I explore the extent to which Villiers can be understood to belong to the pragmatist tradition, in accordance with Richard Rorty’s conception of a mechanized qua demetaphysicalized self in which the unconscious is conceived as “an alternative set” of beliefs and desires, a kind of “conversational partner” that enables ethical “self-enrichment”.
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8th Mediterranean Congress for Aesthetics. Aesthetics of Everyday Life in Contemporary Cities. Conference proceedings, 2021
It would not be an exaggeration to say that questions like ‘how to live one’s life’ or ‘what a go... more It would not be an exaggeration to say that questions like ‘how to live one’s life’ or ‘what a good life is’ are rarely raised in contemporary philosophical discourse, and whenever they are, they are approached in terms of a Kantian, utilitarian, or virtue ethics perspective. Despite their ostensive differences, however, these approaches formulate a dominant theoretical discourse that eliminates concrete human experience, reducing it to universalist claims and values that are, in turn, grounded in ahistorical notions and entities.
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
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Philosophical Inquiries, 2021
In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and phil... more In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical philosophy of science” and “philosophical history of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical philosophy of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim to maintain a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.
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Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, 2018
In this paper, I attempt to argue for a different kind of philosophical discourse. Namely, I deli... more In this paper, I attempt to argue for a different kind of philosophical discourse. Namely, I delineate a philosophical approach that can be defined in opposition to traditional philosophy, conceived as a more or less ahistorical and transcendental inquiry. According to this approach, exemplified in the thought of Richard Rorty, the different ontological and epistemological claims of philosophy are nothing but variations of the same metaphysical themes, constitutive of its very tradition. In order to present and argue for this point, I show how Rorty's nominalist, conceptualist, and particularistic stance can be better understood in light of Raymond Geuss' and Ian Hacking's two metaphilosophical schemas. I also attempt to show how certain conceptual tensions that seem to emerge from the use of these schemas for understanding Rorty's stance, can contribute to the critique of philosophy traditionally conceived.
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Gavagai, 2017
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Cogito, 2005
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Conference presentations (selection) by Manolis Simos
8th Mediterranean Congress for Aesthetics: Aesthetics of Everyday Life in Contemporary Cities, 9–11 September, 2021
It would not be an exaggeration to say that questions like ‘how to live one’s life’ or ‘what a go... more It would not be an exaggeration to say that questions like ‘how to live one’s life’ or ‘what a good life is’ are rarely raised in contemporary philosophical discourse, and whenever they are, they are approached in terms of a Kantian, utilitarian, or virtue ethics perspective. Despite their ostensive differences, however, these approaches formulate a dominant theoretical discourse that eliminates concrete human experience, reducing it to universalist claims and values that are, in turn, grounded in ahistorical notions and entities.
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
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The Society for Philosophy and Technology Conference, Lille, 28—30 June, 2021
Peter Sloterdijk’s philosophy of technology can be understood in terms of a naturalized reinterpr... more Peter Sloterdijk’s philosophy of technology can be understood in terms of a naturalized reinterpretation of Heidegger’s history of Being. In light of this reinterpretation, Sloterdijk depicts the future in transhumanist terms. Specifically, in his imagery of ‘cybernetic modernity’, the constitutively efficient machine is the—always having been needed—extension of the constitutively imperfect human body. According to this imagery, the history of modernity is conceived as a history of narcissistic traumas, of displacements of man’s privileged position in nature. Sloterdijk argues that the first three well-known traumas—Copernican heliocentrism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian unconscious—presuppose the conceptualisation of the human in terms of machine. Finally, this historical development is underpinned by a specific mechanism, namely, the disposition of the mechanical engineer to demystify nature, traumatizing, thus, the non-engineers she enlightens.
A critical discussion of Sloterdijk’s schema is attempted. First, I show in which way Sloterdijk adopts an essentialist philosophy of technology, conceiving technology as metaphysically autonomous. Specifically, I argue that his conception of technology can be understood in terms of Ian Hacking’s ‘styles of scientific reasoning’, and his essentialism in terms of inevitabilism. Second, in light of the above, I show that Sloterdijk’s inevitabilism is grounded in a specific conception of Hegel’s notion of struggle for recognition. Third, I present, from a Nietzschean and pragmatist perspective, the reasons why such a metaphysical stance is problematic, and explore the way in which Sloterdijk’s essayistic approach can be interpreted to neutralise these metaphysical commitments.
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Pragmatism and the Analytic-Continental Split, Sheffield, 9–11 August, 2017
According to Richard Rorty’s pragmatist stance, philosophy, traditionally conceived, constitutes ... more According to Richard Rorty’s pragmatist stance, philosophy, traditionally conceived, constitutes a dominant discourse of theoretical inquiry that reduces concrete reality in universal and ahistorical entities. Despite any ostensible differences and proclamations of the opposite, philosophy should be understood as fundamentally identified with essentialist metaphysics, and the versions it (diachronically and synchronically) assumes as variations of this metaphysical stance.
Thus, modern philosophy is understood to appear in two variations. The first is that of Cartesian metaphysics, and can be conceived, in a somehow simplified way, in terms of a triple thesis involving a sharp distinction between mind and world, a relation of representation between the two, and the grounding of this relation in an ahistorical subject. The second variation is that of Hegelian metaphysics, and despite the fact that it constitutes a critique of the Cartesian viewpoint, it shares with the latter the same metaphysical structure. Put in an equally simplified way, subject and world are replaced by a series of successive discourses produced by history. The fact that history is governed by ahistorical reason indicates that the Hegelian viewpoint can be seen as the replacement of one set of metaphysical categories with another.
