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Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11402.

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  1. Kidney black markets and legal transplants: Are they opposite sides of the same coin?. (2010). Mendoza, Roger.
    In: Health Policy.
    RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:94:y:2010:i:3:p:255-265.

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  2. CADAVERIC VS. LIVE-DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: THE INTERACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY. (2005). Caglayan, Mustafa ; Anbarci, Nejat.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gla:glaewp:2005_25.

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References

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Cocites

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  2. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. (2012). Troyan, Peter.
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  4. Robust stability in matching markets. (2011). Kojima, Fuhito.
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  5. On Integration Policies and Schooling. (2011). Subiza, Begoña ; Alcalde, Jose.
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  6. Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion. (2010). Rothblum, Uriel ; Perach, Nitsan.
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  7. Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets. (2010). AFACAN, MUSTAFA.
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  8. Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms. (2010). Kojima, Fuhito.
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  10. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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  12. Constrained school choice. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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  13. Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2009). Kojima, Fuhito ; Hatfield, John William .
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  14. If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Grosskopf, Brit.
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  19. On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles. (2008). Oviedo, Jorge ; Neme, Alejandro ; Masso, Jordi ; Martínez Valenzuela, Ruth ; Martinez, Ruth .
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  23. Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets. (2008). Boudreau, James.
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  25. Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences. (2007). Knoblauch, Vicki ; Celik, Onur.
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  44. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  45. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. (2005). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
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