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Dealing with Time-inconsistency: Inflation Targeting vs. Exchange Rate Targeting. (2017). Fujiwara, Ippei ; Davis, Jonathan.
In: 2017 Meeting Papers.
RePEc:red:sed017:795.

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  1. Policy Time-Inconsistency: A Comparison of Managed Floating Exchange Rate and Controlled Exchange Rate Regimes. (2016). Rasekhi, Saeed ; Rastgar, Majid.
    In: Journal of Money and Economy.
    RePEc:mbr:jmonec:v:11:y:2016:i:4:p:351-373.

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