According to this approach, both branches of analytic and continental philosophy, however defined and under whatever form of inquiry they appear, suggesting either an ahistorical conception of subject as condition of possibility of human experience, or an ahistorical conception of reason as condition of understanding of historical reality, belong to the same metaphysical tradition. Thus, Rorty’s pragmatist stance can be seen to overcome the analytic-continental split through the critique of both branches as metaphysical.
The present paper approaches this issue in a twofold way. First, I analyse Rorty’s thought. I attempt to show the way in which it constitutes a historicist nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance, and a critical discourse that can undermine and overcome philosophy traditionally conceived. Second, I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of this stance, and attempt to show in which way representative, contemporary, metaphilosophical approaches that argue for an (even minimal) idea of progress in philosophy are undermined as metaphysical. Specifically, I focus on Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea of the possibility of rational choice between rival philosophical paradigms, and argue that his idea that incommensurability does not preclude comparability is underpinned by specific metaphysical realist commitments concerning meaning and reference. Rorty’s idea of philosophy as either conversation or Geistesgeschichte provides the diagnosis and therapy of this metaphilosophical picture.
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XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, University of Athens, August, 2013
In this paper, I attempt to argue for a different kind of philosophical discourse. Namely, I deli... more In this paper, I attempt to argue for a different kind of philosophical discourse. Namely, I delineate a philosophical approach that can be defined in opposition to traditional philosophy, conceived as a more or less ahistorical and transcendental inquiry. According to this approach, exemplified in the thought of Richard Rorty, the different ontological and epistemological claims of philosophy are nothing but variations of the same metaphysical themes, constitutive of its very tradition. In order to present and argue for this point, I show how Rorty’s nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance can be better understood in light of Raymond Geuss’ and Ian Hacking’s two metaphilosophical schemas. I also attempt to show how certain conceptual tensions that seem to emerge from the use of these schemas for understanding Rorty’s stance, can contribute to the critique of philosophy traditionally conceived.
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Centre for Cultural Studies Research, University of East London, 8–9 September, 2011
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IASPIS Konstnärsnämnden. The Swedish Arts Grants Committee Stockholm, 3–5 September, 2009
Michel Foucault’s work can be considered a series of genealogical investigations which challenge ... more Michel Foucault’s work can be considered a series of genealogical investigations which challenge the hypostatisation of concepts as non-historical entities and the consideration of methodological approaches as unique devices of tracking metaphysically objective truths, and which expose them as social and historical constructs. The function of genealogical analysis is based on the critical replacement of the theoretical model of sovereignty with a different conception of power as a dynamic nexus of forces which forms and permeates the whole social body. According to this conception, power constitutes the condition of production of discourses of knowledge, while, in turn, the produced systems of truth enhance and extend power.
This paper shows how the psychological and psychiatric constitution of the concept of individual abnormality is combined with the biological constitution of the concept of population, and its medicalisation and regularisation, forming, thus, the conditions of possibility of racism. Furthermore, the paper presents the critical impact of the above investigations to contemporary political theory conceived as a form of governing rationality. Finally, it shows how these concrete analyses formulate and enrich Foucault’s Nietzschean methodological premises.
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Nietzsche on Mind and Nature, 17th International Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, September, 2009
Michel Foucault’s work can be considered a series of genealogical investigations which challenge ... more Michel Foucault’s work can be considered a series of genealogical investigations which challenge the hypostatisation of concepts as ahistorical entities and the consideration of methodological approaches as unique devices of tracking metaphysically objective truths, and which expose them as social and historical constructs. This paper analyses Foucault’s interpretative reception of Nietzsche’s concept and practice of genealogy, and examines Foucault’s own genealogical investigation as a historical critique of fundamental psychological concepts.
In Foucault’s exegesis of Nietzschean genealogy in his 1971 essay “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire”, genealogy as the historical recording of different, dispersed and singular events is conceived as opposed to and critical of the metahistorical essentialist and teleological metaphysics. In his series of lectures «Il faut défendre la société», “Society must be defended”, at the Collège de France (1975–1976), Foucault seems to elaborate further on the methodology of genealogical investigation in order for it to be used in the context of his own historical inquiries. The diagnostic criterion of genealogy is now rendered in terms of political power-effect and the critical function of genealogy is orientated in a concrete way towards specific discursive formations. These considerations inform Foucault’s analytical tools. The theoretical model of sovereignty is critically replaced from a different conception of power as a dynamic nexus of forces which forms and permeates the whole social body. According to this conception, power constitutes the condition of production of discourses of knowledge, while, in turn, the produced systems of truth enhance and extend power.
This paper examines the coherence of Foucault’s reception of the concept of genealogy, the justification of the genealogical project in political terms and the extent to which genealogy can be conceived in terms of an internalist critique. It focuses on the example of Foucault’s own genealogy as critique of fundamental psychological concepts, as undertaken in his Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976). Specifically, the Foucauldian genealogy shows how certain identified ensembles of knowledge are characterised by the threefold process of the implantation of a sexual attribution, the acknowledgement of a pathological parameter, and their placement in the nexus of social relations, which takes place in a series of historical instances. The paper reconstructs and explains, with reference to the above methodological considerations, the way this genealogy functions, and gestures towards a reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy in the light of Foucault’s reception.
