Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College. (2007). Petropoulou, Dimitra ; Muûls, Mirabelle ; Muuls, Mirabelle .
In: Economics Series Working Papers.
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:372.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 1

Citations received by this document

Cites: 36

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY. (2012). Olarreaga, Marcelo ; Krishna, Pravin ; gawande, kishore.
    In: International Economic Review.
    RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:1:p:115-132.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. [1] Baldwin, R. (1985), The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. [10] Cox, G. W. and Munger, M. C. (1989), Closeness and Turnout: a Methodological Note, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 768-775
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  3. [11] Corden, W (1974), Trade Policy and Welfare, Oxford: Oxford University Press
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  4. [12] Eicher, T. and T. Osang (2002) Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: A Comment, American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1702-1711

  5. [13] Gawande, K. (1998), Comparing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 128-140

  6. [14] Gawande, K. and U. Bandyopadhyay (2002), Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 139-152

  7. [15] Geys, B. (2006), Explaining Voter Turnout: a Review of Aggregate-Level Research, Electoral Studies, Vol. 25, No.4, pp. 637-663
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  8. [16] Goldberg, P. K. and G. Maggi (1999), Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, Vol. 89 , No. 5, pp.1135-1155

  9. [17] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 833-850

  10. [18] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1996), Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, Review of Economic Studies, Vol.63, No. 2, pp. 265-286 35

  11. [19] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2001), Special Interest Politics, Cambridge, The MIT Press
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  12. [2] Barro, R.(1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice, Vol.14, No. 1, pp. 19-42

  13. [20] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2002), Interest Groups and Trade Policy, Princeton, Princeton University Press
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  14. [21] Hansen, W. L. (1990), The International Trade Commission and The Politics of Protectionism, American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 21-46

  15. [22] Helpman, E.(1997), Politics and Trade Policy, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, David Kreps and Kenneth Wallis (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press

  16. [24] Lee, J-W. and P. Swagel (1997), Trade Barriers and Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 372-382

  17. [25] List, J. and D. Sturm (2006), How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 4, pp. 1249-1281

  18. [26] Matsusaka, J. G. (1993), Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions, Public Choice, Vol. 76, No. 4 pp.313334

  19. [27] Mayer, W. (1984), Endogenous Tariff Formation, American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 970-985

  20. [28] Mitra, D. (1999), Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, pp. 1116-1134

  21. [29] Olson, M. (1971), The Logic of Collective Action: Public goods and the theory of groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  22. [3] Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002), The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.117, No.4, pp. 1415-1451 34

  23. [30] Pincus, J. (1975), Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 757-778

  24. [31] Roelfsema, H. (2004), Political Institutions and Trade Protection, Utrecht School of Economics, Discussion Paper Series nr: 04-06

  25. [32] Shiells, C. R, R. M. Stern and A. V. Deardorff (1986), Estimates of the Elasticities of Substitution between Imports and Home Goods for the United States, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 122, No. 3, pp. 497-519 36

  26. [33] Stromberg, D. (2005), How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Prohahihty of Being Florida, TIES, Stockholm University, mimeo
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  27. [34] Trefler, D.(1993), Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp.138-160

  28. [35] Wiberg, M. (2005), Endogenous Tariff Formation and the Political Economic of Retaliation, Liberalization and Trade Wars under Representative Democracy, Stockholm University, mimeo
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  29. [36] Willmann, G.(2003), Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs, Kid Working Paper 2003-10

  30. [37] Yang, C. (1995), Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model, American Economic Review, Vol.85, No. 4, pp.956-963

  31. [4] Besley, T. and A. Case (1995), Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Term Limits, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 769-798

  32. [5] Bombardini, M. (2005), Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation, University of British Columbia, mimeo

  33. [6] Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, http://www.bls.gov/cew/home.htm, 1983
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  34. [7] Busch, M. and E. Reinhart (1999), Industrial Protection and Location, The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 1028-1050
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  35. [8] Caves, R. (1976), Economic Models of Political Choice: Canadas Tariff Structure, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 278-300

  36. [9] Coate, S. and S. Morris, (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.103, No. 6, pp. 1210 - 1235

