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Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency. (2018). Roberti, Paolo ; immordino, giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore.
In: CSEF Working Papers.
RePEc:sef:csefwp:519.

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Cocites

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  2. What happens in criminal firms after godfather management removal? Judicial administration and firms’ performance. (2022). Calamunci, Francesca M.
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  3. Optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime. (2020). immordino, giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore ; Roberti, Paolo.
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  4. Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources. (2019). Mastrorocco, Nicola.
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  5. Criminal Networks, Market Externalities and Optimal Leniency. (2018). Roberti, Paolo ; immordino, giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore.
    In: CSEF Working Papers.
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  6. Optimal Leniency and the Organization Design of Group Delinquency. (2018). Roberti, Paolo ; immordino, giovanni ; Piccolo, Salvatore ; Karako-Palminteri, Gulen .
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