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Philosophy and/as Literature Conference, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, 5–6 May , 2009
In his work "The Art of Living" (1999) Alexander Nehamas discusses the tradition of the philosoph... more In his work "The Art of Living" (1999) Alexander Nehamas discusses the tradition of the philosophy of the art of living which attempts the creation of an admired philosophical life through the organisation of philosophical views in a coherent whole. Nehamas distinguishes between a universalist art of living, according to which a single mode of life is displayed and suggested as good for all, and a non-universalist, individualist one. He examines the latter version and explains how Montaigne, Nietzsche and Foucault belong to and inform that philosophical tradition. The individualist art of living constitutes both a philosophical and a literary enterprise. It is philosophical since “the content and nature of the self created […] depends on holding views on issues that have traditionally been considered philosophical” (ibid.: 3), and since a life which examines the issue of how a life should be lived constitutes a philosophical life. Equally, it is literary since the interconnection among one’s philosophical views is not only a matter of logic but also a matter of style. Style is the creative matter which preserves the necessary psychological and interpretative coherence for the created self. Thus, the model for the construction of an individual is that of the literary character. The literary element and the above notion of ‘the creation of an admired philosophical life’ indicate the aestheticist orientation of the self-fashioning project.
However, two possible difficulties could emerge. The first possible difficulty is twofold and it concerns the philosophical character of the individualist art of living. On the one hand, the engagement of the artist of living with a set of already formulated philosophical problems seems to compromise the individualist aspect of the enterprise. On the other hand, the self-referential aspect of the art of living could be considered to test the limits of its philosophical character. The second possible difficulty concerns the aestheticist character of the individualist art of living. The primacy of the aesthetic aspect over the epistemic and the moral could lead to counter-intuitive and self-refuting conclusions.
The paper constitutes an examination of these issues. The discussion of Richard Rorty’s approach to the construction of a philosophical life, and specifically both his attempt to reconcile the romantic urge of self-fashioning with moral intuitions, and his mapping of the philosophical discourse, enable the elucidation of Nehamas’ premises and the enrichment of his analysis, resolving thus the issues raised. Furthermore, Rorty’s views on truth accommodate Nehamas’ views on the matter, providing the grid for a more formal conceptualisation of the latter’s insights. Thus, these two complementary approaches can be considered to provide a metaphilosophical framework for approaching the philosophers of the art of living and similar instances of literary philosophy.
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Courses by Manolis Simos
Graduate course in "History and Philosophy of Science and Technology" and "Science, Technology, Society—Science and Technology Studies" Graduate Programmes, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Spring semester, 2021
Το μάθημα εξετάζει τη σχέση μεταξύ λογοτεχνίας, επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας, και διαρθρώνεται σε τέ... more Το μάθημα εξετάζει τη σχέση μεταξύ λογοτεχνίας, επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας, και διαρθρώνεται σε τέσσερις θεματικές ενότητες. Πρώτον, εξετάζεται η αναπαράσταση επιστημονικών ιδεών και τεχνολογιών σε συγκεκριμένα λογοτεχνικά έργα από τα τέλη του 18ου αιώνα μέχρι σήμερα. Δεύτερον, εξετάζονται μορφές ψηφιακής λογοτεχνίας, λογοτεχνικών έργων με συγκροτητική στην παραγωγή τους την παρουσία της ψηφιακής τεχνολογίας. Τρίτον, εξετάζεται η απόδοση σε ένα ορισμένο είδος μυθοπλαστικού λόγου του 19ου αιώνα του status της (οιονεί-)επιστημονικής, ψυχολογικής και κοινωνικής ανάλυσης (Zola, Maupassant, αδελφοί Goncourts). Τέλος, εξετάζεται η δυνατότητα κατανόησης της τεχνολογίας με όρους σημείων, και, κατ’ επέκταση, η δυνατότητα προσέγγισης της τεχνολογίας με όρους ερμηνευτικής.
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Graduate course in "History and Philosophy of Science and Technology" and "Basic and Applied Cognitive Science" Graduate Programmes, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Winter semester, 2020
The course constitutes an introduction to the philosophical investigation of technology. The fram... more The course constitutes an introduction to the philosophical investigation of technology. The framework of this investigation is defined by two interrelated, fundamental questions; the question concerning the neutrality of technological artifacts, and the question concerning whether technological development is determined by a logic inherent to technological systems. In the context of this framework, a series of approaches is examined. We examine phenomenological and postphenomenological approaches, and, specifically, the issue of the mediation of technology in the understanding of the world, and the issue of the co-shaping of humans and technologies. We examine constructivist approaches, according to which technology is contingently constituted, with historical and social elements being constitutive in the adoption of specific technologies. We examine the critique of the metaphysical presuppositions underpinning the distinction between human being and artifact, the possibility of understanding technology in terms of signs, and, thus, the possibility of approaching technology in terms of hermeneutics.
Το μάθημα αποτελεί εισαγωγή στη φιλοσοφική εξέταση της τεχνολογίας. Εξετάζονται τοποθετήσεις σε δύο θεμελιώδη ερωτήματα· στο ερώτημα της εγγενούς ή μη ουδετερότητας των υλικών διατάξεων, και στο ερώτημα της αναπόφευκτης εξέλιξης της τεχνολογίας, ή της ιστορικά ενδεχομενικής συγκρότησής της. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό διερευνάται μια σειρά προσεγγίσεων. Εξετάζονται κατασκευασιοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες κοινωνικές δεσμεύσεις φαίνεται να είναι καθοριστικές για την υιοθέτηση συγκεκριμένων τεχνολογιών. Εξετάζεται η κριτική στη μεταφυσική διάκριση μεταξύ υποκειμένου και αντικειμένου, από ανθρωπολογικές προσεγγίσεις. Εξετάζονται υστεροφαινομενολογικές προσεγγίσεις και, συγκεκριμένα, τα θέματα της συγκροτητικής διαμεσολάβησης της τεχνολογίας στην αντίληψη του κόσμου, και της δυνατότητας συνδιαμόρφωσης ανθρώπου και τεχνολογίας.
