Alberti, Federica, and Edward J. Cartwright. Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods. Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 (2012): 063.
Asch, Peter, Gary A. Gigliotti, and James A. Polito. Free riding with discrete and continuous public goods: some experimental evidence. Public Choice 77, no. 2 (1993): 293305.
- Au, Winton. Criticality and Environmental Uncertainty in Step-Level Public Goods Dilemmas. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 8, no. 1 (2004): 40.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Barrett, Scott, and Astrid Dannenberg. Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 43 (2012): 1737217376.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Bartling, Björn, and Urs Fischbacher. Shifting the blame: On delegation and responsibility. The Review of Economic Studies 79, no. 1 (2012): 67-87.
Blount, Sally. When Social Outcomes Aren′t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences. Organizational behavior and human decision processes 63, no. 2 (1995): 131144.
Brandts, Jordi, and David J. Cooper. It's what you say, not what you pay: an experimental study of managerâ€employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. Journal of the European Economic Association 5, no. 6 (2007): 1223-1268.
- Brandts, Jordi, David Cooper, and Roberto Weber. Legitimacy, social distance, and leadership in the turnaround game. Management Science, online first (2014).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cadsby, Charles Bram, and Elizabeth Maynes. Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence. Journal of Public Economics 71, no. 1 (1999): 53-73.
Charness, Gary, and Matthew O. Jackson. Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. Journal of Economic Theory 136, no. 1, (2007): 417-445. Charness, Gary, and Matthew O. Jackson. The role of responsibility in strategic risktaking.
Charness, Gary. “Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market.†Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, (2000): 375-384.
Chaudhuri, Ananish, and Tirnud Paichayontvijit. Recommended play and performance bonuses in the minimum effort coordination game. Experimental Economics 13.3 (2010): 346-363.
Czap, Hans J., and Natalia V. Czap. Donating-selling tradeoffs and the influence of leaders in the environmental goods game. The Journal of Socio-Economics 40, no. 6 (2011): 743-752.
Dannenberg, Astrid, Andreas Löschel, Gabriele Paolacci, Christiane Reif, and Alessandro Tavoni. On the provision of public goods with probabilistic and ambiguous thresholds. Environmental and Resource Economics, online first (2014).
Dawes, Robyn M., John M. Orbell, Randy T. Simmons, and Alphons JC Van De Kragt. Organizing groups for collective action. The American Political Science Review (1986): 1171-1185.
- Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, Paul C. Stern (2003) The struggle to govern the commons. Science 362:1907-1912.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Eichberger, J., Kelsey, D., Schipper, B., (2008). “Granny versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games.†Theory and Decision 64 (2008): 333-362.
Falk, Armin, and Michael Kosfeld. The hidden costs of control. The American Economic Review (2006): 1611-1630.
Fershtman, Chaim, and Uri Gneezy. Strategic delegation: An experiment. RAND Journal of Economics (2001): 352-368.
Fischbacher, U. and Gaechter, S. (2010), “Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments,†American Economic Review, 100, 541-556.
Fischbacher, Urs, Werner Güth, and M. Vittoria Levati. Crossing the point of no return: A public goods experiment. No. 2011, 059. Jena economic research papers, 2011.
Freytag, Andreas, Werner Güth, Hannes Koppel, and Leo Wangler. “Is regulation by milestones efficiency enhancing? An experimental study of environmental protection.†European Journal of Political Economy 33, (2014): 71-84.
Güth, Werner, M. Vittoria Levati, Matthias Sutter, and Eline Van Der Heijden. Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Public Economics 91, no. 5 (2007): 1023-1042.
Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini. Individual Behavior and Group Membership. American Economic Review 97, no.4, (2007): 1340-1352 Charness, Gary, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jimenez, Juan A. Lacomba, and Francisco Lagos. The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game. The American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (2012): 2358-2379.
- Gillet, Joris, Edward Cartwright, and Mark van Vugt. Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games. Personality and Individual Differences 51, no. 3 (2011): 231-236.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Gustafsson, Mathias, Anders Biel, and Tommy Gärling. Egoism bias in social dilemmas with resource uncertainty. Group processes & intergroup relations 3, no. 4 (2000): 351-365.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Hamman, John R., George F. Loewenstein, and Roberto A. Weber. Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship. American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (2010): 1926-46.
Hamman, John R., Roberto A. Weber, and Jonathan Woon. An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods. American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 4 (2011): 738-752.
