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STEPHENS, MELVIN. 2001. The long-run consumption effects of earnings shocks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (1), 28–36. Online Appendix A A.1. Additional figures and tables Full schedule of UI benefits in Brazil. The UI benefit level depends on a displaced formal worker’s average wage in the three months prior to layoff and ranges from 100% to 187% of the minimum wage. Define w the displaced formal worker’s average nominal wage in the three months prior to layoff expressed in multiples of the prevailing minimum wage (mw). Her UI benefit level (b) is then calculated as follows: • b = mw if w < 1.25 • b = .8 w if 1.25 ≤ w < 1.65 • b = 1.32 mw + .5 w if 1.65 ≤ w < 2.75 • b = 1.87 mw if w ≥ 2.75