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Undergraduate course, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Spring semester, 2020
Το μάθημα συνιστά μια φιλοσοφική, θεωρητική, και ευρύτερη πολιτισμική διερεύνηση της ίδιας της φι... more Το μάθημα συνιστά μια φιλοσοφική, θεωρητική, και ευρύτερη πολιτισμική διερεύνηση της ίδιας της φιλοσοφικής δραστηριότητας. Συγκεκριμένα, αφορά την προβληματική της δυνατότητας κατανόησης της φιλοσοφίας ως αυτόνομης γνωστικής δραστηριότητας. Η προβληματική αυτή διερευνάται σε τέσσερις θεματικές ενότητες. Η πρώτη θεματική ενότητα αποτελεί την συζήτηση σύγχρονων φιλοσοφικών προσεγγίσεων της αναλυτικής και της ηπειρωτικής παράδοσης. Η δεύτερη θεματική ενότητα αφορά την σχέση της φιλοσοφίας με άλλους τομείς, και σε αυτό το πλαίσιο διερευνάται παραδειγματικά η σχέση μεταξύ φιλοσοφίας και λογοτεχνίας. Η τρίτη θεματική ενότητα αφορά τη σχέση μεταξύ της φιλοσοφίας και της ιστορίας της, και εστιάζει στο θέμα της ιστορικότητας των φιλοσοφικών προβλημάτων. Τέλος, η τέταρτη θεματική ενότητα αφορά τη συζήτηση σύγχρονων αντιφιλοσοφικών προσεγγίσεων, τουλάχιστον σύμφωνα με μια περισσότερο παραδοσιακή αντίληψη του φιλοσοφείν.
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Undergraduate course, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Winter semester 2019–2020, 2019
Το μάθημα αφορά τις θεωρητικές, φιλοσοφικές, αλλά και ευρύτερες πολιτισμικές προκείμενες και συνέ... more Το μάθημα αφορά τις θεωρητικές, φιλοσοφικές, αλλά και ευρύτερες πολιτισμικές προκείμενες και συνέπειες των κοινωνικών σπουδών της επιστήμης και της τεχνολογίας. Συγκεκριμένα, εστιάζει στο ιστοριογραφικό και φιλοσοφικό ρεύμα της κατασκευασιοκρατίας της επιστήμης και της τεχνολογίας.
Η κοινωνική κατασκευασιοκρατία μπορεί να κατανοηθεί, σε γενικές γραμμές, ως η ιδέα ότι τα πράγματα ή μέρος των πραγμάτων του φυσικού κόσμου είτε καθορίζονται αιτιακά από κοινωνικούς παράγοντες, είτε συγκροτούνται από αυτούς. Με άλλα λόγια, σύμφωνα με την ιδέα αυτή, οι περιγραφές του φυσικού κόσμου αποτελούν κι αυτές κατασκευές του λιγότερο ή περισσότερο ευρύτερου κοινωνικού πλαισίου εντός του οποίου διατυπώνονται.
Η ιδέα αυτή έχει συνέπειες για την αντίληψη που έχουμε για το πως είναι ο κόσμος (οντολογία), καθώς και για τη γνωστική μας σχέση με αυτόν (γνωσιολογία). Συγκεκριμένα, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται, η ύπαρξη πραγμάτων και γεγονότων μεταφυσικά ανεξάρτητων από το υποκείμενο της επιστημονικής γνώσης (αντιρεαλισμός). Επίσης, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας ως ανιστορικής γνωστικής λειτουργίας· αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας η οποία εγγυάται την ορθότητα και την αλήθεια των αναπαραστάσεών μας για τον φυσικό κόσμο καθοριζόμενη, σχεδόν αποκλειστικά, από αυτόν, ανεξάρτητη από τα πολιτισμικά συμφραζόμενα εντός των οποίων λειτουργεί.
Αναλυτικότερα, εξετάζονται η ιστορία, οι κριτικοί στόχοι, και το περιεχόμενο των κατασκευαστικών προσεγγίσεων τόσο στην αναλυτική όσο και στην ηπειρωτική παράδοση της ιστορίας και φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας. Συγκεκριμένα, τα μάθημα εστιάζει σε κοινωνιολογικές, ανθρωπολογικές και ιστορικές-γενεαλογικές προσεγγίσεις.
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Papers by Manolis Simos
In this paper, I focus on Auguste de Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s last novel “L’Ève future” (1886) and his shorter contes that involve the constitutive presence of scientific ideas and technological configurations, like “Le secret de l’ancienne musique” (1878) and “Le secret de l’échafaud” (1883). Characteristically, in his novel, the inventor Thomas Edison appears to attempt to cure his friend’s, Lord Ewald’s, love for the singer Alicia Clary—whose uncanny disjunction between her beauty and her personality has haunted Ewald—by creating an automaton in which the physical appearance of Alicia would be combined with a matching intellect. In this context, Villiers’ imagery seems to meet Peter Sloterdijk’s insights. According to Sloterdijk, the constitutively efficient machine is the—always having been needed—extension of the constitutively imperfect human body. To the extent that the history of modernity can be conceived as a history of narcissistic traumas, of displacements of man’s privileged position in nature, the first three well-known traumas—Copernican heliocentrism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian unconscious—presuppose the conceptualization of the human in terms of machine.