Hasson, Reviva, Åsa Löfgren, and Martine Visser. Climate change in a public goods game: investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation. Ecological Economics 70, no. 2 (2010): 331-338.
Hasson, Reviva, Åsa Löfgren, and Martine Visser. Treatment effects of climate change risk on mitigation and adaptation behaviour in an experimental setting. South African Journal of Economics 80, no. 3 (2012): 415-430.
- Holton, P.F. Ruffin, J. Thibaut. “Individual-group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact.†Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23, (1987): 250–267.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Huck Steffen, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann. “Strategic delegation in experimental marketsâ€. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 4 (2004): 561574 Insko, C.A., R.L. Pinkley, R.H Hoyle, B. Dalton, G. Hong, R. Slim, P. Landry, B.
Köszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. “A model of reference-dependent preferences.†Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 4 (2006): 1133-1166.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.†Econometrica 47, no. 2, (1979): 263-292.
Komai, Mana, and Philip J. Grossman. Leadership and group size: An experiment. Economics Letters 105, no. 1 (2009): 20-22.
Komai, Mana, Philip J. Grossman, and Travis Deters. Leadership and information in a singleâ€shot collective action game: An experimental study. Managerial and Decision Economics 32, no. 2 (2011): 119-134.
Kroll, Stephan, Todd L. Cherry, and Jason F. Shogren. Voting, punishment, and public goods. Economic Inquiry 45, no. 3 (2007): 557-570.
Kumru, Cagri S., and Lise Vesterlund. The effect of status on charitable giving. Journal of Public Economic Theory 12, no. 4 (2010): 709-735.
Levati, M. Vittoria, Matthias Sutter, and Eline van der Heijden, Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51:5 (2007): 793-818.
Levy, David M., Kail Padgitt, Sandra J. Peart, Daniel Houser, and Erte Xiao. Leadership, cheap talk and really cheap talk. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 77, no. 1 (2011): 40-52.
Loomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. “Regret Theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty.†The Economic Journal 92, no. 368 (1982): 805-824.
McBride, Michael. Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study. Economics of governance 11, no. 1 (2010): 77-99.
Meidinger, Claude, and Marie Claire Villeval. “Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating?†Working Paper du GATE 2002-13. (2002).
- Milinski, Manfred, Ralf D. Sommerfeld, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, Floyd A. Reed, and Jochem Marotzke. The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no. 7 (2008): 2291-2294 Moxnes, Erling, and Eline Van der Heijden. The effect of leadership in a public bad experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 6 (2003): 773-795.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Nash, John F., Rosemarie Nagel, Axel Ockenfels, and Reinhard Selten. The agencies method for coalition formation in experimental games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 50 (2012): 20358-20363.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Potters, Jan, Martin Sefton, and Lise Vesterlund. After you—endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games. Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 8 (2005): 1399-1419.
Potters, Jan, Martin Sefton, and Lise Vesterlund. Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study. Economic Theory 33, no. 1 (2007): 169-182.
- Rivas, M. Fernanda, and Matthias Sutter. Leadership, reward and punishment in sequential public goods experiments in Reward and punishment in social dilemmas. Oxford University Press. Edited by P.A.M. Van Lange, B. Rockenbach, and T. Yamagishi. (2014).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Song, Fei. “Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individual versus group-representatives.†Games and Economic Behavior 62, (2008): 675-696.
Suleiman, Ramzi, David V. Budescu, and Amnon Rapoport. Provision of step-level public goods with uncertain provision threshold and continuous contribution. Group Decision and Negotiation 10, no. 3 (2001): 253-274.
Tavoni, Alessandro, and Simon Levin. 2014. ‘Managing the Climate Commons at the Nexus of Ecology, Behaviour and Economics’. Nature Climate Change 4 (12): 1057–63.
Tavoni, Alessandro, Astrid Dannenberg, Giorgos Kallis, and Andreas Löschel. Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 108 (2011): 11825-11829.
- Van Dijk, Eric, Henk Wilke, Marieke Wilke, and Linda Metman. What information do we use in social dilemmas? Environmental uncertainty and the employment of coordination rules. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35, no. 2 (1999): 109-135.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, Andrew Herr, and Elinor Ostrom. Collective choice in the commons: Experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes. The Economic Journal 110, no. 460 (2000): 212-234.
- Wit, Arjaan, and Henk Wilke. Public good provision under environmental and social uncertainty. European Journal of Social Psychology 28, no. 2 (1998): 249-256.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now