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A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?. (2016). Sekkat, Khalid ; Méon, Pierre-Guillaume.
In: Working Papers CEB.
RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/227827.

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  1. Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt. (2021). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; François, Abel ; Franois, Abel.
    In: ULB Institutional Repository.
    RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/314760.

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  2. Democratic transitions can attract foreign direct investment: Effect, trajectories, and the role of political risk. (2021). Lacroix, Jean ; Sekkat, Khalid ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
    In: Journal of Comparative Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:49:y:2021:i:2:p:340-357.

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  3. Key determinants of elite rivalry: theoretical insights and empirical evidence. (2018). Veiga, Francisco ; Sochirca, Elena.
    In: NIPE Working Papers.
    RePEc:nip:nipewp:02/2018.

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  4. Do democratic transitions attract foreign investors and how fast?. (2017). Sekkat, Khalid ; Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Lacroix, Jean.
    In: Working Papers CEB.
    RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/246943.

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  5. Democratization and the conditional dynamics of income distribution. (2016). Maarek, Paul ; Dorsch, Michael .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01350968.

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    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-544.

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  49. Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure. (2002). Knack, Stephen ; Keefer, Philip.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2910.

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  50. The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution. (2002). Pezzini, Silvia ; MacCulloch, Robert.
    In: STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stidep:36.

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