In this paper, I explore a series of interrelated themes. First, I investigate whether this mechanized view of the self is embraced or approached critically, and the way the overcoming of the mind-body dualism is instantiated. Second, I explore the way in which unconscious elements appear irreducible to corporal and mechanical aspects of the self. Third, most importantly, I show that Villiers can be understood to pre-empt and be critical of a metaphysical, that is, ahistorical and hypostatised, conception of the unconscious. Namely, focusing on Villiers’ critique of technoscientific reductionism, and the narrative tropes he employs, I argue for a pragmatist version of an unconscious structure. I explore the extent to which Villiers can be understood to belong to the pragmatist tradition, in accordance with Richard Rorty’s conception of a mechanized qua demetaphysicalized self in which the unconscious is conceived as “an alternative set” of beliefs and desires, a kind of “conversational partner” that enables ethical “self-enrichment”.
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
Conference presentations (selection) by Manolis Simos
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
A critical discussion of Sloterdijk’s schema is attempted. First, I show in which way Sloterdijk adopts an essentialist philosophy of technology, conceiving technology as metaphysically autonomous. Specifically, I argue that his conception of technology can be understood in terms of Ian Hacking’s ‘styles of scientific reasoning’, and his essentialism in terms of inevitabilism. Second, in light of the above, I show that Sloterdijk’s inevitabilism is grounded in a specific conception of Hegel’s notion of struggle for recognition. Third, I present, from a Nietzschean and pragmatist perspective, the reasons why such a metaphysical stance is problematic, and explore the way in which Sloterdijk’s essayistic approach can be interpreted to neutralise these metaphysical commitments.
Thus, modern philosophy is understood to appear in two variations. The first is that of Cartesian metaphysics, and can be conceived, in a somehow simplified way, in terms of a triple thesis involving a sharp distinction between mind and world, a relation of representation between the two, and the grounding of this relation in an ahistorical subject. The second variation is that of Hegelian metaphysics, and despite the fact that it constitutes a critique of the Cartesian viewpoint, it shares with the latter the same metaphysical structure. Put in an equally simplified way, subject and world are replaced by a series of successive discourses produced by history. The fact that history is governed by ahistorical reason indicates that the Hegelian viewpoint can be seen as the replacement of one set of metaphysical categories with another.
According to this approach, both branches of analytic and continental philosophy, however defined and under whatever form of inquiry they appear, suggesting either an ahistorical conception of subject as condition of possibility of human experience, or an ahistorical conception of reason as condition of understanding of historical reality, belong to the same metaphysical tradition. Thus, Rorty’s pragmatist stance can be seen to overcome the analytic-continental split through the critique of both branches as metaphysical.
The present paper approaches this issue in a twofold way. First, I analyse Rorty’s thought. I attempt to show the way in which it constitutes a historicist nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance, and a critical discourse that can undermine and overcome philosophy traditionally conceived. Second, I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of this stance, and attempt to show in which way representative, contemporary, metaphilosophical approaches that argue for an (even minimal) idea of progress in philosophy are undermined as metaphysical. Specifically, I focus on Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea of the possibility of rational choice between rival philosophical paradigms, and argue that his idea that incommensurability does not preclude comparability is underpinned by specific metaphysical realist commitments concerning meaning and reference. Rorty’s idea of philosophy as either conversation or Geistesgeschichte provides the diagnosis and therapy of this metaphilosophical picture.
This paper shows how the psychological and psychiatric constitution of the concept of individual abnormality is combined with the biological constitution of the concept of population, and its medicalisation and regularisation, forming, thus, the conditions of possibility of racism. Furthermore, the paper presents the critical impact of the above investigations to contemporary political theory conceived as a form of governing rationality. Finally, it shows how these concrete analyses formulate and enrich Foucault’s Nietzschean methodological premises.
In Foucault’s exegesis of Nietzschean genealogy in his 1971 essay “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire”, genealogy as the historical recording of different, dispersed and singular events is conceived as opposed to and critical of the metahistorical essentialist and teleological metaphysics. In his series of lectures «Il faut défendre la société», “Society must be defended”, at the Collège de France (1975–1976), Foucault seems to elaborate further on the methodology of genealogical investigation in order for it to be used in the context of his own historical inquiries. The diagnostic criterion of genealogy is now rendered in terms of political power-effect and the critical function of genealogy is orientated in a concrete way towards specific discursive formations. These considerations inform Foucault’s analytical tools. The theoretical model of sovereignty is critically replaced from a different conception of power as a dynamic nexus of forces which forms and permeates the whole social body. According to this conception, power constitutes the condition of production of discourses of knowledge, while, in turn, the produced systems of truth enhance and extend power.
This paper examines the coherence of Foucault’s reception of the concept of genealogy, the justification of the genealogical project in political terms and the extent to which genealogy can be conceived in terms of an internalist critique. It focuses on the example of Foucault’s own genealogy as critique of fundamental psychological concepts, as undertaken in his Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976). Specifically, the Foucauldian genealogy shows how certain identified ensembles of knowledge are characterised by the threefold process of the implantation of a sexual attribution, the acknowledgement of a pathological parameter, and their placement in the nexus of social relations, which takes place in a series of historical instances. The paper reconstructs and explains, with reference to the above methodological considerations, the way this genealogy functions, and gestures towards a reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy in the light of Foucault’s reception.