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Heterogeneous information and trade policy. (2011). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:1296.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?. (2011). Mayda, Anna Maria ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:85:y:2011:i:1:p:114-128.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy. (2011). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8726.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Would Global Patent Protection be too Weak without International Coordination?. (2011). Yan, Kit Ming ; Lai, Edwin ; Edwin L.-C. Lai, ; Isabel K.-M. Yan, ; Edwin L.-C. Lai, .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3509.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy. (2011). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:596.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Asymmetric information and trade policy. (2010). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:1253.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions. (2010). Mayda, Anna Maria ; Ludema, Rodney ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7926.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Asymmetric Information and Trade Policy. (2010). Ponzetto, Giacomo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:514.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Skilled migration and education policies: Is there still scope for a Bhagwati tax?. (2009). Scalera, Domenico.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:19643.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade. (2009). Olarreaga, Marcelo ; Krishna, Pravin ; gawande, kishore.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14953.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Do Interest Groups affect US Immigration Policy?. (2009). Mayda, Anna Maria ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: CReAM Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:crm:wpaper:0904.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Lobbying competition over trade policy. (2009). Olarreaga, Marcelo ; Krishna, Pravin ; gawande, kishore.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale. (2009). Farvaque, Etienne ; Lagadec, Gael.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2522.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems. (2008). Minier, Jenny ; Matschke, Xenia ; Fredriksson, Per.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-20.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research. (2008). Krishna, Kala ; Katayama, Hajime ; Imai, Susumu.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13899.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?. (2008). Facchini, Giovanni ; Mayda, Anna Maria ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/244.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation. (2008). Bombardini, Matilde.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:75:y:2008:i:2:p:329-348.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries. (2008). Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:74:y:2008:i:1:p:143-157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?. (2008). Mayda, Anna Maria ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6898.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College. (2008). Petropoulou, Dimitra ; Muûls, Mirabelle ; Muuls, Mirabelle .
    In: CEP Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0849.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation. (2007). Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2006-12.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries. (2007). Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-28.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research. (2007). Krishna, Kala ; Katayama, Hajime ; Imai, Susumu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qed:wpaper:1151.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College. (2007). Petropoulou, Dimitra ; Muûls, Mirabelle ; Muuls, Mirabelle .
    In: Economics Series Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:wpaper:372.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?. (2007). Mayda, Anna Maria ; Facchini, Giovanni ; Mishra, Prachi.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3183.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Market access for sale. (2007). Silva, Peri ; Olarreaga, Marcelo ; Kee, Hiau Looi.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:82:y:2007:i:1:p:79-94.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States. (2006). Hoekman, Bernard ; gawande, kishore.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3819.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?. (2006). Krishna, Kala ; Katayama, Hajime ; Imai, Susumu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qed:wpaper:1114.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?. (2006). Krishna, Kala ; Katayama, Hajime ; Imai, Susumu.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12258.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Are antidumping duties for sale? case-level evidence on the Grossman-Helpman protection for sale model. (2006). Sherlund, Shane ; Evans, Carolyn.
    In: International Finance Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedgif:888.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Protection for Sale Under Monopolistic Competition : An Empirical Investigation. (2006). Lee, Myoung-jae ; Chang, Pao-Li.
    In: Microeconomics Working Papers.
    RePEc:eab:microe:22061.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States. (2006). Hoekman, Bernard ; gawande, kishore.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5634.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation. (2006). Sherlund, Shane ; Matschke, Xenia.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:1:p:405-421.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Trade Barriers As Bargaining Outcomes. (2005). gawande, kishore ; Li, Hui.
    In: International Trade.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0505002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches. (2005). Krishna, Pravin ; gawande, kishore.
    In: International Trade.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0503003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation. (2005). Sherlund, Shane ; Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-36.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2005). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11269.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: Evidence from Brazil. (2005). Ferreira, Pedro ; Facchini, Giovanni.
    In: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:45:y:2005:i:2-3:p:432-446.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Protection for sale under monopolistic competition. (2005). Chang, Pao-Li.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:66:y:2005:i:2:p:509-526.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Trade, foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals. (2005). Kang, Jong Woo ; Eicher, Theo.
    In: Journal of Development Economics.
    RePEc:eee:deveco:v:77:y:2005:i:1:p:207-228.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2005). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
    In: Development Working Papers.
    RePEc:csl:devewp:207.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries. (2005). Matschke, Xenia.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1502.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry. (2004). Duso, Tomaso ; Jung, Astrid .
    In: Vienna Economics Papers.
    RePEc:vie:viennp:0402.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy. (2004). Sturm, Daniel ; list, john.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10609.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment or Acquisition: Optimal Entry Modes for Multinationals. (2004). Kang, Jong Woo ; Eicher, Theo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1174.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing. (2003). Willmann, Gerald ; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ; Facchini, Giovanni.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cauewp:1546.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry. (2003). Duso, Tomaso ; Jung, Astrid .
    In: CIG Working Papers.
    RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. DO LABOR ISSUES MATTER IN THE DETERMINATION OF U.S. TRADE POLICY? AN EMPIRICAL REEVALUATION. (2003). Sherlund, Shane ; Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt82k4x4f5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. DO LABOR ISSUES MATTER IN THE DETERMINATION OF U.S. TRADE POLICY? AN EMPIRICAL REEVALUATION. (2003). Sherlund, Shane ; Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt0sn637k8.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. DO LABOR ISSUES MATTER IN THE DETERMINATION OF U.S. TRADE POLICY? AN EMPIRICAL REEVALUATION. (2003). Sherlund, Shane ; Matschke, Xenia.
    In: Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:scciec:qt82k4x4f5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-02-26 23:17:09 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.