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Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule. (2014). Miller, Stephen ; Yuan, Huiping .
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:nlv:wpaper:1401.

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Rediscovering Economic Policy in Europe?. (2022). Acocella, Nicola.
    In: Review of Economics and Institutions.
    RePEc:pia:review:v:13:y:2022:i:1-2:n:1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. “Whatever it takes”: A plea for active monetary policies. (2021). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Messori, Marcello ; Canofari, Paolo.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:208:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003372.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule. (2014). Miller, Stephen ; Yuan, Huiping .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:nlv:wpaper:1401.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule. (2013). Yuan, Huiping ; Miller, Stephen.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2013-35.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. When Can Policy Makers Anchor Expectations? Dynamic controllability and the limits to time inconsistency. (2013). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Marco, Di Pietro .
    In: wp.comunite.
    RePEc:ter:wpaper:0104.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Expectations Dynamics: Policy, Announcements and Limits to Dynamic Inconsistency. (2012). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics.
    RePEc:bpj:sndecm:v:16:y:2012:i:2:n:3.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. The Optimality and Controllability of Discretionary Monetary Policy. (2011). Yuan, Huiping ; Miller, Stephen.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-17.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games. (2011). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:32-34.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. THE OPTIMALITY AND CONTROLLABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY THROUGH DELEGATION WITH CONSISTENT TARGETS. (2011). Yuan, Huiping ; Miller, Stephen ; Chen, Langnan.
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:58:y:2011:i:1:p:82-106.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision. (2010). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella ; Giovanni, Di Bartolomeo .
    In: Politica economica.
    RePEc:mul:je8794:doi:10.1429/33588:y:2010:i:3:p:389-408.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. (2010). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:32:y:2010:i:1:p:55-67.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games. (2009). Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella ; Giovanni, Piacquadio Paolo .
    In: wp.comunite.
    RePEc:ter:wpaper:0054.

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  13. Economic policy when models disagree. (2009). Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard ; Desgagne, Bernard Sinclair ; Barrieu, Pauline .
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:37607.

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  14. Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games. (2009). Piacquadio, Paolo Giovanni ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:303-305.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. (2008). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella .
    In: wp.comunite.
    RePEc:ter:wpaper:0034.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. The Emerging New Theory of Economic Policy. (2008). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Economia Internazionale / International Economics.
    RePEc:ris:ecoint:0023.

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  17. When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability. (2008). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7078.

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  18. Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation. (2007). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella .
    In: wp.comunite.
    RePEc:ter:wpaper:0020.

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  19. Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation. (2007). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:4419.

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  20. Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited. (2006). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Computational Economics.
    RePEc:kap:compec:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:91-112.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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