However, two possible difficulties could emerge. The first possible difficulty is twofold and it concerns the philosophical character of the individualist art of living. On the one hand, the engagement of the artist of living with a set of already formulated philosophical problems seems to compromise the individualist aspect of the enterprise. On the other hand, the self-referential aspect of the art of living could be considered to test the limits of its philosophical character. The second possible difficulty concerns the aestheticist character of the individualist art of living. The primacy of the aesthetic aspect over the epistemic and the moral could lead to counter-intuitive and self-refuting conclusions.
The paper constitutes an examination of these issues. The discussion of Richard Rorty’s approach to the construction of a philosophical life, and specifically both his attempt to reconcile the romantic urge of self-fashioning with moral intuitions, and his mapping of the philosophical discourse, enable the elucidation of Nehamas’ premises and the enrichment of his analysis, resolving thus the issues raised. Furthermore, Rorty’s views on truth accommodate Nehamas’ views on the matter, providing the grid for a more formal conceptualisation of the latter’s insights. Thus, these two complementary approaches can be considered to provide a metaphilosophical framework for approaching the philosophers of the art of living and similar instances of literary philosophy.
Courses by Manolis Simos
Το μάθημα αποτελεί εισαγωγή στη φιλοσοφική εξέταση της τεχνολογίας. Εξετάζονται τοποθετήσεις σε δύο θεμελιώδη ερωτήματα· στο ερώτημα της εγγενούς ή μη ουδετερότητας των υλικών διατάξεων, και στο ερώτημα της αναπόφευκτης εξέλιξης της τεχνολογίας, ή της ιστορικά ενδεχομενικής συγκρότησής της. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό διερευνάται μια σειρά προσεγγίσεων. Εξετάζονται κατασκευασιοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες κοινωνικές δεσμεύσεις φαίνεται να είναι καθοριστικές για την υιοθέτηση συγκεκριμένων τεχνολογιών. Εξετάζεται η κριτική στη μεταφυσική διάκριση μεταξύ υποκειμένου και αντικειμένου, από ανθρωπολογικές προσεγγίσεις. Εξετάζονται υστεροφαινομενολογικές προσεγγίσεις και, συγκεκριμένα, τα θέματα της συγκροτητικής διαμεσολάβησης της τεχνολογίας στην αντίληψη του κόσμου, και της δυνατότητας συνδιαμόρφωσης ανθρώπου και τεχνολογίας.
Η κοινωνική κατασκευασιοκρατία μπορεί να κατανοηθεί, σε γενικές γραμμές, ως η ιδέα ότι τα πράγματα ή μέρος των πραγμάτων του φυσικού κόσμου είτε καθορίζονται αιτιακά από κοινωνικούς παράγοντες, είτε συγκροτούνται από αυτούς. Με άλλα λόγια, σύμφωνα με την ιδέα αυτή, οι περιγραφές του φυσικού κόσμου αποτελούν κι αυτές κατασκευές του λιγότερο ή περισσότερο ευρύτερου κοινωνικού πλαισίου εντός του οποίου διατυπώνονται.
Η ιδέα αυτή έχει συνέπειες για την αντίληψη που έχουμε για το πως είναι ο κόσμος (οντολογία), καθώς και για τη γνωστική μας σχέση με αυτόν (γνωσιολογία). Συγκεκριμένα, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται, η ύπαρξη πραγμάτων και γεγονότων μεταφυσικά ανεξάρτητων από το υποκείμενο της επιστημονικής γνώσης (αντιρεαλισμός). Επίσης, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας ως ανιστορικής γνωστικής λειτουργίας· αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας η οποία εγγυάται την ορθότητα και την αλήθεια των αναπαραστάσεών μας για τον φυσικό κόσμο καθοριζόμενη, σχεδόν αποκλειστικά, από αυτόν, ανεξάρτητη από τα πολιτισμικά συμφραζόμενα εντός των οποίων λειτουργεί.
Αναλυτικότερα, εξετάζονται η ιστορία, οι κριτικοί στόχοι, και το περιεχόμενο των κατασκευαστικών προσεγγίσεων τόσο στην αναλυτική όσο και στην ηπειρωτική παράδοση της ιστορίας και φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας. Συγκεκριμένα, τα μάθημα εστιάζει σε κοινωνιολογικές, ανθρωπολογικές και ιστορικές-γενεαλογικές προσεγγίσεις.
In this paper, I focus on Auguste de Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s last novel “L’Ève future” (1886) and his shorter contes that involve the constitutive presence of scientific ideas and technological configurations, like “Le secret de l’ancienne musique” (1878) and “Le secret de l’échafaud” (1883). Characteristically, in his novel, the inventor Thomas Edison appears to attempt to cure his friend’s, Lord Ewald’s, love for the singer Alicia Clary—whose uncanny disjunction between her beauty and her personality has haunted Ewald—by creating an automaton in which the physical appearance of Alicia would be combined with a matching intellect. In this context, Villiers’ imagery seems to meet Peter Sloterdijk’s insights. According to Sloterdijk, the constitutively efficient machine is the—always having been needed—extension of the constitutively imperfect human body. To the extent that the history of modernity can be conceived as a history of narcissistic traumas, of displacements of man’s privileged position in nature, the first three well-known traumas—Copernican heliocentrism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian unconscious—presuppose the conceptualization of the human in terms of machine.
