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Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access. (2007). Cotton, Christopher.
In: MPRA Paper.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:1842.

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  1. Access Fees in Politics. (2008). Cotton, Christopher.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mia:wpaper:0903.

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References

References cited by this document

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