In this paper, I explore a series of interrelated themes. First, I investigate whether this mechanized view of the self is embraced or approached critically, and the way the overcoming of the mind-body dualism is instantiated. Second, I explore the way in which unconscious elements appear irreducible to corporal and mechanical aspects of the self. Third, most importantly, I show that Villiers can be understood to pre-empt and be critical of a metaphysical, that is, ahistorical and hypostatised, conception of the unconscious. Namely, focusing on Villiers’ critique of technoscientific reductionism, and the narrative tropes he employs, I argue for a pragmatist version of an unconscious structure. I explore the extent to which Villiers can be understood to belong to the pragmatist tradition, in accordance with Richard Rorty’s conception of a mechanized qua demetaphysicalized self in which the unconscious is conceived as “an alternative set” of beliefs and desires, a kind of “conversational partner” that enables ethical “self-enrichment”.
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
Michel Foucault’s later work of a genealogy of the self can be considered a therapeutic response to the above diagnosis. In the context of his genealogical investigation, Foucault focuses on the ancient, classical and Hellenistic, philosophy, and analysing the interrelated notions and practices of the ‘art of living’ (technê tou biou), of ‘care for the self’ (epimeleia eautou) and of ‘spiritual exercises’, develops the interpretative concept of an aesthetics of existence. This concept indicates that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to the aforementioned conceptualisation of morality: it is not universalist—that is, it does not prescribe a moral code or duty to be followed by everybody; and it is not metaphysical—that is, it is not grounded in an ahistorical structure of the subject. In contrast, he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one’s life into a work of art.
In the context of this paper, I will address the following issues.
(1) I will attempt to explicate Foucault’s notion, show that it should be understood as a nominalist and contextualist stance, and argue for its timeliness as a valid philosophical alternative.
(2) I will attempt to illustrate the above and, particularly, the idea of the constitution of subjectivity with reference to Gabriele D’Annunzio’s Pleasure (Il Piacere).
A critical discussion of Sloterdijk’s schema is attempted. First, I show in which way Sloterdijk adopts an essentialist philosophy of technology, conceiving technology as metaphysically autonomous. Specifically, I argue that his conception of technology can be understood in terms of Ian Hacking’s ‘styles of scientific reasoning’, and his essentialism in terms of inevitabilism. Second, in light of the above, I show that Sloterdijk’s inevitabilism is grounded in a specific conception of Hegel’s notion of struggle for recognition. Third, I present, from a Nietzschean and pragmatist perspective, the reasons why such a metaphysical stance is problematic, and explore the way in which Sloterdijk’s essayistic approach can be interpreted to neutralise these metaphysical commitments.
Thus, modern philosophy is understood to appear in two variations. The first is that of Cartesian metaphysics, and can be conceived, in a somehow simplified way, in terms of a triple thesis involving a sharp distinction between mind and world, a relation of representation between the two, and the grounding of this relation in an ahistorical subject. The second variation is that of Hegelian metaphysics, and despite the fact that it constitutes a critique of the Cartesian viewpoint, it shares with the latter the same metaphysical structure. Put in an equally simplified way, subject and world are replaced by a series of successive discourses produced by history. The fact that history is governed by ahistorical reason indicates that the Hegelian viewpoint can be seen as the replacement of one set of metaphysical categories with another.
According to this approach, both branches of analytic and continental philosophy, however defined and under whatever form of inquiry they appear, suggesting either an ahistorical conception of subject as condition of possibility of human experience, or an ahistorical conception of reason as condition of understanding of historical reality, belong to the same metaphysical tradition. Thus, Rorty’s pragmatist stance can be seen to overcome the analytic-continental split through the critique of both branches as metaphysical.
The present paper approaches this issue in a twofold way. First, I analyse Rorty’s thought. I attempt to show the way in which it constitutes a historicist nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance, and a critical discourse that can undermine and overcome philosophy traditionally conceived. Second, I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of this stance, and attempt to show in which way representative, contemporary, metaphilosophical approaches that argue for an (even minimal) idea of progress in philosophy are undermined as metaphysical. Specifically, I focus on Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea of the possibility of rational choice between rival philosophical paradigms, and argue that his idea that incommensurability does not preclude comparability is underpinned by specific metaphysical realist commitments concerning meaning and reference. Rorty’s idea of philosophy as either conversation or Geistesgeschichte provides the diagnosis and therapy of this metaphilosophical picture.
This paper shows how the psychological and psychiatric constitution of the concept of individual abnormality is combined with the biological constitution of the concept of population, and its medicalisation and regularisation, forming, thus, the conditions of possibility of racism. Furthermore, the paper presents the critical impact of the above investigations to contemporary political theory conceived as a form of governing rationality. Finally, it shows how these concrete analyses formulate and enrich Foucault’s Nietzschean methodological premises.
In Foucault’s exegesis of Nietzschean genealogy in his 1971 essay “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire”, genealogy as the historical recording of different, dispersed and singular events is conceived as opposed to and critical of the metahistorical essentialist and teleological metaphysics. In his series of lectures «Il faut défendre la société», “Society must be defended”, at the Collège de France (1975–1976), Foucault seems to elaborate further on the methodology of genealogical investigation in order for it to be used in the context of his own historical inquiries. The diagnostic criterion of genealogy is now rendered in terms of political power-effect and the critical function of genealogy is orientated in a concrete way towards specific discursive formations. These considerations inform Foucault’s analytical tools. The theoretical model of sovereignty is critically replaced from a different conception of power as a dynamic nexus of forces which forms and permeates the whole social body. According to this conception, power constitutes the condition of production of discourses of knowledge, while, in turn, the produced systems of truth enhance and extend power.
This paper examines the coherence of Foucault’s reception of the concept of genealogy, the justification of the genealogical project in political terms and the extent to which genealogy can be conceived in terms of an internalist critique. It focuses on the example of Foucault’s own genealogy as critique of fundamental psychological concepts, as undertaken in his Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976). Specifically, the Foucauldian genealogy shows how certain identified ensembles of knowledge are characterised by the threefold process of the implantation of a sexual attribution, the acknowledgement of a pathological parameter, and their placement in the nexus of social relations, which takes place in a series of historical instances. The paper reconstructs and explains, with reference to the above methodological considerations, the way this genealogy functions, and gestures towards a reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy in the light of Foucault’s reception.
However, two possible difficulties could emerge. The first possible difficulty is twofold and it concerns the philosophical character of the individualist art of living. On the one hand, the engagement of the artist of living with a set of already formulated philosophical problems seems to compromise the individualist aspect of the enterprise. On the other hand, the self-referential aspect of the art of living could be considered to test the limits of its philosophical character. The second possible difficulty concerns the aestheticist character of the individualist art of living. The primacy of the aesthetic aspect over the epistemic and the moral could lead to counter-intuitive and self-refuting conclusions.
The paper constitutes an examination of these issues. The discussion of Richard Rorty’s approach to the construction of a philosophical life, and specifically both his attempt to reconcile the romantic urge of self-fashioning with moral intuitions, and his mapping of the philosophical discourse, enable the elucidation of Nehamas’ premises and the enrichment of his analysis, resolving thus the issues raised. Furthermore, Rorty’s views on truth accommodate Nehamas’ views on the matter, providing the grid for a more formal conceptualisation of the latter’s insights. Thus, these two complementary approaches can be considered to provide a metaphilosophical framework for approaching the philosophers of the art of living and similar instances of literary philosophy.
Το μάθημα αποτελεί εισαγωγή στη φιλοσοφική εξέταση της τεχνολογίας. Εξετάζονται τοποθετήσεις σε δύο θεμελιώδη ερωτήματα· στο ερώτημα της εγγενούς ή μη ουδετερότητας των υλικών διατάξεων, και στο ερώτημα της αναπόφευκτης εξέλιξης της τεχνολογίας, ή της ιστορικά ενδεχομενικής συγκρότησής της. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό διερευνάται μια σειρά προσεγγίσεων. Εξετάζονται κατασκευασιοκρατικές προσεγγίσεις, σύμφωνα με τις οποίες κοινωνικές δεσμεύσεις φαίνεται να είναι καθοριστικές για την υιοθέτηση συγκεκριμένων τεχνολογιών. Εξετάζεται η κριτική στη μεταφυσική διάκριση μεταξύ υποκειμένου και αντικειμένου, από ανθρωπολογικές προσεγγίσεις. Εξετάζονται υστεροφαινομενολογικές προσεγγίσεις και, συγκεκριμένα, τα θέματα της συγκροτητικής διαμεσολάβησης της τεχνολογίας στην αντίληψη του κόσμου, και της δυνατότητας συνδιαμόρφωσης ανθρώπου και τεχνολογίας.
Η κοινωνική κατασκευασιοκρατία μπορεί να κατανοηθεί, σε γενικές γραμμές, ως η ιδέα ότι τα πράγματα ή μέρος των πραγμάτων του φυσικού κόσμου είτε καθορίζονται αιτιακά από κοινωνικούς παράγοντες, είτε συγκροτούνται από αυτούς. Με άλλα λόγια, σύμφωνα με την ιδέα αυτή, οι περιγραφές του φυσικού κόσμου αποτελούν κι αυτές κατασκευές του λιγότερο ή περισσότερο ευρύτερου κοινωνικού πλαισίου εντός του οποίου διατυπώνονται.
Η ιδέα αυτή έχει συνέπειες για την αντίληψη που έχουμε για το πως είναι ο κόσμος (οντολογία), καθώς και για τη γνωστική μας σχέση με αυτόν (γνωσιολογία). Συγκεκριμένα, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται, η ύπαρξη πραγμάτων και γεγονότων μεταφυσικά ανεξάρτητων από το υποκείμενο της επιστημονικής γνώσης (αντιρεαλισμός). Επίσης, φαίνεται να αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας ως ανιστορικής γνωστικής λειτουργίας· αμφισβητείται μία έννοια ορθολογικότητας η οποία εγγυάται την ορθότητα και την αλήθεια των αναπαραστάσεών μας για τον φυσικό κόσμο καθοριζόμενη, σχεδόν αποκλειστικά, από αυτόν, ανεξάρτητη από τα πολιτισμικά συμφραζόμενα εντός των οποίων λειτουργεί.
Αναλυτικότερα, εξετάζονται η ιστορία, οι κριτικοί στόχοι, και το περιεχόμενο των κατασκευαστικών προσεγγίσεων τόσο στην αναλυτική όσο και στην ηπειρωτική παράδοση της ιστορίας και φιλοσοφίας της επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας. Συγκεκριμένα, τα μάθημα εστιάζει σε κοινωνιολογικές, ανθρωπολογικές και ιστορικές-γενεαλογικές προσεγγίσεις.